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From Science as 'Development Assistance' to 'Global Philanthropy'[1]

Hebe Vessuri

Introduction

Ever since Francis Bacon at the dawn of the modern age, science has been presented as harboring the promise of providing the solution to the most intractable problems faced by mankind and the natural world. In the course of modern history it has also been targeted as a useful tool in dealings related to the growth of "modern, independent, democratic" societies beyond the West in the post-colonial world. Different from scientific cooperation assumed to take place between relatively equal countries, from the late 19th century onwards science as development assistance compounded with philanthropy was embraced by western powers as the royal road contributing to the growth of non-western country capacities.

In this paper we reconstruct the main lines of evolution of science for development highlighting some initiatives that targeted infrastructure, health, capacity building, natural resources, international trade and competitiveness. The mounting trend of business-foundation collaboration has crystallized in the term "philanthrocapitalism", which tries to sell the idea of the philanthropic largesse and social-entrepreneurial mission of new billionaires of the 1990s as unprecedented and capable of "saving the world". The way the United Nations' platforms came to complement or be subordinated to powerful individual or country programs is briefly reviewed. So is philanthropic science, epitomized by the Rockefeller and Gates Foundations, i.e. the kind of work specifically funded by (and in control of) extremely wealthy Northern individuals. Finally we consider the increasing role of business philanthropy and charitable investment within the growth of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) models and the associated actual and symbolic role of experts and expertise, including the recent multiplication of "think tanks" and consulting work for public policies in developing countries.

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A Science for Development in the Waning Colonial Experience

At the end of the Second World War (WW2), the vast regions that constituted the colonial world became the "developing" countries or "third world." Together with Latin American countries, born of earlier decolonizations, they had to rethink the world and their place in it. "A new intellectual universe and moral community" (Cooper and Packard, 2005) grew up around the world development initiative of the post WW2 era. It carried the conviction that the alleviation of poverty would not occur simply by self-regulating processes of economic growth and social change. It required a concerted intervention by the national governments of both poor and wealthy countries in cooperation with an emerging body of international aid and development organizations. The transfer of knowledge of productive techniques has been key to the whole idea of development, accompanied with foreign aid and investment on favorable terms, health and education improvement, and economic planning.

In the waning of the colonial era in the 1930s and 1940s, the idea of development had already attracted the attention of leaders of both imperial metropolis and colonial outposts. Comparisons between different European versions of empire immediately reveal the complexity of the problem of analysis (MacLeod, 1992) both through time and space. In particular, the British and French colonial experiences of science in the Great War represented an intensification of rational method applied to statecraft and the application of rationality, exemplified in science, to imperial efficiency. In MacLeod's view, that this attitude finds acceptance from India and the white dominions to Latin America and Asia speaks to the persuasive power of the promise of science. At the same time, in the interwar period imperial markets were seen as important sources of replenishment to metropolitan economies depleted by the war. Development became the hallmark of British "constructive imperialism" in the attempts to maintain the empire itself, whatever the cost; while in France, the development project became associated with the planning ideology of the socialist left.

The French segment of the scientific community that generated knowledge and skills for developing countries, similar to their British or Dutch counterparts, was different from the one that addressed northern audiences. The ways that, through the Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), France dealt with science aimed at Northern audiences, serving the ambitions and demands of metropolitan France, differed from applied science and assistance to Southern countries in their attempt to spawn development through the Office de Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-mer (ORSTOM). Eventually this generated distinct forms of knowledge and know-how, which circulated through different international networks of communication and institutions, among semi-academic or non-academic audiences, composed mainly of Third World politicians or administrators, or Third World social and economic groups, international bureaucrats, other developed-country scientists or their counterparts in the third world (Ragouet et al., 1997; Bennett and Hodge, 2011; Boomgaard, 2013).

Even in the German case, a latecomer to imperial ventures, before WW1 a powerful stimulus for supporting overseas investments in the exact sciences was when they were combined with practical applications. German fears that to withhold support in China or Samoa would open the field to foreign competitors such as the United States emerge clearly from Pyenson's account (1985) that brings out the characteristically modern tension that German scientists already felt between the old ideal of science as an international enterprise above politics and their growing realization that government-supported science must serve political ends. Also nations like Canada (IDRC) and Sweden (SIDA-SAREC), which have no colonial heritage, after WW2 developed research agencies with alternative agendas related to development assistance.

From International to Global Governance in Development

In the decades following WW2, a dizzying array of international organizations connected to the development field were founded or revamped, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), UNICEF, FAO and UNDP, numerous international and local governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarian and advocacy movements, research institutes, private foundations, business groups, and so on. Internationalization, of course, carried with it the idea that it was between or among nations. The basic unit remained the nation, even as relations among nations became increasingly necessary and important.

In the context of internationalization, the idea of knowledge, research and action for development was paramount. As part of this complex and variegated set-up, many people from developing countries studied economics, development and applied science in universities in Europe and the United States and were hired by governmental and non-governmental organizations in their home countries, trying to apply the organizational "blueprints" defined in the North. The expansion of universities and systems of higher education in the different regions of the world has been staggering, with the explicit purpose of contributing to development and the construction of modern nations, following the patterns and models of universities in the North (Sörlin and Vessuri, 2007). Thus also began a flow of talents that has been called ‘brain-drain’ and more recently ‘international circulation of talents,’ by which the developing world made a reverse transfer to the developed world of its best scientists, produced and educated in the developing countries (Johnson & Regets, 1998; Smith & Favell, 2006; Boeri et al., 2012).

From 1946 through the early 1990s these actors were shaped by two main factors: the Cold War and the political and ideological rivalry between Western capitalism and Eastern communism; and, a corollary to this, the paradigm of economic development and modernization, perceived by Western powers as the sole path to progress for the decolonized third world (itself a key battleground of the Cold War). But as early as the 1950s it was clear that the post-war reconfiguration of world power brought few benefits to the former colonies. In 1964 the G-77 movement of non-aligned (with either the Soviets or the Americans) countries was founded to confront neocolonialism in development aid, to demand respect for sovereignty in decision-making, and to denounce unfair international trade arrangements and the lack of democracy in UN agencies. Yet this was also arguably the high point of each of these concerns.

Three decades later, for instance, the institutional landscape related to development had changed its nature, often abandoning even the ideational commitment to former goals. Instead, programs and agencies were increasingly constrained by an ideological context attacking the role of the state and favoring private sector, for-profit approaches. The case of a UN agency like the World Health Organization (WHO) is exemplary. By the 1980s, WHO had ceased to be at the heart of international health activities, as stipulated in its 1946 Constitution (Birn, 2014). Less than half of WHO’s budget came from annual dues subjected to “democratic” World Health Assembly decisions. Donors, who included a variety of private entities in addition to member countries, increasingly shifted WHO’s budget away from dues-funded activities to *a priori* assignment of funds to particular programs and approaches. In this period, the World Bank—exerting pressure under the banner of health care services and efficiency reforms and privatization—had a far larger health budget than WHO, and many bilateral agencies simply bypassed WHO in their international health activities.

This process of institutional hollowing out has continued to date. Presently almost 80% of WHO’s budget is earmarked, whereby donors designate how their “voluntary” contributions are to be spent (WHO, 2011). Since the 1990s the WHO hobbled along on public-private partnerships (Nitsan 2012) that particularly the Rockefeller Foundation had helped to innovate in order to fund its vaccine initiatives (Muraskin, quoted in Birn, 2014). Public-private partnerships have provided business interests, such as pharmaceutical corporations, with a major, arguably unjustified, role in international public health policymaking. Moreover, as these events were unfolding, international health, in which the basic unit remained the nation, was renamed ‘global health’, with the integration of many formerly national institutions in one global setting. The role of international philanthropy, i.e. the private charitable funding by a handful of global North-based and individually owned foundations, was thereby greatly inflated as against supposedly public international institutions.

The globalized economy of the present is often presented as if it no longer made sense to think of national teams of labor and capital. We witness an effective erasure of national boundaries for economic purposes in organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as they abandon internationalization and promote globalization, contrary to the interests of their member nations, and to the intent of their charter (Daly, 1999). As part of this, while a *topos* in international UN organizations is the increase of transparency, skepticism reigns about the possibility of “communicating” about subjects of great technical and political complexity (Abeles et al. 2011). However, despite globalization is being pushed hard by powerful transnational corporations, in fact it turns out to be unfettered individualism for corporations on a global scale, governed by the ideal of absolute advantage, an unexamined ideal as such.

The evolution of Philanthrocapitalism

Despite an uncertain position in the popular and political imagination, the philanthropic foundations of the early 20th century in the U.S. perceived themselves as custodians of a better world, using the fortunes amassed by entrepreneurs of industrial capitalism to create a programme of social progress (Brooks, 2015). They ‘saw their mission as not simply to heal the sick or repair the effects of conflict, but to enhance society’s ability to solve fundamental scientific and social problems’ (Fleishman, 2009). However, the foundations were often accused of using personal interests to interfere unduly in public affairs, acting as ‘*Don Quixotes in Limousines’* (Whitaker, 1974, quoted by Brooks, 2015), frequently contributing, directly or indirectly, to enhance the donors’ business and investment interests, many of them linked to industries that were highly exploitative and damaging to the environment.

Models of corporate philanthropy have been shown to see social responsibility as a sort of add-on (Kleine, 2014). Business models have proliferated in the development field. Companies operate “normally” and in pursuit of profit, and once the profits have been generated, a percentage of the gains is then reinvested in charitable causes, for example, in the communities where the

Northern consumers live or indeed in poverty-reducing projects in the Global South.

The Rockefeller and Gates Foundations are two remarkable examples of the nature of philanthropy in the contemporary world and their role in accompanying, supporting and/or confronting the nation-states to which they belong. Both have focused their actions on generating and applying new knowledge. The former appeared when the international field of science assistance for development in the first half of the 20th century was still in gestation; the latter in a very different setup of neoliberal globalization and fading hegemony of the U.S.

On the one hand, the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) sought to establish scientific cooperation with developing countries as a legitimate sphere for (inter) governmental action, creating, largely from scratch, the principles, practices, and key institutions of international development in fields like health (Fosdick, 1952). On the other, the Gates Foundation has challenged the leadership and capacity of public multilateral agencies, pushing ahead an overlapping global development governance arrangement with a huge role allotted for the private sector (Richter, 2004).

The RF was probably the major influence upon international health's 20th century agenda, approaches, and actions [ref?]. The League of Nations' Health Organisation, founded after WWI, was partially modeled on the RF's International Health Division (IHD), active since the early days of the RF in 1913, and shared many of its values, experts, and know-how in disease control, institution-building, and educational and research work, even as it challenged the RF's narrow, medicalized understandings of health. With the creation of the WHO in 1948, the IHD was subsumed into the larger RF in 1951, discontinuing its overseas work.

The RF's efforts, however, went well beyond health: stabilizing colonies and emerging nation-states by helping them meet the social demands of their populations, encouraging the transfer and internationalization of scientific, bureaucratic, and cultural values, stimulating economic development and growth, expanding consumer markets, and preparing vast regions for foreign investment, increased productivity, and incorporation into the expanding system of global capitalism. The RF's international program sought to generate goodwill and promised social advancement in place of gunboat diplomacy and colonial repression (Berman, 1983). It helped build the U.S.'s "international health as foreign policy" proficiency. When in the mid-1930s Germany started to use medical aid to befriend Mexico, Brazil, and other countries in Latin America as it sought allies and essential resources, including oil, rubber, and minerals—and these countries began to play off the Anglo-American-German rivalry—the RF redoubled its public health efforts in the region. This heightened RF involvement, requested by the U.S. State Department, and reflected in the activity of the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, who held the position of the “Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs” , was instrumental in persuading Latin Americans to side with the Allies (Cramer and Prutsch, 2006; Price, 2008).

The new business philanthropy

Philanthropic and business interests have long been involved in international health, but it was not until the 1990s that public-private partnerships (PPPs) were formalized as a central element of global health. Following the policy of privatizing public goods put forth by the World Bank and IMF, PPPs consciously drew on profit-making principles as a driver of policies, product development, and other activities, further weakening the WHO and any semblance of democratic global health governance. The Global Fund was established in 2002 as a PPP organization between governments, civil society, the private sector and people affected by AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, being formally designed to accelerate the end of those diseases as epidemics. However, it turned out to serve, among other things, to weaken an important transnational movement for intellectual property (IP) reform that had emerged in the late 1990s to address the gross profiteering of pharmaceutical companies that impeded access to HIV/AIDS drugs in low- and middle-income countries, particularly in Africa. For example, a case filed by the AIDS Law Project (a human rights advocacy organization) in South Africa in 2002 against excessive pricing by foreign pharmaceutical companies found a sympathetic ear with the country’s Competition Tribunal. Settling out of court, the companies agreed to issue voluntary generic licenses for AIDS drugs, an outcome that inspired activists in other countries to follow suit (Singh, 2007).

The Global Fund, like many PPPs, offered “business opportunities”—lucrative contracts—as a prime feature of its work. This illustrates how global health is being captured by business interests in a way that was not even part of the original RF strategy; by contrast, this saw international health to be in the public, not the profiteering, domain, even if ultimately benefiting the private sector. PPPs promote profit-making at the front end of global health work, as opposed to strategic public health activities (for example, against yellow fever by RF in the first quarter of the 20th century) that benefited capitalist interests indirectly and once the public health work was carried out.

The current infusion of profit-making in philanthropic ventures has reached entirely new dimensions. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) efforts appear to be emblematic of an overall trend towards for-profit style management, leadership training, and goal-setting in global development and health, as well as the privatizing of public activities. PPPs have been among the key levers of BMGF influence through a global health funding and operations modality enabled by the massive entry of private capital into the health and development arena at the end of the Cold War. Today the BMGF is by far the largest philanthropic organization involved in global health. Its primary aim in this area is “harnessing advances in science and technology to reduce health inequities” (BMGF website) through the innovation and application of health technologies, encompassing both treatment (via diagnostic tools and drug development partnerships) and prevention (through, for example, vaccines and microbicides).

Like the RF before, the Gates Foundation’s influence and dominance over the global health and development agenda stems from multiple factors: the magnitude of its donations; its ability to mobilize resources quickly and allocate substantial sums to large or innovative efforts; the renown of its patron; its technology-driven and cost-effective emphases; as well as the clout and leverage it garners from the extraordinary range of organizations that it partners with or funds. Echoing the RF, the BMGF follows a technically oriented approach—with programs designed to achieve positive evaluations through narrowly defined goals—and adheres to a business model that emphasizes short-term achievements.

The BMGF appeared in 2000 at a time when overall spending for global health was stagnant, and when suspicion by political and economic elites (and, via hegemonic media, by voters in many countries) of public and overseas development assistance was at a near all-time high. Many low- and middle-income countries were floundering under the multiple burdens of HIV/AIDS, re-emerging infectious diseases, and soaring chronic ailments, compounded by decades of World Bank and IMF-imposed social expenditure cuts. Thus, despite the manifold shortcomings of an approach that is focused on technology- (e.g. vaccines that do not require refrigeration in infrastructure-poor tropical climates were one key targeted technology that failed to materialise) and drugs, as well as a disease-by-disease approach (polio, tuberculosis, malaria), the BMGF has stuck with its ambitious goals of eradicating four diseases, including polio, by 2030. This model prevails at present, abetted by the BMGF’s prime infuence at formal global health decision-making bodies. This, despite the critics’ argument that this approach is failing to deliver within the timescales originally envisaged a group of innovation initiatives funded by the Gates Foundation and various governments that were intended to solve key global health and development problems.

In recent years the BMGF has been accused of investing its endowment in profiteering pharmaceutical companies and polluting industries—including ExxonMobil (whose forerunner was founded by John D. Rockefeller) and Chevron, which have been linked to environmental and health crises in the Niger Delta and other oil-rich regions (Piller et al, 2007)—as well as in "private corporations that stand to gain from the Foundation's philanthropic support of particular global health initiatives" (People's Health Movement, 2011).

For instance, the BMGF's involvement in the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), like its global health efforts, illustrates the profound contradiction between the aims of philanthropy (or philanthrocapitalism) and the needs of poor populations (Morvaridi, 2012). AGRA, like the RF's Green Revolution programs in the 20th century, focuses on technological and market models for increased agricultural output. This emphasis comes at the expense of equitable, democratic, and sustainable approaches based on securing land rights for small producers (all-the-more pressing in a context of large-scale foreign land grabs in countries facing dire hunger and malnutrition problems) and supporting local and regional food distribution networks (Jarosz, 2012). In addition to profound concerns about AGRA's role in the research and promotion of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) and the development of privately patented seeds, local analysts have also linked AGRA to the fostering of private ownership and corporate control of Africa's genetic wealth without the sharing of credit or benefits with the cultivators (Thompson, 2012).[2]

The importance of public scrutiny is growing as other donors, including the Canadian and South African governments, are adopting the Grand Challenges approach, originally launched by the BMGF in 2004 to accelerate the pace of research (Sharma 2015). The Grand Challenges in Global Health initiative aimed to catalyze scientific and technological innovation to achieve major breakthroughs in global health. In 2014 a consortium of partners including Brazil, Canada, India, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States decided to fund a new phase of Grand Challenge initiatives, around three main actions: infant health, gender inequality and new scientific and technical interventions for global health. The BMGF is central to this effort. [3]

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[2] In this regard, AGRA differs from the earlier RF-sponsored efforts, which kept hybridized seeds in the public domain, given that this was before gene patenting was legalized in 1980 (Fitzgerald, 1990).

[3] For this and further information on partners see (http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2014/10/Gates-Foundation-Grand-Challenges-Breakthrough-Science).

Philanthropists, past and present, have typically rationalized their actions as necessary to address 'market failures' (Payton & Moody, 2008). Of course, (global) public health, like many other social goods and services, by definition resides in the realm of market failure because it is externalized from the costs of doing business in bilateral transactions. The need for philanthropy to become more like the for-profit capital markets is a common theme among the new philanthropists, especially those who have made their fortune in finance (*The Economist*, 2006). Whether their promotion of capitalist approaches as superior to the public sector in regulating and delivering services is correct or not does not seem substantiated. In the global health arena of more recent decades, the argument that the public sector is incapable of addressing societal needs has contemptuously disregarded the full-fledged assault on public spending and infrastructure on the part of international financial institutions' conditionalities and structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s, not to mention the wave of predatory private bank lending, unfair trade practices, and hegemonic leverage over the WTO by powerful countries (Stiglitz, 2007).

Tapping knowledge globally: the new markets for policies

Business relationships as much as international civil society, now online, and academia all afford channels for the international mobility of generic ideas and means for the penetration of particular forms of knowledge and kinds of relations within the state and society. Business philanthropy acts as intermediary between national and international policies. National governments, especially those of small and fragile states, experience a reduction in their capacity of driving the educational and science systems. A proliferation of policy networks nationally and globally made up of 'operationally autonomous' but 'structurally coupled' organizations, blurs the boundaries between state, economy and civil society.

Since the 1970s there has been an explosive growth of 'policy intermediation' institutions (such as think tanks, policy networks and centers, reform advocates and consultants), the *modus operandi* of which is defined in terms of the generation, circulation and implantation of potentially agenda-shifting ideas models and strategies. A basic ingredient of development assistance today can be broadly described as the 'importation' of 'innovative policies developed elsewhere' by the national elites, and the imposition of policies by multilateral agencies, and/or processes of structural convergence. It is part of a broader set of processes that include new modes of philanthropy and assistance for scientific development and education, the market processes of capital growth and expansion, and the search by business of new opportunities for profit.

New social actors, hybrid social subjects who are spatially mobile, ethically malleable, and able to speak the languages of public, private and philanthropic value are part of a global service class increasingly but not necessarily disconnected from national identities and loyalties (Vessuri, 2010; Ball, 2010). As at different times in the past, cosmopolitized resistance to this particular model is also present among the existing intellectual diasporas from Southern countries As members of a “specialists elite”, experts linked to powerful transnational agencies and groups –the World Bank, WTO and the OECD in particular-, disseminate new forms of policy and expertise in policies, ready to take the opportunities of reform and modernization of the public sectors in countries all over the world. They have played an important role in packing, selling and implementing *New Public Management* techniques, as state agencies contemplating institutional change or strengthening often enlist the services of expert consultants to clarify options – and recommend courses of action (Larbi, 1999).

The literature on the social studies of science emphasizes that the generation of knowledge takes place in different localities and under particular circumstances (Livingstone, 2003). The situated character of knowledge has been particularly demanding for developing countries in their need to dominate the conditions of science implementation locally (Waast and Mouton, 2007). In the 1990s globalization processes developed in parallel with substantial changes in the global framework of knowledge production. The central features with regard to cooperation started to change from being framed as *assistance* to particular countries to *joint work* in research programs (shared labs) and exchanges of teachers and students connected in networks within broader supra-national programs (Finholt & Olson, 1997).

The modalities of research internationalization that led to new forms of collaboration in North America and the European Union fostered the creation of international research networks (Castells, 1996, 2006; Cantwell & Piscitello, 1999), and a new wave of internationalization of higher education (Altbach & Knight, 2007; Mollis, 2006). In the new institutional set-up, think- tanks together with consultants and educational firms, deliver policy assistance (for a potential profit) developing local policy infrastructures, instilling the discourses of prevalent western policy directly or as spillovers in the local policy systems. They often have specific and effective points of entry in the political systems nested as they are in networks of relationships. Their authority and legitimacy are not natural but are cultivated through management practices and intellectual activity. The ‘aura’ of intellectual authority and independence may be misleading for ideas are often harnessed to political and economic interests (Ball, 2012).

Non-governmental organizations and actors have growing significance in all the functions of governance, from the establishment of objectives and norms, to the selection of the means, the regulation of the operations and the verification of results. This is particularly relevant for science, which is internally governed by its own members –the scientists- and externally through its interactions with the society in which it is immersed (European Commission, 2009). The multiplication of supra-national organizations and multinational corporations in the funding of research has contributed to redefine the space of scientific-technical research, removing it from the previously dominant paradigm of *national science.* The expansion and acceleration of global interconnectivity has significant socioeconomic and ideational implications that serve to reconfigure the international system, fostering in part the emergence of new economic spaces incongruent with existing political frontiers (Mathews, 1997).

The current descriptive narrative of knowledge shows it as a network with multiple nodes and connexions, and as a dynamic system very different from the notion common a few decades ago as a basic or lineal structure of disciplinary rhetoric. The metaphor of unity, together with the values of universality and certainty, has been largely replaced by metaphors of plurality and relationality in a complex world. The values of control, dominance and expertise are currently being redefined as values of dialogue, interaction and negotiation (Rip, 2010; Ravetz, 2012). It is not clear yet whether this is to be considered as a good, bad, neutral or ambivalent and complex change.

Conclusion

Crucially since the early 20th century the foundations saw themselves as distinct from charities; a 'scientific philanthropy', as it was sometimes referred to, was to develop society according to its own rationale and to encourage others to do the same as a means of social salvation (Sealander, 2003). More recently new ideas are being advanced, Hacker Philanthropy, proposed by billionaire entrepreneur Sean Parker; and Effective Altruism, championed by philosopher Peter Singer (http://philanthrocapitalism.net, 2015). The first refers to focusing philanthropy on finding solutions that work; the second refers to focusing philanthropy where it can have the greatest impact. Clearly, there is some overlap between the two ideas, both of which go to the heart of what philanthrocapitalism is about.

Philanthropic foundations have been and continue to be significant transnational actors 'because of their direct and indirect influence on other actors in world politics' (Bell, 1991). An understanding of how transnational philanthropy works in the interstices of state-private networks, both as quasi-market and quasi-state, is critical in understanding how it is related to geopolitical projects. The collaboration between state and private agencies increased through joint-supported institutes and researches. But whereas in the past profit-making in connection with the public sphere was denounced for being self-serving and a violation of the principle of separation of public and private interests that should be avoided as problematic and unethical, today it is viewed by private capital—and rationalized by a disquietingly quiet public—as a desirable outcome that ought to be encouraged.

As the world globalizes and becomes more integrated more opportunities emerge for collective action. There is a whole series of global public goods, such as world peace, global health, the protection of environment, global knowledge. If the global community does not provide them collectively, it is likely that they will be insufficient. While the existence of an adequate balance between private and public sectors continues to be unsolved, the provision of some system for funding public goods is obviously required. The contemporary large philanthropic foundations concentrate an important portion of the wealth of the world that might be devoted to global public goods. In their rhetoric business philanthropies are devoted to them, and in fact they could set in motion huge resources, spread more advanced technology and increase human wellbeing in an exponential way.

However, the tenet that such business models can solve social problems and are superior to redistributive, collectively deliberate policies and actions employed by elected governments remains unconvincing.

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