Nathan Hancart

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Current Position	**PhD Candidate in Economics**, University College London Expected Completion: 2023	2018 – present
Fields	Primary: Microeconomic Theory Secondary: Information Economics, Behavioural Economics	
Supervisors	Prof. Ran Spiegler Prof. Vasiliki Skreta	
Prior Education	**MRes** in Economics, University College London **MSc** in Economics, University College London **BSc** in Business Engineering, Université Libre de Bruxelles	2018 2017 2016

Job Market Paper

Optimal Menus of Tests

I study the optimal design of menus of tests. Prior to taking a binary decision, accept or reject a privately informed agent, a decision-maker (DM) can perform one test from a restricted set. For example, the restriction can come from information processing or technological constraints. The DM wants to accept a subset of types whereas the agent always wants to be accepted. Instead of choosing the test himself, the DM let the agent choose a test from a menu. The choice itself then serves as an additional dimension for information revelation. I characterise when a menu is optimal and show that the DM does not benefit from committing to an action. Using this result, I characterise the optimal menu when the DM has a most informative test. I give conditions on the DM's preferences under which the DM wants or does not want to include a less informative test in the menu. I also characterise the optimal menu when types are multidimensional or when tests vary in their difficulty.

Working Paper

Managing the Expectations of Buyers with Reference-dependent Preferences,
R&R at Journal of Economic Theory

I consider a model of monopoly pricing where a risk-neutral firm makes an offer to a buyer with reference-dependent preferences. The reference point is the ex-ante probability of trade and the buyer exhibits an attachment effect: the higher his expectations to buy, the higher his willingness-to-pay. When the buyer's valuation is private information, a unique equilibrium exists where the firm plays a mixed strategy and its profits are the same as in the reference-independent benchmark. The equilibrium always entails inefficiencies: even as the firm's information converges to complete information, it mixes on a non-vanishing support and the probability of no trade is greater than zero. Finally, I show that when the firm can obtain costless signals on the buyer's valuation, it can do strictly better than in the reference-independent benchmark by leveraging the uncertainty generated by a noisy learning strategy. However, this advantage vanishes as the attachment effect grows large.

The (No) Value of Commitment,

I provide a sufficient conditions under which a principal does not benefit from commitment in general economic problems. I then apply this condition in a mechanism design setting. A designer does not benefit from being able to contract over actions when his preferences are partially aligned with the agent. Verifying the condition does not necessitate verifying explicitly that the strategy under commitment is a best-response to the information revealed in the economic problem.

Teaching	**Microeconomics** (MRes, UCL) **Advanced Microeconomic Theory** (MSc, UCL) **Economics of Information** (BSc, UCL)	2018 – present 2018 – 2020 2017 – 2019
Honors & Awards	Award for best Teaching Assistant on an MRes module, UCL	Jun 2022
	Nominated to Inspiring Teaching Delivery, Student Choice Award, UCL	Jun 2020

Referee Service	Theoretical Economics	
Professional Experience	Research assistant for Prof. Ran Spiegler	Apr 2018 – 2022
	Research assistant for Prof. Vasiliki Skreta	2019 – 2022
	Student Representative for PhD students at the Economics Department	2017 – 2022
Presentations	International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook, 2022), Brown-bag theory seminar UCL (2022, 2021), World Congress Game Theory Society (Budapest, 2021), Applied Theory Workshop (Toulouse School of Economics, 2020)	
Languages	French (Native), English (Fluent), Dutch (Basic), Hebrew (Basic)	
Software Skills	Mathematica, Matlab	