



# Exchange of Experiences for the Future: Japanese and Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Support Activities in Conflict Zones



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Japanese and Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Support Activities in Conflict Zones*

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Edited by  
**A. Merthan DÜNDAR**



# **Exchange of Experiences for the Future: Japanese and Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Support Activities in Conflict Zones**



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Ankara, 2018

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## **Foreword**

The economic, political and cultural relations between Turkey and Japan continues to strengthen. Even today, lack of any serious conflicts between these two nations during the World wars has a positive effect on bilateral relations. Quite naturally these factors contribute greatly to the cooperation opportunities between Japan, which is located at the eastern corner Asia and Turkey, in the western end.

In the recent years, the most significant collaboration effort between these two countries was on the topic of refugees. Turkey was greatly affected by the war in Iraq and Syria in her southern borders and had shown the utmost devotion in tackling the refugee problem. Despite being abandoned by richer countries, Turkish Republic had been taking on millions of refugees and has been spending billions of dollars to keep them safe and well. Despite numerous hurdles and hardships, Turkey has been using her great deal of experience and knowledge to deal with the refugee crisis.

Turkey's experience on this topic has a historical background. This historical background could be summarized as following: Starting with the second half of the 19th century, Ottoman Empire lost much of her territories and influence in the Balkans and the Caucasus region, which has been under her rule for the last 600 years. In the span of 50 to 60 years, from Balkans (Greece, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia), from Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Moldova even Ukraine and Russia), and from Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Chechnya, Northern Caucasus) nearly 5 million people left their homes to move to Turkey. Almost half of them have died or were killed during this migration.

During the World War I and its aftermath, thousands of refugees mostly from Middle East had come to Turkey. After World War I, thousands of Turks were forced to leave their homes and become refugees in their homelands due to the invasion attempt of Italian, French, English and Greek armies. This situation only came to an end with the complete victory of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk over the invaders and establishment of Turkish Republic. Even then, starting with 1923 (Treaty of Lausanne), thousands of Turkish Muslims living in Greece were moved to Anatolia and even more Christian Turks and people of Greek descent were moved to Greece. In the period up to the World War II, groups of people numbering in thousands had

migrated to Turkey. With the end of the World War II, Uighurs and Kazakh Turks from China (Eastern Turkistan) and Turk-Tatars from Chinese Manchuria, Korea and Japan had migrated to Turkey in groups.

Refugees arriving in Turkey had a considerable increase in numbers after the 1980's; first half a million Turks migrated from Bulgaria, then Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Turkman people running from Afghanistan arrived in Turkey. From the start of the 1990's half a million Kurds, running from Iraq, took refuge in Turkey.

Not counting illegal immigrants coming to Turkey to find work, there are millions of people, Syrians and Iraqis and people from several other countries currently residing in Turkey, either running from war or using Turkey as a stepping stone to move to Europe.

In addition to this, Turkey avails aid to refugees from Afghanistan, Somali, Palestine, Bangladesh and Myanmar. This is the historical background to Turkey's immense experience and knowledge in humanitarian aid. "VEFALI TÜRK GELDİ YİNE" (True-hearted Turk comes again), a common saying in Balkans and Middle East is a good indication of Turkish people's sensibilities and vigorous activities when it comes to humanitarian aid.

Japan, despite not opening her doors to millions of refugees like Turkey and lagging behind Turkey when it comes to material aid, has been very active when it comes to providing humanitarian aid to conflict zones. Japan, having experienced the devastation of the World War II, has been dedicated to regional and global peace. She has been helping refugees of internal conflicts and wars of Southeast Asia, Africa and Middle East and so has become experienced in organization of humanitarian aid. Also, as a country that deals with earthquakes, tsunamis and typhoons in regular intervals, Japan has a great deal of experience when it comes to keeping alive great masses of people that have lost their homes in these disasters.

There is no doubt, that a collaboration and exchange of experiences between these two countries would be paramount. For this purpose, with the contributions of Ankara University Asia-Pacific Research Center (APAM), Japan Foundation, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Embassy of Japan, on 19th February 2018 an international symposium took place titled: **Exchange of Experiences for the Future: Japanese And Turkish Humanitarian Aid & Support Activities in Conflict Zones**. This academic meeting was joined by academicians from Turkey, Japan, Jordan and England, representatives of NGO's and official humanitarian aid bodies and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a great deal of humanitarian aid experience coming from a wide range of countries,

from Uganda to Syria, had been shared with the scientific community and the general public. The presentations have been gathered in a book with the goal of reaching an even wider public.

Ankara University and Japan Foundation are the most important contributors to the symposium and this book. Therefore, I would like to thank them wholeheartedly. I also would like to extend my gratitude to Embassy of Japan in Ankara, for his speech in the symposium H.E. Japanese Ambassador Akio MIYAJIMA and former Japanese Ambassador Hiroshi OKA, for his unending support Rector of Ankara University Prof. Dr. Erkan İBİŞ and Vice Rector of Ankara University Prof. Dr. Ayhan ELMALI, Japanese Embassy First Secretary Chokki HIDETARO and Second Secretary Mariko TSUNOKAKE, Yoshiko OZAWA from JICA Ankara Office, Mr. Akif ATLI from UNHCR, Dr. Mehmet GÜLLÜOĞLU head of AFAD, Mr. Tandoğan NOYAN from Türk KIZILAYI, Ms. Ikuko NATORI and Ms. Takako ODA from AAR Japan, Ms. Reiko INOUE from PARCIC. I would like to thank to all the speakers of the symposium and writers of the chapters of this book, also to Ms. Aysun HARPER from APAM, Mr. Orçun KOÇAK and staff of Ankara University Printing House.

Prof. Dr. A. Merthan DÜNDAR  
Director, Ankara University  
Asia-Pacific Research Center (APAM)



**H. E. AMBASSADOR AKIO MIYAJIMA'S REMARKS  
AT THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM  
EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCES FOR THE FUTURE:  
JAPANESE AND TURKISH HUMANITARIAN AID &  
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES IN CONFLICT ZONES**

**19.02.2018**

Since I heard about the idea of the symposium last year, I have been excited with high expectation and interest. Before my appointment as Ambassador to Turkey last September, I myself had worked on the issues of international conflicts not on the fields but in NY and Tokyo. I worked for 4 years at our Permanent Mission to the UN from 2007 to 2011 including 2 years on the Security Council with Turkish colleagues. From 2015 to 2017 I served as Secretary-General of Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office in Japan, which coordinates Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Until May 2016 for 5 years Japan SDF's military engineers had been dispatched to UNMISS (UN Mission to South Sudan). I went to Juba 4 times and witnessed very difficult political, economic and humanitarian situation in that conflict-torn, fragile country with almost one third of its 12 million people are either IDP or refugees overseas especially to Uganda.

Japan has been active in providing humanitarian assistance globally both bilaterally through JICA and multilaterally through UN agencies, working together with NGOs. Since I came here, I have learned that Turkey has become one of the most important humanitarian assistance provider in the world, No2 next to the US per capita basis according to Turkish colleagues. I am a believer of Turkey-Japan partnership. I sometimes feel we are two nations with one heart. So I am convinced that this Symposium will be very useful and timely in sharing experiences and finding the way forward working together.

Today, I'd like to briefly touch on three points; namely the importance and relevance of human security approach and what and how Japan has been doing in assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey, and emerging new situation surrounding refugees here.

First, the importance of human security is increasing more and more in today's complicated and globalized world as we face such threats as terrorism, disaster and infectious diseases.

These challenges are international and transnational, affecting people directly and are intricately linked to each other. Human security approach Japan has been advocating is emphasizing the following 3 elements: (1) protection of individuals and empowerment as the most important objective; (2) comprehensive response to multiple issues; (3) collaboration among all relevant actors such as national/local government, international organizations, NGOs, civil society etc. Human security approach aims to protect people from critical and pervasive threats to human life, people's livelihoods and dignity, and to enhance human fulfilment. This human security approach is one of the most important pillars of Japan's foreign policy as well as one of the basic principles in our ODA Charter. It has increasingly gained recognition and become main-streamed in international fora. Now let me turn to Japan's efforts to help Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Turkey has been accepting the refugees since the beginning of the Syrian crisis and has become the largest refugee-hosting or recipient country in the world. I would like to express my deepest respect to the Turkish government and institutions for their continuous generous and inclusive support to the refugees.

Japan also attaches the importance to support to improve the humanitarian situation and it has been conducting humanitarian aid to Syria and the neighboring countries. Inside Turkey, Japan has provided about 522 million dollars to support the refugees. Our support is a tailor-made, based on the specific needs of each community, and human-centered, firmly with human security approach in mind. Its assistance is being provided through both multilateral and bilateral channels.

First, Japan has provided about 102 million US dollars to the refugees in Turkey with the cooperation international organizations and NGOs. Vocational training to the refugees, establishment of community center, food assistance, educational support, transportation support and other projects are ongoing. Japan emphasizes support for vulnerable people such as women including widows and children. Now, we are working with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in this area. Last fall I attended the opening ceremony of UN Woman's vocational training center for Syrian women and girls.

Second, Japan, through JICA has been also providing ODA loans up to 420 million dollars for local authorities' infrastructure improvement projects

such as the maintenance of water supply and sewer pipes of the host community accepting huge Syrian refugees. Through empowerment of the host community, we aim to improve the living environment of both Turkish and Syrian refugees in the area. Most local governments we are supporting through ODA loans are close to the Syrian border such as Gaziantep city.

Lastly, I would like to touch on emerging challenges. The Syrian crisis has entered the 8th year. So far they have been treated by Turks as ‘special guests.’ But whether they like it or not, most of them will stay here. More and more Syrian refugees have been migrating to big cities such as Istanbul, Bursa, Ankara, and Izmir for a better life and job. We need to tackle with those urban refugee issues. 2 weeks ago I visited a UNFPA community center in Izmir to support Syrian refugee women in reproductive health area and listen to their plight and difficulties. It is reported on growing frustration among Turks and tension between Turks and refugees, based upon somehow inflated perception of refugees receiving unfair benefits or taking their jobs. They must be frightened if Turks’ voices of ‘go back home’ will become louder. We may not see ‘emergency’ humanitarian situation here but we should pay close attention to this issue of social integration or cohesion as very important and serious challenge for 3.5 million refugees, Turks, and the international community for years to come.

Today, many experts in humanitarian aid and refugees issues all around the world are gathering in this hall. Through good presentations and lively discussion, I sincerely hope that we can find the way forward for our future cooperation in this critically important area.

Let me end my remarks by wishing that the symposium would be truly fruitful.

Thank you for your attention.

## **THE TURKISH RED CRESCENT RELIEF OPERATIONS FOR MIGRANTS: Border Relief Operations**

**Bayram SELVI\***

This paper is reflects of Turkish Red Crescent Powerpoint presentation of Migration Department, at the Ankara University.Syrian Arab Republic has been experiencing internal disturbances since 15 March 2011 in respect of events took place in Arab states due to public demands started in 2010 towards democracy, freedom and human rights. “*Syrian Crisis Humanitarian Relief Operation*” has been launched by the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) on April 29, 2011. Turkish Red Crescent has been providing facilitation since 2012 for the logistics of the cross border operations of all humanitarian actors responding from Turkey to Syria.

### **Country Field Coordination Office Facilities**



**1.429**

*Trucks Facilitated  
Year 2018*

- Planning Item Request,
- Delivery and Procurement,
- Receiving Donation by Contacting with Donors
- Delivery of Received Donations to The Camps Based On Need and Priorities,
- Control of Delegation’s Financial Transaction
- Warehouse Stock.

---

\* TÜRK KIZILAYI



### 14 Border Relief Points

Today, TRC Border Teams are now operational and assisting the cross border operations of humanitarian organizations. 14 Border relief points (Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Mardin) are existing and 5 of them are actively used. Others may periodically open and close.


### The Number of Trucks Distributed for the Years



**40.802**


*Trucks Facilitated*

TRC facilitated on average was 500 trucks of humanitarian assistance per month belonging to 196 NGOs from the beginning but the number of trucks have been increased to 850 in 2016 and in the year 2017 average has reached to 550. In the beginning of 2018 average of trucks crossing is 480.




### KIZILAYKART PROGRAMME

KIZILAYKART, which can be used through all POS machines and ATM's nationwide, is a cash based assistance tool provided to foreigners living in Turkey under International or Temporary Protection.




## IN-CAMP IMPLEMENTATION




## EMERGENCY SOCIAL SAFETY NET (ESSN)







The number of beneficiaries of Kızılaykart ESSN Programme has reached 1,258,489 people (215,618 household) in March 2018:




The upload amount of Kızılaykart ESSN Programme has reached 151.018.680,00 TL in February 2018:




### Eligibility Analysis of the Kızılaykart ESSN Programme Beneficiaries








**Card Distribution Information of Kizilaykart ESSN Programme**

## **CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER FOR EDUCATION (CCTE)**






In the scope of Kızılaykart CCTE Programme, total uploaded payment amount since the start of the program is 101.769.070 TL as of the latest payment period September.



In the scope of Kızılaykart CCTE Programme, total number of regular beneficiaries is 292.924 in the latest payment period. Additional payments were transferred to the KIZILAYKART's for new school terms on September and January.

### Eligibility Analysis of the Kızılaykart CCTE Programme Beneficiaries




### Card Distribution Information of Kızılaykart CCTE Programme

Card Distribution Rate	Total Distributed Cards	Total Undistributed Cards
96%	156.292	6.253


## CALL CENTER

The Turkish Red Crescent has opened a call center for ESSn to solve every arising problem for the best of beneficiaries. The servis has 5 langues Turkish, Arabic, English, Persian and Psahto.



“The Psychosocial Support Programme for Syrian Children in Turkey” carries out its activities within the framework of cooperation agreement signed between the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and UNICEF in May 2013 with the aim of supporting children’s resilience and coping mechanisms and recover from the long-term negative impacts of the conflict as well support integration in their new environment.

TRC and UNICEF have been cooperating to run the PSS programme by TRC youth workers and support of the Syrian youth volunteers, to create protective environments such as Child & Youth Friendly Spaces and where Syrian children can express themselves freely. Through this particular programme, it is aimed to increase the adaptation and social harmonization of school-aged Syrians by enhancing their resilience in the host community.



### RC/RC MOVEMENT COOPERATION PROGRAMME

Red Cross-Red Crescent Movement Cooperation Programme came into force in 25 March 2016, in order to manage and maintain the collaboration with the movement actors such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the stakeholder National Societies as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Within the framework of the Red Cross-Red Crescent Movement Cooperation Programme, projects are developed to find solutions to the problems of foreigners in Turkey. The current projects that Red Crescent-Red Crescent Movement Collaboration Programme is working on are in the following:

#### Supporting Urban Refugees Project

Supporting Urban Refugees Project was carried out with the aim of supporting the Syrians living outside of camps with the financial support of the IFRC. 586,400 people were reached in Ankara, Adana, Bursa, Konya, İzmir and İstanbul and in other cities in need. Within the scope of the project; food items, kitchen sets, hygiene sets and blankets are distributed by TRC staff.

The distribution figures are given below:

<b>SUPPORTING URBAN REFUGEES DISTRIBUTON LIST</b>					
<b>PLACE OF DISTRIBUTION</b>	<b>BLANKET</b>	<b>FOOD PACKAGE</b>	<b>KITCHEN SET</b>	<b>HYGIENE SET</b>	<b>HYGIENE SET (FOR BABIES)</b>
<b>ANKARA</b>	7.555	8.334	3.035	7.369	8.003
<b>ADANA</b>	2.835	4.000	1.921	3.915	2.603
<b>BURSA</b>	13.005	6.500	3.500	6.500	4.500
<b>İZMİR</b>	12.005	5.500	3.000	5.500	5.600
<b>İSTANBUL</b>	6.510	8.600	3.588	8.600	8.600
<b>KONYA</b>	5.000	5.848	2.702	6.819	5.528
<b>MARDİN</b>	3.000	3.000	1.500	3.000	3.000
<b>DİYARBAKIR</b>	1858	1858	929	1858	1858
<b>KAYSERİ</b>	2000	2000	1000	2000	2000
<b>KOCAELİ</b>	2.000	2.000	1.000	2.000	2.000
<b>MUĞLA</b>	1000	1000	500	1000	1000
<b>MANİSA</b>	1000	1000	500	1000	1000
<b>SİVAS</b>	1000	1000	500	1000	1000
<b>KAHRAMANMARAŞ</b>	3.990	1000	2.495	3.990	3.990
<b>GAZİANTEP</b>	7.400	2.000	2.700	7.400	5.400
<b>ŞANLIURFA</b>	6.400	1.600	2.700	6.400	5.400
<b>HATAY</b>	6.400	1.000	2.700	6.400	5.400
<b>KİLİŞ</b>	600	-	300	600	600
<b>KARABÜK</b>	350	-	-	-	-
<b>BATMAN</b>	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
<b>MERSİN</b>	3.010	603	-	-	-
<b>SAMSUN</b>	585	1000	1000	1000	1000
<b>MALATYA</b>	164	500	292	500	-
<b>ORDU</b>	600	120	120	120	0
<b>HAKKÂRİ</b>	1.260	0	0	500	500
<b>KAMPLAR</b>	0	0	0	30.000	30.000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>90.527</b>	<b>59.463</b>	<b>36.982</b>	<b>108.471</b>	<b>99.982</b>

As a continuation of Supporting Urban Refugees Project has started with the support of European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office (ECHO) fund. Items are planned to be distributed through branches. Items details are in the following; Within the scope of the project are planned to be reached 20.000 families in İstanbul, Ankara, Kayseri, Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Konya, Kilis, Kahramanmaraş and Mardin.

### **Community Center Program**

In January 2015, the Community Center Program came into existence with the support of the IFRC to respond to the increasing human needs in line with the population growth in urban areas. There are 15 Community Centers in Turkey [Şanlıurfa, İstanbul (Asian side and European side), Konya, Ankara, Kilis, Bursa, İzmir, Adana and Mersin, Gaziantep, Hatay, Kayseri, Kahramanmaraş and Mardin).The services and activities given at the Community Centers are as follows:



## Ulucanlar Soup

### Kitchen Project

"Ulucanlar Soup Kitchen", which has been providing daily meals to needy people since 1919 within the supervision of the Turkish Red Crescent Ankara Branch in the Ulucanlar area of Ankara, has been restored in 2016 with IFRC financial support to serve foreign residents in the neighborhood.

In addition to the hot food service in the soup kitchen, two meals of hot food are also delivered daily with mobile catering vehicles to the houses of Syrian and Iraqi families, who do not have the opportunity to come to the soup house. Through the mentioned project around 5.000 people are reached per day.



### Ankara Şehit Serhat Önder Child Protection Center



Şehit Serhat Önder Child Protection Center provided services in March 2017, in which activities, workshops, seminars and trainings were organized under various topics to provide psychosocial support with the children in the Child Friendly Space and Youth Friendly Space for 6-18 age group. One of the most important feature of the center is following a need-based education method.

The center also monitors the psychological and developmental processes of the children and the related activities are carried out by professionals.

There is also shuttle service for children.



The center are reached **7.882** children  
as of February 2018.


### Cookery Course

Cookery Course has started in the Ankara Branch of Turkish Red Crescent within the scope of collaboration among Ankara Community Center, Altındağ Public Education Center and Evening Art School. The course consisted Apprentice Cookery Modular Program is 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week. After ending Apprentice Cookery Modular Program to be continued 272 hours, participants will be gained the ability of personal care, preparation of occupation, dishwashing and throwing garbage, choosing sources of nutrients, preparing vegetable garniture, basic stock or essences, boiling soup, preparing the food from egg and simple deserts. After finishing this module, participants will continue with Chef Assistant Modular Program.

### Restoring Family Links (RFL)

The over six-year crisis in Syria has displaced more than 4,8 million people into the neighboring countries and thousands of people have become separated from and/or lost their family members on the migration routes.


Tracing activities for both people who are living in Turkey and want to locate their family members abroad, and people who are living abroad and want to locate their family members in Turkey; family reunification between especially family members who cannot come to Turkey by regular ways from Syria and who have gone to Europe; and Red Cross/Red Crescent message for maintaining family links and preventing the losing contact are needed especially in the irregular migration cases to or throughout Turkey.



### ESSN - Protection Programme Component

Within the cash support applications covered by the ESSN Project, Service Centers has encountered some complaints and problems requiring intervention based on protection, along with the cash transfer. To answer this need, ESSN Protection Programme has been initiated with the support of IFRC in March 2017.

Within this context, complaints and problems has been taken and those are followed and referred by field teams.



### CCTE - Protection Programme Component

TRC and UNICEF have created collective access teams to engage and evaluate a significant proportion of the families in the disadvantaged group who have the necessary conditions to benefit from CCTE (15 in the first stage). These teams will ensure that problems in the field of child protection, including domestic violence, child labor and child marriage are identified and referral to relevant services is provided.

In addition, adults who are encountered in the household visits are taken as cases or redirected to relevant places if necessary.

	♀ Female	♂ Male	⚥♂ Total
 Child	<b>15.674</b>	<b>16.082</b>	<b>31.756</b>

# **THE ROLE OF TURKISH NGOS IN SOCIAL COHESION OF SYRIANS**

**Ermin ÇEBİ\***

## **Introduction**

Anatolia has witnessed huge migration waves from the ancient times that brought thousands of cultural diversities together. However, the modern era brought many casualties to the whole world as happened in these territories. Since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century until the present day, because of the ongoing wars and internal disputes, forced migration became a regular phenomenon in the Ottoman and Modern Turkish Republic. The most important mass migrations to Turkish territories are migrations of 19<sup>th</sup> century, mass migrations after WWI, migrations following the establishment of Turkish Republic and 21<sup>th</sup> century migrations.<sup>1</sup>

Final migration flow created a new agenda for Turkish society. According to data given by 15.06.2017, the number of registered Syrian refugees is 3,049, 879 (İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü). The number fluctuates on a daily basis and there is uncertain number of

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\* IHH

<sup>1</sup> Some examples of prominent migrations such as migration of Albanians who were placed in Arnavutköy in 1468, migration Polonian villages during 19th century upon their annexation by the Russian Empire, migration of Crimeans after the invasion of Russia in 1783, migration of 2.5 milyon Circassions, migration of Azeri people to Anatolia after 1877-1878, migration of Bosnians, Pomaks and other muslim ethnicities. Georgian migrations started during Ottoman-Russian war between 1828-1829 and continued until 1921. After the establishment of Turkish Republic migrations to Anatolia did not stop and Greek Turkish population exchange took place in 1923 and 384 thousand people migrated to Anatolia between 1922 and 1938. Mass migration from Macedonia is another important migratory movement in 1924 and followed by the third wave in 1953. With Turkish-Bulgarian residence agreement in 1925, 218,998 people migrated to Turkey and these migrations continued till 1989. With the occupation of East Turkistan migration from these lands started by 1950s and still continues. Iranian Revolution, invasion of Afghanistan by Russia, Gulf war in 1991 war in Bosnia brought many new migrants to Turkey. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü [http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/hakkimizda\\_308\\_309](http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/hakkimizda_308_309).

unregistered refugees. Whilst most of the refugees have been settled in the southern part and in Istanbul, there are still significant numbers of Syrians who have been dispersed all over Turkish cities.

Despite many concerns, people are still performing at their best to overcome the refugee crisis. Specifically, media outlets impose negative images of refugees and stimulate a sense of refugee occupation. These feelings have been accompanied by violent explosions in many cities. These stirred sense of horror, and intensified tension against refugees. Despite these negative inputs, specifically escalated by the media, the Turkish people are still willing to host the migrants into their territories. According to a study, which has been published in 2015, 30 percent of Turkish people have helped Syrians directly or indirectly (Erdoğan, 2015:180).

NGOs play a big role in overcoming the refugee crisis in two aspects. While they are very active in meeting the refugees' basic needs, they also help them to adapt to the society. Another role of NGOs is their help Turkish society to embrace Syrians.

This paper generally aims to understand the role of civil society in managing smooth transition of refugees' existence in the country, by focusing on some projects and initiations of Turkish NGOs. I have chosen NGOs with easy access. My involvement in an NGO named as İHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation has helped me in observing the process more closely.

### **Methodology**

The study based on survey of the reports, thesis, and articles. The website of Development Workshop (Kalkınma Atölyesi) that collected 233 studies from 2011 till 2016 related to Syrian refugees, helped a lot in reviewing the materials. Additional to written materials, telephone conversations and face-to face interviews have been made for the study.

Visuals of aid and awareness campaigns have been collected via Internet. The campaign discourses also has been included in the study in order to see how the NGOs carries the awareness to the society via campaigns. Finally some educational projects that are the result of social awareness have been chosen.

### **Literature Review**

There is three important works that related to the subject of this study, have been come across during literature review. One report about NGOs activities toward Syrians is a report of a workshop made on 28.05.2014.

Twenty-one NGOs has joined the workshop and the report includes brief information about activities of participant NGOs, the problems they faced, and summary of similar workshop, which took place in Ankara (Mavi Kalem Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği).

Another study with the name “Report on the Activities of NGOs for Syrian Refugees in Turkey, has been prepared on 2013 by İGAMDER (Research Centre on Asylum and Migration). The report is a product of short time duration and introduces the works of some national, international and local NGOs. This report has been prepared with participant observation and semi-structured interviews in three cities as Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Kilis. The aim of this study has been stated as analysing the role of NGOs in solving the problems of Syrian refugees. These cities have been chosen because of their intense Syrian population and the high number of refugee camps (Çorabatır & Hassa, 2013:2)

Among these studies, the largest scale study has been prepared on December 2014 by Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center HUGO with the title “Syrians in Turkey Social Acceptance and Integration Research”. Data has been collected through interviews with Turkish and Syrian interviewees on media and NGOs (Erdoğan, 2014). This study has became a book and been published on February 2015. One section of this study has analysed the situation and the role of NGOs (Erdoğan, February, 2015:165-172).

According to this report while the capacity of NGOs and their approach are different from each other they spend massive effort in the case of Syrian and these efforts contribute the social acceptance enormously. The most active NGOs are the faith-based NGOs working in first aid, whilst human right-based NGOs are more active outside of the region. While there are professional NGOs, there are other NGOs, which are newly established (Erdoğan, February, 2015:213). According to information given in the research, thirty-eight NGOs have been visited and interviewed. Their approaches to social acceptance and cohesion, activities, report, press statements have been reviewed (Erdoğan, February, 2015:104). But the study does not contain these analyses. According to the study more than ninety Syrian NGOs have been established during this process. In terms of the subject of the paper, the other important analyses are about NGOs’ approach concerning temporariness of Syrians and reflection of this idea on the projects and activities (Erdoğan, February, 2015:168). Other important point according to information given by NGOs is the readiness of Syrians for the cohesion, while the hesitation still continues among Turks (Erdoğan, February, 2015:170).

### **Brief Background of the Increasing Importance of NGOs in Turkey in Terms of Their Works Toward Refugees**

Growing role of NGOs in the refugee issue in Turkey starts 1960's. UNHCR and Turkish offices had worked in close contact on asylum seekers who arrived Turkey specifically from former Soviet Union and her surrounding countries to seek asylum in a third country. The intensive years that Turkey received refugees from Middle East and African countries mostly were during 1988, 1989, and 1991 and Turkey prioritized internal security and had not applied non-refoulement policy. From 1996's UN's initiatives and the efforts of Turkish police department had entered a new reform process that had three main focuses as allowing the asylum seekers filing appeals against deportation, initiation of Turkish authorities' cooperation with NGOs and training of bureaucrats on the refugee issue (Kirişçi, 2008:15).

Turkey stood as model country in the process of asylum seeking following years and worked compatible with EU Legislations between 2002-2003. But Turkey could not display further development in the process because of Turkey-EU negotiation process has entered a halt from 2005. Besides, change in regulations on June 2006 has shown negative reflections in implementation procedures toward refugees. With 2006, EU regulations which are defined as building *European Stronghold* implemented strict control on entrance of asylum seekers. This has created tension between Turkey and EU specifically with intensification of war in Iraq, hunger in Somalia and etc. Therefore before Syrian War broke out, ambiguity of the refugee issue had remained with many question marks (Kirişçi, 2008:15).

At the legal level of the problem while the solutions could not be found because of international controversies. The problem was very serious in affecting big amount of people at the humanitarian level. At this point NGOs and civil platforms played very crucial role in helping refugees whose status remained unclear and NGOs carried important initiations to overcome the problems of those years (Kılıç, 2008:29).

While the NGOs played important role in meeting basic needs of refugees such as food, accommodation, education, employment, and etc, they also played a big role in supporting refugees for the judicial support. Especially parallel to the increase in asylum seeking 2006 onward, NGOs activities have been intensified in raising awareness in the protection of refugees. They have organized symposiums on refugee issue and future developments. Main NGOs which were working on these issues were; Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, Amnesty International, The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed -known as MAZLUMDER-,

IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, Human Rights Association İHD, Deniz Feneri, The Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants SGDD (Sığınmacı ve Göçmenlerle Dayanışmga Derneği) The Association for Solidarity with Refugees-Mülteci Der, Human Rights Research Association İHAD, Human Resource Development Foundation.<sup>2</sup>

### **Why is There a Need for Cohesion<sup>3</sup>?**

On January 2016 Pakistani journalist *Javid Siddiqi* gave an interview to a news agency and evaluated the flow of Syrians to Turkey. He identified the similarities that faced both countries dealing with refugee crises. Siddiqi's use of the term *Pakistanization* of the country was used to depict what Turkey can face in the future if long-term refugee policies are not put into place. According to Siddiqi, Pakistan coped well and managed with the refugees for as long as aid arrived from the Muslim world and from international organizations. The economic assistance that has been utilized by Pakistan to manage the Afghan migrants, delayed for almost 30 years from developing social policies that would form a basis for future management (Carpar, 2016). Siddiqi's this comment needs to be considered upon the repatriation of Afghan refugees that stands as a major catastrophe for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the international community.

Pakistan is hosting approximately 3 million Afghans for 30 years. During the 30 years of stay, Afghans had settled their houses, set up their businesses, and even married local people. Nonetheless, by the increasingly devastating attacks in Pakistan following the US invasion of Afghanistan, the country decided to repatriate Afghans. Should this happen it will possibly be considered as the biggest migration of modern history.

What makes this last repatriation crucial that is that it has created a great deal of controversy and hatred among two peoples. While Pakistani people had criticized the Afghans for having created social disorder, their Islamic identities have managed to live together because of their common

<sup>2</sup> For example in 2008 number of NGOs make news release about refugees who lost their life in Tigris, and deportation of Uzbek refugees. They call for an action to the government authorities and tried to get attention of public opinion. They started to work on some specific areas such as Kırklareli Refugee camp, İstanbul Kumkapı Hostel, transit zones in airports to deal with the problems refugees faced. *Mültecilik Sorunlar, Sorunlar Tanıklıklar ve Çözüm Önerileri*, İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı İlmi Seriler Toplantısı 2, Haziran 2009, p.88

<sup>3</sup> Turkish authorities prefer the term “uyum” which is the exact translation of “cohesion” instead of “integration” that associates with assimilation. This study emphasizes the importance of giving highest possible initiative to the civil society see:  
[https://www.academia.edu/11575259/Syrians\\_in\\_Turkey\\_Social\\_Acceptance\\_and\\_Integration\\_Türkiyedeki\\_Suriyeliler\\_Toplumsal\\_Kabul\\_ve\\_Uyum](https://www.academia.edu/11575259/Syrians_in_Turkey_Social_Acceptance_and_Integration_Türkiyedeki_Suriyeliler_Toplumsal_Kabul_ve_Uyum), p.5

cultural background. A similar situation is occurring in Turkey. Although NGOs responded effectively to meet the basic needs of the Syrians, the prolonged war and the ambiguity of the return of refugees require developing policies in order to facilitate a meaningful and cohesive integration of Syrians into Turkish society. A major obstacle to the integration policy is the fact that Turkey has many restrictions and limitation on migrants and refugees because of the excessive influx of people seeking asylum due to prolonged conflicts on its borders. As a result, many migrants and refugees opt to migrate to Europe instead of Turkey, knowing full well that Turkish policies are very restrictive. For the Syrians, the restrictions and limitations pose as a barrier to meaningful integration and an acknowledging of Turkey's generosity because they struggle to identify with the policies of the state.

### Some Samples of Campaigns and Discourses Involved

Relief campaigns are important carriers of messages and serve as tools to accomplish what is being targeted. In fact, there is a need for a professional focus for the campaigns in terms of capability in reaching a wide audience. Scientific measurements of the effects of campaign discourses and visuals in presenting Syrians to the society can yield significant results. Whilst most of the visuals contain of images of women and children, the basic message is to display the vulnerability and disadvantageous conditions of the people. While the "helplessness" mobilizes the public more in raising awareness and assistance, this situation may be coded in the minds that Syrians always "deprived and needy", causing us to ignore the potential of contribution to Turkey. Appreciation of those qualified Syrian population would ease social acceptance and cohesion (Erdoğan, February, 2015:171).



**Figure 1:** Syrian muhajirs are our brothers and sisters

While the Turkish government formalizes some judicial arrangements for Syrians to benefit from governmental services, in the meantime it considers the sensitivity of the issue and this can be observed from official statements. For instance, on 18 January 2013, government officers sent an issue to the governors of 11 cities stating that Syrian *guests* must be provided with health services (Yılmaz, 2013). The usage of the term “guest” is an important indicator as the state’s intention to create a positive attitude in the society about the Syrians even though they are defined by the status of temporary asylum seekers. According to this status, while Syrians cannot have the rights of refugee such as traveling to a third country, they cannot be sent back to Syria unless they themselves give consent or desire to return. The implementation has been applied only to Syrian refugees fleeing from the trauma of a violent and brutal war.

The terminology that have been used for Syrians are as *refugee*, *asylum seeker*, *migrant*, *stateless* and *internally displaced person*. Migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, and guests constitute the terminology used to describe the legal status of Syrians inside Turkey.<sup>4</sup>

When it comes to the general reflections on migration in the society, one additional term has been included in this paper - that is *muhajir*. The term *muhajir* which is an Arabic word from within the Islamic tradition, means a Muslim who migrates from one place to another because of oppressions and tyranny that prevent him/her to practice his/her Islamic way of life (İHH Araştırma ve Yayınlar Birimi, 2009:13). Early usage of *muhajir* goes back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad when the Muslims migrated to another place by giving up their settled life, homes, and business just to follow the principles of Islam as a whole without any confrontation.

*Muhajir* is a word derived from the word *hijrah* that is literally means “to leave a homeland and to migrate another land”. In Islamic literature *hijrah* is being described by the emigration of first Muslims following the pressures from the leaders of Makka. They had migrated from Mecca to Abyssina and later to Medina in 622 AD. Historically, after the Muslims setting their states, the term gained different approach and has been expressed as abandoning what God has forbids (Shoukri, 2011:51-52). After gaining independence of from colonizers, new nation states of Muslims

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<sup>4</sup> According to a research, the percentage of the term *Asylum-seeker* %26, *Migrant* %15, *Syrian* %8, *Refugee* %4, *Guest* %3 in the academic papers. Erdem Selvin, *Göçün Bilimsel Anlatısı: Türkiye ‘Akademiya’sının Suriyeli ‘Mülteciler’ ile İmtihani Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Avrupa Çalışmaları Merkezi Öğrenci Forumu Bülteni*, Mayıs / 2016, p.20, v:5, Dosya: Suriye Krizi, Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye, retrieved from; <https://acmof.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/bc3bc1ten-dosya-5-suriye-krizi3.pdf>

brought different complexities. Modern structure of new Muslim nation states and tendency in secularization created different discussion and different new approaches in some terminologies. Dictator regimes of new Muslim states forced people for different pursuits. These initiatives had met with very harsh oppressions. Hama massacre in 1982, in Syria, is still very alive in the mind of Islamist masses. Therefore some people and NGOs prefer to call the Syrians and other refugees from Muslim communities as *muhajir*.

The argument, for this usage, is to avoid applying a western term with all its connotations on the Syrian people as it projects a sense of statelessness and humiliation. The understanding that these people fled their country because of oppression and because of an assault on their Islamic identity, is a very important determinant in this usage.



**Figure 2:** Humanity do wear mercy! Aid campaign for our Syrian brothers



**Figure 3:** “This is a call for flour relief; Let’s consolidate our being ansar”



**Figure 4:** Syrian Refugees are our brothers!  
Don’t touch my brother!



**Figure 5:** Do not ignore! Let’s look after Syrians who are under difficulties and let’s together heal their wounds



**Figure 6:** “I am freezing, help!” “Winter is cold and freeze but brotherhood of Istanbul warms. Help for our Syrian refugee brothers and sisters”.

In an interview with one of the NGOs representative in Şanlıurfa, which hosts the largest Syrian population in Turkey, the representative expressed that the concept muhajir reminds people the generosity of the ansar who hosted the first Muslims migrants in their homes. For this reason, there may be significant benefits in using such terminologies. The spread of these uses may encourage harmony, compassion, empathy, generosity and compassion in society (Behcet Atilla, personal interview, November 16, 2016).

Ansar means “helper” in Arabic and the word refers the people of Medina who welcomed Muhajirun from Mecca. After the migration spiritual brotherhood had been established between Muhajirun and Ansar by the prophet. Ansar hosted muhajirun as their family members and shared with them their houses, properties. Qur'an defines Islamic brotherhood as “Those who believed, and adopted exile, and fought for the Faith, with their property and their persons, in the cause of Allah, as well as those who gave (them) asylum and aid-these are (all) friends and protectors of another (Al-Anfal 8/72) (Last prophet info, March 3, 2010).



**Figure 7:** Protest about attack and discourses against Syrians

A group of students who visited Syrian camps in the frame of IHH projects, decided to start a project which was named as *Weaving for Brotherhood* (Kardeşlik Örgüsü). The project was launched in October 2013 with the support of IHH. It was announced in the cities and universities and received remarkable support (Nurgül Karagül, personal interview, November 16, 2016). The project was also supported by other NGOs. Handmade sweaters were sent to the refugee camps at the beginning. The cost of materials which have been distributed to volunteers to weave, has been provided by the income from the bookmarks which are prepared by a university student. In the second stage of the project Syrian women were provided with wools and knitting needles to weave sweaters for their children and people. The project received cash donations and this led to the purchasing of first-hand clothes for Syrians who were settled in refugee camps (Kardeşlik Örgüsü, 2013).



**Figure 8:** “The project aims to help a tiny bit our Syrian brothers and sisters who experience the war very painfully, to protect them from freezing colds of the winter and the most importantly to show that we never forget them and we will not allow the world to forget.



**Figure 9:** Weaving for brother!  
We are weaving wael and muffle  
ouryrian brothers/sisters.



**Figure 11:** Announcement is about collecting winter clothes in Üsküdar square between certain hours of the day related too Weaving for Brotherhood.



**Figure 10:** Bookmarks prepared and sold by university students to purchase equipment for weaving



**Figure 12:** About announcement of the event which composes few social formations, in Istanbul Bilgi University

The important detail about the project was that volunteers came together from different ages and even different countries. This has been an important contribution in fostering the idea of the "humanity for all" and for improving the sense of brotherhood and awareness about Syrians.

The project further stimulated individuals to improve some other ideas through social media and resulted forming a platform that collected two trucks of winter clothes (İki Tır Dolusu Kardeşlik Örgüsü , 2013).

### Foundations, Projects, Platforms

While there is a clear division in the society in general about the war in Syria, division has also had a strong impact on the religious and conservative population of Turkey. This has resulted in a stagnation in relief campaigns which are mostly run by faith based NGOs, for a long time. With the intensification of the war, people became aware of the issue and NGOs increased their relief effort, which focused largely on humanitarian aid. While 5 years of drastic war exhausted much of faith based NGOs, many

local and small scale organizations had to stop their projects because of lack finance and staff during this period. However there are NGOs which still persist and continue in their efforts from the first day of war to meet the needs of Syrians.

First aid is being provided mainly by local faith based NGOs in many cities. Human rights organizations focus on reporting the conditions, observing the refugee problem and offering solutions to state or international authorities. International organizations have remained unwilling or incapacitated to resolving the Syrian-refugee's crises (Sivil Düşün, 2013:13).

Faith based NGOs mostly do not have a connection with international foundations such as UNHCR whose activities have been allowed in 2012. However UNCHR has positioned itself very hesitantly and only joined the process for observation and education for the volunteers. By 2014 International NGOs and UNHCR operated some projects, specifically in the field of education. UNICEF cooperated with mostly secular NGOs ((Sivil Düşün, 2013:18-19), which were not active on the ground and reached a limited number of Syrians and had little acted for refugees in the cities (Tuğba Öztürk, personal interview, November 16, 2016).

NGOs generally are not allowed to conduct any relief projects inside the 23 refugee camps all over Turkey. *AFAD Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency* which is the governmental entity takes care of all the processes inside the camps. However, the majority of refugees live outside of the official camps and most of them were not registered. The low levels of registration prevented Syrians from being recognized officially and deprived them from benefiting official facilities. In this regard, refugees outside the camps need aid more. However *Directorate General of Migration Management* has set up a law enforcement as *Foreigners and International Protection* which was published on 11.04.2013 with law no. 6458; *Law on Foreigners and International Protection* which is an assurance for the rights of migrants and international protection seekers. “The legal framework of the rights of migrants and refugees has been brought in line with the international standards”. Directorate General of Migration Management aims to be structured in 81 provinces, 148 districts and outside Turkey. This protection law is considered “as an assurance of the rights of migrants and international protection seekers by basing an effective asylum and migration management on a strong legal ground” (İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü).

While there is significant progress in the field, there is insufficient coordination between NGOs (Tutkun, March 2016 & Erdoğan, February 2015:169-194). Since the catastrophe of the war has escalated, the need for

cooperation between the various NGOs have come into the spotlight in order to initiate a system that would help to disperse relief more effectively and ensure that families are not overlooked.

The platform composition of eleven NGOs and two individuals in Ankara aims to gather all activities and relief organizations to ensure coordination between those NGOs. According to the project organizers Syrians who are living in Ankara will be determined and their addresses will be collected in one particular software program. These families will be supported financially to ensure that they are able to send their children to the schools. Another aim is to determine professions of Syrian society in Ankara for future projects and coordination. Coordination between those NGOs is important in terms of preventing any chaos on the ground, work definition of each NGOs and involvement of civil society in the relief and cohesion process (Tutkun, March 2016 & Erdoğan, February 2015:169-194).

Şanlıurfa branch of IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation founded another humanitarian relief platform which is composed of local NGOs and it has implemented full-scale projects. The platform maintains contact with the governorship, municipality, and with office of religious affairs in the city. Platform functions as bridge between refugees and the various official and non-governmental structures. NGOs platform of Şanlıurfa also initiated cooperation with other cities' and countries' NGOs in conducting relief projects (Sivil Düşün, 2013).



**Figure 13:** Announcement about "Neighborhood talks" with Syrian Youths

There are noteworthy efforts in Şanlıurfa such as weekly meetings of Turkish and Syrian youths in the houses of volunteers or Syrian madrasas in the city. Conversations between the two nations' youth are based on the problems, solutions and projects needed. IHH representative of Şanlıurfa states that during the meetings, Turkish participants introduce themselves by adding names of cities in Syria after their own names and try to make their names sound like Syrians -such as *Behcet Abu Muhammed Shami*- with the aim of honoring their guests. Other activities that contribute to the cohesion of the society, include initiating seminars under the name Ansar and Muhajir, participating in funerals, condolences gatherings and wedding ceremonies of Syrians and meeting the expenses of those events. A noteworthy incident narrated by IHH Şanlıurfa representative is an important example in seeing the importance of aid activities. A boy from Deir-ez-Zor was mistakenly shot by Turkish gendarmerie and Syrian youths in the city were planning to organize a protest. Nonetheless the family of the victim opposed the protests and prevented youths from gaining momentum by explaining the good intention of the local people from whom they received a warm welcome when they arrived the city. This is a very sad and touching story about how people mutually try to overcome many sorrows. IHH offers important services such as assisting individuals to find the families of missing persons in the city and to help them to meet. IHH uses Arabic banners in their activities and programs to indicate their inclusive intentions.

Additionally, refugees are not asked to come to the offices to fetch their aid, rather relief materials are delivered to the homes of refugees to avoid any unintentional harm and disrespect. Women officers of the branches invite Syrian women to help with handmade foods for selling in charity bazaars for Syrians. This environment allows women to socialize and to get to know each other. Turkish students in the faculty of theology teach Turkish to the Syrian students in Syrian madrasas while Syrians teach Arabic to their Turkish friends. Fifty percent of the 14 staff are Syrians. IHH office initiated the foundation of Syrian NGOs in the city and maintain regular contact with the NGOs to generate a close understanding and feeling of togetherness which helps in the relief planning and execution. They support 21 madrasas in the city (Behcet Atilla, personal interview, November 16, 2016).

From the first day of the disputes IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation which was founded in 1995 during Bosnian War, exerted efforts to create an awareness in the society about its' relief projects. It was the first Turkish NGO that provided aid materials and had been transferred to AFAD to be used inside the camps (Sivil Düşün, 2013).

The foundation has spent 820,082,233 TL for Syria relief projects which are categorized under social, food, accommodation and health relief between March 2011-July 2017 (İHH Suriye Faaliyet Raporu, 2017). The foundation has settled specific offices and hired staff only for projects in Syria. İHH is working with 700 composed of staff and volunteers of whom 360 of them are Syrians. The Organization also works with over 100 Turkish and 100 international and 92 Syrian civil structures in conduction projects. Total activities are based on 200.000m<sup>2</sup> open area. Administrative centers, schools, university, storages for materials, bakeries, public kitchens, offices, houses for orphans and widows, social reinforcements have been established on 95.000m<sup>2</sup> (Provided data is limited to December 2016).

Karkamış and four in as Syria as Bab-ul Hava, Bab-us Selam, Türkmenbaşı, Cerablus. In total there are 6 container towns in Siccu, Reyyan, Bab-ul Iman, Shuheda, Bab-u Nur, Öncüpınar, Elbeyli Bab-us Selam. The other four tent camps have been transferred to AFAD. Total 60.000 Syrians are living in those containers. There are 25 tent camps which compose 12.500 tents and 90.000 Syrian, in Yayladağı, in districts of Idlib, Halep, Azez (İHH, December 2016).

While the emergency relief projects are the first agenda of İHH, there are very important long term projects which should be instituted to support the welfare of the people. In the first years of war, when the number of refugees increased in the camps as well as out of the camps, education centers and clinics, have been set up.

Recently there are very impressive projects are under preparation such as the *Children Living Center* which has been built in Reyhanlı, district of Hatay. The center has been designed by professional architects with the aim of providing a warm environment rather than hosting the children and their mothers in the shelters. Almost 990 children who are the victim of ongoing war will be accommodated with their mothers in the complex.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> There are 20 villa-type houses, and 3 clinics, meeting and entertainment buildings, mosque, administrative building, playgrounds, green areas for plantation is taking place. The aim of the project is to take care of the children's physical and spiritual well-being, providing them with accommodation, education, healthcare, food, cloth, counseling for their traumas and protecting them against criminal organizations.



**Figure 14:** Final condition of the project



**Figure 15:** Final condition of the project

Since the beginning of war from 2011, 10.000 trucking rig of food were sent to Syria with the help of countrywide campaigns. 17.400 ton of flour, 7840 dry food 19.790-ton stable food, and 266.190.000 unit of bread sent Syria only during 2015. Beside first aids, there are other important relief activities such as orphan protection and education. 6.450 orphan children are under sponsorship. 11 orphanages have been established inside Syria and 2.940 children are taken care under those orphanages with their mothers (İHH, December 2016).

Over 10.000 orphans receive stationery, rent allowance, psycho-social rehabilitation. 11 schools in Turkey and 18 schools have been established in Syria. 347 schools and 157.000 students who are studying in these schools are supported logistically. The University of Damascus which is composed of four faculties and with the capacity of 1.750 students, started its education in Azez's camps regions (İHH, October 26, 2016). As a result of protocols with the Ministry of Education, students who study in vocational courses can have training certificates. Syrian university students are given scholarships. Reports and workshops on education problems and solutions are being prepared on regular basis (İHH, December 2016).

### Joint Campaigns of NGOs

*I need you* was an important joint campaign which was composed of local NGO's and governmental relief organizations (AFAD, January 22, 2014).

The campaign which was very impressive in the society created awareness and received a huge amount of relief.

Another campaign which was initiated by Turkiye Diyanet Foundation has been named as *Winter came...a bread, a blanket for Syria!*. This campaign has also been supported by many NGO's.



**Figure 16:** Campaign for winter clothes "Make the six missing"



Figure 17: Campaign visual of "I need you"

In the press conference of the campaign, this platform has been described as state, nation, NGO and media cooperation. Head of Religious Affairs Mehmed Görmez expressed the relief as "*mobilization that is not the help for a friend, brother, neighbor, relative; we are as a nation going to save the mankind from being hostage*". He stated that death of a human being in Syria means the death of all humanity" "death of our humanity". He again addressed the common consciences of the Turkish nation which responded earlier from the state and from any other public enterprises. These words are very inclusive and supportive.

His speeches were very detailed and clear about the challenges and difficulties faced by the Syrians and he gave examples of previous campaigns launched by the NGOs. He stated that it did not matter to which faction the Syrians belonged or what ideology they espoused, what mattered was that the nation was being called upon to assist and provide relief. Accordingly therefore, he declared that this was not an issue of Muslims only, this was an issue of all humanity (Suriye için başlatılan... February 25, 2013).



**Figure 18:** Winter came! A bread and a blanket for Syria!



**Figure 19:** Turkish Red Crescent relief truck which is covered with word that “you are not alone”

### **Some Examples of the Educational Project**

Education is an important factor in the healing, cohesion and development of the Syrians. Currently there are 1,395,455 0-18 aged Syrians in Turkey and total number between 5-18 is 1,020,598. The 0-4 years old population is about 374,847 (İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü). While 311.526 Syrian children have a chance to study in temporary education centers and governmental schools since 2012, 523.583 children could not continue their schooling process (Coşkun, İ. & Emin, M. (2016).

#### **1. Zeytin Dalı- Olive Branch**

The project which has been named as “Olive Branch” launched in June 2015, with the cooperation of Muntada AID which is an England-based medical relief organization and AID Alliance of International Doctors. This project aims to promote “response” programs, to diminish risk factors and to develop supporting life factors for Syrian children and women (Project of Olive Branch).

A Moroccan teacher who lived in Syria for 12 years before the war and migrated to Turkey collected a group of children who were selling paper tissues in the streets of Fatih, a district of Istanbul. She organised a class with these students and asked for help from AID regarding class materials. Later the children who were mostly from rural areas of Aleppo were taken for psychological support under AID supervision. The program has been planned for six months of therapy for 36 children. Those who show positive development complete the program while those who need more therapy continue for other six months until the therapist decides positively. Until now there 60 physiotherapies have been completed with 73 children and 80 women (Tuğba Öztürk, personal interview, November 16, 2016). The fourth period of the project was completed between 01.12.2016 and 31.05.2017 with 61 children and 154 women (Project of Olive Branch).

Within this project volunteers are playing an important part in the supervision of professionals. While there are professional therapy programs supported by handmade workshops, playgroups, cultural tours for children, mothers are joining Turkish language courses, needlecraft, calligraphy, marbling art and etc. These activities are considered as part of the treatment process and based on feedback from these activities helped with the healing of both groups’ social relationships. While these efforts are paid for in terms of the refugee children, there are some obstacles psychologists and volunteers face. Syrian women consider therapies as a process which are applied only by mentally disturbed people. Therefore at the beginning they

agreed to send their children and hesitated to meet with psychologists. They considered releasing their sorrows as complaining about their fate and react against God's will. Another pressure on them was their concern about confidentiality. It has taken time for them and for the volunteers to trust each other and to start the rehabilitation process. Another obstacle is their temporariness in Istanbul since Turkey is considered as a transition center.

Therefore the center focused more on making vocational courses for women to be able to stand on their own. Aside from all of these obstacles, there are participations, which are ongoing and increasing on a daily basis. These activities are considered as treatment processes and provide some means of relief and healing but they need a lot of interaction and opportunities to spend more time with each other. Specifically Turkish language courses attracted women participants and directors of centers needed to develop extra backup lists (Project of Olive Branch). In the center there is very meaningful harmony between Syrian and Turkish teachers, translators, even Turkish orphans who took therapies in previous times and are now involved in the process as group sister/brother. The center also provides translators for women and children when they need to go to hospitals, schools or governmental offices. Volunteers in AID also took professional seminars especially from lawyers who are interested in refugee and migration issues in Turkey. They are provided with the information on the rights of refugee, and their access to social services.

While the center dedicates huge efforts to meet the most important needs of those people, it has to deal with the complexity of Syrian society. The director of the center gives interesting information that Syrian society has many factions inside and they had to spend quite a time to overcome serious difficulties of this complexity. While the center hires translators for therapies from Aleppo, a patient who is from Damascus may not feel comfortable with this. While the center directs refugees to other relief organizations, which are funded, by non-Arab refugees of Syria, to receive relief, non-Arab NGOs may not agree in helping Syrian Arabs. Therefore another issue of cohesion among Syrians has emerged as a major concern. AID officers warn about not the mistake of identifying the Syrians as a homogeneous community and has directed that the developing projects must respond to this complexity (Tuğbanur Öztürk, personal interview, November 16, 2016).

## **2. Onun İşi Okumak-Labour of the Child is Education**

The project which was initiated in January 2016 gave birth to the association named as *Children of the Earth* (Yeryüzü Çocukları). This was

an initiation upon hearing the news of a Syrian child named Muhammed Girrez who lives in Istanbul. Muhammed lost his father in Syria and had to work for a livelihood. He stated in the interview that he would like to be a doctor if he could have a chance to study. Many people tried to reach Muhammed to donate his education and support his family. Upon the news about Syrian child labors, Turkish NGOs and civilians initiated projects to reintegrate these children with education (Ertekin, February 3, 2016).

A group of volunteers decided to help these children who are deprived of education because they have to work. While the project received remarkable support from the society, the idea needed to be projected and this led to formation of the foundation of Children of the Earth. The project was named as *Labour of the child is education* (Onun İşi Okumak). The aim of the project is to prevent the children from giving up their studies to earn an income for their families. The first target of the project was Syrian children who are between 6-18 in Istanbul. 96 children have rejoined the schools and 13 families have been provided financial aid to be able to maintain their children's study (Data limited to 2016). The project is also being supported by other NGO's such as IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, ÖNDER Association of Imam Hatip High Schools, Turkish Red Crescent, Zeyd Bin Sabit Association in the context of joint cooperation. Ministry of Education is also involved in the process.

With the help of cooperating foundations children are determined and are settled in official schools. The registration process of these children has been accompanied by volunteers and their study is being supported by additional courses that are basically Turkish language courses. Volunteers have an important role in communication between families and the schools, between children and teachers. There are a certain number of volunteer supervisors for each family of a sponsored child. Volunteers are also in the position to audit the family should they abuse the given scholarship for the child and send him/her back to work. Long term targets of the association is to spread the idea in Turkey and to reach as many refugee children as possible who are forced to work. The association set up a center for children to recover their educational loss and speed up their Turkish language learning process while trying to register the children for the school at the same (Yeryüzü Çocukları).

### **3. Farkındayım Yanıbaşındayım-“I am aware of you, I am with you”**

*The Woman, Family and Youth Center KAGEM* has launched a project to ensure the maintenance of the education of Syrian orphan girls via informal education. Successful students according to their demand will be

supported by transferring them to governmental schools. At the same time Turkiye Diyanet Foundation provided informal Qur'anic and religious education in the mosques. The main target of the project is girls who are between 10-25 years. The pilot scheme was planned for Ankara and 150 girls have been chosen for the project in the beginning. Syrian girls who are living in Ankara are provided transportation during weekends to go their homes during their participation in this project. Social and cultural activities are being planned for those girls to improve their social and psychological developments (Suriyeli Yetim Kızlara Eğitim Desteği, 2015)

The campaign, named as *Farkındayım Yani Başındayım - I am aware of you I am with you* has been run in Ankara, Gaziantep, and Şanlıurfa. The Ministry of Education assigned 17 schools in which 12.978 benefited. In the website of the project launch it is stated that the values of the brotherhood of Ansar and Muhajir was the fundamental principle in launching the project. The aim of this approach has been explained as a tool to educate “our young brothers and sisters who take refuge in our country, hold their hand and launch projects that will allow them to meet knowledge and learning” (Farkındayım Yanıbaşındayım).



**Figure 20:** Do you want to be involved by Ansar



**Figure 21:** Humanity do wear mercy! Relief Campaign for our Syrian brothers and sisters.

### Conclusion

Civil Society in modern conceptualization- has a strong base as an extension of religious motivation and a long history of *Waqf* tradition in Turkey. Turkish society has had to confront tough and severe repressive systems and institutional policies that attempted to erase their Islamic identity. This process strengthened the people's awareness of social and educational services which were first initiated by building thousands of mosques and supporting the religious educational process by building Islamic High Schools, hostels for students, Qur'anic teaching centers etc. all over the country. The struggle of existence and identity is reflected in the foundation of most NGOs, which contribute the largest part to social welfare work today.

The war in Syria depolarized Turkish society, which is a reflection of Syrian deterioration. While NGOs had to struggle with this situation, the ongoing war economically exhausted many small scale Turkish NGOs. The Government agencies and some NGOs have persisted providing relief to Syrians whilst Turkey is holding more than 3 million refugees as the war continues and expands on its borders. The 15 July Coup shocked the country and Turkey entered another very critical period in its existence which

drastically shook up many institutions. The effect of the coup still lingers. The war in Syria is playing out across the borders as well as inside Turkey due to the attacks by ISIS. The battle with the PKK has also caused many internal displacements plus the displacement of the Syrians.

Remarkable efforts by Turkey with her civil society which includes NGOs, platforms, schools, municipalities, semi-governmental agencies and individuals are being made and are very important in repulsing countless dangers. But there is a lot more to do for the future due to the uncertainty and escalating conflict on the ground.

NGOs, which represent the concrete form of civil society, meet the humanitarian needs for a social cohesion process. However other elements such as education, language, protection of Syrian identity and Turkish identity stand as important essentials of the cohesion. Many Syrians have been settled in cities, started their business, or have been employed, and many of them register in schools. The local people encounter Syrians everywhere. Turkey needs to transform this situation to its advantage, which will help both the people (Syrians and Turks). The NGOs are playing a critical role in this episode of Turkey's history of Waqf and generosity of Ansar and Muhajir relations. There is a need to improve long-term strategies as a matter of urgency even as the primary forms of humanitarian aid, which are necessary, continue.

This paper aimed to present some of the works that are implemented by NGOs by showing their vitality in preventing social chaos in our country, which is encountering significant challenges and efforts to destabilize the nature and essence of the Turkish society. While NGOs have many drawbacks and can be weak in professional approaches to the conditions they find themselves in, their practical experiences should be considered in the development of policies and plans by the state and by the academic world as well. As a community of the history of the Waqf, we must reflect on these experiences if we are to engage in bigger discussions about cohesion, brotherhood and Islamic spirit. Finally, we must pay attention to the internal dynamics of communities and how we label their experiences if we are truly committed to the work of serving humanity.

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## **CAN SOUTH SUDANESE REFUGEES BE A HOPE FOR UGANDA? :**

### **Uganda's Refugee Assistance Strategy and AAR Japan's Attempt to Foster Solidarity and Friendship among Children in Bidibidi Refugee Settlement**

**Ikuko NATORI\***

#### **Introduction**

The global population of forcibly displaced persons has grown substantially over the past two decades, from 33.9 million in 1997 to 65.6 million in 2016 (UNHCR, 2016). Forcibly displaced persons, by UNHCR definition, include refugees, internally displaced persons<sup>1</sup> and asylum seekers<sup>2</sup>. Out of the 65.6 million, 22.5 million are refugees. On African continent, Uganda hosts over 1.4 million refugees as of February 2018, which ranks as fifth largest refugee population in the world, and the largest among African countries.

Association for Aid and Relief, Japan (AAR Japan), is an international NGO engaged in refugee assistance since its establishment in 1979 with its headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. Responding to the sudden and massive influx of refugees from South Sudan to northern Uganda in July 2016, AAR Japan entered West Nile region of Uganda to conduct a rapid needs assessment for refugees the following month. In September 2016, AAR Japan started its emergency response in one of the refugee settlement areas. As of February 2018, AAR Japan is delivering assistance to schools and implementing a project to foster solidarity and friendship among children in Bidibidi refugee settlement, one of the newly-opened refugee settlements established by the government of Uganda in cooperation with UNHCR.

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<sup>1</sup> Internally displaced persons refer to those who were forced to leave their homes but within the country.

<sup>2</sup> Asylum-seekers are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined.

### **From Segregation to Integration: Refugee Assistance Strategy in Uganda**

Having a history of receiving some 10,000 refugees from Poland during the Second World War, Uganda has been opening its doors to refugees. Those who ran away from dreadful armed conflicts and political turbulence of neighboring countries found asylum in Uganda. Even before the sudden and massive influx of refugees from South Sudan starting in July 2016, Uganda was already home to some 500,000 refugees from Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and others.

#### **Uganda's Local Settlement Policy**

Uganda's refugee assistance is characterized by its local settlement policy. Unlike other African countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, where refugees are confined into refugee camps, the government of Uganda allocates land to refugees for shelter and agricultural use. This allocation of land to refugees has been practiced till today in Uganda with positive increase in food production witnessed, having enabled to phase out food ration distribution from a number of settlements (OPM, 2004:9).

#### **Control of Alien Refugee Act : CARA of 1960**

On the other hand, separation of refugees from its host communities was another element of refugee policy in Uganda till the 2000's. Under CARA (Control of Alien Refugee Act) of 1960, the only law in Uganda regarding refugees till the introduction of Refugees Act 2016, refugees were not allowed to go outside of the settlement areas without permission, nor allowed to seek employment freely. Moreover, refugee settlements were mostly located in remote areas, further separating refugees from towns as well as from host communities, as it was often not financially durable for refugees with limited cash income to visit host towns (Murahashi, 2017:170). It was only after the introduction of the Refugees Act 2006 that refugees were entitled to travel document and to free movement in Uganda.

Refugees and host communities were segregated through administration structure as well. Refugee affairs were treated directly under the control of Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) through Refugee Welfare Council (RWC), by-passing the existing Local Councils. Local Council was under the jurisdiction of the district governor. Therefore, the voices of refugees did not reach the governor, but reached only RWC (Murahashi, 2017:169-170). Services were delivered separately as well. For example, health services for refugees were provided by those NGOs as Implementation Partners of

UNHCR in refugee settlements, while local residents and self-settled refugees went to health centers ran by District Health Services (Sugiki, 2007:52). There were not much chances for refugees and host community members to mingle and communicate with each other (Murahashi, 2017: 170).

### **The Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugee in Africa: ICARA II (1984)**

The idea of bridging refugee assistance with development of hosting areas was introduced for the first time in 1984 during the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa: ICARA II, to solve the problem of heavy burden of protracted refugees on hosting countries (Murahashi, 2017:171). The resolution A/RES/39/139 adopted by the UN General Assembly emphasized the “vital importance of the complementarity of refugees aid and development assistance”. The followings are excerpts from the resolution;

“Gravely concerned at the persistent and serious problem of large numbers of refugees on the African continent,”

“Aware of the economic and social burden borne by African countries of asylum on account of the presence of these refugees and its consequences for the national development and of the heavy sacrifices made by them, despite their limited resources,”

“Emphasized the vital importance of the complementarity of refugees aid and development assistance and of achieving durable solutions to the problems of refugees in Africa through the voluntary repatriation or local integration of refugees and the necessity of providing assistance for the strengthening of the social and economic infrastructures of African countries receiving refugees and returnees;

### **SRS (1999), DAR (2004) and ReHoPE (2016): Integration of Refugees into National Development Plan**

Further promoting the synergy of refugee assistance and development of the hosting areas, the government of Uganda launched the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) in 1999. SRS aimed at empowering not only refugees, but also nationals, to be self-sufficient. Integrating services for the refugees with those of the nationals was another goal of SRS. In 2004, Development Assistance for Refugee Hosting Areas (DAR) was introduced, building upon the achievements and challenges of SRS.

In 2016, Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) Strategic Framework was introduced, focusing on districts and communities that host refugees, with investments meant to benefit both the host and refugee communities. ReHoPE is also a framework that supports the Government of Uganda's decision to include refugee management and protection within the National Development Plan II (NDPII, 2015/16 – 2019/20)

### **Bidibidi Settlement: the Influx of South Sudanese Refugees**

Bidibidi settlement was established in August 2016 to respond to the influx of South Sudanese refugees into Northern Uganda. This massive influx of refugees (approximately 2,000 per-day) was triggered by the eruption of armed conflicts involving heavy weapons in Juba, the capital city of South Sudan in mid-July. In four month after its opening, Bidibidi settlement was already filled up with more than 250,000 refugees, majority of which fled from the southern part of South Sudan.

Upon arrival, refugees register themselves at the Reception Center by registering their finger print, and receive refugee family attestation certificate and blue registration card. This blue card is required to receive food ration from World Food Program. The food ration consists of corn, beans, corn soya products (CSB), cooking oil and salt. Floor mat and blanket are provided and refugees stay at the Reception Center for some days.

Registered refugees are given a land of 30 meter by 30 meter, as well as so-called “start-kit”, which consists of small water container, basin, cooking pot, vinyl sheet for roofing, floor mat, mosquito net, rope, blanket, solar light, and farming tools. Then they are expected to build their houses and make their lives by farming, livestock raising, petty trade at the local market, etc.

### **Refugee Children: Communication Barriers and Mistrust**

Bidibidi consists of 5 zones. Sixty-four percent of the refugees are children under 18, and they come from various ethnic groups, such as Madi, Pari, Lotuko, Acholi, Dinka, Nuer and Kakwa among others. Each ethnic group has its own language, meaning that English that they learn at school and probably Juba Arabic<sup>3</sup> are the only common languages for communication among South Sudanese children, at least for those who speak such languages. Literacy rates of girls and boys of South Sudan are as low as 40% and 60% respectively<sup>4</sup>, making English communication with Ugandan children also quite difficult for many Sudanese children.

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<sup>3</sup> Juba Arabic is spoken in Equatoria region, which spreads across southern part of South Sudan.

<sup>4</sup> GESS website (<http://girlesseducationssouthsudan.org/south-sudan-education-statistics/>)

A series of interviews with refugee children that AAR Japan conducted since August 2016 found that many of them were stressed with trauma from war experience, such as witnessing the killing of their family members or villagers of their home villages. A girl that I met in December 2016 told me that she had trouble sleeping at night.

Host community of Zone 5 area did not have any primary school nearby even before the zone opened. Therefore, around 600 Ugandan children of the host communities of Zone 5 joined Yangani primary school that AAR Japan had built for some 5,000 refugee children who registered to study at the school. Groupings per each ethnic group and fights among them have been witnessed in schools<sup>5</sup>.

To create more peaceful learning environment and foster peaceful coexistence among children, AAR Japan launched two activities. One was the teachers' training on classroom management, and the other was football tournament event.

### **AAR Japan's Attempt to Foster Solidarity and Friendship Among Children of Settlement Areas**

The teachers' training covers such topics as child protection, basic psychosocial care, classroom management with discipline, cross-cultural understanding and life skill education.

Football tournament was joined by a total of 224 refugee children and children of host communities, coming from 12 schools. After the event, interviews were conducted to 96 children out of the 224 who participated in the event. Ninety children, or 94% of those interviewed, answered that they felt much closer to the children of different ethnic groups. Children of host communities answered that they started recognizing refugee children by their names, instead of seeing them just as refugees. Some children stated that they felt stronger sense of solidarity and friendship.

### **The Way Forward**

As of February 2018, there are 1,053,598 South Sudanese refugees in Uganda<sup>6</sup>. The prospect of returning to South Sudan is dim, at least in the near future due to ongoing political turmoil, destructed infrastructure and extremely unstable security environment. Challenges are still mounting, such

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<sup>5</sup> Reports from expatriates of AAR Japan stationed in Yumbe (near Bidibidi settlement), May 2017.

<sup>6</sup> According to The Republic of Uganda and UNHCR (<https://ugandarefugee.org>)

as how to make all refugees to be self-sufficient, or how to secure enough resources to maintain those education and health facilities, and water supply and road infrastructures that were built in the settlement areas.

Moreover, mistrust among refugees or between refugees and host community members is quite dangerous as it can lead to the destabilization of the settlement areas. Without doubt, peace and stability are primary conditions for the settlement areas to become economically viable, as well as ReHoPE strategy to succeed. AAR Japan's attempts to generate solidarity and friendship in the settlement areas is still in its initial stage, and trust building always takes time even in much less complicated environment. Long-term commitment of the government of Uganda as well as of relief and development actors, stable funding, and continuous evaluation and analysis of assistance efforts are indispensable for the South Sudanese refugees to be a hope for development, peace and stability of northern Uganda.

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# **RELIEF WORKS AND CHALLENGES: OBSERVATIONS AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES IN THE ACEH CASE**

**Mehmet ÖZAY\***

## **1. Introduction**

Aceh, a province of the Republic of Indonesia, is remembered as the most devastated region during the earthquake and tsunami that occurred on December 24, 2004. This region witnessed not only the greatest casualties, in both tangible and intangible forms, but also the most relief work in an area covering almost 800 km. coastal region (Masyrafah; McKeon 2008, 1; Athukorala 2012).<sup>1</sup>

As mentioned in various reports and also based on the writer's own witnessing, hundreds of national and international relief organizations took part in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process in Aceh and some of them continued their work over a relatively longer period. The extension of aid organizations was based on the planning and guidance of the national reconstruction and rehabilitation agency (*Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi-BRR*) for various projects in the region. The disaster not only caused a huge number of human casualties, but also had a "pronounced effect" on the socio-economic activities in major cities of the province.<sup>2</sup>

The article is arranged basically in two major sections. The main purpose of this paper is to provide some reflections of the relief work process conducted by some relevant Turkish agencies during the post-tsunami phase in Aceh pertaining to relief work and reconstruction, in

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<sup>1</sup> "Economic and Social Conditions in Aceh". p. 5.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/226271-116833550999/APEAfinal-3.pdf>. (Retrieved, on 14 March 2018).

<sup>2</sup> *Aceh and Nias: Two Years After the Tsunami*, 2006 Progress Report, BRR and Partners, December, p. 7, 10. (Retrieved, on 4 February 2018).

particular.<sup>3</sup> I would like to take up and explore some issues alongside personal observation of relief works carried out in a few areas exposed to natural disasters. Besides that, my personal encounters with individuals within various sectors of Acehnese society were no doubt significant opportunities for me to transmit their unheard opinions to some or larger extent. And what makes this paper more relevant even after years of the tsunami is that negative perception of the Acehnese society towards the overall socio-economic development in the province has been pervasive.

This will be followed briefly with how national (Indonesian government) and some international agencies, such as the UN and ASEAN, attempted to reorganize the disaster management process on the basis of lessons taken from the Aceh example. Then there will be a discussion of the institutionalization attempts of disaster management, in particular by ASEAN which, though initiated in the early decades of its establishment, was stimulated to act accordingly after the experiences of various disasters, in particular the tsunami recovery process in Aceh in 2004.

It is asserted that the analytical approach to relief work efforts will have some constructive impacts on this sector. No doubt that the idea of restructuring relief works conducted in any disasters at the initial stage and sustainable developmental projects during later stages is still relevant. Since learning lessons from the previous disaster management conditions are not satisfying (Athukorala 2012), it is hoped that this initial paper would contribute to ideas of improvement of relevant relief agencies' capacities to reach an optimum goal in their works. It is also aimed to augment the literature for the benefit of stakeholders playing enormous roles in this field.

## 2. Disasters and Relief Work

Disasters, either emerging naturally or happening as consequences of intended and/or unintended actions of human beings, cause drastic changes in nature and human life. In particular, natural disasters have drastic consequences on the poor or most vulnerable sectors of societies in less developed or developing countries and regions (Jensen 2010, xi).

Amongst others, it can be asserted here that the most deadly natural disasters are tsunamis, typhoons, cyclones, and earthquakes that periodically appear in the Asia-Pacific region. All these sorts of natural disasters make the Asia-Pacific region the most natural disaster-prone region in the world

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<sup>3</sup> Mehmet Özay. (2005). "Tsunami acısı dinmedi". *Yenisafak Gazetesi*, 25 Aralik 2005. <https://www.yenisafak.com/arsiv/2005/aralik/25/d02.html>.

(Jha; Stanton-Geddes 2013, 13-4).<sup>4</sup> Among the countries in this region, Indonesia has, no doubt, a uniquely high vulnerability since it is in the junction of three continents (Bildan 2003, 27-8).

On the other hand, disasters caused by human negligence or intent such as explosions, wars, forest fires, and even floods as witnessed in the region similarly affect the lives of human beings and natural environment (Chan 2012, 503).<sup>5</sup> Although there are some disputes globally upon whether floods and famines are natural or human made,<sup>6</sup> there can be no doubt that they also have considerable impact on the environment and human life.

Tackling such types of disasters is very significant and these processes must be taken into consideration with effective approaches by relief organizations. In addition, the number of people who live in disaster-prone areas has increased to almost one third of the world population. What makes this issue more important is the increase in the number of disasters in the recent decades. As mentioned by some experts, there has been a total of over 1200 ‘reported disasters’ since the 1970s until the mid 2000s (Fisher 2007, 115).

The emergence of vulnerability is clearly observed in both human and physical environments. Hence, no doubt, “grave consequences” are very relevant for the poor who are lack of any significant economic support, instead bound totally their own basic livelihoods as observed in similar geographies.<sup>7</sup> Life casualties during these situations, such as destruction of residential housing areas and other various infrastructures, necessitate relief works in order to rehabilitate human and social life and reconstruct the material environment.

The phenomenon of relief or aid works to vulnerable people is the product of a feeling of solidarity that emerges during expected and unexpected natural and man-made disasters. Relief work, conducted in the very initial stage just after the disaster, is crucial because of the urgency of the situation. While the efforts during this phase nevertheless play a primary

<sup>4</sup> “Foreword”, *ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management*, p. 1. (Retrieved, on 29 January 2018).

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.disaster-survival-resources.com/man-made-disasters.html>. (Retrieved, on 28 January 2018).

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/the-world-s-worst-natural-disasters-1.743208>. (Retrieved, on 28 January 2018).

<sup>7</sup> “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters”, p. 1. [www.unisdr.org/wcdr](http://www.unisdr.org/wcdr). (Retrieved, on 11 February 2018).

role to save people's lives in particular, the later stages of re-construction of tangible and intangible aspects of a society exposed to disaster should be taken into consideration.

Though national and international relief organizations put considerable efforts into practice in order to recover the relevant society by targeting to "build back better" and help the latter return to its normal life, they encounter various challenges during preparation and implementation of their relevant projects in the field. These challenges can be classified as tangible and intangible aspects (Athukorala 2012).<sup>8</sup>

In this regard, relief organizations have particular priorities and direct their efforts so as to reach the victims, who are physically affected by the disaster, to supply their biological needs and demands such as food and nutrition, water and sanitation, shelter etc. which lead them to be able to continue their accustomed daily life in the relatively short term. This initial stage has a function, to a certain degree, to prepare the victims for their daily routine activities without bound to much external assistance. On the other hand, as mentioned in various reports by international bodies and academic papers, the economic recovery process is also crucial, in particular, for societies which are experiencing poor economic development, armed conflicts etc. (Jensen 2010, xi).

### **3. From Emergency Aid to Developmental Issues**

Turkish agencies reached Aceh province, among other relief agencies, in the earlier stage of the tsunami disaster. The agencies initiated their field works once observation and evaluation processes, and having contacts with some institutions had been conducted. Thus, Turkish relief organizations focused on distribution of emergency aid kits including food, cleaning and hygiene materials, etc., which are also named as the prime needs, to the displacement camps (Athukorala 2012). The organizations then commenced building semi-permanent accommodation in various sub-districts of the province, such as Aceh Besar, Lamno in western coast, and participated in removing and cleaning debris in Banda Aceh, the capital city. These efforts seemed to be fundamentally necessary given the nature of the initial stage of the disaster.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> "Economic and Social Conditions in Aceh". p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Mehmet Özay. (2009). "Tsunami kurbanları aniliyor", *Timeturk*, 26.12.2009.

<https://www.timeturk.com/tr/2009/12/26/tsunami-kurbanlari-aniliyor.html>;

Mike Corder. (2005). "Tsunami survivors thankful for aid", 10 April.

<http://articles.latimes.com/2005/apr/10/news/adfg-aid10> (Retrieved, on 11 February 2018);

Here I should emphasize the “Bitai phenomenon” because of the housing project near the city center of the capital city. Kampung Bitai (*Bait al-Makdis*), known as the “Turkish village” (Djajadiningsrat 1934, 202), almost two kilometers from the historical mosque of Baiturrahman, was rebuilt by the Turkish Red Crescent from zero ground following the decisive order of R. T. Erdoğan, then Prime Minister of Turkey, during his visit Banda Aceh in February 2005.<sup>10</sup> I call it a “phenomenon” because it was appreciated by the Acehnese, from village people to the local governor, due to it being regarded as one of the highest quality housing projects. And it was a crucial step since “the quality of reconstruction is also considered to be generally consistent with the build back better norm” (Athukorala 2012).

On the other hand, not only the basic infrastructure projects but also developmental projects, by which I mean “community empowerment projects”, though initiated to some extent, are observed to have been left behind in this process.<sup>11</sup> As observed in a larger coastal area, including the regions Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, and West Aceh, survivors of the households did not have any significant access mechanism to sustainable financial services. And though the overall economic loss in the province caused by the tsunami was around 4.5 billion US Dollars, and the loss of productive sectors such as fisheries, farming and manufacturing 1.2 billion US Dollars, it is difficult to find out an exact figure about economic loss of the households pertaining to their sustainable production system (Athukorala 2012).<sup>12</sup>

The residents of this region lost not only their houses and but also their basic means of economic production, such as agricultural and gardening fields, animal husbandry, fishing boats etc. which meant fundamental economic subsistence mechanisms. Beyond this, the tsunami caused enormous damage to the soil, river basins, and generally all coastal areas that were definitely of fundamental importance for the people’s economic activity. Though it is argued that the some institutions enhanced economic recovery programs, there were significant weaknesses and dysfunctions even years after the tsunami (Masyrafah; McKeon 2008, 3).

<sup>10</sup> Annual Report, 2006, “Turkey”, 4 May, p. 4. <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/annual05/05AA070annual.pdf>. (Retrieved, on 11 February 2018).

<sup>11</sup> “Başbakan Erdoğan felaket bölgesinde”, 06.02.2005, *Hürriyet*. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-erdogan-felaket-bolgesinde-294516>. (Retrieved, on 14 March 2018).

<sup>12</sup> Mehmet Özay. (2015). “Açe’de kına yakmak veya Açe’ye kına yakmak”. <http://guneydoguasyacalismalari.blogspot.com.tr/search?q=tsunami>

<sup>12</sup> “Economic and Social Conditions in Aceh”. p. 5.

But the issue of developmental projects cannot be underestimated in the emergency aid process. These projects are regarded to be relevant with providing economic recovery as well. Instead, both emergency aid and economic recovery are held in a successive way in order to revive pre-disaster community life in order to lead to a betterment of the socio-economic, including cultural life, observed in the pre-disaster era. It is rightly argued that, there was a significant gap between relief operations and developmental initiatives, as mentioned for other cases as well.<sup>13</sup> And this situation was significantly observed in Aceh as well. Though there were some hope about the economic future of the province after the tsunami,<sup>14</sup> negative perception is still widespread among the Acehnese.

As it is understood in some research papers and observed first hand by the present writer, this gap is caused not by the nature of the things, but instead by focusing on first emergency aid and lacking consideration and planning for longer term developmental projects in disaster-prone regions.

In this context, the importance of developmental projects pertaining to improving the vulnerable sector to make it self-sufficient in economic production is undeniable. Self-sustainability of people in particular are significant since,

- the poor are the ones experiencing direct and longer term economic losses.
- developing countries, such as Indonesia have relatively less effective social support systems for the vulnerable sector of the society, or no support systems at all.
- completing the emergency relief work will not allow the poor to sustain their own living.
- rural areas are comparatively more prone to losses and “the vulnerability of rural livelihoods” is higher owing to the latter’s exposure to direct interaction with the environment (Jensen 2010, 14).

This is very relevant to the Indonesian context, since the peoples’ vulnerability, in particular the rural sector of the population, is higher (Bildan 2003, 28). This gap should be taken into consideration by the relevant stakeholders including regional governments and international relief organizations. To find out a practical solution to this problem, the latter

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<sup>13</sup> <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/challenges-in-the-humanitarian-field-the-big-picture/>.  
(Retrieved, on 30 January 2018).

<sup>14</sup> “Economic and Social Conditions in Aceh”. p. 6.

should diversify their funds and collaborate with some professional bodies that are assumed to be experts in micro-credit programmes to enhance the capacity and capability of the vulnerable. As observed in the villages around Aceh Besar, adjunct region to Banda Aceh, capital city of Aceh Province, rural people involved in a variety of types of production systems including copra, coconut oil, gardening, poultry, small scale animal farming, forestry etc. These people could have been led to continue their economic activities with relatively small amounts of capital; improving their skills and approaches under basic guidance of experts. It is right to emphasize at least some key points, as follows, so as to give some understanding that is assumed to be helpful to cause this mentioned gap:

- the restrictions of aid organizations themselves in particular operational areas
- lack of knowledge and information about socio-economic realities of the disaster-prone areas
- underestimation of the potentialities of the local economic values and infrastructure
- considering the overall modernization process leads to discourage GOs and NGOs to initiate their programs.

Instead of these restrictions, the relevant agencies can merge their aid operations with developmental projects by some minor changes and upgrades to their operational mechanisms. Since, at least some aid organizations have enough capacity to collect huge resources, what they need is to divert their projections by recruiting professionals for developmental initiatives on the basis of the realities of local communities.

As an alternative, aid organizations should try to find alternative ways to be able to collaborate with developmental agencies either from the same country or the others which have some common understanding, vision and mission, from the early stages of their operations. In particular, the planning stages could be beneficial to save material and human resources and accordingly lead the adaptation of the people into a new developmental environment.

The benefits of this merging the power and facilities of two organizations operating in distinct areas will be as follow:

- saving material and human resources,
- using time accordingly for the recovery of the victims in a short period,

- initiating programs with the active participation of the local individuals, cooperation etc.
- considering the local experiences and values for facilitating all exist.

In regard to this, relief organizations need to adopt a new collaborative and innovative approach with local institutions to enhance socio-economic conditions of the disaster-resilient region (Athukorala 2012).

NGOs can collaborate with some other key stakeholders such as construction, farming, planting, fishery, and forestry companies just after the former have completed their emergency aid programs for the needy people. This collaboration is assumed to facilitate the direct involvement of the mentioned companies by the guidance of NGOs that possess practical approaches, knowledge, and communication mechanisms needed for reaching the vulnerable sector of the society.

The importance of this issue is based on the size of destruction of livelihoods in disaster areas, as observed in Aceh in 2004. The reports published by the relevant agencies remind us why the relief organizations should focus on improving livelihood programs.<sup>15</sup>

#### **4. Humanitarian Act: Responsibilities and Facts for Sustainability**

Relief work, as observed in both national and global levels, is conducted by various institutions. These institutions, classified under the concept of governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), respond in emergency situations and conduct a very crucial task as observed during the disasters that have appeared worldwide. Among the institutions participating in field work are agencies in UN body, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, government agencies of individual states such as AFAD (Disaster Emergency Management Authority), JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), Ausaid (Australian Aid), Indonesian Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB), even “militaries and private companies, and private individuals” operate in relief works (Fisher 2007, 115).

In the history of relief assistance, it is seen that there have been some attempts to organize global relief efforts. For instance, there was a charter

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<sup>15</sup> *Aceh and Nias: Two Years After the Tsunami*, 2006 Progress Report, BRR and Partners, December, p. 15. (Retrieved, on 4 February 20). (Note: The earthquake and tsunami caused 100,000 small business persons lost their livelihoods; 4,717 coastal fishing boats lost; more than 20,000 ha fish ponds destroyed; 60,000 farmers displaced; more than 70,000 ha agricultural land damaged. See for details: ibid.)

titled International Relief Union agreed upon by the member countries of the League of Nations in 1927. Hence, the global political situation, and later on World War Two, created obstacles. Another stage was seen during the 1980s (Fisher 2007, 117). One of the latest efforts was conducted just after the months of the tsunami in Aceh, which is mentioned above referring to the Hyogo Framework of Action (Jensen 2010, 15).<sup>16</sup>

With regard to this, the collaboration of these agencies with each other and their close relationships with the host-country cannot be underestimated to materialize a higher level of satisfying efforts in disaster-prone areas. It is expected that the relevant agencies are to harmonize their roles and responsibilities in order to achieve successful disaster risk management (Jensen 2010, xii; Athukorala 2012). The main purpose of all these activities of the regional and global agencies is to find more feasible and economic approaches to make the civil/private and state organizations more effective in the field. Besides these semi-governmental organizations, private relief organizations might attempt to merge in the form of larger partnerships that can have crucial impact and reflections in regional based field works.

The need for having a common and mutual understanding among international relief agencies is crucial to conduct their works in a collaborative and supportive manner in the field. In fact, having an agreement among the agencies is not surprising; instead, it is a compulsory process emerging alongside with the experiences of disasters. For instance, the earthquake and tsunami in December of 2004 became a learning process for relief organizations and the local and national governments in various regions (Syamsidik et al. 2017, 3).<sup>17</sup>

In this regard, ASEAN, NATO, and UN, in various levels of talks, discussed for a betterment of legal issues, procedures and practices in the field (Fisher 2007, 117). Besides that, the higher education institutions, for instance as observed in Aceh and in the US, initiated various degree programs under the title of "disaster management courses" (Roza 2007, 39).<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters*, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). (Retrieved, on 4 February 2018); ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, p. 3.  
<http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119170000.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> Making Aceh safer through Disaster Risk Reduction in Development (DRR-A), Lessons Learned: Building Awareness and Education, (2012), United Nations Development Programm and Government of Indonesia, p. 8.

<sup>18</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Aceh International Workshop and Expo on Sustainable Tsunami Disaster Recovery (AIWEST – DR 2016), p. 1.

In this context, the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies can form a model for active and effectual collaborations. There were some initiatives to form a unitary operation procedure as seen as follow in the form of Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief of 1994, and the Sphere Project Humanitarian and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, which was updated in 2004. Though these attempts to determine a common and collaborated effort for the benefit of the victims in the field, it is difficult to assert that a satisfying result has been reached globally (Fisher 2007, 117).

The increasing capacity and capability of relief organizations in operations are expected to save a significant number of peoples' lives and make the latter sustainably reconnect to life again. Though these organizations provide considerable efforts into practice in order to recover the vulnerable people and help the latter prepare to return their normal life circle, there are some significant challenges during the works of NGOs in the field. These challenges can be classified as tangible and intangible aspects. Tangible areas cover all material aid processes in operations including emergency aid, distribution of food, and reconstruction of camps and housing areas and running these operations in a relatively short period of time.

On the other hand, effects of the disasters can also be observed in intangible areas such as psychologies of the people. Realization of intangible aspects takes more significant time and effort, including distinct expertise of professionals in order to revive the psycho-cultural areas. There are some significant issues that should be considered for effective field works by relief organizations. These issues should be taken into consideration in a deepening manner.

## **5. Challenges**

Here I should focus on some basic aspects of challenges with which relief agencies come across in the field.

### **5.1. Human Resources Capacity**

Relief organizations have paid positions generally for managerial staff in the headquarters in their institutions (Roza 2007, 33). Because of this reason, relief organizations or NGOs principally consider to recruit volunteers among the ones who either have special skills or do not, to assign as field workers majorly and partially for office workers in order to cut their already limited budgets and be frugal in their expenditures.

Volunteers; if we need to give a definition, they are individuals who contribute to a relevant relief work with their personal knowledge and expertise in full social responsibility without expecting any material benefit or advantage (Çakmak 2002, 88). Volunteers, -at least some of them-, are expected to work in the field, even those who come from professional sectors, and they need to adapt in various aspects to this new environment. A considerable aspect of this process is the responsibility of the NGO management to give the internal training for volunteer individuals (Çakmak 2003, 71).

It could be argued that the volunteers learn relevant skills through first hand affiliation to the real time conditions in the field. Hence, this causes obstacles in the delivery of relief work. As seen in the programs of some professional institutions, skills dealing with relief work should be disseminated through formal training settings.<sup>19</sup>

With regard to this, the individual volunteers need to be equipped with capacities and capabilities such as knowledge and information about local language, attitudes and culture, at least in a basic form, in order to tackle potential challenges. Simple miscommunication is potentially a cause of disruption in the interaction between field workers and needy people. It is beyond the satisfaction level of the latter, instead a crucial step which is function to sustain the relief work.

## **5.2. Language Barrier**

Overcoming the language barrier is a very fundamental issue that should be handled urgently in initial stages. To communicate with the people, the field workers need to have a basic form of the spoken language in the relevant society and they should have communicative skills and not disregard other aspects such as body language and so on. The language aspect also includes having some awareness of cultural values of the society.

## **5.3. Empathetic Relationships and Direct Involvement With Needy People**

Emphatic relationships of the field workers with the vulnerable sectors of the society that becomes the subject of any disasters have a larger impact on the success and sustainability of the relief work. This approach allows the field workers to perceive the real needs of the vulnerable group beyond distributing aid packages in a regular period.

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<sup>19</sup> <https://odihpn.org/magazine/preparing-humanitarian-workers-for-disaster-response-a-red-crossred-crescent-field-training-model/>. (Retrieved, on 7 February 2018).

The relief workers are expected to have extra considerations about the socio-cultural and religious identities and practices in relevant societies. For instance, as observed in Aceh, religious and cultural values could be very determinative in social life and any types of relief efforts should be affiliated with these values and practices.<sup>20</sup>

In this regard, the field workers need to be equipped and to get first-hand information about the relevant society in order to understand the difficulties and realize their targets. This process includes tangible and intangible perspectives of the relevant society including basic psycho-cultural realities and social entities.

In addition, having emphatic relations allow the relief work volunteers to engage without any psychological barriers with the locals. It is assumed that this interaction facilitates the former to draw on the local wisdom, knowledge, and capacity in order to make both sides to enhance their cooperation in maximal level in.<sup>21</sup> In the first hand, the ones who work in the field of psycho-social programs should be equipped with,

- a) Understanding of local cultural values,
- b) Considering the sensitivity of religious and ethnic minorities,
- c) Being neutral towards all socio-religious groups.

While there is prioritization in relief work, this process should be carefully planned, structured and implemented by the relevant parties by collaborating with local socio-religious leaders. Otherwise, it will cause disruptions and disturbances in the whole process of relief work.

During disasters, beyond tangible and human casualties, intangible sectors of a society such as cultural-, historical- and religious institutions that are demolished or washed away, to some or larger extent, as observed clearly in the Aceh context, should be taken into consideration significantly. Since these are the life channels of a given society that bound individuals to their society and constitute meaning for the whole sector of society. These institutions supply real support to the vulnerable people after the initial stage of relief work.

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<sup>20</sup> Making Aceh safer through Disaster Risk Reduction in Development (DRR-A), Lessons Learned: Building Awareness and Education, (2012), United Nations Development Programm and Government of Indonesia, p. 3-4.

<sup>21</sup> This is significantly referred in the UN report. See: p. 44. (Retrieved, on 4 February 2018).

No doubt that operating in these fields requires qualifications and expertise. In this regard, NGOs can approach native individuals and institutions to understand the core values and meanings of these institutions.

#### **5.4. Decision Making or Missing Points in Relief Work**

A decision making mechanism is no doubt a significant phenomenon that establishes the forms and regulations of relief agencies. Hence, what makes the latter more practical and adaptable in their approach is their flexibility and resilience. In this regard, these organizations are seen in the form of progressiveness in comparison to government agencies in the context of any encounters with the unintended environment such as disasters.

The decision making process, expected to flow from top-down, say, from the managerial staff, whether they have had field experience or not, to field workers might cause irregularities or disruptions of the work.

Though I do not underestimate the professionalism of the relief institutions' decision making process, I should emphasize the importance of the field workers' roles in the decision making process. My opinion is based on the field workers' acknowledgement of the cause and consequences of the real situations in the very first hand. This can be rightfully understood as the advantages of being in the field physically and engagement of the vulnerable sectors in the society. With regard to this, I should emphasize that volunteers are in expectation to be in a position to be listened to, based on their knowledge and experience and their capacity to analyze the real situation in the field and the value of data they collected in the very first hand. This situation should allow the horizontal relations, instead of hierarchic action that is mostly observed in state organizations. No doubt that this mechanism, will allow the volunteers get satisfaction and put in more effort (Çakmak 2002, 89; Çakmak 2003, 149).

Hence the realities and unexpected conditions that are observed and witnessed by the field staff should be taken into consideration by headquarters staff or senior staff. In fact, whether it is an equality matter between field staff and managerial staff or not, this is an aspect of the field's reality which is urgently needed to be considered by relevant parties.

#### **5.5. Public Relations**

In a relief work which is no doubt a human activity, there is the receiving party or requesting party, say, the vulnerable people and involved in different stages in this process act either as taker or giver. In particular,

the latter need to express themselves in front of the former. Introducing itself to the vulnerable society is a crucial stage for a relief agency. This is a process that functions to close the social gap between the parties.

With regard to this, relief organizations should disseminate information about their institutions and field works to the relevant society. This can be materialized through various ways. Though, person to person relations is very crucial for a strong communication between relief workers and the vulnerable people, publication and some other media segments should also be considered as a significant step for sustainable relief process.

Starting from the identity of the relief agency, its plans and projects for the vulnerable sector of the society and the implementation of all these in the field allow them to be known by the members of the society. For that purpose, relief agencies should have the capacity of human resources and material infrastructure in order to initiate this public relations effort. Vernacular languages should be given priority in the relevant publications that can be in the form of handouts, brochures, periodicals, power point presentations, and audio-visual media.

Dissemination of information through various media is taken for granted as a responsibility and a way to create trust among the society and in the eyes of the funding institutions. In addition, in this way, the relief institutions can establish how transparent they are in their projects. Since individuals and institution funders wish to see acknowledged how the resources have been used and how the projects have reached the target groups (Çakmak 2003, 63). It can be argued that this process allows the expansion of the successful projects into society in a larger perspective.

These written and audio-visual media help the distinct sectors of the relevant society to understand the relief work and lead them to accommodate themselves to the new environment. This process also allows the relief organizations to evaluate their works on how effectively they are perceived by the people and allows them to reposition on the basis of the needs and feedback of the relevant society.

As observed in the field, after the emergency stage, the society needed communication vehicles, such as radio. Though it is a relatively costly investment, establishing a radio station supports the society in various ways. No doubt that operating a small radio station is considerably beneficial both educate the public about the issues relevant to disaster management and to express ideas and thoughts and disseminate updated information about field

works.<sup>22</sup> Through the operation of a radio station, vulnerable people also find an opportunity to voice up their ideas about the process and explain their real needs and get informed by listening various programs. Besides, the programs which include entertaining activities such as music programs, expert talks, drama, and storytelling have an impact as psychological support for various age groups.

### **5.6. Overlapping of Relief Work**

Overlapping of relief work is considered a significant problem since it causes not only material waste but also confusion among the vulnerable people. It can be argued that at least one of the reasons of this situation is caused by weaknesses during the planning stage such as “the lack of coordination” (Athukorala 2012). In this regard, general statistical data about the geography, climate and human population, and people’s culture, which include the significant logistic centers, roads and ports, maps of housing areas, number of households etc., are needed much in the very first hand. In addition, the management of this data is also another issue to be taken into consideration by professional individuals and organizations to coordinate all the efforts.

Without considerable preparations and organizations in pre-relief work, the aid organizations either unintentionally overlap their efforts, or the items directed to the victims are just considered as waste since these are improper for the people’s consumption and use.

Hence, there are some obstacles and challenges to realize this fundamental process. For instance, some relief organizations prefer not to collaborate with the central organization or to follow its direction and guidance due to the latter’s slow-speed mechanism. Another excuse that is commonly expressed is that of relief agencies’ responsibilities to their donors. They have to prove how they reach the vulnerable in the field, for their satisfaction of how the aid task carried out by supplying feedback in the form of financial report and visual materials to their donors or general public (Athukorala 2012).

No doubt that this is a very practical approach of relief agencies in order to guarantee, to lesser or larger extent, their fund resources or to increase the portion of them for future tasks to be pursued. In addition, building a success

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<sup>22</sup> Making Aceh safer through Disaster Risk Reduction in Development (DRR-A), Lessons Learned: Building Awareness and Education, (2012), United Nations Development Programm and Government of Indonesia, p. 7.

story and acquiring a title of fame by reaching the vulnerable circles in a fastest way is asserted to reflect definitely positive image of the relief agency in both national and international public opinion and media.

This might be accepted as a sort of justification for the relief organizations. However, a particular focus should be given to the quality of work and sustainability of the efforts which are more crucial for the victims' recovery and rehabilitation process on the course of time. In regard to this, a consensus among the organizations taking part to reach the victims of a disaster should be manifested.

Pertaining to this, the central body of management should focus on a practical policymaking process that mobilizes according to all relevant relief organizations to reach the field at the the fastest speed possible. If these sorts of bodies, at least in potential natural disaster-prone regions, are ready by having set globally recognized policies, the leadership of the body in any real emergency cases will produce a satisfying level of practices of distribution emergency relief tasks. The responsible organizations should map out strategically their directions of action. This process will definitely contribute to the process of their institutionalization.

No doubt that the stakeholders working in the very critical stages of relief work are expected to prioritize significant communication in order to promote a higher level of cooperation among each other. Both the planning of an individual relief organization and the strengthening of the efforts between governmental and non-governmental agencies are much needed during this stage.

## **6. Responsibilities of National and Regional Governments**

The issues relevant to tasks and responsibilities of the regional and national governments cover from issuing relief workers visas and recognizing the status of the relief organizations until supplying data that undeniably causes tangible and intangible losses such as money, time, and efforts of the relief organizations.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that during the extraordinary situation caused by disaster, individuals or small groups of people can act to benefit themselves through unlawful deeds under the guise of aid work. Relief works in conflict areas, such as Aceh (until 2005), Patani (Thailand), Mindanao (The Philippines), and Rakhine State of Myanmar or some other places smaller or larger extent exposed to regional or national security problems in Asia-Pacific, come across interest clashes among the various circles including the independent movements or movements looking for

acquiring the right of an autonomous region, regional and national police and military forces, regional war-lords and political elites, etc. The relevant conflict areas are generally the places having considerable natural resources including forest products, and other illegitimate economic activities such as black market and drug businesses, weapons smuggling, etc. All these appear as disadvantages for the relief works that are in particular assumed to reach the most vulnerable sectors of the conflict societies. No doubt that these technical or bureaucratic matters reflect setbacks for field works and the vulnerable people then become the real losers.

As observed and witnessed during the relief work operations in Aceh Province of the Republic of Indonesia, the customs policies caused delays of a huge number of containers including aid materials that were assumed to reach victims on time (Fisher 2007, 116). I personally witnessed a similar situation in which a cargo full of food materials for the staff of some Turkish NGOs was prevented by the custom officers in International Polonia Airport, Medan, in one of the late months in 2005. After some longer talks and deals with the authorities through finding influential Indonesian people, the cargo was released.

On the other hand, though there had been some programs such as BAKORNAS PBA (National Coordinating Body for Natural Disaster Management) having networks and branches until the level of sub-districts, tackling with the disaster since 1979 (Bildan 2003, 28), it has been observed that the Indonesian national and state governments had to initiate various programs after the tsunami, as mentioned in some places in this article, which in this regard can be considered definitely as a learning process in national and international level. For instance, the local disaster management office initiates some regular programs such as socialization programs, at public level and in particular schools. It is understood that these national institutions have understood the paramount importance of dissemination of information of relevant issues such as risk decreasing data etc. in order to decrease community vulnerability during disasters and look for cooperation and collaborations with some other agencies at local and national levels.<sup>23</sup>

## **7. ASEAN: Initiating a Regional Response to Disasters**

After some years, alongside with other developments, ASEAN as a regional body of union has been conducting various workshops and meetings with the politicians, professionals' participation from the member states to overcome the challenges emerging during the disaster occasions. In regard to this, no doubt that the tsunami in 2004 was a triggering effect on this

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<sup>23</sup> LGSat p. 7.

preparedness in regional level as mentioned in the Asean Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) paper.<sup>24</sup> As partly seen in this article, the experience of recovery and rehabilitation acquired in Aceh became a factor for the stakeholders in ASEAN, and no doubt beyond it, to initiate various disaster management projects to tackle with similar natural disasters in the whole region.

Post-tsunami relief work triggered institutional efforts and attempts to be initiated and guided under some international institutions. It should be mentioned that these initiatives were commenced since the first anniversary of the tsunami in Aceh through an institution named ‘disaster mitigation research center’ (TMMRC) of Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh.<sup>25</sup> Later on, ASEAN, which is made up ten regional countries, and its relevant agencies decided to enhance their collaboration in relief and developmental projects in disaster-affected regions as programmed in the formation of AADMER, a strategic program was decided to give priority to small and medium sized enterprises, micro-insurance etc.<sup>26</sup>

It can be safely asserted that the policy makers in ASEAN have been attempting to initiate various programs, since “more than 50 percent of global disaster mortalities occurred in the ASEAN region”.<sup>27</sup> Beside that, it is observed that global perspectives were attempted to be developed by the agencies of the United Nations as seen in the form of the Hyogo Framework for Action, an international conference held in Kobe.<sup>28</sup>

It is also important to remind that the majority of ASEAN nations are considered as traditional agricultural societies, though development, modernization or industrialization have been increasingly exercised in recent decades. Hence, a significant size of the population of the ASEAN still conduct their lives in rural areas and earn their incomes through traditional production systems.

<sup>24</sup> <http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119170000.pdf>, p. 2. (Retrieved, on 29th January 2018); “Foreword”, *ASEAN Vision 2025 On Disaster Management*, p. 1, 7. (Retrieved, on 29th January 2018).

10<sup>th</sup> Aceh International Workshop and Expo on Sustainable Tsunami Disaster Recovery (AIWEST – DR 2016), p. 1.

<sup>26</sup> *ASEAN Vision 2025 On Disaster Management*, p. 2. (Retrieved, on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018).

<sup>27</sup> *ASEAN Vision 2025 On Disaster Management*, p. 4. (Retrieved, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018).

<sup>28</sup> This process can be observed in the world conference on Disaster Reduction held between 18 and 22 January 2005, in Kobe. See: *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters*, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). (Retrieved, 4<sup>th</sup> February 2018).

Notably, this feature reminds us not only of human fatalities but also of a variety of economic activities such as agriculture, animal farming, plantation, fishery and forestry are prone to be in potential degradation in various degrees. This situation, no doubt, forces the policy makers of ASEAN to have significant preparations by reorienting their approaches and developing new perspectives in order to act holistically in close cooperation among the agencies of the member states.

We should highlight here a few aspects of limitations of the relief and developmental works in the region. In this regard, people to people interactions in ASEAN context has still to be ameliorated significantly. Though the initial stages were commenced during the talks in 2008 and reflected in ASEAN charter in the form of “three pillars”, in particular the development of ASEAN “socio-cultural community” need to be studied and waited to be implemented significantly. And this process was renewed by member states observed in the 2015 Declaration of Resilience and it was emphasized that beyond other factors socio-cultural measures are relevant to tackle with the “reduction of vulnerability to disaster”.<sup>29</sup> Since this is itself a source of problem for various organizations in the region to operate freely in a disaster prone area. In addition to this, though ASEAN wishes to be a playmaker in its own region to tackle all forms of disasters, we should figure out that the member countries do not want to be prone to global powers’ hub of emergency response.

Though there is a comprehensive cooperation such as AADMER (Petz 2014, 1),<sup>30</sup> and ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre)<sup>31</sup>, and some affirmative accounts from the ASEAN authorities in various meetings about the successful establishment process of AHA,<sup>32</sup> it should be tested in a significant disaster case in the field how the member states act accordingly to minimize the casualties and to rehabilitate the socio-economic and cultural injuries in relevant societies. Since there is an article to foresee collaboration in improvement of disaster management capacities of member states in ASEAN Declaration agreed on 26 June 1976 (Loevy

<sup>29</sup> ASEAN Vision 2025 On Disaster Management, p. 7, 8. (Retrieved, on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018).

<sup>30</sup> “Foreword”, ASEAN Vision 2025 On Disaster Management, p. 1. (Retrieved, on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018).

<sup>31</sup> Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to AADMER, and Third Meeting of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management (AMMDM), 16 December 2015, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup> Chairman’s Statement of the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management (AMMDM).

2016, 202),<sup>33</sup> there seems it has not much been effectively implied during the various disasters, in particular, the 2004 tsunami.

All these above-mentioned formation processes are no doubt a positive development for the peoples of ASEAN. Hence, this phenomenon needs to be handled accordingly since ASEAN hosts some corrupt socio-economic practices. Resource mobilization is deeply connected to how to corruption and create healthy economic activities for public benefit.

## 8. Conclusion

The tsunami made Aceh a very important testing ground for relief agencies. There is no doubt that national and international relief agencies have acknowledged enough experiences to tackle with similar disaster conditions. As observed in the process, various global and regional organizations have initiated collaborative programs in order to integrate their institutional efforts.

On the other hand, though there were significant emergency relief works realized, a larger investment for infrastructure projects in coastal areas of Aceh province in post-tsunami period would be beneficial. It is doubtful the economic recovery steps alongside the local people's needs have been successfully continued.

After the initial stage of emergency, some agencies started micro-credit projects to reach the vulnerable people to revive their subsistence economic activities. Hence, I can argue that this opportunity has not been functionally used by national and international aid organizations.

Aceh is still in a vulnerable situation in the context of self-sufficiency of basic livelihood, lack of electricity and clean water supply; though surrendered by seas the fishery sector is still run by traditional methods and; Medan, the capital city of adjunct province, North Sumatra is the fundamental source of major products and materials; northern and western sea ports inactive in terms of both national and international export import activities.

All these issues force us to reconsider a need for a new approach in the task of relief organizations, in particular the vulnerability of the people in economic sustainability in the field.

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<sup>33</sup> <http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119170000.pdf>, p. 2. (Retrieved, on 29th January 2018).

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## **JICA'S COOPERATION ON SYRIANS IN TURKEY**

**Masaki IIYAMA\***  
**Miyuki KONNAI\***

### **1. GENERAL VIEW OF JICA'S ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY**

It is great honor for us to have a presentation at this prestigious international symposium organized by Ankara University. Today, we would like to introduce our activities as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Turkey.

First of all, let us briefly introduce JICA Turkey's history of cooperation since 1959. We started our first Technical cooperation "Training in Japan" in 1959 and our first ODA loan "Hasan Ugurlu Dam and HEPP" in 1971. Our office was opened in Ankara in 1995.

We have mainly four assistance schemes:

- (1) Technical Cooperation
- (2) ODA Loan
- (3) Public Private Partnership (PPP)
- (4) Grass Roots assistance

Our priority areas are:

- (1) Improvement of business and investment environment including urbanization and environment program
- (2) Capacity building policies for disaster reduction
- (3) Strengthening development partnership relations

Up to 2016, the total budget for Technical cooperation is 46 billion JPY with 5,222 Trainees, 1,560 Japanese experts dispatch, 72 Senior Volunteers). The total commitment of ODA Loan is 697 billion JPY with 27 projects. Our project sites spread all over Turkey with above four schemes.

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\* JICA Office - Turkey  
\* JICA Office - Turkey

## 2. ASSISTANCE FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY

The next is about our projects specific to assist Syrians. We have two projects, ODA Loan and Technical Cooperation.

### (1) ODA Loan

The first project is ODA Loan “Local Authorities Infrastructure Improvement Project”, which has started in 2015, and the loan amount is 45 billion Japanese yen. The purpose is to support 10 local municipalities in southern-east region strengthening their capacities for public services on basis of the fact that it is getting harder for them to maintain their services due to Syrian refugee inflows. The loan is utilized for construction of basic infrastructures such as water, sewage and waste disposal. We can take three features of this project.

The first point is that it is a project that responds exactly to the needs of citizens of the host communities as well as Syrian refugees themselves by approaching the improvement of the basic public services. In many local municipalities in Turkey, there has been a high need for responding to the aging and deficiencies of infrastructures for a long time. And in 2011, Syrian crisis happened and the need got more urgent. Under such situation, this project will be highly and directly beneficial for host communities as well as Syrian refugees.

The second point is that this project started soon after receiving the official cooperation request from Turkish Government. This means that both the Japanese Government and JICA promptly reviewed the request and decided to implement the project in order to respond to the urgent and globally important issue of the Syrian refugee. In addition, design of the project is also contributing smooth implementation. For example, consulting support for feasibility study in local municipalities is included in the loan scope, and not international but local competitive procurement procedure is adopted for construction work. As a result, the project preceded other international organizations’ projects in terms of contribution to host communities and Syrian refugees. In this regard, we are very grateful to some of the mayors for their appreciation to JAPAN.

The last point is that JICA adopted two-step-loan for this project. I mean the JICA’s loan is financed to local municipalities through the Iller Bank. As a result, JICA can monitor the progress of each sub-project in each municipality with the Iller bank. And it leads to appropriate supervision. We also believe that it is important for humanitarian projects that the local offices like Iller

Bank can conduct project supervision instead of international financial institutions (IFIs) like JICA even in areas where it is difficult for IFIs officials to enter in terms of security control.

## **(2) Technical Cooperation**

The second project is Technical Cooperation “Survey and Pilot Project on Social Service for Syrians.” This project has been implemented with Ministry of Family and Social Policies since November 2017. The target areas are Ankara, Istanbul, Mersin and Gaziantep.

Our main objective is supporting the most vulnerable people, focusing on three areas;

- (a) Strengthening the capacity of Social Service Center (SSC) staffs
- (b) Strengthening the function of care management of SSC
- (c) Enhancing Social Cohesion

We have been implementing above three activities in Gungoren SSC in Isntabul and Akdeniz SSC in Mersin. In Gaziantep, our focus is social cohesion activities with the cooperation of UN WOMEN. The total budget of this project is around 110 million JPY (1mil USD). This project will be a pre-activity for the future long-term Technical Cooperation.

We hope our projects have been contributing to mitigate the burdens of the government of Turkey. We will continue our projects to support Syrians with effective manners, responding to the various needs of Syrians.

## **UYGHUR REFUGEES LIVING IN TURKEY AND THEIR PROBLEMS**

**Abdürreşit Celil KARLUK\***

### **Introduction**

It is a well-known fact that Uyghurs are of Turkish origin the native and indigenous people of East Turkestan. This region is within the borders of the People's Republic of China today and its official name in China is Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. As a result of the removal of the East Turkestan Republic established in 1945 by Russian-Chinese cooperation, the region was first transformed into a province of the People's Republic of China with the name of Xinjiang, and then reconstructed in accordance with the ideology of the CCP with the name Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (1955). The promised autonomy has never been implemented in parallel with the practices of the Chinese bureaucracy tradition of “上有政策,下有对策” (the higher authorities have policies, the localities have their countermeasures) (Ding, 2002; Bovingdon, 2004).

Moreover, the rights and laws promised to minority or indigenous peoples in the relevant legislation, including the Territorial Autonomy Act, adopted by the People's National Congress in 1984, are remained on paper only and are not implemented in any way (Bovingdon 2004: 42-43; Ertürk 2016: 22). The minority nationalities policy in China have undergone fundamental changes after 1990, especially in the Uyghur and Tibet regions, gradually shifted to the similar structure to the colonial system (Sautman, 2000). Increasing Chinese immigrant populations and discriminatory policies have resulted in the enduring marginalization of nations, such as Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian, Yi, who have unique memory and strong ethno-national culture throughout the country (Nayal, 2012: 61-64).

In this article, the author after briefly explain why and how the Uyghur Turks forced to migrate from their homeland to foreign country, will focus the Uyghur refugees in Turkey who comes from the Southeast Asia route,

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and present firsthand information about their current problems. The interview data used in this article was collected in Sefakoy and Zeytinburnu, Istanbul in October 2017 by author and his master student<sup>1</sup>. Moreover, this study aims to cover not only to include the complex situations of those Uyghur refugees and the main problems of they faced but also to include the consequences of the political situation from a humanitarian perspective.

### **First, the Main Reasons of Forcing Uyghurs to Migrate**

The CCP administration, which actively participates in the rhetoric that prevailed in Western politics after the September 11 attacks, adopted the method of punishment and discriminate with state apparatuses by placing Uyghurs on the target board (Chung 2002; Dru, 2002; Waine 2009; Clarke, 2010; Sean, 2018). As of this date, China has been insisting on practices that will radicalize Uyghurs as far as possible within and outside the region (Meyer, 2016). For instance,

- Since 1994, religious worship and religious education have been totally banned, dissemination of atheism and heathenism education as far as the villages (Klimeš, 2018);
- The removal of Uyghur language from education and administrative system since 2003, the forced dissemination of Chinese language and culture in all layers of life, especially in schools, government and social life (Dwyer, 2005; Karluk, 2016);
- Forcing single Uyghur girls in the 16-22 age group, which numbered hundreds of thousands since 2006, to transfer to the industrial cities in eastern China (Karluk, 2010);

Between the years 2012-2015, by agreeing with organized human traffickers in the southern borders of China, most important part of Uyghurs, who first crossed the frontiers of Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos and then reached Malaysia, then most of them arrived in Turkey (WUC, 2016: 8)<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Special thanks to my graduate student Melike Merve Soysal and Gizem Nur Demirel for field research contributions. Also, I would like to thank Nilgün Elik Küçük Yıldırım for her contributions to the English text.

<sup>2</sup> Uighur Refugees in Southeast Asia, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/uighur-refugees-southeast-asia>, visited: 10.06.2018.

Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, "Uighur refugees, China's power and what to do about it?", Daily Sabah, 1 December 2014, <https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/kilic-bugra-kanat/2014/12/01/uighur-refugees-chinas-power-and-what-to-do-about-it>, visited: 07.06.2018; Huffington Post, "UN 'shocked' after Thailand sends back Uighur refugees to China", 9 June 2015, <https://uyghuramerican.org/article/un-shocked-after-thailand-sends-back-uighur-refugees->

While most of Uyghurs who were arrested in these countries have been extradited to China, thanks to Turkey's initiatives a part of them were brought to Turkey<sup>3</sup>. For example, the Turkish media and the Turkish government began to deal with these people when 220 illegal immigrants who were arrested in police raids on a forested land in Thailand on March 2014, introduced themselves as "Turks" in the control of identification<sup>4</sup>.

Although the Turkish media touched on the issue to a limited extent in the years 2014 and 2015, the Turkish government has pressured by the Turkish citizens on the social media and in various arenas<sup>5</sup>.

Today most Uyghur refugees in Turkey are people who come to Turkey from over Southeast Asia. The small portion of these refugees are students who took refuge from Egypt to Turkey in 2017.

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china.html visited 06.06.2018; Although it is not an SCO member country Thailand often repatriates Uyghur refugees to China. The motive behind the repatriations may be explained by the economic relationship between the two countries. See Robert Potter, "Why Thailand returned the Uyghurs", August 5 2015, The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/what-thailand-returned-the-uyghurs/>, visited: 08.06.2018.

<sup>3</sup> 173 Uighur refugees arrive in Turkey from Thailand, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/173-uighur-refugees-arrive-in-turkey-from-thailand-84912>, visited: 22.05.2018

<sup>4</sup> Tayland'da ormanda 220 Türk mülteci bulundu, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/tayland-da-ormanda-200-turk/dunya/detay/1851146/default.htm>, visited: 08.06.2018; Uygur Türklerinin Çin'e teslim edilmesi tepkisi, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2015/07/09/uygur-turklerinin-cine-teslim-edilmesi-tepkisi>, visited: 09.06.2018.

<sup>5</sup> Turkish help for Uighur refugees looms over Erdogan visit to Beijing, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-china-uighurs-insight/turkish-help-for-uighur-refugees-looms-over-erdogan-visit-to-beijing-idUSKCN0Q10PM20150727>, visited: 12.05.2018.



Source: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/uighur-refugees-southeast-asia>, Visited: 10.06.2018

### **Uyghur Refugees from the Southeast Asia Route.**

There is no precise information on the total number of this group in Turkey. It is known that today this population, which has estimated more than 10,000 in Istanbul and Kayseri, continues their lives under very difficult conditions<sup>6</sup> (Wuc, 2016: 12). It is the most important situation which should be emphasized, in a way that they have been able to cross from the well-protected Chinese borders to Vietnam and Thailand illegally with their families (Wuc, 2016: 7-12). Since Uyghurs are a nation that can be immediately distinguished within the borders of China with their physical images, clothings, and inadequate Chinese. One of the NGO official working on to meet various needs of Uyghur immigrants in Istanbul expressed the following opinion on this group.

"The emigration of these people from Turkestan started with the actualizing of conditions masterminded by China and it lasted for 6 years. Most of young, 10 thousand people (which could be 15 thousand) who were getting fed up with pressure and oppression participated in this migration flow and came to Turkey".

An Uyghur refugee participating in my research gave the following response to the question about "why you migrated" from China:

"Who would leave from places of birth, relatives, friends and seek peace from foreign lands? We were desperate, we couldn't have done what the Chinese every said and what the Chinese every wanted. They did not give us any of our rights guaranteed by China's Constitution and religious belief law. Those who tell them that what they do is contrary to their laws, those who complain them to court and those who apply the higher authorities arrested and severely tortured. They even killed. The secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party openly told us, 'I am the law, what I say would happen'. They were doing and getting what they wanted. They tried to hit us from our most sensitive part, at first, they applied abortion, then they totally forbade our religion and the very last they removed our language from education. They took our 16-year-old girls forcedly to work in China. They resorted to unimaginable ways to test whether we fasted during Ramadan. They even reward bad people who drink and steal. When we said something against .... they did not cut our tongue directly, but they did everything else, heavy fine, sentenced to jail without interrogation, torture, indefinite employment in labor camps. In brief, we had no choice but to escape..." (Interviewee: Male, married, 50 years; Interview Date: 20.08.2016; Interview location: Kayseri bus station).

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<sup>6</sup> Turkish help for Uighur refugees looms over Erdogan visit to Beijing, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-china-uighurs-insight/turkish-help-for-uighur-refugees-looms-over-erdogan-visit-to-beijing-idUSKCN0Q10PM20150727>, visited: 12.05.2018.

Another refugee is:

"There are cameras all over the streets outside of houses in East Turkestan. If I want to go to another district, another place, even my sister's house, I have to get permission from security unit and to inform the security unit. After informing them where we were going to go and getting permission, the owner of the house we came in have to call immediately to the security unit and tell them that the person arrived at that time and give our ID number." (Interviewee: Women, 74 years, Widow, Kashgarian, Interview Date: 28.10.2017; Interview location: Zeytinburnu)

### **Current Situation and Challenges**

Uyghur refugees in Turkey are trying to survive in Istanbul Zeytinburnu, Sefaköy regions, and Kayseri under very difficult conditions for the last five years. The problems they encounter are almost the same: legal certificate of residence, health, accommodation, education, and security.

November 2017, One of NGO official who is closely interested in the various problems of this group has given the following information about the problems they face:

"So far, these people do not have any official status. As a result of many years of negotiations and our struggle for their residence permits, the right to apply has been granted. However, because of the require strange, complex conditions and impossible documents, only a few people were able to get their residence permits. Therefore, they face very serious problems, which include their jobs and children, such as health, and most importantly accommodation. We applied both to the state and government bodies and NGOs, however, no significant step has been taken yet. I would like to especially point out that the health problems are faced in very tragic dimensions and there have been very critical incidents lately. Recently, an increasing number of irregular and random detention and arrest operations are turning the lives of Uyghurs into hell in Turkey. The Uyghurs are constantly in fear and anxiety. 90% of the detainees are innocent. What's interesting is that those who should be arrested are wandering freely in the streets..."

In line with China's policies against the East Turkistan Turks (Uyghurs), the arbitrary police operations against ISIS further targeted the Uyghur community in Turkey. Indeed, it was not a secret that China has wanted

all Uyghurs abroad to be extradited. Abdulkadir Yapçan who lived in Istanbul since 2001 was one of the Uyghur leaders, holding also Turkish citizenship. Yapçan was an activist for independence against the Chinese invasion of Xinjiang, and police arrested him in Istanbul on the ground of a “red bulletin” that China had issued. Moreover, Turkish government later shut down “İstiklal TV”, the voice of the Uyghur Turks in Turkey<sup>7</sup>. China's various initiatives and pressures since 2017 have started to produce results. An increase was reported in the arrests of Uyghurs, who live in Istanbul and Kayseri, and their transfers to repatriation centers. This kind of development in Uyghur refugees community has created insecurity and concern in the thousands of Uyghurs who do not have Turkish passports. Therefore, they have started to seek ways to go to safer countries.

On the other hand, one of the most important problems experienced by the Uyghurs is safety issues and the feeling of constantly being threatened. This situation has caused the prevalence of serious psychological depression in migrants and revealed the situation of immigrants living in a sense of insecurity. The reason for this situation is that the security units of the Chinese state, especially the intelligence service, keep Uyghurs living abroad in a very strict monitoring. Those who have relatives within the borders of China can only get in touch with them through a messaging application, WeChat. Those who download this application to their cellphones fall into the traps of related security units, enabling them to communicate with anyone at any time as well as monitoring all the conversations. Local authorities have managed to control the Uyghurs abroad as they desire with various irrational practices such as taking their relatives as hostages and imprisoning them. In this regard, one of refugee has provided the following information:

"They searched my mother-in-law's house, and they took my wife's brothers, because we escaped abroad. My mother-in-law got sick from fear, then became hospitalized. And we cannot hear this from them, we heard it indirectly from other sources, they told us what happened. The last time we had a conversation with her, she said that "Promise me that you will not be involved in anything there, that you will not betray to China, then record this verbal promise with your voice and send it to me on WeChat. I can show it to the

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<sup>7</sup> Police Crackdowns on Isis And the Consequences for Refugees From The Caucasus And Central Asia In Turkey; <http://www.vocaleurope.eu/police-crackdowns-on-isis-and-the-consequences-for-refugees-from-the-caucasus-and-central-asia-in-turkey/>, visited: 10.06.2018.

policemen when they ask." Thus, my mother-in-law said to us, "If you care about us, don't do anything wrong there. Don't be friends with anyone, just go to work and come home, don't talk to anybody. Because you are there watch over." (Interviewee: Woman, 38 years, married; Interview date: 28.10.2017; Interview location: Zeytinburnu, X NGO office)

Another problem which they have encountered is the social exclusion. many of Uyghur refugees in Istanbul emphasize being labeled as "Chinese" by the local people. Uyghurs perceived it as humiliating and exclusion when they labeled by locals as a "Chinese".

"the children were very excluded in their schools. They called my kids Chinese. Then my children asked me "Mother we are Muslims, why they call us Chinese in here?" And I tried to explain this to my kids. "They call you Chinese by looking at your physical appearance since they do not know East Turkestan and East Turkestanis. We are of course Muslims and original Turks." (Interviewee: Woman, 38 years, married; Interview date: 28.10.2017; Interview location: Zeytinburnu, X NGO office):

### **Uyghurs Coming from Egypt**

After the prohibition of religious education and teaching in East Turkestan, some of Uyghurs who have good financial situation sent their children to Muslim countries especially to Egypt to learn Islamic knowledge. Egypt became the country that accepted the most Uyghur students. It is estimated that more than three thousand Uyghur students have receiving education in Egypt.

XUAR's new CCP boss Chen Quanguo insisted on unprecedeted extreme securitist, assimilationist chauvinist practices in the Uyghur region since January 2017 (Zenz&Leibold, 2018). However, XUAR administration has requested that students, especially those studying in Muslim countries, should return to China by putting the strain on them through their families. Students who returned to China following the call were immediately arrested at the airport or later imprisoned<sup>8</sup> (Human Rights Watchs, 2018: 144). The return has stopped with the spread of this news in abroad. Chen administration increased its pressure and after reaching an agreement with the Egyptian Administration on July 05, 2017, began to arrest the students in Cairo universities, especially those in Al-Azhar University (Chung 2018).

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<sup>8</sup> China Detains 12-Year-Old Uyghur Boy on Return to Xinjiang From Egypt, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/boy-07242017153914.html>, visited 25.05.2018.

The news of hundreds of students arrested and taken to China has created alarm among the Uyghur students in Egypt<sup>9</sup>. Those who could obtain Turkish visa fled to Turkey<sup>10</sup>.

According to the information obtained from SİM Foundation which is focused on Uyghur students coming to Turkey from Egypt, the sole number of students applying to them has reached 700 people. The number of students staying away from Eastern Turkestan NGOs due to various concerns is unknown. The problems that this group has faced in Turkey can be listed as follows:

- Since the connection with their parents was interrupted, they were financially challenged and the absolute majority run out of money. Especially the situation of those are who are married and have children is even worse.
- Due to the practices in the Turkish education system, it became impossible for the Uyghur students to resume their education from where they left off in Egypt.
- Those who were able to settle in universities through various channels started to work illegally at low salaries because they had no financial power to cover their daily living expenses, including tuition fees.
- Students generally suffered from mental breakdowns and psychological depression.

### **Conclusion**

The Uyghur refugees stated that they had to leave their homeland as a result of the assimilationist and discriminatory policies of China towards Uyghur. They came to Turkey with the idea that Chinese would no longer bother them and therefore they would live comfortably. Although Turkey has allowed these people to enter and live in Turkey, they were not given any legal status due to legislation and Chinese reservation.

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<sup>9</sup> Lisa Barrington, Egypt detains Chinese Uighur students, who fear return to China: rights group, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-china-uighur/egypt-detains-chinese-uighur-students-who-fear-return-to-china-rights-group-idUSKBN19S2IB>, visited:26.05.2018.

<sup>10</sup> Nour Youssef, Egyptian Police Detain Uighurs and Deport Them to China, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/asia/egypt-muslims-uighurs-deportations-xinjiang-china.html>, visited: 10.06.2018.

Therefore, they were unable to benefit from any of the facilities provided to the Syrians. This group, possessed by financial difficulties, hopelessness and psychological breakdown, has become open to various abuses. In fact, a considerable number of people were taken to Syria. The Turkish People and various charities have tried to look after these people who do not have any official status. Despite all the difficulties, whether it is refugees coming from Southeast Asia or students coming from Egypt, they continue to live on a minimum level with the support of various Turkish NGOs, especially the Eastern Turkestan NGOs in their respective provinces. It is very important that the state institutions act as soon as possible to solve the problems of the Uyghurs in both groups and to prevent them from being exploited by various organizations.

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## **LESSONS LEARNED: FINDINGS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE ASSISTANCE IN JORDAN**

**Maki NIIOKA \***

### **Background**

It has been exactly seventy years since thousands of Palestinians fled their homes into Jordan after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. They were hopeful to return home soon. Over the years, however, makeshift tents turned into concrete buildings and the Palestinian refugee camps today look like ordinary communities in any town. Currently, there are about 2.2 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan and 17% of them are living in 13 refugee camps. The largest of all in Jordan, Baqaa camp, has a population of nearly 120,000 and the number keeps growing. In 2009, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) established Training and Employment Centers (TEC) at four refugee camps, namely Baqaa, Irbid, Hitteen, and Souf, as bases of technical cooperation project ‘Capacity Development of Livelihood Improvement for Palestinian Refugees,’ in partnership with the Department of Palestinian Affairs under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Project aims to empower Palestinian refugees and enhance their roles in society through the following livelihood promotion programs.

The first is a self-employment program providing hands on skill trainings for women in their 30s and 40s to start home based businesses. The second is a wage employment program to help young men and women, mostly school dropouts, to find jobs. Finally, a behavioral change program, which goes in parallel with the wage employment program, has been developed to bring positive perception about women’s participation on economic activities by tackling ‘a culture of shame.’ The culture of shame is prevalent particularly at refugee camps where working women are perceived negatively and people are very conscious about how others think of them.

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\* Project Expert Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

### **Methodology of Survey**

To draw lessons learned, a quick survey was conducted by interviewing 24 female beneficiaries of the self-employment program. They were asked both qualitative and quantitative questions as follows; kind of business engaged, average monthly income and difficulties faced in continuing business at homes, strategies to overcome challenges they faced etc.

#### **1. Survey Results**

Of all the interviewees, 50% are in the age of between 40 and 50, 87% are married, 54% have 4-6 children, 62% are high school dropouts, 50% of their household heads are unemployed, and 42% receive assistance from the government, UNRWA, charity organizations, etc. With regards to the types of businesses the women are engaged in, 62% are in cosmetics, 54% in perfume, 29% in soap, and 1% in honey, dairy, detergent, respectively (many women are involved in more than one business). Forty six percent are in home based businesses more than 3 years. As for the average monthly income, 37% earn between 25JD and 50JD, 25% less than 25JD, 21% between 50JD and 100JD, and 17% more than 100JD. All of the women with more than 100JD earnings have been in businesses over 5 years whereas those who are with less than 25JD have just taken training courses and started production at home.

It has been found that 58% of the interviewees experienced difficulties in marketing their products. To overcome the problem, many women utilized SNS. They started advertising their products on their Facebook pages and created Whats App groups to spread information for wider audience. This was a very efficient way to reach potential customers as many women don't have mobility to sell their products even inside the camps because of socio-cultural barriers. The marketing problem is also linked to a lack of transportation. A woman in Prince Hassan camp found a marketing mediator who has a good connection with people outside the camp. She now depends on the mediator to sell her products while focusing only on the production of soaps and perfumes. Other women had difficulty in meeting demands from customers. For example, when women produce cosmetics such as moisturizers and whitening creams, they use pots and pans in the kitchen. It was a problem for a woman in Gaza camp because the productivity was low. She applied for a loan of 2,500JD at a local microfinance institution to purchase a production machine. It made her possible not only to produce cosmetics in a large volume with minimal effort but to increase the sales up to 300JD. As a mother of 9 children, she has more time taking care of them. Another woman in Gaza camp in dairy production business had the same problem of not meeting orders in a timely manner because she had to depend on a farm which doesn't deliver milk when needed. She decided to take a

loan of 1,000JD from her relatives and bought 6 goats. She is now able to secure stable supply of milk at home and produces yoghurt and cheese for sale.

### 3. Concluding Remarks

Here are some findings and recommendations for livelihood promotion projects through small business development:

- Fluctuation of income; know the characteristics of products (e.g., sales of cosmetics is high in summer and low in winter, dairy production is available mainly from March to October) and develop coping strategy accordingly,
- Competition in the market; think about value addition. Cheap imported products are easily found inside the camps so it is necessary either to raise quality or lower the price to sell their own products,
- Support from male members in family; persuade husbands in case they are not happy with wives going outside home to market products as they encounter non-family males,
- Non-traditional skill training courses; take women out of authentic businesses to male dominating field (plumbing, automobile mechanics, fixing mobile phones, mobile application development, etc.,),
- Targeting youth; mobilize unemployed and discouraged teens, often school dropouts, from dependency on parents and siblings by providing practical skill trainings of new technology meeting market needs,
- Importance of following up; check periodically with all the trainees about the progress after the training courses. When the trainees have a mentor to seek advice, they have fewer tendencies to discontinue despite difficulties. Following up with trainees enables a project implementer to identify the problems to be solved and get the ideas to refine the methodologies,
- Appropriate assistance to refugees; provide technical assistance, financial assistance or both? The project should carefully assess the trainees in the process of following up after skill training courses and select innovative entrepreneurs with serious commitment to qualify for financial assistance. In so doing, the risk for the project would be minimized and positive environment of competitiveness among the trainees would be generated.

# **ECONOMIC LIVES OF REFUGEES IN KENYA : PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM NAIROBI AND KAKUMA CAMP**

**Naohiko OMATA\***

## **1. Introduction**

Kenya currently hosts 490,000 refugees, making it the 10th largest refugee-hosting country in the world and the 4th largest in Africa, following Uganda, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (UNHCR 2017). Most of the refugees are from Somalia but Kenya also hosts refugees from South Sudan, Ethiopia, DRC, and Sudan. Refugees are concentrated in three main locations: the Dadaab camp, the Kakuma camp, and Nairobi.

Since the mass influx of Somali refugees in the early 1990s, Kenyan refugee policy has imposed significant restrictions on refugees' socioeconomic rights (Wagacha and Guiney 2008; Campbell et al. 2011). It has been described as a policy of 'abdication and containment': delegating responsibility to the international community and requiring refugees to reside in camps (Milner 2009). Its refugee policies contrast notably with those of neighbouring Uganda, which allows refugees the right to work and freedom of movement - just as Kenya had done during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, in spite of such restrictions, a number of studies and reports have documented the ways in which refugees in Kenya continue to be dynamic and important economic actors in the areas in which they reside. Kenya therefore represents an interesting context in which to examine the economic lives of refugees and their interactions with host communities within a seemingly constrained regulatory environment (Sanghi et al. 2016; Enghoff et al. 2010).

The Kenyan context offers an opportunity to further explore a particular, and still largely under-researched, question: 'What difference does it make – in economic terms – to be a refugee?' (See Betts et al. 2016).


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
We know from New Institutional Economics that markets are shaped by their institutional context (North 1990; Williamson 2000), including things such as property rights, the right to move, and the right to work shape people's interaction with markets. In Kenya, the institutional environment is fundamentally different for refugees as compared to host nationals. Yet parallel regulatory environments also can create particular constraints and opportunities for different groups. In particular, the contrast created by a dualistic regulatory structure may enable distinctive economic activities, notably based on arbitrage. So what do restrictions on refugees' socio-economic activities mean for their economic outcomes, in comparison to host nationals? And to what degree can such regulatory restrictions be considered a main factor in variation of economic outcomes for refugees and other groups?

In order to answer these questions, we draw upon data collected from our research conducted in Kenya between 2016 and 2017. We adopted a participatory, mixed methods approach to collect quantitative and qualitative data from both refugees and host communities in and around the Kakuma refugee camp and the capital city, Nairobi. By way of background to our two research sites, Kakuma, founded in 1991, hosts some 184,000 refugees and is located in Turkana County in north-western Kenya, less than 100 km from the Kenya-South Sudan border (see Map 1). It is jointly managed by UNHCR and the Camp Manager's Office, an authority under the national government's Ministry of Interior. The area has an arid climate and poor soil quality, and there is little agriculture. Indigenous Turkana people have historically relied upon nomadic livelihoods, although many are now taking advantage of alternative livelihood opportunities including business and urban employment. Most non-Turkana Kenyan people in the area are economic migrants who moved to Kakuma town to create businesses after the creation of the camp. Food rations are distributed to refugees by UNHCR and WFP. Thirteen implementing Partners (IPs) of UNHCR provide community services and support for livelihoods activities, including vocational training and village banking. A number of markets operate in different parts of the camp, and commercial activities inside the camp are tolerated by the camp authorities.

**Map 1: Kenya**




In Nairobi, our other research site, refugees face a different economic and regulatory environment. Despite the country's encampment policy, Kenya's capital hosts about 64,000 refugees, making it a home to 15% of the country's refugee population (see Map 2). By moving to the city, refugees give up almost all access to assistance. The city's 30,000 Somali refugees are concentrated in the well-known Eastleigh district of Nairobi, known as 'Little Mogadishu' (Carrier 2016). The presence of a large 'ethnic Somali' Kenyan population offers Somali refugees an opportunity for partial assimilation within Eastleigh (Lindley 2011). Other refugee groups in Nairobi, such as the Congolese, also tend to concentrate geographically but in smaller groups. In recent years, the number of Congolese refugees has increased to around 19,000. In contrast to the Somalis, they are scattered throughout the capital city, especially in suburb areas such as Kasarani, Kayole, Umoja, and Githurai. The Congolese tend to be Christian and Swahili-speakers and integrate relatively easily into Kenyan society.

**Map 2: Nairobi**

The primary purpose of this paper is to offer an overview of findings from our Kenya research across these sites. Our central conclusion is that, even in constrained regulatory environments, refugees engage in economic activities, and have significant and complex economic interactions with host communities. We suggest, in contrast to other recent work on the economic impact of refugees in Kenya, that important insights stem from data that comparatively analyses refugees and host communities across both urban and camp contexts.

The paper follows a particular analytical structure that moves from outcomes to explanations. After explaining our methodology, we outline the main findings of the report in terms of economic outcomes for refugees and hosts across a range of indicators that are tied to well-being, broadly divided into livelihoods, standard of living, and subjective measures of well-being. Next, we group our data relating to possible explanations for this variation in well-being into the following four broad sections: *regulation*, *networks*, *capital* and *identity*. As a more intuitive to think about these categories, one might re-phrase them as: ‘how you are governed’, ‘who you know’, ‘what you have’, and ‘who you are’. Then we present some practical implications before conclusion. This structure reflects the conceptual framework for the paper, which is illustrated below.



## 2. Methodology

This paper is based on a participatory, mixed methods approach, focusing on two of the three main refugee-hosting areas in Kenya: Kakuma and Nairobi. We conducted six-months of fieldwork between October 2016 and June 2017. We focused on Somali and Congolese refugees in Nairobi, and South Sudanese, Somali, and Congolese refugees in the Kakuma camp. In both contexts, we included the local host communities living in Nairobi and near to Kakuma camp in Turkana County within our research.

We sequenced qualitative and quantitative methods in each site. Initially, we used a range of qualitative tools, including unstructured and semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, transect walks, participatory livelihood mapping, and wealth breakdown exercises to understand the economic lives and interactions of refugees and hosts, and to establish trust within the communities. In addition to interviewing refugees and hosts, we undertook interviews with representatives of relevant government bodies, international organisations, and NGOs.

Next we moved to a large-scale survey ( $n=4355$ ) intended to generate representative data and enable comparative analysis. In and around Kakuma, we interviewed 1965 adults, of whom 1362 were refugees and 603 Turkanas. Of our final interview sample, 443 are Congolese, 456 are Somali, and 463 are South Sudanese. In Nairobi, we interviewed 2390 adults. Our sample was divided in four main strata: 701 Congolese refugees, 556 Somalis refugees, 567 Kenyans living in Congolese concentrated areas, and 566 Somali Kenyans.


The questionnaires for both refugees and hosts include modules on a range of themes such as demographics, economic activities, income, assets, networks, mobility, health and well-being. Sampling weights, clustering and stratification are taken into account in the analysis. 95% confidence intervals around the mean are illustrated in the figures below.

### **3. Economic Outcomes**

In this paper, we aim to describe and explain variation in economic outcomes within and between the refugees and host communities in Kenya. Here, we describe variation in economic outcomes in three areas: livelihoods, standards of living, and subjective well-being.


#### **Livelihoods**

Refugees are significantly less likely to have an economic activity than Kenyans. But employment rates and income levels vary by location. Those living in Nairobi are significantly more likely to be engaged in an economic activity, and those with a job earn on average more money than their counterparts in Kakuma.



**Figure 1 – Has an economic activity by gender**

(Each vertical line in the figure illustrates the 95% confidence interval around the mean)



**Figure 2 – Median monthly income by gender**

In Kakuma, the South Sudanese have the lowest rate of employment: only 13% of them have a livelihood. This is partly explained by the fact that many South Sudanese refugees arrived in the camp recently. About 50% of the South Sudanese who did have an economic activity are hired by an NGO as an ‘incentive worker’ – defined as an informal, non-contractual worker with an upper limit placed on monthly remuneration.

Compared to the South Sudanese, Congolese and Somali refugees are significantly more likely to have an economic activity. 73% of Congolese men and 59% of Congolese women have a livelihood. About half of these are employed by an NGO as incentive workers. For the Congolese, other popular activities include working in a beauty/hair salon, being a construction worker, having a small shop, or tailoring. While 42% of Somali men have an economic activity, only 24% of women do so. Compared to other nationalities, Somali refugees are less likely to be incentive workers, and more likely to work in their own shop.

About half of interviewees from the host population in Kakuma have an economic activity, but the types of work done by local hosts sharply differ from the activities undertaken by refugees; by far the most common activities for Turkana involve selling firewood or charcoal to refugees.

Inside Kakuma camp, around 5000 refugees work for UNHCR and its partner agencies as informal, non-contractual workers. Although they usually work full-time hours, they are given reduced, capped ‘incentive pay’ rather than a salary. Steven is a South Sudanese refugee who works as a community mobiliser at a UNHCR partner NGO. He has been in the role since 2015 and works to respond to community complaints relating to aid distribution. He works 6 days a week between 8am and 3pm, and earns 5500 KES per month. He explained how difficult it is for his household to survive off his incentive payments: “with my current salary, I am not able to afford basic items such as a mattress and food. But I cannot find any better job in Kakuma so I have no choice”.

Similar to Kakuma, in Nairobi there is considerable variation in socio-economic outcomes for refugees. Compared to Somali refugees, Somali Kenyans are more likely to have an economic activity, and the income from this activity is significantly higher. About 44% of Somali refugees have an economic activity, while 60% of Somali Kenyans have a job. For those working, the median income of Somali refugees is 15,000 KES per month, but 20,000 KES per month for Somali Kenyans. For both Somali and Somali Kenyans living in Eastleigh the most common livelihood is working in shops.



In comparison, many Congolese refugees find it a struggle to survive in Nairobi. One asset that Congolese refugees do have is their knowledge of Swahili. This often enables them to find work and to navigate the city's informal economy. However, the fact that many Congolese refugees find employment relatively easily in Nairobi does not mean that they are earning sufficiently. While 67% of men and 42% of women have a job, their income is substantially lower than other groups living in the capital. The median income of Congolese refugees with an economic activity, 7000 KES per month, is about half the median income of Kenyans living in the same areas.



### **Living Standards and Subjective Well-being**

As one might expect, living standards are on average higher in Nairobi than Kakuma. But, perhaps contrary to expectations, refugees are not always worse off than local host communities. Rather there is significant variation across contexts and nationalities.


In Kakuma, the vast majority of refugees depend at least partly upon food rations provided by aid organisations. This is particularly the case for more recently arrived South Sudanese. Food rations are generally considered to be inadequate and so households often pool their rations, regularly through so-called 'fictive households'. Compared to other nationalities, both South Sudanese refugees and Turkana locals are significantly worse off on several key indicators for well-being: they eat fewer meals per day, they are less likely to own a mobile phone or a television, and are less likely to have access to electricity.

Compared to Kakuma, living standards in Nairobi are relatively high, especially for Somali refugees and the host population. As shown in Figure 3 to 6, these groups eat 3 meals per day. About 90% of them have a mobile phone, 80% have a television, and almost all of them have access to electricity. In comparison, Congolese refugees in Nairobi are significantly worse off. They eat about 2 meals per day on average. Although most of them (87%) have a mobile phone, which is an indispensable device to access many economic opportunities and participate socially in Nairobi, only 51% of them have a television at home.

**Figure 3 – Number of meals per day****Figure 4 – Has a mobile phone**

**Figure 5 – Has a television****Figure 6 – Has electricity at home**

Subjective (self-assessed) well-being reveals a slightly different pattern, compared to relatively objective measures (see Figure 7). Across all contexts, Kenyans are significantly more satisfied with their lives than refugees. In Kakuma, Turkana people appear to be more satisfied than other groups, despite earning lower incomes and owning fewer assets than the Congolese and the Somali. In Nairobi, Congolese refugees are unsatisfied with their life, while other groups are neutral or rather satisfied.



**Figure 7 – Subjective well-being**

#### 4. Regulation

As discussed above, in Kenya refugees face a distinctive regulatory environment compared to host nationals. According to New Institutional Economics theory, market functioning is inherently shaped by the institutions that regulate them. In Kenya, refugees are operating within a particular economic governance framework, the most striking feature of which includes a dualistic regulatory framework stemming from policy and legal restrictions on refugees' right to work and mobility. However, in

practice, there is a de facto ‘legal pluralism’ within Kenya. Restrictions are differently enforced and implemented in different parts of the country, and in fact Kakuma and Nairobi represent different regulatory environments in the same country.

In Kakuma, refugees cannot move around freely due to encampment policy, and are not granted the right to work outside the camp. Although they can go into Kakuma town and other nearby areas, they cannot travel beyond these areas without the permission of the Kenyan Department for Refugee Affairs. To obtain permission they need special dispensation based on medical, education, or business ground although business reasons are frequently disallowed.

Refugees also face an additional set of Kakuma-specific rules. They are not allowed to keep livestock (cattle, goats, camels) or other animals because of concerns about fuelling tensions between refugees and Turkana people who own livestock. Refugees are also prohibited from cutting down trees for charcoal production since this is a main income source for many Turkana people.

On an informal level, refugees’ ability to run a business often relies upon being willing and able to pay bribes. Police officers target ‘unauthorised’ businesses such as pharmacies, clinics, boda-boda (motor-bike taxi) companies, and breweries, all of which require specific licenses in Kenya. According to one Congolese boda-boda driver:

There are 2 specific stopping points in the camp. 1) Hong Kong and 2) Near Angelina Jolie’s school. Every day, we have to pay 50 KES. If we pay once, they will not stop us again in the same day...If we resist the police or refuse to pay, they will take our motorbike and keep it at the police station. The police will also give us a ‘fine’ of 10,000 KES...


There was a clear difference in the way local host community members were treated by the police. When Turkana people were asked whether they experienced any police harassment or requests for a bribe; their responses were almost always ‘never’. These restrictions impose a set of constraints on refugees’ economic lives compared to the indigenous Turkana. Indeed, some refugees described the camps as a ‘half prison’, and refugees typically identified restrictions on their rights to move freely and to work outside the camp as significant obstacles for economic activity.

In Nairobi, refugees’ access to work and employment opportunities is structured differently compared to Kakuma. Although Kenya is viewed as a

country that does not allow refugees to work, there are differences in refugee policy enforcement between the national and local levels. One of the assistant chiefs of the local government acknowledged that in general the local government has historically been fairly tolerant: "Yes, we know the Kenyan national government employs a tough policy against refugees but at a community level, we are accommodating of them... most local governments do not really pay attention to legal status". Additionally, in spite of the encampment policy, refugees in Nairobi are legally able to obtain business licenses from the city council of Nairobi. For example, Anne-Marie, a Congolese refugee, who runs a hair salon in Nairobi, explained that she paid 9500 KES for a business license plus 5000 KES for a trade license and 4500 KES for a fire license. Her certificates, provided by the city council, were displayed on the wall of her salon. A legal officer of an NGO in Nairobi explained the seeming contradiction between the national government and the city council regarding refugees' right to work:

Provision of business licenses falls under the authority of a county government. This is a completely separate process from work permits issued by the Ministry of Interior...city council is not interested in refugee ID or registration status. Fees from business licenses are a part of city council's revenue so they do not exclude refugees as long as they pay it. In a way, city council does not discriminate between refugees and locals.

However, many of these contradictions – and the gap between national policy and local implementation – also create opportunities for the police to routinely extract bribes from refugees. In Nairobi, refugees are frequently and systematically subject to widespread police harassment. Refugees are significantly more likely to pay contributions to the police compared to Kenyans (Figure 8).



**Figure 8** – Had to pay a contribution to the police last month

## 5. Networks

Refugees' economic outcomes are shaped by their networks. Different connections shape economic opportunity structures and strategies in particular ways (Omata 2017; Buscher 2013; Palmgren 2013; Lindley 2010; Horst 2006). Additionally, refugees sometimes have economic networks that connect Kakuma and Nairobi, as well as transnational connections across Kenya, Africa, and globally. Specifically, these networks can be deployed in economically useful ways in order to access supply chains, remittances, and social protection; the impact of social networks on access to each of these resources are explored separately in the section below.

### Supply Chain

There is a commonly-held assumption that refugee camps are necessarily isolated and economically disconnected (See Betts et al. 2014). Although Kakuma is located in a remote area, several hours from the nearest major commercial hubs, it is nevertheless economically interconnected. A commercial bus service between Kakuma and Nairobi is run by the Somali Kenyan-owned bus company. This enables a range of commodities to enter

the camp, including clothing, shoes, household items, medicines, stationary, and cosmetics. Despite mobility restrictions, a non-negligible number of refugees travel within Kenya to purchase goods that are then sold in the camp. In Kakuma, the average income of refugees who travelled outside the camp for business reasons the year before the survey is about 14,000KES per month, which is 78% higher than the average income of refugees with an economic activity.

However, most refugee entrepreneurs establish supply chains by working with brokers. For example, many of the Somali owned shops in Kakuma are connected to wholesalers in Eastleigh. Fadumo is a Somali female refugee living in Kakuma camp; she came to Kakuma from Dadaab in 2009 and she has been selling female clothing since 2015. She buys clothes and fabric from Eastleigh through Kenyan middlemen in Nairobi and pay in Mpesa. Although she has never met the Kenyan middlemen, she was introduced to them through her own network of Somali shop owners. As Fadumo's story highlights, because of tight restrictions on refugees' mobility, most refugee shop owners rely on brokers for supply. These brokers are mostly Kenyans but occasionally refugees also act as brokers.

For some businesses in Eastleigh, supply chains are transnational, and may even extend beyond Africa. For instance, selling gold is a common Somali business in Eastleigh. Suad, a Somali woman who came to Eastleigh in 2006, has been trading gold for several years. In her shop located on the basement floor of a multi-story shopping mall, she explained, "I began this business in 2010. I am dealing in gold rings, necklaces, earrings, and bangles...I import gold items from Dubai through my Somali Kenyan business partner. He was my neighbour in Nairobi. He has a Kenyan passport so he is able to easily travel to Dubai."

### **Remittances**

Networks are especially important for access to remittances. In the absence of access to formal banking, refugees' transnational connections and the resulting money transfers are one of the main sources of business finance. In Kakuma, there are several Hawala (an informal system of money transfer) agencies operating inside the camp. According to Mustafa, a Somali employee at one of these agencies, there is considerable demand for money transfer:



We receive 250 customers per day during the first 10 days of every month. After that, 100–150 customers per day. Somali refugees account for the vast majority of our customers...Some Somali

refugees receive money 2–3 times a month... Remittances are from mainly US but also from UK, Australia and Canada. Some come from Puntland or Somaliland.

Larger Somali businesses tend to be especially reliant upon remittances. One of the owners of a large business in the camp is Mohamed, a Somali refugee who owns a grocery in Kakuma. His shop stands out in the camp with well-stocked items which he purchases mostly from Nairobi and Eldoret. He opened his grocery shop in 2013 with 500 USD sent by relatives in the US, where several members of his extended family are based. They continue to send 100–200 USD/month.

The impact of receiving overseas remittances was also significant amongst Nairobi's refugee communities. Often, large or medium-sized businesses, especially in Eastleigh, that are owned or co-owned by Somali refugees benefit from remittances sent by members of the diaspora. For instance, Katra is a Somali female refugee who operates a clothing business. She came to Eastleigh in 2006 and is officially registered in Nairobi. Her shop is co-owned with a cousin based in Minnesota, who was resettled to the US in 2005. They both contributed 5000 USD in start-up capital; the money was necessary to cover stock, rent, and license fees, for example.


Comparatively, refugees generally receive higher remittances than host nationals, especially Somali refugees. Additionally, refugees in Nairobi receive higher remittances than those in Kakuma. In Nairobi, 43% of Somalis refugees receive remittances compared to 36% of ethnic Somali Kenyans, while 23% of Congolese receive remittances compared to 28% of Kenyans living in the same neighbourhoods. In Kakuma, 35% of Somalis, 32% of South Sudanese, and 17% of Congolese refugees receive remittances, compared to just 19% of the Turkana (see Figure 9). Refugees also receive remittances at a mean level higher amount than host nationals (see Figure 10). Focusing on those receiving remittances, the median amount received in Nairobi is around 252,000 KES/year for Somalis, 60,000 for Congolese; 120,000 for Somali Kenyans, and 24,000 for other Kenyans. In Kakuma, the median amount received by those benefiting from remittances is around 63,000 for Somalis, 26,250 for South Sudanese, and 12,000 for Congolese, compared with around 6,000 for the Turkana.

**Figure 9** – Proportion receiving remittances**Figure 10** – Remittances: median amount received per year for those receiving money


### Social Protection

Social protection plays an important role in shaping economic well-being of refugees. It is often assumed that refugees' main source of protection comes from international organisations or NGOs. In practice, though, refugees themselves are an important source of social protection for other refugees. Indeed, our data from both Kakuma and Nairobi illustrates the critical role of different forms of social protection, with friends, family, and community being widely cited as far more important sources for social protection than international organisations.

In Kakuma and Nairobi, we asked refugees where they would be most likely to go if faced with different kinds of need. Figures 11 and 12 summarise a small part of these findings, showing that both refugees and host rely on their close networks if they have not enough food to eat or if they need money for an emergency, for example to purchase a medicine. Almost nobody would refer such challenges to UNHCR or an NGO.



**Figure 11** – Who would you ask if you were looking for 500 KES in an emergency, for example to purchase medicine?



**Figure 12 – Who would you ask if you did not have enough food to eat?**

Our qualitative research indicates that families and households offer an extremely important source of social protection. Interestingly, however, not all households have members who are necessarily related to one another through familial or genetic connections. So-called ‘fictive households’ often bring together members who were not previously related. In Kakuma, this practice was particularly prevalent among recently arrived South Sudanese refugees. For example, Rut is a member of such a fictive household. He is a 24-year-old South Sudanese refugee of Nuer ethnicity who came to Kakuma alone in 2014. He now lives as a member of a large household whose members are not kin-related:

**Q: With whom did you come to Kakuma?**

**A:** Alone – during the war, our family got separated.

**Q: Do you live with any other people now?**

**A:** Yes, there are 7 people in our shelter.

**Q: Who are these 7 people?**

**A:** We are all male south Sudanese refugees aged 19–25.

**Q: Are you related each other?**

**A:** None of us are related. 2 are from Equatoria ethnicity and 5 are from Nuer ethnicity.

**Q: How did you meet?**

**A:** We met at the reception centre when we arrived initially. We were put together to live in the same temporary shelter and got to know each other.

**Q: Why did you decide to live together?**

**A:** We have very little food so it is better to share it. We can also help each other in case of any trouble like illness.

**Q: How many of you are working now?**

**A:** No one. We all rely on food rations. We gather them and sell them to get money for other things also.

Over time, these artificial households sometimes work in ways that replicate the functions of a family. Elder refugees establish rules for appropriate behaviours or mentor younger or more vulnerable members of their household. For instance, in Rut's household, smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol is strictly prohibited regardless of their age. If anyone falls ill then other members of the household take care of that person. While all 7 members share daily household chores, those approaching graduation or important exams will be exempt.

## 6. Capital

Financial, human capital, and physical capital are essential for economic activity. Yet, refugees' access to credit, education, and health care are often different from those available to host country citizens. Where formal provision is limited, informal social institutions sometimes offer an alternative source of these forms of capital. Each one is important in its own right and has an impact on refugees' economic outcomes and well-being.

### Access to Finance

Refugees in Kenya are generally not allowed to open a bank account. This constraint is reflected in the data collected in Nairobi. While 30% of Somali Kenyans and 43% of Kenyans have a bank account, only 7% of Somali refugees and 2% of Congolese refugees have one. Access to banking is poor in Kakuma: only 3% refugees and hosts have a bank account.

According to a senior officer of refugee-supporting NGO in Nairobi, “refugees are virtually excluded from formal financial systems in Kenya because they [financial institutions] think that refugees can disappear at any time”. Exclusion from financial services poses a particular challenge for entrepreneurs who seek start-up capital for their businesses.

Although remittances can sometimes fill this gap, not all refugees have access to transnational networks. In the absence of access to Kenyan financial institutions, many refugees in Kakuma camp have looked for financial support from aid organisations. Compared to Nairobi where refugees have little access to humanitarian aid, there are several refugee-supporting organizations that provide finance for refugee entrepreneurs. Indeed, we interviewed several refugees who initiated joint-businesses with loans from UNHCR partners such as AAH, LWF and DRC. Most of these lending services are given to a group of refugees with a shared business idea and interest. Other refugees resorted to informal lending from within their own community. In Kakuma camp, Somali refugees obtained loans from members of the same clanship or Somali Kenyan business owners in Kakuma town.

Outside the camp where refugees generally lose access to humanitarian assistance from UNHCR and its partners, refugee entrepreneurs must seek alternative financial sources. As a means to obtain financial capital, some refugees in Nairobi create rotating savings and credit associations. In particular, within the Somali community, there are numerous ‘ayutos’, a type of community savings mechanism. Fatuma, a Somali female refugee, who has run an ayuto since 2011, explained its importance for refugees:


Now we have 17 members. Every Friday, each member gives 1500 KES. One person will get this total... In Eastleigh, we need to start business to secure our bread, medicine and police bribe [on our own]. But it is not easy to get a loan for us. We don't have documents and ID card which formal banks request. This is the only way to get initial capital.

Refugees with limited access to financial capital often work together to fill in this gap. Some refugees formed a business consortium with other fellow refugees to reduce the burden of common expenditures. For example, there was a group consisting of 7 Congolese refugee tailors in Nairobi. They rented a working space from a Kenyan landlord and shared the rent of 5000 KES and electricity bills while their work remained individual and they did not share profits amongst members. Interestingly, however, some members in this group shared a sewing machine – one form of physical capital – which they co-purchased by putting together their limited savings.

### Education

Refugees living in Kakuma camp are on average better educated than the Turkana. Refugees living in the camp have on average 6.4 years of formal education, while the Turkana only have 2.4 years of formal education (Figure 13). In contrast, Kenyans living in Nairobi are better educated than the refugees: they have accomplished more years of education. Overall, men receive greater access to formal education than women.

Inside Kakuma camp, we came across a number of refugee-led informal schools. Amongst South Sudanese communities in particular, there were several schools that focused on teaching basic language skills in English and Swahili for new arrivals. Somali refugees also founded madrassa schools for their children. These educational facilities set up by refugees exist outside formal schooling systems that are built by UNHCR.




**Figure 13 – Years of education by gender**

In Nairobi, refugees often benefit from vocational and entrepreneurial educational support provided by refugee-led Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). One such CBO, Refugee Care, was established by a Congolese refugee pastor in 2016, and has been operating in refugee-concentrated areas in Nairobi such as Kayole and Umoja. It offers refugees vocational support, including language training and business development counselling. An executive board member described the organisation's work:

Currently, there are about 350 beneficiaries. They are all refugees, mainly Congolese but also some Burundians and Ethiopians...We live closely with our beneficiaries so we understand what kind of problems they face here... [As part of entrepreneurship support] We have been assisting 42 widows to build their own income source. Many of them are now selling bitenge...Congolese know bitenge well and it is relatively easy to start [with limited resource].

### **Health**

In order to measure health, our questionnaire included 6 questions to assess the health of refugee and host populations. On a scale from 0 "no difficulty" to 4 "extreme difficulty", respondents had to evaluate how much difficulty they have in (1) standing for long periods, (2) taking care of their household responsibilities, (3) learning a new task, (4) joining community activities, (5) concentrating, and (6) walking. Figure 14 reports the average score obtained by respondents. Although self-reporting, findings show that refugees' health is significantly worse on average than the host community's. This is particularly true for South Sudanese refugees living in Kakuma, and Congolese refugees living in Nairobi.



**Figure 14 – Health score (higher scores are worse)**

Having sound health is crucial for refugees' economic survival. But in general, refugees face a challenge in this area. In Nairobi, as a UNHCR partner agency, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) provides health support for refugees by referring those with special medical needs to a hospital and providing mobile medical services to self-settled refugees. The acting Director of NCCK emphasised the importance of good health for urban refugees:

Urban refugees need to be self-reliant [to cover their medical expenses] but not all of them are able to do so...Many of them are engaged in casual labour so if they don't work, they don't have bread for that day. Health is a critical issue for refugees.

NCCK's concern is particularly relevant to Congolese refugees since the vast majority of them are working in Nairobi's informal sector without any medical leave. As the comments of some interviewees implied, they seem to be working for long hours regularly.

Having good health is of course important for refugees in the camp too. Given limited access to lucrative economic opportunities inside Kakuma, as explained above, some refugee households send their members to urban commercial hubs to diversify income sources. Typically, this split household

strategy requires relatively young members in good health because such internal migration necessitates physical and mental strength in addition to finance.

## 7. Identity

As “identity economics” has begun to recognise, identity has significant economic implications (Akerlof and Kranton 2010). This has been highlighted by sociologists and anthropologists as important for understanding refugees’ socio-cultural integration. Gender, ethnicity, and religion, for instance, and the complex interactions between them, sometimes enable or constrain a range of economic strategies and outcomes.

### Ethnicity

A specific example of the role of one facet of identity is ethnicity. The Banyamulege Congolese, frequently called “Tutsi Congolese”, comprising around 12,000 of Nairobi’s 19,000 Congolese refugees, have a large community association within Nairobi called CBCRK. Jacques, a chairperson of the CBCRK, explained the mission of his organisation.

Our aim is to improve the daily life of Banyamulenge [Congolese] refugees...In DRC...we had conflictual relationship with other tribes...Because we had so many plights in DRC, our tribes are so united...In Nairobi, our target areas include health, education, livelihoods, legal, security, social issues. We also assist with funerals and weddings.

Similarly, in Kakuma, strong internal bonds based on ethnicity were important for the welfare of members of that group. This was most evident among South Sudanese refugees, who are largely divided into Nuer and Dinka groups. The South Sudanese refugee chairperson of the Nuer Association Council of Elders in Kakuma camp, explained:

[We have] 2000 [members] but membership is growing due to recent influxes... only Nuer can be our members...The main purpose is to unite 4 different clans of Nuer and to bring together all Nuer in the camp...[We do] many things. If one of us is arrested by the police, we will negotiate with police to release him or her. We also provide in-kind support for vulnerable groups such as orphans, chronically ill, and those who need medical assistance...We collect 1 cup of maize or flour from members every month and sell it to food buyers in order to make some cash. This is our main income source for the organisation. In addition, sometimes, we get assistance from diaspora members abroad.

### **Religion**

Religious and faith-based organisations often provide direct material assistance in Nairobi, usually based (even if not explicitly) on a shared religious identity. In Nairobi, several Congolese churches have formed a consortium called the “Alliance of Refugee Churches in Nairobi”. It comprises 20–30 churches which meet every 3-months to share experiences and identify ways to collaborate. The churches provide not only moral and spiritual encouragement to refugees but also food, rent subsidies, counselling, and financial support to the most vulnerable. Simon, a pastor from one of the biggest Congolese churches in Nairobi called “Release International Mission” – which has more than 1500 members (mostly Congolese refugees but some Burundian, Rwandan, Ethiopian, and Kenyans too) – illustrates how religious institutions serve as a first provider of aid for refugees:

We give temporary shelters and food for new arrivals. They can sleep there for several nights or even a few weeks. We request donations from members for these new arrivals...We offer some food and rent support for vulnerable people like widows and orphans. We give tuition subsidiary for children. We are providing micro-loans for refugee entrepreneurs though the amount is limited. For one person, we can give only 5000–6000 KES. So far we have 70 recipients.

As a result, churches are often the “first stop” for newly arrived Congolese refugees, and are referenced as being able to give concrete guidance on the complex systems of refugee registration processes for new arrivals and teach newcomers how to survive in Nairobi as refugees.

### **Gender**

In Kakuma, female South Sudanese refugees play a particularly active role in the resale of food rations to local traders. This secondary market appears to be systematically organised by several women groups in the camp. Within Kakuma, there are specific sites where women will meet after receiving food rations to group food items in order to sell in bulk at a fixed price. Each has a representative member that negotiates pricing in order to avoid competition between the groups. One of these representatives in Kakuma informed us that many of them came to Kakuma ‘with empty hands’ and were single heads of households. She explained that the majority of them had limited educational and business backgrounds and therefore had to find alternative means of survival that did not require much initial capital or technical expertise.

In Nairobi, a considerable number of Congolese female refugees are involved in selling bitenge (a brightly coloured fabric). Congolese women have a reputation regionally for their interest in fashion, and are renowned as connoisseurs of bitenge, which are also popular amongst Kenyan women. In choosing to sell bitenge, female hawkers capitalise upon a cultural asset. One of the Congolese bitenge sellers we interviewed, Gentille, explained why she chose to hawk bitenge in Nairobi:

Bitenge is from Congo. It is our culture. Congolese know better than others about bitenge. We are experts! ...When we sell, we wear bitenge. Kenyans say they want to wear the same dress like me. Interestingly, bitenge hawkers in Nairobi typically work in groups of 4-5 refugees and travel together. Gentille, who works with 3 other Congolese female refugees, told us that this is a protection strategy in case of trouble, such as police arrest or mugging on streets.

As these examples illustrate, in both the camp and the city, many female refugees engage in distinctive economic activities, and frequently collaborate with other women of the same nationality within small cooperatives.

## 8. Implications

This report represents the preliminary analysis of our data from Kenya. Nevertheless, the insights from both quantitative and qualitative data offer a range of implications for researchers, practitioners and policy-makers.

### Working Under Constraints

There is often a common assumption that in host countries that do not allow the right to work, little can be done to promote refugees' economic participation and market based approaches to assistance. But even when there is no formal right to work, refugees engage in diverse forms of economic activity. A significant proportion still have an economic activity, whether through formal employment or self-employment. Even though most refugees in camps receive food rations, these are usually regarded as insufficient, and a good number of refugee men have an income generating activity. In urban areas, little assistance is available, and nearly all refugees in Nairobi need to be economically independent and make ends meet without relying on humanitarian aid. The challenge for international public policy makers is to find ways to support refugees' economic participation that can be reconciled with political sensitivities and legal barriers.

### **Recognising Legal Pluralism**

Even in the same country, regulation on refugees' economic participation may be interpreted and implemented differently in different local contexts. Although Kenya's 2006 Refugee Act places limitations on refugees' right to work and freedom of movement, there is significant variation in its implementation. In practice, Kakuma and Nairobi represent different regulatory environments for refugees. Put simply, there is a system of de facto legal pluralism. Different levels and types of socio-economic participation are tolerated across these different contexts partly because of local politics and partly because of challenges relating to enforcement. In Kakuma, there are specific restrictions placed on refugees such as the ban on firewood collection and ownership of livestock, for example, but refugee employment with UNHCR and NGOs is tolerated, and refugees are usually allowed to run small businesses. In Nairobi, both Somalis in Eastleigh and the Congolese in other neighbourhoods have a high degree of economic autonomy. The policy implication is clear: it is necessary to look beyond the national level policy or legislation in order to recognise sub-national variation in practice.

### **Understanding Social Protection**

An important source of social protection for refugees appears to come not from international organisations and NGOs but from refugees themselves. Although food rations are important for many refugees in Kakuma, in the event of an emergency, food shortages, or a security issue, refugees are more likely to turn to their own networks, including friends, family, and neighbours than to aid agencies. Refugees' own networks are among the most important sources of protection and assistance for refugees, and yet they are rarely acknowledged or supported by international policy-makers. They should be routinely recognised, mapped, and supported.

### **Building A Model**

We have outlined the basis of a model to explain variation in economic outcomes for refugees and hosts. The preliminary model's value is not just academic but, with refinement, may be relevant to policy. This is because it implicitly highlights the areas in which advocacy, programming, and policy should focus in order to enhance economic outcomes, and relationships between refugees and hosts; specifically, regulation, networks, identity, and capital. In each of these areas, refugees and hosts face distinctive opportunities and constraints, all with implications for particular economic

outcomes. Strengthening opportunities and reducing constraints in each of these areas holds the key to enhancing well-being, and improving refugee-host interactions.

### **9. Conclusion - Improving Economic Governance**

Refugees have distinctive economic lives compared to hosts. This paper shows that a range of economic outcomes can be improved by enhancing opportunities relating to regulation, networks, capital, and identity. At both macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, appropriate interventions can make a difference to the lives of refugees.

But who is responsible for economic policy relating to refugees and hosts? Formally, of course, it is host governments. However many host governments lack the political will or capacity to set or update such policies. More broadly speaking, where could policy competencies and deep knowledge reside and how could economic policies be designed, regularly updated, and implemented for major refugee-hosting contexts around the world? How could a global framework for such policies be created, and what would be needed to adapt this to particular national and local contexts? What role might UNHCR, the World Bank, governments, businesses, NGOs, refugees, and academia play in building this type of enhanced institutional capacity? What should be the relationship between levels of governance: global, national, local, municipal, and even camp-level? To what extent is the inclusion of refugees in national development plans, for example, an adequate basis for such policies?

In any context, markets function or fail based on the institutional and policy context within which they are regulated. Every major refugee hosting context should have an economic policy and strategy specifically for refugees and the immediate host community, based on robust analysis and consultation.

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# **JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA)'S ASSISTANCE FOR THE FORCIBLY DISPLACED IN CONFLICT- AFFECTED COUNTRIES**

**Miyoko TANIGUCHI\***

## **1. Introduction**

By the end of 2016, 65.6 million individuals had been forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations (UNHCR, 2017), the highest number of people since World War II. While the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) continues to grow, so does their length of time in displacement. In response to this humanitarian crisis, a strong consensus emerged at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 among Member States regarding the need for humanitarian and development sectors. In the same year, at the UN Summit, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was adopted by world leaders. Accordingly, the Japanese government expressed its strong commitment to helping to reduce the refugee crisis, mainly through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the implementing agency of Japan's official development assistance (ODA), under the approach of a "humanitarian and development nexus." In this context, this article is divided into three parts: (i) the JICA's assistance for the forcibly displaced; (ii) the JICA's assistance in the Middle East; and (iii) challenges, lessons, and future considerations for the humanitarian and development nexus based on these experiences.

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## 2. The JICA's Assistance for the Forcibly Displaced

Today, protracted refugee situations<sup>1</sup> are the norm rather than the exception, in accordance with the change in the nature of conflicts, which are characterized by their longevity, intractability, high recurrence, and mutability (ICRC, 2017). These situations stem from political impasses that prevent conflicts from being resolved and stop refugees from returning home voluntarily in safety and dignity or from integrating into their countries of asylum.

The conflict in Syria continues to produce protracted refugee situations that are some of the most compelling humanitarian challenges confronting host governments around the world. Syrian refugees, whose number increased to 5.3 million in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018), generally continue to have limited rights in host countries, being deprived of freedom of movement, recourse to any system of justice, and legal employment, while most continue to lack the necessary resources to meet their basic needs. As the majority of refugees are living in host communities, tension between refugees and their host communities over scarce resources has intensified. This shift has forced humanitarian and development aid agencies to develop new strategies to manage the challenges of working with forcibly displaced persons.

In this context, the JICA has increased assistance for the forcibly displaced in the mid and long term, in line with the above-mentioned recent global trends. At the UN World Summit for Refugees and Migrants, Japanese Prime Minister Abe announced the provision of seamless assistance to both refugees and host communities, from humanitarian or emergent aid to economic development. Japan has committed to providing assistance of about 2.8 billion US dollars between 2016 and 2018, as humanitarian and self-reliance aid to refugees and migrants, and as assistance to host countries and communities. Consequently, the JICA will (i) assist through maximization of its strengths and practices as an aid agency, (ii) promote the nexus between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, and (iii) increase the presence of Japan through the visibility of its assistance and the dissemination of effective information. Where recurrence of conflict is high, the JICA is taking an approach of improving

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<sup>1</sup> A protracted refugee situation, as defined by the UNHCR, is one in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five or more years in a given asylum country. The UNHCR estimates that the average length of major protracted refugee situations is now 26 years. Twenty-three of the 32 protracted refugee situations at the end of 2015 have lasted for more than 20 years.

governance and strengthening the relationship between government and people.

In contrast to the conventional approach that focuses more on countries in transition to peace, the new approach of the JICA lies in direct assistance for both host communities and countries, even those in conflict, and refugees through the easing of social tensions, promotion of local integration, the building of refugees' self-reliance, and the strengthening of local governance. For instance, assistance for refugees in host countries includes (i) reconstruction of community infrastructure, (ii) technical and financial assistance to national and local governments, (iii) livelihood and food security for the self-reliance of refugees, (iv) human resource development for refugees, and (v) promotion of co-existence with local populations. Assistance for countries in a state of conflict and fragility includes (i) capacity building of local government to deliver services, including IDPs, (ii) capacity building of national and local governments to deliver services to IDPs, and (iii) maintenance of the capacity of a government to provide basic services to people who remain in the country.

### **3. JICA Assistance for the Middle East: Comprehensive Assistance toward Stabilization**

Situations in the Middle East are such that (i) the number of refugees and IDPs from Syria and Iraq remains at a high level, (ii) the humanitarian crisis continues, (iii) the burden on neighboring countries is excessive, and (iv) concern is high about the expansion of violent extremism owing to political confusion and high unemployment rates. In response, the JICA is promoting the resolution of root cause of the instability from a long-term perspective, supporting the recovery and development of the region. Actions undertaken by the JICA are (i) assistance for stabilization through economic and social development and human resource development in the Middle East, including Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, (ii) dispatch of JICA experts for refugees, and (iii) acceptance of Syrian students at the post-graduate level to foster human resources to contribute to the recovery of Syria in the future.

The living conditions of Syrian refugees across the region continue to be extremely challenging. For example, in Jordan, 80 percent of Syrian refugees living outside of camps are living below the poverty line, while more than 76 percent of Syrian refugees are below the poverty line in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2018). Historically, Jordan and Lebanon have both received large-scale influxes of refugees from Palestine, Iraq, and Syria, which have become a serious burden in social, economic, and political terms for Jordan and Lebanon, as shown by the high number of refugees in

proportion to their geographical size and populations. Worse, the conditions for Syrian refugees may deteriorate even further because the ongoing war in Syria is making the return of the refugees in the foreseeable future unlikely.

The legal status of “Syrian refugees” contributes to their vulnerable position in the host countries. Neither Jordan nor Lebanon has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol. Thus, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registers Syrians as de facto refugees under international law, though this designation does not confer any legal rights within national jurisdictions. Jordan introduced a new law to give Syrian refugees temporary protected status so that the refugees could access public services, apply for work permits, and seek recourse from the criminal justice system. By contrast, lacking a national framework for refugee protection, Lebanon restricted access to its territory and even encouraged the refugees to return to Syria; it also restricted legal residency for the refugee community to decrease the number of Syrians in the country, heavily affecting the UNHCR’s ability to execute its international protection mandate (Janmyr, 2018).

Given the above context, the JICA has been putting its new approach into practice to assist Syrian refugees in severely affected host countries. In the case of Jordan, there are three levels of assistance: national, local and sectoral, and grassroots. By combining various assistance schemes, the JICA has been increasing assistance in Jordan, including financial assistance through loans, in relation to the water supply, livelihoods, and disability; through technical cooperation and IT product and human resource development, bringing in the private sector; and refugee camp assistance through Japanese volunteers. In the same way, for Lebanon, the JICA is helping in the formulation of a project on road reconstruction and job creation through loans and education, and in improving the water supply through technical cooperation. Those efforts are based on the idea of sharing burdens and responsibilities in international communities, which will become more important under the Global Compact on Refugees to be agreed among all Member States of the United Nations in 2018.

#### **4. Challenges, Lessons Learned, and Considerations: For a Humanitarian and Development Nexus**

Along with the implementation of programs and projects on the ground, some challenges, lessons learned, and considerations for the humanitarian and development nexus are identified in the following. First, the fluidity and mobility of refugees sometimes become an issue for development projects whose design has been based on the assumption that the target beneficiaries

are living in a specific geographical area, and which are often required to guarantee accountability for the effects of their aid. Due to the nature of refugees, who often travel from one place to another, be it for personal reasons or government policy, it is difficult to trace beneficiaries and assess the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of aid after the completion of a project. To overcome these issues, creative approaches and methods should be developed, together with new guidelines or frameworks, in response to the changing needs of the present global situation.

Second, the legal status and various rights of refugees in host countries should be carefully reviewed when assistance is being formulated and specific projects are being designed, because host countries may not necessarily sign international conventions on refugees. Besides, policy toward refugees in host countries and the rights given to refugees sometimes change in accordance with domestic politics and/or diplomatic deals with the international community, as do refugees' needs from humanitarian and development aid. Thus, the type of assistance given to Syrian refugees should be carefully assessed with reference to the rights given to the refugees, especially in relation to residence permits, land use, and working permission, in host countries that are the official counterparts of the development agency.

Third, political sensitivity over Syrian refugees should be understood at both national and local levels as having the potential to result in political destabilization in host countries and even in the whole region. For instance, the policy on Syrian refugees in Lebanon is caused by the near-paralysis of the government related to the delicate sectarian balance between Sunni and Shia communities. The fragile sectarian situation and the fact that Hezbollah, the leading Shia Lebanese political actor, has been actively supporting the regime in Syria, have strained Lebanon's capacity to receive large numbers of Sunni refugees (Ferris and Kemal, 2016). Furthermore, social tension between Syrians and Lebanese in host communities has become apparent (ARK, 2018). Thus, aid allocation should be balanced between host communities and refugees to avoid further social tension and the politicization of refugees, in compliance with the "Do No Harm" principle.

Fourth, various types of assistance can be combined by a development agency for refugees and host communities/countries. If the host countries are categorized as "middle or higher-income countries," they are not eligible for "grant aid" under the JICA's regulations. In such cases, the JICA may provide soft or concessional loans for infrastructure development that contributes to the economic and social development and stability for the host communities/countries. It may not be politically viable for a host

government to make loans for refugees because the protracted presence of refugees on a massive scale is generally regarded as a serious burden by constituencies and stimulates competition for access to resources. Thus, a development agency can play a significant role in sharing responsibility for peace and stability, maximizing its comparative advantages through collaborative work with humanitarian aid agencies that directly assist refugees.

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## **REFUGEE PROBLEM: IS IT A THREAT ON TURKEY'S NATIONAL SECURITY?**

**Haluk KARADAĞ\***

There have been more than 300,000 newly born babies of Syrian refugees and 3.5 million Syrian population have been living in Turkey today<sup>1</sup>. This amazing numbers alone underlines the significant importance and future complications of the refugee problem for Turkey. With its 80 million population, including its government, agencies and people, she is trying to help those people who are suffering since 2011. During period of civil war in Syria, Turkey spent 30 billion US dollars to the people who need immediate humanitarian aid<sup>2</sup>. Today some of the refugees are living in 26 refugee camps and others are living in all 81 cities of Turkey<sup>3</sup>. The educational status of these people is also poor. 33% of the refugees had never gone to a school and 13% of them had learned Arabic with their own efforts<sup>4</sup>. So, illiteracy is common among this community. However these statistics are reflecting only Syrian side of the story. Other than that, refugees from countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and Bangladesh are staying and start living in Turkey (Figure-1). To explain briefly, no countries accepted such amount of refugees in the near history.

These entire phenomenon expressed above have been made overall situation more complicated for Turkey. Besides the economic, socio-cultural,

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
<sup>1</sup> Bülent Sarioğlu, "More than 300,000 'stateless' Syrian Babies Born in Turkey: Refugee Subcommittee", Hurriyet Daily News (2018), Retrieved from: <http://www.hurriyedailynews.com/more-than-300-000-stateless-syrian-babies-born-in-turkey-refugee-subcommittee-128494>

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and educational problems, security is emerging as another important factor for the host country. But there are also some precipitating causes for the security concerns. We analyze here in this paper these causes under several subcategories to understand the security issue. First focus will be on combatants which are known as ‘fighters’, who fought in a –terrorist-organization before. The term ‘fighter’ defines a person who still have tendency to violence and it is easy for him to commit a crime again. He also sees no reason to be a member of any criminal organization, such a kind of ‘mafia’. Second focus will be on smuggling and human trafficking. Third focus will be on male/female prostitution.



**Figure-2** Distribution of Irregular Migrants by Citizenship by Year

### Trend of Violence

There are two kinds of jihadists we will consider here in this study. The ones which still have connections with former organizational bodies and others have no connections with these organizational structures. While pressure increased on radical Islamist militants in Syria and Iraq they tend to cut loose from the organizations which they were part of. So, militants are seeking to find a way to change their positions and hide their identities. Neighboring countries seem best place to hide in and perfect destination to

start a new life. Although changing their names and life stories, they may still have connections with previous organizational bodies<sup>5</sup>. This is the main characteristic makes these people dangerous and puts them under ‘risky’ category.

We categorize second group which has no connection with former organizational bodies. Tremendous number of illiterate, untrained and unskilled people starts facing with other kinds of problems when they pass thorough other country. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs give a satisfactory information to understand the psychology of these groups. After crossing the borders of host country, the *safety needs* step is met by the authorities but the other steps also need to be satisfied. A failure in satisfaction –which are rarely successful- triggers people to find an illegal way for survival. In the Syria case due to the civil war most of the people sent their families to the safer neighboring countries, mostly Turkey, and joined to an armed group to fight. After certain years some tired of fighting, quit the –terrorist- organization and going back to join their families<sup>6</sup>. However, it is difficult to accommodate themselves to the situation in the new place and primary challenge here is to find an appropriate job for a suitable wage. Owing to the fact that new country, new rules and new social norms might turn out the optimistic expectations into painful facts in the new life of the displaced family. Post traumatic disorder may change their attitudes and incites them easily to commit a crime. So, conditions before he or she had lived may cause jihadists to exhibit criminal behavior depending on past vicious experiences.

### **Smuggling and Human Trafficking**


Smuggling and human trafficking is another serious concern for Turkey. These type of immigration, irregular migration, increases the number of immigrants without any governmental control in the country. (Figure-2) The billion-dollar business makes smuggling and human trafficking popular among some of those people in the region. Despite the difficulty of taking full control of borderline of 911 kilometers, Turkey has constructed a 764 km concrete security wall with other alternative security measures such as patrol routes, manned and unmanned towers, thermal cameras, and remote-controlled weaponry systems to prevent or at least

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<sup>5</sup> T24 News, Güvenlik Uzmanlarından IŞİD uyarısı: Yaklaşık 900 cihatçı Türkiye'ye döndü; tehlike geçmiş değil. <http://t24.com.tr/haber/guvenlik-uzmanlarından-isid-uyarisi-yaklasik-900-cihatci-turkiyeye-dondu-tehlike-gecmis-degil,477590>

<sup>6</sup> BBC Turkish, Guardian: Eski IŞİD militanları sınırda Türkiye'ye geçiyor. <http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-41249672>

minimize the number of illegal smuggling and human trafficking<sup>7</sup>. However there still will be attempts to penetrate the border in the future. Drug and cigarette trafficking are the ones mostly threatening Turkey in this business. 3,160 people arrested from drug trafficking trade in Turkey in 2017. These numbers are the indicators of deteriorating situation of struggle with the public health and financial security concerns.



**Figure-2** The Number of Irregular Migrants Between 2005-2018<sup>8</sup>

Human trafficking is also old issue in today's world. There are myriads of examples to human trafficking especially in some African and Asian countries. Townsend and Mili explained tragedy of human trafficking in their article with examples from Afghanistan and Pakistan as shown below:

Robbery, petty crime and trafficking in various goods are common means of subsistence for terrorist cells. ‘The muja-

<sup>7</sup> Daily Sabah, “Turkey Finishes Construction of 764-km Security Wall on Syria Border”, <https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2018/06/09/turkey-finishes-construction-of-764-km-security-wall-on-syria-border>

<sup>8</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, Irregular Migration, (Retrieved from) [http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/irregular-migration\\_915\\_1024\\_4746\\_icerik](http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/irregular-migration_915_1024_4746_icerik)

hideen in *Tajikistan* routinely kidnap children and release them after extorting ransom, steal people's belongings, including their livestock'...Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain, who leads Pakistan's hunt for al-Qa'ida militants in northwestern Pakistan, explained in his speech 'boys whose average age is 16 or 17 years, and it is my assessment that most of them have either been kidnapped or they were sold...and after bringing them here, these [boys] are used for terrorism'. Whether smuggled or trafficked, most youths are reported to come from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup>

Smuggling is at the heart of criminal enterprises<sup>10</sup>. So, it needs to be tightly controlled by the authorities.

### **Male/Female Prostitution**

Recently there appeared male or female prostitutions' stories in some European media. Refugees fleeing to other countries especially EU countries with the hope of finding a better life. However they are facing with realities and starting to earn money by resorting to illegal ways. These unfortunate people spend most of their funding to the human smugglers and start to live below the host countries poverty line. Then there left no money to spend for living. Most of these people have also no work to do and earn a living. So, all scenario can be explained as desperate attempt to survive. In Turkey, it is really difficult to find clues on illegal prostitution issue but in some European countries we can openly see some cases. For example according to the independent survey made by DPA in Germany there are young refugees (especially males) between the ages of 20 to 25 from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Syria earning money thorough prostitution. In Frankfurt, AIDS Assistance group claims actual numbers are high among refugees who serves as prostitutes<sup>11</sup>. These cases show us that desperation among refugees could be source of social breakdown in the community and nurture the illegal ways of making money.

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<sup>9</sup> Jacob Townsend and Hayder Mili, "Human Smuggling and Trafficking: An International Terrorist Security Risk?", CTC Centinel Journal, (May 2008), Vol.1, Issue 6.

<sup>10</sup> Andrew Wong, "A Multibillion-dollar Criminal Network is Being Fuelled by Inadequate Refugee Policies", CNBC News, (Retrieved from) <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/27/refugee-crisis-fuelling-criminal-network-and-human-trafficking.html>

<sup>11</sup> Anna Kristina Bückmann and Ira Schaible, 'It's about survival': Why young male refugees are turning to prostitution. The Local de. (Retrieved from) <https://www.thelocal.de/20170522/its-about-survival-why-young-male-refugees-are-turning-to-prostitution>

### **Conclusion**

Sample cases explained above reveal the security concerns which Turkey could be facing off in the near future. It is not only because Turkey has borderline with problematic (weak) states. Refugees also come from distant countries, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Congo. Our focus, here in this paper, specifically point out the dangers which originated from immigration. We sort out the perils of immigration for host country under three categories; violence/terrorism, smuggling/human trafficking and male/female prostitution. Three of these concerns have potential to affect economic, human, personnel and community security in the country. Turkey, with 26 refugee camps scattered all around, and near 85 percent of immigrants are living outside of these camps –most of them are living under lower standards of life with very low wages- would be facing off problematic situation in the near future. In addition to that it seems a serious problem to integrate some refugee communities into the Turkish culture, language and daily life. In conclusion refugee problem is a problem of mankind not only neighboring countries, effects every other nation in the world, and comprehensive solution has belonged to be humanity.

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## **HUMAN SUPPORT AND HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT IN THE RURAL AREAS**

**Yuki ONOGI\***

### **SYRIAN PEOPLE IN RURAL AREAS**

- No food/ non food item support provided by any agency
- Living in tent or temporal shelter: 54%
- Families with a pregnant woman: 5%
- Children without taking vaccination: 57%
- Families with elderly people: 5%
- Families without regular incomes: 33%
- Monthly income was less than minimum wage
- Main incomes : from daily agriculture/ factory work
- Children in school: 20%

(Data was collected from 534 families in 2016)

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\* PARCIC - Representative in Turkey



### HUMAN SUPPORT IN THE HOST COMMUNITIES

Who	What
Mokhtar, Turkish neighbours	<b>Food, kitchen tools, blankets,</b> <b>mattresses</b>
House/land owners	-Free utilities such as gas, water, electricity -free rent fee or at cheap price
Mokhtar	<b>Wood as fuel in the winter</b>

### FOOD AND NON FOOD ITEM SUPPORT



### MICRO GARDENING




## CHILDREN IN RURAL AREAS





## LOCAL COMMUNITIES



## SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMMES IN TURKEY

Who	What
Ministry of Family and Social Policies	Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) 120 TL/person/ month
Ministry of Family and Social Policies	The Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE)
Ministry of Health	Free general medical examination at designated hospitals
Ministry of Interior	Citizenship