Specification of the a variant of the Sailfish consensus algorithm at a high level of abstraction.

In this variant, a leader vertice is committed only when it has a quorum $(e.g.\ 2f+1)$ of DAG parents in the next round.

EXTENDS DomainModel, TLC

```
CONSTANT
```

GST the first synchronous round (all later rounds are synchronous)

```
--algorithm Sailfish {
    variables
         vs = \{\}, the vertices of the DAG
         es = \{\}, the edges of the DAG
         no\_vote = [n \in N \mapsto \{\}]; no\_vote messages sent by each node
    define {
         LeaderVertice(r) \triangleq \langle Leader(r), r \rangle
         VerticeQuorums(r) \stackrel{\Delta}{=}
             \{VQ \in \text{SUBSET } vs:
                    \land \forall v \in VQ : Round(v) = r 
 \land \{Node(v) : v \in VQ\} \in Quorum\} 
     }
    process ( correctNode \in N \setminus F )
        variables round = 0; current round
l0:
        while (TRUE)
        either with ( v = \langle self, round \rangle ) {
              add a new vertex to the DAG and go to the next round
             vs := vs \cup \{v\};
             if (round > 0)
             with ( vq \in VerticeQuorums(round - 1) ) {
                   from GST onwards, each node receives all correct vertices of the previous round:
                 when round \ge GST \Rightarrow (N \setminus F) \subseteq \{Node(v2) : v2 \in vq\};
                  es := es \cup \{\langle v, pv \rangle : pv \in vq\}; add the edges
                 if ( LeaderVertice(round-1) \notin vq ) send no\_vote if previous leader vertice not included
                       no\_vote[self] := no\_vote[self] \cup \{LeaderVertice(round - 1)\}
              };
             round := round + 1
         }
        or with (r \in \{r \in R : r > round\})
               go to a higher round
             when round < GST; from GST onwards, correct nodes do not skip rounds
             round := r
         }
     }
```

Next comes our model of *Byzantine* nodes. Because the real protocol disseminates *DAG* vertices using reliable broadcast, *Byzantine* nodes cannot equivocate and cannot deviate much from the protocol (lest their messages be ignored).

```
process ( byzantineNode \in F )
         variables round_{-} = 0;
l0:
        while (TRUE) {
              maybe add a vertices to the DAG:
             either with ( v = \langle self, round_- \rangle ) {
                 vs := vs \cup \{v\};
                 if (round_- > 0)
                       with ( vq \in VerticeQuorums(round_- - 1) )
                           es := es \cup \{\langle v, pv \rangle : pv \in vq\}
              } or skip;
              maybe send a no\_vote messages:
             if (round_{-} > 0)
             either
                 no\_vote[self] := no\_vote[self] \cup \{LeaderVertice(round\_-1)\}
             or skip;
              go to the next round:
             round_{-} := round_{-} + 1
         }
     }
 }
Next we define the safety and liveness properties
Committed(v) \triangleq
     \land v \in vs
     \land Node(v) = Leader(Round(v))
     \land \{Node(pv) : pv \in Parents(v, es)\} \in Quorum
     \land \lor Round(v) = 0
         \lor LeaderVertice(Round(v) - 1) \in Children(v, es)
         \lor \exists Q \in Quorum : \forall n \in Q :
                LeaderVertice(Round(v) - 1) \in no\_vote[n]
Safety \triangleq \forall v1, v2 \in vs:
     \land Committed(v1)
     \land Committed(v2)
     \land Round(v1) \le Round(v2)
     \Rightarrow Reachable(v2, v1, es)
Liveness \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \forall r \in R:
     \land r \geq GST
     \land Leader(r) \notin F
     \land \forall n \in N \setminus F : round[n] > r + 1
     \Rightarrow Committed(LeaderVertice(r))
```

Finally we make a few auxiliary definitions used for model-checking with TLC

```
The round of a node, whether Byzantine or not
Round_{-}(n) \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \text{ if } n \in F \text{ THEN } round_{-}[n] \text{ ELSE } round[n]
 Basic typing invariant:
TypeOK \triangleq
      \land \forall v \in vs : Node(v) \in N \land Round(v) \in Nat
      \land \forall e \in es:
             \wedge e = \langle e[1], e[2] \rangle
              \land \{e[1], e[2]\} \subseteq vs
              \land Round(e[1]) > Round(e[2])
      \land \forall n \in N:
          \land Round_{-}(n) \in Nat
          \land no\_vote[n] \subseteq \{\langle Leader(r), r \rangle : r \in R\}
Sequentialization constraints, which enforce a particular ordering of the actions. Because of how
actions commute, the set of reachable states remains unchanged. This speeds up model-checking
SeqConstraints(n) \triangleq
      wait for all nodes to finish previous rounds:
      \land (Round_{-}(n) > 0 \Rightarrow \forall n2 \in N : Round_{-}(n2) \geq Round_{-}(n))
      wait for all nodes with lower index to leave the round:
      \land \forall n2 \in N : NodeIndex(n2) < NodeIndex(n) \Rightarrow Round_(n2) > Round_(n)
SeqNext \triangleq (\exists self \in N \setminus F : SeqConstraints(self) \land correctNode(self))
                 \lor (\exists self \in F : SeqConstraints(self) \land byzantineNode(self))
SeqSpec \stackrel{\triangle}{=} Init \wedge \Box [SeqNext]_{vars}
 Example assignment of leaders to rounds:
ModLeader(r) \triangleq NodeSeq[(r\%Cardinality(N)) + 1]
 Constraint to stop the model checker:
StateConstraint \triangleq
     LET Max(S) \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \text{ CHOOSE } x \in S : \forall y \in S : y \leq x \text{IN}
           \forall n \in N : Round_{-}(n) \in 0 \dots (Max(R) + 1)
 Some properties we expect to be violated:
Falsy1 \triangleq \neg (
      \land Committed(\langle Leader(1), 1 \rangle)
Falsy2 \triangleq \neg (
      \land Committed(\langle Leader(0), 0 \rangle)
      \land \neg Committed(\langle Leader(1), 1 \rangle)
      \land \neg Committed(\langle Leader(2), 2 \rangle)
```

```
 \land \ Committed(\langle Leader(3), \ 3 \rangle)
```