

Project 4 - Auditing with OSquery and YARA

OSquery is an multi-platform operating system instrumentation framework. It is supported for Windows, OSX, Linux and FreeBSD. [1]

OSquery exposes the operating system's data in the form of a relational database that is tuned for high-performance. It can be used for various kinds of instrumentation of the OS. Running processes, kernel modules, installed packages and more for basic monitoring of the system. It can also be used for network monitoring to get open ports, firewall rules and more. It can even be connected with syslog to read syslog events. Some of the examples queries and their outputs are shown below.

PART 1: BASIC MONITORING OF A SYSTEM

P1.1a - `SELECT pid,name,user_time,system_time FROM processes ORDER BY pid DESC LIMIT 10;`

```
osquery> SELECT pid,name,user_time,system_time FROM processes ORDER BY pid DESC LIMIT 10;
```

pid	name	user_time	system_time
4928	kworker/2:0-events	0	140
4927	kworker/3:0-events	0	260
4924	osqueryi	200	80
4912	kworker/1:1-ata_sff	10	0
4897	zsh	400	200
4896	asciinema	0	10
4895	asciinema	40	10
4894	asciinema	310	440
4815	kworker/1:3-events	0	1500
4812	kworker/0:2-cgroup_destroy	110	140

P1.2a - `SELECT version, arguments, device FROM kernel_info;`

```
osquery> SELECT version, arguments, device FROM kernel_info;
```

version	arguments	device
5.14.0-kali4-amd64	ro quiet splash	UUID=bb71bd36-b961-41e3-8202-84c2f0bcbdfa

P1.2b - `SELECT name, size, used_by, address FROM kernel_modules ORDER BY name ASC LIMIT 10;`

```
osquery> SELECT name, size, used_by, address FROM kernel_modules ORDER BY size DESC LIMIT 10;
```

name	size	used_by	address
ext4	917504	-	0xffffffffc0874000
sunrpc	663552	-	0xffffffffc0955000
drm	634880	vmwgfx,ttm,drm_kms_helper	0xffffffffc02c1000
vmwgfx	385024	-	0xffffffffc0815000
aesni_intel	380928	-	0xffffffffc05d9000
usbcore	331776	usbhid,ehci_pci,uhci_hcd,ehci_hcd	0xffffffffc03ed000
drm_kms_helper	307200	vmwgfx	0xffffffffc0794000
libata	294912	ata_generic,ata_piix	0xffffffffc0539000
bridge	274432	br_netfilter	0xffffffffc0bea000
nf_tables	262144	nft_chain_nat,nft_counter,nft_compat	0xffffffffc0c47000

P1.3a -SELECT name,version,source,maintainer

...> FROM deb_packages

...> WHERE (source <> '') AND (name LIKE '%security%' or maintainer LIKE '%security%');

```
osquery> SELECT name,version,source,maintainer
...> FROM deb_packages
...> WHERE (source <> '') AND (name LIKE '%security%' or maintainer LIKE '%security%');
```

name	version	source	maintainer
bully	1.4.00-1+b1	bully (1.4.00-1)	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
cgpt	0-R88-13597.8-1	vboot-utils	Sophie Brun <sophie@offensive-security.com>
ettercap-common	1:0.8.3.1-4	ettercap	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
ettercap-graphical	1:0.8.3.1-4	ettercap	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
hashcat-data	6.1.1+ds1-1	hashcat	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
hydra	9.1-1+b2	hydra (9.1-1)	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
hydra-gtk	9.1-1+b2	hydra (9.1-1)	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libafflib0v5	3.7.19-2	afflib	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libbfl01	20170123-6	libbfl0	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libcapstone-dev	4.0.2-3+b1	capstone (4.0.2-3)	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libcapstone4	4.0.2-3+b1	capstone (4.0.2-3)	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libewf2	20140807-2+b2	libewf (20140807-2)	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libnids1.21	1.25-1	libnids	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libradare2-5.0.0	5.0.0+dfsg-1	radare2	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libradare2-common	5.0.0+dfsg-1	radare2	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libradare2-dev	5.0.0+dfsg-1	radare2	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libtsk10	4.11.0+dfsg-1	slouthkit	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libvhd1	20210425-1	libvhd1	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libvmdk1	20200926-2	libvmdk	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libyara4	4.0.5-1	yara	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libyara8	4.1.3-1	yara	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
libyara9	4.2.0-3	yara	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
ophcrack-cli	3.8.0-3	ophcrack	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
python3-binwalk	2.3.2+dfsg1-1	binwalk	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
python3-flask-security	4.0.0-1	flask-security	Debian Python Team <team+python@tracker.debian.org>
python3-scapy	2.4.4-4	scapy	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
statsprocessor	0.11+git20160316-3+b1	statsprocessor (0.11+git20160316-3)	Debian Security Tools <team+pkg-security@tracker.debian.org>
vboot-kernel-utils	0-R88-13597.8-1	vboot-utils	Sophie Brun <sophie@offensive-security.com>

P1.3b - SELECT name, version FROM deb_packages WHERE name LIKE '%iptables%';

```
osquery> SELECT name, version FROM deb_packages WHERE name LIKE '%iptables%';
```

name	version
iptables	1.8.7-1

P1.4a - SELECT path, username, groupname, permissions

...> FROM suid_bin

...> WHERE username LIKE 'root' AND groupname LIKE 'root' AND permissions LIKE 's';

```
osquery> SELECT path, username, groupname, permissions
...> FROM suid_bin
...> WHERE username LIKE 'root' AND groupname LIKE 'root' AND permissions LIKE 's';
```

path	username	groupname	permissions
/bin/chsh	root	root	S
/bin/sudo	root	root	S
/bin/newgrp	root	root	S
/bin/ntfs-3g	root	root	S
/bin/fusermount3	root	root	S
/bin/fusermount	root	root	S
/bin/vmware-user-suid-wrapper	root	root	S
/bin/sudoedit	root	root	S
/bin/chfn	root	root	S
/bin/passwd	root	root	S
/bin/su	root	root	S
/bin/vmware-user	root	root	S
/bin/sg	root	root	S
/bin/pkexec	root	root	S
/bin/gpasswd	root	root	S
/bin/mount	root	root	S
/bin/umount	root	root	S
/sbin/mount.cifs	root	root	S
/sbin/umount.nfs	root	root	S
/sbin/mount.ntfs-3g	root	root	S
/sbin/mount.nfs	root	root	S
/sbin/umount.nfs4	root	root	S
/sbin/mount.nfs4	root	root	S
/sbin/mount.ntfs	root	root	S
/sbin/mount.smb3	root	root	S
/usr/bin/chsh	root	root	S
/usr/bin/sudo	root	root	S
/usr/bin/newgrp	root	root	S
/usr/bin/ntfs-3g	root	root	S
/usr/bin/fusermount3	root	root	S
/usr/bin/fusermount	root	root	S
/usr/bin/vmware-user-suid-wrapper	root	root	S
/usr/bin/sudoedit	root	root	S
/usr/bin/chfn	root	root	S
/usr/bin/passwd	root	root	S
/usr/bin/su	root	root	S
/usr/bin/vmware-user	root	root	S
/usr/bin/sg	root	root	S
/usr/bin/pkexec	root	root	S
/usr/bin/gpasswd	root	root	S
/usr/bin/mount	root	root	S
/usr/bin/umount	root	root	S
/usr/sbin/mount.cifs	root	root	S
/usr/sbin/umount.nfs	root	root	S
/usr/sbin/mount.ntfs-3g	root	root	S
/usr/sbin/mount.nfs	root	root	S
/usr/sbin/umount.nfs4	root	root	S
/usr/sbin/mount.nfs4	root	root	S
/usr/sbin/mount.ntfs	root	root	S
/usr/sbin/mount.smb3	root	root	S

P1.4b - SELECT * FROM sudoers WHERE header LIKE '%sudo%';

```
osquery> SELECT * FROM sudoers WHERE header LIKE '%sudo%';
```

source	header	rule_details
/etc/sudoers	%sudo	ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL

PART 2: NETWORK AND PROCESS MONITORING

P2.1a - SELECT * from listening_ports LIMIT 10;

```
osquery> SELECT * from listening_ports LIMIT 10;
```

pid	port	protocol	family	address	fd	socket	path	net_namespace
542	4767	6	2	127.0.0.1	5	17819		4026531992
691	80	6	10	::	4	16785		4026531992
515	546	17	10	fe80::20c:29ff:fe63:4f10	24	16907		4026531992
515	58	255	10	::	21	10218		4026531992
1	0	0	1		39	0	/run/systemd/notify	4026531992
1039	0	0	1		12	0	@/tmp/.ICE-unix/1039	4026531992
522	0	0	1		3	0	/run/systemd/journal/syslog	4026531992
609	0	0	1		7	0	@/tmp/.X11-unix/X0	4026531992
1	0	0	1		145	0	/run/systemd/fsck.progress	4026531992
357	0	0	1		3	0	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	4026531992

P2.1b - SELECT pid, socket, protocol, local_address, remote_address, local_port, remote_port FROM process_open_sockets LIMIT 4;

```
osquery> SELECT pid, socket, protocol, local_address, remote_address, local_port, remote_port FROM process_open_sockets LIMIT 4;
```


pid	socket	protocol	local_address	remote_address	local_port	remote_port
542	17819	6	127.0.0.1	0.0.0.0	4767	0
691	16785	6	::	::	80	0
515	16800	17	10.0.0.81	10.0.0.1	68	67
515	16907	17	fe80::20c:29ff:fe63:4f10	::	546	0

P2.1c -SELECT interface_addresses.interface, interface_addresses.address, interface_details.ibytes, interface_details.obytes FROM interface_addresses INNER JOIN interface_details ON interface_addresses.interface=interface_details.interface;

```
osquery> SELECT interface_addresses.interface, interface_addresses.address, interface_details.lbytes, interface_details.obytes FROM interface_addresses INNER JOIN ...> interface_details ON interface_addresses.interface=interface_details.interface;
```

interface	address	lbytes	obytes
lo	127.0.0.1	800	800
eth0	10.0.0.81	109834167	2055121
docker0	172.17.0.1	0	0
lo	::1	800	800
eth0	2601:197:a80:6520::4822	109834167	2055121
eth0	2601:197:a80:6520:2a80:db16:796d:f4eb	109834167	2055121
eth0	2601:197:a80:6520:20c:29ff:fe63:4f10	109834167	2055121
eth0	fe80::20c:29ff:fe63:4f10%eth0	109834167	2055121

P2.2a -SELECT chain, policy, src_ip,src_port, dst_ip,dst_port, bytes FROM iptables;



Kali seems to have a bug in this table implementation as pointed out by TA Vineeth in Piazza. Even though there are iptable rules, they dont seem to be listed here. IPtables rules are listed in the screenshot below

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ sudo iptables -L -v
```

Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT 0 packets, 0 bytes)									
pkts	bytes	target	prot	opt	in	out	source	destination	
0	0	REJECT	icmp	--	any	any	anywhere	anywhere	icmp echo-request reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
0	0	DROP	all	--	any	any	anywhere	dns.google	
4	336	DROP	all	--	any	any	dns.google	anywhere	

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)									
pkts	bytes	target	prot	opt	in	out	source	destination	
0	0	DOCKER-USER	all	--	any	any	anywhere	anywhere	
0	0	DOCKER-ISOLATION-STAGE-1	all	--	any	any	anywhere	anywhere	anywhere
0	0	ACCEPT	all	--	any	docker0	anywhere	anywhere	ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED
0	0	DOCKER	all	--	any	docker0	anywhere	anywhere	
0	0	ACCEPT	all	--	docker0	!docker0	anywhere	anywhere	
0	0	ACCEPT	all	--	docker0	docker0	anywhere	anywhere	

Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT 0 packets, 0 bytes)									
pkts	bytes	target	prot	opt	in	out	source	destination	
0	0	DROP	all	--	any	any	dns.google	anywhere	

Chain DOCKER (1 references)									
pkts	bytes	target	prot	opt	in	out	source	destination	
0	0	RETURN	all	--	any	any	anywhere	anywhere	

Chain DOCKER-ISOLATION-STAGE-1 (1 references)									
pkts	bytes	target	prot	opt	in	out	source	destination	
0	0	DOCKER-ISOLATION-STAGE-2	all	--	any	any	docker0 !docker0	anywhere	anywhere
0	0	RETURN	all	--	any	any	anywhere	anywhere	

Chain DOCKER-ISOLATION-STAGE-2 (1 references)									
pkts	bytes	target	prot	opt	in	out	source	destination	
0	0	DROP	all	--	any	docker0	anywhere	anywhere	anywhere
0	0	RETURN	all	--	any	any	anywhere	anywhere	

Chain DOCKER-USER (1 references)									
pkts	bytes	target	prot	opt	in	out	source	destination	
0	0	RETURN	all	--	any	any	anywhere	anywhere	

P2.3a - SELECT pid, name, cmdline FROM processes WHERE cmdline LIKE '%sbin%';

```
osquery> SELECT pid, name, cmdline FROM processes WHERE cmdline LIKE '%sbin%';
```

pid	name	cmdline
2201	cron	/usr/sbin/cron -f
484	haveged	/usr/sbin/haveged --Foreground --verbose=1
515	NetworkManager	/usr/sbin/NetworkManager --no-daemon
522	rsyslogd	/usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
543	ModemManager	/usr/sbin/ModemManager
581	lightdm	/usr/sbin/lightdm
610	agetty	/sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear tty1 linux
636	apache2	/usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
686	apache2	/usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
687	apache2	/usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
688	apache2	/usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
690	apache2	/usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
691	apache2	/usr/sbin/apache2 -k start

```
osquery>
```

P2.3b - SELECT pid, name, uid, resident_size FROM processes ORDER BY resident_size DESC LIMIT 7;

```
osquery> SELECT pid, name, uid, resident_size FROM processes ORDER BY resident_size DESC LIMIT 7;
```

pid	name	uid	resident_size
609	Xorg	0	163440000
1122	xfwm4	1000	92976000
1370	qterminal	1000	88216000
724	dockerd	0	86324000
1168	xfdesktop	1000	55140000
577	containerd	0	55084000
1162	Thunar	1000	53064000

P2.3c - SELECT pid, name, uid, euid, resident_size FROM processes WHERE uid != euid;

```
osquery> SELECT pid, name, uid, euid, resident_size FROM processes WHERE uid != euid;
```

pid	name	uid	euid	resident_size
1384	sudo	1000	0	5284000
5181	passwd	1000	0	4060000

P2.4a - SELECT username, pid, host,
...> datetime(time, 'unixepoch', 'localtime') AS connection_started
...> FROM
...> last LIMIT 10;

```
osquery> SELECT username, pid, host,  
...> datetime(time, 'unixepoch', 'localtime') AS connection_started  
...> FROM  
...> last LIMIT 10;
```

username	pid	host	connection_started
kali	968	:0	2021-05-31 03:34:47
kali	0	:0	2021-05-31 18:16:03
kali	828	:0	2021-09-15 15:36:49
kali	0	:0	2021-09-15 17:04:51
kali	804	:0	2021-09-15 22:04:40
kali	0	:0	2021-09-15 22:07:58
kali	827	:0	2021-09-16 06:21:50
kali	0	:0	2021-09-16 06:26:05
kali	20325	:0	2021-09-20 12:29:58
kali	0	:0	2021-09-20 19:50:43

PART 3: ENABLING THE EVENTS and Syslog

Syslog is a powerful Linux logging framework that can be used for various logs and events management. It is used as a standard logging format widely across the industry. One of the major advantages of syslog is - logging messages can be classified based on the severity level such as - emergency, warning, informational etc. This will make it easier for anyone who is analyzing the logs to prioritize what is important based on the use case. It can be used as central logging system to collect logs from various applications and various machines in the network into a centralized syslog server.

OSquery can be linked with syslog to get the events of the system from the osqueryi interface in the form SQL queries.

This can be done with the help of some configuration changes to allow syslog to pipe the messages to osquery and osquery can then populate the table with the events received from syslog. An example of what can be added /etc/rsyslog.conf is shown in the screenshot below:

```
template(
  name="OsqueryCsvFormat"
  type="string"
  string="%timestamp:::date-rfc3339,csv%,%hostname:::csv%,%syslogseverity:::csv%,%syslogfacility-text:::csv%,%syslogtag:::csv%,%msg:::csv%\n"
)
** action(type="ompipe" Pipe="/var/osquery/syslog_pipe" template="OsqueryCsvFormat")
```

After syslog is configured to pipe values into osquery, we can add a configuration file that determines the settings needs to be used by osquery while handling the events. Options such as logger_path, verbose, enable_syslog and many more. OSquery works based on the values set to these options. More of the options can be found in the osquery documentation and digital ocean article linked below in references. [2][3]

One of the additions to these configuration files is the packs - these are extended configuration files provided by osquery community so that they can directly be used without having to write then on our own. These packs can be used for incident-response, vuln-management and more. Active packs in the system are listed below using the osquery_packs table. [4]

P 3.1

```
(root@kali)~# osqueryi
Using a virtual database. Need help, type '.help'
osquery> SELECT name, platform, version, discovery_executions from osquery_packs where active = 1;
```

name	platform	version	discovery_executions
main			1
osquery-monitoring			1
incident-response			1
it-compliance			1
vuln-management			1

```
osquery>
```

PART 4: FILE INTEGRITY MONITORING

File integrity monitoring can be very useful to keep track of important files and how and when they are being changed. Osquery supports FIM by modifying the configuration file listed above to enable_file_events and few other parameters that need to be changed in the configuration file.

File paths to be monitored has an option to use wildcard characters that can be used to specific files in one level or recursively or ending with specific characters and so on. [5]

For this example, I made a simple pack that I have modified to use monitor the files in /home/namruth. Screenshot of the pack is shown below:


```
GNU nano 5.9
[
  "queries": {
    "file_events": {
      "query": "select * from file_events;",
      "removed": false,
      "interval": 180
    }
  },
  "file_paths": {
    "homes": [
      "/root/.ssh/%",
      "/home/%/.ssh/%"
    ],
    "sbin": [
      "/sbin/%"
    ],
    "home": [
      "/home/namruth/%"
    ],
    "tmp": [
      "/tmp/%"
    ]
  }
}
```

Duration of the interval to run the query can be set (180 seconds in this case) and file paths can be set with wild characters. Path to this pack needs to be added in the osquery.conf file. Screenshots below show the file events generated before and after creating a text file /home/namruth folder which is being monitored.

P4.1

```
osquery> SELECT target_path, action FROM file_events;
+-----+-----+
| target_path | action |
+-----+-----+
| /tmp/#2753080 | UPDATED |
| /tmp/#2753078 | UPDATED |
| /tmp/#2753081 | UPDATED |
| /tmp/#2753080 | UPDATED |
| /tmp/#2753078 | UPDATED |
| /tmp/#2753081 | UPDATED |
+-----+-----+
```

P4.2

```
osquery> SELECT target_path, action FROM file_events;
```

target_path	action
/tmp/#2753080	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753078	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753081	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753080	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753078	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753081	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753080	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753078	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753081	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753080	UPDATED
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/tmp/#2753081	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753080	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753078	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753081	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753080	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753078	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753081	UPDATED
/home/namruth/.test4.txt.swp	CREATED
/home/namruth/.test4.txt.swp	UPDATED
/home/namruth/.test4.txt.swp	UPDATED
/home/namruth/.test4.txt.swp	DELETED
/home/namruth/.test4.txt.swp	CREATED
/home/namruth/.test4.txt.swp	UPDATED
/home/namruth/.test4.txt.swp	UPDATED
/home/namruth/test4.txt	CREATED
/home/namruth/test4.txt	UPDATED
/home/namruth/test4.txt	UPDATED
/home/namruth/.test4.txt.swp	DELETED
/tmp/#2753080	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753078	UPDATED
/tmp/#2753081	UPDATED

PART 5: USING YARA FOR MALWARE ANALYSIS

Yara is a tool used for identifying malware samples. As the number of malware variants grew rapidly in the last few years, this tool can be used to write simple to complex boolean expressions that can be used identify malware families. Any yara file typically has three sections: meta - description of the rule, author etc, strings - strings that can be used to match the malware and condition - boolean expression using the strings and other keywords in yara.[6]

A sample example shown in yara documentation -

```
rule silent_banker : banker
{
    meta:
        description = "This is just an example"
        threat_level = 3
        in_the_wild = true
    strings:
        $a = {6A 40 68 00 30 00 00 6A 14 8D 91}
        $b = {8D 4D B0 2B C1 83 C0 27 99 6A 4E 59 F7 F9}
        $c = "UVODFRYSIHLNWPEJXQZAKCBGMT"
    condition:
        $a or $b or $c
}
```

P5.1

I uploaded the file on virus total to see its reputation and other properties

-<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e6995b5428e887d790c6b77b32fddc143658ce2125ba192e8255d1ab70db6cac>

I used the "strings" command to identify some of the useful strings in the file. These are:

- watchdog
- Watchdog
- WatchDog
- /proc/self/exe
- POST /cdn-cgi/
- AVAUATA

QGVaMMIKG
PGDPGQJ
NMACVKML
AMMIKG
AMLVGLV
NGLEVJ
VPCLQDGP
GLAMFKLE

This file is mirai malware variant.
Some of its unique properties are:

Its file size is typically less than 200KB

It is an ELF executable with magic number 0x7f454c46, converting it to little endian format to be used in the rule below

It contains atleast one the strings listed in the second block above.

It contains watchdog string in various cases

It typically uses the path /proc/self/exe and the http request POST /cdn-cgi/

```
rule mirai_malware
{
  meta:
    description = "YARA Rule for Mirai botnet malware variant"
    author = "Namruth Reddy"
    date = "24-March-2022"

  strings:
    $s1 = "QGVaMMIKG" fullword ascii
    $s2 = "PGDPGQJ" fullword ascii
    $s3 = "NMACVKML" fullword ascii
    $s4 = "AMMIKG" fullword ascii
    $s5 = "AMLVGLV" fullword ascii
    $x1 = "watchdog" fullword ascii nocase
    $x2 = "POST /cdn-cgi/" fullword ascii
    $x3 = "/proc/self/exe" fullword ascii
    $x4 = "/dev/null" fullword ascii
    $x5 = "AVAUATA"

    condition:
      ( filesize < 200KB and uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and
        ( 1 of ($s*) ) and ( 5 of ($x*) ) )
}
```

P5.2

I uploaded the file on virus total to see its reputation and other properties -

<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2923843a5ee9f6772b5a2a2c63bf606bd01fcb28bfeaede60a83b49e9a93266b/detection>

I used the "strings" command to identify some of the useful strings in the file. These are:

185.239.242.109:4269

/proc/net/route

YakuzaBotnet

Scarface1337

Scarface1337Self Rep Fucking NeTiS and Thisity On Ur FuCkInG FoReHeAd We BiG

L33T HaxErS

/proc/net/route

This file is a linux trojan variant malware.

It usually communicates to the IP 185.239.242.109:4269 and accesses files in the location /proc/net/route

It also contains useful words like Scarface1337 and YakuzaBotnet

File size of such malware is typically < 100KB

It is an ELF executable with magic number 0x7f454c46, converting it to little endian format to be used in the rule below

```
rule linux_trojan_malware
{
  meta:
    description = "YARA Rule for linux trojan malware variant"
    author = "Namruth Reddy"
    date = "23-March-2022"

  strings:
    $a = "185.239.242.109:4269" fullword ascii
    $b = "YakuzaBotnet" fullword ascii
    $c = "Scarface1337" fullword ascii
    $d = "/proc/net/route" fullword ascii

  condition:
    ( filesize < 100KB and uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and
      ( $a and $d ) and ( $b or $c ) )
}
```


After writing the yara rules for both the files, we execute yara to see if they are being identified correctly. Output of both the files are shown below:

P5.3

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
└─$ yara -s -r namruth1.yar e6995b5428e887d790c6b77b32fddc143658ce2125ba192e8255d1ab70db6cac
mirai_malware e6995b5428e887d790c6b77b32fddc143658ce2125ba192e8255d1ab70db6cac
0xaf70:$s1: QGVaMMIKG /proc/self/exe and word ASCII
0xaf7d:$s2: PGDPGQJ /dev/null and word ASCII
0xaf87:$s3: NMACVKML AVAATA
0xaf96:$s4: AMMIKG
0xaf9f:$s5: AMLVGLV
0xb007:$x1: watchdog 0x463c457f and uint32(8) == 0x463c457f and
0xb010:$x1: Watchdog 0x463c457f and uint32(8) == 0x463c457f
0xb019:$x1: WatchDog
0xb047:$x2: POST /cdn-cgi/
0xb022:$x3: /proc/self/exe
0xb610:$x4: /dev/null
0x21e0:$x5: AVAATA
```

P5.4

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
└─$ yara -s -r namruth2.yar 2923843a5ee9f6772b5a2a2c63bf606bd01fcb28bfeaede60a83b49e9a93266b
linux_trojan_malware 2923843a5ee9f6772b5a2a2c63bf606bd01fcb28bfeaede60a83b49e9a93266b
0xb160:$a: 185.239.242.109:4269
0xc849:$b: YakuzaBotnet
0xc856:$c: Scarface1337
0xc62f:$d: /proc/net/route
```

PART 6: USING OSQUERY AND YARA TO IDENTIFY MALWARE SAMPLES

Osquery can be integrated with yara to check for file integrity event changes. There are two types of yara tables: [7]

1. Yara_events - this table can be used for auto yara detection when a specific file integrity event is triggered.
2. Yara - this is an on demand scan of a specific file.

Using the yara rules and malware files given in the assignment, yara on demand scan is executed and the values are populated in the yara table as shown below:

P6.1

```
SELECT * FROM yara WHERE
```

```
path="/home/kali/Downloads/e6995b5428e887d790c6b77b32fddc143658ce2125ba192e8255d1ab70db6cac" AND sigfile="/home/kali/Downloads/namruth1.yar";
```

```
osquery> SELECT * FROM yara WHERE path="/home/kali/Downloads/e6995b5428e887d790c6b77b32fddc143658ce2125ba192e8255d1ab70db6cac" AND sigfile="/home/kali/Downloads/namruth1.yar";
```

path	strings	matches	count	sig_group	sigfile
			tags		
/home/kali/Downloads/e6995b5428e887d790c6b77b32fddc143658ce2125ba192e8255d1ab70db6cac		mirai_malware	1		/home/kali/Downloads
/namruth1.yar	\$s1:af70,\$s2:af7d,\$s3:af87,\$s4:af96,\$s5:af9f,\$x1:b007,\$x2:b047,\$x3:b022,\$x4:b610,\$x5:21e0				

```
osquery> █
```

P6.2

SELECT * FROM yara WHERE

path="/home/kali/Downloads/2923843a5ee9f6772b5a2a2c63bf606bd01fcb28bfeaede60a83b49e9a93266b" AND sigfile="/home/kali/Downloads/namruth2.yar";

```
osquery> SELECT * FROM yara WHERE path="/home/kali/Downloads/2923843a5ee9f6772b5a2a2c63bf606bd01fcb28bfeaede60a83b49e9a93266b" AND sigfile="/home/kali/Downloads/namruth2.yar";
```

path	strings	tags	matches	count	sig_group	sigfile
/home/kali/Downloads/2923843a5ee9f6772b5a2a2c63bf606bd01fcb28bfeaede60a83b49e9a93266b wnloads/namruth2.yar	\$a:b160,\$b:c849,\$c:c856,\$d:c62f		linux_trojan_malware	1	ELP	/home/kali/Do

```
osquery>
```

ALL RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY

- Trojan.Linux.Generic.320140
- Trojan.Generic.ASSET.32158
- ELPMal-ABC (70)
- ELPMal-ABC (70)
- Al-You
- Accabit
- Awes-Mobile
- Awes (no cloud)
- Trojan.Linux.Generic.320140
- Trojan.Linux.Generic.320724
- ELPMal-BDU (70)
- ELPMal-BDU (70)
- ELPMal-BDU (70)

References:

- [1] - <https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/>
- [2] - <https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-monitor-your-system-security-with-osquery-on-ubuntu-16-04>
- [3] - <https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/syslog/>
- [4] - <https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/configuration/>
- [5] - <https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/file-integrity-monitoring/>
- [6] - <https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/stable/>
- [7] - <https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/yara/>