# PARMENIDES

*The great philosopher Parmenides is the central figure of this dialogue. He, not Socrates, directs the philosophical discussion—if Plato has a 'spokesman' here, it is Parmenides. Socrates is portrayed as a very bright and promising young philosopher—he is virtually a teenager, only just beginning his career in the subject—who needs to think a lot harder and longer before he will have an adequate grasp of the nature of reality: this Socrates is a budding metaphysician, not the purely ethical thinker of* Apology *and other 'Socratic' dialogues.*

*Accompanied by his disciple Zeno (originator of Zeno's paradoxes), Parmenides has come on a visit to Athens. At Pythodorus' house, after Zeno has read out his book (now lost) attacking the intelligibility of any 'plurality' of real things, Socrates questions Zeno and is then questioned by Parmenides about his own conception of reality as consisting of nonphysical, nonperceptible 'Forms' in which perceptible, physical entities 'participate'. Parmenides raises six difficulties that Socrates' view entails, including the celebrated 'third man' argument to which twentieth-century analytical philosophers have paid much attention. Concluding the first part of the dialogue, he explains the method of analysis which Socrates must now use in order to resolve them—Socrates' efforts to articulate a theory of Forms have been premature. One must consider systematically not just the consequences of any hypothesis, but also those of its denial, and the method involves other complexities as well: one must systematically consider eight different trains of consequences, in order to decide finally what the right way of putting one's thesis will be. In the second part of the dialogue, occupying more than two-thirds of its total length, Parmenides demonstrates this new method, using as his respondent not Socrates but one of the other young men present, Aristotle. (In choosing this name, Plato may have been alluding to the philosopher Aristotle, who began his own metaphysical work as a member of Plato's Academy.) Considering the 'hypothesis' of 'one being', he works out a series of eight conflicting 'deductions' (plus a ninth, 155e–157b, added as an appendix to the first two) as to its metaphysically significant properties—its being, unity, sameness and difference, similarity and dissimilarity, motion and rest, place, time, and so on. It is left to Socrates, and to the reader, to infer just what use to make of these deductions in determining how best to formulate an adequate theory of Forms. Since the theory that Socrates presented at the beginning of the dialogue is plainly the one developed in* Symposium, Phaedo, *and* Republic, *this dialogue seems to be implying that that theory of Forms needs refurbishing and that, in demonstrating his method,*

*Parmenides has shown us how to do that.* Parmenides *thus points forward to* Sophist, Statesman, *and* Philebus, *where Forms are further rethought.*

*The meeting of Socrates with the Eleatic philosophers (an invention of Plato's) is reported in a way unparalleled in the other dialogues. The narrator, Cephalus—a different Cephalus from the one in whose house the* Republic's *conversation takes place—speaks directly to the reader (as Socrates himself does in* Republic*), telling of his visit to Athens from his home in Clazomenae, accompanied by a group of Clazomenian philosophers. (Clazomenae was famous as the birthplace of the pre-Socratic 'physical' philosopher Anaxagoras.) They have come specially to hear Antiphon, in fact Plato's younger half brother, recite from memory the record of this conversation: he had heard it from Pythodorus. Cephalus now reports what Antiphon said, in himself reporting what Pythodorus had told him the various speakers on the original occasion had said to one another: four levels of conversation, counting the one Cephalus is having now with an undetermined group—us, the readers. The effect is twofold: to emphasize the extraordinary philosophical value of this conversation and to put us hearers at a great intellectual distance from it—as if to say that we could barely be expected to assimilate and learn properly from it. The situation in* Symposium *is in some ways comparable—except that the meeting there is reported at only two removes and its fame apparently extends only to those with a personal interest in Socrates (one intimate of Socrates has just reported it to a second and is now reporting it to another friend).* This *conversation is marked as having truly universal significance.*

*J.M.C.*

## Cephalus

126 When we arrived in Athens from home in Clazomenae, we ran into Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace. Adeimantus took me by the hand and said, "Welcome, Cephalus. If there is anything you want here that we can do for you, please tell us."

"In fact that's the very reason I'm here," I replied, "to ask a favor of you."

"Tell us what you want," he said.

b And I replied, "Your half brother on your mother's side – what was his name? I've forgotten. He would have been a child when I came here from Clazomenae to stay before – and that's a long time ago now. I think his father's name was Pyrilampes."

"It was, indeed," he said.

"And his?"

"Antiphon. But why do you ask?"

"These men are fellow citizens of mine," I said, "keen philosophers, and they have heard that this Antiphon met many times with a friend of Zeno's

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called Pythodorus and can recite from memory the discussion that Socrates c
and Zeno and Parmenides once had, since he heard it often from Pythodorus."

"That's true," he said.

"Well, we want to hear that discussion," I replied.

"Nothing hard about that," he said. "When Antiphon was a young man, he practiced it to perfection, although these days, just like the grandfather he's named for, he devotes most of his time to horses. But if that's what's called for, let's go to his house. He left here to go home just a short time ago, but he lives close by in Melite."

After this exchange, we set off walking and found Antiphon at home 127
engaging a smith to work on a bit of some kind. When he had finished with the smith, and his brothers told him why we were there, he recognized me from my earlier visit and greeted me. We asked him to go through the discussion, and he balked at first – it was, he said, a lot of work. But finally he narrated it in detail.

Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the Great Panathenaea. Parmenides was already quite venerable, b
very gray but of distinguished appearance, about sixty-five years old. Zeno was at that time close to forty, a tall, handsome man who had been, as rumor had it, the object of Parmenides' affections when he was a boy. Antiphon said that the two of them were staying with Pythodorus, outside c
the city wall in the Potters' Quarter, and that Socrates had come there, along with a number of others, because they were eager to hear Zeno read his book, which he and Parmenides had just brought to Athens for the first time. Socrates was then quite young.

Zeno was reading to them in person; Parmenides happened to be out. Very little remained to be read when Pythodorus, as he related it, came d
in, and with him Parmenides and Aristotle – the man who later became one of the Thirty. They listened to a little of the book at the very end. But not Pythodorus himself; he had heard Zeno read it before.

Then Socrates, after he had heard it, asked Zeno to read the first hypothesis of the first argument again; and when he had read it, Socrates said, e
"Zeno, what do you mean by this: if things[1] are many, they must then be both like and unlike, but that is impossible, because unlike things can't be like or like things unlike? That's what you say, isn't it?"

"It is," said Zeno.

"If it's impossible for unlike things to be like and like things unlike, isn't it then also impossible for them to be many? Because, if they were many, they would have incompatible properties. Is this the point of your arguments – simply to maintain, in opposition to everything that is commonly said, that things are not many? And do you suppose that each of your arguments is proof for this position, so that you think you give as

1. Lit., "the things that are."

many proofs that things are not many as your book has arguments? Is
128 that what you're saying – or do I misunderstand?"

"No," Zeno replied. "On the contrary, you grasp the general point of the book splendidly."

"Parmenides," Socrates said, "I understand that Zeno wants to be on intimate terms with you not only in friendship but also in his book. He has, in a way, written the same thing as you, but by changing it round he tries to fool us into thinking he is saying something different. You say in
b your poem that the all is one, and you give splendid and excellent proofs for that; he, for his part, says that it is not many and gives a vast array of very grand proofs of his own. So, with one of you saying 'one,' and the other 'not many,' and with each of you speaking in a way that suggests that you've said nothing the same – although you mean practically the same thing – what you've said you appear to have said over the heads of the rest of us."

"Yes, Socrates," said Zeno. "Still, you haven't completely discerned the truth about my book, even though you chase down its arguments and
c follow their spoor as keenly as a young Spartan hound. First of all, you have missed this point: the book doesn't at all preen itself on having been written with the intent you described, while disguising it from people, as if that were some great accomplishment. You have mentioned something that happened accidentally. The truth is that the book comes to the defense of Parmenides' argument against those who try to make fun of it by
d claiming that, if it[2] is one, many absurdities and self-contradictions result from that argument. Accordingly, my book speaks against those who assert the many and pays them back in kind with something for good measure, since it aims to make clear that their hypothesis, if it is many,[3] would, if someone examined the matter thoroughly, suffer consequences even more absurd than those suffered by the hypothesis of its being one. In that competitive spirit, then, I wrote the book when I was a young man. Someone made an unauthorized copy, so I didn't even have a chance to decide
e for myself whether or not it should see the light. So in this respect you missed the point, Socrates: you think it was written not out of a young man's competitiveness, but out of a mature man's vainglory. Still, as I said, your portrayal was not bad."

"I take your point," Socrates said, "and I believe it was as you say. But
129 tell me this: don't you acknowledge that there is a form, itself by itself,[4]

2. I.e., the all (cf. 128a8–b1).

3. In English we normally speak of a hypothesis *that* something is the case. Instead, Zeno here, and later Socrates and Parmenides, regularly place the content of a hypothesis within an "if" clause, ready for us to draw out its implications and consequences: e.g., "if the all is one, then . . . ," or "if the all is many, then. . . ."

4. According to the usage of this dialogue, something is "itself by itself," first, if it is separate from other things or is considered on its own, apart from other things. When the phrase is construed in this way, "by itself" means "apart, on its own." Second,

of likeness, and another form, opposite to this, which is what unlike is? Don't you and I and the other things we call 'many' get a share of those two entities? And don't things that get a share of likeness come to be like in that way and to the extent that they get a share, whereas things that get a share of unlikeness come to be unlike, and things that get a share of both come to be both? And even if all things get a share of both, though they are opposites, and by partaking of them are both like and unlike themselves, what's astonishing about that?

"If someone showed that the likes themselves come to be unlike or the b
unlikes like – that, I think, would be a marvel; but if he shows that things that partake of both of these have both properties, there seems to me nothing strange about that, Zeno – not even if someone shows that all things are one by partaking of oneness,[5] and that these same things are many by partaking also of multitude. But if he should demonstrate this thing itself, what one is, to be many, or, conversely, the many to be one – at this I'll be astonished.

"And it's the same with all the others: if he could show that the kinds c
and forms[6] themselves have in themselves these opposite properties, that would call for astonishment. But if someone should demonstrate that I am one thing and many, what's astonishing about that? He will say, when he wants to show that I'm many, that my right side is different from my left, and my front from my back, and likewise with my upper and lower parts – since I take it I do partake of multitude. But when he wants to show that I'm one, he will say I'm one person among the seven of us, d
because I also partake of oneness. Thus he shows that both are true.

"So if – in the case of stones and sticks and such things – someone tries to show that the same thing is many and one, we'll say that he is demonstrating *something* to be many and one, not the one to be many or the many one – and we'll say that he is saying nothing astonishing, but just what all of us would agree to. But if someone first distinguishes as separate the forms, themselves by themselves, of the things I was talking about a moment ago – for example, likeness and unlikeness, multitude and oneness, rest and motion, and everything of that sort – and then shows e
that in themselves they can mix together and separate, I for my part," he said, "would be utterly amazed, Zeno. I think these issues have been

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something is "itself by itself," if it is itself responsible for its own proper being, independently of other things. When the phrase is understood in this way, "by itself" means "in virtue of, or because of, itself." Both of these meanings should be kept in mind whenever this phrase recurs in the translation.

5. In this dialogue Plato uses the expression *to hen* in several ways. It is variously translated as "the one," "oneness," and "one" depending on the context.

6. In this dialogue Plato uses three different abstract expressions to specify these entities, two of which occur here: *genos* (a term restricted to the part of the dialogue preceding the "Deductions"), rendered as "kind," and *eidos*, rendered as "form." Later he will use a third term, *idea*, rendered as "character."

handled with great vigor in your book; but I would, as I say, be much more impressed if someone were able to display this same difficulty, which you and Parmenides went through in the case of visible things, also
130 similarly entwined in multifarious ways in the forms themselves – in things that are grasped by reasoning."

Pythodorus said that, while Socrates was saying all this, he himself kept from moment to moment expecting Parmenides and Zeno to get annoyed; but they both paid close attention to Socrates and often glanced at each other and smiled, as though they admired him. In fact, what Parmenides said when Socrates had finished confirmed this impression. "Socrates," he
b said, "you are much to be admired for your keenness for argument! Tell me. Have you yourself distinguished as separate, in the way you mention, certain forms themselves, and also as separate the things that partake of them? And do you think that likeness itself is something, separate from the likeness we have? And one and many and all the things you heard Zeno read about a while ago?"

"I do indeed," Socrates answered.

"And what about these?" asked Parmenides. "Is there a form, itself by itself, of just, and beautiful, and good, and everything of that sort?"

"Yes," he said.

c "What about a form of human being, separate from us and all those like us? Is there a form itself of human being, or fire, or water?"

Socrates said, "Parmenides, I've often found myself in doubt whether I should talk about those in the same way as the others or differently."

"And what about these, Socrates? Things that might seem absurd, like hair and mud and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and worthless? Are
d you doubtful whether or not you should say that a form is separate for each of these, too, which in turn is other than anything we touch with our hands?"

"Not at all," Socrates answered. "On the contrary, these things are in fact just what we see. Surely it's too outlandish to think there is a form for them. Not that the thought that the same thing might hold in all cases hasn't troubled me from time to time. Then, when I get bogged down in that, I hurry away, afraid that I may fall into some pit of nonsense and come to harm; but when I arrive back in the vicinity of the things we agreed a moment ago have forms, I linger there and occupy myself with them."

e "That's because you are still young, Socrates," said Parmenides, "and philosophy has not yet gripped you as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you begin to consider none of the cases beneath your notice. Now, though, you still care about what people think, because of your youth.

"But tell me this: is it your view that, as you say, there are certain forms from which these other things, by getting a share of them, derive their
131 names – as, for instance, they come to be like by getting a share of likeness, large by getting a share of largeness, and just and beautiful by getting a share of justice and beauty?"

"It certainly is," Socrates replied.

"So does each thing that gets a share get as its share the form as a whole or a part of it? Or could there be some other means of getting a share apart from these two?"

"How could there be?" he said.

"Do you think, then, that the form as a whole – one thing – is in each of the many? Or what do you think?"

"What's to prevent its being one,[7] Parmenides?" said Socrates.

"So, being one and the same, it will be at the same time, as a whole, in b
things that are many and separate; and thus it would be separate from itself."

"No it wouldn't," Socrates said. "Not if it's like one and the same day. That is in many places at the same time and is none the less not separate from itself. If it's like that, each of the forms might be, at the same time, one and the same in all."

"Socrates," he said, "how neatly you make one and the same thing be in many places at the same time! It's as if you were to cover many people with a sail, and then say that one thing as a whole is over many. Or isn't that the sort of thing you mean to say?"

"Perhaps," he replied. c

"In that case would the sail be, as a whole, over each person, or would a part of it be over one person and another part over another?"

"A part."

"So the forms themselves are divisible, Socrates," he said, "and things that partake of them would partake of a part; no longer would a whole form, but only a part of it, be in each thing."

"It does appear that way."

"Then are you willing to say, Socrates, that our one form is really divided? Will it still be one?"

"Not at all," he replied.

"No," said Parmenides. "For suppose you are going to divide largeness itself. If each of the many large things is to be large by a part of largeness d
smaller than largeness itself, won't that appear unreasonable?"

"It certainly will," he replied.

"What about this? Will each thing that has received a small part of the equal have something by which to be equal to anything, when its portion is less than the equal itself?"

"That's impossible."

"Well, suppose one of us is going to have a part of the small. The small will be larger than that part of it, since the part is a part of it: so the small itself will be larger! And that to which the part subtracted is added will e
be smaller, not larger, than it was before."

"That surely couldn't happen," he said.

7. Removing the brackets in a10–11.

"Socrates, in what way, then, will the other things get a share of your forms, if they can do so neither by getting parts nor by getting wholes?"

"By Zeus!" Socrates exclaimed. "It strikes me that's not at all easy to determine!"

"And what do you think about the following?"

"What's that?"

132 "I suppose you think each form is one on the following ground: whenever some number of things seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems to be some one character, the same as you look at them all, and from that you conclude that the large is one."

"That's true," he said.

"What about the large itself and the other large things? If you look at them all in the same way with the mind's eye, again won't some one thing appear large, by which all these appear large?"[8]

"It seems so."

"So another form of largeness will make its appearance, which has emerged alongside largeness itself and the things that partake of it, and b in turn another over all these, by which all of them will be large. Each of your forms will no longer be one, but unlimited in multitude."

"But, Parmenides, maybe each of these forms is a thought,"[9] Socrates said, "and properly occurs only in minds. In this way each of them might be one and no longer face the difficulties mentioned just now."

"What do you mean?" he asked. "Is each of the thoughts one, but a thought of nothing?"

"No, that's impossible," he said.

"Of something, rather?"

"Yes."

c "Of something that is, or of something that is not?"

"Of something that is."

"Isn't it of some one thing, which that thought thinks is over all the instances, being some one character?"

"Yes."

"Then won't this thing that is thought to be one, being always the same over all the instances, be a form?"

"That, too, appears necessary."

"And what about this?" said Parmenides. "Given your claim that other things partake of forms, won't you necessarily think either that each thing is composed of thoughts and all things think, or that, although they are thoughts, they are unthinking?"[10]

"That isn't reasonable either, Parmenides," he said. "No, what appears d most likely to me is this: these forms are like patterns set in nature, and

8. Alternatively: "If you look at them all in the same way with the mind's eye, won't some one large again appear, by which all these appear large?"

9. Alternatively: "But, Parmenides, maybe each of the forms is a thought of these things."

10. Alternatively: "or that, although they are thoughts, they are not thought?"

other things resemble them and are likenesses; and this partaking of the forms is, for the other things, simply being modeled on them."

"If something resembles the form," he said, "can that form not be like what has been modeled on it, to the extent that the thing has been made like it? Or is there any way for something like to be like what is not like it?"

"There is not."

"And isn't there a compelling necessity for that which is like to partake of the same one form as what is like it?"[11] e

"There is."

"But if like things are like by partaking of something, won't that be the form itself?"

"Undoubtedly."

"Therefore nothing can be like the form, nor can the form be like anything else. Otherwise, alongside the form another form will always make its appearance, and if that form is like anything, yet another; and if the form 133 proves to be like what partakes of it, a fresh form will never cease emerging."

"That's very true."

"So other things don't get a share of the forms by likeness; we must seek some other means by which they get a share."

"So it seems."

"Then do you see, Socrates," he said, "how great the difficulty is if one marks things off as forms, themselves by themselves?"

"Quite clearly."

"I assure you," he said, "that you do not yet, if I may put it so, have an inkling of how great the difficulty is if you are going to posit one form b in each case every time you make a distinction among things."

"How so?" he asked.

"There are many other reasons," Parmenides said, "but the main one is this: suppose someone were to say that if the forms are such as we claim they must be, they cannot even be known. If anyone should raise that objection, you wouldn't be able to show him that he is wrong, unless the objector happened to be widely experienced and not ungifted, and consented to pay attention while in your effort to show him you dealt with many distant considerations. Otherwise, the person who insists that they are necessarily unknowable would remain unconvinced." c

"Why is that, Parmenides?" Socrates asked.

"Because I think that you, Socrates, and anyone else who posits that there is for each thing some being, itself by itself, would agree, to begin with, that none of those beings is in us."

"Yes – how could it still be itself by itself?" replied Socrates.

"Very good," said Parmenides. "And so all the characters that are what they are in relation to each other have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. And whether one posits the d

11. Removing the brackets in e1.

latter as likenesses or in some other way, it is by partaking of them that we come to be called by their various names. These things that belong to us, although they have the same names as the forms, are in their turn what they are in relation to themselves but not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in this way are *of* themselves but not *of* the forms."

"What do you mean?" Socrates asked.

"Take an example," said Parmenides. "If one of us is somebody's master or somebody's slave, he is surely not a slave of master itself – of what a
e master is – nor is the master a master of slave itself – of what a slave is. On the contrary, being a human being, he is a master or slave of a human being. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself; and, in the same way, slavery itself is slavery of mastery itself. Things in us do not have their power in relation to forms, nor do they have theirs in relation to us; but, I repeat, forms are what they are *of* themselves and in relation
134 to themselves, and things that belong to us are, in the same way, what they are in relation to themselves. You do understand what I mean?"

"Certainly," Socrates said, "I understand."

"So too," he said, "knowledge itself, what knowledge is, would be knowledge of that truth itself, which is what truth is?"

"Certainly."

"Furthermore, each particular knowledge, what it is, would be knowledge of some particular thing, of what that thing is. Isn't that so?"

"Yes."

"But wouldn't knowledge that belongs to us be of the truth that belongs to our world? And wouldn't it follow that each particular knowledge that
b belongs to us is in turn knowledge of some particular thing in our world?"

"Necessarily."

"But, as you agree, we neither have the forms themselves nor can they belong to us."

"Yes, you're quite right."

"And surely the kinds themselves, what each of them is, are known by the form of knowledge itself?"

"Yes."

"The very thing that we don't have."

"No, we don't."

"So none of the forms is known by us, because we don't partake of knowledge itself."

"It seems not."

"Then the beautiful itself, what it is, cannot be known by us, nor can the
c good, nor, indeed, can any of the things we take to be characters themselves."

"It looks that way."

"Here's something even more shocking than that."

"What's that?"

"Surely you would say that if in fact there is knowledge – a kind itself – it is much more precise than is knowledge that belongs to us. And the same goes for beauty and all the others."

"Yes."

"Well, whatever else partakes of knowledge itself, wouldn't you say that god more than anyone else has this most precise knowledge?"

"Necessarily."

"Tell me, will god, having knowledge itself, then be able to know things d
that belong to our world?"

"Yes, why not?"

"Because we have agreed, Socrates," Parmenides said, "that those forms do not have their power in relation to things in our world, and things in our world do not have theirs in relation to forms, but that things in each group have their power in relation to themselves."

"Yes, we did agree on that."

"Well then, if this most precise mastery and this most precise knowledge belong to the divine, the gods' mastery could never master us, nor could their knowledge know us or anything that belongs to us. No, just as we e
do not govern them by our governance and know nothing of the divine by our knowledge, so they in their turn are, for the same reason, neither our masters nor, being gods, do they know human affairs."

"If god is to be stripped of knowing," he said, "our argument may be getting too bizarre."

"And yet, Socrates," said Parmenides, "the forms inevitably involve these objections and a host of others besides – if there are those characters 135
for things, and a person is to mark off each form as 'something itself.' As a result, whoever hears about them is doubtful and objects that they do not exist, and that, even if they *do*, they must by strict necessity be unknowable to human nature; and in saying this he seems to have a point; and, as we said, he is extraordinarily hard to win over. Only a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some kind, a being itself by b
itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will discover that and be able to teach someone else who has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself."

"I agree with you, Parmenides," Socrates said. "That's very much what I think too."

"Yet on the other hand, Socrates," said Parmenides, "if someone, having an eye on all the difficulties we have just brought up and others of the same sort, won't allow that there are forms for things and won't mark off a form for each one, he won't have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesn't allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the c
same. In this way he will destroy the power of dialectic[12] entirely. But I think you are only too well aware of that."

"What you say is true," Socrates said.

"What then will you do about philosophy? Where will you turn, while these difficulties remain unresolved?"

12. The Greek word is *dialegesthai*, which could instead be translated as "discourse," or untechnically as "conversation."

"I don't think I have anything clearly in view, at least not at present."

"Socrates, that's because you are trying to mark off something beautiful, and just, and good, and each one of the forms, too soon," he said, "before
d you have been properly trained. I noticed that the other day too, as I listened to you conversing with Aristotle here. The impulse you bring to argument is noble and divine, make no mistake about it. But while you are still young, put your back into it and get more training through something people think useless – what the crowd call idle talk. Otherwise, the truth will escape you."

"What manner of training is that, Parmenides?" he asked.

"The manner is just what you heard from Zeno," he said. "Except I was
e also impressed by something you had to say to him: you didn't allow him to remain among visible things and observe their wandering between opposites. You asked him to observe it instead among those things that one might above all grasp by means of reason and might think to be forms."

"I did that," he said, "because I think that here, among visible things, it's not at all hard to show that things are both like and unlike and anything else you please."

"And you are quite right," he said. "But you must do the following in addition to that: if you want to be trained more thoroughly, you must not
136 only hypothesize, if each thing is, and examine the consequences of that hypothesis; you must also hypothesize, if that same thing is not."

"What do you mean?" he asked.

"If you like," said Parmenides, "take as an example this hypothesis that Zeno entertained: if many are,[13] what must the consequences be both for the many themselves in relation to themselves and in relation to the one, and for the one in relation to itself and in relation to the many? And, in turn, on the hypothesis, if many are not, you must again examine what the consequences will be both for the one and for the many in relation
b to themselves and in relation to each other. And again, in turn, if you hypothesize, if likeness is or if it is not, you must examine what the consequences will be on each hypothesis, both for the things hypothesized themselves and for the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. And the same method applies to unlike, to motion, to rest, to generation and destruction, and to being itself and not-being. And, in a word, concerning whatever you might ever hypothesize as being or as not being or as having any other property, you must examine the
c consequences for the thing you hypothesize in relation to itself and in relation to each one of the others, whichever you select, and in relation to several of them and to all of them in the same way; and, in turn, you must examine the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to whatever other thing you select on each occasion, whether what you hypothesize you hypothesize as being or as not being. All this you must

13. Alternatively: "if [things] are many," or "if there are many."

do if, after completing your training, you are to achieve a full view of the truth."

"Scarcely manageable, Parmenides, this task you describe! And besides, I don't quite understand," he said. "To help me understand more fully, why don't you hypothesize something and go through the exercise for me yourself?"

"For a man my age that's a big assignment, Socrates," he said. d

"Well then," said Socrates, "you, Zeno – why don't you go through it for us?"

And Antiphon said that Zeno laughed and said, "Let's beg Parmenides to do it himself, Socrates. What he's proposing won't be easy, I'm afraid. Or don't you recognize what a big assignment it is? Indeed, if there were more of us here, it wouldn't be right to ask him – it's not fitting, especially for a man his age, to engage in such a discussion in front of a crowd. Ordinary people don't know that without this comprehensive and circu- e
itous treatment we cannot hit upon the truth and gain insight. And so, Parmenides, I join with Socrates in begging you, so that I too may become your pupil again after all this time."

When Zeno had finished speaking, Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that he too, along with Aristotle and the others, begged Parmenides not to refuse, but to give a demonstration of what he was recommending. In the end Parmenides said: "I am obliged to go along with you. And yet I feel like the horse in the poem of Ibycus.[14] Ibycus compares himself to a horse – a champion but no longer young, on the point of drawing a chariot 137
in a race and trembling at what experience tells him is about to happen – and says that he himself, old man that he is, is being forced against his will to compete in Love's game. I too, when I think back, feel a good deal of anxiety as to how at my age I am to make my way across such a vast and formidable sea of words. Even so, I'll do it, since it is right for me to oblige you; and besides, we are, as Zeno says, by ourselves.

"Well then, at what point shall we start? What shall we hypothesize b
first? I know: since we have in fact decided to play this strenuous game, is it all right with you if I begin with myself and my own hypothesis? Shall I hypothesize about the one itself and consider what the consequences must be, if it is one or if it is not one?"

"By all means," said Zeno.

"Then who will answer my questions?" he asked. "The youngest, surely? For he would give the least trouble and would be the most likely to say what he thinks. At the same time his answer would allow me a breathing space."

"I'm ready to play this role for you, Parmenides," Aristotle said. "Because c
you mean me when you say the youngest. Ask away – you can count on me to answer."

14. Ibycus frg. 6 (Page 1962). Ibycus of Rhegium (sixth century B.C.) was best known for his love poems.

"Very good," he said. "If it is one,[15] the one would not be many, would it?"—"No, how could it?"—"Then there cannot be a part of it nor can it be a whole."—"Why?"—"A part is surely part of a whole."—"Yes."—"But what is the whole? Wouldn't that from which no part is missing be a whole?"—"Certainly."—"In both cases, then, the one would be composed of parts, both if it is a whole and if it has parts."—"Necessarily."—"So in
d both cases the one would thus be many rather than one."—"True."—"Yet it must be not many but one."—"It must."—"Therefore, if the one is to be one, it will neither be a whole nor have parts."—"No, it won't."

"Well, then, if it doesn't have a part, it could have neither a beginning nor an end nor a middle; for those would in fact be parts of it."—"That's right."—"Furthermore, end and beginning are limits of each thing."—"Doubtless."—"So the one is unlimited if it has neither beginning nor end."—"Unlimited."—"So it is also without shape; for it partakes of neither
e round nor straight."—"How so?"—"Round is surely that whose extremities are equidistant in every direction from the middle."—"Yes."—"Furthermore, straight is that whose middle stands in the way of the two extremities."—"Just so."—"So the one would have parts and be many if it partook of either a straight or a curved shape."—"Of course."—"There-
138 fore it is neither straight nor curved, since in fact it doesn't have parts."—"That's right."

"Furthermore, being like that, it would be nowhere, because it could be neither in another nor in itself."—"How is that?"—"If it were in another, it would surely be contained all around by the thing it was in and would touch it in many places with many parts; but since it is one and without parts and does not partake of circularity, it cannot possibly touch in many places all around."—"It can't."—"Yet, on the other hand, if it were in itself, its container would be none other than itself, if in fact it were in itself; for
b a thing can't be in something that doesn't contain it."—"No, it can't."—"So the container itself would be one thing, and the thing contained something else, since the same thing will not, as a whole at any rate, undergo and do both at once. And in that case the one would be no longer one but two."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"Therefore, the one is not anywhere, if it is neither in itself nor in another."—"It isn't."

"Then consider whether, since it is as we have said, it can be at rest or in motion."—"Yes, why not?"—"Because if it moves, it would either move
c spatially or be altered, since these are the only motions."—"Yes."—"But the one surely can't be altered from itself and still be one."—"It can't."—"Then it doesn't move by alteration at least."—"Apparently not."—"But by moving spatially?"—"Perhaps."—"And if the one moved spatially, it surely would either spin in a circle in the same location or change from one place to another."—"Necessarily."—"Well then, if it spins in a circle, it must be poised on its middle and have other parts of itself that move

15. The hypothesis could also be rendered "if one is." But cf. Parmenides' statement above at 137b.

round the middle. But how will a thing that has nothing to do with middle or parts manage to be moved in a circle round its middle?"—"Not at all."—"But by changing places does it come to be here at one time, there at another, and move in this way?"—"If in fact it moves at all."—"Wasn't it shown that it cannot be anywhere in anything?"—"Yes."—"Then is it not even more impossible for it to *come* to be?"—"I don't see why."—"If something comes to be in something, isn't it necessary that it not yet be in that thing – since it is still coming to be in it – and that it no longer be entirely outside it, if in fact it is already coming to be in it?"—"Necessarily."—"So if anything is to undergo this, only that which has parts could do so, because some of it would already be in that thing, while some, at the same time, would be outside. But a thing that doesn't have parts will not by any means be able to be, at the same time, neither wholly inside nor wholly outside something."—"True."—"But isn't it much more impossible still for a thing that has no parts and is not a whole to come to be in something somewhere, if it does so neither part by part nor as a whole?"—"Apparently."—"Therefore it doesn't change places by going somewhere and coming to be in something, nor does it move by spinning in the same location or by being altered."—"It seems not."—"The one, therefore, is unmoved by every sort of motion."—"Unmoved." d e 139

"Yet, on the other hand, we also say that it cannot be in anything."—"Yes, we do."—"Then it is also never in the *same* thing."—"Why?"—"Because it would then be *in* that – in that same thing it is in."—"Of course."—"But it was impossible for it to be either in itself or in another."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"So the one is never in the same thing."—"It seems not."—"But what is never in the same thing neither enjoys repose nor is at rest."—"No, it cannot."—"Therefore the one, as it seems, is neither at rest nor in motion."—"It certainly does appear not." b

"Furthermore, it won't be the same as another thing or itself; nor, again, could it be different from itself or another thing."—"Why is that?"—"If it were different from itself, it would surely be different from one, and would not be one."—"True."—"On the other hand, if it were the same as another, it would be that thing, and not itself. So in this way, too, it would not be just what it is – one – but would be different from one."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"Therefore, it won't be the same as another or different from itself."—"No, it won't." c

"And it won't be different from another, as long as it is one; for it is not proper to one to be different from something, but proper to different-from-another alone, and to nothing else."—"That's right."—"Therefore it won't be different by being one. Or do you think it will?"—"No indeed."—"Yet if it isn't different by being one, it will not be so by itself; and if it isn't so by itself, it will not itself be so. And if it is itself in no way different, it will be different from nothing."—"That's right."

"Nor will it be the same as itself."—"Why not?"—"The nature of the one is not, of course, also that of the same."—"Why?"—"Because it is not the case that, whenever a thing comes to be the same as something, it d

comes to be one."—"But why?"—"If it comes to be the same as the many, it must come to be many, not one."—"True."—"But if the one and the same in no way differ, whenever something came to be the same, it would always come to be one; and whenever it came to be one, it would always
e come to be the same."—"Certainly."—"Therefore, if the one is to be the same as itself, it won't be one with itself; and thus it will be one and not one. But this surely is impossible. Therefore the one can't be either different from another or the same as itself."—"It can't."—"Thus the one could neither be different from nor the same as itself or another."—"Yes, you're quite right."

"Furthermore, it will be neither like nor unlike anything, either itself or another."—"Why?"—"Because whatever has a property the same is surely like."—"Yes."—"But it was shown that the same is separate in its nature
140 from the one."—"Yes, it was."—"But if the one has any property apart from being one, it would be more than one; and that is impossible."—"Yes."—"Therefore, the one can in no way have a property the same as another or itself."—"Apparently not."—"So it cannot be like another or itself either."—"It seems not."

"Nor does the one have the property of being different; for in this way too it would be more than one."—"Yes, it would be more."—"Surely that which has a property different from itself or another would be unlike itself
b or another, if in fact what has a property the same is like."—"That's right."—"But the one, as it seems, since it in no way has a property different, is in no way unlike itself or another thing."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"Therefore the one could be neither like nor unlike another or itself."—"Apparently not."

"Furthermore, being like that, it will be neither equal nor unequal to itself or another."—"How?"—"If it is equal, it will be of the same measures as that to which it is equal."—"Yes."—"But surely if it is greater or less,
c it will, in the case of things with which it is commensurate, have more measures than those that are less, and fewer than those that are greater."—"Yes."—"And in the case of things with which it is not commensurate, it will be of smaller measures in the one case, and of larger measures in the other."—"No doubt."—"Well, if a thing doesn't partake of the same, it can't be of the same measures or of the same anything else at all, can it?"—"It can't."—"So it couldn't be equal to itself or another, if it is not of the same measures."—"It certainly appears not."—"Yet if it is, on the other
d hand, of more measures or fewer, it would have as many parts as measures; and thus, again, it will be no longer one, but just as many as are its measures."—"That's right."—"And if it were of one measure, it would prove to be equal to its measure; but it was shown that it couldn't be equal to anything."—"Yes, it was."—"Therefore, since it doesn't partake of one measure or many or few, and since it doesn't partake of the same at all, it will, as it seems, never be equal to itself or another; nor again will it be greater or less than itself or another."—"That's absolutely so."

e "What about this? Do you think that the one can be older or younger than, or the same age as, anything?"—"Yes, why not?"—"Because if it is

the same age as itself or another, it will surely partake of likeness and of equality of time, of which – likeness and equality – we said the one has no share."—"Yes, we did say that."—"And we also said that it does not partake of unlikeness and inequality."—"Of course."—"Then, being like that, how will it be able to be older or younger than, or the same age as, 141
anything?"—"In no way."—"Therefore, the one could not be younger or older than, or the same age as, itself or another."—"Apparently not."

"So if it is like that, the one could not even be in time at all, could it? Or isn't it necessary, if something is in time, that it always come to be older than itself?"—"Necessarily."—"Isn't the older always older than a younger?"—"To be sure."—"Therefore, that which comes to be older than b
itself comes to be, at the same time, younger than itself, if in fact it is to have something it comes to be older than."—"What do you mean?"—"I mean this: there is no need for a thing to come to be different from a thing that is already different; it must, rather, already be different from what is already different, have come to be different from what has come to be different, and be going to be different from what is going to be different; but it must not have come to be, be going to be, or be different from what comes to be different: it must come to be different, and nothing else."—"Yes, that's necessary."—"But surely older is a difference from younger c
and from nothing else."—"Yes, it is."—"So that which comes to be older than itself must also, at the same time, come to be younger than itself."—"So it seems."—"But it must also not come to be for more or less time than itself; it must come to be and be and have come to be and be going to be for a time equal to itself."—"Yes, that too is necessary."—"Therefore it is necessary, as it seems, that each thing that is in time and partakes of time be the same age as itself and, at the same time, come to be both older d
and younger than itself."—"It looks that way."—"But the one surely had no share of any of that."—"No, it didn't."—"Therefore, it has no share of time, nor is it *in* any time."—"It certainly isn't, as the argument proves."

"Now, don't you think that 'was' and 'has come to be' and 'was coming to be' signify partaking of time past?"—"By all means."—"And again that e
'will be' and 'will come to be' and 'will be coming to be' signify partaking of time hereafter?"—"Yes."—"And that 'is' and 'comes to be' signify partaking of time now present?"—"Of course."—"Therefore, if the one partakes of no time at all, it is not the case that it has at one time come to be, was coming to be, or was; or has now come to be, comes to be, or is; or will hereafter come to be, will be coming to be, or will be."—"Very true."—"Could something partake of being except in one of those ways?"—"It couldn't."—"Therefore the one in no way partakes of being."—"It seems not."—"Therefore the one in no way is."—"Apparently not."—"Therefore neither *is* it in such a way as to be one, because it would then, by being and partaking of being, be. But, as it seems, the one neither is one nor is, if we are obliged to trust this argument."—"It looks that way." 142

"If something is not, could anything belong *to* this thing that is not, or be *of* it?"—"How could it?"—"Therefore, no name belongs to it, nor is there an account or any knowledge or perception or opinion of it."—

"Apparently not."—"Therefore it is not named or spoken of, nor is it the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it."—"It seems not."—"Is it possible that these things are so for the one?"—"I certainly don't think so."

b "Do you want to return to the hypothesis from the beginning, in the hope that another kind of result may come to light as we go back over it?"—"I do indeed."—"If one is, we are saying, aren't we, that we must agree on the consequences for it, whatever they happen to be?"—"Yes."—"Consider from the beginning: if one is, can it *be*, but not partake of being?"—"It cannot."—"So there would also be the being of the one, and that is not the same as the one. For if it were, it couldn't be the being of c the one, nor could the one partake of it. On the contrary, saying that one is would be like saying that one is one. But this time that is not the hypothesis, namely, what the consequences must be, if one is one, but if one is. Isn't that so?"—"Of course."—"Is that because 'is' signifies something other than 'one'?"—"Necessarily."—"So whenever someone, being brief, says 'one is,' would this simply mean that the one partakes of being?"—"Certainly."

"Let's again say what the consequences will be, if one is. Consider d whether this hypothesis must not signify that the one is such as to have parts."—"How so?"—"In this way: if we state the 'is' of the one that is, and the 'one' of that which is one, and if being and oneness are not the same, but both belong to that same thing that we hypothesized, namely, the one that is, must it not itself, since it is one being, be a whole, and the parts of this whole be oneness and being?"—"Necessarily."—"Shall we call each of these two parts a part only, or must the part be called part of the whole?"—"Of the whole."—"Therefore whatever is one both is a whole and has a part."—"Certainly."

"Now, what about each of these two parts of the one that is, oneness e and being? Is oneness ever absent from the being part or being from the oneness part?"—"That couldn't be."—"So again, each of the two parts possesses oneness and being; and the part, in its turn, is composed of at least two parts; and in this way always, for the same reason, whatever part turns up always possesses these two parts, since oneness always possesses being and being always possesses oneness. So, since it always 143 proves to be two, it must never be one."—"Absolutely."—"So, in this way, wouldn't the one that is be unlimited in multitude?"—"So it seems."

"Come, let's proceed further in the following way."—"How?"—"Do we say that the one partakes of being, and hence is?"—"Yes."—"And for this reason the one that is was shown to be many."—"Just so."—"And what about the one itself, which we say partakes of being? If we grasp it in thought alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, will it appear to be only one, or will this same thing also appear to be many?"— b "One, I should think."—"Let's see. Must not its being be something and it itself something different, if in fact the one is not being but, as one,

partakes of being?"—"Necessarily."—"So if being is something and the one is something different, it is not by its being one that the one is different from being, nor by its being being that being is other than the one. On the contrary, they are different from each other by difference and otherness."—"Of course."—"And so difference is not the same as oneness or being."—"Obviously not."

"Now, if we select from them, say, being and difference, or being and c
oneness, or oneness and difference, do we not in each selection choose a certain pair that is correctly called 'both'?"—"How so?"—"As follows: we can say 'being'?"—"We can."—"And, again, we can say 'one'?"—"That too."—"So hasn't each of the pair been mentioned?"—"Yes."—"What about when I say 'being and oneness'? Haven't both been mentioned?"—"Certainly."—"And if I say 'being and difference' or 'difference and oneness,' and so on – in each case don't I speak of both?"—"Yes."—"Can things d
that are correctly called 'both' be both, but not two?"—"They cannot."—"If there are two things, is there any way for each member of the pair not to be one?"—"Not at all."—"Therefore, since in fact each pair taken together turns out to be two, each member would be one."—"Apparently."—"And if each of them is one, when any one is added to any couple, doesn't the total prove to be three?"—"Yes."—"And isn't three odd, and two even?"—"Doubtless."

"What about this? Since there are two, must there not also be twice, and e
since there are three, thrice, if in fact two is two times one and three is three times one?"—"Necessarily."—"Since there are two and twice, must there not be two times two? And since there are three and thrice, must there not be three times three?"—"Doubtless."—"And again: if there are three and they are two times, and if there are two and they are three times, must there not be two times three and three times two?"—"There certainly must."—"Therefore, there would be even times even, odd times odd, odd 144
times even, and even times odd."—"That's so."—"Then if that is so, do you think there is any number that need not be?"—"In no way at all."—"Therefore, if one is, there must also be number."—"Necessarily."—"But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. Or doesn't number, unlimited in multitude, also prove to partake of being?"—"It certainly does."—"So if all number partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it?"—"Yes."

"So has being been distributed to all things, which are many, and is it b
missing from none of the beings, neither the smallest nor the largest? Or is it unreasonable even to ask that question? How could being be missing from any of the beings?"—"In no way."—"So being is chopped up into beings of all kinds, from the smallest to the largest possible, and is the most divided thing of all; and the parts of being are countless."—"Quite c
so."—"Therefore its parts are the most numerous of things."—"The most numerous indeed."

"Now, is there any of them that is part of being, yet not one part?"—"How could that happen?"—"I take it, on the contrary, that if in fact it *is*,

it must always, as long as it is, be some one thing; it cannot be nothing."—"Necessarily."—"So oneness is attached to every part of being and is not absent from a smaller or a larger, or any other, part."—"Just so."—"So, d being one, is it, as a whole, in many places at the same time? Look at this carefully."—"I am – and I see that it's impossible."—"Therefore as divided, if in fact not as a whole; for surely it will be present to all the parts of being at the same time only as divided."—"Yes."—"Furthermore, a divided thing certainly must be as numerous as its parts."—"Necessarily."—"So we were not speaking truly just now, when we said that being had been distributed into the most numerous parts. It is not distributed into more e parts than oneness, but, as it seems, into parts equal to oneness, since neither is being absent from oneness, nor is oneness absent from being. On the contrary, being two, they are always equal throughout all things."—"It appears absolutely so."—"Therefore, the one itself, chopped up by being, is many and unlimited in multitude."—"Apparently."—"So not only is it the case that the one being is many, but also the one itself, completely distributed by being, must be many."—"Absolutely."

"Furthermore, because the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as the 145 whole, would be limited. Or aren't the parts contained by the whole?"—"Necessarily."—"But surely that which contains would be a limit."—"Doubtless."—"So the one that is is surely both one and many, a whole and parts, and limited and unlimited in multitude."—"Apparently."

"So, since in fact it is limited, does it not also have extremities?"—"Necessarily."—"And again: if it is a whole, would it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can anything be a whole without those three? And if any one of them is missing from something, will it still consent to be a whole?"—"It won't."—"The one, as it seems, would indeed have b a beginning, an end, and a middle."—"It would."—"But the middle is equidistant from the extremities – otherwise, it wouldn't be a middle."—"No, it wouldn't."—"Since the one is like that, it would partake of some shape, as it seems, either straight or round, or some shape mixed from both."—"Yes, it would partake of a shape."

"Since it is so, won't it be both in itself and in another?"—"How so?"—"Each of the parts is surely in the whole, and none outside the whole."—c "Just so."—"And are all the parts contained by the whole?"—"Yes."—"Furthermore, the one is all the parts of itself, and not any more or less than all."—"No, it isn't."—"The one is also the whole, is it not?"—"Doubtless."—"So if all its parts are actually in a whole, and the one is both all the parts and the whole itself, and all the parts are contained by the whole, the one would be contained by the one; and thus the one itself would, then, be in itself."—"Apparently."

d "Yet, on the other hand, the whole is not in the parts, either in all or in some one. For if it were in all, it would also have to be in one, because if it were not in some one, it certainly could not be in all. And if this one is among them all, but the whole is not in it, how will the whole still be in all?"—"In no way."—"Nor is it in some of the parts: for if the whole were

in some, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible."—"Yes, impossible."—"But if the whole is not in some or one or all the parts, must it not be in something different or be nowhere at all?"—"Necessarily."— e
"If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but since it is a whole, and is not in itself, it must be in another. Isn't that so?"—"Certainly."—"So the one, insofar as it is a whole, is in another; but insofar as it is all the parts, it is in itself. And thus the one must be both in itself and in a different thing."—"Necessarily."

"Since that is the one's natural state, must it not be both in motion and at rest?"—"How?"—"It is surely at rest, if in fact it is in itself. For being 146
in one thing and not stirring from that, it would be in the same thing, namely, itself."—"Yes, it is."—"And that which is always in the same thing must, of course, always be at rest."—"Certainly."—"What about this? Must not that which is always in a different thing be, on the contrary, never in the same thing? And since it is never in the same thing, also not at rest? And since not at rest, in motion?"—"Just so."—"Therefore the one, since it is itself always both in itself and in a different thing, must always be both in motion and at rest."—"Apparently."

"Furthermore, it must be the same as itself and different from itself, b
and, likewise, the same as and different from the others, if in fact it has the aforesaid properties."—"How so?"—"Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part."—"Apparently."

"Is the one itself part of itself?"—"In no way."—"So neither could it be a whole in relation to itself as part of itself, because then it would be a part in relation to itself."—"No, it could not."—"But is the one different c
from one?"—"No indeed."—"So it couldn't be different from itself."—"Certainly not."—"So if it is neither different nor whole nor part in relation to itself, must it not then be the same as itself?"—"Necessarily."

"What about this? Must not that which is in something different from itself – the self that is in the same thing as itself – be different from itself, if in fact it is also to be in something different?"—"It seems so to me."—"In fact the one was shown to be so, since it is, at the same time, both in itself and in a different thing."—"Yes, it was."—"So in this way the one, as it seems, would be different from itself."—"So it seems." d

"Now, if anything is different from something, won't it be different from something that is different?"—"Necessarily."—"Aren't all the things that are not-one different from the one, and the one from the things not-one?"—"Doubtless."—"Therefore the one would be different from the others."—"Different."

"Consider this: aren't the same itself and the different opposite to each other?"—"Doubtless."—"Then will the same ever consent to be in the different, or the different in the same?"—"It won't."—"So if the different is never to be in the same, there is no being that the different is in for any time; for if it were in anything for any time whatsoever, for that time the e

different would be in the same. Isn't that so?"—"Just so."—"But since it is never in the same, the different would never be in any being."—"True."—"So the different wouldn't be in the things not-one or in the one."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"So not by the different would the one be different from the things not-one or they different from it."—"No, it wouldn't."—"Nor by themselves would they be different from each other, if they don't
147 partake of the different."—"Obviously not."—"But if they aren't different by themselves or by the different, wouldn't they in fact entirely avoid being different from each other?"—"They would."—"But neither do the things not-one partake of the one; otherwise they would not be not-one, but somehow one."—"True."—"So the things not-one could not be a number either; for in that case, too, they would not be absolutely not-one, since they would at least have number."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"And again: are the things not-one parts of the one? Or would the things not-one in that case, too, partake of the one?"—"They would."—"So if it is in
b every way one, and they are in every way not-one, the one would be neither a part of the things not-one nor a whole with them as parts; and, in turn, the things not-one would be neither parts of the one nor wholes in relation to the one as part."—"No, they wouldn't."—"But in fact we said that things that are neither parts nor wholes nor different from each other will be the same as each other."—"Yes, we did."—"So are we to say that the one, since it is so related to the things not-one, is the same as they are?"—"Let's say so."—"Therefore the one, as it seems, is both different from the others and itself, and the same as the others and itself."—"It certainly looks that way from our argument."

c "Would the one then also be both like and unlike itself and the others?"—"Perhaps."—"At any rate, since it was shown to be different from the others, the others would surely also be different from it."—"To be sure."—"Wouldn't it be different from the others just as they are different from it, and neither more nor less?"—"Yes, why not?"—"So if neither more nor less, in like degree."—"Yes."—"Accordingly, insofar as it has the property of being different from the others and they, likewise, have the property of being different from it, in this way the one would have a property the same as the others, and they would have a property the same as it."—"What do you mean?"

d "As follows: don't you apply to something each name you use?"—"I do."—"Now, could you use the same name either more than once or once?"—"I could."—"So if you use it once, do you call by name that thing whose name it is, but not that thing, if you use it many times? Or whether you utter the same name once or many times, do you quite necessarily always also speak of the same thing?"—"To be sure."—"Now 'different'
e in particular is a name for something, isn't it?"—"Certainly."—"So when you utter it, whether once or many times, you don't apply it to another thing or name something other than that thing whose name it is."—"Necessarily."—"Whenever we say 'the others are different from the one' and 'the one is different from the others,' although we use 'different' twice,

we don't apply it to another nature, but always to that nature whose name it is."—"Of course."—"So insofar as the one is different from the others, and the others from the one, on the basis of having the property difference 148
itself, the one would have a property not other, but the same as the others. And that which has a property the same is surely like, isn't it?"—"Yes."—"Indeed, insofar as the one has the property of being different from the others, owing to that property itself it would be altogether like them all, because it is altogether different from them all."—"So it seems."

"Yet, on the other hand, the like is opposite to the unlike."—"Yes."—"Isn't the different also opposite to the same?"—"That too."—"But this was shown as well: that the one is the same as the others."—"Yes, it b
was."—"And being the same as the others is the property opposite to being different from the others."—"Certainly."—"Insofar as the one is different, it was shown to be like."—"Yes."—"So insofar as it is the same, it will be unlike, owing to the property opposite to that which makes it like. And surely the different made it like?"—"Yes."—"So the same will make it unlike; otherwise it won't be opposite to the different."—"So it c
seems."—"Therefore the one will be like and unlike the others – insofar as it is different, like, and insofar as it is the same, unlike."—"Yes, it admits of this argument too, as it seems."

"It also admits of the following."—"What is that?"—"Insofar as it has a property the same, it has a property that is not of another kind; and if it has a property that is not of another kind, it is not unlike; and if not unlike, it is like. But insofar as it has a property other, it has a property that is of another kind; and if it has a property that is of another kind, it is unlike."—"That's true."—"So because the one is the same as the others and because it is different, on both grounds and either, it would be both d
like and unlike the others."—"Certainly."

"So, in the same way, it will be like and unlike itself as well. Since in fact it was shown to be both different from itself and the same as itself, on both grounds and either, won't it be shown to be both like and unlike itself?"—"Necessarily."

"And what about this? Consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and the others."—"Very well."—"Surely the one was shown to be in itself as a whole."—"That's right."—"Isn't the one also in the others?"—"Yes."—"Then insofar as it is in the others, it would e
touch the others; but insofar as it is in itself, it would be kept from touching the others, and being in itself, would touch itself."—"Apparently."—"Thus the one would touch itself and the others."—"It would."

"And again, in this way: must not everything that is to touch something lie next to that which it is to touch, occupying the position adjacent to that occupied by what it touches?"—"Necessarily."—"So, too, the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie directly adjacent to itself, occupying a place next to that in which it itself is."—"Yes, it must."—"Now if the one were two it could do that and turn out to be in two places at the same time; but 149
won't it refuse as long as it is one?"—"Yes, you're quite right."—"So the

same necessity that keeps the one from being two keeps it from touching itself."—"The same."

"But it won't touch the others either."—"Why?"—"Because, we say, that which is to touch must, while being separate, be next to what it is to touch, and there must be no third thing between them."—"True."—"So there must be at least two things if there is to be contact."—"There must."—"But if to the two items a third is added in a row, they themselves will
b be three, their contacts two."—"Yes."—"And thus whenever one item is added, one contact is also added, and it follows that the contacts are always fewer by one than the multitude of the numbers. For in regard to the number being greater than the contacts, every later number exceeds all the contacts by an amount equal to that by which the first two exceeded
c their contacts, since thereafter one is added to the number and, at the same time, one contact to the contacts."—"That's right."—"So however many the things are in number, the contacts are always fewer than they are by one."—"True."—"But if there is only one, and not two, there could not be contact."—"Obviously not."—"Certainly the things other than the one, we say, are not one and do not partake of it, if in fact they are other."—"No, they don't."—"So number is not in the others, if one is not in them."—"Obviously not."—"So the others are neither one nor two, nor do they
d have a name of any other number."—"No."—"So the one alone is one, and there could not be two."—"Apparently not."—"So there is no contact, since there aren't two items."—"There isn't."—"Therefore, the one doesn't touch the others nor do the others touch the one, since in fact there is no contact."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"Thus, to sum up, the one both touches and does not touch the others and itself."—"So it seems."

"Is it then both equal and unequal to itself and the others?"—"How
e so?"—"If the one were greater or less than the others, or they in turn greater or less than it, they wouldn't be in any way greater or less than each other by the one being one and the others being other than one – that is, by their own being – would they? But if they each had equality in addition to their own being, they would be equal to each other. And if the others had largeness and the one had smallness, or vice versa, whichever form had largeness attached would be greater, and whichever had smallness attached would be less?"—"Necessarily."

"Then aren't there these two forms, largeness and smallness? For certainly, if there weren't, they couldn't be opposite to each other and couldn't
150 occur in things that are."—"No. How could they?"—"So if smallness occurs in the one, it would be either in the whole of it or in part of it."—"Necessarily."—"What if it were to occur in the whole? Wouldn't it be in the one either by being stretched equally throughout the whole of it, or by containing it?"—"Quite clearly."—"Wouldn't smallness, then, if it were in the one equally throughout, be equal to it, but if it contained the one, be larger?"—"Doubtless."—"So can smallness be equal to or larger than some-
b thing, and do the jobs of largeness and equality, but not its own?"—"It

can't."—"So smallness could not be in the one as a whole; but if in fact it is in the one, it would be in a part."—"Yes."—"But, again, not in all the part. Otherwise, it will do exactly the same thing as it did in relation to the whole: it will be equal to or larger than whatever part it is in."—"Necessarily."—"Therefore smallness will never be in any being, since it occurs neither in a part nor in a whole. Nor will anything be small except smallness itself."—"It seems not."

"So largeness won't be in the one either. For if it were, something else, apart from largeness itself, would be larger than something, namely, that c
which the largeness is in – and that too, although there is for it no small thing, which it must exceed, if in fact it is large. But this is impossible, since smallness is nowhere in anything."—"True."

"But largeness itself is not greater than anything other than smallness itself, nor is smallness less than anything other than largeness itself."—"No, they aren't."—"So the others aren't greater than the one, nor are they less, because they have neither largeness nor smallness. Nor do these two themselves – largeness and smallness – have, in relation to the one, their d
power of exceeding and being exceeded; they have it, rather, in relation to each other. Nor could the one, in its turn, be greater or less than these two or the others, since it has neither largeness nor smallness."—"It certainly appears not."—"So if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it must neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?"—"Necessarily."—"Now, it is quite necessary that something that neither exceeds nor is exceeded be equally matched, and if equally matched, equal."—"No doubt."

"Furthermore, the one would also itself be so in relation to itself: having e
neither largeness nor smallness in itself, it would neither be exceeded by nor exceed itself, but, being equally matched, would be equal to itself."—"Of course."—"Therefore the one would be equal to itself and the others."—"Apparently."

"And yet, since it is in itself, it would also be around itself on the outside, and as container it would be greater than itself, but as contained it would 151
be less. And thus the one would be greater and less than itself."—"Yes, it would be."

"Isn't this necessary too, that there be nothing outside the one and the others?"—"No doubt."—"But surely what is must always be somewhere."—"Yes."—"Then won't that which is in something be in something greater as something less? For there is no other way that something could be in something else."—"No, there isn't."—"Since there is nothing else apart from the others and the one, and since they must be in something, must they not in fact be in each other – the others in the one and the one b
in the others – or else be nowhere?"—"Apparently."—"So, on the one hand, because the one is in the others, the others would be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one would be less than the others, since it is contained. On the other hand, because the others are in the one,

by the same argument the one would be greater than the others and they less than it."—"So it seems."—"Therefore the one is both equal to, and greater and less than, itself and the others."—"Apparently."

"And if in fact it is greater and less and equal, it would be of measures
c equal to, and more and fewer than, itself and the others; and since of measures, also of parts."—"Doubtless."—"So, since it is of equal and more and fewer measures, it would also be fewer and more than itself and the others in number, and, correspondingly, equal to itself and the others."—"How so?"—"It would surely be of more measures than those things it is greater than, and of as many parts as measures; and likewise it would be of fewer measures and parts than those things it is less than; and correspondingly for the things it is equal to."—"Just so."—"Since it is,
d then, greater and less than, and equal to, itself, would it not be of measures more and fewer than, and equal to, itself? And since of measures, also of parts?"—"Doubtless."—"So, since it is of parts equal to itself, it would be equal to itself in multitude, but since it is of more and fewer parts, it would be more and fewer than itself in number."—"Apparently."—"Now won't the one be related in the same way also to the others? Because it appears larger than they, it must also be more than they are in number; and because it appears smaller, fewer; and because it appears equal in largeness, it must also be equal to the others in multitude."—"Necessarily."—"Thus,
e in turn, as it seems, the one will be equal to, and more and fewer than, itself and the others in number."—"It will."

"Does the one also partake of time? And, in partaking of time, is it and does it come to be both younger and older than, and neither younger nor older than, itself and the others?"—"How so?"—"If in fact one is, being surely belongs to it."—"Yes."—"But is *to be* simply partaking of being
152 with time present, just as *was* is communion with being together with time past, and, in turn, *will be* is communion with being together with time future?"—"Yes, it is."—"So the one partakes of time, if in fact it partakes of being."—"Certainly."

"Of time advancing?"—"Yes."—"So the one always comes to be older than itself, if in fact it goes forward in step with time."—"Necessarily."—"Do we recall that the older comes to be older than something that comes to be younger?"—"We do."—"So, since the one comes to be older than itself, wouldn't it come to be older than a self that comes to be younger?"—
b "Necessarily."—"Thus it indeed comes to be both younger and older than itself."—"Yes."

"But it *is* older, isn't it, whenever, in coming to be, it is at the now time, between *was* and *will be*? For as it proceeds from the past to the future, it certainly won't jump over the now."—"No, it won't."—"Doesn't it stop
c coming to be older when it encounters the now? It doesn't come to be, but is then already older, isn't it? For if it were going forward, it could never be grasped by the now. A thing going forward is able to lay hold of both the now and the later – releasing the now and reaching for the

later, while coming to be between the two, the later and the now."—"True."—"But if nothing that comes to be can sidestep the now, whenever a thing *is* at this point, it always stops its coming-to-be and then is whatever d
it may have come to be."—"Apparently."—"So, too, the one: whenever, in coming to be older, it encounters the now, it stops its coming-to-be and is then older."—"Of course."—"So it also is older than that very thing it was coming to be older than – and wasn't it coming to be older than itself?"—"Yes."—"And the older is older than a younger?"—"It is."—"So the one is then also younger than itself, whenever, in its coming-to-be older, it encounters the now."—"Necessarily."—"Yet the now is always present to the one throughout its being; for the one always is now, when- e
ever it is."—"No doubt."—"Therefore the one always both is and comes to be older and younger than itself."—"So it seems."

"Is it or does it come to be for more time than itself or an equal time?"—"An equal."—"But if it comes to be or is for an equal time, it is the same age."—"Doubtless."—"And that which is the same age is neither older nor younger."—"No, it isn't."—"So the one, since it comes to be and is for a time equal to itself, neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself."—"I think not."

"And again: what of the others?"—"I can't say."— "This much, surely, 153
you can say: things other than the one, if in fact they are different things and not *a* different thing, are more than one. A different thing would be one, but different things are more than one and would have multitude."—"Yes, they would."—"And, being a multitude, they would partake of a greater number than the one."—"Doubtless."—"Now, shall we say in connection with number that things that are more or things that are less come to be and have come to be earlier?"—"Things that are less."—"So, the least thing first; and this is the one. Isn't that so?"—"Yes."—"So of all b
the things that have number the one has come to be first. And the others, too, all have number, if in fact they are others and not an other."—"Yes, they do."—"But that which has come to be first, I take it, has come to be earlier, and the others later; and things that have come to be later are younger than what has come to be earlier. Thus the others would be younger than the one, and the one older than they."—"Yes, it would."

"What about the following? Could the one have come to be in a way contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?"—"Impossible."—"Yet c
the one was shown to have parts, and if parts, a beginning, an end, and a middle."—"Yes."—"Well, in the case of all things – the one itself and each of the others – doesn't a beginning come to be first, and after the beginning all the others up to the end?"—"To be sure."—"Furthermore, we shall say that all these others are parts of some one whole, but that it itself has come to be one and whole at the same time as the end."—"Yes, we shall."—"An end, I take it, comes to be last, and the one naturally d
comes to be at the same time as it. And so if in fact the one itself must not come to be contrary to nature, it would naturally come to be later

than the others, since it has come to be at the same time as the end."—"Apparently."—"Therefore the one is younger than the others, and the others are older than it."—"That, in turn, appears to me to be so."

"But again: must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything else, if in fact it is a part and not parts, be one, since it is *a* part?"—"Necessarily."—"Accordingly, the one would come to be at the
e same time as the first part that comes to be, and at the same time as the second; and it is absent from none of the others that come to be – no matter what is added to what – until, upon arriving at the last part, it comes to be one whole, having been absent at the coming-to-be of neither the middle nor the first nor the last nor any other part."—"True."—"Therefore the one is the same age as all the others. And so, unless the one itself is naturally contrary to nature, it would have come to be neither earlier nor
154 later than the others, but at the same time. And according to this argument the one would be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others older or younger than it. But according to our previous argument, it was both older and younger than they, and likewise they were both older and younger than it."—"Of course."

"That's how it is and has come to be. But what about its coming-to-be both older and younger, and neither older nor younger, than the others and they than it? Is the case with coming-to-be just as it is with being, or
b is it different?"—"I can't say."—"But I can say this much, at least: if something is indeed older than another thing, it could not come to be still older by an amount greater than the original difference in age. Nor, in turn, could the younger come to be still younger. For equals added to unequals, in time or anything else at all, always make them differ by an amount equal to that by which they differed at first."—"No doubt."—"So
c what is older or younger could never come to be older or younger than what is older or younger, if in fact they always differ in age by an equal amount. On the contrary, something is and has come to be older, and something younger, but they do not come to be so."—"True."—"So also the one, since it is older or younger, never comes to be older or younger than the others that are older or younger than it."—"Yes, you're quite right."

"But consider whether it comes to be older and younger in this way."—"In what way?"—"In the way that the one was shown to be older than the others and they older than it."—"What of that?"—"When the one is
d older than the others, it has surely come to be for more time than they."—"Yes."—"Go back and consider: if we add an equal time to more and less time, will the more differ from the less by an equal or a smaller fraction?"[16]—"A smaller."—"So the one's difference in age in relation to the others will not be in the future just what it was at first. On the contrary, by getting an increment of time equal to the others, it will differ from them in age always less than it did before. Isn't that so?"—"Yes."—"Wouldn't that
e which differs from anything in age less than before come to be younger

16. The word translated here and below as "fraction" is elsewhere translated as "part."

than before in relation to those things it was previously older than?"—"Younger."—"And if the one comes to be younger, don't those others, in turn, come to be older than before in relation to it?"—"Certainly."—"So what is younger comes to be older in relation to what has come to be earlier and is older, but it never is older. On the contrary, it always comes to be older than that thing. For the older advances toward the younger, while the younger advances toward the older. And, in the same way, the 155
older, in its turn, comes to be younger than the younger. For both, by going toward their opposites, come to be each other's opposite, the younger coming to be older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. But they could not come to *be* so. For if they came to be, they would no longer *come* to be, but would be so. But as it is they come to be older and younger than each other. The one comes to be younger than the others, because it was shown to be older and to have come to be earlier, whereas the others come to be older than the one, because they have come to be later. b

"And by the same argument the others, too, come to be younger in relation to the one, since in fact they were shown to be older than it and to have come to be earlier."—"Yes, it does appear so."

"Well then, insofar as nothing comes to be older or younger than a different thing, owing to their always differing from each other by an equal number, the one would not come to be older or younger than the others, and they would not come to be older or younger than it. But insofar as things that came to be earlier must differ from things that come to be later by a fraction that is always different, and vice versa, in this way they c
must come to be older and younger than each other – both the others than the one and the one than the others."—"Of course."—"To sum up all this, the one itself both is and comes to be older and younger than itself and the others, and it neither is nor comes to be older or younger than itself or the others."—"Exactly."

"And since the one partakes of time and of coming to be older and d
younger, must it not also partake of time past, future, and present – if in fact it partakes of time?"—"Necessarily."—"Therefore, the one was and is and will be, and was coming to be and comes to be and will come to be."—"To be sure."—"And something could belong to it and be of it, in the past, present, and future."—"Certainly."—"And indeed there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it, if in fact even now we are engaging in all those activities concerning it."—"You're right."—"And a name and an account belong to it, and it is named and spoken of. And e
all such things as pertain to the others also pertain to the one."—"That's exactly so."

"Let's speak of it yet a third time. If the one is as we have described it – being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partaking of time – must it not, because it is one, sometimes partake of being, and in turn because it is not, sometimes not partake of being?"—"Necessarily."—"When it partakes, can it at that time not partake, or partake when it

doesn't?"—"It cannot."—"So it partakes at one time, and doesn't partake at another; for only in this way could it both partake and not partake of
156 the same thing."—"That's right."—"Isn't there, then, a definite time when it gets a share of being and when it parts from it? Or how can it at one time have and at another time not have the same thing, if it never gets and releases it?"—"In no way."

"Don't you in fact call getting a share of being 'coming-to-be'?"—"I do."—"And parting from being 'ceasing-to-be'?"—"Most certainly."—"Indeed the one, as it seems, when it gets and releases being, comes to be
b and ceases to be."—"Necessarily."—"And since it is one and many and comes to be and ceases to be, doesn't its being many cease to be whenever it comes to be one, and doesn't its being one cease to be whenever it comes to be many?"—"Certainly."—"Whenever it comes to be one and many, must it not separate and combine?"—"It certainly must."—"Furthermore, whenever it comes to be like and unlike, must it not be made like and unlike?"—"Yes."—"And whenever it comes to be greater and less and equal, must it not increase and decrease and be made equal?"—"Just so."

c "And whenever, being in motion, it comes to a rest, and whenever, being at rest, it changes to moving, it must itself, presumably, be in no time at all."—"How is that?"—"It won't be able to undergo being previously at rest and later in motion or being previously in motion and later at rest without changing."—"Obviously not."—"Yet there is no time in which something can, simultaneously, be neither in motion nor at rest."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"Yet surely it also doesn't change without changing."—"Hardly."—"So when does it change? For it does not change while it is at rest or in motion, or while it is in time."—"Yes, you're quite right."

d "Is there, then, this queer thing in which it might be, just when it changes?"—"What queer thing?"—"The instant. The instant seems to signify something such that changing occurs from it to each of two states. For a thing doesn't change from rest while rest continues, or from motion while motion continues. Rather, this queer creature, the instant, lurks
e between motion and rest – being in no time at all – and to it and from it the moving thing changes to resting and the resting thing changes to moving."—"It looks that way."—"And the one, if in fact it both rests and moves, could change to each state – for only in this way could it do both. But in changing, it changes at an instant, and when it changes, it would be in no time at all, and just then it would be neither in motion nor at rest."—"No, it wouldn't."

157 "Is it so with the other changes too? Whenever the one changes from being to ceasing-to-be, or from not-being to coming-to-be, isn't it then between certain states of motion and rest? And then it neither is nor is not, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be?"—"It seems so, at any rate."—"Indeed, according to the same argument, when it goes from one to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and neither separates nor combines. And when it goes from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it being made like or

unlike. And when it goes from small to large and to equal and vice versa, b
it is neither small nor large nor equal; nor would it be increasing or
decreasing or being made equal."—"It seems not."—"The one, if it is,
could undergo all that."—"Doubtless."

"Must we not examine what would be proper for the others to undergo,
if one is?"—"We must."—"Are we to say, then, what properties things
other than the one must have, if one is?"—"Let's do."—"Well then, since
in fact they are other than the one, the others are not the one. For if they
were, they would not be other than the one."—"That's right." c

"And yet the others are not absolutely deprived of the one, but somehow
partake of it."—"In what way?"—"In that things other than the one are
surely other because they have parts; for if they didn't have parts, they
would be altogether one."—"That's right."—"And parts, we say, are parts
of that which is a whole."—"Yes, we do."—"Yet the whole of which the
parts are to be parts must be one thing composed of many, because each
of the parts must be part, not of many, but of a whole."—"Why is that?"—
"If something were to be part of many, in which it itself is, it will, of d
course, be both part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the
others, if in fact it is part of all of them. For if it is not part of one, it will
be part of the others, that one excepted, and thus it will not be part of
each one. And if it is not part of each, it will be part of none of the many.
But if something is part of none, it cannot be a part, or anything else at
all, of all those things of which it is no part of any."—"It certainly appears
so."—"So the part would not be part of many things or all, but of some
one character and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole,' since it has e
come to be one complete thing composed of all. This is what the part
would be part of."—"Absolutely."—"So if the others have parts, they
would also partake of some one whole."—"Certainly."—"So things other
than the one must be one complete whole with parts."—"Necessarily."

"Furthermore, the same account applies also to each part, since it too 158
must partake of the one. For if each of them is a part, 'each,' of course,
signifies that it is one thing, detached from the others and being by itself,
if in fact it is to be *each*."—"That's right."—"But clearly it would partake
of the one, while being something other than one. Otherwise, it wouldn't
partake, but would itself be one. But as it is, it is surely impossible for
anything except the one itself to be one."—"Impossible."

"But both the whole and the part must partake of the one; for the whole
will be one thing of which the parts are parts, and in turn each thing that
is part of a whole will be one part of the whole."—"Just so."—"Well, then, b
won't things that partake of the one partake of it, while being different
from it?"—"Doubtless."—"And things different from the one would surely
be many; for if things other than the one were neither one nor more than
one, they would be nothing."—"Yes, you're quite right."

"Since both things that partake of the oneness of a part and things that
partake of the oneness of a whole are more than one, must not those things

themselves that get a share of the one in fact be unlimited in multitude?"—"How so?"—"Let's observe the following: isn't it the case that, at the time when they get a share of the one, they get a share, while not being one and not partaking of the one?"—"Quite clearly."—"While being multi-
c tudes, then, in which oneness is not present?"—"Certainly, multitudes."—"Now, if we should be willing to subtract, in thought, the very least we can from these multitudes, must not that which is subtracted, too, be a multitude and not one, if in fact it doesn't partake of the one?"—"Necessarily."—"So always, as we examine in this way its nature, itself by itself, different from the form, won't as much of it as we ever see be unlimited in multitude?"—"Absolutely."

d "Furthermore, whenever each part comes to be one part, the parts then have a limit in relation to each other and in relation to the whole, and the whole has a limit in relation to the parts."—"Quite so."—"Accordingly, it follows for things other than the one that from the one and themselves gaining communion with each other, as it seems, something different comes to be in them, which affords a limit for them in relation to each other; but their own nature, by themselves, affords unlimitedness."—"Apparently."—"In this way, indeed, things other than the one, taken both as wholes and part by part, both are unlimited and partake of a limit."—"Certainly."

e "Well, aren't they both like and unlike each other and themselves?"—"In what way?"—"On the one hand, insofar as they are all unlimited by their own nature, they would in this way have a property the same."—"Certainly."—"Furthermore, insofar as they all partake of a limit, in this way, too, they would all have a property the same."—"Doubtless."—"On the other hand, insofar as they are both limited and unlimited, they have
159 these properties, which are opposite to each other."—"Yes."—"And opposite properties are as unlike as possible."—"To be sure."—"So in respect of either property they would be like themselves and each other, but in respect of both properties they would be utterly opposite and unlike both themselves and each other."—"It looks that way."—"Thus the others would be both like and unlike themselves and each other."—"Just so."

"And indeed we will have no further trouble in finding that things other than the one are both the same as and different from each other, both in motion and at rest, and have all the opposite properties, since in fact they
b were shown to have those we mentioned."—"You're right."

"Well, then, suppose we now concede those results as evident and examine again, if one is: Are things other than the one also not so, or only so?"—"Of course."—"Let's say from the beginning, what properties things other than the one must have, if one is."—"Yes, let's do."—"Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others separate from the one?"—"Why?"—"Because surely there is not something else in addition to them
c that is both other than the one and other than the others; for all things have been mentioned, once the one and the others are mentioned."—"Yes,

all things."—"So there is no further thing, different from them, in which same thing the one and the others could be."—"No, there isn't."—"So the one and the others are never in the same thing."—"It seems not."—"So they are separate?"—"Yes."

"Furthermore, we say that what is really one doesn't have parts."—"Obviously not."—"So the one could not be in the others as a whole, nor could parts of it be in them, if it is separate from the others and doesn't have parts."—"Obviously not."—"So the others could in no way partake d
of the one, if they partake neither by getting some part of it nor by getting it as a whole."—"It seems not."—"In no way, then, are the others one, nor do they have any oneness in them."—"Yes, you're quite right."

"So the others aren't many either; for each of them would be one part of a whole, if they were many. But as it is, things other than the one are neither one nor many nor a whole nor parts, since they in no way partake of the one."—"That's right."—"Therefore, the others are not themselves two or three, nor are two or three in them, if in fact they are entirely e
deprived of the one."—"Just so."

"So the others aren't themselves like and unlike the one, and likeness and unlikeness aren't in them. For if they were themselves like and unlike, or had likeness and unlikeness in them, things other than the one would surely have in themselves two forms opposite to each other."—"Apparently."—"But it was impossible for things that couldn't partake even of one to partake of any two."—"Impossible."—"So the others are neither like nor unlike nor both. If they were like or unlike, they would partake 160
of one of the two forms, and if they were both, they would partake of two opposite forms. But these alternatives were shown to be impossible."—"True."

"So they are neither the same nor different, neither in motion nor at rest, neither coming to be nor ceasing to be, neither greater nor less nor equal. Nor do they have any other such properties. For if the others submit to having any such property, they will partake of one and two and three and odd and even, of which it was shown they could not partake, since b
they are in every way entirely deprived of the one."—"Very true."

"Thus if one is, the one is all things and is not even one, both in relation to itself and, likewise, in relation to the others."[17] "Exactly."

"So far so good. But must we not next examine what the consequences must be, if the one is not?"—"Yes, we must."—"What, then, would this hypothesis be: 'if one is not'? Does it differ at all from this hypothesis: 'if not-one is not'?"—"Of course it differs."—"Does it merely differ, or is saying 'if not-one is not' the complete opposite of saying, 'if one is not'?"— c

17. Alternatively, accepting a plausible emendation at b3: "Thus if one is, the one is all things and is not even one, both in relation to itself and in relation to the others, and likewise for the others." With this emended text, the sentence describes the contents of all four deductions, instead of only the first two.

"The complete opposite."—"What if someone were to say, 'if largeness is not' or 'if smallness is not' or anything else like that, would it be clear in each case that what he is saying is not is something different?"—"Certainly."—"So now, too, whenever he says, 'if one is not,' isn't it clear that what he says is not is different from the others, and don't we recognize what he means?"—"We do."—"So he speaks of something, in the first place, knowable, and in the second, different from the others, whenever
d he says 'one,' whether he attaches being or not-being to it; for we still know what thing is said not to be, and that it is different from the others. Isn't that so?"—"Necessarily."

"Then we must state from the beginning as follows what must be the case, if one is not. First, as it seems, this must be so for it, that there is knowledge of it; otherwise we don't even know what is meant when someone says, 'if one is not'."—"True."—"And it must be the case that the others are different from it – or else it isn't said to be different from them?"—"Certainly."—"Therefore difference in kind pertains to it in addi-
e tion to knowledge. For someone doesn't speak of the difference in kind of the others when he says that the one is different from the others, but of *that* thing's difference in kind."—"Apparently."

"Furthermore, the one that is not partakes of *that* and of *something*, *this*, *to this*, *these*, and so on; for the one could not be mentioned, nor could things be different from the one, nor could anything belong to it or be of it, nor could it be said to be anything, unless it had a share of *something* and the rest."—"That's right."—"The one can't *be*, if in fact it is not, but nothing prevents it from partaking of many things. Indeed, it's even
161 necessary, if in fact it's that one and not another that is not. If, however, neither the one nor *that* is not to be, but the account is about something else, we shouldn't even utter a sound. But if that one and not another is posited not to be, it must have a share of *that* and of many other things."—"Quite certainly."

"So it has unlikeness, too, in relation to the others. For things other than the one, since they are different, would also be different in kind."—"Yes."—"And aren't things different in kind other in kind?"—"Doubtless."—
b "Aren't things other in kind unlike?"—"Unlike, certainly."—"Well, then, if in fact they are unlike the one, clearly things unlike would be unlike an unlike."—"Clearly."—"So the one would also have unlikeness, in relation to which the others are unlike it."—"So it seems."

"But, then, if it has unlikeness to the others, must it not have likeness to itself?"—"How so?"—"If the one has unlikeness to one, the argument would surely not be about something of the same kind as the one, nor would the hypothesis be about one, but about something other than one."—
c "Certainly."—"But it must not be."—"No indeed."—"Therefore the one must have likeness of itself to itself."—"It must."

"Furthermore, it is not equal to the others either; for if it were equal, it would then both be, and be like them in respect of equality. But those are both impossible, if in fact one is not."—"Impossible."—"Since it is not equal

to the others, must not the others, too, be not equal to it?"—"Necessarily."—"Aren't things that are not equal unequal?"—"Yes."—"And aren't things unequal unequal to something unequal?"—"Doubtless."—"So the one partakes also of inequality, in relation to which the others are unequal to it."—"It does." d

"But largeness and smallness are constitutive of inequality."—"Yes, they are."—"So do largeness and smallness, too, belong to this one?"—"It looks that way."—"Yet largeness and smallness always stand apart from each other."—"Certainly."—"So there is always something between them."—"There is."—"Then can you mention anything between them other than equality?"—"No, just that."—"Therefore whatever has largeness and smallness also has equality, since it is between them."—"Apparently."—"The one, if it is not, would have, as it seems, a share of equality, largeness, and smallness."—"So it seems." e

"Furthermore, it must also somehow partake of being."—"How is that?"—"It must be in the state we describe; for if it is not so, we wouldn't speak truly when we say that the one is not. But if we do speak truly, it is clear that we say things that are. Isn't that so?"—"It is indeed so."—"And since we claim to speak truly, we must claim also to speak of things 162
that are."—"Necessarily."—"Therefore, as it seems, the one *is* a not-being; for if it is not to *be* a not-being, but is somehow to give up its being in relation to not-being, it will straightway be a being."—"Absolutely."—"So if it is not to be, it must have *being* a not-being as a bond in regard to its not-being, just as, in like manner, what is must have *not-being* what is not, in order that it, in its turn, may completely be. This is how what is would most of all be and what is not would not be: on the one hand, by what is, if it is completely to be, partaking of being in regard to being a being b
and of not-being in regard to being a not-being; and, on the other hand, by what is not, if in its turn what is not is completely not to be, partaking of not-being in regard to not-being a not-being and of being in regard to being a not-being."[18]—"Very true."—"Accordingly, since in fact what is has a share of not-being and what is not has a share of being, so, too, the one, since it is not, must have a share of being in regard to its not-being."—"Necessarily."—"Then the one, if it is not, appears also to have being."—"Apparently."—"And of course not-being, if in fact it is not."—"Doubtless."

"Can something that is in some state not be so, without changing from that state?"—"It cannot."—"So everything of the sort we've described, c
which is both so and not so, signifies a change."—"Doubtless."—"And a change is a motion – or what shall we call it?"—"A motion."—"Now wasn't the one shown both to be and not to be?"—"Yes."—"Therefore, it appears both to be so and not so."—"So it seems."—"Therefore the one that is not has been shown also to move, since in fact it has been shown to change from being to not-being."—"It looks that way."

18. Dropping the supplement in 162a8 and removing the brackets in b2.

"Yet, on the other hand, if it is nowhere among the things that are – as it isn't, if in fact it is not – it couldn't travel from one place to another."—
d "Obviously not."—"So it couldn't move by switching place."—"No, it couldn't."—"Nor could it rotate in the same thing, because it nowhere touches the same thing. For that which is the same is a being, and what is not cannot be in anything that is."—"No, it can't."—"Therefore the one, if it is not, would be unable to rotate in that in which it is not."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"And, surely, the one isn't altered from itself either, whether as something that is or as something that is not. For the argument would no longer be about the one, but about something else, if in fact the one were altered from itself."—"That's right."—"But if it isn't altered and doesn't rotate in the same thing or switch place, could it still move
e somehow?"—"Obviously not."—"Yet what is unmoved must enjoy repose, and what reposes must be at rest."—"Necessarily."—"Therefore the one, as it seems, since it is not, is both at rest and in motion."—"So it seems."
163 "Furthermore, if in fact it moves, it certainly must be altered; for however something is moved, by just so much it is no longer in the same state as it was, but in a different state."—"Just so."—"Then because it moves, the one is also altered."—"Yes."—"And yet, because it in no way moves, it could in no way be altered."—"No, it couldn't."—"So insofar as the one that is not moves, it is altered, but insofar as it doesn't move, it is not altered."—"No, it isn't.—"Therefore the one, if it is not, is both altered and not altered."—"Apparently."

"Must not that which is altered come to be different from what it was
b before, and cease to be in its previous state; and must not that which is not altered neither come to be nor cease to be?"—"Necessarily."—"Therefore also the one, if it is not, comes to be and ceases to be, if it is altered, and does not come to be or cease to be, if it is not altered. And thus the one, if it is not, both comes to be and ceases to be, and does not come to be or cease to be."—"Yes, you're quite right."

"Let's go back again to the beginning to see whether things will appear
c the same to us as they do now, or different."—"Indeed, we must."—"Aren't we saying, if one is not, what the consequences must be for it?"—"Yes."—"When we say 'is not,' the words don't signify anything other than absence of being for whatever we say is not, do they?"—"Nothing other."—"When we say that something is not, are we saying that in a way it is not, but in a way it is? Or does this 'is not' signify without qualification that what is not is in no way at all and does not in any way partake of being?"—"Absolutely without qualification."—"Therefore what is not
d could neither be nor partake of being in any other way at all."—"No, it couldn't."

"Can coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be possibly be anything other than getting a share of being and losing it?"—"Nothing other."—"But what has no share of being could neither get nor lose it."—"Obviously not."—"So the one, since it in no way is, must in no way have, release, or get a share

of, being."—"That's reasonable."—"So the one that is not neither ceases to be nor comes to be, since in fact it in no way partakes of being."—"Apparently not."—"So it also isn't altered in any way. For if it were to e
undergo this, it would then come to be and cease to be."—"True."—"And if it isn't altered, it must not move either?"—"Necessarily."—"And surely we won't say that what in no way is is at rest, since what is at rest must always be in some same thing."—"In the same thing, no doubt."—"Thus, let's say that what is not is, in turn, never at rest or in motion."—"Yes, you're quite right."

"But in fact nothing that is belongs to it; for then, by partaking of 164
that, it would partake of being."—"Clearly."—"So neither largeness nor smallness nor equality belongs to it."—"No, they don't."—"Furthermore, it would have neither likeness nor difference in kind in relation to itself or in relation to the others."—"Apparently not."

"What about this? Can the others be related to it, if, necessarily, nothing belongs to it?"—"They can't."—"So the others are neither like nor unlike it, and they are neither the same as nor different from it."—"No, they aren't."—"And again: will *of that*, *to that*, *something*, *this*, *of this*, *of another*, *to another*, or time past, hereafter, or now, or knowledge, opinion, perception, b
an account, a name, or anything else that is be applicable to what is not?"—"It will not."—"Thus one, since it is not, is not in any state at all."—"At any rate, it certainly seems to be in no state at all."

"Let's go on and say what properties the others must have, if one is not."—"Yes, let's do."—"They must surely be other; for if they weren't even other, we wouldn't be talking about the others."—"Just so."—"But if the argument is about the others, the others are different. Or don't you apply the names 'other' and 'different' to the same thing?"—"I do."— c
"And surely we say that the different is different from a different thing, and the other is other than another thing?"—"Yes."—"So the others, too, if they are to be other, have something they will be other than."—"Necessarily."—"What would it be then? For they won't be other than the one, if it is indeed not."—"No, they won't."—"So they are other than each other, since that alternative remains for them, or else to be other than nothing."—"That's right."

"So they each are other than each other as multitudes; for they couldn't be so as ones, if one is not. But each mass of them, as it seems, is unlimited d
in multitude, and if you take what seems to be smallest, in an instant, just as in a dream, instead of seeming to be one, it appears many, and instead of very small, immense in relation to the bits chopped from it."—"That's quite right."—"The others would be other than each other as masses of this sort, if they are other, and if one is not."—"Quite so."

"Well then, won't there be many masses, each appearing, but not being, one, if in fact one is not to be?"—"Just so."—"And there will seem to be a number of them, if in fact each seems to be one, although being many."— e
"Certainly."—"And among them some appear even and some odd,

although not really being so, if in fact one is not to be."—"Yes, you're quite right."

"Furthermore, a smallest too, we say, will seem to be among them; but
165 this appears many and large in relation to each of its many, because they are small."—"Doubtless."—"And each mass will be conceived to be equal to its many small bits. For it could not, in appearance, shift from greater to less, until it seems to come to the state in between, and this would be an appearance of equality."—"That's reasonable."

"Now won't it appear to have a limit in relation to another mass, but itself to have no beginning, limit, or middle in relation to itself?"—"Why is that?"—"Because whenever you grasp any bit of them in thought as
b being a beginning, middle, or end, before the beginning another beginning always appears, and after the end a different end is left behind, and in the middle others more in the middle than the middle but smaller, because you can't grasp each of them as one, since the one is not."—"Very true."—"So every being that you grasp in thought must, I take it, be chopped up and dispersed, because surely, without oneness, it would always be grasped as a mass."—"Of course."—"So must not such a thing appear one to a person
c dimly observing from far off; but to a person considering it keenly from up close, must not each one appear unlimited in multitude, if in fact it is deprived of the one, if it is not?"—"Indeed, most necessarily."—"Thus the others must each appear unlimited and as having a limit, and one and many, if one is not, but things other than the one are."—"Yes, they must."

"Won't they also seem to be both like and unlike?"—"Why is that?"—"Just as, to someone standing at a distance, all things in a painting,[19] appearing one, appear to have a property the same and to be like."—
d "Certainly."—"But when the person comes closer, they appear many and different and, by the appearance of the different, different in kind and unlike themselves."—"Just so."—"So the masses must also appear both like and unlike themselves and each other."—"Of course."

"Accordingly, if one is not and many are, the many must appear both the same as and different from each other, both in contact and separate from themselves, both moving with every motion and in every way at rest, both coming to be and ceasing to be and neither, and surely everything
e of that sort, which it would now be easy enough for us to go through."—"Very true indeed."

"Let's go back to the beginning once more and say what must be the case, if one is not, but things other than the one are."—"Yes, let's do."—"Well, the others won't be one."—"Obviously not."—"And surely they won't be many either, since oneness would also be present in things that are many. For if none of them is one, they are all nothing – so they also

19. Plato's word here refers specifically to painting that aims at the illusion of volume through the contrast of light and shadow.

couldn't be many."—"True."—"If oneness isn't present in the others, the others are neither many nor one."—"No, they aren't."

"Nor even do they appear one or many."—"Why?"—"Because the others 166
have no communion in any way at all with any of the things that are not, and none of the things that are not belongs to any of the others, since things that are not have no part."—"True."—"So no opinion or any appearance of what is not belongs to the others, nor is not-being conceived in any way at all in the case of the others."—"Yes, you're quite right."—"So if one is not, none of the others is conceived to be one or many, since, without b
oneness, it is impossible to conceive of many."—"Yes, impossible."—"Therefore, if one is not, the others neither are nor are conceived to be one or many."—"It seems not."

"So they aren't like or unlike either."—"No, they aren't."—"And indeed, they are neither the same nor different, neither in contact nor separate, nor anything else that they appeared to be in the argument we went through before. The others neither are nor appear to be any of those things, if one is not."—"True."—"Then if we were to say, to sum up, 'if one is c
not, nothing is,' wouldn't we speak correctly?"—"Absolutely."

"Let us then say this – and also that, as it seems, whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other."—"Very true."