

The notional category of evidentiality: Day 3

Evidentiality and self-knowledge

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Agenda for today

- ▶ So far
 - ▶ Evidentials in root declaratives
 - ▶ Evidence holder: speaker
 - ▶ Conversational dynamics of evidential statements
- ▶ Bigger picture
 - ▶ Evidentials in attitudes and questions
 - ▶ Who is the evidence holder?
- ▶ Proposal: evidentials as 1-person attitude reports
 - ▶ A uniform account for root declaratives, attitudes, questions
 - ▶ Evidentiality in context of perspectival expressions
 - ▶ Empirical scope: Bulgarian, German (*wohl, sollen*), Turkish, Japanese *youda* (more data in the handout)

Roadmap

- ① Primer on self-knowledge and self-attributions
- ② The first-person component of evidentials
 - ▶ Strictly autocentric in root declaratives
 - ▶ De se in attitudes
- ③ The mental state component of evidentials
 - ▶ Non-challengeability in dialogues
 - ▶ Lack of speaker-oriented readings in information-seeking questions

- (1) A. Sweetie, you should go home!
B. Mom, am I cold?
A. No, you are hungry! (A joke)
- (2) "That's not what you want." When arguing, it was always his tactic to deny the validity of our requests. If you wanted, say, a stack of pancakes, he would tell you not that you couldn't have them but that you never wanted them in the first place. "I know what you want" was always met with "No you don't."
(David Sedaris, *Ashes*)

Self-knowledge and self-attributions I

- ▶ Self-knowledge is special (Gertler 2011, 2017)
 - ▶ perceptual experiences
 - ▶ beliefs
 - ▶ desires
 - ▶ pain (Aydede 2013)
 - ▶ ...
- ▶ One way to conceptualize: distinguished epistemic status
 - ▶ the knower has privileged access to certain types of information about oneself
 - ▶ other parties do not, as there is no direct third-party assessment

Self-knowledge and self-attributions II

- ▶ Self-attributions: linguistic expressions that describe first-person mental states (cf. also Bar-On 2004; Bar-On and Long 2011)
 - ▶ 1-person psych predicates: *I am delighted*
 - ▶ 1-person attitude reports: *I hope*
 - ▶ 1-person bouletic statements: *I wish*
 - ▶ ...
 - ▶ Self-attributions: true if uttered sincerely
- (3) a. Self-attribution:
 I want to go on vacation to Costa Brava.
- b. Regular statement:
 Mandy wants to go on vacation to Costa Brava.
- ▶ Parallel: self-verification of explicit performatives such as *I promise* (Searle 1989; Condoravdi and Lauer 2011)

Self-knowledge and self-attributions III

- ▶ Grammar can conceptualize self-knowledge in a special way
 - ▶ Person restrictions with the so-called experiencer predicates in Japanese, which describe feelings and internal states (Kuroda 1965; Hashimoto 2015)
 - ▶ Egophoric agreement, verbal marking that denotes intentional actions (Zu 2015, 2018; Coppock and Wechsler 2018; Floyd et al. 2018)

Self-knowledge and self-attributions IV

- ▶ Today: evidentials as self-attributions
- ▶ Main claim:
 - ▶ evidentials, across languages and evidence types (including hearsay), as self-ascriptions of a mental state
 - ▶ a range of their linguistic properties can be derived under this account

Self-knowledge and self-attributions V

- ▶ Key ingredients for the semantics
 - ▶ The 1-person component: the self, determined by the environment (root clause vs. complement clause)
 - ▶ The mental state component: reasoning about propositions (cf. Krawczyk 2012; Winans 2016; Eckardt and Beltrama 2019)
- ▶ General template: evidentials as attitude reports in Hintikkan semantics
- ▶ Informally, evidentials describe the mental state of having reasoned about particular evidence
- ▶ Formal details: handout on Slack, talk at GLOW 2020 <https://osf.io/6xzg4/>

(4) $\llbracket \text{EV} \rrbracket^{c, \langle e, w \rangle, g} = \lambda p. \forall \langle e', w' \rangle \in \text{REASON}_{\iota x. \text{Holder}(x, e), w} : [p(e')(w')],$
where $\text{REASON}_{\iota x. \text{Holder}(x, e), w} = \{ \langle e', w' \rangle \mid \text{it is compatible with what } \iota x. \text{Holder}(x, e) \text{ reasons in } w \text{ at } e \text{ for } \iota x. \text{Holder}(x, e) \text{ to be } \iota y. \text{Holder}(y, e') \text{ in } w' \text{ at } e' \}$

Self-knowledge and self-attributions VI

► Whose evidence?

(5) Turkish

a. Root declaratives: the speaker

ipucu sol köşe-dey-**mış**
clue left corner-LOC-**IND.PST**

'The clue is in the left corner, I hear/infer.'

b. Attitudes: the attitude holder construed de se

Alexis { ipucu sol köşe-dey-**mış** } de-di.
Alexis { clue left corner-LOC-**IND.PST** } say-PST

'Alexis said that, given what she herself heard/inferred, the
clue was in the left corner.'

c. Canonical information-seeking questions: the addressee

ipucu sol köşe-dey-**mış** mi
clue left corner-LOC-**IND.PST** Q

'Given what you hear/infer, is the clue in the left corner?'

Self-knowledge and self-attributions VII

- ▶ The pattern not unique to evidentials
- ▶ Many expressions that deal with opinion/knowledge/point-of-view behave similarly
- ▶ A spate of proposals for the unified account for the self and perspective (Speas and Tenny 2003; Tenny 2006; McCready 2007; Pearson 2013; Sundaresan and Pearson 2014; Woods 2014; Sundaresan 2018; Zu 2018)
- ▶ Evidentials fall squarely within this group but ...
 - ▶ No clear evidence for a unified syntax
 - ▶ Clear evidence for semantic heterogeneity of first-person-oriented content (Anand 2006; Weatherston and Egan 2011; Moltmann 2012; Podobryaev 2017; Jaszczołt and Huang 2018)
- ▶ Goal for now: a working analysis for evidentials, possible to reconcile with unifying approaches should such evidence become available

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The 1-person component: Root declaratives I

- ▶ Assumption in most approaches
 - ▶ Evidence holder corresponds an implicit argument
 - ▶ Autocentric perspective (=anchored to the speaker)
 - ▶ Not a given!
 - ▶ Variables in semantics require justification (Beaver and von Fintel, ESSLLI 2019 <https://dkcosts.kvf.me/>)
 - ▶ Many perspectival elements allow non-autocentric perspective
 - ▶ Context-sensitive adjectives (Partee 1989 and later work)
- (6) Jo will go to a **local** tea house after the class.
- a. local to the speaker
 - b. local to Jo
 - c. ...

The 1-person component: Root declaratives II

- ▶ Epistemic modals *might* and *must* (see discussion in Hacking 1967; Egan et al. 2005; von Fintel and Gillies 2008; Weatherson and Egan 2011; Yanovich forth.)

(7) *Ann is planning a surprise party for Bill. Unfortunately, Bill learned all about it. Currently Ann is walking past Chris's apartment carrying a large supply of party hats. She sees a bus on which Bill frequently rides home, so she jumps into some nearby bushes to avoid being spotted. Bill, watching from Chris's window, is quite amused. Chris is puzzled and asks Bill why Ann is hiding in the bushes. Bill says:*

I **might_{ANN}** be on that bus.

The 1-person component: Root declaratives III

- ▶ Evidence holder: always the speaker in root declaratives

(8) Turkish

✓ *Context 1, speaker's evidence: I am in an escape room. A team member tells about the clue. I say:*

#*Context 2, third-party's evidence: I have designed a new escape room and am testing it. I am watching a muted video of a team of people inside. After talking to a team member, one person suddenly rushes to a far left corner. I think that that person was told that a clue is in that corner (which is incorrect, as I know the plot and that the clue is not there). I say:*

ipucu sol köşe-dey-**mış**
clue left corner-LOC-IND.**PST**

[HEARSAY]

≈'Given what is said, the clue is in the left corner'

The 1-person component: Root declaratives IV

- ▶ The infelicity in Context 2 in (8) due to perspectival anchoring
 - ▶ relevant evidence requirements satisfied
 - ▶ felicitous in the corresponding speaker-oriented scenario in Context 1
- ▶ Such data: delineating the space of analytical options
- ▶ Machinery that allows non-autocentric readings overgenerates for evidentials, incl. approaches to evidentials as vanilla Kratzerian modals (Matthewson et al. 2007; Peterson 2010; Lee 2013)

Bottom line: We need an account that ensures the strict autocentric perspective

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The 1-person component: Attitudes I

- ▶ Many languages: evidentials occur in clausal complements (embeddability determined by syntax, not semantics; Korotkova 2019)
- ▶ When embeddable, evidentials often **shift** in attitudes: evidence holder = attitude holder

(9) St'át'imcets (Salish; British Columbia, Canada)

Context: Lémya7 was babysitting your nephew and niece and she noticed at one point that the boy had a red mark on his face and his sister was looking guilty. She tells you when you get home what she noticed. Then you tell the mother of the kids:

tsut s-Lémya7 [kw s-tup-un'-ás k'a
say NOM-Lémya7 [DET NOM-punch-TRANS-3.ERG INFER
s-Maria ta sésq'wez'-s-a]
NOM-Maria DET younger.sibling-3POSS-EXIS]
'Lémya7 said that, given what she inferred, Maria hit her younger brother.'

(adapted from Matthewson et al. 2007:229-230)

The 1-person component: Attitudes II

- ▶ Shift in attitudes is semantically trivial:
 - ▶ Speech and attitude predicates (*say, believe, think ...*) operate on worlds (Hintikka 1969 and much later work; see Pearson forth. for an overview)
 - ▶ Any world-sensitive expression in their scope: affected
 - ▶ Special mechanisms for other readings (Keshet and Schwarz 2019)
 - ▶ If evidentials talk about evidence in a world w , then evidentials-in-attitudes talk about evidence in the worlds introduced by the attitude
- ▶ Another possible interpretation for evidentials-in-attitudes
 - ▶ Evidential concord (Matthewson et al. 2007; Schenner 2010; Schwager 2010): e.g. a hearsay evidential “repeating” a speech predicate or an inferential evidential under a doxastic predicate
 - ▶ Unproblematic for most theories, likely same as semantically vacuous *might* under *think* (Huitink 2012; Kratzer 2013)
- ▶ The behavior of evidentials across the board different from appositives (Korotkova 2016b)

The 1-person component: Attitudes III

- ▶ Less trivial: obligatory *de se* (=about oneself) construal
 - ▶ The evidence holder has to be consciously aware of their evidence
- ▶ Larger context
 - ▶ Attitudes *de se*: attitudes made consciously about oneself (Lewis 1979; Perry 1979)
 - ▶ A number of linguistic expressions only allow *de se* construal (PRO, some logophors, long-distance reflexives, some shifted indexicals; Morgan 1970; Chierchia 1989; Anand 2006; Schlenker 2011; Pearson 2013, 2015; Zu 2018, Deal forth.)
 - ▶ De *se* necessitates a particular linguistic analysis (see discussion in Pearson 2018, Patel-Grosz forth.)

The 1-person component: Attitudes IV

► English PRO

- (10) a. *Context, de re: Winnie the Pooh and Piglet are going to hunt a Woozle. They find footprints that they think belong to one of those creatures. Unbeknownst to them, however, they have been walking in circles, and the footprints are Pooh's own.*

✓Pooh; claimed that **he**; was a Woozle.

#Pooh; claimed **PRO**; to be a Woozle.

- b. *Context, de se: Pooh thinks he himself is a Woozle.*

✓Pooh; claimed that **he**; was a Woozle.

✓Pooh; claimed **PRO**; to be a Woozle.

(adapted from Pearson 2013:559-560)

The 1-person component: Attitudes V

- ▶ Evidential de se

(11) Turkish

✓ *Context 1, de se: Alexis was playing an escape room with a team. One of the team members told her that the clue was in the left corner and she describes the situation to me.*

#*Context 2, de re: Alexis and I are watching a muted video of a team of people in an escape room. After talking to a team member, one person suddenly rushes to a far left corner. Alexis thinks that that person was told that a clue is in that corner, and says so to me. What she doesn't realize is that this person is herself.*

Alexis [ipucu sol köşe-dey-**mış**] de-di. [Hearsay]
Alexis [clue left corner-LOC-**IND.PST**] say-PST
'Alexis said that she was told that the clue was in the left corner.'

The 1-person component: Attitudes VI

- ▶ Evidentiality: another instance of *de se* in the verbal domain
(also egophoric agreement, the jussive mood, or experiencer predicates (Zu 2018:174-189))
- ▶ Parallel with the nominal domain: phonologically null or minimal pronouns are more likely to be obligatorily read *de se* (Patel-Grosz forth.)
- ▶ Simply having an individual argument in the semantics isn't enough: it ensures co-reference but not awareness
- ▶ One way to account for *de se*: co-variation of individuals and worlds (Lewis 1979; Chierchia 1989)

Bottom line: We need an account that ensures awareness

The 1-person component: Recap

- ▶ **Data from root declaratives:**
An individual argument
- ▶ **Data from attitudes:**
An individual argument obligatorily construed de se
- ▶ **Overall:**
Interesting constraints on the semantic theory
(several possible options within this space)

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The mental state component: Non-challengeability I

- ▶ Recap from Day 2:
 - ▶ Evidentials resist denials of the form “That’s not true”
 - ▶ Non-challengeability: diagnostic of NAI (Murray 2014, 2017)
 - ▶ Anaphoric potential ≠ at-issueness in relevant frameworks
(Snider 2017; Korotkova 2020)
- ▶ Today:
 - ▶ “That’s not true”: a form of denial
 - ▶ Self-attributions resist denials regardless of linguistic form
 - ▶ Evidentials pattern like self-attributions

The mental state component: Non-challengeability II

- ▶ Self-attributions typically immune to correction (some more than others; cf. Wright 1998; Bar-On 2004)
- (12) A. I wish my grandparents were alive.
 B. # No, you don't.

- ▶ Infelicitous/presumptuous to challenge or deny something that one has no access to

The mental state component: Non-challengeability III

- ▶ Self-attributions: linguistic form of denial doesn't matter

(13) Turkish

[Tramp-in kazan-cağ-ın-ı
[Trump-GEN win-NMLZ-3SG.POSS-ACC] um-uyor-um
'I hope that Trump will win'.

(14) Responses to (13) (targeting the attitude)

- | | |
|---|---|
| A. #Hayır. (Bu) doğru değil.
no this true NEG
Int'd: 'No. That's not true.' | C. #Yanlış-iyor-sun.
be.mistaken-PROG-2SG
Int'd: 'You're mistaken.' |
| B. #Sana katılm-ıyor-um.
you.DAT join-PROG-1SG
Int'd: 'I disagree.' | D. #Haklı değil-sin.
right NEG-2SG
Int'd: 'You're not right.' |

The mental state component: Non-challengeability IV

- ▶ Non-challengeability: only 1-person uses

(15) Turkish

Can [Tramp-in kazan-cağ-lı-n-] um-uyor
John [Trump-GEN win-NMLZ-3SG.POSS-ACC] hope-PROG
'John hopes that Trump will win'.

(16) Responses to (15) (targeting the attitude)

- A. ✓No, that's not true.
- B. ✓You are mistaken.
- C. ✓You are not right.
- D. ✓I disagree.

The mental state component: Non-challengeability V

- ▶ Evidentials resist denials across the board

(17) Turkish

Context 1, hearsay: I read a note in Los Angeles Times.

Context 2, inference: People around me are smoking weed.

Kaliforniya otu yasallaştırmış

California weed legalize-IND

'California legalized marijuana, I hear/infer.'

(18) Responses to (17)

- | | |
|--|---|
| A. That's not true.
$= \neg$ [California legalized]
$\neq \neg$ [You hear/infer it] | C. You are not right.
$= \neg$ [California legalized]
$\neq \neg$ [You hear/infer it] |
| B. You are mistaken.
$= \neg$ [California legalized]
$\neq \neg$ [You hear/infer it] | D. I disagree.
$= \neg$ [California legalized]
$\neq \neg$ [You hear/infer it] |

The mental state component: Non-challengeability VI

- ▶ NAI-approaches to the non-challengeability of evidentials do not explain the pattern (NAI entailments can be disagreed with using *You're mistaken*; Korotkova 2016a)
- ▶ Both the 1-person and the mental state components crucial
 - ▶ Non-challengeability: rooted in the properties of cognitive processes denoted by evidentials, analyzed here as reasoning from given evidence
 - ▶ Evidence holder: the highest authority over evidential state
 - ▶ Third party cannot felicitously contest it under normal circumstances
 - ▶ Self-attributions: non-challengeable (13)
 - ▶ 3-person statements: ordinary disagreement (15)

The mental state component: Non-challengeability VII

- ▶ Many approaches: some pronominal element in the semantics (Murray 2014, 2017; Faller 2019)
- ▶ Not enough

- (19) a. I ran a marathon.
 b. ✓No, you didn't. You ran a half-marathon.

- ▶ Speaker-oriented content can be challenged; first-person mental states cannot be

Bottom line: We need a mental state component to account for non-challengeability; NAI-accounts are insufficient

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The mental state component: Interrogative flip I

- ▶ Cross-linguistically robust pattern: evidentials shift in information-seeking questions

(20) German

✓ *Context 1: Kit and I are hiking in the bear country and see fresh tracks. Kit talks to a ranger (I can't hear them). I ask:*

#*Context 2: Kit and I are hiking in the bear country and see fresh tracks. I talk to a ranger, but then forget what I'm told and ask:*

Soll hier ein Bär gewesen sein?
REP.3SG.PRES here INDEF bear be.PRT be.INF
'Did a bear pass here?'

✓ ADDRESSEE-ORIENTED: given what you heard

#SPEAKER-ORIENTED: given what I heard

The mental state component: Interrogative flip II

- ▶ The phenomenon: interrogative flip, also attested for a range of point-of-view phenomena (Speas and Tenny 2003; Tenny 2006; Zu 2018)
- ▶ Previous explanations of the pattern: an obligatory syntactic/semantic mechanism (leads to incorrect predictions in many cases; see discussion in Korotkova 2016b)
- ▶ A new old take on the interrogative flip: division of labor between semantics and conversational pragmatics

The mental state component: Interrogative flip III

- ▶ Canonical information-seeking questions signal the speaker's ignorance and are about the addressee's knowledge (Hintikka 1962; Searle 1969)
- ▶ Not surprising that point-of-view expressions **may** shift
- ▶ Correct prediction: interrogative flip is not always obligatory (observation goes back to at least Mitchell 1986)

(21) Was it **tasty**?

- tasty to the speaker
- tasty to the addressee
- tasty to a third party

The mental state component: Interrogative flip IV

- ▶ Flip seems obligatory with self-attributions
 - ▶ Speaker-oriented readings not available
 - ▶ The speaker has the highest epistemic authority
 - ▶ They are the only person who can know the answer

- (22) Do ✓you/ #I have a headache? (Gunlogson and Carlson 2016:182)
- (23) ✓Are you / #Am I hungry?
- (24) Do ✓you/ #I want coffee?
- (25) Do ✓you/ #I hope to summit Mt. Rainier next spring?

- ▶ Another argument for pragmatics
 - ▶ Most mechanisms of interrogative flip target only implicit arguments, while (22–25) have overt pronouns

The mental state component: Interrogative flip V

- ▶ Interrogative flip with evidentials: of the same nature
 - ▶ Pragmatics makes the addressee-oriented reading available
 - ▶ Semantics blocks the speaker-oriented reading
- ▶ As with non-challengeability, both the 1-person and the mental state components are necessary
- ▶ Information-seeking questions about the first person are possible

(26) ✓Did I win the lottery?

The mental state component: Interrogative flip VI

- ▶ Correct prediction of a pragmatic view on interrogative flip: speaker-oriented readings available in questions that do not presuppose the speaker's ignorance (included under the general umbrella of non-canonical questions; Dayal 2016:268–292)
 - ▶ Quiz questions
 - ▶ Rhetorical questions (Biezma and Rawlins 2017)
 - ▶ Self-addressed questions (Littell et al. 2010, Eckardt forth)
 - ▶ Biased questions (Romero and Han 2004; Romero et al. 2017)
- ▶ To learn more about non-canonical questions, check out Research Unit "Questions at the interfaces" in Konstanz,
<https://typo.uni-konstanz.de/questionsInterfaces/>

The mental state component: Interrogative flip VII

- ▶ **Biased questions:** the speaker has a hunch regarding the answer (Romero and Han 2004; Romero et al. 2017)

(27) German

a. BIASED QUESTION

Hat Peter **nicht eine** Wohnung beschafft?
have.3SG.PRES Peter NEG INDEF apartment purchase.PRT
'Didn't Peter purchase an apartment?'

Regular Q + negation: *keine Wohnung* (NEG.INDEF apt)

b. BIASED QUESTION WITH *sollen*

Soll Peter nicht eine Wohnung beschafft
REP.3SG.PRES Peter NEG INDEF apartment purchase.PRT
haben?
have.INF
≈'Peter purchased an apartment, I heard. Is that true?'

The mental state component: Interrogative flip VIII

- ▶ Non-canonical questions differ from regular questions at least pragmatically
- ▶ A pragmatic account of interrogative flip captures speaker-oriented readings straightforwardly
- ▶ In a different empirical domain, see Davidson 2015 on a pragmatic, rather than semantic, account of Role Shift in Sign languages

Bottom line: The mental state component is sufficient to explain the lack of speaker-oriented readings in canonical information-seeking questions

The mental state component: Recap

- ▶ **Data from dialogues:**
Sufficient explanation of otherwise tricky facts on denials
- ▶ **Data from questions:**
Sufficient explanation without postulating unnecessary mechanisms
- ▶ **Overall:**
Division of labor between semantics and pragmatics

Conclusion

- ▶ Evidentials describe self-knowledge and have a semantics of self-attributions (cf. Lewis 1996 on evidence as a mental state)
 - ▶ New evidence for the obligatory autocentric perspective in root declaratives
 - ▶ Novel data on *de se*
 - ▶ New explanations for two well-known patterns: non-challengeability and interrogative flip
- ▶ Shared by evidentials of different morphosyntactic categories
- ▶ What is evidentiality? Still an open question!

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