

This is a specification of the commit-adopt algorithm of Gafni and Losa in the message-adversary model with dynamic participation. The specification is written in PlusCal and TLA+.

The message-adversary model with dynamic participation is like the sleepy model, except that processes never fail; instead, the adversary corrupts their messages. This has the same effect as processes being faulty but is cleaner to model.

Note that, to check this specification with the TLC model-checker, you must first translate the PlusCal algorithm to TLA+ using the TLA toolbox or the TLA+ VSCode extension.

EXTENDS *Naturals*, *FiniteSets*, *Utilities*

CONSTANTS

P the set of processors
 V the set of possible values
 Bot the special value “bottom”, indicating the absence of something
 $Lambda$ the failure notification “lambda”
 $NoCommit$ an indication that a processors didn’t see a unanimous majority in round 1 of the algorithm

ASSUME $Distinct(\langle P, V, \{Bot\}, \{Lambda\}, \{NoCommit\} \rangle)$

--algorithm *CA*{

variables

$input \in [P \rightarrow V]$; the processors’ inputs
 $sent = [p \in P \mapsto Bot]$; messages sent in the current round
 message received by p from q in the current round; Bot means no message received:
 $received = [p \in P \mapsto [q \in P \mapsto Bot]]$;
 $rnd = 1$; the current round (1, 2, or 3); we end at 3 but nothing happens in round 3
 the processors’ outputs (either Bot , $\langle \text{“commit”}, v \rangle$, or $\langle \text{“adopt”}, v \rangle$) for some v
 $output = [p \in P \mapsto Bot]$;

define {

$TypeOkay \triangleq$
 $\wedge input \in [P \rightarrow V]$
 $\wedge sent \in [P \rightarrow V \cup \{Bot, NoCommit\}]$
 $\wedge received \in [P \rightarrow [P \rightarrow V \cup \{Bot, NoCommit, Lambda\}]]$
 $\wedge rnd \in \{1, 2, 3\}$
 $\wedge output \in [P \rightarrow \{Bot\} \cup \{\langle ca, v \rangle : ca \in \{\text{“commit”}, \text{“adopt”}\}, v \in V\}]$

the set of processors from which p received a message (*i.e.* heard of):

$HeardOf(p) \triangleq \{q \in P : received[p][q] \neq Bot\}$

the set of minority subsets of S :

$Minority(S) \triangleq \{M \in SUBSET S : 2 * Cardinality(M) < Cardinality(S)\}$

the number of votes for v that p received:

$VoteCount(p, v) \triangleq Cardinality(\{q \in P : received[p][q] = v\})$

the set of values v for which p received a strict majority of votes:

$VotedByMajority(p) \triangleq \{v \in V : 2 * VoteCount(p, v) > Cardinality(HeardOf(p))\}$

the set containing the value voted for most often, if any, according to p ’s received messages:

$MostVotedFor(p) \triangleq \{v \in V : \forall w \in V \setminus \{v\} : VoteCount(p, v) > VoteCount(p, w)\}$

for technical reasons, we need the program counter of a processor in round r :

$Pc(r) \triangleq \text{CASE } r = 1 \rightarrow \text{"r1"}$

$\square r = 2 \rightarrow \text{"r2"}$

$\square r = 3 \rightarrow \text{"r3"}$

Now we give the two safety properties:

$Agreement \triangleq \forall p, q \in P : output[p] \neq Bot \wedge output[q] \neq Bot \wedge output[p][1] = \text{"commit"}$

$\Rightarrow output[p][2] = output[q][2]$

$Validity \triangleq \forall p \in P : \forall v \in V :$

$pc[p] = \text{"Done"} \wedge (\forall q \in P : input[q] = v) \Rightarrow output[p] = \langle \text{"commit"}, v \rangle$

}

macro *broadcast*(v) {

$sent := [sent \text{ EXCEPT } ![self] = v]$

}

The following macro is used to deliver messages to the processors. It includes message corruptions by the adversary:

macro *deliver_msgs*(*participating*, *corrupted*) {

with ($ByzMsg \in [P \rightarrow [corrupted \rightarrow V \cup \{Bot, Lambda, NoCommit\}]]$) {

we assert the properties of the no-equivocation model:

when $\forall p1, p2 \in P : \forall q \in corrupted :$

$ByzMsg[p1][q] \in V \Rightarrow ByzMsg[p2][q] \in \{ByzMsg[p1][q], Lambda\} ;$

$received := [p \in P \mapsto [q \in P \mapsto$

IF $q \in corrupted$

THEN $ByzMsg[p][q]$ p receives a corrupted message

ELSE IF $q \in participating$

THEN $sent[q]$ p receives what q sent

ELSE $Bot]$ p receives nothing

}

}

Now we give the specification of the algorithm:

fair process ($proc \in P$) {

in round 1, vote for $input[self]$:

r1: $broadcast(input[self]) ;$

r2: **await** $rnd = 2 ;$

if there is a majority for a value v , propose to commit v :

if ($VotedByMajority(self) \neq \{\}$)

with ($v \in VotedByMajority(self)$) the set is a singleton at this point

$broadcast(v)$

else

$broadcast(NoCommit) ;$

r3: **await** $rnd = 3 ;$ in round 3 we just produce an output

if ($VotedByMajority(self) \neq \{\}$) if there is a majority for a value v , commit v :

with ($v \in VotedByMajority(self)$) the set is a singleton at this point

$output[self] := \langle \text{"commit"}, v \rangle$

else if ($MostVotedFor(self) \neq \{\}$) otherwise, adopt a most voted value:

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with (  $v \in \text{MostVotedFor}(\text{self})$  ) there can be multiple values in the set
   $\text{output}[\text{self}] := \langle \text{"adopt"}, v \rangle$ 
else if no value was voted for, adopt input:
   $\text{output}[\text{self}] := \langle \text{"adopt"}, \text{input}[\text{self}] \rangle$ 
}

Below we specify the behavior of the adversary. The no-equivocation model guarantees that if a processor receives  $v$  from  $p$ , then all receive  $v$  or  $\text{Lambda}$ .

fair process (  $\text{adversary} \in \{\text{"adversary"}\}$  ) {
adv: while (  $\text{rnd} < 3$  ) {
  await  $\forall p \in P : \text{pc}[p] = \text{Pc}(\text{rnd} + 1)$ ;
  pick a participating set and a set of corrupted processors:
  with (  $\text{Participating} \in \text{SUBSET } P \setminus \{\{\}\}$  )
  with (  $\text{Corrupted} \in \text{Minority}(\text{Participating})$  )
     $\text{deliver\_msgs}(\text{Participating}, \text{Corrupted})$ ;
     $\text{rnd} := \text{rnd} + 1$ ;
  }
}
}

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Canary invariants that should break (this is to make sure that the specification reaches expected states):

To find a state in which some process outputs:

$\text{Canary1} \triangleq \forall p \in P : \text{output}[p] = \text{Bot}$

To find a state in which some process commits while another adopts:

$\text{Canary2} \triangleq \forall p, q \in P :$
 $\quad \wedge \text{output}[p] \neq \text{Bot}$
 $\quad \wedge \text{output}[q] \neq \text{Bot}$
 $\quad \Rightarrow \neg(\text{output}[p][1] = \text{"commit"} \wedge \text{output}[q][1] = \text{"adopt"})$

To find a state in which two processes adopt different values:

$\text{Canary3} \triangleq \forall p, q \in P :$
 $\quad \wedge \text{output}[p] \neq \text{Bot}$
 $\quad \wedge \text{output}[q] \neq \text{Bot}$
 $\quad \Rightarrow \neg(\text{output}[p][1] = \text{"adopt"} \wedge \text{output}[q][1] = \text{"adopt"} \wedge \text{output}[p][2] \neq \text{output}[q][2])$

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