

Formalization and Validation of Safety-Critical Requirements*

Alessandro Cimatti

FBK-irst
Trento, Italy
cimatti@fbk.eu

Marco Roveri

FBK-irst
Trento, Italy
roveri@fbk.eu

Angelo Susi

FBK-irst
Trento, Italy
susi@fbk.eu

Stefano Tonetta

FBK-irst
Trento, Italy
tonettas@fbk.eu

The validation of requirements is a fundamental step in the development process of safety-critical systems. In safety critical applications such as aerospace, avionics and railways, the use of formal methods is of paramount importance both for requirements and for design validation. Nevertheless, while for the verification of the design, many formal techniques have been conceived and applied, the research on formal methods for requirements validation is not yet mature. The main obstacles are that, on the one hand, the correctness of requirements is not formally defined; on the other hand that the formalization and the validation of the requirements usually demands a strong involvement of domain experts.

We report on a methodology and a series of techniques that we developed for the formalization and validation of high-level requirements for safety-critical applications. The main ingredients are a very expressive formal language and automatic satisfiability procedures. The language combines first-order, temporal, and hybrid logic. The satisfiability procedures are based on model checking and satisfiability modulo theory. We applied this technology within an industrial project to the validation of railways requirements.

1 Introduction

Formal methods are widely used in the development process of safety-critical systems. The application of formal verification techniques relies on the formalization of the system's design into a mathematical language. Several formal languages are available according to the different aspects that are relevant to the verification, and many design tools can automatically formalize the design into one of these languages. The verification techniques typically trade-off the automation of the analysis with the expressiveness of the specification language. State-of-the-art approaches mix *model checking* and *theorem proving* in order to tackle the verification of infinite-state systems with a sufficient level of automation.

Another important aspect of the development process is the correctness of the *requirements*. Very often bugs in the late phases are caused by some flaws in requirements specification. These are difficult to detect and have a huge impact on the cost of fixing the bug. Nevertheless, formal methods on requirements validation are not yet mature. In particular there is no precise definition of correct requirements.

The most relevant solution has been proposed in the context of the *property-based approach* to design, where the development process starts from listing a set of formal properties, rather than defining an abstract-level model. The requirements validation is performed with a series of checks that improve the confidence in the correctness of the requirements. These checks consist of verifying that the requirements do not contain contradictions and that they are neither too strict to forbid desired behaviors, nor too weak to allow undesired behaviors. This process relies on the availability of a sufficiently expressive logic so that properties as well as desired and undesired behaviors can be formalized into formulas.

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The approach considers a one-to-one mapping between the properties and the logical formulas. This allows for traceability of the formalization and the validation results, and for incremental and modular approaches to the validation.

In the context of *safety-critical applications*, the choice of the language used to formalize the requirements is still an open issue, requiring a delicate balance between expressiveness, decidability, and complexity of inference. The difficulty in finding a suitable trade-off lies in the fact that the requirements for many real-world applications involve several dimensions. On the one side, the objects having an active role in the target application may have complex structure and mutual relationships, whose modeling may require the use of rich data types. On the other side, static constraints over their attributes must be complemented with constraints on their temporal evolution.

One of the main obstacle in applying this approach to the industrial level is that requirements are often written in a natural language so that a *domain knowledge* is necessary both to formalize them and to define which behaviors are desirable and which not during the validation process. Since domain experts are typically not advanced users of formal methods, they must be provided with a rich but friendly language for the formal specification and an automatic but scalable engine for the formal verification.

In this paper, we report on a methodology and a series of techniques that we developed for the formalization and validation of high-level requirements for safety-critical applications. The methodology is based on a three-phases approach that goes from the informal analysis of the requirements, to their formalization and validation [CRST08a]. The methodology relies on two main ingredients: a very expressive formal language and automatic satisfiability procedures. The language combines first-order, temporal, and hybrid logic [CRST08b, CRST09, CRT09]. The satisfiability procedures are based on model checking and satisfiability modulo theory. We applied this technology within an industrial project to the validation of railways requirements. The tool [CCM⁺09] integrates, within a commercial environment, techniques for requirements management and model-based design, and advanced techniques for formal validation with the model checker NuSMV [CCGR00].

The rest of the paper is organized as follow: in Section 2, we outline the proposed methodology, giving details on the chosen language in Section 2.1 and on the validation procedure in Section 2.2; in Section 3, we describe the project where the methodology was applied; in Section 4, we review the related work, and in Section 5, we conclude.

2 A methodology for the formalization and validation of requirements

Our methodology has been presented in [CRST08a]. It consists of three main steps:

- *Informal analysis.* The first activity in the methodology is the informal analysis of the set of requirements. In this phase, first the requirement fragments are identified and categorized on the basis of their characteristics. Then, they are structured according to their dependencies.
- *Formalization.* The second phase consists of the formalization of each categorized requirement fragment identified in the informal analysis by specifying the corresponding formal counterpart. The link between informal and formal is used for requirements traceability of the formalization against the informal textual requirements, and to select directly from the textual requirements document a categorized requirement fragment to validate.
- *Formal validation.* The third phase aims at improving the quality of the requirements and increasing the confidence that the categorized requirement fragment and its corresponding formalized counterpart meet the design intent. It consists of the definition of a series of validation problems

and the analysis of the results given by an automatic validation check. The problems include three main types of checks; namely, checking logical consistency, scenario compatibility, and property entailment:

- *Logical consistency* to formally verify the absence of logical contradictions in the considered formalized requirement fragments. It is indeed possible that two formalized requirement fragments mandate mutually incompatible behaviors. Note that this check does not require any domain knowledge.
- *Scenario compatibility* to verify whether a scenario is admitted given the constraints imposed by the considered formalized requirement fragments. Intuitively, the check for scenario compatibility can be seen as a form of simulation guided by a set of constraints. The check for scenario compatibility can be reduced to the problem of checking the consistency of the set of considered formalized requirement fragments with the constraint describing the scenario.
- *Property entailment* to verify whether an expected property is implied by the considered formalized requirement fragments. This check is similar in spirit to model checking, where a property is checked against a model. Here the considered set of formalized requirement fragment plays the role of the model against which the property must be verified. Property checking can be reduced to the problem of checking the consistency of the considered formalized requirement fragments with the negation of the property.

If one of the check reveals a problem, two causes are possible: the first one is that the formalization is not correct due to an improper use of the formal language or to an ambiguity of the informal specification; the second possibility is that there is a flaw in the informal specification that needs to be corrected. An inspection of the diagnostic information can be carried out in order to discriminate among the two possibilities in order to take the most appropriate corrective action.

In fact, the above checks not only produce a yes/no answer, but they can also provide the domain expert with diagnostic information, mainly in the form of:

- *Traces*. When consistency and scenario checking succeeds, it is possible to produce a trace witnessing the consistency, i.e. satisfying all the constraints in the considered formalized requirement fragments. Similarly, when a property check fails the tool provides a trace witnessing the violation of the property by the formalized requirement fragments.
- *Unsatisfiable core*. If the specification is inconsistent or the scenario is incompatible, no behavior can be associated to the considered formalized requirement fragments; in these cases, the tool can also generate diagnostic information in the form of a minimal inconsistent subset. This information can be given to the domain expert, to support the identification and the fix of the flaw.

2.1 A property specification language for safety-critical applications

The success of the methodology relies on the availability of a specification language which is enough expressive to represent the requirements of safety-critical applications, and enough simple to be used by domain experts and analyzed with automatic techniques.

In order to specify requirements in the context of safety-critical applications we adopt a fragment of *first-order temporal logic*. The first-order component allows to specify constraints on objects, their relationships, and their attributes, which typically have rich data types. The temporal component allows to specify constraints on the temporal evolution of the possible configurations. We enriched the logic with constructs able to specify hybrid aspects of the objects' attributes such as derivatives of the continuous

variables and instantaneous changes of the discrete variables. The logical formulas are consequently interpreted over hybrid traces where continuous evolutions alternate with discrete changes. Finally, the logic has been designed in order to be suitable for an automatic analysis with model checking techniques.

As described in [CRST09], we use a class diagram to define the classes of objects specified by the requirements, their relationships and their attributes. The class diagram basically defines the signature of the first-order temporal logic. The functional symbols that represent the attributes and the relationships of the objects are flexible in the sense that their interpretation change at different time points. Quantifiers are allowed to range over the objects of a class, and can be intermixed with the temporal operators.

The basic atoms of the logic are arithmetic predicates of the attributes and relationships of objects. As described in [CRT09], the “next” operator can be used to refer to the value of a variable after a discrete change, while the “der” operator can be used to refer to the first derivative of continuous variables during a continuous evolution.

The temporal structure of the logic encompasses the classical linear-time temporal operators combined with regular expressions. This combination is well established in the context of digital circuits and forms the core of standard languages such as the Property Specification Language (PSL) [EF06].

On the lines of PSL, we also provide a number of syntactic sugar which increases the usability of the language by the domain experts. This includes natural language expressions that substitute the temporal operators, the quantifiers, and most of the mathematical symbols.

2.2 Model checking techniques for requirements validation

The validation process of the proposed methodology relies on a series of satisfiability checks: consistency checking is performed by solving the satisfiability problem of the conjunction of the formalized requirements; the check that the requirements are not too strict is performed by checking whether the conjunction of the requirements and the scenario’s formulas is satisfiable; finally, the check that the requirements are not too weak is performed by checking whether the conjunction of the requirements and the negation of the property is unsatisfiable.

Unfortunately, the satisfiability problem of the chosen language is undecidable. The undecidability comes independently from the combination of temporal and first-order logics, from the combination of the uninterpreted functions and quantifiers, and from the hybrid component of the logic.

Nevertheless, we want to keep such expressiveness in order to faithfully represent the informal requirements in the formal language. Thus, we rely on automatic albeit incomplete satisfiability procedures.

First, we fix a number of objects per class so that it is possible to reduce the formula to equi-satisfiable one free of quantifiers and functional symbols [CRST09]. As described in [CRST08b], we can automatically find a bound on the number of objects for classes under certain restrictions.

Second, we translate the resulting quantifier-free hybrid formula into an equi-satisfiable formula in the classical temporal logic over discrete traces. In this case, we exploit the linearity of the constraints over the derivatives to guarantee the existence of a piecewise-linear solution and to encode the continuity of the continuous variables into quantifier-free constraints.

Third, we compile the resulting formula into a Fair Transition System (FTS) [MP92], whose accepted language is not empty iff the formula is satisfiable. For the compilation we rely on the works described in [CRT08, CRST08b]. We apply infinite-state model checking techniques to verify the language emptiness of the resulting fair transition system. In particular, we used Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [BCCZ99], particularly effective in solving the satisfiable cases and producing short models,

and Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) [CGJ⁺00], more oriented to prove the unsatisfiability cases.

The language non-emptiness check for the FTS is performed by looking for a lasso-shape trace of length up to a given bound. We encode this trace into an SMT formula using a standard BMC encoding and we submit it to a suitable SMT solver. This procedure is incomplete from two point of views: first, we are performing BMC limiting the number of different transitions in the trace; second, unlike the Boolean case, we cannot guarantee that if there is no lasso-shape trace, there does not exist an infinite trace satisfying the model (since a real variable may be forced to increase forever). Nevertheless, we find the procedure extremely efficient in the framework of requirements validation.

In order to prove the emptiness of the FTS, we use predicate abstraction. We adopt a CEGAR loop, where the abstraction generation and refinement are completely automated. The loop consists of four phases: 1) *abstraction*, where the abstract system is built according to a given set of predicates; the abstract state space is computing by passing to the SMT solver an ALLSAT problem; 2) *verification*, where the non-emptiness of the language of the abstract system is checked; if the language is empty, it can be concluded that also the concrete system has an empty language; otherwise, an infinite trace is produced; the abstract system is finite so that we can used classical model checking techniques; 3) *simulation*: if the verification produces a trace, the simulation checks whether it is realistic by simulating it on the concrete system; if the trace can be simulated in the concrete system, it is reported as a real witness of the satisfiability of the formula; the trace is simulated by checking the satisfiability of the SMT problem; 4) *refinement*: if the simulation cannot find a concrete trace corresponding to the abstract one, the refinement discovers new predicates that, once added to the abstraction, are sufficient to rule out the unrealistic path; also this step is solved with an SMT solver.

3 The ETCS project

The European Train Control System (ETCS) is a project supported by the European Union aiming at the implementation of a common train control system in all European countries to allow the uninterrupted movement of train across the borders. ETCS is based on the implementation on board of a set of safety critical functions of speed and distance supervision and of information to the driver. Such functions rely on data transmitted by track-side installations through two communication channels: fixed spot transmission devices, called balises, and continuous, bidirectional data transmission through radio according to the GSM standard. ETCS is already installed in important railway lines in different European countries (like Spain, Italy, The Netherlands, Switzerland) and installations are in progress in other countries, such as Sweden, UK, France, Belgium and also non-European railways such as China, India, Turkey, Arabia, South Korea, Algeria and Mexico.

Since 2005, the European Railway Agency (ERA) is responsible of managing the evolution of the ETCS specifications (change control management), ensuring their consistency, and guaranteeing the backwards compatibility of new versions with the old ones.

In 2007, ERA issued a call to tender for the development of a methodology complemented by a set of support tools, for the formalization and validation of the ETCS specifications. The activity poses many hard problems. First, the ETCS documents are written in natural language, and may thus contain a high degree of ambiguity. Second, the ETCS specifications are still in progress, and receive contribution by many people with different culture and background. Third, the ETCS comprises a huge set documents, and comes with severe issues of scalability.

The EuRailCheck project, originated from the successful response to the call to tender by the con-

sortium composed by “Registro Italiano Navale (RINA)”, a railway certifying body, “Fondazione Bruno Kessler - irst”, a research center, and “Dr. Graband and Partners”, a railway consultancy company.

Within the project, we developed a support tool, covering the various phases of the described methodology, based on the integration of algorithmic formal verification techniques within traditional design tools. Moreover, a realistic subset of the specification was formalized and validated applying the developed methodology and tools. The results of the project were then further exploited and validated by domain experts external to the consortium. The evaluation was carried out in form of a workshop, followed by hands-on training courses. These events were attended by experts from manufacturing and railways companies, who provided positive feedback on the applicability in the large of the methodology.

3.1 Tool support

The EuRailCheck supporting tool, which has been designed and developed within the project, considered several user and technical requirements such as easy of use, and openness.

The technological basis was identified in two tools provided by IBM: the RequisitePro suite was used as a front end for the management of the ETCS informal requirements; and, the Rational Software Architect (RSA) was used for the management of the formalization of the ETCS requirements into UML class diagrams and temporal constraints. RSA was chosen for its openness in the manipulation of UML specification, and its customizability thanks to the embedded Eclipse platform it is built upon. RSA worked as a gluing platform, and all the modules were developed as plug-ins for RSA. The main functionalities include RequisitePro custom tagging, annotation of UML diagrams with constraints (syntax checking, completion), support for the instantiation to finite domains, control of the validation procedure. Moreover, we also developed, relying on the API provided by RequisitePro and on the Eclipse platform, the traceability links among the informal requirements classified in RequisitePro and their formal counterpart inside RSA. The verification back-end is based on an extended version of the NuSMV/CEGAR [CCGR00] model checker, able to deal with continuous variables, and to analyze temporally complex expressions in RELTL [EF06, CRST09, CRT09].

4 Related work

Several works faced with the problem of the formal specification and validation of requirements. Some of them focused on the problem of formalizing natural language specifications, other focused on the formal specification languages to be used in such a task, other proposed a methodological approach to the requirements representation and validation.

On the first side, works such as [FGR⁺94] and [AG06] aim at extracting automatically from a natural language description a formal model to be analyzed. However, their target formal languages cannot express temporal constraints over object models. Moreover, they miss a methodology for an adequate formal analysis of the requirements. Other works such as [GMM90, BDZ97] provided expressive formal languages to represent the requirements. Although, the proposed languages have some similarities with ours such as the adoption of first-order temporal logic, they do not allow specification of hybrid aspects which are necessary for safety-critical applications. Also these works miss a methodology for the analysis of the formal requirements and the verification algorithms are perform either with interactive theorem proving or with model checking restricted to propositional sub-cases.

Several formal specification languages such as Z [Spi92], B [Abr96], and OCL [OMG06] have been proposed for formal model-based specification. They are very expressive but require a deep background

in order to write a correct formalization. Alloy [Jac02] is a formal language for describing structural properties of a system relying on the subset of Z [Spi92] that allows for object modeling. An Alloy specification consists of basic structures representing classes together with constraints and operations describing how the structures change dynamically. Alloy only allows to specify attributes belonging to finite domains (no Reals or Integers). Thus, it would have been impossible to model the Train position as requested by the ETCS specifications. Although Alloy supports the “next” operator (“prime” operator) to specify the temporal evolution of a given object, it does not allow to express properties using LTL and regular expressions.

Among the methodological approaches, in [HJL96], a framework is proposed for the automated checking of requirement specifications expressed in Software Cost Reduction tabular notation, which aims at detecting specification problems such as type errors, missing cases, circular definitions and non-determinism. Although this work has many related points to our approach, the proposed language is not adapt to formalize requirements that contain functional descriptions of the system at high level of abstraction with temporal assumptions on the environment. Formal Tropos (FT) [SPGM05, FLM⁺04] and KAOS [DDMvL97, vL09] are goal-oriented software development methodologies that provide a visual modeling language that can be used to define an informal specification, allowing to model intentional and social concepts, such as those of actor, goal, and social relationships between actors, and annotate the diagrams with temporal constraints to characterize the valid behaviors of the model. Both FT and KAOS are limited to propositional LTL temporal constraints, and thus not suitable for formalizing safety-critical requirements.

5 Conclusions

In this paper we described a recent research line that we are pursuing in the context of requirement validation for safety-critical applications. We developed an end-to-end methodology for the analysis of requirements, which combines informal and formal techniques. The property-based approach guarantees traceability, by allowing for a direct correspondence between the components of the informal specification and their formalized counterparts. The formal specification language mixes linear-temporal logic with first-order and hybrid components. Automatic albeit incomplete techniques based on model checking are used to check consistency, entailment of required properties, and possibility of desirable scenarios.

The methodology has been applied in a project with industrial partners for the formalization and validation of railways requirements. During the project, we developed a tool that integrates, within a commercial environment for traditional requirements management and model-based design, advanced techniques for formal validation. The tool has been used and validated by potential end users external to the project’s consortium.

In the future, we will pursue the following lines of activity. First, we will investigate the application of automated techniques for Natural Language Processing (e.g. automated tag extraction, discourse representation theory), in order to increase the automation of the first phase of the methodology. Second, we will explore extensions to the expressiveness of the formalism, the relative scalability issues of the verification tools.

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