Battle Orders

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US Army Forces in the Korean War 1950–53



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US Army Forces in the Korean War 1950–53

Donald Boose

Consultant editor Dr Duncan Anderson • *Series editors* Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic

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Introduction

General Douglas MacArthur, CINCFE (center), talking with US Ambassador to the ROK, John Muccio (left) and Maj Gen Edward M. Almond, Chief of Staff, FEC, June 29, 1950. Almond would later command X Corps. (MHI)

Lt Gen Walton H. Walker, CG EUSAK, at Masan, August 8, 1950, during the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. He would be killed in a traffic accident on December 23, 1950. (MHI)

This book examines the organization, equipment, doctrine, and tactics of US Army forces in the 1950–53 Korean War. The focus is US Army *combat* forces. Only the largest and most significant support units are included. Marine Corps, Republic of Korea (ROK), United Nations (UN), and special operations forces are covered in other Osprey books.[1]

US Army organization, equipment, and tactics were affected by many factors, including lessons learned from World War II; the situation at various stages of the war; and Korean geography. The steep, rugged Korean terrain precluded large-scale armored operations, required artillery with a high angle of fire, and hindered radio and wire communications. Commanders adjusted their organization for combat and modified the official Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) to adapt to combat conditions as the war shifted from the defense to the offense and from mobile to static warfare.

The war began on June 25, 1950, when the North Korean People's Army (KPA) invaded the Republic of Korea.[2] On June 30, US President Harry S. Truman authorized US ground forces to stop the North Korean attack. The United States was able to intervene quickly because of the proximity of General Douglas MacArthur's United States Far East Command (FEC), which included Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker's Eighth US Army, consisting of four under-strength infantry divisions based in Japan. The first Army infantry combat unit in Korea, a task force from the 24th Infantry Division, went into action south of the ROK capital of Seoul on July 5.[3] It was able to do little to delay the KPA, but additional forces were on the way. Within a month, three of Walker's divisions were fighting in Korea and more US forces would soon join them. Immediately after the North Korean attack, the United Nations Security Council passed three resolutions that condemned the attack, called upon UN member states to assist the Republic of Korea to "repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area," asked UN states to make forces available "to a unified command under the United States," and requested the United States designate a force commander. Eventually, 15 UN nations, in addition to the United States, sent combat forces, while five other nations sent medical units. President Truman designated General MacArthur to be Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC), as well as Commander in Chief of the US Far East Command (CINCFE).

On July 13, 1950, General Walker moved his headquarters to Korea, establishing "Eighth US Army in Korea" (EUSAK). On July 14, President Syngman Rhee gave operational control of all ROK military forces to General MacArthur, who designated General Walker as the UNC Ground Component Commander, with operational control of all US, Republic of Korea, and UN

1 A list of relevant Osprey volumes is included in the end matter of this book.
2 For a history of the Korean War, see Carter Malkasian, *The Korean War, 1950-1951*, Osprey Essential Histories No. 8.
3 The first US Army unit to see combat in Korea was Detachment X (Provisional), 507th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Mobile), consisting of four M55 towed quadruple machine guns and 33 officers and men. This unit was flown from Japan to Suwon airfield south of Seoul on June 29, 1950, and engaged North Korean aircraft that day, shooting down one and damaging another.

Soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division plant an American flag on the bank of the Yalu River at Hyesanjin on the North Korean border with China, on November 23, 1950. This was the farthest north that UNC forces reached. Three days later, the Chinese would begin a massive offensive that drove UNC forces out of North Korea. (NACP)

ground forces. Eighth Army's mission, operations, and organization changed at different phases of the war. General Walker initially had to commit forces piecemeal to delay the North Korean advance until he could form a coherent line along defensible terrain in southeast Korea. He then conducted a brilliant defense, using newly arriving and unengaged forces to form ad hoc fighting teams to repel North Korean penetrations and conduct limited counterattacks. In August, MacArthur formed a new force, Major General Edward M. Almond's X Corps, composed of the 7th Infantry Division (the last remaining Army division in Japan), the 1st Marine Division, and artillery, engineer, and other elements.

Phase II began in mid-September with X Corps striking from Japan to conduct an amphibious assault at Inch'on, followed by Eighth Army's breakout and pursuit of the retreating KPA. After the recapture of Seoul, General MacArthur retained X Corps as a separate force, sending it into northeast Korea while Eighth Army continued the advance in the west. By November 1950, X Corps had become a de facto field army, with three US infantry divisions, a two-division ROK corps, and its own Tactical Air Command.

The third phase of the war began on November 26, 1950, when a 300,000-man Chinese force struck Eighth Army and X Corps, forcing them back to the south.[4] General Walker was killed in a jeep accident on December 26 and Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway took command of Eighth Army, which now included X Corps. Ridgway revitalized the UNC ground force, which had suffered badly from

Lt Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, CG EUSAK December 26, 1950–April 14, 1951, being briefed by Lt Col Gilbert Check, Cdr, 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, on March 9, 1951, during Operation RIPPER, the offensive that took Eighth Army back to the 38th Parallel. (MHI)

4 The Chinese People's Volunteers (the name used by the Chinese for their military force in Korea) entered Korea secretly beginning on October 19, 1950. They struck US and ROK forces on 25 October, inflicting heavy casualties. The Chinese broke off their attacks on November 6 and withdrew. The UNC offensive into the north then continued until the second, much larger, Chinese offensive.

Lt Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, CG EUSAK February 11, 1953–April 1, 1951, receiving an Ethiopian flag from Col Asfaw Andarge, Cdr, Ethiopian Bn, April 26, 1953. Ethiopia was one of 16 UN nations that provided combat forces to the UNC. Next to Taylor are Maj Gen Bruce Clark, CG I Corps, and Maj Gen Arthur G. Trudeau, CG 7th Inf Div. (MHI)

the Chinese attack and the humiliating withdrawal from the north. By the end of January, Eighth Army was prepared to resume the counteroffensive and, for the next six months, Eighth Army and the combined Chinese and North Korean ground force conducted a war of movement with deep penetrations, determined defenses, and bold counteroffensives. In April 1951, General Ridgway became CINCFE/CINCUNC when President Truman relieved General MacArthur of command. Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet then took command of Eighth Army.

By June 1951, with UNC ground forces generally north of the 38th Parallel, both the US and Chinese leaderships had concluded that they were unwilling to pay the cost of trying to reunite Korea by military force and truce talks began the following month. The final phase of the war began in November 1951, when Eighth Army settled into static warfare of fortifications, artillery duels, intensive patrolling, and limited objective attacks by both sides that continued after Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor replaced Van Fleet as Commanding General of Eighth Army on February 11, 1953. Combat ended in Korea when an Armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.

The Korean War was brutal, tragic, and frustrating, but the commanders, Soldiers, and Marines of Eighth Army used ingenuity and flexibility, adapting to a war they had not expected to fight, adjusting to the circumstances of limited war in mountainous terrain against an enemy that substituted manpower and guile for modern technology. Each phase of the war brought some innovation in the organization of US ground forces. Many of the current doctrinal concepts for organizing joint and multinational forces were born and refined during the Korean War, which continues to provide a worthwhile and relevant subject of study.

Lt Gen James A. Van Fleet, CG EUSAK, April 14, 1951–February 11, 1953, in front of the X Corps commander's aircraft, an L-17 Navion, July 4, 1951. (MHI)



Combat mission

Activated in the Southwest Pacific in 1944, Eighth Army was, at the start of the Korean War, the largest US military force outside the Continental United States and the only American field army with a combat mission, although there were six administrative (non-combat) armies in the United States and, later in 1950, Seventh Army was established as a field army with a combat mission in Europe. The wartime mission of a field army was to conduct sustained, large-scale ground combat operations in a theater of war. It also had administrative responsibility for the assigned and attached units and "territorial" responsibilities, such as refugee control and civil assistance, within its area of operations. In Korea, Eighth Army was responsible not only for planning and conducting combat operations, but also for logistic support within Korea, development of the ROK Army, control of prisoners of war, administration of civil relief to the Korean civilian population in the war zone, and political and economic relations with the ROK Government. These additional tasks became an increasing burden, so, in 1952, CINCFE established a separate command, the Korea Communications Zone (KCOMZ), to assume these responsibilities outside the combat zone.

The specific mission of Eighth Army changed during different phases of the war. The early guidance to General MacArthur from Washington was to clear South Korea of North Korean forces; but first, the enemy attack had to be stopped, so Eighth Army's initial mission was to delay to defensible positions, then to defend while building up strength to conduct a counteroffensive. As early as July 13, 1950, MacArthur made clear that he saw his mission as not merely to drive the invaders back across the 38th Parallel, but to destroy their forces and, if necessary, to occupy all of North Korea. On October 7, 1950, the UN General Assembly recommended action to unify Korea under an independent, democratic government. That same day, US forces crossed the 38th Parallel (ROKA forces had already crossed the Parallel on October 1). The mission of Eighth Army and X Corps (which operated independently from September to December 1950) was now to complete the destruction of the KPA and reunify Korea.

After the Chinese intervention, the immediate tasks were to assure the survival of the UNC field force and halt the Chinese offensive as far north as

"To close with the enemy." Infantrymen of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, with artillery and air support advance on Hill 43, southeast of Seoul, during Operation THUNDERBOLT, Eighth Army counteroffensive, January 29, 1951. (NACP)

possible. The UNC resumed the counteroffensive in early 1951 with the mission to inflict casualties and regain ground through offensive operations. After the truce talks began, the mission changed to one of active defense. Eighth Army was authorized to conduct limited offensive actions to seize key terrain and inflict heavy casualties on the Chinese and North Koreans, but while planning took place for possible offensives, to include amphibious operations, the UNC conducted no further major attacks.

The specific missions of units depended on the type of unit and the direction provided by higher headquarters. In 1950, the US Army consisted of arms (those branches—infantry, armor, and artillery—for which the primary function was combat) and the administrative and technical services (those branches primarily concerned with providing support or administration). Some branches, such as engineers, had primary missions in both combat and support. The mission of the infantry was to "close with the enemy by fire and maneuver in order to capture or destroy him; or to repel his assault by fire and maneuver."[5]

The mission of armor forces was to "close with and destroy enemy forces using fire, maneuver, and shock action in coordination with other arms." In addition to bringing shock action to the battlefield, armor had inherited the other traditional cavalry missions of screening and reconnaissance. With the end of the horse cavalry after World War II, the term "armored cavalry" came into use, but the branch was officially designated as "armor" in 1950. In Eighth Army, armor units included the divisional tank battalions, infantry regimental tank companies, divisional reconnaissance (light armor) companies, and army-level separate reconnaissance platoons. In 1950, the artillery branch included both field artillery units, whose mission was to provide artillery support to infantry and armor forces, and antiaircraft artillery, which had the primary mission of local air defense against enemy aircraft and the additional mission of supporting ground forces by attacking "mechanized and other terrestrial targets."

The administrative services included the Adjutant General Corps, responsible for official correspondence, personnel administration, post office activities, publications, and military history; the Chaplains; and the Office of the Provost Marshal General (Military Police). The technical services included chemical units, responsible for smoke and incendiary material, toxic chemical and biological warfare agents, and chemical warfare weapons and equipment. In the absence of an enemy chemical threat in Korea, the major Chemical Corps effort consisted of smoke generation, the maintenance and distribution of flamethrowers and other flame warfare material, and the use of chemical decontamination equipment to supplement Quartermaster Corps field bath units. Engineers were responsible for construction and demolition of fortifications, obstacles, and bridges; the construction and maintenance of roads; camouflage; water purification and distribution; firefighting; surveying; mapmaking and distribution; construction and maintenance of facilities and public utilities; support of amphibious operations; and the tactical operation of beachheads and ports. Engineer units designated as "combat engineers" were armed and equipped to fight as infantry. Medical units and personnel treated, cared for, and evacuated the sick, injured, and wounded; administered hospitals; and supervised sanitation and preventive medicine activities. Ordnance units supplied and maintained tanks and other vehicles, aircraft, artillery, small arms, and ammunition. Quartermaster units procured and supplied food, clothing, fuel, and other supplies and were also responsible for laundry, field bath units, and recovery and burial or evacuation of the dead. Signal Corps units were responsible for communications, supply of signal equipment and material, photography, and motion pictures. Transportation units maintained and administered the Korean railway system, operated seaports, controlled highway movement, and deployed fleets of trucks to transport personnel and material.

5 This and succeeding mission quotations are from the applicable Tables of Organization and Equipment.

Preparation for war: doctrine and training

Doctrine, an officially approved set of principles to guide the actions of military forces, is inherently bound up with both weapons and equipment, and organization for combat. A change in any of these three stimulates change in the others. A major motivator for doctrinal change is the actual experience of war and so the Army began the Korean War with doctrine derived from the experience of World War II. In 1946, a series of Army conferences reviewed that experience and recommended changes to doctrine and organization.

During World War II, army organization had been based on the concepts of "streamlining," limiting a unit to those assets that it always needed, and "pooling," keeping units of similar type that were occasionally needed (such as antiaircraft and anti-tank forces and engineers) in pools under the control of higher headquarters to reinforce or support lower level forces as required. The 1946 conferences reinforced the importance of coordinating firepower in "combined arms" operations of infantry, armor, and artillery supported by air power. Accordingly, infantry forces were reinforced with elements that had previously been held in pools at higher levels. Light (105mm) and medium (155mm) howitzer batteries grew from four to six tubes, an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons (AAA AW) battalion was added to divisional artillery (DivArty), and the infantry division gained a tank battalion. The infantry regiment lost its cannon company (six 105mm towed howitzers) and anti-tank company (18 57mm towed anti-tank guns), but gained a tank company (22 tanks) and a heavy mortar company (12 4.2in. mortars). Infantry squads were reduced from 12 to nine men, but firepower at the lowest tactical levels increased as machine guns were redistributed down to platoon level.

On paper, the 1950 infantry division was more powerful than its World War II counterpart, but few units actually had all their authorized personnel and equipment. Drastic postwar budget cuts, demobilization, and the emphasis on atomic warfare led to neglect of ground combat forces. In Japan, Eighth Army had no corps headquarters, corps artillery, or the engineers and other support elements normally assigned to corps headquarters. Its divisions averaged 70 percent strength. Divisional tank battalions were reduced to one tank company equipped with M24 light tanks. Most DivArty field artillery battalions had only two four-gun firing batteries and the AAA (AW) battalion had been reduced to a single battery. Infantry regiments had no tank companies and only two of the three authorized infantry battalions, except for the 24th Infantry, which consisted of black enlisted men and, in the segregated Army of 1950, received most of the African-American infantry replacements, who could not, by policy, be assigned to the "white" units.

Segregated soldiers

At the start of the Korean War, the US Army was still racially segregated, with all African-American soldiers assigned to units referred to officially as "colored" or "Negro Enlisted." These units often had an asterisk (*) marked against them in contemporary order of battle documents. An increasing number of black officers had been assigned by 1950, but these units still had predominantly white officers.

By 1951, these racially based policies could no longer be supported. One factor was that the US military leadership believed that all-black units performed less well than racially integrated units. The evidence for this was mixed. While the "colored" 24th Regimental Combat Team was criticized for its performance in the early months of the war, the black 2d Ranger Company fought with valor and distinction, jumping into Munsan in March 1951 alongside the "white" 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the 4th Ranger Company. Nor was there much to criticize about the service of the black 64th Tank Battalion, the "colored" field artillery and antiaircraft artillery battalions, and the many support and service units. Perhaps as important in ending the segregated Army in Korea was the burden of maintaining separate replacement systems and, as casualties mounted, the impossibility of restricting replacements racially.

Beginning in the late summer of 1951, the black units began to be integrated by reassigning personnel. By early 1952 the "colored" units were a thing of the past and the 1948 desegregation order was finally carried out.

The same budget constraints and emphasis on occupation duty also affected training. In 1949, as occupation duties wound down, General Walker began a program to turn Eighth Army into an effective combined-arms force working as a team with the Air Force and Navy. Personnel turbulence and equipment shortages interfered with training, but the program had progressed through battalion level by May 1950. Regimental exercises and air–ground training were to be completed in July 1950, and amphibious exercises were to take place by the end of October. Unfortunately, Eighth Army was committed to battle long before the program was completed.

Doctrine for combat

US Army doctrine was reflected in field manuals and other publications, particularly the 1949 edition of Field Manual (FM)100-5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations*, which identified two types of combat operations, offensive and defensive. In offensive operations, friendly ground forces, supported by air and naval forces, were to move forward to meet the enemy (**movement to contact**) then **attack** to destroy enemy forces and to take and hold ground. In the attack, US Army forces attempted to fix enemy forces in position with supporting attacks and to degrade the enemy's combat capability, first through long-range fires from aircraft (and ships in coastal areas), then by artillery, while maneuvering forces to conduct the main attack against the enemy flank or rear, holding a force in reserve to exploit success, cover a retrograde, or strengthen a threatened force. The basic approach of "fire and maneuver"—engaging the enemy with fire and maneuvering against him—applied at every level, from the field army down to the rifle squad. If the attack was successful, friendly forces **exploited** the success, moving forward rapidly, and advancing after retreating enemy forces (**pursuit**).

Defensive operations included the **defense** to hold ground and **retrograde** (movement to the rear). The object of the defense was to gain time until friendly forces could build up strength to take the offensive, or to hold on one front with reduced forces while concentrating forces to conduct decisive offensive actions on another. Retrograde operations were conducted to **delay** enemy forces, to **withdraw** to more suitable defensive locations, or to **retire** from the battlefield.

The missions of airborne forces were to attack, seize, and hold important objectives, exploit initial airborne assaults, and to occupy or reinforce units beyond the immediate reach of other ground forces. If reinforced, they could also be used for sustained ground combat. The development of the C-119 "Flying Boxcar" cargo airplane made it possible to airdrop artillery and vehicles, eliminating the requirement for the gliders that had played a prominent role in World War II. The airborne assault was conducted in three phases: the initial assault by airborne troops; the landing of heavy equipment to strengthen the airhead; and the arrival of other ground forces, either by air or land, to consolidate or exploit the initial success. Ideally, the airborne assault would be conducted in enemy rear areas where there were few troops or fixed defenses.

Tanks were seen as inherently offensive weapons that could mass firepower and act with speed and aggressiveness from unexpected directions, taking advantage of the tank's characteristics of armor protection, firepower, mobility, and shock action. But one of the lessons of World War II was that the tank was also the best anti-tank weapon. The infantryman was equipped with anti-tank rocket launchers and recoilless rifles, but the tank forces took on most of the anti-tank role. FM 100-5 stated that armor would not normally be used to hold defensive positions, but was

Pfc Lewis E. Canis (left) and Pfc Bernard E. Wisch of G Company, 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, prepare to defend their position with an M1919A4 light machine gun, March 10, 1952. In the foreground and leaning against a tree are two Browning automatic rifles (BARs). Three M1 rifles are also visible and a rifle smoke grenade can be seen just above the ammunition box in the foreground. (MHI)

M46 tank of C Company, 6th Tank Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, firing on enemy positions. January 10, 1952. (NACP)

Artillerymen of C Battery, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, receiving a fire mission February 28, 1952. Note the logs to prevent the trails from sinking into the mud. The 15th FA Bn normally fired in direct support of one of the division's infantry regiments. During the battle for Heartbreak Ridge, August 26–September 2, 1951, the 15th fired 14,525 rounds in one day, a record for the war. (MHI)

suited for use in covering forces, and as part of a powerful, mobile counterattack force. The missions of the infantry division tank battalions and regimental tank companies in the defense were to protect the infantry from enemy tanks, and to counterattack enemy forces that penetrated defensive positions, the tanks providing heavy firepower, the infantry protecting the tanks from enemy infantrymen and their antitank weapons.

Artillery doctrine called for central control to permit massing fires and rapid shifting of fires among targets. Effective use of artillery depended upon the ability to coordinate the fires of many different battalions and batteries. Each artillery battalion had a Fire Direction Center (FDC) that received requests for fire and missions from higher headquarters, and translated them into fire commands for the guns. In addition, regiments, divisions, and corps generally established a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) to coordinate and integrate artillery, close air support, naval gunfire, and the fires of unit weapons. The FSCC pre-planned fires, but also prepared to engage targets of opportunity. Artillery effects included **destruction** of the target, **neutralization** (rendering the enemy ineffective), **harassing** (intermittent fires to demoralize and curtail movement), and **interdiction** (to disrupt lines of communication).

Within an infantry division, each of the three light (105mm howitzer) battalions was normally placed in **direct support** (D/S) of one of the division's infantry regiments, which could make requests for fires directly to the supporting artillery battalion. The medium (155m howitzer) battalion provided **general support** (G/S), firing in support of the operation as a whole, rather than in support of a specific regiment. Battalions assigned the **general support reinforcing** (G/SR) mission supported the force as a whole and reinforced the fires of other artillery units. Artillery was not customarily placed in reserve, so the battalion normally in direct support of a regiment fired G/S and G/SR missions when the regiment was in reserve. Corps artillery battalions, which were generally heavy (8in. howitzer or 155mm gun) or very heavy (240mm howitzer) battalions, reinforced the fires of divisions within the corps and conducted other missions, such as counter-battery fire against enemy artillery units.

Army forces were designed to be "task organized"—units could be combined to carry out a specific mission or series of tasks. The most common task force was the regimental combat team, made up of an infantry regiment, an artillery battalion, an engineer combat company, and other elements required for the mission. However, temporary "task forces" of all sizes, from division down to company size, were created throughout the Korean War.

The doctrine and procedures for air–ground operations, based primarily on US Army and Air Force experience in Northern Europe in World War II, were set forth in the 1946 version of FM 31-35, *Aviation in Support of Ground Forces*, modified by a 1950 supplementary Joint Training Directive. Both were based on the assumptions that air and ground units formed a combat team, that air superiority was a prerequisite to effective air–ground operations and must have priority, that aircraft were more vulnerable and costly than artillery, and that central control of air

assets provided the essential flexibility to concentrate or distribute air power as the situation required. The preferred missions for air–ground operations were interdiction of enemy reinforcements and destruction of enemy mechanized forces on the move. Direct support of ground forces in contact—Close Air Support (CAS)— was only to be considered when enemy forces could not be engaged effectively by artillery. Air and ground forces were viewed as separate, co-equal forces under a unified commander who, alone, could make authoritative decisions affecting both forces. All air assets in the theater were to be controlled by the air force commander, who would in wartime assign a tactical air force to work in cooperation with a field army. The two headquarters would be co-located and would establish a Joint Operations Center, with the Army element receiving and evaluating requests for close air support from the front line units, while the Air Force element would make the final decisions on the allocation of air assets and direct the aircraft to the targets. An Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) would direct the actual strikes onto the targets.

Effective close air support is a difficult, complex, and dangerous operation that requires practice for its effective execution. In the post-World War II era of tight budgets and an Air Force focus on its strategic mission at the expense of tactical aviation, there had been little emphasis on air–ground operations, and neither the soldiers nor the airmen were sufficiently practiced in the relevant techniques. During the war, these problems were largely overcome, and US air superiority and ability to conduct close air support provided a major advantage to UNC ground forces. CAS was widely used and was often given top priority when ground forces were under attack, but the priority of CAS missions, the level at which TACPs should operate, and Army vs. Air Force control of strikes were contentious issues throughout the war.

"Logistics is that branch of administration which embraces the management and provision of supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, and service. It envisions getting the right people and the appropriate supplies to the right place at the right time and in the proper condition."[6] The fundamental principle is to push supplies forward: the impetus for supply should come from the rear, replenishment should be continuous, and, while forward commanders have their own logistical responsibilities within their units, they should not be burdened with the details of resupply and other support. From time to time during the Korean War, US units faced shortages and logistic problems, but overall, the army's logistical system, from the stateside arsenals, depots, and ports; to the logistical infrastructure in Japan; and through the logistical commands and support units in Korea, served US forces well.[7]

The actual experience of combat in Korea—the enemy's tactics, the Korean terrain, and the weather—would all affect the way doctrine was applied and provide new lessons for the future, driving further changes in doctrine, organization, weapons, and equipment.

KATUSAs

Because of the shortage of US personnel in Eighth Army in 1950, Far East Command developed a program to augment the US units with South Korean soldiers who would be paid and administered by the ROK Army, but otherwise serve on the same basis as US soldiers. The Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) program began in August 1950, with the opening of a recruit-training center near Pusan. After five days training, the recruits were sent to US units. Some 8,300 KATUSA soldiers were sent to each of the divisions. Later, as the flow of US replacements increased, the numbers of KATUSA soldiers in the combat units decreased, but the program continued throughout the war. Within the Korean Service Corps (KSC) and Korean Transportation Corps (KTC), Korean civilians also played a key role as workers in support units, and by backpacking rations, ammunition, equipment, and wounded soldiers for the combat units, often at the risk of their lives.

6 FM 100-10, *Field Service Regulations, Administration*, September 1949.

7 James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989) is the standard account of US Army logistics in the Korean War.

Unit organization

Organizational terminology

With a few exceptions, all ground forces in Korea were assigned to the Commanding General of Eighth Army, who then either retained direct control, or attached them to corps, divisions, the 2d Logistical Command, or other units, retaining the authority to resume direct control or to attach them to different units. Units are "assigned" to an organization on a relatively permanent basis. "Attached" units are placed under the command and control of another force on a temporary basis.

For specific missions, all or part of one unit might be placed under the Operational Control (O/C) of another unit. **Operational Control** is the authority to organize and employ forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It is normally a temporary authority only for the duration of a mission. Operational Control does not include authority for logistics, administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

Most Army units are organized under a Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E), a document that prescribes the official designation, normal mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirements for the unit. The various permanently assigned components of a military organization that are essential to the function of the higher-level unit and listed in the T/O&E are called "organic" units or elements.

When there was a need for a unit, but no existing unit was available for deployment, CINCFE or CG Eighth Army authorized the temporary establishment of an Army Unit (AU) from within the resources of the theater. All the AUs established in the Far East Command were numbered in the 8000 series and identified by their number and type of organization, such as the 8209th AU, Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH). Although technically incorrect, some Army Units were referred to informally as if the AU were a regularly numbered unit: "8209th MASH" as the shorthand for the unit's correct designation.

Units organized for a specific purpose, usually temporary, from military personnel on temporary duty from their assigned positions in other, already established, units, were called Provisional (Prov) units.

Unit designation practices

Field armies were numbered, with the numbers spelled out, as in the case of Eighth US Army, which was normally abbreviated as EUSA, although the abbreviation "8A" was often used in lists of units and for vehicle markings. When General Walker established his headquarters in Korea on July 13, 1950, his command was renamed "Eighth US Army in Korea" to differentiate it from Eighth Army (Rear) in Japan. Even though Eighth Army (Rear) was inactivated in August 1950, and its responsibilities taken over by the newly formed Japan Logistical Command, the EUSAK abbreviation was used until February 1953, when Lt Gen Taylor restored the old name.

Corps, the major fighting components of a field army, were identified with Roman numerals: I, IX, and X Corps. Divisions were numbered with Arabic numbers: 1st Cavalry Division, and the 2d, 3d, 7th, 24th, 25th, 40th, and 45th Infantry Divisions (the 1st Cavalry Division had been converted to a standard infantry division during World War II, but retained its cavalry designation). Regiments were also designated with Arabic numbers, as were separate battalions. The corps, division, regimental, and separate battalion numbers derived from the lineage of each unit, which could trace its heritage back through history.

The bumper numbers on this disabled M4A3E8 Sherman tank identify it as Tank 15 (Δ15) of the 32d Infantry Regimental Tank Company, 7th Infantry Division (7-32-1). This incident took place as X Corps advanced on the central front during an offensive called Operation KILLER, February 20–March 6, 1951. (NACP)

Battalions within an infantry regiment were an integral part of the regiment and were numbered sequentially (1st, 2d, and 3d). Companies and artillery batteries within battalions were lettered. Since the battalions of an infantry regiment were a permanent part of the regiment, all the companies in the regiment were lettered sequentially: the 1st Battalion was composed of A, B, C, and D (heavy weapons) companies; the 2d Battalion, E, F, G, and H (heavy weapons) companies; and the 3d Battalion, I, K, L, and M (heavy weapons) companies. By tradition, dating back to a time when the written forms of the letters "I" and "J" were identical, there was never a J company. Separate companies (those not organic to a battalion) were numbered, rather than lettered, as in the case of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 8th Ranger Companies. Smaller units, such as platoons or sections, were numbered sequentially within each company or battery.

On occasion, elements of one unit were detached for service with another unit. Detached battalions, companies/batteries, platoons, or sections, retained their identity, as when A Battery, 17th Field Artillery Battalion was temporarily attached to the 936th Field Artillery Battalion in June 1951. A part of a unit separated from the main organization for duty elsewhere was called a "detachment," as in the case of the Detachment, 11th Airborne Military Police Company, which was attached to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team for its operations in Korea. Separate T/O&E units smaller than platoon size were also called "detachments" and these were numbered like other separate units (43d Engineer Utility Detachment, for example).

Artillerymen of A Battery, 17th Field Artillery Battalion, firing an 8in. howitzer, June 10, 1951. The 17th was among the first non-divisional artillery battalions to arrive, and for six months was the only 8in. howitzer battalion in Korea. Single batteries, and even individual howitzers, were frequently detached to reinforce the fires of other artillery battalions. (NACP)

Field army

At the time of the Korean War, the field army was the largest self-contained Army unit. Normally commanded by a full general, the Korean War-era field army headquarters (T/O&E 51-1A of 1952) was authorized 384 officers, 49 warrant officers, and 641 enlisted soldiers. In addition to the four principal staff officers, the G-1 (personnel), G-2 (intelligence), G-3 (plans, operations, and training), and G-4 (logistics) and their staffs, the headquarters included some 22 special staff sections dealing with the gamut of military specialties. Except for the headquarters, there was no fixed organization for a field army, which normally consisted of the headquarters, "special troops" (the troops assigned or attached to the headquarters), a variable number of corps and divisions (some or all of which might be assigned to the corps), and other units that were either essential to the operation of the army headquarters, or which were held centrally by the army to support the entire force.

Eighth US Army in Korea, June 1951



- Eighth Army Special Troops were troops assigned or attached to the Eighth Army headquarters.
- Long Lines Signal Group (LLSG) was attached from General MacArthur's General Headquarters, Far East Command (GHQ FEC) to maintain communication between MacArthur and the Eighth Army Commanding General. ASAPAC(Advance) was an element of the Army Security Agency's Pacific headquarters that directed the operations of ASA units in Korea that intercepted, decoded, and analysed Communist communications. In both cases, Eighth Army provided these units with logistic support and had military justice authority (courts-martial jurisdiction) over them (abbreviated "LS & CMJ"), but, while they worked very closely with Eighth Army, they received their direction from their own higher headquarters.
- The UN Civil Assistance Command in Korea (UNCACK) was responsible for short-term assistance to Korean civilians using U.S. Army funds appropriated by Congress under the Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK) program. UNCACK's initial task was to safeguard the rear areas by preventing disease and unrest through provision of food, medicine, clothing, and other goods to meet immediate civilian requirements. But it eventually took on a range of responsibilities, including providing food to prisoners of war, resettling civilian internees, assisting veterans, conducting financial and economic coordination, and carrying out short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction projects.
- KMAG was the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea. KMAG teams were attached to Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) units down to battalion level. Some ROKA units were attached directly to U.S. units. The rest of ROKA was under the Eighth Army Commanding General's operational control (OPCON).

Corps

The three US corps headquarters (and ROK corps, when they were established) assisted the Eighth Army commander in controlling ground forces in Korea. Commanded by a major general or lieutenant general, the corps was primarily a tactical unit designed to carry out combat operations and so had few administrative and logistical units. The corps headquarters (T/O&E 100-1 of 1950) was authorized 97 officers, 17 warrant officers, and 146 enlisted men. The total size of the corps depended on the number and size of the divisions and other units assigned and attached. It consisted of the headquarters, corps troops, and a number of infantry divisions, artillery battalions, an engineer combat group, and other forces depending on the mission and situation. The corps troops normally included a headquarters company, corps artillery headquarters, a field artillery observation battalion, a signal battalion, a light aviation section, a military police company, and administrative elements.



Infantry division

Commanded by a major general, the division was the smallest unit that included all the essential arms and services, and could conduct substantial military operations with its own resources. The authorized strength (T/O&E 7N of 1948) was 18,804 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers. Command and administrative elements were grouped into a headquarters and headquarters company. The division's combat power lay with its three infantry regiments, the division artillery, a tank battalion, an engineer combat battalion, and a reconnaissance company. The support elements were a medical battalion, signal company, military police company, ordnance maintenance company (replaced by an ordnance battalion in 1952), quartermaster company, and replacement company. These units were organized to provide direct support to each of the infantry regiments, and general support to the entire division. During the war, some divisions organized provisional aviation companies, combining the light aircraft and helicopters that were authorized in the infantry regiments under a 1952 T/O&E change.

The **infantry regiment** (T/O&E 7-11N of 1948) was the largest maneuver element of the division. Commanded by a colonel, it consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, a service company, three infantry battalions, a tank company, a heavy mortar company, and a medical company.

The regimental headquarters company included a counterfire platoon that used sound equipment to locate enemy weapons; a communications platoon; an intelligence and reconnaissance (I&R) platoon that conducted foot and jeep-mounted scouting and patrolling, and manned observations posts; an antitank mine platoon capable of both emplacing and locating/destroying land mines; and a security platoon that provided close-in protection for the regimental command post.

The service company consisted of a company headquarters, a regimental administration platoon, and a regimental service platoon. The administration



platoon included a personnel section that handled personnel administration and maintenance of records, a supply section, and a graves registration section that supervised the collection and evacuation of the dead. The service platoon was responsible for supply and maintenance activities. It included a tank maintenance section, a truck maintenance section, and sections to provide ammunition, fuel, and food to the battalions, the tank company, and the heavy weapons company.

The medical company, commanded by the regimental surgeon, consisted of a company headquarters, a collecting platoon, and three battalion medical platoons. The collecting platoon included ambulances and litter bearers as well as the collecting station that provided immediate medical care for the sick and wounded and prepared those requiring further treatment for evacuation to the rear. Each battalion medical platoon consisted of a battalion aid station, medics, and litter bearers, and was designed to support one of the infantry battalions.

Collectively, the support personnel and vehicles of the regiment were called the "regimental train," and were organized into a "combat train" that included the ammunition, maintenance, fuel and lubricants, and medical vehicles



required to support combat operations; and a "field train" that included the kitchen, baggage, and administrative vehicles.

The heavy mortar company consisted of a company headquarters and three heavy mortar platoons. The headquarters included a communications section and an operations and fire direction section that controlled the fires of the company. Each heavy mortar platoon consisted of a headquarters element with a forward observer team to direct fires and four heavy mortar squads, each consisting of one 4.2in. heavy mortar with its crew and a 3/4-ton truck.

The regimental tank company, organized under T/O&E 17-37N of 1948, consisted of a company headquarters and four tank platoons with a total of 22 tanks. The company headquarters included a headquarters section with two tanks with bulldozer attachments and a 1/4-ton truck; a maintenance section with one M32 tank recovery vehicle, one M39 armored utility vehicle or M3A1 halftrack, and a 1/4-ton truck; and an administrative, mess, and supply section with two 2 1/2-ton trucks, a 3.5in. rocket launcher, and a .50-cal. heavy machine gun, which could be either ground mounted, or mounted on either of the 2 1/2-ton trucks. Each tank platoon consisted of five tanks. The Number 1 tank was that of the platoon leader, who also had a 1/4-ton truck. Tanks Number 2 and 3 constituted the 1st Section of the platoon; Tank 4 (that of the platoon sergeant) and Tank 5 formed the 2d Section.

During the war, some of the authorized weapons and equipment were changed and the size of the regiment reduced by eliminating some administrative

Battalion Surgeon 1st Lt Buford Sasebold (second from right), 2d Lt Frederick W. Holzwarth (next left), and three medical corpsmen treat a casualty at the battalion aid station operated by the 32d Infantry Regimental Medical Company, May 10, 1953. After treatment, casualties were sent to the 7th Medical Battalion clearing station for further evacuation to a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital. (NACP)

A 4.2in. mortar squad of 2d Platoon, Heavy Mortar Company, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, at their bunker on Heartbreak Ridge in east central Korea, September 27, 1952, during the static phase of the war. (MHI)

and support positions while maintaining the fighting strength. The authorized strength of the regiment was 3,774 at the start of the war, 3,662 in 1952, and 3,531 by the end of the war. A 1952 T/O&E authorized a six-man light aviation section with a light liaison airplane and a helicopter, but these were almost always combined into a centrally controlled divisional aviation element.

When employed tactically, the regiment used its infantry battalions, supported by the tank company, as its maneuver forces, with the heavy mortar company providing supporting fire. Normally, one of the 105mm howitzer battalions of the division artillery provided direct support fire for each of the regiments when in contact with the enemy. The direct support artillery battalion and other elements, such as an engineer combat company and an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battery, could also be attached to the regiment, forming a "regimental combat team" (RCT) for a particular mission. In addition to the divisional regiments, three self-contained separate regimental combat teams were sent to Korea. The 5th RCT was normally employed by being attached to a division, and, for a time, served as the third regiment in the 24th Infantry Division, replacing the 34th Infantry Regiment, which had taken so many casualties that it was sent back to Japan to be reorganized. The 65th RCT operated as a separate unit for only a short time before being assigned as the third regiment of the 3d Infantry Division. The 187th Airborne RCT, built from elements of the 11th Airborne Division, operated throughout the war as a separate regimental combat team.



The crew of an M4A3E8 tank of the 5th Regimental Tank Company surrounded by British and American correspondents after crossing the 38th Parallel, April 2, 1951. The 5th Regimental Combat Team was the last US occupation force to leave Korea in 1949, and was stationed in Hawaii when the war began. The 5th RCT had strong local connections with Hawaii (many of its members were Hawaii residents), reflected in the names of their tanks. (NACP)

The **airborne infantry regiment** (T/O&E 7-31 of 1950) had an authorized strength of 3,376 and a structure similar to that of the standard infantry regiment except that, instead of a regimental tank company and heavy mortar company, it had a support company with a company headquarters (headquarters section, operations and fire control section, and communications section), two heavy mortar platoons with four 4.2in. mortars each, and an anti-tank platoon with six 90mm T8 antitank guns on lightweight airborne carriages, three .50-cal. heavy machine guns, and six 3.5in. rocket launchers. Although the T8 anti-tank guns remained on the support company T/O&E throughout the war, the 187th found them to be too heavy during their first combat jump in October 1950. During its second airborne operation in March 1951, the 187th jumped without the T8s. The anti-tank platoon was then replaced by an additional heavy mortar platoon, and the anti-tank capability of the battalions was beefed up by replacing the 75mm with 105mm recoilless rifles. In April 1951, a section of six M24 light tanks was added to the support company. In the **airborne regimental combat team**, the airborne field artillery battalion (T/O&E 6-225 of 1950) had 12 105mm howitzers, rather than the 18 in a conventional FA battalion (changed to 18 in T/O&E 6-325 of 1953), and the airborne AAA AW battery (T/O&E 4/227 of 1950) had towed instead of self-propelled weapons.

The **infantry battalion** (T/O&E 7-15N of 1948) was the basic infantry tactical unit and, supported by the tank and heavy mortar companies, provided the combat power of the regiment. Because it was an integral part of the regiment, it had little in the way of administrative and logistical support elements, most



Paratroopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team conduct a practice jump from C-119s of the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) near Seoul, March 23, 1951. (MHI)

Airborne Infantry Regiment T/O&E 7-31



- One light tank section (six M24 75mm gun tanks) was added to the support company in April 1951.
- The antitank platoon was replaced with a third heavy mortar platoon in the summer of 1951.
- Later T/O&E changes reduced the strength of the airborne infantry regiment to 3,200.

of this support being provided by the regimental service and medical companies. Commanded by a lieutenant colonel, the infantry battalion was composed of a headquarters and headquarters company, three rifle companies, and a heavy weapons company. It had a strength of 917 at the beginning of the war, dropping to 859 through several T/O&E changes by the end of the war.

The headquarters and headquarters company consisted of the battalion headquarters and the headquarters company, which included the company headquarters, the battalion headquarters section, an intelligence section, a communications platoon, and a pioneer and ammunition (P&A) platoon. The battalion headquarters consisted of the commander, the executive officer, and the staff (S-1, S-2, S-3, assistant S-3, and S-4), who, along with the enlisted men



of the battalion headquarters section, manned the battalion command post (CP). The headquarters was equipped with three 1/4-ton trucks, and a 2 1/2-ton truck mounting a .50-cal. heavy machine gun. The company headquarters had one 1/4-ton truck, a 3/4-ton truck, and a 2 1/2-ton truck with a .50-cal. machine gun, as well as two 3.5in. rocket launchers. The communication platoon was equipped with five 1/4-ton trucks and a 3/4-ton truck, and contained a 3.5in. rocket launcher in addition to the individual weapons of the platoon members. The intelligence section consisted of two two-man squads, each with a 1/4-ton truck, which performed intelligence analysis as well as patrol and reconnaissance work. The pioneer and ammunition platoon provided security to the headquarters, carried ammunition, and did pioneer engineering work, such as laying and sweeping mines, constructing foot bridges, and emplacing barbed wire. The pioneer and ammunition platoon had two 3.5in. rocket launchers, one 1/4-ton truck, a 3/4-ton truck, and a 2 1/2-ton truck mounting a .50-cal. machine gun.

The heavy weapons company, commanded by a captain, consisted of a company headquarters, a machine-gun platoon (four heavy and four light machine guns), a recoilless rifle platoon (four 75mm recoilless rifles), and an 81mm mortar platoon (four 81mm mortars). The company headquarters had two 1/4-ton trucks, a 3/4-ton truck, and a 2 1/2-ton truck mounting a .50-cal. heavy machine gun. The machine-gun platoon consisted of a headquarters with one



Mortar Platoon, D Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, commanded by 1st Lt Donald P. Noble (standing, left), with its four 81mm mortars, August 21, 1951. Lt Noble carries a .45-cal. pistol in a holster. The platoon sergeant (center) holds a .30-cal. carbine. The assistant platoon sergeant (right front) and most of the soldiers are armed with M1 rifles. (NACP)

Automatic Rifleman, Pfc Joseph E. Sayer (left), and Assistant Automatic Rifleman, Pvt Vern E. Heilskov, of E Company, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, with their .30-cal. M1918A2 Browning automatic rifle (BAR) in a bunker, August 20, 1951. (NACP)

1/4-ton truck and two 3.5in. rocket launchers; two machine-gun sections, each with a headquarters element and two machine-gun squads. Generally, the machine-gun section was used as a unit under the direction of the section leader, with both guns firing against one target to provide the greatest possible density of fire without interruption. Each machine-gun squad had one gun crew, but was equipped with two machine guns: a heavy, water-cooled M1917A1 .30-cal. machine gun, and a light, air-cooled M1919A4, or A6, .30-cal. machine gun as well as a 1/4-ton truck for transportation. In the attack, the crew would carry and fire the light machine gun. In the defense, or when feasible in the attack, both guns would be manned by skeleton crews.

The recoilless rifle platoon consisted of a headquarters element with a 1/4-ton truck and a .50-cal. heavy machine gun with a tripod, and two sections with one 3/4-ton truck, two 75mm recoilless rifles on tripod mounts, and one 3.5in. rocket launcher in each. These weapons were used primarily against fortifications, tanks, and other vehicles. In September 1952, the T/O&E of the heavy weapons company was changed to replace one of the 75mm recoilless rifles in each section with two 105mm recoilless rifles, a powerful weapon that proved to have problems with reliability and accuracy, but was the predecessor of the famous 106mm recoilless rifle that served for decades in the US and foreign armies after the war.

The mortar platoon provided indirect fires in support of the rifle companies. It consisted of a platoon headquarters (which included a fire direction center and had two 3.5in. rocket launchers and a 1/4-ton truck), and two mortar sections, each with a headquarters element and two mortar squads with one 81mm mortar and one 1/4-ton truck in each squad.

The rifle company (T/O&E 7-17N/c.1 of 1950) was the basic infantry unit and had administrative and supply, as well as tactical combat functions. It was commanded by a captain and consisted of a headquarters section, three rifle platoons, and a weapons platoon. The headquarters section included the

Rifle Platoon 1950 T/O&E 7-17N with changes through 15 Nov 50

Legend

- **a** Platoon Leader (Lieutenant) (.45-cal. pistol)
- **b** Platoon Sergeant (M/Sgt) (M1 rifle)
- **c** Assistant Platoon Sergeant (Sfc) (M1 rifle)
- **d** Messenger (Pfc) (M1 rifle)
- **e** Squad Leader (Sfc) (M1 rifle)
- **f** Assistant Squad Leader (Sgt) (M1 rifle)
- **g** Automatic Rifleman (Cpl) (BAR, .45-cal. pistol)
- **h** Assistant Automatic Rifleman (Pfc) (M1 rifle)
- **i** Rifleman/Ammo bearer (Pfc) (M1 rifle)
- **j** Rifleman (Cpl) (M1 rifle)
- **k** Rifleman (Pfc) (M1 rifle with M7 Grenade Launcher)
- **l** Machine Gunner (Cpl) (M1919A6 LMG) (.45-cal. pistol)
- **m** Assistant Machine Gunner (Pfc) (.45-cal. pistol)
- **n** Ammo bearer (Pfc) (M1 rifle)
- **o** Ammo bearer (Pfc) (M2 carbine)
- **p** Rocket Gunner (Cpl) (3.5in. RL) (.45-cal. pistol)
- **q** Assistant Rocket Gunner (Pfc) (.45-cal. pistol)

T/O&E called for one soldier per squad, as designated by the squad leader, to be issued the M1C sniper rifle.

Rifle Platoon 1953 T/O&E 7-17N with 2 changes through 13 Apr 53

Legend

- **a** Platoon Leader (Lieutenant) (.45-cal. pistol)
- **b** Platoon Sergeant (M/Sgt) (M1 rifle)
- **c** Assistant Platoon Sergeant (Sfc) (M1 rifle)
- **d** Messenger (Pfc) (M1 rifle)
- **e** Squad Leader (Sfc) (M1 rifle)
- **f** Assistant Squad Leader (Sgt) (M1 rifle)
- **g** Automatic Rifleman (Cpl) (BAR)
- **i** Rifleman/Ammo bearer (Pfc) (M1 rifle)
- **j** Rifleman (Cpl) (M1 rifle)
- **k** Rifleman/Ammo bearer (Pfc) (M1 rifle with M7 Grenade Launcher)
- **l** Machine Gunner (Cpl) (M1919A6 LMG) (.45-cal. pistol)
- **m** Assistant Machine Gunner (Pfc) (.45-cal. pistol)
- **n** Ammo bearer (Pfc) (M1 rifle)
- **o** Ammo bearer (Pfc) (M2 carbine)
- **p** Rocket Gunner (Cpl) (3.5in. RL) (.45-cal. pistol)
- **q** Assistant Rocket Gunner (Pfc) (.45-cal. pistol)

T/O&E called for one soldier per squad, as designated by the squad leader, to be issued the M1C sniper rifle.

command group (company commander, executive office, first sergeant, company clerk, communications sergeant, radio operators, messengers, and an orderly), and an administrative group that consisted of the administrative warrant officer, mess personnel, the supply sergeant, and an armorer. Each rifle company had four 1/4-ton trucks and one 2 1/2-ton truck, which mounted a .50-cal. heavy machine gun. The weapons platoon included the platoon headquarters, a mortar section with three 60mm mortars for close-in support of the rifle platoons, and a recoilless rifle section with three 57mm recoilless rifles.

The major combat power of the rifle company lay with its three rifle platoons. Each platoon had a five-man headquarters consisting of a platoon leader (lieutenant), platoon sergeant (master sergeant), assistant platoon sergeant (sergeant first class), and two messengers (privates first class); three nine-man rifle squads; and a nine-man weapons squad. The rifle squad consisted of a squad leader (sergeant first class) and an assistant squad leader (sergeant), both armed with a .30-cal. M1 Garand rifle; an automatic rifleman (corporal) armed with a .30-cal. M1918A2 Browning automatic rifle (BAR) and a .45-cal. pistol (rarely carried in practice); an assistant automatic rifleman (private first class) armed with the M1 rifle; and five riflemen (three corporals and two privates first class) also armed with the M1 rifle. One of the riflemen served as ammunition bearer for the BAR, and one carried an M7 grenade launcher. One man in the squad, designated by the squad leader, was to be armed with the M1C sniper rifle, although the sniper rifles were usually held at platoon or company level and issued to selected snipers. The weapons squad consisted of a squad leader (sergeant first class), a four-man team with one M20 3.5in. rocket launcher, and another four-man team with an M1919A6 light machine gun. The rocket gunner and machine gunner were corporals, while the two assistant gunners and four ammunition bearers were privates first class. Two of the ammunition bearers were armed with M2 .30-cal. carbines.

M45 tank of the Headquarters and Service Company, 6th Tank Battalion, crossing the Kum River, September 16, 1950, during the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. The M45 was essentially an M26 tank with a 105mm howitzer in place of the 90mm gun. Records indicate the 6th Tank Battalion was the only unit in Korea equipped with these tanks, and M46 tanks had replaced all of them by early 1951. (NACP)

T/O&E 7-17 of 15 May 1952 retained the rifle platoon structure, but the BAR gunner was no longer authorized a pistol. An additional light machine gun replaced the rocket launcher in the weapons squad and a four-man 3.5in. rocket launcher team was added to the rifle platoon headquarters.

In combat, American infantrymen found that it was useful to have more than one BAR in the squad, while the size of the squad varied as men were killed and wounded, and replacements arrived. In 1952, the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces directed overseas theatre commanders to issue extra BARs. By the fall of 1952, rifle squads had two BARs and in April 1953 the T/O&E was changed to reflect two automatic riflemen, deleting the assistant automatic rifleman position so that the squad remained at nine men.

The divisional **tank battalion** (T/O&E 17-35N of 1948) provided the division's armor punch. The organization changed very little during the war, although the types of tanks and the tank nomenclature varied. The tank battalions that deployed to Korea were organized under various T/O&Es and some were designated as "heavy tank battalions," some as "medium tank battalions," and some as "tank battalions." They were also variously equipped with M24, M4A3E8, M26, M45, and M46 tanks. In November 1951, all Eighth Army tank battalions were reorganized under T/O&E 17-35N with some local modifications. The T/O&E battalion had a headquarters and service company, with two M24 light tanks, three 90mm-gun M26 heavy tanks, two M32 tank recovery vehicles, six M39 armored utility vehicles (AUVs), two heavy wrecking trucks, and 1/4-ton, 3/4-ton, and 2 1/2-ton trucks. Each heavy tank company was





authorized 20 M26 tanks, two M45 tanks (M26 tanks with 105mm howitzers instead of 90mm guns), one M32 tank recovery vehicle, and one M39 armored utility vehicle. In Korea, all the battalions were redesignated as "tank battalions" and all were equipped with two M24 light tanks and 69 medium tanks (either M4A3E8 or M46). The tree diagram shows this organization.

The divisional **reconnaissance company** (T/O&E 17-57N of 1948), commanded by a captain, consisted of a company headquarters and three reconnaissance platoons. Its mission was to provide security and reconnaissance for the division headquarters. The company headquarters consisted of a headquarters section; a maintenance section; and administration, mess, and supply sections. The headquarters section included one M24 light tank commanded by the company executive officer, an M39 armored utility vehicle (AUV), and three 1/4-ton trucks. The maintenance section, which included the armorer and tank and automotive mechanics, was also mounted in an M39. The admin section (clerks and mess personnel) included three 2 1/2-ton trucks mounting .50-cal. machine guns, and a 3/4-ton truck. Each of the three reconnaissance platoons included a 1/4-ton truck for the platoon leader, a scout section of four 1/4-ton trucks (two of which mounted .30-cal. light machine guns), a tank section of two M24 light tanks, a nine-man rifle squad and driver mounted in an M39 and equipped with a water-cooled .30-cal. heavy machine gun, and a support squad with two 1/4-ton trucks and a 81mm mortar. In combat, there was some variation in the equipment of the reconnaissance platoon, especially early in the war, when 37mm-gun M8 armored cars, M20 armored utility cars, and M3A1 halftracks substituted for or augmented the 1/4-ton trucks and M39 AUVs of the companies.

Each tank battalion headquarters and service company included a reconnaissance platoon, and two separate reconnaissance platoons were assigned to Eighth Army Special Troops to provide security for Eighth Army headquarters and conduct reconnaissance.

The **division artillery** (T/O&E 6-10N of 1948) consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery with two light aircraft, three 105mm howitzer battalions, one 155mm howitzer battalion, an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons (self-propelled) (AAA AW (SP)) battalion, and a medical detachment. Each 105mm howitzer battalion (T/O&E 6-25N of 1948) consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery with two light aircraft, a service battery, and three howitzer batteries, each with six 105mm howitzers towed by 2 1/2-ton trucks. The service battery included the ammunition train, responsible for carrying the battalion's ammunition, and for replenishing ammunition from forward ordnance ammunition dumps. The 155mm howitzer battalion (T/O&E 6-335N of 1948) was organized in the same way as the 105mm battalions, with each howitzer battery comprised of six 155mm howitzers towed by M5 13-ton high-speed

M24 light tanks of the 16th Reconnaissance Company, 1st Cavalry Division, move north across the Han River during the Eighth Army advance, June 6, 1951. (NACP)

M19 twin 40mm gun motor carriage assigned to the 187th Airborne RCT, which had previously been issued truck-towed 40mm AAA guns that could be dropped by parachute. In 1951, the 187th was beefed up with light tanks, M19s, and other heavy weapons for its ground combat role. Photo taken June 6, 1951. (NACP)



tractors. Prior to 1952, the field artillery battalions were referred to as "truck-drawn" or "tractor-drawn." After 1952, they were called "towed" battalions.

The AAA AW (SP) battalion (T/O&E 44-75N of 1948) consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery and four automatic weapons batteries. Each automatic weapons battery consisted of a battery headquarters and two automatic weapons platoons. Each platoon consisted of a platoon headquarters and four gun sections. Each gun section consisted of an automatic weapons squad with one M19 twin 40mm gun motor carriage (GMC) and one M16 multi-gun motor carriage (four .50-cal. machine guns mounted on a halftrack), which was also called a "Quad Fifty." In Korea, most of the AAA AW (SP) battalions were armed entirely with M16 Quad Fifties.

Ranger companies: North Korean guerrilla operations in the early days of the Korean War prompted General Walker and the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins to organize units to conduct similar operations. He had directed that "Marauder" (later renamed "Ranger") companies be formed to conduct operations behind enemy lines. The 8213th Army Unit, Eighth Army Ranger Company, was established on August 25, 1950, trained in Korea, and began combat operations on October 14, 1950. In December, the Ranger companies trained in the United States began arriving in Korea. Commanded by a captain and composed of five officers and 100 enlisted soldiers, they were organized under T/O&E 7-87 of October 1950 with the mission to "infiltrate through enemy lines and attack command posts, artillery, tank parks, and key communications centers or facilities." The six-man company headquarters included the company commander, executive officer, first sergeant, and three

enlisted men, a communications chief, a medical aidman, and a messenger, each of which doubled as a light truck driver for the three company vehicles: two 1/4-ton jeeps and a 2 1/2-ton truck. Each of the three rifle platoons consisted of a platoon headquarters (the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and a medical aidman) and three ranger squads. Each ten-man ranger squad was heavily armed, with two Browning Automatic Rifles, a .30-cal. light machine gun, a 3.5in. rocket launcher, a 60mm mortar, and two sets of demolition equipment, in addition to four M1 rifles, four M2 carbines, and four submachine guns. These weapons were distributed among the squad members depending on the mission. Each platoon headquarters had an additional .30-cal. light machine gun and a 57mm recoilless rifle, which could be provided to the ranger squads as the tactical situation required. This was a lean organization with no support personnel. The T/O&E provided for a seven-man augmentation (a supply sergeant, a mess sergeant, four cooks, and a clerk) if directed by higher headquarters, but the Ranger Companies generally relied on the units to which they were attached for their mess and supply support. The Eighth Army Ranger Company was initially organized on the basis of late-World War II Ranger Company T/O&Es, but was later reorganized under T/O&E 7-87. In August 1951, all the Ranger Companies were inactivated.

The **engineer combat battalion** (T/O&E 5-15N of 1948) built and maintained roads, bridges, landing strips, fortifications, and other such facilities; installed and cleared obstacles and minefields; carried out demolitions; assisted in assault stream crossings and attacks against fortifications; operated water points; and, in an emergency, fought as infantry.



The battalion consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters and service company, four identical engineer combat companies, and a medical detachment. The headquarters and service company consisted of a headquarters and an equipment platoon with cranes, tractors, road graders, dump trucks, bridging material, and other equipment, as well as five M4A3 tanks with bulldozer blades. The engineer combat companies consisted of a headquarters and three identical platoons, each with a headquarters and three engineer combat squads. Each company had 23 dump trucks (one of which was assigned to each squad for transportation, as well as hauling material), a bulldozer, and other vehicles and equipment.



The divisional **medical battalion** (T/O&E 8-15N of 1948) operated the division clearing station, evacuated the sick, injured, and wounded, and provided dental service. It was organized into a headquarters and headquarters company, an ambulance company, with 30 3/4-ton ambulances, and a clearing company, which operated the divisional clearing station. In combat, the clearing station received casualties from the regimental collecting station, provided immediate treatment, and evacuated the casualties as quickly as possible, either to a nearby mobile army surgical hospital (MASH) or directly to an evacuation hospital in Pusan. Those seriously wounded casualties who were evacuated by helicopter bypassed the division clearing station and were flown from the battalion aid station or, in some cases, directly from the place where the man was wounded.



The divisional **military police company** (T/O&E 19-27N of 1948) was responsible for the enforcement of military law, orders, and regulations within the division, controlled traffic and the circulation of personnel and vehicles within the division area, protected property, handled prisoners of war, and operated check points. It consisted of the provost marshal section; a company headquarters; a police platoon consisting of a headquarters and three ten-man police squads; and a traffic platoon consisting of a platoon headquarters and three ten-man traffic squads.



The divisional **ordnance maintenance company** (T/O&E 9–8 of 1948) carried out field maintenance (major repairs, except for rebuilding and major overhaul) of vehicles, weapons, equipment, and ammunition; stored and issued ordnance supplies; conducted technical inspections of ordnance material; and evacuated weapons and equipment requiring major overhaul or rebuilding to the ordnance depots. It consisted of a division ordnance officer section, a company headquarters, a supply platoon, and two maintenance platoons, each consisting of an automotive section, a service and recovery section, and an armament section. The service and recovery sections each had an M26 tractor and a 45-ton M15 8-wheel semi-trailer (together called an M25 Dragon Wagon), capable of transporting tanks and other heavy vehicles and equipment, an M32 tank recovery vehicle, two 4-ton wrecker trucks, and a machine shop mounted on a 2½-ton truck chassis. The armament section had specialized equipment for artillery repair and maintenance, while the automotive section had the capability to perform repairs on motor vehicles.

In May 1952, the divisional ordnance maintenance company was replaced by an **ordnance battalion** (T/O&E 9-25) composed of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, a forward ordnance company, and a rear ordnance company. The forward ordnance company included three maintenance platoons, each capable of supporting a regimental combat team, equipped with two M32 tank recovery vehicles and two 6-ton wreckers. The rear company included a service platoon recovery section with two Dragon Wagons.

The divisional **quartermaster company** (T/O&E 10-17N) provided food; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; Army-issue clothing and equipment; bathing and laundry facilities; and graves registration supervision. The quartermaster company drew supplies in bulk from supply points established by an Army-





level quartermaster group and transported and distributed them through division supply points. The quartermaster company included the office of the division quartermaster, the company headquarters, a supply platoon, three truck platoons with 16 2½-ton trucks each for transporting supplies, and a field service platoon providing bath, laundry, and graves registration services.

The **replacement company** (T/O&E 20-7N of 1948), consisting of a company headquarters and four replacement platoons, received, administered, and trained replacements pending assignment to units within the division.



The divisional **signal company** (T/O&E 11-7N of 1948) installed and operated wire and radio communications, and provided teletype and radio relay communication, photography, and messenger service within the division headquarters. It was organized administratively into headquarters, operations, and construction platoons, and a division signal supply, photo, and maintenance section. For field operations, the company was organized into flexible teams organized in two groups, one to support the command post and one to support the division's rear echelon. The construction platoon constructed and maintained wire lines; the operations platoon provided message center, radio, telephone and teletype, and radio relay support.

Non-divisional artillery

Corps artillery consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery (T/O&E 6-501 of 1950) to which a field artillery observation battalion and varying numbers of artillery groups and battalions were attached. Corps artillery battalions might be armed with towed or self-propelled 105mm howitzers, 155mm howitzers, 8in. howitzers, 155mm guns, or towed 240mm howitzers. These battalions were organized like divisional battalions, but had their own medical detachments. The 8in. howitzer and 155mm gun battalions (both under T/O&E 6-415 of 1950 [towed] or T/O&E 6-435 of 1950 [self-propelled]) had three four-gun or four-howitzer batteries (total of 12 tubes). The 240mm howitzer battalions (T/O&E 6-515 of 1950) had three batteries of two howitzers each (total of six tubes).

Prior to 1952, the self-propelled artillery battalions were referred to as "armored field artillery" (AFA) battalions, as they were normally assigned to armor divisions. However, because of the shortage of artillery units, several AFA battalions were sent to Korea. They were organized similarly to truck and tractor battalions but were equipped with M7 105mm howitzer motor carriages (HMCs), M37 105mm self-propelled howitzers, M41 155mm HMCs, M43 8in. HMCs, or M40 155mm gun motor carriages (GMCs).

An **artillery group** consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery (T/O&E 6-12 of 1948) and several artillery battalions. The number, type, and caliber of the attached units varied to meet the needs of the situation. In the absence of a group headquarters, one or more battalions could be attached to another battalion to form an **artillery battalion group**, in which case, the battalion-group headquarters would perform the same function as the artillery group.

The mission of the **field artillery observation battalion** (T/O&E 6-75 of 1948) was to use sound, flash, and radar ranging to locate enemy artillery and mortars and to collect meteorological data. The battalion consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery, three observation batteries, and a medical detachment. Each observation battery consisted of sound and flash equipment and two radar sets.

SCR784 radars of the 1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion being pulled into position by M5A3 13-ton high-speed tractors, August 29, 1950. Normally one FA obsn bn would be assigned to a corps, but during most of the Korean War, the 1st FA Obsn Bn was the only one in Korea and supported each corps with one battery. In January 1951 it was reequipped as a 105mm howitzer battalion, but reverted to its observation role the following month. The M5A3 tractors were later replaced with 4-ton trucks. (NACP)

The **AAA group headquarters and headquarters battery** (T/O&E 44-12 of 1948) provided tactical control and administrative supervision of two or more antiaircraft battalions. Normally, the AAA group would be assigned at Army level and the attached units were 90mm gun battalions or a mixture of 90mm gun and AAA AW battalions. The **AAA gun battalion (90mm)** (T/O&E 44-15 of 1948) consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery, four gun batteries, and a medical detachment. Each gun battery had a battery headquarters, a gun platoon, and a range platoon. The range platoon used radar to track aerial targets. The gun platoon had a headquarters, four gun sections, and a machine-gun section. Each gun section had one M2 90mm AAA gun towed by a tractor. The machine-gun section had four M55 multiple .50-cal. machine-gun trailers (essentially a Quad Fifty mounted on a trailer towed by a 2½-ton truck). These battalions provided local air defense against high-flying aircraft and could also fire against mechanized or other terrestrial targets. They were normally assigned to corps or army artillery, either as a separate battalion, or attached to an AAA group.

The **AAA AW battalion (mobile)** (T/O&E 44-27 of 1948) had a headquarters and headquarters battery and two automatic weapons platoons. Each platoon had a headquarters and four gun sections. Each gun section had a range squad that directed the guns, one 40mm gun mounted on an M2A1 halftrack, and one M55 Quad Fifty trailer towed by a 2½-ton truck. A 1952 T/O&E change (T/O&E 44-27A) replaced the 40mm halftracks with 40mm guns towed by 2½-ton trucks and reorganized the platoons into a machine-gun section of four machine-gun squads, each with one M55 Quad Fifty, and a 40mm gun section of four 40mm squads, each with one towed 40mm gun. The **AAA AW battalion (semi-mobile)** consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery, four automatic weapons batteries, and a medical detachment. Each AW battery contained eight towed 40mm AAA guns and eight M55 towed Quad Fifties. The battalion had only enough organic transportation to move one battery at a time, hence the term "semi-mobile." These units were frequently paired with 90mm gun battalions to protect fixed installation.

Corps, army, and theater support organizations

Based on the experience of World War II, the Army had developed the **logistical command**: a headquarters structure to which service and support units, as well as combat units for security and defense, could be assigned or attached. There were three types of logistical command, all with the same basic structure, but differing in the size of its staff and the number of service units assigned or attached. The Type A command would support about 30,000 combat troops (including the organic support troops within the combat units), a Type B command would support a force of 100,000, and a Type C command would support more than 400,000 troops. The 2d Logistical Command, located in the Pusan area, was a Type C command supporting all of Eighth Army. The 3d Logistical Command, a Type B command, was initially established to support X Corps at Inch'on, but later became the support element for 2d Logistical Command. Both were absorbed into Korea Communications Zone (KCOMZ) in 1952. The majority of non-divisional administrative and technical service units were assigned or attached to the logistic commands (later to KCOMZ), but some directly supported Eighth Army or the corps.

Personnel arriving in Korea were processed through two replacement battalions (later re-designated replacement depots), one in Pusan and one in Inch'on. Most personnel and material arrived by sea through the major ports of Pusan on the southeast coast and Inch'on on the west coast, near Seoul. The 7th Transportation Major Port operated Pusan and the 21st Transportation Medium Port operated Inch'on. The 14th Transportation Port Battalion

operated two other medium-sized seaports on the south and west coasts, while sub-units of the 7th Transportation Major Port operated smaller ports, called Port Commands or Outports. In each case, the units administered the ports, repaired and maintained the port facilities, operated watercraft, and managed the arrival, unloading, and departure of shipping.

Within Korea, the 425th Transportation Traffic Regulating Group coordinated all rail, highway, and air transportation. After the establishment of KCOMZ, this group regulated traffic within the KCOMZ area, while a separate detachment performed that mission in the combat zone under Eighth Army. Rail traffic was controlled by the 3d Transportation Military Railway Service (TMRS), which supervised the Korean National Railway and the small number of private narrow-gauge railway lines. The 3d TMRS carried out its mission through two transportation railway operating battalions and one transportation railway shop battalion. Motor transport activity was regulated by the 351st Transportation Highway Transport Group and conducted by transportation truck or heavy truck companies (48 trucks) and amphibian truck companies (38 DUKW 2$^{1}/_{2}$-ton amphibious trucks). The actual number of operational vehicles varied widely; on average, truck companies kept 35 vehicles operating, while at one point the 3d Transportation Amphibian Truck Company operated 71 DUKWs.

Road transportation in Korea was a challenge. The mountain chains and steep hills channeled movement and there were few paved roads, most of which were narrow, poorly drained, and surfaced with crushed gravel. Improvement and maintenance of these roads; construction of new roads, bridges, airfields, depots, and other facilities; rehabilitation of ports; and construction of prisoner of war facilities was the mission of the engineer units. Each corps was supported by an engineer combat group composed of three or four engineer combat battalions structured similarly to the divisional battalions, as well as dump truck, light equipment, panel bridge, float bridge, and pontoon bridge companies. At Eighth Army level, three engineer construction groups of two to four construction battalions performed large-scale engineering construction operations. The 409th Engineer Brigade Headquarters (two construction battalions) performed these operations in and around Pusan, first for Eighth Army, then for KCOMZ, until an engineer construction group replaced it in March 1953.

The 2d Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) was organized and equipped to support amphibious operations by landing assault troops, bringing in supplies and equipment over the beach, and operating ports and harbors. The 2d ESB

Road transportation in Korea was a challenge. Rains washed out this road, part of the main supply route (MSR), July 27, 1952. 2d Infantry Division Engineers make a temporary repair. (MHI)

served in Korea from the Inch'on landing until October 1951, when it returned to Japan. Some engineer units called Special Category Army With Air Force (SCARWAF) were assigned to the Air Force to build and maintain airfields.

A signal group that supervised four signal battalions provided Eighth Army communications. A signal battalion supported each corps. One signal depot supported Eighth Army and another supported KCOMZ. One signal group from Japan helped maintain communications between Korea and FEC headquarters. The 440th Signal Aviation Construction Battalion was assigned to support the Air Force.

Eighth Army ordnance maintenance and supply service was provided by three ordnance groups: one that issued and maintained vehicles and towed weapons; one that provided frontline support, with one battalion supporting each US corps; and one that operated ammunition dumps. A fourth group located at Pusan and assigned to KCOMZ supervised ordnance support for units throughout Korea.

Quartermaster support was provided through two depots in Pusan, and two quartermaster groups that provided forward support to the Seoul area and to the US corps. An innovation during the Korean War was the establishment by the 23d Quartermaster Group of quartermaster service centers, one for each US corps, that brought together many quartermaster units to operate laundry, bath, clothing and equipment exchange, and other services. The Army and KCOMZ quartermaster units also provided for the further evacuation of the remains of American war dead that had been evacuated through division, corps, and army collecting points or interred in temporary cemeteries.

The Korean War saw two important innovations in medical treatment of combat casualties. The first was the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH), originally a 60-bed truck-borne hospital designed to bring surgical treatment of casualties close to the front lines. There were not enough MASH units to support each division, as intended, but by 1952, two MASH units (including a Norwegian MASH) supported each US corps and the size of the units had been increased substantially. The other innovation was the evacuation of casualties by helicopter from the field to the MASH or, in some cases, further to the rear. Two hospital trains provided a means to evacuate large numbers of wounded. Evacuation hospitals treated wounded and evacuated more serious cases to larger hospitals in Japan. Field and station hospitals provided health care to forces stationed in Korea and to prisoners of war. Medical battalion headquarters provided administration and support to separate medical units and, at the end of the war, most were brought under the 30th Medical Group. Two medical depots, one in Pusan and one in the Seoul area, received, stored, and issued medical supplies.

The major chemical units were the 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, which served as an artillery unit (and was eventually re-designated as an infantry mortar battalion) and two chemical smoke generator battalions, which were prepared to obscure major installations and units in the Seoul and Pusan areas in the event of enemy air attack. Two chemical service companies issued and serviced flamethrowers and two chemical decontamination companies supplemented the quartermaster bath units. Otherwise, the chemical units prepared for the eventuality of enemy use of chemical or biological weapons.

Five military police battalions provided security, controlled traffic, guarded convoys, trains, and railway facilities, fought the black market, manned guard posts and checkpoints, and operated stockades for Eighth Army and KCOMZ. The huge number of enemy prisoners of war (POW) required a substantial military police effort, with five MP battalions involved in the processing and control of POWs and the operation of POW and internee compounds. Another battalion provided staff and administrative support to the POW effort. In 1951 a military police group was activated to supervise prison operations on the island of Koje-do off the Korean south coast, where many of the POW camps were located. In 1952, a provisional Prisoner of War Command (later the 8203d AU POW Command) was activated to administer the entire POW effort.

Tactics

In the early weeks of the war, General Walker had no choice but to conduct a retrograde. In prewar retrograde doctrine, the **delay** used the same tactics as the defense (described below), but its purpose was to trade space for time, slowing the enemy without fighting a decisive engagement. The **withdrawal** was an operation through which a force disengaged from the enemy to regain or preserve freedom of action. In **retirement**, a force avoided decisive combat by marching away from the enemy after breaking contact by withdrawal, or when there was no contact. In Korea, US infantry fought as individual and widely separated battalion and regimental combat teams, setting up defensive positions blocking the main avenues of approach, defending as long as possible without getting trapped, then withdrawing to new blocking positions. This was not easy. The North Koreans infiltrated through gaps and around the flanks, set up roadblocks and ambushes, and overran command posts and artillery positions.

The artillery battalions that deployed with the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions and 1st Cavalry Division in July 1950 were badly under strength in personnel and guns. The artillery tried to make up for the shortage through rapid firing, but the frequent displacement of the guns during the repeated withdrawals made targeting difficult and the gunners frequently had to defend their guns against KPA forces that had infiltrated through or outflanked the infantry. In the first month of the war, US artillery battalions that were ambushed or overrun lost or abandoned 30 howitzers.

The North Koreans had a strong force of heavily armored Soviet-built T34 tanks with 85mm guns. The US M24 light tanks initially deployed to Korea could neither punch through the T34's armor, nor resist the 85mm shells. Photographs of the time frequently show M24s in hastily dug revetments, facing south with the turret reversed and the gun pointing north so that, upon the approach of the enemy, they could "shoot and scoot"—firing a few rounds before heading south. The army's 2.36in. anti-tank rocket launchers also proved to be ineffective. More powerful 3.5in. rocket launchers were soon rushed to Korea, but the tank problem wasn't solved until American medium tanks arrived on the scene at the end of July. Meanwhile, the outgunned M24s assisted in the delay as best they could, supporting infantry in counterattacks and on defensive positions and helping them break through roadblocks.

In spite of these difficulties, Walker's forces delayed the enemy advance for nearly a month before withdrawing behind the Naktong River into the Pusan Perimeter, August 1–4, 1950.

The defense

The defense described in FM 100-5 called for the selection and organization of a position that was to be held at all costs. A mobile covering force would delay and disorganize the enemy and deceive him as to the actual location of the friendly defense line. The commander would establish a line of outposts—the **general outpost line**—on terrain forward of the main defense line to provide warning of the approach of the enemy force, delay and disorganize him, and give the units in the main battle position time to prepare to meet the attack. Each battalion would also place outposts immediately ahead of its position, forming the **combat outpost line** to provide local security, deceive the enemy as to the location of the friendly defense line, and gain time for the defenders. The line along the most forward positions of the defense area was called the **main line of resistance** (MLR). The defending commander was to make best

use of the terrain to assure good observation for artillery fire, good fields of fire for infantry and tanks, natural obstacles, cover (terrain features that blocked enemy fire), and concealment (foliage and other features that blocked enemy observation). Obstacles, including barbed wire and mines, would slow the enemy and channel his attack. Artillery and mortar units would preplan defensive fires along likely enemy avenues of approach and in front of friendly defensive positions. As the enemy approached, he would come under air and long-range artillery attack. The covering force, general outposts, and combat outposts would delay the enemy as long as possible and he would be taken under fire by artillery, then mortars, and finally by the machine guns, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and rifles of the defending infantry units culminating in the **final protective fires** on the **final protective line**, where the interlocking fires of all available weapons would check the enemy assault. If the enemy broke through, the troops would withdraw to previously prepared alternative positions, and a mobile reserve force, including tanks, would conduct an immediate counterattack before the enemy could consolidate his gains. Ideally, the enemy would be so exhausted, disrupted, and weakened by the friendly fires that his attack would fail.

General Walker realized that the defense envisioned in US doctrine—with forces deployed on a continuous line and tied in with adjacent units—was not possible. In such a defense, a division would normally be assigned a six- to eight-mile front. Walker's understrength US divisions and the relatively well-equipped ROK 1st Infantry Division would have to hold fronts of 30 to 40 miles along the Naktong River. The remaining four Korean divisions, with less mobility and firepower but aligned in more defensible mountainous terrain to the east and supported by UNC air and naval forces, would defend fronts of about 12 miles. While Walker could not conduct an FM 100-5 defense, Eighth Army's superior mobility and interior lines gave him the capability to conduct a version of the "mobile defense," an operation developed by US armor officers in World War II. In a true mobile defense most of the defending force is held in reserve as a counterattack force while the remainder holds a series of strongpoints. Since Walker did not have enough forces to maintain a large mobile reserve, he used ad hoc forces drawn from quiet sectors and from newly arriving units. Taking advantage of the network of roads and railways inside the Pusan Perimeter, he moved these "fire brigades" to reinforce threatened sectors and to destroy or eject KPA forces that penetrated the main line of resistance.

On July 31, 1950, the first tanks capable of taking on the T34s arrived. These were the lead elements of the 8072d Army Unit, Medium Tank Battalion, a provisional tank battalion activated in Japan and equipped with rebuilt M4A3E8 76mm-gun Sherman tanks that had been in storage, and the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), which had a 22-tank company of M4A3E8s. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade brought 22 M26 90mm-gun tanks on August 2.[8] The remainder of the 8072d (renamed the 89th Medium Tank Battalion) arrived on August 4, and three days later the 6th, 70th, and 73d tank battalions arrived in Pusan with a mixture of M4A3E8, M26, and the latest M46 90mm-gun tanks. The 2d Infantry Division arrived between August 1 and 20, bringing its 72d Tank Battalion and three regimental tank companies, all equipped with M4A3E8s. Together, these provided Eighth Army a potent armor force during the August 1950 battles.

While the tank problem was solved, the only artillery reinforcements that arrived in August were the 9th (155mm howitzer) and 17th (8in. howitzer) Field Artillery (FA) Battalions, and the understrength 1st FA Observation Battalion. The artillery shortage was so severe that from September to December 1950, the

8 These units had been preceded in Korea by the 8064th Army Unit, Provisional Tank Platoon (one officer and 14 enlisted men) equipped with three M26 tanks from the Tokyo Ordnance Depot. The 8064th AU arrived on July 16, 1950, and went into action on July 31 against KPA infantry, but the M26s broke down and were abandoned without ever meeting KPA T34s.

Guns of the 68th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion (90mm) attached to the 10th AAA Group, fire as field artillery in support of the 1st Cavalry Division on the first day of the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, September 16, 1950. (NACP)

10th Antiaircraft Artillery Group was pressed into service as a field artillery unit supporting the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st and 6th ROK Divisions, and the 24th Infantry Division. The group established a fire direction center and controlled the fires of a diverse group that included, at one time or another, FA battalions, 90mm AAA gun battalions, and a chemical mortar battalion. The AAA guns would return to their air defense duties in January 1951, but divisional AAA automatic weapons were used against ground targets throughout the war, providing high volumes of accurate fire against enemy troops and vehicles.

The inadequacies in numbers of artillery notwithstanding, Eighth Army held on. By September 15, 1950, the North Koreans had been battered by US airpower, exhausted from the continuous offensive, and weakened by the interdiction of their long supply lines. UNC forces now had the strength and capability to go on the offensive.

The offense

Historically, there have been five forms of offensive maneuver. In the **frontal attack**, the simplest form of maneuver, friendly forces attack the enemy head on, using the most direct approaches. This can be successful against a weak or disorganized enemy, but since it exposes the attacking force to the defender's concentrated fire, it can be costly against a well-prepared enemy in strong defensive positions. **Infiltration** consists of covert movement through enemy lines, making use of cover and concealment, to a position in the enemy's rear. **Envelopment** avoids the enemy's front by maneuvering around him to attack his flank or rear. If the enemy has no unprotected (assailable) flank, then the friendly force seeks to create one through a **penetration** by focusing the attack on a narrow front, rupturing the enemy defense and thereby creating flanks on either side of the penetration. The **turning movement** is a form of envelopment in which the friendly force bypasses the enemy defense, seizing key terrain deep in the enemy's rear area along his lines of communication and forcing him to turn all or part of his force away from his defensive positions to meet the new threat.

In every case, the attack was to be conducted in a coordinated manner, with a main attack and one or more supporting attacks. The main attack was to seize the objective and destroy the enemy force, while the supporting attacks fixed the enemy in position, deceived him as to the location of the main attack, forced him to commit his reserves prematurely, and prevented him from



reinforcing the troops threatened by the main attack. In the envelopment, the main attack was directed against the enemy flank, while the secondary attack engaged his front. The penetration was a three-stage maneuver. First, the main attack would rupture the enemy's front line while one or more secondary attacks fixed enemy forces elsewhere along the line to prevent reinforcement of the threatened area. Next, the attacking force would engage enemy forces on either side (the "shoulders") of the penetration. Finally, forces would pour through the gap and seize objectives in the enemy's rear.

In a turning movement, the force making the maneuver generally operated so far away from the force facing the enemy defense line that support between the two was impossible. Each of the forces had to be strong and mobile enough to avoid defeat and accomplish the mission. The force conducting the turning movement had to be able to seize the critical terrain and hold out against enemy counterattacks. The other friendly force would then break through the enemy defense and link up with the force lodged in the enemy rear.

The attack would begin with aerial and artillery bombardment of enemy defenses, lines of communications, supply dumps, and command posts to reduce his combat power, disrupt his defense, and prevent his movement of supplies and reinforcements. Infantry and tank forces would move to assault positions as close to the enemy as possible while indirect fires from aircraft, artillery, and mortars kept the enemy's head down and neutralized his defenses. At the moment of assault, the indirect fires would lift, moving





beyond the front line to targets deeper in the enemy's rear to prevent him from moving forces forward to reinforce the defense during the assault. Once on the objective, the attackers would consolidate their position and prepare to repel the enemy's counterattack or to resume the advance.

On September 15, 1950, the counteroffensive began with the Inch'on landing, a turning movement that inserted X Corps' two divisions deep behind enemy lines to seize the port of Inch'on, Kimp'o Airfield, and Seoul and block the North Korean Army's major lines of communication. Eighth Army's breakout from the Pusan Perimeter began on September 16. After several days of tough fighting, the North Korean army began to withdraw and Eighth Army's attack turned into a pursuit.

By late 1950, each infantry division included a tank battalion, and all but the first three divisions that arrived in Korea had regimental tank companies. During the breakout, it finally became possible to use armor as intended, at least on a small scale, with task forces built around tank companies making deep forays into the north. X Corps frequently used its tanks for reconnaissance missions, as well as to support the infantry. Tanks were almost always employed by platoons as part of a combined-arms team with infantry. The usual offensive formation was the column, as the mountainous Korean terrain and rice paddies (impassable except in winter) generally restricted movement to roads, streambeds, and narrow valleys.

UNC offensive operations, September–October 1950.

Tank–infantry team of the 1st Cavalry Division moves north about 14 miles north of Kaesong, October 13, 1950. The tank is an M4A3E8 of the 70th Tank Battalion. (NACP)

One adaptation to offensive doctrine occurred at the lowest tactical level in Korea: the infantry squad. During the 1946 army conferences, there had been a doctrinal split in the US Army over whether the rifle squad should consist of teams or be one single maneuver element. The decision was that the rifle squad would be the smallest combat unit, fighting as a single nine-man team. In the attack, the weapons squad would provide the base of fire, while the rifle squads would be the maneuver element, advancing with each squad member firing as he moved forward—a technique known as "marching fire" or "assault fire"—in order to maintain fire superiority through a heavy volume of fire from rifles, automatic rifles, and machine guns supplemented by other assigned and attached weapons. Although this became the accepted doctrine, and the squad was organized based on this concept, there continued to be strong voices for the Marine Corps "fire team" concept with "fire and maneuver" carried out within the rifle squad, one part of the squad acting as the fire support element, suppressing enemy fire while the maneuver element moved forward. The 1949 version of Field Manual 7-10, *Rifle Company, Infantry Regiment*, provided for both assault by the entire squad on line and by fire and maneuver.

American troops soon found that the "marching fire" technique did not work well in the rugged Korean terrain against KPA and Chinese infantrymen who dug in on reverse slopes of hills and into holes from which they threw grenades downhill at advancing US soldiers. Under these conditions, fire and maneuver by squad fire teams proved to be a more useful approach that worked even better if the squad could acquire an additional automatic rifle and form two similar fire teams, each with an automatic rifle. Most rifle squads soon sported at least two BARs, a change that was blessed by Eighth Army in 1952 and was reflected in a T/O&E change in early 1953.

The 187th Airborne RCT conducted the first airborne operation of the war on October 20, 1950, at Sukch'on and Sunch'on, 30 miles north of the North Korean capital, P'yongyang. The mission was to cut off retreating KPA forces as Eighth Army advanced and to rescue Allied prisoners of war. On D-Day, 74 C-119s from the 314th Combat Cargo Wing, each carrying 42 paratroopers or heavy cargo, and 40 C-47s of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, each carrying 18 paratroopers, dropped 2,673 paratroopers. The regimental headquarters and 1st and 3d Battalions dropped at Sukch'on on Drop Zone (DZ) William, a

Paratroopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team boarding a C-119 on October 20, 1950, for the first combat jump of the Korean War. (MHI)

pear-shaped area about five miles long and four miles wide, at 0405hrs. The 2d Battalion dropped at Sunch'on, about 15 miles to the east, about 20 minutes later, landing on DZ Easy, a three-mile wide irregular ellipse. The 105mm howitzers and other weapons of the 674th Airborne Field Artillery Battalion and Support Company were divided between the two DZs. At each DZ, it took less than a minute for all the paratroopers and cargo to clear the aircraft. The 187th met no initial opposition and quickly assembled on the ground. There were only 36 injuries, but two howitzers, two 90mm anti-tank guns, and four vehicles broke loose from the chutes or streamed in (the parachutes failed to open completely). Replacements for the howitzers and vehicles, as well as supplies, ammunition, and 671 additional paratroopers were dropped on October 21 and 22. The regiment's cargo trucks and other heavy gear, called the "Land Tail," came in by ground. The 187th rescued 25 prisoners, but the others had already been moved north (some had been killed), and most of the North Koreans had withdrawn by the time of the operation, although the 187th clashed with retreating elements of a KPA regiment. By October 22, ground forces had linked up with the 187th RCT. This was the first combat jump since World War II, and the first time heavy equipment, including 105mm howitzers and trucks, were dropped by parachute in a combat operation.

Withdrawal, retirement, and defense

As the offensive continued into North Korea, Eighth Army and X Corps units found themselves advancing along separate routes, taking advantage of roads and valleys to push forward quickly. During the rapid advance, units did not always protect their flanks or clear the high ground along the route of advance. This dispersion and disregard of doctrinal principles affected the Allied ability to conduct a coherent defense when the Chinese attacked, first on October 25 and then in force on November 26, 1950. Once again, Allied soldiers met an enemy that sought gaps in the line, penetrated weak points, and enveloped friendly positions. The most common US infantry disposition was "two up; one back," with two elements on line and one element in reserve. The Chinese moved to contact in a similar formation, but when they met an enemy force, they shifted to a formation with one element forward to probe the defense and engage the enemy while two elements prepared to exploit success, penetrate gaps, and envelop the flanks. Some elements of Eighth Army, particularly the ROK II Corps and 2d Infantry Division, took heavy casualties, but Walker succeeded in withdrawing the remainder of his army, breaking contact, and retiring to the 38th Parallel. In the east, one Army regimental combat team was destroyed, and the 1st Marine Division had to execute a fighting withdrawal, but X Corps was able to retire by sea, largely intact.

During the Eighth Army withdrawal and retirement, tanks cleared roadblocks, covered rear guard units, protected regimental command posts and supply lines, and escorted convoys. They also set up roadblocks at key road junctions until friendly forces had passed through. Artillery provided heavy barrages that assisted the infantry in breaking contact, but some artillery units were overrun or had to abandon their guns as they ran the gauntlet of Chinese forces. US units lost 85 artillery pieces, the ROK forces many more.

General Ridgway initiated the last major retrograde soon after he took command of Eighth Army on December 26, 1950, withdrawing to a line about 40 miles south of Seoul in the face of another major Chinese offensive. In the withdrawal and defense, Ridgway called for a return to tactical fundamentals

Troops of the 17th Infantry Regiment and 17th Regimental Tank Company enter Hyesanjin on the Yalu River, November 21, 1950. (MHI)

M41 155mm howitzer motor carriage of the 999th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, probably January 1951. (MHI)

and for the use of strongpoints on hills and ridges with all-around defenses and heavy air and artillery bombardments to destroy enemy forces that flowed around these positions. Americans became adept at dealing with the enemy tactics, holding their positions, and, when necessary, withdrawing in a disciplined manner. Their determined defense brought the Chinese offensive to a halt and set the stage for a counteroffensive that would eventually carry Eighth Army north of the 38th Parallel.

Counteroffensive

After the Chinese New Year's Offensive ended, the Chinese broke contact and withdrew. Ridgway immediately initiated aggressive patrolling and large-scale reconnaissance in force operations to regain contact and probe the Chinese front line. When he attacked, he did so aggressively, but with deliberation and caution, using phase lines to control forward movement and ensure that units maintained contact with the forces on their flanks. By the end of 1950, a total of one field artillery group, three 155mm howitzer battalions, one 8in. howitzer battalion, one observation battalion (which located enemy artillery through radar, flash, and sound), and a rocket battery had arrived. The observation battalion had been temporarily converted to a 12-gun 105mm howitzer battalion and the rocket battery had been re-equipped with six 105mm howitzers. Eleven more battalions, including two battalions of long-range 155mm guns, would arrive by the end of March 1951. The last three battalions arrived in December 1951. Although this number was short of the amount Ridgway desired, the Americans were finally in a position to make use of very heavy artillery fires to support their attacks. When the enemy counter-attacked, US units were better able to conduct planned, orderly withdrawals under pressure to previously prepared defensive positions, and to use counterattacks and massive artillery concentrations to blunt the enemy attacks.

Pvt Ricardo Lopez (left) and Cpl Raymond Zimmerman, two of three remaining riflemen of the 2d Squad, 3d Platoon, L Company, 7th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, the leading assault squad in the attack on Hill 717 south of the Iron Triangle area, July 3, 1951. The rest of the squad was killed or wounded. Both are armed with .30-cal. M1 rifles with M4 bayonet knife (designed for the carbine, but preferred by many infantrymen with the M1 rifle), and Mk. II "Pineapple" fragmentation grenades. (MHI)

Eighth Army advances north, January–November 1951.

Tanks continued to play a key role during the counteroffensive, participating in the reconnaissance in force operations and patrols, supporting infantry in the attack, and adding punch to the defense when the Chinese counterattacked. Normally, one tank company would operate with a regiment, allocating one tank platoon to an infantry battalion or, on occasion, to a rifle company. In the attack, the tanks acted as accompanying guns, providing close, direct-fire support. The tank–infantry team would move to a location from which the tanks could provide direct fire on the objective, then the infantry would advance under cover of the tank fire. Once the infantry were on the objective, the tanks would move forward to support the infantry on the captured position. When the enemy counterattacked, the tanks added their firepower to the defense.

On March 22, 1951, the 187th Airborne RCT conducted the second airborne operation of the war at Munsan-ni, near the Imjin River, about 25 miles north of Seoul. Their mission was to block retreating enemy forces and facilitate Eighth Army's advance. Beginning at 0900hrs, 77 C-119s and 49 C-46s (substituted for C-47s) of 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) dropped the 187th and attached 2d and 4th Ranger Infantry Companies at two small drop zones, DZs North and South. Enemy resistance was light and uncoordinated and link up with ground forces took place later the same day.

By April 20, 1951, Eighth Army had advanced to a line running from the Imjin River in the west to a point on the east coast about 25 miles north of the 38th Parallel (Line KANSAS) and was preparing to push further north when the Chinese began their last full-scale offensive of the war. Eighth Army, now under the command of Lt Gen James A. Van Fleet, withdrew to a line just north of Seoul (Line GOLDEN and NO-NAME), where Van Fleet determined to halt the Chinese with maximum use of artillery, directing that the rate of fire should be increased five-fold, a rate that could be sustained for limited times by devoting all transportation to ammunition resupply. The Chinese offensive of May

16–22 was stopped by a determined defense bolstered by exceptionally heavy artillery concentrations by units expending their "Van Fleet Days of Fire."

On May 20, Van Fleet resumed the offensive and by July 1 had returned to Line KANSAS and in the west pushed 15 miles further to Line WYOMING. Eighth Army heavily fortified Line KANSAS and constructed hasty defenses on Line WYOMING, which would serve as an outpost line for the main line of resistance. In September and October, Eighth Army advanced five to ten miles to a new line, called JAMESTOWN in the western sector defended by I Corps, MISSOURI in the central sector defended by IX Corps, and MINNESOTA in the east, defended by X Corps and ROK forces.

Static warfare

On 12 November 1951, with the truce talks making progress, General Ridgway ordered Eighth Army to assume the "active defense." From this point on, there were no more major offensives by either side until the Chinese and North Koreans launched a six-division attack in the final month of the war. Offensive action was limited to almost continuous offensive patrolling, artillery duels, and limited objective battalion-sized attacks and counterattacks. Eighth Army forces seized terrain features several thousand yards to the front of the JAMESTOWN–MISSOURI–MINNESOTA Line and established outposts to serve as patrol bases and strong points to stop or disrupt enemy attacks and buffer the MLR. There were frequent sharp, bloody battles for these outposts with names like Bunker Hill, The Hook, Little Gibraltar, Old Baldy, and Porkchop. Patrols were launched from the outposts to provide intelligence, counter enemy probes, and maintain an offensive spirit, while limited objective attacks took place to strengthen the front line by seizing key terrain features or to recapture outposts taken by enemy attack.

American Soldiers and Marines built trench lines, firing positions, bunkers, and dugouts reinforced with sandbags and logs. They used ingenuity to construct obstacles to impede the attacking enemy: barbed-wire fences and entanglements laced with anti-personnel mines, trip-wire flares, and improvised flame mines called fougasses. Fabricated from 55-gallon drums filled with gasoline and napalm, fougasses were set into the ground at an angle, detonated by white phosphorous shells or grenades, and threw out a fiery mass as much as ten yards wide and 40 yards long, incinerating attackers while providing illumination. The defenders engaged the attacking enemy with squad weapons, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, flamethrowers, and, in the final stages, hand grenades. The divisional AAA AW battalions dispersed their Quad Fifty and twin 40mm automatic weapons along the line. The massive firepower of these weapons led the Chinese to refer to the Quad Fifties as "running water."

Searchlight batteries, at first operated by engineers but later transferred to the artillery, provided direct illumination of the battlefield at night. Once the front stabilized, the searchlight detachments were installed in semi-permanent positions, being withdrawn during the day to nearby protected positions and moved up at night to forward positions. Some tanks were also fitted with powerful searchlights to further illuminate the battlefield. The use of searchlights and flares helped prevent enemy infiltration, but had some unintended consequences. Some commanders asked for continuous illumination of enemy position and the light spilling over the hills and into rear areas actually assisted the enemy's efforts to resupply at night.

Tanks sometimes participated in infantry attacks on enemy positions and assisted in the defense by firing from dug-in positions on ridgelines overlooking the defensive positions, or from the reverse slopes, which added to the angle of fire, providing greater range and plunging fire against the enemy, converting the tank guns into artillery. In some cases, tank crews gained the same effect by digging ramps to elevate the fire of their guns. Tank crews became adept at using their high-velocity guns to break up enemy bunkers.

Under Army doctrine, the 150-mile, 17-division front required 50–60 corps-level artillery battalions; Eighth Army had 19. Until January 1953, there was only one observation battalion that had to divide its batteries among the corps. There were no artillery groups in the US corps, so corps artillery headquarters batteries had to assume the task of controlling artillery directly. Nonetheless, artillery played a key role and Eighth Army's gunners maintained exceptionally high rates of fire, sometimes raising concerns of depleting stocks. Artillery observers established heavily fortified observation bunkers along the MLR, from which they could direct fire against enemy positions and attacking troops. Fires were planned in such detail that not all targets could be marked on the maps, as there were so many as to make the maps illegible.

The DivArty light 105mm battalions used proximity fuzes to detonate air bursts over the heads of attackers, while the medium 155mm howitzers were used both against attacking soldiers and to break up enemy fortifications. The highly accurate, powerful 8in. howitzers of the corps artillery were even more useful against bunkers, and in March and April of 1953, two battalions of 155mm howitzers were converted to even larger 240mm howitzers. Long-range 155mm guns fired against assembly areas, command posts, and supply points up to 20,000 yards deep in the enemy rear. Self-propelled 155mm guns were also used for "assault fire" missions, moving up onto the line to fire directly at enemy positions. It was a dangerous business as the guns were vulnerable to counterbattery artillery, direct fire from enemy self-propelled artillery, and even sniper fire. A tank often accompanied the SP gun to protect it from enemy self-propelled guns and the gun never lingered long in any one position, firing at preplanned targets and then moving quickly to a new position before enemy artillery could get the range. Artillery was also used successfully to suppress enemy antiaircraft fire during air strikes.

The long period of static warfare brought out ingenuity on both sides, with much adaptation of doctrine to the peculiar circumstances. Then and throughout the war, most of the Army's tactical difficulties came not from inadequacies in the doctrine, but from shortages of personnel and equipment, and from disregard of fundamentals. For the most part, although enemy tactics, the Korean terrain and weather, and other factors required some adaptation, the tactical doctrine with which the US Army entered the Korean War generally served it well.

M16 Quad Fifty of C Company, 145th AAA AW (SP) Battalion, 45th Infantry Division, in action May 3, 1952. During the static phase of the war, the Quad Fifties were used with devastating effect against attacking enemy troops. (MHI)

Weapons and equipment

The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the 5th Regimental Combat Team on patrol along the Han River, March 16, 1951. Platoon leader 1st Lt David Chung carries a .45-cal. pistol in a shoulder holster. Pfc Wilford Kam is manning a .50-cal. M2 heavy machine gun. Sgt Isami Sumida is armed with a .30-cal. M1 rifle. Sgt John Y.S. Lee, with a Combat Infantryman's Badge over his left pocket, is driving. (NACP)

Individual and crew-served weapons

The US Army infantryman in the Korean War was armed with much the same weapons as his World War II counterpart: the .30-cal. M1 (Garand) rifle, the .30-cal. semi-automatic M1 and selective-fire M2 carbine (M2 was not issued in World War II), and the .30-cal. M1918A2 Browning automatic rifle (BAR). Officers and selected enlisted men carried the .45-cal. M1911A1 pistol, general officers often carried a .38-cal. revolver, and vehicle crews, artillerymen, and support personnel were generally armed with a carbine or .45-cal. M3A1 submachine gun ("Grease Gun").

Most of the crew-served weapons were also of World War II vintage: the .30-cal. air-cooled M1919A4 or A6 light machine guns, the .30-cal. water-cooled M1917A1 heavy machine gun, the .50-cal. M2 heavy machine gun, and the 60mm M2, 81mm M1, and 4.2in. M2 mortars. While the World War II-era M2 60mm, which could only be fired by dropping the round down the barrel, was still in use early in the war, it was soon replaced by the M19, which could be fired with a trigger, allowing it to be used as a direct-fire weapon. In 1952 the 81mm M1 mortar began to be replaced by the M29 with a significantly longer range (5,100 yards vs. 3,290 yards) and the 4.2in. M2 began to be replaced by the M30, which had a range of 7,480 yards (the M2 had a 4,400-yard range). Some of the earlier models remained in use through the war. The 4.2in. mortar was originally designed to fire chemical gas and smoke shells, but could also deliver high explosive and was used in that role in the Korean War. All three mortars fired high-explosive, white phosphorous (bursting-type smoke for screening and casualty-producing),

Sgt John Hovis (right) holds a 2.36in. rocket launcher (bazooka), found to be ineffective against North Korean tanks. Pfc William H. Gillespie holds the 3.5in. Super Bazooka that replaced it, August 26, 1950. (NACP)

Pfc Roman Braughty, 75mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon, M (Heavy Weapons) Company, 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, fires his weapon in support of infantry units during Operation PILEDRIVER, the seizure of Line WYOMING, June 9, 1951. A Browning automatic rifle is lying in the foreground. (NACP)

Flamethrowers were effective against bunkers and other fortifications in the offense and against enemy troops in the defense. The M2-2 portable flamethrower carried by this soldier of K Company, 5th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, weighed 70lb fully loaded with four gallons of fuel and used pressurized nitrogen to propel a mixture of napalm and gasoline in a 50-yard stream of flame. This photo was taken during the bloody Eighth Army advance to the JAMESTOWN–MISSOURI–MINNESOTA Line in October 1951. (MHI)

and illumination rounds, while the 4.2in. mortar could also fire tear gas and burning-type smoke rounds.

Rocket launchers (bazookas) and recoilless rifles were used as anti-tank weapons and against fortifications. The first units into combat carried 2.36in. M9A1 rocket launchers, which proved to be useless against North Korean T34 tanks and were soon replaced with 3.5in. M20 "Super Bazookas."

The recoilless rifle used a perforated cartridge case that released part of the propellant gases rearward through vents in the breech of the weapon, reducing the recoil so the weapon did not need a recoil mechanism or heavy mount. The 57mm M18 recoilless rifle weighed only 45lb and could be fired from the shoulder or mounted on a machine-gun tripod. The heavier 75mm M20 was tripod mounted. Late in the war, units began to receive the 105mm M27 recoilless rifle, which had a powerful punch, but was unreliable and inaccurate. After the war, it was replaced by the 106mm M40 recoilless rifle, which remained in service for decades.

Some tanks were fitted with M3-4 flamethrowers in place of the bow gun. This M4A3E8 of C Company, 89th Tank Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, attacks Chinese positions near the Han River, March 9, 1951. (MHI)

M26 Pershing tank of the 70th Tank Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, advances north from Taegu during the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, September 17, 1950. The M26 could take on the North Korean T34s, but it was heavy and underpowered and all had been replaced in Korea by early 1951, either by M46s or by M4A3E8s. (NACP)

Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles

The 75mm-gun M24 Chaffee light tanks that equipped the first three divisions deployed to Korea were nimble and effective in the reconnaissance role for which they were intended, but could not stand up against the North Korean T34 tanks. When more powerful tanks arrived, the M24s reverted to the reconnaissance role. The M4 Sherman, the most widely used American tank in World War II, was mechanically rugged and reliable, but did not have the armor or firepower to stand up against late-model German tanks and ended the war with a mixed reputation. In Korea, however, the Sherman was in its element. Armed with a 76mm high-velocity gun, it could deal with North Korean T34 tanks, while its light weight and maneuverability were suitable for Korea's mountainous terrain. The 90mm-gun M26 Pershing tank mounted a heavier gun and thicker armor than the Sherman, but was powered by the same engine and, weighing 13 tons more, had a poor power-to-weight ratio and was less mechanically reliable. The 90mm-gun M46 Patton was the best-liked tank in Korea. Only slightly heavier than the M26 and with a more powerful engine, it had the highest power-to-weight ratio of any tank in the war and was capable of "neutral steering" (it could pivot 360 degrees in place).

The M8 armored car (Greyhound) mounted a 37mm gun in a cast steel open-topped turret. The more widely used M20 version had an identical chassis, but instead of a turret, had an open cargo compartment and a machine-gun mount. Greyhounds were primarily used by military police and reconnaissance units. The M39 armored utility vehicle used the chassis of the agile, speedy World War II-era M18 Hellcat tank destroyer. Essentially a turretless tank with an open, boxy cargo compartment, the M39 was originally designed to be a prime mover for heavy anti-tank guns. In Korea, it was used as an artillery prime mover, command vehicle, and armored personnel carrier. In the summer of 1953, a small number of T18E1 full-tracked infantry vehicles (soon re-designated M75 armored personnel carriers) arrived in Korea and were used to transport wounded and resupply frontline outposts. Large numbers of World War II-era halftracks were also used in Korea. The 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion was equipped with the LVT (3) amphibious tracked landing vehicle (Bushmaster), which had an open cargo compartment; the LVT(3)(C), which had an aluminum cover over the cargo compartment; and the LVT(A)5 (Amtank), an armored LVT with a 75mm howitzer mounted in a power traversing turret with elevation stabilizer to improve the accuracy of the howitzer at sea.

M46 Patton tanks of C Company, 64th Tank Battalion, 3d Infantry Division, in defensive positions guarding Hamhung during the withdrawal of X Corps from North Korea, December 7, 1950. The M46 can be distinguished from the M26 by the small rear tension idler wheel and the exhaust muffler on the rear fender. (MHI)

Field artillery

The 105mm M2A1 howitzer, towed by a 2 1/2-ton truck, had a 12,000-yard range and could fire rapidly and in great volume, making it useful against enemy personnel. The M7B1 howitzer motor carriage (HMC) was a 105mm howitzer mounted in a Sherman tank chassis. The Tokyo Ordnance Depot modified some M7B1s to increase the maximum elevation to provide higher-angle fire over the steep Korean hills. These modified versions were called M7B2s. One battalion was equipped with the newer 105mm M37 self-propelled howitzer, which used the same chassis as the M24 light tank.

ABOVE Artillerymen of the 2d Field Artillery Rocket Battery load 4.5in. M8 rockets into a T66E2 launcher, February 27, 1953. The battery was also equipped with six 105mm howitzers. (NACP)

TOP LEFT An M7B1 105mm howitzer motor carriage of the 300th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. (MHI)

LEFT A 240mm howitzer on the M2A1 transporter wagon. The howitzer carriage was transported on a separate wagon. (MHI)

BELOW A Quad Fifty mounted on an M39 armored utility vehicle of the 52d AAA AW (SP) Battalion of the 24th Infantry Division. The organic AAA battalion of the 24th Division was the 26th, but Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 52d AAA Bn provided the headquarters until October 31, 1951, when the unit was redesignated as Hq & Hq Btry, 26th AAA Bn. (MHI)

The 155mm M1 howitzer, towed by the M5 13-ton high-speed tractor, had an 18,000-yard range. It was a versatile weapon that could fire rapidly and with greater range and power than the 105mm. The 155mm M41 howitzer motor carriage used the M24 light tank chassis. The 8in. M2 howitzer, pulled by an M4 18-ton high-speed tractor, fired a 200lb shell out to 18,000 yards with power and accuracy that made it an effective counter-battery weapon. The 8in. M43 HMC used an M4 Sherman tank chassis. The 155mm M2 gun (Long Tom), towed by the M4 tractor, was less accurate than the howitzers, but its 25,000-yard range made it useful against enemy supply points, command posts, and bivouac areas. The 155mm M40 gun motor carriage used the same chassis as the M43 8in. HMC. In the last three months of the war, two 155mm howitzer battalions were converted to 240mm (9.6in.) M1 howitzers towed by M6 38-ton tractors. These mammoth weapons fired a 360lb projectile for 14 miles, and were used primarily against deep caves and heavy bunkers, The 2d Field Artillery Rocket Battery was equipped with six 105mm howitzers and 12 T66E2 24-tube rocket launchers towed behind $2^1/_2$-ton trucks. The launchers fired 4.5in. M8 rockets, which carried a 4.3lb high-explosive round to a range of 4,500 yards.

Antiaircraft weapons

The 90mm M2 antiaircraft artillery (AAA) guns, towed by M4 tractors, were intended for defense against high-altitude aircraft, but were used as field artillery early in the war. The self-propelled AAA automatic weapons (AW) battalions were each equipped with some combination of the multiple gun motor carriage M16A1 (Quad Fifty), which consisted of four .50-cal. machine

Line trucks of the 101st Signal Battalion, IX Corps, May 13, 1953. The lead truck is a new Reo M34 2 1/2-ton truck. Behind it is a World War II-era GMC CCKW 2 1/2-ton truck, which the M34 was designed to replace. (NACP)

guns mounted in a halftrack, and the 40mm M19A1 multiple gun motor carriage (Dual 40): two 40mm Bofors guns mounted in an open turret on an M24 light tank chassis. The Quad Fifty could also be mounted in a 2 1/2-ton truck or, as the M55, on a trailer. In at least one case in the 25th Division, Quad Fifties were also mounted on M39 armored utility vehicles. The multiple motor gun carriage M15A1 was a 37mm gun and two .50-cal. machine guns mounted coaxially in a halftrack. Many of these were in storage in Japan and the Tokyo Ordnance Depot modified them, replacing the 37mm gun with a 40mm Bofors. Mobile AAA AW battalions were equipped with single 40mm Bofors guns towed by 2 1/2-ton trucks and with M55 Quad Fifty trailers.

Motor vehicles

The most common Army motor vehicles in Korea were the World War II-era 1/4-ton truck (jeep), the 3/4-ton weapons carrier, and the family of 2 1/2-ton trucks. The versatile 2 1/2-ton 6x6 cargo trucks pulled artillery pieces, transported troops, and kept the supplies and ammunition flowing. With specialized bodies, they served as dump trucks, shop vans, tankers, mobile laboratories, fire trucks, and many other purposes. Generally similar in appearance, 4-ton, 6-ton, and 7 1/2-ton trucks were also used in various roles. By 1951, the Army had decided on a

Equipment nomenclature

The Army nomenclature system usually designated weapons and equipment with a descriptive name and model number (bayonet M1). Model numbers were assigned to each weapon or item of equipment when it entered service and were assigned numerically for each type of equipment (M26 tank, M1 rifle). Some weapons and vehicles also had popular names, such as the "Sherman" tank.

Weapons were further identified by caliber (width of the bore of a gun or diameter of a projectile). The Army used both English (inches) and metric (millimeters) systems to measure caliber (60mm mortar, 8in. howitzer). The complete nomenclature of a weapon might also include other information. For example, the standard heavy machine gun with a 0.5in. bore as it appeared in tables of organization and equipment was "GUN MACHINE CAL 50 BRG M2 HB," which meant the second model that entered service (M2) of a machine gun with a caliber (bore) of 0.5 inch (CAL 50), manufactured by Browning (BRG), and with a heavy barrel (HB). For ease of reading, simplified versions are used in this publication: ".50-cal. M2 heavy machine gun" or "M1 rifle."

When a major modification was made to an item of equipment, the modified version received an "A" suffix, with numbers indicating additional modification, as in the case of "105mm M2A1 howitzer." There were some variations in this system. Model numbers were not always issued consecutively and weapons and equipment introduced before World War II had model numbers based on the year of entry into service: ".30-cal. M1918A2 Browning automatic rifle (BAR)."

Modifications to armored vehicle chassis were designated by "B" suffixes (tank recovery vehicle M32B3). Weapons and equipment still undergoing testing received "T," rather than "M" model numbers (T18 armored utility vehicle). Experimental modifications were designated by "E" suffixes (T18E1 armored utility vehicle). In some cases, the "E" modification suffixes were unofficially retained after equipment went into service. For example, the most widely used tank in Korea was officially the M4A3 (76) HVSS (W) Sherman tank. This was the third modification of the M4 tank (M4A3) with a 76mm gun (76), a horizontal volute suspension (HVSS—a type of suspension in which heavy springs were mounted horizontally), and "wet" storage of ammunition (W)—the ammunition was stored in lockers filled with liquid to reduce the chance of fire and explosion if hit. During testing, the tank had been designated M4A3E8. This simpler designation was widely used, even in official publications, and the M4A3E8 was popularly known as the "Easy Eight."

Wheeled vehicles were usually identified by cargo weight capacity, the number of powered and unpowered wheels, and other significant characteristics. The most widely used vehicle in Korea was the 2 1/2-ton 6x6 cargo truck, with a cargo capacity of two and a half tons and six wheels, all powered. Some had short wheel bases (SWB) or were equipped with winches (WW). Most wheeled vehicles introduced before 1950 had no "M" numbers, so the T/O&E designation for such a vehicle was: "TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2 TON 6x6 SWB WW." Most of the 2 1/2-ton trucks in Korea were built by the General Motors Corporation (GMC) and were popularly known as "Jimmies" or "Deuces." The GMC designation for this truck, CCKW (C = 1941 model, C = conventional cab, K = all-wheel drive, and W = dual rear wheels), was often used in publications. The amphibious version of the GMC 2 1/2-ton truck was also identified in official documents by the GMC designation, DUKW (D = 1942 model, U = amphibious, K = all-wheel drive, and W = dual rear wheels) and was popularly known as the "Duck."

new generation of larger wheeled vehicles with 24-volt electrical systems and other improvements. In April 1952, these new vehicles began arriving in Korea for a six-month field test. They were the M38 1/4-ton truck (similar to the Willys civilian CJ), M37 3/4-ton truck, M34 Reo 2 1/2-ton cargo truck, M135 GMC 2 1/2-ton cargo truck with automatic transmission, and International Harvester M41 5-ton truck. These new vehicles began to be phased in later that year, replacing on a one-for-one basis the old World War II types, which were reconditioned and turned over to the ROK Army. Nonetheless, many of the older vehicles were still in service when the war ended.

The amphibious version of the 2 1/2-ton truck, the DUKW (Duck), was widely used by Army amphibious truck and boat and shore units. The full-tracked M29C amphibious light cargo carrier (Weasel) was useful inland, as well as in water, resupplying front-line positions in the precipitous and often soggy Korean terrain. The largest motor vehicle used in Korea was the M25 40-ton tank transporter (Dragon Wagon), consisting of an armored or unarmored M26 6x6 tractor and an M15 or M15A1 low-bed semi-trailer. It was used by ordnance units for the recovery and transportation of armored fighting vehicles.

Mechanics of the Aviation Section, 45th Infantry Division, work on an L-19, January 14, 1952. (MHI)

Aircraft

At the beginning of the war, Army light aviation detachments flew World War II-era liaison aircraft for aerial reconnaissance, artillery spotting, courier duty, and senior officer transportation. Later in the war, the Cessna L-19A, an extensively modified version of the Cessna 170 civilian light plane, replaced these aircraft. Tough and versatile, the L-19 (nicknamed the "Bird Dog" by General Mark W. Clark) was used for artillery spotting, observation and liaison, light cargo transportation, medical evacuation, laying communication wire by air, and spraying insecticide. The four-seat, low-wing North American L-17A (and the nearly identical Ryan-built L-17B) Navion was used primarily for medical evacuation and senior officer transportation and was the personal aircraft of the Eighth Army commander. Late in the war, the seven-passenger De Havilland L-20 Beaver joined it in the liaison, light cargo, and aerial ambulance role.

The Bell H-13 (Sioux) was used for observation and courier duties, but became most famous for aerial medical evacuation and is probably the best-known Army Korean War era aircraft from its television role as the "MASH helicopter." A small number of Hiller H-23A (Raven) observation and medical

Cpl Charles Moorhead next to a Stinson L-5E liaison airplane of the 7th Infantry Division Aviation Section. Early in the war, Army aviation units were equipped with World War II-era Piper L-4 Cubs, Stinson L-5s, and Aeronca L-16s, all of which were replaced by Cessna L-19s by November 1951. (MHI)



This first De Havilland L20 Beaver arrived in Korea for evaluation in December 1951. By July 1952, 18 were flying alongside L-17s in the multi-place liaison, light cargo, and aerial ambulance role. (NACP)

evacuation helicopters were used in 1951, but, being underpowered and unreliable, were soon phased out. In March 1953, the 6th Transportation Helicopter Company arrived with 21 Sikorsky H-19C Chickasaw cargo helicopters. A second company, the 13th, arrived before the end of the war. The H-19C could carry five stretchers; and eight fully armed troops, or the equivalent weight of cargo.

The following charts show the numbers and types of weapons in the infantry divisions at the start and at the end of the war.

Divisional Weapons T/O&E 7N July 7, 1948, with Change 1, November 29, 1950

Weapon	Infantry Division	Division Artillery	Infantry Regiment	Infantry Battalion	Combat Engineer Battalion	Tank Battalion	Reconnaissance Company
.45-cal. pistol	2,794	522	530	130	30	356	35
.30-cal. M1 rifle	6,913		1,899	507	729	19	64
.30-cal. M1C sniper rifle	243		81	27			
.30-cal. carbine	7,474	2,934	1,060	253	1,33	278	64
.45-cal. SMG	638	151	34		65	146	18
.30-cal. BAR	412		135	45		1	3
.30-cal. LMG	160		39	13	26	11	6
.30-cal. HMG	40		12	4			3
.50-cal. HMG	354	106	47	8	28	13	3
2.36 or 3.5in. RL	546	193	83	20	40	18	6
57mm RR	81		27	9			
75mm RR	39		12	4			
60mm mortar	84		27	9	3		
81mm mortar	40		12	4		1	3
4.2in. mortar	36		12				
105mm howitzer	54	54					
155mm howitzer	18	18					
.50-cal. quad AAA AW	32	32					
40mm twin AAA AW	32	32					
M24 lt tk	9					2	7
M26 hvy tk	123		20[1]			63[2]	
M45 med tk	12		2			6	
M4A3 med tk	5				5[3]		
Tk recovery vehicle	11	1	1			5	
Armored utility vehicle	34	17	1			9	5
M20 armored car	1						
Liaison airplane	18	10					

Notes:
[1] Two with bulldozer blades. [2] Six with bulldozer blades. [3] All with bulldozer blades.

Infantry Division Weapons T/O&E 7 (15 May 52) with Changes 1 (30 Dec 52) and 2 (13 Apr 53)

Weapon	Infantry Division	Division Artillery	Infantry Regiment	Infantry Battalion	Tank Battalion	Reconnaissance Company
.45-cal. pistol	2,203	59	520	125	357	35
.30-cal. M1 rifle	8,099	1,234	1,873	469	21	61
.30-cal. M1C sniper rifle	243		81	27		
.30-cal. carbine	5,352	1,750	801	184	283	63
.45-cal. SMG	970	459	37		159	20
.30-cal. BAR	493		162	54	1	3
.30-cal. LMG	309	42	69	22	12	9
.30-cal. HMG	36		12	4		
.50-cal. HMG	331	98	51	8	13	3
.3.5in. RL	566	210	86	21	18	6
57mm RR	81		27	9		
75mm RR	21		6	2		
105mm RR	36		12	4		
60mm mortar	81		27	9		
81mm mortar	36		12	4		
M21 halftrack 81mm mortar carriage	4					3
4.2in. mortar	36		12			
105mm howitzer	54	54				
155mm howitzer	18	18				
.50-cal. quad AAA AW	32	32				
40mm twin AAA AW	32	32				
T41E1 76mm-gun tk[3]	9				2	7
M47 90mm-gun tk[4]	135		22[1]		69[2]	
M32 tk recovery vehicle	18	1	2		5	
Armored utility vehicle	4				2	2
T18 armored inf vehicle[5]	4				1	3
T59 tracked armored vehicle[5]	6		1		3	
2-place aircraft	13	9	1			
Multi-passenger aircraft	3					
Helicopter utility	10	1	1			

Notes:

[1] Two with bulldozer blade.

[2] Six with bulldozer blade.

[3] M24 lt tk issued to units in Korea.

[4] M46 med tk issued to units in Korea.

[5] Most units in Korea issued M39 armored utility vehicle.

Command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I)

Command relationships

The Army chain of command during the Korean War began at the highest level with the President of the United States transmitting his orders through the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, in turn, provided strategic direction and guidance through the Army Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, US Far East Command (CINCFE), who controlled all US forces in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and the Ryukyu, Mariana, Bonin, and Volcano Islands. CINCFE was also Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), in charge of the occupation of Japan until 1952, when the occupation ended. On July 8, 1950, CINCFE (then General MacArthur) was given the additional responsibility of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). On July 14, ROK President Syngman Rhee gave General MacArthur "command authority" over all ROK forces. Thus, General MacArthur, as CINCFE, commanded all US forces and, as CINCUNC, exercised control over all Republic of Korea and UN forces.

On paper, Far East Command (FEC) had three Service components: Far East Air Forces (FEAF); Naval Forces, Far East (NavFE); and US Army Forces Far East (USAFFE). General MacArthur, who was the Commanding General (CG) of USAFFE when Far East Command was established on January 1, 1947, renamed his USAFFE headquarters as General Headquarters, Far East Command (GHQ FEC) and did not maintain a separate Army component command.





The largest Army force in FEC was Eighth Army. During the Korean War, the CG Eighth Army was the UNC/FEC Ground Component Commander with command of all US ground forces and operational control of the ROK and UN ground forces. During the first months of the war, CG Eighth Army controlled his US forces directly, but after September 1950, when the headquarters of I and IX Corps became operational, he directed most of his combat forces through the US and ROK corps commanders, except for those held as Eighth Army reserve or general support to the entire army. All UN forces were attached to US units at the appropriate level: battalions were attached to US regiments, brigades to US divisions or corps, and the British 1st Commonwealth Division to I Corps. Some ROK units not assigned to ROK corps were attached to US corps or divisions. CG EUSAK transmitted his guidance to the rest of the ROK Army through the ROK Army Chief of Staff.

During the first two months of the war, CG Eighth Army continued to be responsible for logistic and other operations in Japan. To carry out these duties, he retained an element in Yokohama, Japan, called Headquarters, Eighth Army (Rear) and renamed his command in Korea "Eighth US Army in Korea" (EUSAK). On August 24, 1950, Japan Logistical Command (JLC) was activated to take over Eighth Army Japan responsibilities and Eighth Army (Rear) was absorbed into JLC. Tactical forces remaining in Japan after this time constituted the GHQ Reserve, which was replaced on May 10, 1951, by XVI Corps with the mission to defend Japan and conduct training.

For the Inch'on landing and subsequent operations in northeastern Korea, X Corps operated independently from Eighth Army. While the geographic separation of EUSAK and X Corps provided some justification for this, it also meant that there were two ground components in Korea, each reporting separately to General MacArthur. This arrangement ended on December 26, 1950, after X Corps withdrew from North Korea and was placed under CG Eighth Army.

On August 21, 1952, Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) was activated to relieve CG EUSAK from responsibility for logistics, prisoners of war, civil assistance, and political and economic relations with the ROK government in the area outside the combat zone. That same month, US Army Forces Far East was finally activated as the single Army service component

command for the entire Far East Theater. USAFFE took command of Eighth Army and KCOMZ, as well as the functions of Japan Logistical Command, which was deactivated on October 1, 1952. The abbreviation for Far East Command, now a true "joint" headquarters with equal staff participation by all the services, changed to "FECOM."

Command and control

Staffs assisted commanders at every level. At army, corps, and division level, the principal staff officers constituted the "general staff" (the staff of a general officer) and consisted of the G-1 (personnel and administration), G-2 (intelligence), G-3 (operations and training), and G-4 (logistics). At the regimental and battalion level, the principal staff officers were designated the S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4. The "special staff" consisted of officers from the various branches who provided advice to the commander within their areas of expertise.

From the Commanding General of Eighth Army down to the individual squad leader, effective leadership depended on personal contact with subordinates. While the commander was on the move, visiting subordinate commanders and assessing the tactical situation, the deputy or executive officer stayed at the command post (CP), supervising administration and logistics and maintaining contact with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. The command post was the communication nexus of the unit and the place where intelligence analysis and operational planning took place. It was located with regard to the tactical situation and disposition of the troops and, ideally, in a place offering good access to roads, good signal communications, cover, and concealment. The CP was normally sited forward during offensive operations to avoid early displacement as the force advanced, and in the rear during the defense to avoid being displaced or overrun by enemy forces.

At the command post, the commander and staff conducted an ongoing estimate of the situation, planned for future operations based on that estimate and direction from higher headquarters, and issued operation orders. At Army level, the operation order might be a voluminous document with annexes and map overlays. Down at platoon and squad level, it might be a brief verbal order. But at every level, the format was essentially the same: a statement of the enemy and friendly situation; the mission of the unit; execution (how the operation was to be carried out); an explanation of administration and logistics for the operation; and a description of command and control procedures. To make changes once the operation had begun or to issue urgent guidance, the commander issued abbreviated fragmentary orders. Periodic operation reports (PORs) kept superior, subordinate, and adjacent units informed.

Pfc Harvey Mohr, Pfc Raymond Bucci, and Sgt David R. Gilliand (left to right) of the 581st Radio Relay Company, IX Corps, carry gear to a VHF station overlooking the IX Corps Command Post at Hongchon, April 4, 1951. Note their use of traditional Korean "A-frame" pack boards. (NACP)

Communications

Communications were indispensable to effective command and leadership. The principal means of communication were radio, telephone (wire), telegraph and teletype (transmitted either by wire or by radio), and messenger.

Radio was a flexible and generally reliable means of communication, although reception was sometimes poor in the broken Korean terrain, and was essential when units were on the move. Within the divisions, units communicated by medium- and short-range radios, either mounted in vehicles or man-packed. At every level from army to platoon, units operated a command radio net that tied in all subordinate units. A separate artillery net was used to transmit target, fire mission, and related information. In some cases, a separate administrative net handled administrative

Wire team of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, checks communication wire along a road, October 16, 1950. (NACP)

and logistical communication. Very-high-frequency (VHF) radios were uniquely effective in the steep mountains that blocked other radio signals. Although VHF is a line-of-sight system, the signals could be reflected, so American signalmen became adept at using "bank shots," bouncing the signals off mountainsides and canyon walls, and installing relay stations on mountain tops to extend the range.

Wire was the preferred means of communication, being less susceptible to enemy jamming and interception than radio. But conditions in Korea caused problems for wire, too. The steep, broken terrain meant that wire had to be laid by circuitous routes and for convenience, was generally laid along roads, where it was often cut by heavy traffic and lines from adjacent units sometimes got intermingled. Nonetheless, wire was used throughout the war and after the front line stabilized, it became the principal means of communication, with telephone nets essentially paralleling the radio nets. Even tanks, now used primarily as direct-fire artillery, were dug in and wired for telephone communication during the static phase of the war.

During the colonial era, the Japanese had connected Mukden, Manchuria and Tokyo by means of a cable buried under the main highway that ran from Mukden, south across Korea to Pusan, and then under the sea to Fukuoka, Japan. This "Mukden Cable" provided a reliable link between GHQ FEC and Eighth Army and between Eighth Army and those frontline units that were close enough to tap in. Other wire was laid by the signal construction companies and by the divisional signal companies.

Teletype, transmitted by wire or VHF radio, was widely used for communications between Eighth Army, the corps headquarters, and the divisions because it could carry a great volume of traffic and send written material over long distances. In some cases, divisions installed teletype links with divisional artillery and the regiments. Human communication also played a role. Higher-level commanders used liaison officers and couriers to transmit information, while at battalion and lower levels, messengers were an important means of communication. Korea was the last war in which carrier pigeons were used in combat. Each corps headquarters maintained a carrier pigeon loft and conducted tests of pigeon-borne messages, although pigeons were rarely used for actual tactical communications.

Intelligence

Information about the enemy and the area of operations relevant to the conduct of combat operations is **combat intelligence**. The primary use of intelligence is to assist the commander in making sound and timely decisions. During the Korean War, commanders identified the specific intelligence they needed by

Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, moves north after crossing the Naktong River in the push north after the Pusan Perimeter breakout, September 20, 1950. Regimental I&R platoons gathered intelligence through patrolling and manned observation posts. (MHI)

issuing statements of their essential elements of information (EEI), which then served as guidance to those who collected intelligence. Intelligence was collected by observation, reconnaissance, contact with local citizens, interrogation of prisoners, through spies, and through the analysis of documents and photographs. Both the Central Intelligence Agency and Far East Command used clandestine means, including spies, to collect strategic intelligence.

Far East Air Forces and Army aviation conducted aerial reconnaissance, while ground reconnaissance was conducted by the divisional reconnaissance companies, the regimental intelligence and reconnaissance (I&R) platoons, and frontline patrols. Army Security Agency Pacific (ASAPAC) was responsible for communications intelligence (COMINT), which was the interception, decryption, and analysis of Chinese and North Korea radio communications and related activities. ASAPAC maintained a headquarters in Korea, ASAPAC (Advance), to which all ASA units in Korea were assigned. The first tactical ASA unit, the 60th Signal Service Company (Radio Intercept), arrived in Korea in October 1950. By June 1951, there were three battalion headquarters controlling eight Communications Reconnaissance companies. The information they collected provided valuable intelligence to the Eighth Army commander, often apprising him of enemy movements so that he could move his own forces to meet the threats. ASAPAC also attached Low-Level Intercept (LLI) teams to tactical units. Consisting of an officer and two or three radio operator/interpreters, the LLI teams listened in on enemy tactical communications and provided intelligence to the units to which they were attached. ASA equipment and techniques improved throughout the war, but when the line stabilized, the enemy's greater use of wire, rather than radio, communications made interception more difficult. ASA countered this by implanting sound detection devices along the front line so they could listen to enemy telephone communications.

The intelligence staffs that existed at every level from the Eighth Army G2 to the battalion S2s carried out processing information and turning it into usable combat intelligence. They were assisted by Military Intelligence Service (MIS) units attached down to division level. The MIS units included prisoner-of-war interrogators, interpreter/translators, photo-interpreters, and order of battle specialists.

As important to the commander as intelligence was counterreconnaissance to screen friendly forces from enemy observation, and counterintelligence to neutralize or block enemy intelligence and subversion efforts. Counter-intelligence Corps (CIC) units were attached down to division level to assist in the counterintelligence effort, while counterreconnaissance was carried out by tactical units.

Unit status

On the eve of the war, Eighth US Army consisted of four under-strength divisions (1st Cavalry, 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions), the 40th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade with seven AAA battalions, and service and logistic support units. Two battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment and two AAA battalions were located on Okinawa. The nearest units outside the theater were the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in Hawaii; the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing at Camp Pendleton, California; and the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. The only American soldiers stationed in Korea at the start of the war were the 492 members of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG), established on July 1, 1949, to provide advice and assistance to the newly formed ROK military forces.

Shortly after the North Korean attack, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) gave General MacArthur operational control of all US military activities in Korea and authorized him to take action to prevent North Korean forces from overrunning the Seoul–Kimp'o–Inch'on area and to send a survey party to Korea to determine ROK Army logistic requirements. This group, designated General Headquarters Advanced Command and Liaison Group in Korea (GHQ ADCOM), was commanded by Brig Gen John H. Church and consisted of a small staff, headquarters elements, and communications units. ADCOM arrived in Korea on June 27, 1950, when its mission was expanded to control of KMAG and assisting the ROK Army in stopping the North Korean attack.

On July 2, the first elements of the US 24th Infantry Division arrived from Japan by air. Commanded by Lt Col Charles B. (Brad) Smith and known to history as "Task Force Smith," this unit consisted of the headquarters and two reinforced rifle companies of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment and an artillery battery. Smith moved his unit to defensive positions just north of Osan, about 30 miles south of Seoul. On July 4, the 24th Infantry Division commander, Maj Gen William F. Dean, assumed command of all US Army forces in Korea, establishing Headquarters, US Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) at Taejon, co-located with his division headquarters. Dean appointed General Church as his deputy and assigned some ADCOM and KMAG officers as part of his staff. On July 5, KPA forces attacked Task Force Smith, which was forced to withdraw. The other 24th Infantry Division elements moved into blocking positions to delay the North Korean advance along the main avenue of approach into South Korea in the west, while ROK forces fought the invaders in the mountainous country to the east and MacArthur fed additional ground troops into the peninsula.

On July 6, 1950, as the last elements of the 24th Infantry Division arrived, General MacArthur directed General Walker to take command of the ground war in Korea. Walker activated Headquarters, Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK) on July 13 at Taegu, taking command of all US Army forces on the peninsula and all logistical and communications facilities, except for some GHQ FEC personnel. On July 17, Walker received operational control of the ROK Army and incoming UN forces.

By July 18, the 25th Infantry Division was in Korea and the 1st Cavalry Division began to arrive. On July 24, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment arrived from Okinawa. Initially attached to the 24th Infantry Division, in early August they became the third battalions of the 35th and 27th Infantry Regiments of the 25th Infantry Division. On July 30, the first elements of the 2d Infantry Division began to arrive (the entire division would be in Korea by August 19). The 5th RCT arrived on July 31 and was initially attached

to the 25th Infantry Division. On 2 August, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, consisting of the 5th Marine RCT and Marine Air Group 33, arrived.

On July 19, 1950, MacArthur requested two corps headquarters to assist Walker in tactical control of his forces and asked that these corps receive the same numbers as those with which Eighth Army had fought in the Pacific. Accordingly, the Department of the Army re-designated V Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina as I US Corps on August 2, 1950, and IX US Corps was organized at Fort Sheridan, Illinois on August 10, 1950, from elements of Fifth Army. Major General John B. Coulter and an advance party of his I Corps staff arrived in Korea on August 10, 1950, and on August 13 were designated Task Force JACKSON with operational control of US and ROK units to conduct a counterattack against KPA forces that had penetrated UNC lines near P'ohang-dong. I Corps became operational on September 13, 1950, when Major General Frank W. Milburn (who had replaced General Coulter, whom MacArthur had moved to command of the in-coming IX Corps) took command of the 1st Cavalry, 24th Infantry and ROK 1st Divisions, and the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade.

On August 26, X Corps was activated in Japan, separate from EUSAK, to conduct the September 15, 1950, Inch'on amphibious operation with the 7th Infantry Division and 1st Marine Division, including the 5th Marine RCT, which was withdrawn from EUSAK on September 6.

On September 16, I Corps (1st Cavalry Division, 24th Infantry Division, ROK 1st Division, and 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade) led the Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. The 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions attacked on the I Corps left (south) flank and ROK II and I Corps attacked on the right (east) flank. IX Corps (2d and 25th Infantry Divisions) became operational on 23 September with the mission of securing southwest Korea. On September 26, a 1st Cavalry Division task force made contact with the 7th Infantry Division, linking EUSAK and X Corps. By September 30, as Eighth Army prepared to continue the attack to the north and X Corps was withdrawn to conduct an amphibious invasion of northeast Korea, the Eighth Army order of battle across the peninsula from west to east was: IX Corps (25th Infantry Division, 2d Infantry Division, and newly arrived 65th RCT); I Corps (1st Cavalry Division, 24th Infantry Division, 1st ROK Division, and 27th Commonwealth Brigade); II ROK Corps; and I ROK Corps.

Eighth Army advanced into North Korea with I Corps in the west, ROK II Corps in the center, and ROK I Corps in the east. IX Corps and the newly activated ROK III Corps protected the lines of communication. On September 30, ROK I Corps crossed the 38th Parallel, reaching the east coast port of Wonsan by October 20. On October 9, the 1st Cavalry Division also crossed the 38th Parallel and by October 19 had captured P'yongyang. General MacArthur now assigned ROK I Corps to X Corps (making it the equivalent of a field army), drew a boundary between EUSAK and X Corps, and directed both commanders to advance to the northern border. By October 26, ROK forces reached the Yalu River at Ch'osan, the furthest EUSAK penetration into North Korea. On the same day, the 1st Marine Division conducted an unopposed amphibious landing at Wonsan (the ROK I Corps had already cleared Wonsan and was attacking to the northeast). Three days later, the 7th Infantry Division began landing at Iwon. However, beginning on October 19, substantial forces of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) had entered Korea. On October 25, they struck ROK and US forces near Unsan in central Korea, but on November 6, they broke contact and UNC forces resumed their advance. General Walker brought IX Corps on line on November 5, inserting it between I Corps and ROK II Corps. X Corps was bolstered by the arrival of the 3d Infantry Division between November 5 and 15, which secured the port areas while the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions pushed inland to the north.

On November 21, 7th Infantry Division elements reached the Yalu River near Hyesanjin, the furthest X Corps penetration of North Korea. Three days

later, Eighth Army, then generally north of the Ch'ongch'on River, began a coordinated attack toward the Manchurian border with (from west to east) I Corps (24th and ROK 1st Divisions and 27th Commonwealth Brigade); IX Corps (25th and 2d Divisions and Turkish Brigade); and ROK II Corps with 1st Cavalry Division and the recently arrived 29th British Infantry Brigade in reserve. But on the night of November 26, the Chinese began their Second Phase Offensive with attacks against EUSAK forces that badly mauled ROK II Corps and the US 2d Infantry Division. On November 27, the Chinese struck the 1st Marine Division and a 7th Infantry Division RCT west and east of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. Forced back by the fury of the Chinese attack, EUSAK withdrew through P'yongyang to the 38th Parallel, while X Corps withdrew to the Hungnam and Wonsan ports and was evacuated by sea, to be incorporated into Eighth Army.

On December 23, EUSAK was back on a line north of Seoul, generally along the 38th Parallel, with (west to east) I Corps, IX Corps, and ROK III, II, and I Corps. During the enemy New Year's offensive (December 31, 1950, to January 22, 1951), General Ridgway (in command since December 26, 1950, following General Walker's death) brought X Corps on line in the central sector, with ROK III and I Corps to the east (ROK II Corps was deactivated on January 10, 1951).

The alignment of I Corps in the west, IX Corps in the west central sector, X Corps in the central sector, and ROK corps to the east would remain during the Eighth Army counteroffensive and the enemy fourth and fifth offensives in February and April/May 1951. ROK III Corps was deactivated on May 26, so the order of battle after that date was I, IX, X Corps, and ROK I Corps from west to east.

On December 17, 1951, the 1st Cavalry Division returned to Japan and was replaced in Korea by the 45th Infantry Division (Oklahoma National Guard). In January 1952, the 40th Infantry Division (California National Guard) arrived from Japan, replacing the 24th Infantry Division. In April 1952, there was a major realignment of UNC forces all along the front. The 1st Marine Division was replaced on the line by the ROK 8th Division and was moved from X Corps to the western flank of the I Corps sector. ROK II Corps was reconstituted on April 5, 1952, and took over a section of the MLR between IX and X Corps, whose boundaries were adjusted accordingly. From then until the Armistice was signed, the order of battle was I Corps, IX Corps, II ROK Corps, X Corps, and I ROK Corps.

On May 12, 1952, General Mark W. Clark replaced General Ridgway as Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and Far East Command. From October 6 to 15, 1952, the Chinese and North Koreans conducted a ground offensive, inflicting heavy casualties but achieving no significant ground gains and the war of artillery, patrols, and outpost battles resumed. On February 11, 1953, Lt Gen Maxwell D. Taylor replaced Van Fleet as CG, EUSAK. One of his first acts was to drop the "Korea" from the Army's name and it was henceforth known as Eighth US Army.

In March 1953, the Chinese and North Koreans began probing the UNC front line, capturing a few outposts. There was a lull in the fighting in April, but in May the Chinese and North Koreans resumed probing attacks in regimental strength. In June, as the negotiators at P'anmunjom neared agreement on Armistice terms, the Chinese and North Koreans attacked with three divisions against the ROK II Corps in the central sector and, beginning on July 6, they began their last major offensive of the war, capturing the UNC outpost on Pork Chop Hill and again pushing ROK II Corps back about six miles to south of the Kumsong river. General Taylor bolstered the front line with ROK and US units and brought the 187th Airborne RCT back to Korea from Japan. By July 16, UNC forces had stopped the enemy offensive and II Corps began a counterattack to regain some of the lost ground. The fighting then died away and on July 27, 1953, the military commanders of the UNC, CPV, and KPA signed an Armistice Agreement, ending the active combat phase of the Korean War.



Order of battle tables

Notes on the tables: During the course of the Korean War, hundreds of US Army units served in Korea. The attachment and detachment of these units, or parts of the units, was frequent. Due to space limitations, the lists of attached units in the order of battle charts in this chapter are generally limited to battalion or larger-sized units that were attached for more than 30 consecutive days. Some smaller units are included when they were particularly significant, such as Ranger companies and aviation units. Units attached only for logistic support and/or court martial jurisdiction are not included. In some cases, only part of a unit was attached or the unit was placed under operational control, rather than fully attached to the receiving unit. These distinctions are not usually reflected in these lists. Note also that some of the dates for the activation or attachment of units are approximate, since there was sometimes a difference between the date that a change was ordered, when it took place, and when it became effective. In a few cases, information is not available from the official records and these unknown dates are indicated with a question mark. The term "inactivated" is used broadly to indicate a unit ceased to be an effective military formation. In some cases, units listed as "inactivated" remained in existence on paper, but were reduced to zero strength.

Hundreds of logistical and other support units served in Korea, but only those battalions and larger-sized units assigned or attached to the combat corps and divisions are listed here.

The following shorthand notations and abbreviations are used in these tables, but not elsewhere in the book:

<13 Jul 50 – The unit was assigned or attached to the parent unit prior to the date.

27 Jul 50> – The unit remained assigned after the Armistice was signed.

Asgd – Assigned

Atchd – Attached

Resp – Responsible

Segregated – Indicates the unit was restricted to African-American enlisted soldiers prior to integration.

Spt – Support

Eighth Army

Commanders

Lt Gen Walton H. Walker	3 Sep 48–23 Dec 50 (Killed)
Maj Gen Frank W. Milburn (Acting)	23 Dec–26 Dec 50
Lt Gen Matthew B. Ridgway	26 Dec 50–14 Apr 51
Lt Gen James A Van Fleet (Promoted to Gen 1 Aug 51)	14 Apr 51–10 Feb 53
Lt Gen Maxwell D. Taylor (Promoted to Gen 23 Jun 53)	11 Feb 53–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters

Assigned to US Far East Command until after the Armistice.

Assigned units

(Note: Only major units shown. Other units of battalion size or larger assigned or attached to Eighth Army are identified in the tables for the corps, divisions, or non-divisional units, below. Until 25 Aug 50, when Japan Logistical Command was established, Eighth Army also had Japan-based units assigned or attached. These are not listed.)

Unit	Remarks (Dates asgd Eighth Army)
Hq & Hq Co, Eighth Army	<13 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
Eighth Army Special Troops	<13 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
I US Corps	11 Aug 50–27 Jul 53>
IX US Corps	23 Sep 50–27 Jul 53>
X US Corps	26 Dec 50–27 Jul 53>
2d Logistical Command (Hq & Hq Co)	19 Sep 50 (Activated)–16 Oct 52 (Transferred to KCOMZ.)
3d Logistical Command (Hq & Hq Co)	10 Oct 50–16 Oct 52 (Transferred to KCOMZ.)
95th Military Government Gp	24 Feb–28 Oct 51 (Inactivated)
8086th AU, Miscellaneous Gp	Activated 5 May 51 to conduct special operations. Asgd Eighth Army 5 May–10 Dec 51 (Inactivated)
8200th AU, 8th Army Aug	9 May 51–24 Jan 53 (Inactivated)
8201st AU, UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK)	Originally activated as 8201st AU, UN Public Health and Welfare Det. Redesignated UNCACK 10 Dec 50. Asgd Eighth Army 4 Nov 50–16 Oct 52. Detached to KCOMZ 21 Aug–16 Oct 52. Asgd KCOMZ 16 Oct 52–27 Jul 53> Redesignated Korean Civil Assistance Command (KCAC) 1 Jul 53.
8202d AU, Korean Military Assistance Group (KMAG)	Originally designated 8668th AU, US Military Assistance Group, Korea (USMAGK) Asgd Eighth Army 14 Jul–28 Dec 50 (Assets transferred to KMAG.) Asgd Eighth Army 28 Dec 50–27 Jul 53>
1st Marine Division	19 Dec 50–27 Jul 53>
1st Cavalry Division	<13 Jul 50–22 Dec 51 (Transferred to FEC in Japan.)
2d Infantry Division	<13 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
3d Infantry Division	26 Dec 50–27 Jul 53>
7th Infantry Division	<13 Jul 50–30 Aug 50 (Asgd to X Corps.) 26 Dec 50–27 Jul 53>
24th Infantry Division	<13 Jul 50–7 Feb 52 (Transferred to FEC in Japan.)
25th Infantry Division	<13 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
40th Infantry Division	22 Jan 52–27 Jul 53>
45th Infantry Division	17 Dec 51–27 Jul 53>
1st Prov Marine Brig	1 Aug–12 Sep 50 (Asgd to 1st Marine Div.)
5th RCT	5th Inf Regt, 555th FA Bn (105mm howitzer), 72d Engr (C) Co Regimental Tank Company: M4A3E8 tanks. 1 Aug 50–27 Jul 53>

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187th Abn RCT	187th Abn Inf Regt, 674th Abn FA Bn (105mm howitzers), AAA Btry (towed 40mm and M55 AW), Engr Co 18 Oct 50–28 Jun 51 (Transferred to FEC in Japan.) 17 May–13 Jul 52 (Less Arty Bn and AAA Btry.) 13 Jul–16 Oct 52 (Transferred to FEC in Japan.) 23 Jun–27 Jul 53>
Eighth Army Security Bn	Asgd Eighth Army 1 Oct–27 Dec 51 (Inactivated)
8227th AU, Hq, Hq & Svc Co, Special Action Group, and 8245th AU, Raider Company	Special Operation Unit originally formed for Inch'on operation. Asgd GHQ FEC (?) Sep–26 Dec 50 Asgd Eighth Army 26 Dec 50–1 Apr 51 (Inactivated) Atchd X Corps (?) Sep 50–1 Apr 51
6th Medium Tank Bn	(M45 and M46 tanks; all M46 after Jan 51.) Asgd Eighth Army 7 Aug 50–10 Nov 51, then asgd 24th Inf Div 10 Nov 51.
502nd Recon Plat	8064th Army Unit, Heavy Tank Plat (provisional unit consisting of three M26 tanks from Tokyo Ordnance Depot. Deployed to Korea 16 Jul 50. Tanks abandoned 31 Jul 50. Assets used to form 502d Recon Plat (M24 tanks) 20 Jul 50). Asgd Eighth Army 20 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
503rd Recon Plat	(M24 tanks) 8066th Mechanized Reconnaissance Platoon. Asgd Eighth Army 20 Jul–7 Aug 50. Assets used to form 503d Recon Platoon effective 7 Aug 50. Asgd Eighth Army 7 Aug 50–1 Nov 51. Inactivated 1 Nov 51.
8072d AU, Medium Tank Bn	(M4A3E8 tanks) Activated in Japan 17 Jul 50 as provisional unit. Asgd Eighth Army 17 Jul–7 Aug 50. Det A arrived Pusan 31 Jul 50. Remainder of unit arrived 4 Aug 50. Redesignated 89th Tank Bn 7 Aug 50.

Attached units

Unit	Remarks
34th Inf RCT	19 Jul–27 Jul 53> (Deployed from Japan to Pusan 26 May 53, atchd to KCOMZ for prisoner of war security duty. Atchd to Eighth Army and deployed to Eighth Army area 19 Jul 53, but not committed to combat.)
65th Inf RCT	65th Inf Regt, 58th AFA Bn (M37 105mm Howitzer SP), C Co, 10th Engr (C) Bn, C Btry, 3d AAA (AW) Bn (M16 and M19 SP AW) Regimental Tank Company: M4A3E8 tanks. 22 Sep–6 Nov 50 (Detached to Eighth Army from 3d Inf Div.)
301st Comm Recon Bn (Hq & Hq Det)	Atchd from Army Security Agency Pacific (ASAPAC) for logistic support and courts martial jurisdiction 5 Dec 51–27 Jul 53>
303d Comm Recon Bn (Hq & Hq Det)	Atchd from ASAPAC for logistic support and courts martial jurisdiction 10 Jun 51–27 Jul 53>
304th Comm Recon Bn (Hq & Hq Det)	Atchd from ASAPAC for logistic support and courts martial jurisdiction 12 Jun 51–27 Jul 53>

ROK forces

I ROK Corps	17 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
II ROK Corps	17 Jul 50–10 Jan 51 (Inactivated) 5 Apr 52 (Re-activated)–27 Jul 53>
III ROK Corps	2 Oct 50–26 May 51 (Inactivated) 1 May 53 (Re-activated)–27 Jul 53>
Capital ROK Div	17 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
1st ROK Div	17 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
2d ROK Div	17 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
3d ROK Div	17 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
5th ROK Div	17 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
6th ROK Div	17 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
7th ROK Div	17 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>

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8th ROK Div	17 Jul 50–27 Jul 53>
9th ROK Div	18 Dec 50–27 Jul 53>
11th ROK Div	23 Nov 50–27 Jul 53>
12th ROK Div	5 Dec 52–27 Jul 53>
15th ROK Div	12 Jan–27 Jul 53>
20th ROK Div	9 Feb–27 Jul 53>
22d ROK Div	14 Jul–27 Jul 53>
1st KMC Regt	Korean Marine Corps Regiment Atchd <11 Dec 50–27 Jul 53>

UN forces

1st British Commonwealth (COMWEL) Div	28 Jul 51–27 Jul 53>
27th British Inf Brig	29 Aug 50–25 Apr 51
29th British Inf Brig Gp	3 Nov 50 –27 Jul 53> (Asgd to British COMWEL Div 28 Jul 51.)
28th British COMWEL Brig	25 Apr 51 –27 Jul 53> (Asgd to British COMWEL Div 28 Jul 51.)
25th Canadian Inf Brig	5 May 51 –27 Jul 53> (Asgd to British COMWEL Div 28 Jul 51.)
60th Indian Ambulance & Surgical Unit (Abn)	20 Nov 50–27 Jul 53> (Asgd to British COMWEL Div 28 Jul 51.)
16th New Zealand Field Regiment (Arty)	12 Jan 51–27 Jul 53> (Asgd to British COMWEL Div 28 Jul 51.)
Belgian Inf Bn	21 Jan 51–27 Jul 53>
Colombian Inf Bn	15 Jun 51– 27 Jul 53>
Ethiopian Expeditionary Force (Inf Bn)	6 May 51– 27 Jul 53>
French Inf Bn	29 Nov 50–27 Jul 53>
Greek Inf Bn	9 Dec 50–27 Jul 53>
Italian Red Cross Hosp No. 68	16 Nov 51–18 Aug 52 (Transferred to KCOMZ.)
Luxembourg Det	(Served with Belgian Bn.) 31 Jan 51–27 Jul 53>
Netherlands Det (UN) (Inf Bn)	24 Nov 50–27 Jul 53>
Norwegian MASH	22 Jun 51–27 Jul 53>
Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK) (Bn Combat Tm)	19 Sep 50–27 Jul 53>
Swedish Field Hospital	28 Sep 50–13 Aug 52 (Transferred to KCOMZ.)
Thailand 21st Inf Bn	7 Nov 50–27 Jul 53>
Turkish Armed Forces Command (TAFC)	17 Oct 50–27 Jul 53>

I Corps

Commanders

Maj Gen John B. Coulter	2 Aug–11 Sep 50
Maj Gen Frank W. Milburn (Promoted to Lt Gen 14 Feb 51)	11 Sep–23 Dec 50; 26 Dec 50–19 Jul 51
Maj Gen William B. Kean	23–26 Dec 50
Maj Gen John W. O'Daniel	19 Jul 51–28 Jun 52
Maj Gen Paul W. Kendell (Promoted to Lt Gen 16 Sep 52)	29 Jun 52–10 Apr 53
Maj Gen Bruce C. Clark	11 Apr–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters

Assigned to Eighth Army from 12 Sep 50 until after the Armistice.

Units attached to Task Force JACKSON (27 Aug–7 Sep 50, when re-designated Task Force CHURCH and command passed from Maj Gen Coulter to Maj Gen John H. Church, 24th Inf Div Commander):

Unit	Remarks
ROK I Corps (Capital, 3d, and 8th ROK Divs)	27 Aug–7 Sep 50

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21st RCT, 24th Inf Div	27 Aug–7 Sep 50
73d Med Tk Bn (less C Co)	27 Aug–7 Sep 50
ROK 7th Div (Operational Control)	31 Aug–7 Sep 50
3d Bn, 9th Inf, 2d Inf Div with 9th Inf Tk Co	31 Aug–7 Sep 50
15th FA Bn	31 Aug–7 Sep 50

Assigned units

Hq & Hq Co, I Corps, Hq & Hq Btry, I Corps Arty, 51st Corps Sig Bn, 3d Lt Avn Sec, 10th Army Postal Unit, 556th Engr Tech Intel Det, 61st Med Det (Intel), MP Plat, I Corps, 622d MP Co

Attached units (all attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
1st Cav Div	13 Sep–24 Nov 50; 25 Apr–22 Dec 51
2d Inf Div	19–25 Oct 50; 1–5 Nov 50; 15 Jul 52–27 Apr 53
3d Inf Div	4 Jan–12 May 51; 28 May 51–28 Apr 52; 1 Jul–1 Oct 52
7th Inf Div	27 Dec 52–27 Jul 53>
24th Inf Div	16 Sep–3 Dec 50; 2–27 Apr 51
25th Inf Div	28 Nov 50–28 Aug 51; 22–24 Apr 53; 5 May–27 Jul 53>
45th Inf Div	18 Dec 51–17 Jul 52
1st MarDiv	23 Mar 52–27 Jul 53>
5th RCT	13 Sep–2 Nov 50; 30 Nov–2 Dec 50
8213th AU, 8th Army Ranger Co	28 Nov 50–28 Mar 51
3d Abn Ranger Inf Co	26 Mar–12 May 51; 30 May–1 Aug 51
4th Abn Ranger Inf Co	25 Jan–21Feb 51; 6 Jun–1Aug 51
5th Abn Ranger Inf Co	26 Mar–1 Aug 51
6th Medium Tk Bn	15–17 Sep 50; 21–27 Mar 51; 2–27 Apr 51
73rd Tk Bn	24 Mar 51–31 Mar 52; 9 Nov–29 Dec 52
A Co, 79th Tk Bn	13 Dec 50–28 Aug 51
89th Tk Bn	10 Oct–12 Nov 50; 28 Nov 50–28 Aug 51; 2–6 Nov 52
Co A, 1st Armored Amph Bn, USMC	USMC Fleet Marine Force Pacific unit under I Corps operational control (?)–7 Feb 52
Hq & Hq Btry, 1st Prov FA Gp	1 Feb–20 Nov 52 (Unit discontinued.)
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th FA Gp	5 Jan–1 Mar 52
1st FA Obsn Bn	13 Sep–23 Oct 50; 1–19 Nov 50 (- A Btry); 23–28 Nov 50 (C Btry only); 28 Nov–1 Dec 50; 13 Feb–2 Mar 51; 2 Mar–5 Apr (A Btry only); 4 Apr–28 Aug 51 (- B Btry); 28 Aug 51–2 Nov 52 (- B & C Btrys); 11 Nov 52–27 Jul 53>
9th FA Bn	13 Sep 50–17 Jan 51
17th FA Bn	13 Sep–23 Oct 50; 11–23 Nov 50; 5–11 Feb 51; 4 Mar 51–2 Nov 52; 8 Nov 52–27 Jul 53>
64th FA Bn	21 Oct–Dec 52
90th FA Bn	9 Oct–19 Nov 50
92d AFA Bn	4 Jan–8 Feb 51
159th FA Bn	25 Nov 51–27 Jul 53>
176th AFA Bn	18 Feb 51–4 Mar 52
204th FA Bn	3 Apr 51–2 Nov 52; 8 Nov 52–27 Jul 53>
300th AFA Bn	21 Feb–11 May 51
623d FA Bn	15 Oct 52 –27 Jul 53>
674th Abn FA Bn	26–30 Apr 51; 13 Jul–10 Aug 52
936th FA Bn	22 Mar–25 Apr 51; 31 May–17 Jul 51; 31 Jul 51–27 Jul 53>
937th FA Bn	6 Mar–11 May 51; 31 May–28 Aug 51
955th FA Bn	8–27 Apr 51; 29 May–28 Aug 51; 17 Sep–31 Oct 51; 6 Nov 51–22 Mar 52

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987th AFA Bn	20 Jan –13 Mar 52
999th AFA Bn	17 Jan–21 Feb 51; 21 Mar 51–7 Feb 52
Hq & Hq Btry, 10th AAA Gp	13 Sep–1 Dec 50
68th AAA Gun Bn	15 Sep–23 Oct 50; 1 Nov–1 Dec 50
78th AAA Gun Bn	16 Sep–1 Dec 50
AAA Btry, 187th Abn RCT	13 Jul–10 Aug 52
Hq & Hq Co, 19th Engr (C) Gp	(11th Engr (C) Bn) 14 Sep–14 Nov 50
Hq & Hq Co, 1169th Engr (C) Gp	(14th, 151st, and 1092d Engr (C) Bns) 14 Mar 51–27 Jul 53>
51st Sig Bn	14 Sep 50–12 Jun 51 (Asgd to I Corps.)

ROK units

Capital ROK Div	27 Oct–10 Dec 52
ROK 1st Div	13 Sep 50–26 Mar 52; 21 Apr–11 Jul 52; 11 Aug 52–27 Jul 53>
ROK 9th Div	4 Jun–7 Aug 51; 15 Oct 51–5 Apr 52
ROK Marine Corps 5th Bn	16 Mar 51–27 Jul 53>
ROK 5th FA Gp	12 Oct 52–20 Jan 53 (Re-designated 1st ROK Div Arty and Asgd 1st ROK Div.)

UN units

Belgian UN Force (Bn)	7 Mar 51–28 Apr 52; 1 Jul–1 Oct 52
1st Commonwealth Div	(25th Canadian, 28th Commonwealth, and 29th British Brigs) 28 Jul 51–27 Jul 53>
27th Commonwealth Inf Brig	13 Sep–26 Nov 50
28th Commonwealth Inf Brig	29 May–28 Jul 51 (integrated into 1st Commonwealth Div)
29th British Inf Brigade	1 Dec 50–7 Mar 51
1st Royal Tk Regt	6 Dec 52–27 Jul 53>
25th Canadian Inf Brig	19 May–28 Jul 51 (integrated into 1st Commonwealth Div)
Colombian Inf Bn	27 Dec 52–27 Jul 53>
Ethiopian Bn	27 Dec 52–27 Jul 53>
French Bn	15 Jul 52–27 Apr 53
Greek Inf Bn	25 Apr 51–28 Apr 52; 1 Jul–1 Oct 52
Netherlands Bn	15 Jul 52–27 Apr 53
Philippine Bn Combat Team	4 Mar 51–18 Jul 52
Thailand Inf Bn	2–19 Jan 51; 25 Apr–26 Dec 51; 15 Jul 52–27 Apr 53
Turkish Armed Forces Command (Brig)	13 Dec 50–28 Aug 51

IX Corps

Commanders

Maj Gen Frank W. Milburn	10 Aug –11 Sep 50
Maj Gen John B. Coulter	12 Sep 50–31 Jan 51
Maj Gen Bryant E. Moore	31 Jan–24 Feb 51
Maj Gen Oliver B. Smith, USMC	24 Feb–5 Mar 51
Maj Gen William M. Hoge (Promoted to Lt Gen 3 Jun 51)	5 Mar–24 Dec 51
Maj Gen Willard G. Wyman	24 Dec 51–30 Jul 52
Maj Gen Joseph P. Cleland	31 Jul–8 Aug 52
Maj Gen Reuben E. Jenkins (Promoted to Lt Gen 6 Nov 52)	9 Aug 52–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters

Assigned to Eighth Army from 23 Sep 50 until after the Armistice.

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Assigned units

Hq & Hq Co, IX Corps, Hq & Hq Btry, IX Corps Arty, 8219th AU, FA Topo & Metro Det, 101st Sig Bn, 4th Lt Avn Sec, 11th Army Postal Unit, 558th Eng Tech Intel Team, 212th MP Co

Attached units (all attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
1st Cav Div	28 Nov–11 Dec 50; 18 Dec 50–12 Apr 51
2d Inf Div	23 Sep–19 Oct 50; 5 Nov–2 Dec 50; 23 Oct 51–14 Jul 52; 27 Apr–27 Jul 53>
3d Inf Div	1 Oct 52–27 Jul 53>
7th Inf Div	1 May–23 Oct 51; 25 Feb–14 Nov 52
24th Inf Div	3 Dec 50–2 Apr 51; 27 Apr 51–23 Jan 52
25th Inf Div	23 Sep–3 Nov 50; 19–28 Nov 50; 28 Aug 51–20 Feb 52; 12 Nov 52–22 Apr 53; 25 Apr–5 May 53
40th Inf Div	22 Jan –18 Oct 52; 26 - 28 Mar 53
1st MarDiv	19 Feb–1 May 51
5th RCT	8 Jan–21Feb 52; 20 Apr–1 Jul 53
187th Abn RCT	4–6 Jan 51; 30 Apr–21 May 51; 7 Aug–2 Oct 52; 12–27 Jul 53>
8213th AU, 8th Army Ranger Co	10 Oct–3 Nov 50; 19–28 Nov 50; 31 Mar 51–(?)
4th Abn Ranger Inf Co	30 Dec 50–8 Jan 51; 6 Apr–6 Jun 51
72d Tk Bn	2–12 Jan 51; A Co, 7 Apr–6 Jun 51
89th Tk Bn	23 Sep–9 Oct 50; 12–28 Nov 50; 7 Nov 52–5 May 53
5th FA Gp	1 Mar–5 Apr 52
1st FA Obsn Bn	13 Dec 50–24 Jan 51; 2 Mar–3 Apr 51; 2–11 Nov 52
2d Cml Mort Bn	23 Nov 50–14 Feb 51; 17 Feb 51–19 Mar 52; 7 Oct 52–22 Jan 53 (Operated as an artillery unit. Redesignated 461st Inf Bn (Hvy Mort) on 22 Jan 53.)
461st Inf Bn (Hvy Mort)	22 Jan–26 Mar 53
17th FA Bn	23 Nov 50–3 Jan 51; 11 Feb–4 Mar 51; 4 Mar–3 Apr 51 (B Btry only); 13–27 Apr 51; 11–28 May 51
38th FA Bn	23 Oct 51–16 Apr 52
75th FA Bn	18 Jan 52–27 Jul 53>
92d AFA Bn	8–20 Feb 51; 3 Mar 51–27 Jul 53>
176th AFA Bn	4 Mar–5 Apr 52
204th FA Bn	21 Feb–31 Mar 51; 2–8 Nov 52
213th FA Bn	2 Apr 51–27 Jul 53>
235th FA Obsn Bn	1 Jan–27 Jul 53>
424th FA Bn	23 Nov 51–15 Sep 52
555th FA Bn	8 Jan–1 Mar 52
937th FA Bn	11–17 May 51; 28 May 51–27 Jul 53>
955th FA Bn	2 Feb–3 Apr 51; 27 Apr–28 May 51; 28 Aug–17 Sep 51; 31 Oct–6 Nov 51; 21 Jul 52–27 Jul 53>
987th AFA Bn	16 Feb–6 Apr 51; 13 Apr 51–20 Jan 52; 13 Mar–5 Apr 52
999th AFA Bn	21 Feb–21 Mar 51
2d Rocket FA Btry	5–23 Nov 50; 19 Dec 50–27 Jul 53>
52d AAA AW Bn (SP)	18 Dec 50–(?)
304th Communications Recon Bn	(Army Security Agency unit) 6 Mar 52–27 Jul 53>
19th Engr (C) Gp	(11th and 74th Engr (C) Bns) 14 Nov 50–10 Dec 51
36th Engr (C) Gp	(11th, 74th, 194th, and 378th Engr (C) Bns) 19 Mar 51–27 Jul 53>
101st Sig Bn	7 Apr–12 Jun 51 (Asgd to IX Corps on this date)

ROK units

Task Force PAIK	10 Feb–5 Apr 52 (ROK 3d, 6th, and Capital Divs and 5th FA Gp.)

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2d ROK Div	28 Apr 51–3 Apr 52; 1 Jun 52–27 Jul 53>
3d ROK Div	9 Jan–5 Apr 52
6th ROK Div	28 Nov 50–14 Feb 51; 17 Feb–27 Apr 51; 27 Apr 51–12 Jan 52; 20 Mar–5 Apr 52
9th ROK Div	5 Apr 52–27 Jul 53>
11th ROK Div	5–31 Oct 50
Capital ROK Div	18 Mar–5 Apr 52; 10 Dec 52–27 Jul 53>
37th ROK Lt Inf Regt	16 Jun–12 Dec 52
1st ROK FA Gp	1 Jul 52–20 Jan 53 (Re-designated 9th ROK Div Arty this date.)
6th ROK FA Gp	19 Nov 52–20 Jan 53 (Re-designated Capital ROK Div Arty this date.)
7th ROK FA Gp	17 Dec 52–20 Jan 53 (Re-designated 2d ROK Div Arty this date.)

UN units

27th British Brig	27 Nov 50–14 Feb 51; 17 Feb–25 Apr 51
28th Commonwealth Inf Brig	25 Apr–29 May 51
Colombian Inf Bn	24 Jul 51–28 Jan 52
Greek Inf Bn	18 Dec 50–12 Apr 51
Philippine Bn Combat Team	26 Sep–30 Oct 50; 18 Dec 50–13 Jan 51
Turkish Armed Forces Command (Brig)	24 Nov–3 Dec 50

X Corps

Commanders

Maj Gen Edward M. Almond (Promoted to Lt Gen 12 Feb 51)	26 Aug 50–15 Jul 51
Maj Gen Clovis E. Byers	15 Jul–5 Dec 51
Maj Gen Williston B. Palmer (Promoted to Lt Gen 10 Jun 52)	5 Dec 51–9 Jul 52; 13 Jul–11 Aug 52
Gen Ira P. Swift (Acting)	10–12 Jul 52
Maj Gen David L. Ruffner (Acting)	12–14 Aug 52
Maj Gen Isaac D. White (Promoted to Lt Gen 7 Nov 52)	15 Aug 52–31 Mar 53; 8 Apr–27 Jul 53>
Maj Gen Joseph P. Cleland (Acting)	1–7 Apr 53

Next higher headquarters

Assigned to GHQ FEC 26 Aug–26 Dec 50.

Assigned to Eighth Army 26 Dec 50 until after the Armistice.

Assigned units

Hq & Hq Co, X Corps; Hq & Hq Btry, X Corps Arty; 92d FA Btry (Slt); 8221st AU; FA Topo & Metro Det; 5th Lt Avn Sec.

Hq & Hq Co, 3d Logistical Command; 56th Amph Tk & Tractor Bn (LVT(A)5, LVT(3), and LVT(3)(C)); Hq & Hq Co, 19th Engr (C) Gp; 4th Field Hosp; Hq & Hq Co, 60th Ord Gp; Hq & Hq Det, 74th Ord Bn; Hq & Hq Det, 6th QM Gp; Hq & Hq & Svc Co, 14th Trans Port Bn; Hq & Hq Co, 55th Trans Trk Bn; 17th ROK Inf Regt — Aug/Sep–Oct 50: for Inch'on landing

7th Inf Div; 1st MarDiv; 92d AFA Bn; 96th FA Bn; 50th AAA AW Bn; Hq & Hq Co, 2d Engr Special Brig; Hq & Hq Co, 8224th Engr Const Gp; 1st Mobile Army Surgical Hosp; 163d Med Bn; Hq & Hq Det, 328th Ord Bn; Hq & Hq Det, 142d QM Bn; 4th Sig Bn, Corps; Hq & Hq Co, 52d Trans Trk Bn — Aug/Sep–Dec 50

Attached units (all attachd from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
2d Inf Div	2 Jan–22 Oct 51
3d Inf Div	20 Oct–15 Dec 50; 20–30 May 51
7th Inf Div	26 Dec 50–1 May 51; 22 Oct 51–25 Feb 52; 16 Jun–18 Jul 53
25th Inf Div	20 Feb–24 Oct 52
40th Inf Div	18 Oct 52–27 Jul 53>

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45th Inf Div	18 Jul 52–27 Jul 53>
1st Marine Div	27–31 Dec 50; 1 May 51–23 Mar 52
5th RCT	24 Apr 52–20 Apr 53; (- Arty Bn and Hvy Mort Co: 1–27 Jul 53>)
187th Abn RCT	12 Jan–27 Feb 51; 20 May–5 Jun 51
2d Abn Ranger Inf Co	31 Dec 50–23 Feb 51
8227th AU, Hq, Hq & Svc Co, Special Action Gp & Raider Co (Prov)	<11 Dec–26 Dec 50
72d Tk Bn	12 Apr–27 Jul 52
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th FA Gp	30 Aug–12 Dec 50 (Inactivated)
B Btry, 1st FA Obsn Bn	12 Jun 51–2 Nov 52; 14 Nov 52–27 Jul 53>
38th FA Bn	16 Apr–20 Jul 52
57th FA Bn	17 Mar–18 Apr 52
92d AFA Bn	26 Dec 50–4 Jan 51
96th FA Bn	8 Feb 51–27 May 52
145th FA Bn	18 Dec 51–2 Nov 52; 18 Dec 51–2 Nov 52; 9 Nov 52–27 Jul 53>
196th FA Bn	21 Feb–8 Apr 52; 8 Apr 51 –27 Jul 53>
C Btry, 213th FA Bn	6 Jun–27 Jul 53>
300th AFA Bn	14 May 51–21 Mar 52
555th FA Bn	19 Mar 52–20 Apr 53
623d FA Bn	14 Jan–15 Oct 52
780th FA Bn	8 Apr–22 Jun 51; 22 Jun 51–2 Nov 52; 12 Nov 52–27 Jul 53>
936th FA Bn	21 Feb–22 Mar 51
937th FA Bn	Btry A 11 May–18 Dec 51; Bn (-A & B Btrys; + B Btry, 17th FA Bn) 17 May–28 May 51; entire Bn (?)–19 Dec 51
955th FA Bn	22 Mar–21 Jun 52
2d Cml Mort Bn	Bn (- A Btry) 19 Mar–7 Oct 52; A Btry 5 Apr–7 Oct 52
19th Engr (C) Bn	15 Dec 51–27 Jul 53> (73d, 116th, 185th, and 1343d Engr (C) Bns)
8224th Engr Const Gp	<10 Sep–15 Dec 51 Inactivated, Bns transferred to 19th Engr (C) Gp (73d, 116th, 185th, and 1343d Engr (C) Bns)
79th Engr Const Bn	<23–26 Dec 50
Hq & Hq Co, 96th MP Bn	26 Dec 50–4 Feb 51
772d MP Bn	(?) Nov–26 Dec 50
4th Sig Bn	26 Dec 50–12 Jun 51
3d Helicopter Det	<11 Dec 50–7 Jan 51
Hq & Hq Co, 21st Trans Medium Port Bn	<11 Dec–19 Dec 50

ROK units

I ROK Corps Hq	20 Oct–19 Dec 50; 15 Feb–3 Mar 51
III ROK Corps	(20?)–22 May 51 (III Corps inactivated); 1 May–27 Jul 53>
2d ROK Div	3 Jan–15 Feb 51
3d ROK Div	20 Oct–15 Dec 50; 8–10 Feb 51; 3 Mar–(?); 20–30 May 51; 20 Oct–23 Nov 51
Capital ROK Div	20 Oct–19 Dec 50
5th ROK Div	3 Jan–22 Oct 51; 3–10 Apr 53; 15–21 Jun 53
7th ROK Div	1 May–30 Sep 51; 30 Sep–18 Nov 51; 18 Nov 51–16 May 53
8th ROK Div	3 Jan–24 Feb 51; 12 May–15 Nov 51; 18 Mar–28 Sep 52
12th ROK Div	26 Dec 52–27 Jul 53>
20th ROK Div	9 Feb–28 Apr 53; 11 May–27 Jul 53>
1st Korean Marine Corps Regt	<11 Dec–(?) Dec 50
3d ROK FA Gp	24 Sep 52–27 Jul 53> (Re-designated 7th ROK Div Arty 20 Jan 53.)
8th ROK FA Gp	17 Jan 53–27 Jul 53>

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10th ROK FA Gp	22 Apr–27 Jul 53> (Re-designated 20th ROK Div Arty 1 May 53.)

UN units

27th British Commonwealth Brig	14–17 Feb 51
41st Royal Marine Commando (British)	<11–26 Dec 50
Colombian Inf Bn	28 Jan–25 Feb 52; 17 Mar–25 Apr 52
Turkish Inf Brig	20 Feb –24 Oct 52

1st Cavalry Division

Commanders

Maj Gen Hobart R. Gay	29 Sep 49–4 Feb 51
Brig Gen Charles D. Palmer (Promoted to Maj Gen 23 Feb 51)	5 Feb–16 Jul 51
Brig Gen Thomas L. Harrold (Promoted to Maj Gen 15 Sep 51)	17 Jul 51–6 Jul 52
Maj Gen Arthur G. Trudeau	7 Jul 52–15 Mar 53
Brig Gen William J. Bradley	16 Mar–30 Apr 53
Maj Gen Joseph P. Cleland	1 May–5 Jun 53
Maj Gen Armistead D. Mead	6 Jun–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters

Assigned to Eighth Army from before the war to 22 Dec 51, when reassigned to GHQ, FEC and attached to XVI Corps in Japan.

Attached to I Corps 13 Sep–24 Nov 50.

Attached to IX Corps 28 Nov–11 Dec 50 and 28 Dec 50–11 Apr 51.

Attached to I Corps 25 Apr–22 Dec 51.

Assigned units

Note: All units assigned for the duration of the war (25 Jun 50 to 27 Jul 53) except as noted.

Hq & Hq Co, 1st Cav Div; 5th Replacement Co; 1st Cav Div Band; 8th Engr (C) Bn; 15th Med Bn; 545th MP Co; 27th Ord Maint Co (Changed to Ord Bn 1 Feb 53); 15th QM Co; 13th Signal Co.

Unit	Remarks
5th Cav Regt	Personnel of 3d Bn, 14th Inf Regt, 3d Inf Div asgd to form 3d Bn, 5th Cav 26 Aug 50.
7th Cav Regt	Personnel of 3d Bn, 30th Inf Regt, 3d Inf Div asgd to form 3d Bn, 7th Cav 26 Aug 50.
8th Cav Regt	Personnel of 3d Bn, 7th Inf Regt, 3d Inf Div asgd to form 3d Bn, 8th Cav 26 Aug 50.

The regiments of the 1st Cav Div did not have regimental tank companies while the division served in Korea.

A Co, 71st Tk Bn 50; inactivated 16 Oct 50.	(M24 tanks) Personnel transferred to 70th Tk Bn and 16th Recon Co 20 Sep
6th Tk Bn	(M46 & M45 tanks) Asgd to 1st Cav Div on 29 Oct 50, but attached to 24th Inf Div and never served with 1st Cav Div as organic Tk Bn.
70th Tk Bn	(M26 and M4A3E8; all M4A3E8 tanks by Feb 51) Asgd 24th Inf Div 24 Oct 50, but attached to 1st Cav Div. Asgd to 1st Cav Div as organic tk bn 10 Nov 51. Tanks transferred to 245th Tk Bn in Dec 51 during switchover of the 45th Inf and 1st Cav Divs.

Hq & Hq Btry, 1st Cav Div Arty	
61st FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
77th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
99th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
82nd FA Bn	(155mm howitzer)
29th AAA (AW) Bn	(M19A1 and M16 SP AW) Asgd 27 Dec 51 after div arrived in Japan.

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A Btry, 92nd AAA AW (SP) Bn	(M15A1 SP AW) Transferred to 45th Inf Div 24 Dec 51; inactivated 28 Dec 51.

Attached units (all attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
4th Ranger Inf Co (Abn)	6–7 Apr, 6–13 Jun 51
70th Tk Bn	14 Aug 50–10 Nov 51 (Asgd as organic tk bn this date.)
1st FA Obsn Bn	Bn (- A Btry) atchd to 1st Cav Div 29 Aug–21 Sep 50.
17th FA Bn	(8in. howitzer) Entire bn or individual btrys atchd in Sep, 50 and in Feb, Mar, Jun, Aug, Oct, and Nov 51.
936th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) 29 May–17 Jul 51; 3–21 Oct 51 (AR National Guard)
34th Countermortar Radar Det	11 Sep–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 1st Cav Div Arty.)
36th Countermortar Radar Det	18 Sep–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 1st Cav Div Arty.)
52d Inf Counterfire Plat	30 Jul–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 1st Cav Div Arty.)
58th Inf Counterfire Plat	13 Aug–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 1st Cav Div Arty.)
64th Inf Counterfire Plat	31 Aug–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 1st Cav Div Arty.)

UN units

Greek Inf Bn	13 Dec 50–1 Jan 51; 4 Jan–28 Nov 51
Philippine Bn Combat Team	13 Dec 50–10 Jan 51
Thailand Inf Bn	19 Jan–22 Dec 51

2d Infantry Division

Commanders

Maj Gen Laurence B. Keiser	8 Jul–6 Dec 50
Maj Gen Robert B. McClure	7 Dec 50–13 Jan 51
Maj Gen Clark L. Ruffner	14 Jan–2 Apr; 10 Apr–11 Jun; 18 Jun–31 Aug 51
Brig Gen George C. Stewart	3–9 Apr; 12 –17 Jun 51
Brig Gen Thomas W. de Shazo	1–19 Sep 51
Maj Gen Robert N. Young	19 Sep 51–19 Feb 52; 25 Feb–3 May 52
Brig Gen Hayden L. Boatner	20–24 Feb 52
Brig Gen James C. Fry (Promoted to Maj Gen 17 May 52)	4 May 52–3 May 53
Maj Gen William L. Barriger	5 May–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters

Assigned to Eighth Army from before the war to after the Armistice.
Attached to IX Corps 23 Sep–19 Oct 50.
Attached to I Corps 19–25 Oct 50 and 1–5 Nov 50.
Attached to IX Corps 5 Nov–2 Dec 50.
Attached to X Corps 2 Jan–22 Oct 51.
Attached to IX Corps 23 Oct 51–14 Jul 52.
Attached to I Corps 15 Jul 52–26 Apr 53.
Attached to IX Corps 27 Apr 53 until after the Armistice.

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Assigned units

Note: All units assigned for the duration of the war (25 Jun 50 to 27 Jul 53) except as noted.

Hq & Hq Co, 2d Inf Div; 2nd Reconnaissance Co; 2nd Replacement Co; 2nd Inf Div Band; 2nd Engr (C) Bn; 2nd Med Bn; 2nd MP Co; 702nd Ord Maint Co (Changed to 702d Ordnance Battalion 1 Feb 53); 2nd QM Co; 2nd Sig Co.

Unit	Remarks
9th Inf Regt	3d Bn was a segregated unit, integrated Nov 51.
23rd Inf Regt	
38th Inf Regt	
(All 2d Inf Div regimental tank companies were equipped with M4A3E8 tanks.)	
72nd Tank Battalion	M26 tanks replaced by M4A3E8s Jan 51; replaced by M46 tanks by Jan 52.
Hq & Hq Btry, 2nd Inf DivArty	
12th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) Activated 10 Nov 51 from re-designated 503d FA Bn.
15th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
37th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
38th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
503rd FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) Segregated unit, integrated and re-designated 12th FA Bn 7 Nov 51.
82nd AAA AW (SP) Bn	(M16 SP AW)

Attached units (all attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
1st Abn Ranger Inf Co	23–28 Dec 50; 8–9 Jan 51 and 24 Apr–1 Aug 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel transferred to 187th Abn RCT.)
14th Inf Regt	20 Dec 51–29 Jan 52
69th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) 20 Dec 51–20 Feb 52
96th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) 13–15 Feb; 16 Mar–4 Apr; 26 Apr–6 May 51.
196th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) 1 May–6 Jun 51
987th AFA Bn	(M43 8in. HMC) 18 Dec 51–20 Jan 52
B Co, 2d Cml Mort Bn	18 Dec 51–18 Mar 52
28th Countermortar Radar Det	11 Sep–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 2d Inf Div Arty.)
31st Countermortar Radar Det	17 Sep–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 2d Inf Div Arty.)
54th Inf Counterfire Plat	1 Aug–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 2d Inf Div Arty.)
60th Inf Counterfire Plat	1 Aug–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 2d Inf Div Arty.)
66th Inf Counterfire Plat	6 Sep–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 2d Inf Div Arty.)
A Btry, 21st AAA AW Bn	(M16 SP AW) 18 Dec 51–20 Feb 52
2d Plat, 92d Engr Slt Co	1 May–6 Jun 51
1st Plat, 86th Engr Slt Co	19 Dec 51–26 Apr 52
B Co, 65th Eng (C) Bn	20 Dec 51–29 Jan 52 (2d Inf Div 51 O/B shows this unit as C Co, but majority of other records indicate it was B Co.)

UN units

French Inf Bn	11Dec 50–27 Jul 53>
Netherlands Inf Bn	11 Dec 50–15 Aug 51; 23 Sep 51–27 Jul 53>
Thailand Inf Bn	26 Dec 51–27 Jul 53>

3d Infantry Division

Commanders	
Maj Gen Robert H. Soule	10 Aug 50–19 Oct 51
Maj Gen Thomas J. Cross	20 Oct 51–28 Apr 52
Brig Gen Robert L. Dulaney	29 Apr–8 Oct 52
Maj Gen George W. Smythe	9 Oct 52–9 May 53
Maj Gen Eugene W. Ridings	10 May–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters
Assigned to GHQ, FEC Aug 50–26 Dec 50.
Assigned to Eighth Army from 26 Dec 50 until after the Armistice.
Attached to X Corps 11 Nov 50–4 Jan 51.
Attached to I Corps 4 Jan–12 May 51.
Attached to X Corps (minus 7th and 65th RCTs, which remained under Eighth Army control) 17–26 May 51.
Attached to I Corps 28 May 51–28 Apr 52; 1 Jul–1 Oct 52 (Eighth Army Reserve 28 Apr–30 Jun 52).
Attached to IX Corps from 1 Oct 52 until after the Armistice.

Assigned units

Note: All units assigned for the duration of the war (25 Jun 50–27 Jul 53) except as noted.

Hq & Hq Co, 3d Inf Div; 3d Recon Co; 3d Replacement Co; 3d Inf Div Band; 10th Engr (C) Bn; 3d Med Bn; 3d MP Co; 703d Ord Maint Co (Changed to 703d Ord Bn 1 Feb 53); 3rd QM Co; 3rd Sig Co.

Unit	Remarks
7th Inf Regt	
15th Inf Regt	
65th Inf Regt	Asgd 6 Oct 50. Puerto Rican enlisted; reconstituted as a fully integrated unit Mar 53.
All 3d Inf Div regimental tank companies were equipped with M4A3E8 tanks.	
64th Tank Bn	(M46 tanks) Segregated unit; integrated 16 Oct 51. Asgd from 2d Armor Div to 3d Inf Div 13 Aug 50–27 Jul 53>.
Hq & Hq Btry, 3d Inf DivArty	
10th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
39th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
58th AFA Bn	(M37 105mm howitzer SP) Associated with 65th RCT. Segregated unit, integrated 16 Oct 51, converted to towed howitzer and re-designated 58th FA Bn 10 Nov 51.
9th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) Asgd to 3d Inf Div 17 Jan 51.
999th AFA Bn	(M41 155mm HMC) Segregated unit (integrated 25 Nov 51). Released to Eighth Army 17 Jan 51.
3d AAA AW (SP) Bn	(M19A1 and M16 SP AW)

Attached units (all attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
3rd Abn Ranger Inf Co	3 Apr–1 Aug 51 (Inactivated)
7th Cav Regt, 1st Cav Div	21 Nov–16 Dec 51
8th Cav Regt, 1st Cav Div	20 Nov–27 Dec 51
5th RCT	(With 555th FA Bn.) 19 Apr–20 Jun 53
14th Inf Regt	3 Mar–24 Apr 53
26th Inf Scout Dog Plat	30 Jan–13 Jul 53

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99th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) 20 Nov–14 Dec 51
555th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) 19 Apr–28 Jun 53 (Attached with 5th RCT)
999th AFA Bn (SP)	(M41 155mm HMC) 17 Jan–21 Feb 51 (Segregated unit, integrated 25 Nov 51)
27th Countermortar Radar Det	18 Sep–9 Nov 51
35th Countermortar Radar Set	11 Sep–9 Nov 51
67th Inf Counterfire Plat	26 Sep–28 Oct 51
1st Plat (-), 86th FA Btry (Slt)	30 Jan–11 Jul 53
68th Cml Smoke Generator Co	13 Mar–16 Apr 51
72d Engr (C) Co	25 Nov–20 Dec 50; 23 May–8 Jun 53
1st Plat, 1st Engr Slt Co (Prov)	15 Feb–11 May 51
1st Plat, 61st Engr Slt Co	15 Nov 51–26 Apr 52; 5 Jul–20 Oct 52
3dt Plat, 86th Engr Slt Co	21Oct–29 Dec 52

ROK units

9th ROK Inf Div	5 Jun–7 Aug 51
17th ROK FA Bn	5 Jul–20 Oct 52
30th ROK FA Bn	5 Jun–2 Aug 51
89th ROK FA Bn	21 Oct–21 Nov 52

UN units

Belgian Inf Bn	8 Mar–25 Apr 51; 31 Aug–15 Oct 51; 12 Nov 51–27 Jul 53>
Greek Inf Bn	20 Nov 51–27 Jul 53>
Philippine Bn Combat Team	4 Mar–28 Apr 51; 1 Jun 51–11 Apr 52
Thailand Inf Bn	20 Nov–26 Dec 51
Turkish FA Bn	30 Jan–27 Apr 53

7th Infantry Division

Commanders

Maj Gen David G. Barr	8 May 49–11 Feb 51
Maj Gen Claude B. Ferenbaugh	12 Feb–4 Dec 51
Maj Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer	5 Dec 51–3 Jul 52
Brig Gen Wayne C. Smith (Promoted to Maj Gen 20 Sep 52)	4 Jul 52–20 Mar 53
Maj Gen Arthur G. Trudeau	21 Mar–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters

Assigned to Eighth Army from before the war until 30 Aug 50.

Assigned to X Corps 30 Aug–26 Dec 50.

Assigned to Eighth Army from 26 Dec 50 until after Armistice.

Attached to X Corps 26 Dec 50–1 May 51.

Attached to IX Corps 1 May–23 Oct 51.

Attached to X Corps 11 Oct 51–24 Feb 52.

Attached to IX Corps 25 Feb–14 Nov 52.

Eighth Army Reserve 14 Nov–26 Dec 52.

Attached to I Corps from 27 Dec 52 until after the Armistice.

Assigned units

Note: All units assigned for the duration of the war (25 Jun 50–27 Jul 53) except as noted.

Hq & Hq Co, 7th Inf Div; 7th Recon Co; 7th Replacement Co; 7th Inf Div Band; 13th Engr (C) Bn; 7th Med Bn; 7th MP Co; 707th Ord Maint Co (Changed to 707th Ordnance Bn 1 Feb 53); 7th QM Co; 7th Sig Co.

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Unit	Remarks
17th Inf Regt	
31st Inf Regt	
32nd Inf Regt	
All 7th Inf Div regimental tank companies were equipped with M4A3E8 tanks.	
73d Tk Bn	(M26 tanks replaced by M46 Jan 51) Asgd 31 Oct 51.
A Co, 77th Tk Bn	(M24 tanks) Inactivated 10 Nov 51, personnel and equipment transferred to 73d Tank Bn.
Hq & Hq Btry, 7th Inf DivArty	
48th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
49th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
57th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
31st FA Bn	(155mm howitzer)
15th AAA AW (SP) Bn	(M19A1 and M16 SP AW) Assigned 10 Nov 51
29th AAA AW (SP) Bn	Assigned 7th Inf Div 20 Mar 49–10 Nov 51, but remained in Japan attached to 40th AAA Brig. Assigned 1st Cav Div after arrival in Japan 27 Dec 51.

Attached units (all attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
187th Abn RCT	10 Aug–2 Oct 52.
2d Abn Ranger Inf Co	31 Dec 50–1 Aug 51 (Inactivated)
26th Inf Scout Dog Plat	3d Squad attached 28 Apr–23 Jun 52, entire platoon attached 24 Jun–3 Nov 52.
73d Tk Bn	(M4A3E8 & M26 replaced by M46 tanks by Feb 51) Joined division at Inchon and atchd 17 Sep 50–31 Oct 51.
C Btry, 17th FA Bn	(8in. howitzer) 23 May–23 Jun 51
75th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) 24 Feb–25 Mar 52
96th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) 20 Feb–15 Mar; 4–25 Apr 51
213th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) 27 Mar–26 Apr 52
674th Abn FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) 10 Aug–2 Oct 52 (Atchd with 187th Abn RCT.)
32d Countermortar Radar Det	18 Sep–21 Oct 51
38th Countermortar Radar Det	11 Sep–21 Oct 51
57th Inf Counterfire Plat	16 Aug–21 Oct 51
59th Inf Counterfire Plat	16 Aug (15 Sep?)–28 Sep 51
63d Inf Counterfire Plat	2 Sep–21 Oct 51
65th Inf Counterfire Plat	8 Sep–6 Oct 51
3d Plat, 61st FA Btry (Slt)	25 Jan–27 Jul 53>. Re-designated from 61st Engr (Slt) Co 25 Jan 53.
15th AAA AW (SP) Bn	(M19A1 & M16 SP AW) Sep 50–10 Nov 51 (Asgd).
187th AAA AW Btry	(Towed 40mm & M55 AW) 7 Aug–2 Oct 52
1st Plat, 86th Engr Slt Co	23 Jul–14 Nov 52
3d Plat, 61st Engr Slt Co	29 Dec 52–25 Jan 53 (Re-designated 61st FA Btry (Slt) on that date.)
ROK units	
30th ROK FA Bn	27 Mar–26 Apr 52
91st ROK FA Bn	26 Apr–27 Nov 52.
187th ROK FA Bn	27 Apr –27 Jul 53>
UN units	
Colombian Inf Bn	28 Jan 52–27 Jul 53>
Ethiopian Inf Bn	11 Jul 51–27 Jul 53>

24th Infantry Division

Commanders

Maj Gen William F. Dean	Oct 49–20 Jul 50
Maj Gen John H. Church	21 Jul 50–25 Jan 51
Maj Gen Blackshear M. Bryan	26 Jan 51–19 Dec 51
Maj Gen Henry I. Hodes	20 Dec 51–6 Jan 52; 10 Jan–8 Feb 52
Brig Gen Paul D. Adams	7–9 Jan; 9 Feb–5 Mar 52
Maj Gen George W. Smythe	6 Mar–6 Oct 52
Brig Gen W.E. Dunkelberg	7–30 Oct 52
Brig Gen Barksdale Hamlett	31 Oct–2 Nov 52
Maj Gen Charles L. Dasher, Jr.	3 Nov 52–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters

Assigned to Eighth Army from before the war to 23 Jan 52, when reassigned to Headquarters, Far East Command and attached to XVI Corps in Japan.

Attached to Task Force Jackson 5–15 Nov 50.

Attached to I Corps 16 Sep–3 Dec 50.

Attached to IX Corps 3 Dec 50–2 Apr 51.

Attached to I Corps 2 Apr–27 Apr 51.

Attached to IX Corps 27 Apr 51–23 Jan 52.

Assigned to General Headquarters, Far East Command and attached to XIV Corps in Japan 23 Jan–28 Jun 53.

Attached to Korea Communications Zone 5–16 Jul 53.

Assigned units

Note: All units assigned for the duration of the war (25 Jun 50–27 Jul 53) except as noted.

Hq & Hq Co, 24th Inf Div; 24th Recon Co; 24th Replacement Co; 24th Inf Div Band; 3d Engr (C) Bn; 24th Med Bn; 24th MP Co; 724th Ord Maint Co (Changed to 724th Ord Bn 16 Jul 53); 24th QM Co; 24th Sig Co.

Unit	Remarks
19th Inf Regt	No tank company while in Korea.
21st Inf Regt	Tank company (M4A3E8) activated 16 Oct 50.
34th Inf Regt	No tank company. Inactivated 28 Dec 50. Personnel formed 3d battalions of 19th and 21st Inf Regts. 34th Inf (less personnel and equipment) transferred to Japan and rebuilt as part of GHQ FEC reserve.
6th Tk Bn	(M46 tanks) Asgd 10 Nov 51.
70th Tk Bn	(M26 and M4A3E8 tanks; all M4A3E8 after Feb 51) Asgd to 24th Inf Div on paper 29 Oct 50, but never served with the division. Served primarily with 1st Cav Div and re-assigned to that division 10 Nov 51.
A Co, 78th Hvy Tk Bn	(M24 Tanks) Re-designated A Co, 78th Tank Bn 5 Aug 50. Relieved from assignment to 24th Inf Div and inactivated on 16 Oct 50. Personnel and equipment reorganized as 21st Inf Regt Tank Co.
Hq & Hq Btry, 24th Inf Div Arty	
13th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
52d FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
63d FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) The 63d FA Bn was overrun by North Korean forces and nearly destroyed on 14 Jul 50. Between 26 Aug and 2 Sep 50, A Btry personnel and equipment transferred to C Btry, 13th FA Bn; those of B Btry transferred to C Btry, 52d FA Bn. The unit (less personnel and equipment) transferred to Japan, rebuilt, and assigned to 25th Inf Div. 3 Sep 51, its personnel and equipment were transferred to the newly activated 69th FA Bn and the 63d returned to Japan minus personnel and equipment. It was rebuilt and assigned to 24th Inf Div, with which it returned to Korea 16 Jul 53.

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11th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer)
26th AAA AW Bn	(M19A1 & M16 SP AW) A Btry was with the division in Japan before the war. C & D Btrys activated 5 Aug 50, but C Btry did not become operational until 6 Jun 51; D Btry operational on 6 Jul 51. Hq & Hq Btry, 52d AAA AW Bn (attached) provided Bn headquarters until 31 Oct 51, when Hq & Hq Btry, 52d AAA AW Bn re-designated Hq & Hq Btry, 26th AAA AW Bn and A Btry, 21st AAA AW Bn re-designated B Btry, 26th AAA AW Bn. The actual reorganization took place 10 Nov 51.

Attached units (All attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
8th Abn Ranger Inf Co	3–27 Apr 51
5th RCT	18 Sep 50 to replace 34th Inf as the third inf regt in the 24th Inf Div. All or part of the regt normally remained attached, with 555th FA Bn, until the division rotated to Japan on 8 Jan 52.
6th Medium Tk Bn	(M45 and M46 tanks; all M46 after Dec 50) Although asgd to the 1st Cav Div, all or part of the battalion was attached 27 Aug–22 Nov 50; 29 Nov 50–22 Mar 51; and 24 Mar–10 Nov 51, when it was re-assigned to the 24th Inf Div. Redesignated 6th Tank Battalion 10 Nov 51.
1st FA Obsn Bn	21 Sep–31 Oct 50
17th FA Bn	(8in. howitzer) 1–31 Oct 50; 7 Dec 50–4 Jan 51; 14–19 Feb 51
555th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) 18 Sep–6 Nov 50; 9 Nov 50–5 Jun 51; 21 Jun–8 Aug 51; 6 Oct 51–8 Jan 52. (Atchd with 5th RCT.)
955th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer) 8 Apr–22 May 51
2d Cml Mort Bn	All or part of Bn attached 1 Jan–30 Oct 51 (Operated as an artillery unit.)
53d Inf Counterfire Plat	30 Jul–28 Oct 51. (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 24th Inf Div Arty.)
A Btry, 21st AAA AW Bn	(M16 SP AW) 26 Jan–8 Aug 51. Re-designated B Btry, 26th AAA AW Bn and asgd to division 31 Oct 51.
52d AAA AW Bn	Hq & Hq Btry attached 13 Dec 50–8 Aug 51 and 6–31 Oct 51. Firing batteries were A, C, and D Btrys, 26th AAA AW Bn and A Btry, 21st AAA AW Bn. Hq & Hq Btry re-designated Hq & Hq Btry, 26th AAA AW Bn 31 Oct 51.

UN Units

27th British Brig	20–26 Sep; 22 Oct –24 Nov 50; 11 Dec 50–30 Jan 51
Colombian Inf Bn	1 Oct 51–8 Jan 52

25th Infantry Division

Commanders

Maj Gen William B. Kean	8 Jul 50–24 Feb 51
Maj Gen J. Sladen Bradley	25 Feb–13 Jul 51
Maj Gen Ira P. Swift	14 Jul 51–17 Jul 52
Maj Gen Samuel T. Williams	18 Jul 52–26 Jun 53
Brig Gen Louis T. Heath	26 Jun–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters

Assigned to Eighth Army from before the war until after the Armistice.

Attached to IX Corps 23 Sep–3 Nov 50 and 19–28 Nov 50.

Attached to X Corps 28 Nov 50–28 Aug 51.

Attached to IX Corps 28 Aug 51–19 Feb 52.

Attached to X Corps 20 Feb to 23 Oct 52 and 12 Oct 52 to 21 Apr 53 (Eighth Army Reserve 24 Oct–11 Nov 52).

Attached to IX Corps 12 Nov 52–21 Apr 53 and 25 Apr–4 May 53 (Under IX Corps operational control, 25 Apr–4 May 53).

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Attached to I Corps 5 May 53 until after the Armistice.

Assigned units

Note: All units assigned for the duration of the war (25 Jun 50–27 Jul 53) except as noted.

Hq & Hq Co, 25th Inf Div; 25th Recon Co; 25th Replacement Co; 25th Inf Div Band; 25th Med Bn; 25th MP Co; 725th Ord Maint Co (Changed to 725th Ord Bn 1 Feb 53); 25th QM Co; 25th Sig Co.

Unit	Remarks
14th Inf Regt	Tank company: M4A3E8. Regt formed from personnel of 34th Inf in Japan and activated in Korea 5 Sep 51 to replace 24th Inf as third regt of the division.
24th Inf Regt	No tank company. Segregated unit. Inactivated 1 Oct 51 and personnel transferred to other units.
27th Inf Regt	No tank company.
35th Inf Regt	Tank company (M4A3E8) activated Oct? 51.
A Co, 79th Hvy Tk Bn	(M24 tanks) Re-designated A Co, 79th Tank Bn 5 Aug 50. Inactivated 14 Nov 51. Personnel and equipment transferred to 89th Tk Bn.
89th Tank Bn	(M4A3E8 tanks) Activated as 89th Medium Tank Bn in Korea from assets of 8072d AU, Medium Tk Bn 7 Aug 50. Asgd Eighth Army 7 Aug–14 Nov 50. All or part of Bn atchd 25th Inf Div until 14 Nov 51, when asgd. Organized with four tank companies until 10 Nov 51, when reorganized under T/O&E 7-35N with three tank companies. Re-designated 89th Tank Bn 14 Nov 50.
Hq & Hq Btry, 25th Inf DivArty	
8th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
64th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
69th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) Activated from personnel of 63d FA Bn, which had been attached to the division since 16 Aug 51, and assigned to 25th Inf Div on 27 Aug 51, replacing 159th FA Bn.
159th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) Segregated unit associated with 24th Inf. Integrated 1 Jan 52. Converted to 155mm howitzer Bn 20 Nov 51. Replaced as 25th Div Arty FA Bn by 69th FA Bn and reassigned to Eighth Army on 12 Nov 51, but remained atchd to 25th Inf Div until 21 Nov 51, when atchd to IX Corps.
90th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer)
21st AAA AW Battalion (- A Btry)	(M16 SP AW) Assigned as divisional AAA AW Bn 31 Oct 51. From the beginning of the war, A Btry, 21st AAA AW Bn had been attached to 24th Inf Div. On 31 Oct 51, personnel and equipment were transferred to form B Btry, 26th AAA AW Bn (24th Inf Div organic AAA AW Bn) and A Btry, 21st AAA AW Bn was transferred on paper back to its parent battalion, its personnel and equipment coming from A Btry, 25th AAA AW Bn, which was inactivated on that date.
A Btry, 25th AAA AW Bn	(M16 SP AW) Inactivated 31 Oct 51. Personnel and equipment transferred to form A Btry, 21st AAA AW Bn
65th Engr (C) Bn	Less D Co until 15 Apr 53, when 77th Engr (C) Co was re-designated D Co, 65th Engr (C) Bn.
77th Engr (C) Co	Segregated unit associated with 24th Inf Regt. Served as D Co, 65th Eng (C) Bn until 15 Apr 53, when re-designated D Co, 65th Engr (C) Bn. Integrated Sep 51.

Attached units (all attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
5th RCT	3 Aug–9 Sep 50; 4 May–22 Oct 52
1st and 3d Bns, 29th Inf Regt	4 Aug–4 Sep 50. 1st Bn became 3d Bn, 35th Inf; 3d Bn became 3d Bn, 27th Inf.
34th Inf Regt	Attached 16 Aug–5 Sep 51. Regt was brought from Japan specifically to provide personnel and equipment for 14th Inf Regt. Personnel and equipment transferred 5 Sep 51 and 34th Inf Regt (less personnel and equipment) released from attachment to 25th Inf Div and attached to XVI Corps in Japan the same day.

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65th RCT	5 Oct–1 Nov 50; 16–20 May 51
Kimpo Provisional Regt	Atchd 5 May–8 Jul 53. Formed 31 Mar 52 by 1st MarDiv from one Marine Inf Bn rotated from the division reserve regiment, 1st Armored Amph Tractor Bn, 5th Korean Marine Corps Bn and other Marine, Army, and ROK units to defend the Kimpo Peninsula on the 1st MarDiv (and Eighth Army) left flank.
8213th AU, Eighth Army Ranger Co	12 Oct 50–28 Mar 51
5th Abn Ranger Inf Co	31 Mar–1 Aug 51 (Inactivated)
26th Inf Scout Dog Plat (-)	7 Aug–13 Nov 52
8072d AU, Medium Tk Bn (Prov)	(M4A3E8 tanks) Activated in Japan 17 Jul 50 as provisional unit. Lead elements supported 24th and 25th Inf Divs. Remainder of bn arrived in Korea and attached to 25th Inf Div 4 Aug. Merged with A Co, 79th Tank Bn to form 89th Tank Bn 7 Aug 50.
89th Tk Bn	(M4A3E8 tanks) Formed from assets of A Co, 79th Tank Bn and 8072d AU 7 Aug 50. All or part of bn atchd to 25th Inf Div until 14 Nov 51, when asgd to the div.
1st US Marine Tank Bn	(M46 tanks) 5 May–8 Jul 53
7th Recon Co	5 May–8 Jul 53
58th AFA Bn	(M37 105mm SP howitzer) 5 Oct–1 Nov 50 (Attached with 65th RCT), 13–19 May 51; 28–30 Jan 53. (Segregated unit, integrated 16 Oct 51, converted to towed howitzer and re-designated 58th FA Bn 10 Nov 51.)
63d FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) 16 Aug–5 Sep 51 (Unit reduced to zero strength and transferred to Japan. Personnel and equipment formed 69th FA Bn assigned to 25th Inf Div 27 Aug 51.)
555th FA Bn	4 Aug–11 Sep 50; 4 May–22 Oct 52 (Attached with 5th RCT).
A Btry, 780th FA Bn	(8in. howitzer) 27 Oct–3 Dec 51 (US Army Reserve unit.)
987th FA Bn	(M43 8in. HMC) 27 Oct–18 Dec 51 (OH National Guard)
2d Plat, 61st FA Btry (Searchlight)	3 May–8 Jul 53
68th Inf Counterfire Plat	26 Sep–28 Oct 51 (Unit inactivated and personnel and equipment absorbed into 25th Div Arty.)
C Btry, 3d AAA AW Bn	(M16 SP AW) 5 Oct–1 Nov 50
21st AAA AW Bn (- Btry A)	(M16 SP AW) 16 Jul–31 Oct 51 (Btry A attached 18 Jul–31 Jul 51.)
72d Engr Combat Co	4 May–22 Oct 52
25th CIC Det	?–27 Jul 53>
340th MI Service Plat	5 May–8 Jul 53
506th MI Service Plat	1 Sep 52–27 Jul 53>
567th Med Ambulance Co	1 Jan–31 Dec 51
1st Plat, 650th Med Ambulance Co	5 May–8 Jul 53
38th Med Malaria Control Det	21 Feb–16 Sep 51
37th Med Preventive Med Co	1–30 Nov 51
10th Med Preventive Medicine Control Det	29 Dec 52–27 Jul 53>

ROK units

9th ROK Regt	6 Oct–3 Nov 50
92d ROK FA Bn	3 Jul–21 Nov 52
629th ROK FA Bn	27 Apr–27 Jul 53>

UN units

Philippine Battalion Combat Team	28 Sep–30 Oct 50; 29 Apr–20 May 51; 25–31 May 51 (with 25th Canadian Inf Brigade)
Turkish Inf Brigade	11–20 Nov 50; 13 Dec 50–15 Feb 51; 22 Feb–25 May 51; 4 Jun–31 Jul 51; 3 Aug 51–27 Jul 53>

40th Infantry Division

Commanders	
Maj Gen D. H. Hudelson	1 Dec 47–1 Jun 52
Brig Gen Joseph P. Cleland (Promoted to Maj Gen 6 Jul 52)	2 Jun–30 Jul 52; 9 Aug 52–16 Apr 53
Brig Gen Gordon B. Rogers	31 Jul–8 Aug 52
Maj Gen Ridgely Gaither	17 Apr–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters
Assigned to Eighth Army from 22 Jan 52 until after the Armistice.
Attached to IX Corps 22 Jan–17 Oct 52.
Attached to X Corps from 18 Oct 52 until after the Armistice.

Assigned units

Note: All units assigned from before 22 Jan 52 until after the Armistice except as noted.

Hq & Hq Co, 40th Inf Div; 40th Recon Co; 40th Replacement Co; 40th Inf Div Band; 578th Engr (C) Bn; 115th Med Bn; 40th MP Co; 740th Ord Maint Co (Changed to 740th Ord Bn 1 Feb 53); 40th QM Co; 40th Sig Co.

Unit	Remarks
160th Inf Regt	
223d Inf Regt	
224th Inf Regt	

All 40th Inf Div regimental tank companies were equipped with M4A3E8 tanks, replaced with M46 in Oct 51.

140th Tank Bn	M46 tanks

Hq & Hq Btry, 40th Inf DivArty	
143d FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
625th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
980th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
981st FA Bn	(155mm howitzer)
140th AAA AW Bn	(M16 SP AW)

Attached units (all attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
5th RCT	28 Jan–10 Feb 52; 22 Oct 52–30 Jan 53
26th Inf Scout Dog Plat	10 Feb–28 Apr 52
2d FA Rocket Btry	(105mm & T66E1/E2 RL) 27 Feb–16 May 52
555th FA Bn	28 Jan–10 Feb 52; 22 Oct 52–30 Jan 53 (Attached with 5th RCT.)
2d Cml Mort Bn (- A & B Cos)	28 Jan–18 Mar 52 (Operated as an artillery unit.)
21st Cml Decontamination Co (-)	28 Jan 52–27 Jul 53>
One sec, 388th Cml Smoke Generator Co	28 Jan–30 Mar 52
2d Plat, 86th Engr Slt Co	15 Mar 52–27 Jul 53> (Re-designated 86th FA Btry (Searchlight) 25 Jan 53.)
72d Engr (C) Co	22 Oct 52–30 Jan 53 (Attached with 5th RCT)

ROK units	
183d ROK FA Bn	7 Apr 53–after Armistice

45th Infantry Division

Commanders	
Maj Gen James C. Styron	5 Sep 46–20 May 52.
Maj Gen David L. Ruffner	21 May 52–15 Mar 53
Brig Gen Philip D. Ginder	16 Mar–27 Jul 53>

Next higher headquarters
Assigned to Eighth Army from 17 Dec 51 until after the Armistice.
Attached to I Corps 18 Dec–17 Jul 52.
Attached to X Corps from 18 Jul 52 until after the Armistice.

Assigned units

Note: All units assigned from before 17 Dec 51 until after the Armistice except as noted.

Hq & Hq Co, 45th Inf Div; 45th Recon Co; 45th Replacement Co; 45th Inf Div Band; 120th Engr (C) Bn; 120th Med Bn; 45th MP Co; 700th Ord Maint Co (Changed to 700th Ord Bn 1 Feb 53); 45th QM Co; 45th Sig Co.

Unit	Remarks
179th Inf Regt	
180th Inf Regt	
279th Inf Regt	

All 45th Inf Div regimental tank companies were equipped with M4A3E8 tanks.

245th Tank Bn	M4A3E8 tanks

Hq & Hq Btry, 45th Inf DivArty	
158th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
160th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
171st FA Bn	(105mm howitzer)
189th FA Bn	(155mm howitzer)
A Btry, 92d AAA (AW) Bn	(M16 SP AW) Asgd 24 Dec 51; inactivated 28 Dec 51.
145th AAA AW (SP) Bn	(M16 SP AW)

Attached units (all attached from Eighth Army unless otherwise noted)

Unit	Remarks
5th Inf Regt	30 Jan–19 Apr 53 (With 555th FA Bn.)
224th Inf Regt	30–31 Jan 53
10th Abn Ranger Inf Co	1 Jul–15 Sep 51 (Never served in Korea.)
555th FA Bn	(105mm howitzer) 30 Jan–19 Apr 53 (With 5th RCT.)
3d Plat, 61st Engr Slt Co	10 Dec 51–18 Jul 52
1st Plat, 92d Engr Slt Co	27 Sep–30 Dec 52
2d Plat 92d FA Btry (Slt)	30 Jan–10 Jul 53

ROK units	
62d ROK Inf Regt	4 Feb–16 Mar 53
95th ROK FA Bn	3 Jul–21 Nov 52
65th ROK FA Bn	17 Jan–1 Apr 53
66th ROK FA Bn	17 Jan–1 Apr 53
628th ROK FA Bn	7 Apr–12 Jul 53

UN units	
Philippine Bn Combat Team	11 Apr 52–27 Jul 53>

Non-divisional field artillery units

FA groups
1st Prov FA Gp
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th FA Gp
105mm howitzer (truck drawn or towed)
1st FA Obsn Bn – Organized as a 12-gun 105mm how bn 4 Dec 50–11 Feb 51.
2d FA Rocket Btry – Equipped with 6 105mm how; 12 T66E1/E2 4.5in. rocket launchers added Apr 52.
159th FA Bn – Converted to 155mm how bn 20 Nov 51
105mm SP (AFA) – M7 105mm HGC
176th AFA Bn
213th AFA Bn
300th AFA Bn
987th AFA Bn
155mm howitzer (tractor drawn and towed)
9th FA Bn
75th FA Bn
96th FA Bn – Reorganized May 51: Two 155mm how, one 155mm gun, and one 8in. how bty.
159th FA Bn – Converted to 240mm how bn 12 May 53.
196th FA Bn
213th FA Bn – Converted to 240mm how bn Apr 53.
623d FA Bn
936th FA Bn
955th FA Bn
155mm howitzer SP (AFA) – M41 155mm HMC
92d AFA Bn
999th AFA Bn
155mm gun (tractor drawn or towed)
145th FA Bn
155mm gun (SP) - M40 155mm GMC
204th FA Bn
937th FA Bn
8in. howitzer (towed)
17th FA Bn
424th FA Bn
780th FA Bn
8in. howitzer SP - M43 8in. HMC
987th AFA Bn
240mm howitzer (towed)
159th FA Bn
213th FA Bn
FA Obsn Bns
1st FA Obsn Bn
235th FA Obsn Bn
Chemical mortar bns – 4.2in. mortar
2d Chemical Mortar Bn – Redesignated 461st Inf Bn (Hvy Mort) 22 Jan 53

Non-divisional antiaircraft artillery units

Brigades
44th AAA Brigade (Provisional)
Groups
10th AAA Group (Hq & Hq Btry)
29th AAA Group (Hq & Hq Btry)
41st AAA Group (Prov)
227th AAA Group (Hq & Hq Btry)
90mm gun battalions
24th AAA Gun Bn (90mm)
68th AAA Gun Bn (90mm)
78th AAA Gun Bn (90mm)
213th AAA Gun Bn (90mm)
739th AAA Gun Bn (90mm)
773rd AAA Gun Bn (90mm)
Non-divisional AAA AW battalions
25th AAA AW Bn (SP)
30th AAA AW Bn (Smbl)
50th AAA AW Bn (SP)
52nd AAA AW Bn (SP) (Hq & Hq Btry)
76th AAA AW Bn (SP)
398th AAA AW Bn (Smbl)
507th AAA AW Bn (Mobile), (Det X only)
865th AAA AW Bn (SP)
933rd AAA AW Bn (Mobile)
Other Units
Central AAA Sector (Prov)
Northwest AAA Sector (Prov)

Logistical commands and the service support structure

When the troops of the 24th Infantry Division arrived in Korea in June 1950, they had to unload the ships that brought them in, but on July 4, 1950, Maj Gen Crump Garvin established the **Pusan Base Command (Prov)** to provide logistic support to UN forces in Korea. On July 13, 1950, this unit became the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the **Pusan Logistical Command**, which, on July 20, became the **2d Logistical Command** composed of the 192d and 335th Ordnance battalions; the 226th Ordnance Base Depot; the 3d Transportation Military Railway Service (TMRS); the 7th Transportation Medium Port, which operated the port of Pusan; the 8069th

AU, Replacement Battalion, which received, processed, and sent forward replacements coming into Korea; and other, smaller, support units.

The **3d Logistical Command** Headquarters and Headquarters Company was activated on September 19, 1950, arrived in Korea at Inch'on on September 26, 1950, and was assigned to X Corps to unload, receive, store, and forward supplies. On October 10, 1950, as X Corps redeployed to Northeast Korea, 3d Log Command was reassigned to Eighth Army and attached to 2d Log Command to operate Inch'on port and support the Eighth Army advance into North Korea. During the Chinese New Year's offensive in January 1951, 3d Log Command withdrew to Pusan and took responsibilities for logistic support within 2d Log Command and the operation of Pusan.

In September 1951, the 2d Logistical Command divided its responsibilities into four geographic Area Command sectors: Taegu Military Command Area; Kunsan Port Area Command; Seoul Area Command; and 3d Logistical Command (responsible for log support and security of Pusan). The 3d TMRS operated the railroads throughout the area occupied by allied forces.

On July 10, 1952, **Korea Communication Zone** (KCOMZ) was established in Taegu under Maj Gen Thomas W. Herren to relieve Eighth Army of all logistic and territorial responsibilities in the rear of the tactical area. KCOMZ was activated on August 1, 1952, and became operational on August 21, 1952. All Eighth Army units in KCOMZ area were detached to KCOMZ on that date and assigned to KCOMZ on October 16, 1952. The 2d Log Command was absorbed into the new command and on November 1, 1952, its assets were used to form **Korea Base Section**, which became sole logistic operating agency in Korea. The 3d Log Command was reduced to zero strength on November 1, 1952, and inactivated March 20, 1953.

Korea Communications Zone, 1952–53.

KCOMZ's responsibilities were logistic support to US, UN, and ROK forces, administration, civil assistance, movement control, security in the KCOMZ zone, political and economic relations with the ROK government, operation of Korean National Railway, and control of POWs and internees. Its area of responsibility included the territory south of the northern boundaries of Ch'ungch'ong-namdo, Ch'ungch'ong-bukto, and Kyongsang-Pukto provinces and a part of Kangwon Province where there were tungsten mines. KCOMZ was also responsible for three port enclaves: Inch'on, Sokch'ori, and Chumujin. It was divided into three major commands: Korea Base Section, Prisoner of War Command, and the 8201 AU, UN Civil Assistance Command Korea, which was responsible for administration of civil affairs, relief, and economic assistance to the ROK. At the time of the Armistice, KCOMZ had a strength of 34,280.

To provide a reserve force and to provide security for the Taegu–Pusan area and the Korean Railways, regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division were rotated into KCOMZ until April 1953, when the KCOMZ Reserve Force was disbanded (except for 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, which provided POW camp security). In late May 1953, the 24th Infantry Division began rotating reinforced battalions to reconstitute KCOMZ Reserve Force. The entire division moved to Korea July 5–16, 1953 as the final Chinese offensive of the war took place.

Lessons learned

The Korean War came soon after World War II. The US Army went from a war in which its victory had been total to one that ended through negotiation and with the enemy still standing on the battlefield. From the perspective of the American G.I., during the last two years of the war he was asked, not to fight for victory, but to "die for a tie." In fact, the American intervention in Korea halted the North Korean invasion and ejected the Korean People's Army from the territory of the Republic of Korea. One knowledgeable historian has argued persuasively that by fighting the Korean War, the United States forestalled World War III.[9] When the United Nations Command attempted to make use of its initial victory to reunify Korea as a democratic, independent country; however, the Chinese, with massive military manpower, and the Soviet Union, with airpower and logistic support, intervened to prevent that greater victory. To the US soldiers fighting on the ground, the Korean War was total, but from the viewpoint of the US leadership, it was a regional conflict in a far greater global confrontation with the Soviet Union and its allies and, therefore, inevitably, a limited war. The United States leadership was unwilling to put all of the nation's resources into Korea and thus risk being too weak to deal with a Soviet invasion of Europe. Thus, in 1951, during Eighth Army's epic battles on the Korean peninsula, four Army divisions were sent to Europe and two were sent to East Asia. Within that context of limited war, the Army learned many lessons, although some of those lessons were obscured by the manner of the war's ending and by the events that followed.

Some 2,834,000 Army officers and enlisted soldiers served in Korea. Over 27,700 of them died and 77,596 suffered non-fatal (but often crippling) wounds. Their performance varied during the war. The incompletely trained, poorly equipped men of the understrength occupation army that fought the delaying actions and defended the Pusan Perimeter suffered setbacks, but learned quickly. The army that pushed north across the 38th Parallel was more experienced, but still under-strength and short of materiel. Furthermore, the tactic of using thinly stretched, fast-moving columns led to the neglect of some basic doctrinal precepts that aggravated the impact of the Chinese onslaught. The experienced army that Ridgway and Van Fleet led in 1951, bolstered by Reserve and National Guard veterans of World War II, fresh replacements, and resupply of equipment, was as good as any army the United States has ever fielded. The army that fought the two-year long stalemate was ingenious and effective, but the static nature of the war affected both the outlook of the soldiers and the techniques that they used: an increasing emphasis on firepower in place of, rather than in support of, maneuver. A rotation system was instituted in April 1951, guaranteeing that frontline soldiers would return to the United States after about a year, rear-area troops in about 18 months. This system improved morale, but undermined military effectiveness as large numbers of experienced men were replaced by green troops. On balance, with all the vicissitudes, it must be said that the US Army that fought the Korean War proved itself in battle.

A number of doctrinal and organization changes resulted from the war. By 1953, FM 100-5 recognized the mobile defense as an alternative to the positional

9 William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Stueck reiterates this argument in *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

The fundamental things apply. Infantrymen of I Company, 17th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, climb the steep hills of Korea east of the Hwach'on Reservoir, April 5, 1951. (NACP)

defense of pre-war doctrine. The Logistic Command, the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, and the Quartermaster Service Center concepts were all validated by the war and continued long afterward. The nine-man rifle squad with two BARs led after the war to the 11-man squad composed of two fire teams.

Two changes were more momentous. One, the end of racial segregation, permanently changed the culture of the US Army. Another, the use of helicopters, first for medical evacuation and liaison, later for cargo transport, and finally as a way to maneuver combat forces, affected the nature of warfare.

Close air support, like firepower and mobility, provided the US Army with substantial advantages over its enemies, but in spite of the overall effectiveness of close air support, Army–Air Force disputes over control of the strikes, the relative priority of CAS and other air missions, and whether aircraft should be optimized for the CAS mission, were unresolved. The feeling by some Army leaders that the Air Force couldn't be depended on for CAS was one factor that led to the development of armed helicopters. In spite of this disagreement, the Korean War demonstrated to the Army the importance of joint warfare—the effective integration of the combat power of all the services.

In the immediate aftermath of the war there was a revulsion against the idea of fighting limited wars with negotiated settlements and a renewed emphasis on nuclear war. Within a few years, the Army would undergo a major (ultimately unsuccessful) reorganization into the "Pentomic Army" intended to be able to disperse in the face of a nuclear threat and then mass quickly against the enemy. A decade after the Korean War ended, the Army would reorganize yet again and, by that time, was beginning to focus on counter-insurgency as war loomed in Vietnam. With the return to an emphasis on "conventional" war fighting in the 1970s and 80s, the lessons of Korea became more germane. Today, institutions like the Army War College use the Korean War as a historical case study in the organization of joint forces and the conduct of joint operations. Many of the new techniques of warfare developed during the Korean War, most obviously the use of helicopters, but also medical and logistical support systems, are still in use and the fundamental things—the old lessons relearned during the Korean War of how infantry soldiers fight—continue to apply.

Chronology

1950	
25 June	North Korean People's Army (KPA) attacks across 38th Parallel.
25, 27 June, 7 July	UN Security Council (UNSC) passes resolutions under which the United Nations Command (UNC) is established.
27 July	General Headquarters Advanced Command and Liaison Group in Korea (GHQ ADCOM), arrives.
30 June	President Harry S. Truman authorizes use of US ground forces in Korea.
1 July	Lead elements of 24th Inf Div arrive in Korea.
4 July	Headquarters, US Army Forces in Korea (AFIK) established.
5 July	Task Force Smith engages North Koreans near Osan.
13 July	Lt Gen Walton H. Walker establishes Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK), takes command of all US ground forces in Korea.
14 July	President Syngman Rhee places all ROK forces under Gen MacArthur. All ROK ground forces come under CG EUSAK.
14 July–5 August	EUSAK conducts delay.
5 August–	EUSAK defends the Pusan Perimeter. First non-US UN
15 September	ground combat force (British 27th Inf Brig) arrives 28 August.
11 August	I Corps activated.
26 August	X Corps activated.
15 September	Maj Gen Edward M. Almond's X Corps conducts amphibious assault at Inch'on; EUSAK begins breakout from Pusan Perimeter.
23 September	IX US Corps becomes operational.
26 September	X Corps liberates Seoul.
1 October	ROK 3d Division crosses 38th Parallel on Korean east coast.
7 October	UN General Assembly authorizes action in North Korea. 1st Cav Div crosses 38th Parallel.
19 October	EUSAK captures North Korean capital of P'yongyang.
20 October	187th Abn RCT conducts first airborne operation of the war north of P'yongyang.
25 October	Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) First Phase Offensive begins.
26 October	ROK forces reach Yalu River at Ch'osan, furthest EUSAK penetration into North Korea. X Corps conducts unopposed amphibious landing at Wonsan (ROK Capital Division had already cleared Wonsan and was attacking to the northeast).
6 November	CPV ends First Phase Offensive and breaks contact.
21 November	Elements of X Corps reach Yalu River near Hyesanjin, furthest X Corps penetration of North Korea.
24–26 November	Eighth Army and X Corps forces begin attack to the north. CPV Second Phase Offensive begins.
27 November–	EUSAK withdraws to the 38th Parallel. X Corps withdraws
15 December	to Hungnam and Wonsan ports and begins seaborne evacuation.
23 December	Lt Gen Walker killed in a traffic accident.
26 December	Lt Gen Matthew B. Ridgway becomes CG, EUSAK. X Corps incorporated into EUSAK.

31 December	CPV and KPA begin Third Phase (New Year's) Offensive, crossing 38th Parallel.
1951	
1–15 January	Chinese Third Phase Offensive captures Seoul (Feb 4) and pushes EUSAK 50 miles south.
25 January–10 February	Operation THUNDERBOLT, EUSAK counteroffensive, pushes Chinese back to outskirts of Seoul.
11–17 February	Chinese Fourth Phase Offensive pushes EUSAK south.
21 February–6 March	EUSAK counterattacks to near Seoul.
7–31 March	EUSAK recaptures Seoul (Mar 15) and advances to the 38th Parallel.
1–22 April	EUSAK continues the attack toward the "Iron Triangle" (Chinese logistic/command area north of 38th Parallel in central Korea).
11 April	President Truman relieves General MacArthur; Lt Gen Ridgway becomes CINCUNC/CINCFE.
22 April–19 May	Chinese Fifth Phase (Spring) Offensive drives nearly to Seoul.
20 May–1 July	EUSAK stops Communist offensive, renews UNC counteroffensive, advancing to the KANSAS–WYOMING Line, generally north of 38th Parallel.
10 July	Truce talks begin.
August–October	Truce talks suspended, EUSAK conducts limited-objective ground attacks in central Korea.
25 October	Truce talks resume.
12 November	Gen Ridgway ends UNC ground offensive operations and initiates an "active defense" strategy.
17 December	45th Inf Div (Oklahoma National Guard) arrives in Korea; 1st Cav Div returns to Japan.
1952	
22 January	40th Inf Div (California National Guard) arrives in Korea; 24th Inf Div returns to Japan
12 May	Gen Mark W. Clark assumes command of FEC/UNC.
21 August	Korea Communications Zone (KCOMZ) established to take over logistic support, security, prisoner of war control, and civil relief activities in the rear area.
6–15 October	KPA/CPV begin a ground offensive, inflicting heavy casualties but achieving no significant ground gains.
8 October	The UNC declares an indefinite recess of the truce talks.
4 November	Dwight D. Eisenhower elected President, visits Korea December 2–5 .
1953	
11 February	Lt Gen Maxwell D. Taylor becomes CG, Eighth Army.
20 April–3 May	Operation LITTLE SWITCH, exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.
26 April	Truce talks resume.
14–20 July	Chinese conduct final offensive of the war.
27 July	Armistice agreement signed. Combat ends.

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations, consistent with those used in 1950–53, are used in this book:

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
Abn	Airborne
AFA	Armored Field Artillery
Amb	Ambulance
Amph	Amphibian or Amphibious
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
Arty	Artillery
AU	Army Unit
AUV	Armored Utility Vehicle
AW	Automatic Weapons
Bn	Battalion
Brig	Brigade
Btry	Artillery Battery
(C)	Combat (Engineers)
Cal	Caliber
CAS	Close Air Support
Cav	Cavalry
Cdr	Commander
CG	Commanding General
CIC	Counter Intelligence Corps
Cml	Chemical
Co	Company
(Const)	Construction (Engineers)
CPV	Chinese People's Volunteers
D/S	Direct Support
Det	Detachment
Div	Division
DivArty	Division Artillery
Engr	Engineer
EUSAK	Eighth US Army in Korea
FA	Field Artillery
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FEC	Far East Command (until 1952)
FECOM	Far East Command (after 1952)
FM	Field Manual
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center
GHQ	General Headquarters
GMC	Gun Motor Carriage
Gp	Group
G/S	General Support
G/SR	General Support Reinforcing
HMC	Howitzer Motor Carriage
HMG	Heavy Machine Gun
How	Howitzer
Hq	Headquarters
Hvy	Heavy
Inf	Infantry
KCOMZ	Korean Communications Zone
KMC	Korean Marine Corps
KPA	(North) Korean People's Army
LC	Logistical Command
LMG	Light Machine Gun
Lt	Light
Maint	Maintenance
MarDiv	Marine Division
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
Med	Medical
Metro	Meteorological
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
MLR	Main Line of Resistance
Mort	Mortar
MP	Military Police
MSR	Main Supply Route
O/B	Order of Battle
Obsn	Observation
O/C	Operational Control
Ord	Ordnance
Plat	Platoon
POW	Prisoner of War
Prov	Provisional
QM	Quartermaster
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
Recon	Reconnaissance
Regt	Regiment
RL	Rocket Launcher
Rlwy	Railway
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	ROK Army
RR	Recoilless Rifle
QM	Quartermaster
Sec	Section
Sig	Signal
Slt	Searchlight
Svc	Service
SP	Self Propelled
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
Tk	Tank
T/O&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
Topo	Topographical
Trans	Transportation
Trk	Truck
UNC	United Nations Command

The following abbreviations were used for military ranks in 1950–53:

General	Gen
Lieutenant General	Lt Gen
Major General	Maj Gen
Brigadier General	Brig Gen
Colonel	Col
Lieutenant Colonel	Lt Col
Major	Maj
Captain	Capt
First Lieutenant	1st Lt
Second Lieutenant	2d Lt
Warrant Officer	WO
Warrant Officer Junior Grade	WOJG
First Sergeant (E-7)	1st Sgt
Master Sergeant (E-7)	M/Sgt
Sergeant First Class (E-6)	Sfc
Sergeant (E-5)	Sgt
Corporal (E-4)	Cpl
Private First Class (E-3)	Pfc
Private (E-2)	Pvt
Recruit (E-1)	None

Index

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

Key to unit identification