# ivy-method-in-isabelle

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$^{ m th}_{ m i}$	Safety proof eory PBFT mports Main HOL-Eisbach.Eisbach egin	4
if-	ethod rewrite-funs = (simp (no-asm-use) only: fun-upd-apply[abs-def] fun-eq split-asm)  — rewrites function-update and function equality terms to first-order equality	

## 1 First-Order Abstraction

```
{\bf locale}\ by z\hbox{-} quorums =
  fixes byz-member :: 'n \Rightarrow 'q1 \Rightarrow bool (infix \in_b 50)
    and is-good :: 'n \Rightarrow bool
    and good-member :: 'n \Rightarrow 'q2 \Rightarrow bool \text{ (infix } \in_g 50)
  assumes
    \bigwedge q \ n \ . \ n \in_{g} q \Longrightarrow is \text{-}good \ n
        - good quorums contain only good nodes
    and \bigwedge q1 \ q2 . \exists n . n \in_g q1 \land n \in_g q2
      — good quorums intersect
    and \bigwedge q1 . \exists q2 . \forall n . n \in_q q2 \longrightarrow n \in_b q1
      — every byz quorum contains at least one good quorum
{f locale}\ fol\mbox{-}bft=\ byz\mbox{-}quorums+\ linorder\ less\mbox{-}eq\ less\ {f for}
  less-eq :: r \Rightarrow r \Rightarrow bool (infix \leq 50) and less (infix \leq 50) +
fixes bot :: 'r
  — the special bottom round
begin
```

```
no-notation
```

```
\begin{array}{ll} \textit{ord-class.less-eq (op \leq) and} \\ \textit{ord-class.less-eq ((-/ \leq -) [51, 51] 50) and} \\ \textit{ord-class.less (op <) and} \\ \textit{ord-class.less ((-/ < -) [51, 51] 50) and} \\ \textit{Set.member (op \in) and} \\ \textit{Set.member ((-/ \in -) [51, 51] 50)} \end{array}
```

#### lemma False

```
— checking for inconsistent hypothesis

nitpick[expect=genuine, verbose=true] oops
```

 $\label{lemmas} \begin{subarray}{l} \textbf{lemmas} fol-bft-assms = fol-bft-axioms fol-bft-def \ class.linorder-def \ class.order-def \ class.order-axioms-def \ class.linorder-axioms-def \ byz-quorums-def \ def \ class.order-axioms-def \ def \ class.order-axioms-def \ def \$ 

end

### 2 Abstract PBFT Model

We use propose messages to verify 1b messages as in Lamport's version of PBFT. We do not model pre-prepare messages.

```
context fol-bft
begin
```

#### definition byz-send where

```
— byzantine nodes can do anything but impersonate non-byz nodes byz-send vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round' \equiv \forall n . is\text{-}good \ n \longrightarrow (
vote\text{-}msg' \ n = vote\text{-}msg \ n
\land left\text{-}round' \ n = left\text{-}round \ n
\land joined\text{-}round' \ n = joined\text{-}round \ n
\land proposal' \ n = proposal \ n)
```

#### definition join-round where

```
join-round vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round' n r \equiv r \neq bot \land start-round-msg r \land \neg left-round n r \land (\forall n' r' . left-round' n' r' = ((left-round n' r') \lor (n' = n \land r' < r))) \land joined-round' = joined-round(n := (joined-round n)(r := True)) \land vote-msg' = vote-msg \land proposal' = proposal \land start-round-msg' = start-round-msg
```

#### definition propose where

```
propose vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round' n \neq r \equiv (\forall v . \neg proposal n r v)
```

#### definition vote where

```
vote vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round' n \ q \ r \ v \equiv r \neq bot
\land \neg left-round \ n \ r
\land (\exists \ q \ . \ \forall \ n \ . \ n \in_b \ q \longrightarrow proposal \ n \ r \ v)
\land vote-msg' = vote-msg(n := (vote-msg \ n)(r := (vote-msg \ n \ r)(v := True)))
\land proposal' = proposal \land left-round = left-round' \land joined-round' = joined-round
\land start-round-msg' = start-round-msg'
```

#### definition trans where

trans vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round'  $n \ r \ v \ q \equiv$ 

join-round vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round' nr

 $\lor$  propose vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round'  $n \neq r$ 

 $\lor$  vote vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round'  $n \neq r$  v

 $\lor$  byz-send vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round'

## 3 Auxiliary Invariants and Safety Property

### definition inv1 where

```
 \begin{array}{l} inv1 \ vote\text{-}msg \ proposal \ start\text{-}round\text{-}msg \ left\text{-}round \ joined\text{-}round \ \equiv \forall \ n \ r \ v \ . \\ (\forall \ r' \ . \ is\text{-}good \ n \ \land \ joined\text{-}round \ n \ r \land r' < r \longrightarrow left\text{-}round \ n \ r') \\ \land \ (is\text{-}good \ n \ \land \ vote\text{-}msg \ n \ r \ v \longrightarrow (\exists \ q \ . \ \forall \ n \ . \ n \in_g \ q \longrightarrow proposal \ n \ r \ v)) \\ \land \ (\forall \ v' \ . \ is\text{-}good \ n \ \land \ proposal \ n \ r \ v \ \land proposal \ n \ r \ v' \longrightarrow v = v') \end{array}
```

## definition choosable-inv where

```
choosable-inv vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round \equiv \forall r1 \ r2 \ v1 \ v2 \ n \ . \ r1 < r2 \ \land \ is\text{-good} \ n \ \land \ proposal \ n \ r2 \ v2 \ \land \ v1 \neq v2 \longrightarrow (\forall \ q2 \ . \ \exists \ n2 \ . \ n2 \in_{g} \ q2 \ \land \ left\text{-round} \ n2 \ r1 \ \land \neg \ vote\text{-msg} \ n2 \ r1 \ v1)
```

#### definition safety where

 $safety\ vote-msg\ proposal\ start-round-msg\ left-round\ joined-round\ \equiv$ 

```
\forall r \ r' \ q \ q' \ v \ v' \ . \ (\forall n \ . \ n \in_b q \longrightarrow vote\text{-msg } n \ r \ v) \land (\forall n \ . \ n \in_b q' \longrightarrow vote\text{-msg } n \ r' \ v') \longrightarrow v = v'
```

## 4 Safety proof

#### lemma inv1:

assumes inv1 vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round and trans vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round' n r v q shows inv1 vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round' using assms fol-bft-axioms unfolding trans-def inv1-def byz-send-def join-round-def propose-def vote-def fol-bft-assms apply rewrite-funs apply smt done

#### lemma choosable:

assumes inv1 vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round choosable-inv vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round and trans vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round' n r v q shows choosable-inv vote-msg' proposal' start-round-msg' left-round' joined-round' using assms fol-bft-axioms unfolding trans-def inv1-def byz-send-def join-round-def propose-def vote-def fol-bft-assms choosable-inv-def apply rewrite-funs apply smt done

#### lemma safety:

assumes inv1 vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round and choosable-inv vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round shows safety vote-msg proposal start-round-msg left-round joined-round using assms fol-bft-axioms unfolding safety-def inv1-def choosable-inv-def choosable-inv-def fol-bft-assms apply auto apply metis done

end

end