

CertiCore

Zhilei Han,
Xingyu Xie

Verified OS

Serval

Aim

Work

Plan

CertiCore: Verified ucore by Serval

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What is verification?

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To verify your codes satisfy your specification.

// An example of Dafny

```
method Sort(a: int, b: int, c: int)
    returns (x: int, y: int, z: int)
    ensures x <= y <= z
{
    x, y, z := a, b, c;
    if z < y { y, z := z, y; }
    if y < x { x, y := y, x; }
    if z < y { y, z := z, y; }
}
```

Three methodologies of software verification

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Methodology	Prover	Verified software
Interactive	Coq, Isabelle/HOL	seL4, CertiKOS, ...
Auto-active	Dafny & Boogie	Ironclad, Komodo, ...
Push-button	Serval	Yggdrasil, Hyperkernel, ...

Table: Three Methodologies in software verification

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Overview of Serval

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


Figure: The Serval verification stack. Curved boxes denote verification input and rounded-corner boxes denote verifiers.

Limitations of verified software

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- Finite interfaces
- Bounded loops
- Interrupts disabled in privileged mode

Symbolic interpreter as verifier

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```
9 ; interpret a program from a given cpu state
10 (define (interpret c program)
11   (serval:split-pc [cpu pc] c
12     ; fetch an instruction to execute
13     (define insn (fetch c program))
14     ; decode an instruction into (opcode, rd, rs, imm)
15     (match insn
16       [(list opcode rd rs imm)
17        ; execute the instruction
18        (execute c opcode rd rs imm)
19        ; recursively interpret a program until "ret"
20        (when (not (equal? opcode 'ret))
21          (interpret c program)))]))
40 ; execute one instruction
41 (define (execute c opcode rd rs imm)
42   (define pc (cpu-pc c))
43   (case opcode
44     [(ret) ; return
45      (set-cpu-pc! c 0)]
46     [(bnez) ; branch to imm if rs is nonzero
47      (if (! (= (cpu-reg c rs) 0))
48          (set-cpu-pc! c imm)
49          (set-cpu-pc! c (+ 1 pc))))]
50     [(sgtz) ; set rd to 1 if rs > 0, 0 otherwise
51      (set-cpu-pc! c (+ 1 pc))
52      (if (> (cpu-reg c rs) 0)
53          (set-cpu-reg! c rd 1)
54          (set-cpu-reg! c rd 0))]
55     [(sltz) ; set rd to 1 if rs < 0, 0 otherwise
56      (set-cpu-pc! c (+ 1 pc))
57      (if (< (cpu-reg c rs) 0)
58          (set-cpu-reg! c rd 1)
59          (set-cpu-reg! c rd 0))]
60     [(li) ; load imm into rd
61      (set-cpu-pc! c (+ 1 pc))
62      (set-cpu-reg! c rd imm)])])
```

Figure: A fragment of ToyRISC interpreter using Serval (in Rosette)

Symbolic evaluation

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


Figure: Symbolic evaluation of the sign program using the ToyRISC interpreter

Symbolic profile and optimization

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Why Serval is the choice to write specification?

- Diagnosing performance bottlenecks: Rosette symbolic profiler.
- Symbolic optimizations. For example, to limit the values of some symbol.

Use Serval to verify an operating system

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The properties

- absence of undefined behavior
- state-machine refinement
- safety properties

The models

- Execution model: shown in figure.
- Memory model: a set of disjoint blocks of three types.




Figure: System execution: System execution: the lower half and the higher half denote execution in privileged and unprivileged modes, respectively; and arrows denote privilege-level transitions.

Lightweight

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“Four person-weeks to verify an operating system.”

- LoC of Serval framework: 1,244
- LoC of RISC-V verifier: 1,036
- LoC of LLVM verifier: 789
- LoC of CertiKOS: 2,847

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- Tailor ucore with necessary simplification.
- Verify ucore on RISC-V step-by-step.

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Work that is already done

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- Paper Reading: *Scaling symbolic evaluation for automated verification of systems code with Serval*
- Reproduce the verifications in Serval paper.
- Environment setting: Travis-CI

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- 1 Learn more details about the framework: Rosette, RISC-V verifier, LLVM verifier, verification of CertiKOS, verification of Komodo...
- 2 Verify a toy security monitor using on RISC-V and LLVM.
- 3 Verify and simplify ucore step-by-step.