

We have reduced the problem of revenue maximization (for firm  $A$ ) under proportional budgeting to the following maximization problem.

$$\max_{\alpha} \left\{ (1 - \alpha v) E_{\lambda} \left[ p \frac{\lambda}{1 - \frac{\alpha}{e}(1 - \lambda)} + (1 - p)\lambda \right] \right\} \quad (1)$$

Furthermore, because any reward scheme may be written as a proproial budgeting scheme for appropriate  $k$  and  $\alpha$  values, the above optimization also gives results beyond just proportional budgeting. The optimization problem may be written as:

$$\max_{\alpha} \left\{ (1 - \alpha v) \int_0^1 \left( p \frac{\lambda}{1 - \frac{\alpha}{e}(1 - \lambda)} + (1 - p)\lambda \right) f(\lambda) d\lambda \right\} \quad (2)$$

where  $f(\lambda)$  is the pdf of  $\lambda$ , supported on  $[0, 1]$ .

One method to evaluate the above was to use the Taylor series expansion of moments of random variables. Let  $g(\lambda)$  be the function in the integrand above (excluding the pdf), so in our case, the method reduces to:

$$\max_{\alpha} \{ (1 - \alpha v) E_{\lambda}(g(\lambda)) \} \approx \max_{\alpha} \left\{ (1 - \alpha v) \left( g(\mu_{\lambda}) + \frac{g''(\mu_{\lambda})}{2} \sigma_{\lambda}^2 \right) \right\}$$

However, I'm not sure what conditions on the distribution we need to ignore the higher order terms of the series expansion.

First I want to examine the problem with simple delta distributions, i.e.  $\lambda$  constant. There are three cases we care about.

1. ( $\lambda = 0$ ) Here we are maximizing  $(1 - \alpha v) \left( p \frac{0}{1 - \frac{\alpha}{e}} \right)$ . This function is 0 for all values of  $\alpha$  (even as  $\alpha \rightarrow 0$ ). Thus, this result shows (matching our intuition) that some excess loyalty is needed for anyone to adopt the reward program in the model - just another way to think about it.
2. ( $\lambda = 1$ ) Here we are maximizing  $(1 - \alpha v)\lambda$ , which occurs at  $\alpha = 0$ . Here again we just get an obvious result: if all customers have excess loyalty 1, the firm will get all business and should not offer any reward scheme.
3. ( $0 < \lambda < 1$ ) I have been messing with this for a bit. It is quite a messy expression. Through plotting, I've seen some that are maximized at  $\alpha \rightarrow 0$  and some at  $\alpha \rightarrow e$  (generally when  $\lambda$  is large and small, respectively). I have yet to see conditions that give  $\alpha$  something in between.

I figure this may be the easiest problem we can think about solving, so this is what I've been trying to do first.