1. Client requests: de-duplication; include appropriate requests in proposals

request pool; // submitted (but not yet proposed) transactions/requests

MemPool

```
pending requests; // set of requests that were submitted or proposed
  cached results; // cache of recently executed transactions/requests and their results
  Function get transactions()
     return request_pool.pop() // one transaction/request per block
  Procedure add request(reg) // called in Main's request handler
     if <req, result> ∈ cached results
       Reply = <req.id, result>
       send Reply to req.client // take care of client retransmission after execution
       return
     if req ∈ request pool V req ∈ pending requests
       return // duplicate request so don't add to request pool
     request pool.push(req) // add request
     pending_requests.add(req)
2. Client verification of committed command
Client
  replies; // collected replies per request, indexed by hash of request id and result
  pending requests; // requests that client submitted and is awaiting response for
  Procedure start_event_processing(M)
     if M is a reply msg then process reply message(M)
```

pending requests.remove(reply.request id) // remove request id from pending requests

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Procedure process reply message(reply)

If $|replies[req_idx]| == f + 1$ then

req_idx ← hash(reply.request_id || reply.result)
replies[req_idx] ← replies[req_idx] ∪ reply.sender

```
BlockTree
```

```
Procedure process qc(qc)
  if qc.ledger commit info.commit state id ≠ ⊥
    Ledger.commit(qc.vote info.parent id)
    committed block ← pending block tree[qc.vote info.parent id]
    request ← committed block.payload
    result ← "Committed {request.id}"
    Reply ← <request.id, result>
    send Reply to request.client
    MemPool.cached results.add(Reply)
```

3. Validity checks for cryptographic values

Main

```
public keys ← Safety.get public keys() // map of validators to their public keys
Function verify signature(sender, signature)
  if sender ∉ public keys
     return False // unrecognized key
  sender public key ← public keys[sender]
  return verify(signature, sender public key) // returns True if signature is verified
Procedure process proposal msg(P)
  if verify signature(P.sender, P.signature) == False
     return // drop message
  if ( ¬Safety.valid_signatures(P.block.qc, P.last_round_tc)
                                         V ¬Safety.valid_signatures(P.high_commit_qc, ⊥)
     return // drop message
Procedure process vote msg(M)
  if verify signature(M.sender, M.signature) == False
     return // drop message
  if Safety.valid_signatures(M.high_commit_qc, ⊥) == False
     return // drop message
Procedure process timeout msg(M)
  if verify_signature(M.tmo_info.sender, M.tmo_info.signature) == False
     return // drop message
  if Safety.valid signatures(M.high commit qc, M.last round tc) == False
     return // drop message
```

...

4. Catching up with latest commits:

```
PSEUDOCODE for updating other validators
PROCEDURE update_node(block_id):
  missing_commits ← list() #empty initially
  if block_id ∈ commits: #This means block id is in memory
    idx ← index of block_id in commit_queue + 1
    for i from idx to commit queue.end
       missing U = <commit_queue[i].id, commit_queue[i].txn> #append all transactions from
idx+1 onwards
  else: #This means block_id has been flushed to the commits file
     no_more_records = False
     commit found = False
    while(!commit_found)
       record ← read a line in file committed_records
       <id, transaction> ← record
       if block_id ∈ record
         commit\_found \leftarrow True
         break
    if commit_found
       while (!end_of_file)
       record ← read a line in file commited_records
       <id, transaction> ← record
       missing U = \langle id, transaction \rangle
    for commit in commit_queue:
       missing U = <commit.id, commit.transaction>
```