

# What do Young Men Oppose about Feminism?\*

## A Survey Experiment in South Korea

Kazuhiro Terashita<sup>†</sup>

### Abstract

This study examines how young men respond to different feminist claims through a survey experiment. While young men are often portrayed as egalitarian and diversity-oriented, many express opposition to feminism, especially when facing collective threat or economic vulnerability. Previous research has typically treated feminist claims as uniform and focused mainly on young men, without sufficiently addressing how responses vary across generations. To address these gaps, this study uses an unsupervised machine learning model to classify distinct feminist claims in South Korea and designs a survey experiment based on these categories. The experiment was conducted with a nationally representative online panel of South Korean voters aged 18 and older. Results show that young men strongly oppose quota-related claims but are more moderate toward others, such as care work and gender-based violence. Importantly, the analysis reveals that generational context significantly shapes attitudes, with older respondents also showing unique patterns of resistance. These findings contribute to research on political polarization and social movements by highlighting how feminist discourse interacts with generational and gender dynamics, offering insights into how polarization may be mitigated.

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<sup>†</sup>Full-time Lecturer, Department of Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo. E-mail:[kazuhiroterashita@outlook.jp](mailto:kazuhiroterashita@outlook.jp)

## Introduction

In recent years, political polarization based on gender among voters is emerging as a global issue. Political polarization has long been recognized as a factor contributing to the decline of democracy (Orhan 2022). However, gender-based polarization is especially pronounced among younger generations, with young men in many countries showing a growing tendency to reject feminism. In fact, in Western Europe and North America, radical right-wing parties have successfully mobilized young men by using anti-feminist rhetoric (Miller Idriss 2018). At the same time, it is also known that young people tend to favor egalitarian ideas and diversity (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Nteta and Greenlee 2013).

Why do young men, who are generally considered to be egalitarian and diversity-oriented, resist feminism? Previous studies have focused on group-based threats to answer this question. Specifically, they have suggested that when the number of women increases in a male-dominated environment, men perceive this as a collective threat and resist claims promoting gender equality and women's mobility, such as quotas (Krook 2016). However, this explanation does not fully explain why young people in particular are resistant to feminism. Recently, attention has shifted to the economic vulnerability of young people, with some pointing out that young people, who face weaker economic foundations and greater uncertainty about the future than older generations, are more sensitive to improvements in women's social status (J. H. Kim and Kweon 2022).

However, feminism does not always advocate for the improvement of the social status of all "women." In fact, previous studies have revealed that the image of "women" represented by social movements and other groups is biased in terms of women's political representation (English 2020). Specifically, it has been pointed out that feminism has excluded people of color, LGBTQ+ individuals, and people with disabilities (Christoffersen and Emejulu 2023). Additionally, social movements that identify as "feminist" while promoting extreme claims such as racial discrimination or hatred toward trans women have emerged and gained support, particularly among younger generations (Lee 2023). Given this context, the claims made by movements or ideologies that label themselves as "feminist" cannot be taken for granted.

In contrast, previous studies have treated feminist claims as given and focused on voters as the recipients of these claims. As a result, it remains unclear what specific aspects of feminist claims young men perceive as threatening. Traditionally, young men with egalitarian views may support feminist claims such as reducing the burden of care work and closing the gender wage gap. Additionally, there is a possibility that young men are interpreting “feminism” in ways that differ from its intended meaning. Overall, previous research has failed to distinguish between the actual practices of social movements and the images held by those who oppose them.

This study aims to address this gap by examining the practices and perceived images of the feminist movement that have not been sufficiently considered in understanding young men’s aversion to feminism. It does so using survey data and analyses from South Korea. Specifically, this study examines which specific claims made by the feminist movement in South Korea provoke opposition to feminism among voters, especially young men.

Furthermore, this study argues that not only young men but also men and women with different characteristics adjust their level of support in response to feminist claims. While previous perspectives have tended to focus on young men as the primary drivers of gender-based polarization, this study reveals that older generations of both men and women are in fact more sensitive to feminist claims. This finding underscores the need to consider not only generational differences but also intersectional factors such as class differences when examining gender-based polarization.

This study contributes to empirical research on the relationship between social movements and political polarization by presenting these findings. When political polarization is discussed, radical movements on both the right and the left are often highlighted, but how these discourses affect the general electorate remains unclear. Using South Korea as a case study—where not only gender polarization but also various other forms of polarization are evident—this study seeks to elucidate the relationship between social movements and polarization, and explores the potential for social movement messages to either mitigate or exacerbate such divisions.

The structure of this study is as follows. First, I review existing research on political

polarization and anti-feminism among young men and women and identify the key challenges. Next, I present the hypotheses to be tested in this study. I then explain the data and experimental design, followed by the analysis results. Finally, I will discuss the conclusions and their broader implications.

## Literature Review

It is widely recognized that men often adopt political attitudes and behaviors that resist the advancement of women in society. Sociologist Michael Kimmel, in his book *Angry White Men*, describes how white men, despite working hard and staying out of trouble, feel that they are not receiving the economic rewards they deserve, leading them to direct their frustration toward others (Kimmel 2017). This line of argument—namely, that feelings of alienation and economic disadvantage can manifest as resistance to gender equality—has since become a widely discussed topic in political science(e.g. Osborn et al. 2019; Gillion, Ladd, and Meredith 2020).

Recently, such gendered differences in political attitudes have increasingly manifested in the form of political polarization (Off 2024; Lomazzi and Soboleva 2024). Reports indicate that anti-feminist sentiment is rising, particularly among younger generations (Kim, Hannah June and Lee 2022). This phenomenon is evidenced by the success of radical right-wing parties in Western countries in mobilizing young men through anti-feminist rhetoric (Miller Idriss 2018). Anti-feminist discourse has also become prominent within grassroots organizations, including certain social movements.

The phenomenon of political polarization is often explained not only in terms of voting behavior and political attitudes, but also through the lens of highly visible social movements. For instance, polarization surrounding attitudes toward immigration is manifested not only through partisan dynamics—such as the rise of far-right parties—but also through anti-immigrant movements that have become subjects of empirical study. While left-wing movements have traditionally been the focus of research in both social movement studies and the sociology of voters, recent scholarship has increasingly shifted attention to right-wing

populist movements and their participants (e.g. [Gill 2018](#); [Smith 2018](#); [Hochschild 2016](#)).

Focusing specifically on gender, it has been observed in various contexts that not only relatively young men adopt anti-feminist discourse, but also that young women express support for radical feminist claims ([Lee 2023](#)). Furthermore, social movement organizations promoting these claims may exert a certain degree of influence on political polarization ([McVeigh, Cunningham, and Farrell 2014](#)). This is supported by findings in political science and social movement studies, which suggest that the claims advanced by social movements can shape voting behavior and political attitudes within a given region ([Wasow 2020](#); [Madestam et al. 2013](#); [Pop-Eleches, Robertson, and Rosenfeld 2022](#)). In the case of South Korea, scholars have also pointed to the possibility that the spread of misogynistic discourse in online communities is contributing to the emergence of extreme claims ([Y. Kim 2021](#)).

However, the extent to which ordinary voters resonate with the claims made by social movements and civil society remains unclear. In other words, little attention has been paid to the impact of messages conveyed by social movements on voters' polarized political attitudes. Most existing research on polarization has focused on the actions of politicians and voters. Understanding how voters respond to social movement activity could help illuminate the mechanisms that contribute to political polarization.

Furthermore, while the mass media tends to overemphasize the radical claims made by social movements and civil society, researchers have not sufficiently considered the possibility that the degree of polarization in each category may be overstated. In my own research, for example, I found that although young men exhibited misogynistic attitudes on average, there was no significant difference between young men and older men when comparing median values <sup>1</sup>. This suggests that the mean is skewed upward by a subset of individuals with particularly extreme views. In discussing polarization in this category—where variance is large—it is essential to re-examine whether the widespread belief that young men are predominantly anti-feminist is truly valid.

Similarly, when analyzing the causes of young men's so-called “anger,” feminist claims must be approached with caution. While many feminist movements advocate for cor-

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<sup>1</sup>Details will be provided in the supplementary information.

rective measures such as quotas to increase the descriptive representation of women and other minorities, feminist positions have become increasingly diverse in recent years, often differing depending on specific goals (Hooks 2000; English 2020, 2019). From a feminist perspective, increasing descriptive representation and achieving substantive representation are distinct issues (Celis et al. 2008). To address substantive inequality, feminists may pursue goals such as closing the wage gap, equalizing care responsibilities, and eradicating gender-based violence. However, many studies fail to account for these diverse dimensions of feminism and instead focus narrowly on generational and gender-based differences in political attitudes. To accurately assess whether polarization exists, it is necessary to clarify how individuals respond to these diverse feminist claims.

## Theory and Hypothesis

Based on the issues identified in the previous studies discussed above, this study examines the possibility that the acceptance of feminist movement claims varies by generation and gender. While earlier research has primarily focused on generational differences in feminist and anti-feminist attitudes among younger people, it is also theoretically important to consider the possibility that older generations may be more anti-feminist. This study explores hypotheses about how different demographic groups respond to four common feminist claims: the implementation of quotas, the equalization of care work, the correction of wage gaps, and the eradication of sexual violence.

First, in the case of young men, J. H. Kim and Kweon (2022) argue that their economic vulnerability may make them particularly critical of policies such as quotas, which they perceive as threatening their already unstable position. Through voter experiments conducted in South Korea, they demonstrate that younger and more economically insecure men are more likely to oppose quotas (H. Kim and Park 2024; Komlenac et al. 2023). Notably, in South Korea, military service is mandatory only for young men, and this is often perceived as a burden that reduces their future opportunities. If this is the case, young men are more likely to oppose quotas—which could further reduce their access to desirable employment—than to

react strongly to other feminist claims. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed.

*Hypothesis 1: Young men are more likely to oppose social movements advocating gender quotas.*

Next, I examine older generations of men. Like younger men, they may oppose policies that could jeopardize their social or economic status. However, as noted earlier, older men who already occupy secure positions are less likely to oppose the introduction of quotas, as their own status is not directly threatened. On the other hand, they may perceive certain feminist claims—such as wage equality—as a loss of limited resources. Specifically, they may fear that if women receive wages equal to their own, it could reduce their relative advantage in the labor market, even if their absolute wages do not decrease.

This tendency is particularly salient in societies characterized by an M-shaped curve. That is, in modern societies where the gender wage gap is especially large among people in their 30s, 40s, and 50s, younger men often earn similar wages to women, while older men still benefit from substantial wage differences. In such cases, men in older age groups with a significant gender wage gap may be more likely to oppose efforts to correct the wage gap, perceiving it as a threat to their relative power. This leads to the following hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 2a: Older men are more likely to oppose social movements advocating the correction of the gender wage gap.*

The same logic applies to care work. Compared to younger generations, older generations of men have had less involvement in care responsibilities. In other words, for them, the equalization of care work represents a loss of time and personal freedom. This tendency is

especially pronounced among generations with relatively lower awareness of gender equality. While equal sharing of care responsibilities may be taken for granted by younger generations, it is often more difficult for older generations to accept. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed.

*Hypothesis 2b: Older men are more likely to oppose social movements advocating equality in care work.*

Next, let us examine the hypothesis concerning older generations of women. As women, they are generally assumed to support many feminist claims. In particular, issues such as wage gaps and care work are areas where they have experienced direct disparities and discrimination. However, they also belong to a generation that has already secured certain corrective measures through past activism. Quota systems, in particular, are not only a product of their generation's achievements but also mechanisms from which they have directly benefited. In this sense, compared to younger women, many older women are already in positions equivalent to those of men and may not perceive a strong need for additional quota systems.

Moreover, for those who already hold a certain level of social or professional status, the further expansion of quotas may reinforce the stereotype that their positions were not earned through merit. While this stereotype is more strongly held among men, it is also known to vary across generations among women. That is, older women are more likely to internalize the belief that quotas imply an unfair evaluation, which could lead them to oppose the introduction of such systems. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed.

*Hypothesis 3: Older women are more likely to oppose social movements advocating gender quotas.*



Finally, I consider a claim that is likely to receive broad support across all demographic categories: the eradication of sexual crimes and violence. Normatively speaking, this issue has the potential to garner agreement from both men and women, regardless of age. In many countries, sexual violence and exploitation are already criminalized, and in such contexts, people are more likely to support calls for their eradication than general appeals for gender equality. This is because individuals often align their expressed attitudes with prevailing social norms and ideals.

Of course, it is important to acknowledge that social desirability bias may influence responses and inflate apparent support. Nevertheless, on the surface, it is expected that individuals across all categories would support efforts to eliminate sexual crimes and violence. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed.

*Hypothesis 4: Social movements advocating harsher punishments for sex crime are widely supported, regardless of age or gender.*

The above hypotheses are summarized in Table 1. In summary, young men are expected to oppose only the introduction of a quota system, rather than general appeals for gender equality, while older generations of both men and women may oppose a broader range of feminist claims. By highlighting these generational differences, this study demonstrates that it is not only the younger generation that responds critically to the claims of social movements.

Table 1: Hypothesis

	Young men	Young women	Older men	Older women
Quotas	↓	-	-	↓
Wage gap	-	-	↓	-
Care work	-	-	↓	-
Sex crime	↑	↑	↑	↑

## Methods

### Case

This study employs a survey experiment targeting voters aged 18 and older in South Korea. Among advanced democracies, South Korea faces particularly significant political polarization. This division spans various factors such as political party affiliation, region, generation, and social class, but in recent years, gender-based polarization has become particularly pronounced. In particular, clear differences have emerged in the voting behavior of men and women in their 20s and 30s. These differences were starkly evident in the 2022 presidential election, which featured a contest between Yoon Suk-yeol, who campaigned on a pledge to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, and Lee Jae-myung, who took the opposing stance.

Men in their 30s tend to vote more conservatively today, with factors such as debates around the abolition of mandatory military service and special provisions related to it, as well as the spread of misogynistic discourse in online communities, contributing to this trend. This pattern of polarization has also been observed in more recent events. Following President Yoon's declaration of a state of emergency on December 3, 2024—which led to impeachment proceedings and his removal from office by the Constitutional Court—the results of the presidential election held in June 2025 showed that women in their 20s and 30s tended to vote for progressive candidates, while men tended to support conservative candidates.

These circumstances offer valuable conditions for testing my research questions and hypotheses. Not only can I observe young men's acceptance of anti-feminist rhetoric—often cited as a source of gender polarization—but I can also observe young women's support for feminism. Moreover, the generational differences in political awareness, shaped by experiences of rapid economic growth and subsequent stagnation, provide a clear context for examining the intersection of gender and generation. On the other hand, the absence of radical conservative and progressive parties in the political mainstream, as commonly seen in Western Europe, allows for the observation of voter support trends with fewer confounding political

factors.

Furthermore, the uniqueness of the South Korean case makes it an ideal case for studying the conditions of polarization in East Asia. South Korea has experienced gender-based polarization earlier than other democratic countries in the region, such as Japan and Taiwan. While much of the existing research on polarization has focused on Western European countries, this study seeks to enrich empirical insights into gender-based polarization by focusing on the South Korean context.




Figure 1: Voting Preferences by Gender and Age Group in the 20th (2022) and 21st (2025) Presidential Elections

## Data

The data used in this study are based on an original online panel survey conducted from March 4 to 9, 2025. The survey was implemented by distributing a questionnaire created by the author via Quartlics to a panel managed by PureSpectrum. Aiming for 1,500 responses, quota sampling was used to ensure a sample representative of Korean society, based on the latest census data for gender, age, and place of residence. However, the final sample did not strictly adhere to these criteria due to a low number of responses from women aged 60 and above. Furthermore, as described below, the balance across randomly assigned groups was

suboptimal for experimental purposes, so covariates were included in the analysis.

The experiment was administered near the end of the survey. In addition to collecting demographic information such as gender, place of residence, place of origin, income, and employment status, the same survey also included another experiment. This study, including both experiments, was approved by the Kyoto University Graduate School of Law Research Ethics Committee (Approval Number: R6-009).

Only respondents who passed both the satisficer and attention checks were included in the analysis. Specifically, respondents who failed to correctly mark instructed items in the questionnaire were classified as satisficers. As described later, the attention check was conducted twice during the experiment; respondents who failed the first check but passed the second were retained in the dataset. The final dataset consists of 1,309 valid responses that passed these checks. However, since 1,114 respondents answered the outcome variable, the effective sample size is 1,114. It is worth noting that the results reported below are based only on these valid responses, but the overall findings remain largely unchanged even when using the full dataset including satisficers and attention check failures <sup>2</sup>.

## Experimental Design

In this study, I employ a framing experiment using fictional newspaper articles to examine participants' responses to feminist claims made by social movements and how their attitudes may shift as a result. In the latter half of the aforementioned questionnaire, I included the instruction: "Please read the following article to the end and then answer the questions that follow," and presented the following newspaper article.

### ***"Toward an Inclusive and Equal Society..." Rally Calls for Gender Equality***

*On March 8, International Women's Day, civic groups organized rallies in Seoul and other cities across South Korea. In Seoul, a rally held at Marronnier Park brought together a*

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<sup>2</sup>Details of the survey will be provided in the supplementary information.

*diverse group of participants who raised their voices in support of a gender-equal society....*

The content of the article varied across five randomly assigned groups. The control group included statements from a representative of a citizens' group advocating for the realization of a gender-equal society. The remaining four groups were treatment groups, each featuring a different argument: "quotas," "wage gaps," "care work," and "sex crime." The details of each argument are summarized in Table 2. The format and wording of the articles were held constant; only the argument presented was manipulated in order to isolate the effect of each argument on participants' responses.

After reading the article, an attention check was conducted to assess whether participants had read the article thoroughly. This involved a multiple-choice question about the article's content: "According to the newspaper article you just read, what is the organizer's claim? Please select the one that best matches." Respondents who answered correctly could proceed to the next question, while those who answered incorrectly were prompted to reread the article and were shown the article again. Subsequently, participants' understanding was assessed with a second four-choice question. Even if participants answered the second question incorrectly, they were allowed to proceed. However, in this study, participants who answered the second question incorrectly were classified as providing invalid responses and were excluded from the analysis.

Table 2: Framing the News by Group

Groups	Framing
Control	<p>“At the rally, one organizer declared, “<b>We must achieve gender equality.</b>” South Korea consistently ranks among the most unequal developed countries in the Gender Gap Index, published annually by the World Economic Forum. As a result, there have been growing calls to implement various policies promoting gender equality and to shift public attitudes. ”</p>
Quotas	<p>“At the rally, one organizer declared, “<b>A quota system for women should be introduced to increase the number of female politicians.</b>” In South Korea, women remain significantly underrepresented in the National Assembly. As a result, there have been growing calls to introduce a gender quota system — reserving a certain percentage of seats or constituencies for female candidates — along with efforts to shift public attitudes.”</p>
Wage gap	<p>“At the rally, one organizer declared, “<b>The gender wage gap must be corrected and equality must be achieved.</b>” In South Korea, women are often concentrated in lower-paying jobs than men, and many leave the workforce after marriage or childbirth — contributing to a significant gender wage gap. As a result, there have been growing calls to prohibit involuntary job transfers related to childbirth or childcare, as well as efforts to shift public attitudes.”</p>
Care work	<p>“At the rally, one organizer declared, “<b>The burden of housework and childcare should be shared equally between men and women.</b>” In South Korea, women continue to shoulder a disproportionate share of domestic labor and childcare, leading to a significant gender imbalance. As a result, there have been growing calls for mandatory paternity leave and efforts to shift public attitudes.”</p>

Groups	Framing
Sex crime	“At the rally, one organizer declared, “ <b>All sexual violence and crimes must be eradicated.</b> ” In South Korea, incidents of sexual violence and crimes against women — including the Nth Room case and a surge in deepfake-related offenses — remain a serious concern. As a result, there have been growing calls for tougher penalties through criminal code revisions and efforts to shift public attitudes. ”

The subjects were randomly assigned to each group; however, despite this randomization, it remains unclear whether the groups were truly homogeneous. Therefore, a balance check was conducted using standardized differences in variables that could potentially influence both the treatment and the outcome. The results are shown in Figure 2, and as can be seen, each group was found to be heterogeneous in terms of variables that could potentially affect the outcome.




Figure 2: Balance Check

Although participants were randomly assigned to each group, the resulting groups were not necessarily homogeneous. Therefore, a balance check was conducted using standardized differences for variables that could potentially influence both the treatment and the outcome. As shown in the figure, the results indicate that the groups differed significantly in terms of these variables.

It remains unclear whether these variables actually influence the treatment or the outcome, but in cases where group balance is not maintained, regression analysis with covariates is appropriate for estimating treatment effects. This study estimates treatment effects using the following model.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Outcome} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Treatment} + \beta_2 \text{Male} + \beta_3 \text{Age} + \beta_4 \text{Treatment} \cdot \text{Male} \\ & + \beta_5 \text{Treatment} \cdot \text{Age} + \beta_6 \text{Treatment} \cdot \text{Male} \cdot \text{Age} + \mathbf{X} + \epsilon \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

*Outcome* is based on the question, “What do you think about the rally introduced in the newspaper article just now?” which was administered immediately after the newspaper article comprehension task. Responses were measured on a four-point scale ranging from 1 (oppose) to 4 (agree). Respondents who selected “don’t know” or “no answer” were excluded from the analysis.

Rather than focusing on the simple effects of the treatments, this study tests hypotheses assuming heterogeneous treatment effects by gender and age. Gender is categorized as either male or female. Age is represented in two forms: a binary variable distinguishing younger and older generations using the common cutoff of 40 years, and a continuous variable measured in 10-year age brackets from 18–20 up to 70. The model includes interaction terms between each of these variables and the treatment group.

The results of these estimations yield the average treatment effect (ATE) overall and within each subgroup. This study examines variation in these estimates to clarify differences in support for feminist claims advanced by social movements and how these effects vary by gender and age. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study are presented in Table 3.



Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std.Dev	Min	Max	N.Valid
<b>Male</b>	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00	1110.00
<b>Under40</b>	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00	1094.00
<b>Age 10s</b>	3.29	1.47	1.00	6.00	1094.00
<b>Education</b>	2.94	0.63	1.00	5.00	1113.00
<b>Living_sudo</b>	0.62	0.49	0.00	1.00	1114.00
<b>Birth_sudo</b>	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	1114.00
<b>Employment</b>	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00	1112.00
<b>Jobhunting</b>	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00	1112.00
<b>Income</b>	8.15	5.23	1.00	20.00	1103.00
<b>Ideology</b>	5.13	2.24	0.00	10.00	1093.00
<b>Voted</b>	0.91	0.29	0.00	1.00	1102.00
<b>Outcome</b>	2.80	1.03	1.00	4.00	1114.00
<b>Control</b>	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00	1114.00
<b>Treatment_Quota</b>	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	1114.00
<b>Treatment_SexCrime</b>	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	1114.00
<b>Treatment_CareWork</b>	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	1114.00
<b>Treatment_WageGap</b>	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	1114.00

## Results

First, I examine differences between groups. Figure 3 displays variations in outcome scores across the treatment groups. As shown, respondents' attitudes vary depending on the specific claims made by each citizens' group. The most notable difference appears in response to the quota-related claim, which shows a gap of 0.5 to 1.0 points compared to the control and other groups. In contrast, the claim regarding the eradication of sexual crimes received the highest

level of support, with a difference of approximately 0.4 points relative to the control group.




Figure 3: Differences in Outcomes between Groups

However, because the groups in this study are heterogeneous, it is necessary to control for covariates. Furthermore, to examine whether treatment effects differ by gender and age, regression analysis is required. Accordingly, Figure 4 presents results by dividing respondents into two age categories—under 40 and over 40—and shows the treatment effects for each group compared to the control group, disaggregated by gender.

These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 1. Specifically, young men are more likely to oppose social movements advocating for the introduction of quotas than those simply promoting gender equality. The effect size is approximately 0.9 points, which is substantial given that the outcome scale ranges only from 1 to 4. However, this trend also holds for older men, and no significant age-based difference is observed. Therefore, the finding does not indicate that younger people are more opposed to quotas, but rather that men, in general, are.

Next, focusing on older men, I find that both Hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported. In other words, men of the older generation are more likely to express negative attitudes toward claims related to care work and wage gaps. The results for care work are particularly notable,

as they diverge from those of other groups. Specifically, older men tend to oppose claims that they perceive as increasing their own burden. When age is treated not as a binary variable but divided into deciles, the results indicate that this effect becomes more pronounced with increasing age (Figure 5).

Similar patterns are observed in relation to wage gaps. However, when age is categorized into two groups (under 40 vs. over 40), the results are not statistically significant. When age is treated as a continuous variable, men in their 40s and 50s show stronger opposition. In other words, men aged 40 and above—who may perceive their relative power as being threatened—are more likely to oppose efforts to correct wage disparities. The fact that this effect is virtually absent among younger men further supports this interpretation.

Next, examining women from the older generation, I find support for Hypothesis 3. In other words, as women of this generation grow older, they tend to show increasing opposition to the quota system. Interestingly, a statistically significant effect was also observed among women in their 30s—traditionally considered part of the younger generation. This finding highlights the importance of considering the specific sociopolitical context of South Korea. That is, amid growing societal opposition to the expansion of the quota system, these women may be developing resistance to the introduction of additional quotas.

Finally, when examining the effectiveness of measures aimed at eradicating sexual crimes, the results largely support the hypothesis. In other words, these measures had a positive effect across all age groups. Notably, the effect size was larger among young men in their 20s and 30s compared to other age groups and genders. This finding suggests that young men are more inclined to support movements that emphasize concrete harm rather than those that simply advocate for gender equality.

By contrast, the lack of change observed among young women stands in sharp contrast to the responses of young men. However, this does not imply that young women are unsupportive of civic movements. Rather, it suggests that young women tend to support feminist social movements consistently, regardless of whether the claims center on gender equality or other issues. The fact that the effect size for women in their 20s remains unchanged across all treatments supports this interpretation.

Nevertheless, the possibility of social desirability bias must be acknowledged when interpreting responses to measures aimed at eradicating sexual crimes. In other words, opposing such measures could be perceived as endorsing socially undesirable behavior, such as sexual violence, which may have led respondents to provide socially acceptable answers. It is also difficult to rule out the possibility that this bias is more pronounced among younger men. Further detailed analysis is needed in future research.




Figure 4: Estimated Treatment Effects - Gender and Age (under/over 40)

## Conclusion

This study examined the extent to which voter support changes in response to feminist claims, disaggregated by age and gender. The results show that, consistent with previous studies, young men tend to oppose quota systems. However, the study also found that older men and women respond differently depending on the specific claim. Additionally, it was revealed that claims related to the eradication of sexual crimes are viewed favorably across all age and gender groups.

These findings suggest that social movements may either exacerbate or alleviate opin-




Figure 5: Estimated Treatment Effects - Gender and Age (10-year increments)

ion polarization, depending on the nature of their claims. The results also indicate that young men may take relatively moderate positions on feminist issues other than quotas, and that they may even respond positively in some cases.

Most importantly, this effect appears to be strongly shaped by generational differences. While previous studies have focused primarily on younger generations, this study highlights that older generations often exhibit more negative reactions to feminist claims. Although younger generations tend to hold more liberal values, it is important to reconsider the assumption that older generations are simply critical of feminism on egalitarian grounds. Rather, they may adopt political attitudes aimed at maintaining their existing social or economic positions.

## Supplementary

URL: <https://kazuhiroterashita.com/supplementary/>

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