

# Tripping through Hoops: The Effect of Violating Compulsory Government Procedures Appendix

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## **A. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES**

Table A.1: Sample texts in the two treatment arms for a traffic case.

	Informational Texts	Personalized Assistance Texts
<b>2 weeks ahead</b>	<p>Hi NAME, Go to court on MMM DD at HH:MM PM or pay online to avoid license cancellation. Case# XXXXXXXXXXXX. [court website URL here]. Reply STOP to end texts</p> <p>Would you like information about rescheduling court dates, payment plans, or other topics? Please visit us online.</p>	<p>Hi NAME, Go to court on MMM DD at HH:MM PM or pay online to avoid license cancellation. Case# XXXXXXXXXXXX. [court website URL here]. Reply STOP to end texts</p> <p>Would you like information about rescheduling court dates, payment plans, or other topics? Just text back. We will reply during business hours with more info.</p>
<b>1 week ahead</b>	<p>Hi NAME, You have court on DOW MMM DD at HH:MM PM at ADDRESS. We have childcare, payment plans, and rescheduling options. Reply STOP to end texts.</p> <p>Your case # in STUDY SITE is XXXXXXXXXXXX</p>	<p>Hi NAME, You have court on DOW MMM DD at HH:MM PM at ADDRESS. We have childcare, payment plans, and rescheduling options. Reply STOP to end texts.</p> <p>Need help? Just text back! We will respond during business hours. Your case # in STUDY SITE is XXXXXXXXXXXX.</p>
<b>1 day ahead</b>	<p>You can resolve your case tomorrow at HH:MM PM at ADDRESS, Rm #. Show up or pay online to avoid a canceled license &amp; fees.</p> <p>Your case # is XXXXXXXXXXXX</p>	<p>You can resolve your case tomorrow at HH:MM PM at ADDRESS, Rm #. Show up or pay online to avoid a cancelled license &amp; fees.</p> <p>Questions? Just text back! We will respond during business hours. Your case # is XXXXXXXXXXXX.</p>

Notes: SMS messages that were sent to the two treatment arms are displayed above. Each set of text messages was formatted with information specific to the defendant who received them. Only 3.27 percent of treated cases had an undeliverable message/number and 0.96 percent had a person reply saying it was the wrong number.

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics by Credit Score Category for the Automatic Conviction Sample

	Full Sample (1)	Fair or Higher VantageScore (2)	Poor or Lower VantageScore (3)	Unmatched to Credit Data (4)
(A) Demographics and Income				
Female	0.398 (0.490)	0.431 (0.495)	0.453 (0.498)	0.291 (0.454)
White	0.736 (0.441)	0.794 (0.405)	0.693 (0.461)	0.688 (0.464)
Black	0.145 (0.352)	0.099 (0.299)	0.197 (0.398)	0.166 (0.372)
Hispanic	0.073 (0.260)	0.059 (0.236)	0.074 (0.262)	0.093 (0.290)
Other Race	0.034 (0.181)	0.037 (0.189)	0.022 (0.145)	0.041 (0.198)
Age	35.685 (13.889)	37.821 (14.428)	34.614 (11.822)	33.361 (14.403)
Avg Inc. of Zip Code (\$1000s)	70.983 (36.887)	75.526 (38.455)	66.298 (34.724)	68.409 (35.585)
Estimated Income (\$1000s)	– –	81.312 (64.965)	41.367 (22.463)	– –
(B) Case Characteristics				
Municipal	0.009 (0.095)	0.004 (0.066)	0.011 (0.103)	0.015 (0.122)
Traffic	0.991 (0.095)	0.996 (0.066)	0.989 (0.103)	0.985 (0.123)
Criminal	0.000 (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.018)
Can Pay Ahead	0.662 (0.473)	0.640 (0.480)	0.685 (0.465)	0.675 (0.469)
Num Charges on Case	1.755 (0.474)	1.803 (0.436)	1.674 (0.506)	1.759 (0.487)
(C) Prior Court Contact				
Prior Case	0.416 (0.493)	0.403 (0.490)	0.492 (0.500)	0.363 (0.481)
Prior FTA	0.105 (0.307)	0.062 (0.241)	0.176 (0.381)	0.103 (0.305)

Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics for cases where a failure to appear leads to an automatic conviction. Column 1 includes the full sample, Column 2 is restricted to the sample that matched to a pre-randomization credit dataset and has a fair or higher credit score. Column 3 is restricted to the sample that matched to a pre-randomization credit dataset and has a poor or lower credit score. Column 4 is restricted to the sample that did not match to a pre-randomization credit dataset. The estimated income variable is the credit bureau's estimate of the individual's income. This variable is unavailable for the sample that did not match to a pre-randomization credit dataset.

Table A.3: The Impact of Failure to Appear on Fine and Fee Outcomes for the Automatic Conviction Consequence Sample

	Fines and Fees Paid (1)	Fines and Fees Charged (2)
<hr/> (A) All Cases <hr/>		
Failure to Appear	79.959 (13.333)	72.501 (13.369)
Complier Mean Observations	133.875 10889	164.171 10889
<hr/> (B) High Credit Score <hr/>		
Failure to Appear	84.475 (18.096)	95.896 (18.451)
Complier Mean Observations	146.983 4829	155.536 4829
<hr/> (C) Low Credit Score <hr/>		
Failure to Appear	51.836 (23.804)	44.742 (24.475)
Complier Mean Observations	134.395 3006	180.825 3006
<hr/> (D) Unmatched to Credit Data <hr/>		
Failure to Appear	75.937 (25.390)	80.544 (25.326)
Complier Mean Observations	113.222 3054	154.225 3054

Notes: This table shows the effect of a failure to appear on fines and fees charged and paid on the case using assignment to the interventions as an instrument for failure to appear. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to an automatic conviction and sentence. The high credit score sample is defined as those with VantageScores categorized by the credit agency as “Fair” or higher. The low credit score sample is defined as those with VantageScores categorized as “Poor” or lower. The coefficient is the reduced form effect of the treatments on criminal justice outcomes scaled by the effect of the treatments on FTA. The complier means row displays means for those who were assigned to treatment and for whom treatment prevents a failure to appear. Regressions control for covariates in Table 1, time of day of the hearing, and randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.




Figure A.1: Percent of Fines and Fees Paid by Age of Case

Notes: This figure plots binned means of the percent of fines and fees paid by the number of weeks between the scheduled court hearing date and August 6, 2019. The sample only includes control cases that failed to appear within the automatic conviction sample.

Table A.4: The Impact of Failure to Appear on Subsequent Court Contact for the Warrant Consequence Sample

	Warrant on Case (1)	Jail Booking by 1 Yr (2)	Bonded Out by 1 Yr (3)	New Case by 1 Yr (4)
Failure to Appear	0.657 (0.127)	-0.080 (0.127)	0.359 (0.119)	0.025 (0.070)
Complier Mean	.321	.331	.177	.027
Observations	7448	7448	7424	7448

Notes: This table shows the effect of a failure to appear on future court contact using assignment to the interventions as an instrument for failure to appear. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to a bench warrant and that have a full 12 months of follow-up data available to us. The coefficient is the reduced form effect of the treatments on criminal justice outcomes scaled by the effect of the treatments on FTA. The complier means row displays means for those who were assigned to treatment and for whom treatment prevents a failure to appear. Regressions control for covariates in Table 1, time of day of the hearing, and randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A.5: The Impact of Failure to Appear on Subsequent Court Contact within 6 Months for the Warrant Consequence Sample

	Warrant on Case (1)	Jail Booking by 6 Months (2)	Bonded Out by 6 Months (3)	New Case by 6 Months (4)
Failure to Appear	0.714 (0.076)	0.023 (0.065)	0.403 (0.067)	-0.004 (0.036)
Complier Mean	.272	.101	.077	.036
Observations	14800	14800	14759	14800

Notes: This table shows the effect of a failure to appear on future court contact using assignment to the interventions as an instrument for failure to appear. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to a bench warrant and with 6 months of follow-up. The coefficient is the reduced form effect of the treatments on criminal justice outcomes scaled by the effect of the treatments on FTA. The complier means row displays means for those who were assigned to treatment and for whom treatment prevents a failure to appear. Regressions control for covariates in Table 1, time of day of the hearing, and randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

## **B. COMPARING TWO TREATMENT ARMS**

This appendix shows the comparison between the two treatment arms.

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance Between Treatment Arms

	All (1)	Adjusted Differences		
		Control vs. Info.-Only (2)	Control vs. Personal. Assist. (3)	Info.-Only vs. Personal. Assist. (4)
<i>Demographics and Income</i>				
Female	0.365 [0.482]	0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.008)
White	0.707 [0.455]	0.003 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)
Black	0.175 [0.380]	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)
Hispanic	0.078 [0.269]	0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Other Race	0.034 [0.181]	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
Age	35.043 [13.883]	0.433 (0.202)	0.167 (0.199)	-0.083 (0.225)
Avg Inc. of Zip Code	66.271 [34.775]	0.408 (0.510)	0.488 (0.496)	-0.231 (0.557)
<i>Case Characteristics</i>				
Municipal	0.093 [0.291]	0.003 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Traffic	0.686 [0.464]	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Criminal	0.221 [0.415]	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Can Pay Ahead	0.254 [0.436]	0.003 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)
FTA Bench Warrant	0.646 [0.478]	0.001 (0.006)	-0.014 (0.006)	-0.017 (0.007)
Num Charges on Case	2.279 [1.261]	0.034 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.033 (0.019)
<i>Prior Court Contact</i>				
Prior Case	0.497 [0.500]	0.011 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.001 (0.008)
Prior FTA	0.208 [0.406]	0.003 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)
P-value		0.335	0.212	0.537
Observations	30,759	22,496	22,807	16,215

Notes: Column 1 presents summary statistics for the analysis sample. Dummies for court times were omitted from this table for brevity. Columns 2 through 4 display coefficients from balance tests that control for day and court building strata. We include the p-values from a joint test of significance for all of the covariates listed in the table and binaries for court times. Standard deviations are displayed in square brackets. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.



Table B.2: Demographics and Prior Court Contact of Personalized Assistance Treatment Arm by Conversation Take-Up

	Did not Initiate Conversation (1)	Initiated Conversation (2)	Adjusted Difference (3)
<i>Demographics and Income</i>			
Female	0.365 [0.481]	0.370 [0.483]	0.004 (0.011)
White	0.716 [0.451]	0.701 [0.458]	-0.017 (0.011)
Black	0.161 [0.368]	0.191 [0.393]	0.030 (0.009)
Hispanic	0.078 [0.268]	0.072 [0.258]	-0.006 (0.006)
Other Race	0.037 [0.190]	0.033 [0.178]	-0.004 (0.004)
Age	34.298 [13.451]	36.465 [14.778]	2.160 (0.334)
Avg Inc. of Zip Code	66.473 [34.788]	66.388 [34.027]	-0.279 (0.805)
<i>Prior Court Contact</i>			
Prior Case	0.490 (0.500)	0.507 (0.500)	0.014 [0.012]
Prior FTA	0.192 (0.394)	0.216 (0.411)	0.020 [0.009]
Observations	5039	3224	

Notes: Did not Initiate Conversation indicates a non-response or a response indicating a wrong number or opt-out. Column 3 displays coefficients from regressions of each characteristic on whether the respondent initiated a conversation. The regressions also control for day and court building strata. Standard deviations displayed in square brackets. Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses.




Figure B.1: Effects of Information and Personalized Assistance on Case Outcomes

Notes: We plot the effects of an informational nudge and information-plus-personalized assistance relative to the control group. Panel A shows the effects of the two treatments on FTA rates and Panel B shows how the case is resolved. The analysis controls for the variables shown in Table B.1 as well as court time and court date and court building strata. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes 30,759 cases.

## **C. RESULTS WITHOUT COVARIATE CONTROLS**

This appendix reproduces the main analyses controlling only for randomization strata and without dropping observations that are missing covariate information.

Table C.1: The Impact of Any Text Message Treatment on Case Outcomes

	Failure to Appear (1)	Appear in Person (2)	Pay in Advance (3)	Reschedule (4)	Payment Plan (5)	Dismissed or Not Guilty (6)
(A) Automatic Conviction Sample						
Treatment	-0.128 (0.007)	0.026 (0.008)	0.075 (0.010)	0.021 (0.004)	0.008 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Control Mean	0.209	0.168	0.528	0.029	0.015	0.021
Observations	11061	11061	11061	11061	11061	11061
(B) Failure to Appear Warrant Sample						
Treatment	-0.063 (0.005)	0.034 (0.006)	0.000 (0.002)	0.036 (0.003)	0.007 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
Control Mean	0.213	0.637	0.018	0.041	0.097	0.098
Observations	20311	20311	20311	20311	20311	20311

Notes: This table shows the impact of the interventions on case outcomes for our two analysis samples: those in which an FTA results in an automatic conviction and those in which an FTA results in a warrant. The regressions control for randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table C.2: The Impact of Failure to Appear on Fine and Fee Outcomes for the Automatic Conviction Consequence Sample

	Fines and Fees Paid (1)	Fines and Fees Charged (2)
<hr/> (A) All Cases <hr/>		
Failure to Appear	30.981 (9.820)	48.623 (9.686)
Complier Mean	133.781	163.675
Observations	11061	11061
<hr/> (B) Fair or Higher Vantage Score <hr/>		
Failure to Appear	30.745 (14.041)	47.368 (13.957)
Complier Mean	147.717	156.821
Observations	4899	4899
<hr/> (C) Poor or Lower Vantage Score <hr/>		
Failure to Appear	17.923 (17.340)	41.788 (17.450)
Complier Mean	134.077	179.409
Observations	3048	3048
<hr/> (D) Unmatched to Credit Data <hr/>		
Failure to Appear	36.315 (19.162)	59.326 (18.461)
Complier Mean	112.701	152.565
Observations	3114	3114

Notes: This table shows the effect of a failure to appear on fines and fees charged and paid on the case using assignment to the interventions as an instrument for failure to appear. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to an automatic conviction and sentence. The coefficient is the reduced form effect of the treatments on criminal justice outcomes scaled by the effect of the treatments on FTA. The complier means row displays means for those who were assigned to treatment and for whom treatment prevents a failure to appear. Regressions control for randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table C.3: The Impact of Failure to Appear on Subsequent Court Contact for the Warrant Consequence Sample

	Warrant on Case (1)	Jail Booking by 1 Yr (2)	Bonded Out by 1 Yr (3)	New Case by 1 Yr (4)
Failure to Appear	0.645 (0.142)	-0.191 (0.160)	0.340 (0.135)	0.024 (0.077)
Complier Mean	.353	.351	.178	.028
Observations	7561	7561	7537	7561

Notes: This table shows the effect of a failure to appear on future court contact using assignment to the interventions as an instrument for failure to appear. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to a bench warrant and that have a full 12 months of follow-up data available to us. The coefficient is the reduced form effect of the treatments on criminal justice outcomes scaled by the effect of the treatments on FTA. The complier means row displays means for those who were assigned to treatment and for whom treatment prevents a failure to appear. Regressions control for randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.