

Online Optimization and Learning for Sustainable Human-Cyber-Physical Systems

Nathaniel Tucker

Wednesday, November 18, 2020

Global Energy Transition

Two Major Components

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


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Two Major Components

By 2040, electric cars could outsell gasoline-powered cars

Over the next two decades, sales of electric cars may begin to outstrip global sales of internal combustion cars.




Transportation Electrification

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

- Infrastructure management
- Effects on the grid

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

Grid Modernization

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

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- Increased renewables

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
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- Effects on the grid

Both can benefit from optimization and learning mechanisms


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
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


Part 1


An Online Admission Control Mechanism for Electric Vehicles at
Public Parking Infrastructures

Smart Charging: Unlocking the Potential of EVs

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
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Without **smart charging**:

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- Cannot fully integrate **renewable** power generation

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- Can we utilize existing **smart charging** methods for public parking facilities equipped with chargers?

Unfortunately, no

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
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*Require **online** management systems for admission decisions and **shared resource** allocation to enable **smart charging***


System Description

- L dispersed parking facilities with multiple-cable chargers




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
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
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- t_n^- : User n 's arrival time
- t_n^+ : User n 's departure time
- h_n : User n 's desired energy amount
- $\{\ell_n\}$: User n 's preferred facilities
- $\{v_{n\ell}\}$: User n 's valuations for charging at each facility ℓ

Parking and Charging Reservation Options

- There are a set of options \mathcal{O}_n that fulfill user n 's type (θ_n):

$$\{t_n^-, t_n^+, \{c_{no}^{m\ell}(t)\}, \{e_{no}^{m\ell}(t)\}, \{\ell_n\}, \{v_{n\ell}\}\}$$

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- $c_{no}^{m\ell}(t)$: Binary cable reservation; 1 if user n is assigned a cable from EVSE m at facility ℓ at time t in option o ; 0 otherwise
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- If there were posted prices for these options, users could select their utility maximizing reservation

Example Reservation Schedule




Figure: Facility schedule after 1 arrival.

Example Reservation Schedule




Figure: Facility schedule after 2 arrivals.

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


Figure: Facility schedule after 3 arrivals.

Example Reservation Schedule




Figure: Facility schedule after 4 arrivals.

Offline Social Welfare Maximization Problem

$$\max_x \sum_{\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{O}_n, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{M}_\ell} v_{n\ell} x_{no}^{m\ell} - \sum_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{L}} f_g^\ell(y_g^\ell(t))$$

subject to:

$$\sum_{\mathcal{O}_n, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{M}_\ell} x_{no}^{m\ell} \leq 1, \quad \forall n$$

$$x_{no}^{m\ell} \in \{0, 1\}, \quad \forall n, o, \ell, m$$

$$y_c^{m\ell}(t) \leq C_\ell, \quad \forall \ell, m, t$$

$$y_e^{m\ell}(t) \leq E_\ell, \quad \forall \ell, m, t$$

Facilities' Electricity Costs

The energy procurement, $y_g^\ell(t)$, determines the operational cost of facility ℓ (i.e., purchasing electricity from the distribution grid):

$$f_g^\ell(y_g^\ell(t)) = \begin{cases} 0 & y_g^\ell(t) \in [0, s_\ell(t)) \\ \pi_\ell(t)(y_g^\ell(t) - s_\ell(t)) & y_g^\ell(t) \in [s_\ell(t), s_\ell(t) + G_\ell(t)] \\ +\infty & y_g^\ell(t) > s_\ell(t) + G_\ell(t) \end{cases}$$

How to select parking and charging reservations?

- Can examine the dual constraints:

$$u_n \geq 0$$

$$u_n \geq v_{n\ell} - \sum_{\mathcal{T}} \left(c_{no}^{m\ell}(t) p_c^{m\ell}(t) + e_{no}^{m\ell}(t) (p_e^{m\ell}(t) + p_g^\ell(t)) \right)$$

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$$\begin{aligned} u_n = \max & \left\{ 0, \max_{\mathcal{O}_n, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{M}_\ell} \left\{ v_{n\ell} \right. \right. \\ & \left. \left. - \sum_{t \in [t_n^-, t_n^+]} (c_{no}^{m\ell}(t) p_c^{m\ell}(t) + e_{no}^{m\ell}(t) (p_e^{m\ell}(t) + p_g^\ell(t))) \right\} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

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- If $u_n > 0$, user n purchases their utility maximizing parking and charging reservation, and is charged the following cost:

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- Provide performance guarantees

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$$p_g^{\ell}(y_g^{\ell}(t)) = \begin{cases} \left(\frac{L_g}{2R}\right) \left(\frac{2R\pi_{\ell}(t)}{L_g}\right)^{\frac{y_g^{\ell}(t)}{s_{\ell}(t)}} & y_g^{\ell}(t) < s_{\ell}(t) \\ \left(\frac{L_g - \pi_{\ell}(t)}{2R}\right) \left(\frac{2R(U_g - \pi_{\ell}(t))}{L_g - \pi_{\ell}(t)}\right)^{\frac{y_g^{\ell}(t)}{s_{\ell}(t) + G_{\ell}(t)}} + \pi_{\ell}(t) & y_g^{\ell}(t) \geq s_{\ell}(t) \end{cases}$$

Performance Guarantee: Competitive Ratio

- Competitive ratio:

$$\frac{\text{Optimal Offline Solution's Social Welfare}}{\text{Worst Case[Online Mechanism's Social Welfare]}} \geq 1$$

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- An online mechanism is “ α -competitive” when:

$$\alpha \geq \frac{\text{Optimal Offline Solution's Social Welfare}}{\text{Worst Case[Online Mechanism's Social Welfare]}} \geq 1$$

Online Reservation System Competitive Ratio

The online EV charger reservation system that makes use of our heuristic price update functions is α_1 -competitive in social welfare where

$$\alpha_1 = 2 \max_{\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{T}} \left\{ \ln \left(\frac{2R(U_g - \pi_\ell(t))}{L_g - \pi_\ell(t)} \right) \right\}.$$

Competitive Ratio: Imperfect Solar Forecast

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- To avoid constraint violations, use $\underline{s}_\ell(t)$ in pricing functions

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$$f_g^\ell(y_g^\ell(t)) = \begin{cases} 0 & y_g^\ell(t) \in [0, s_\ell(t)] \\ \pi_\ell(t)(y_g^\ell(t) - s_\ell(t)) & y_g^\ell(t) \in [s_\ell(t), s_\ell(t) + G_\ell(t)] \\ +\infty & y_g^\ell(t) > s_\ell(t) + G_\ell(t) \end{cases}$$

- To avoid constraint violations, use $\underline{s}_\ell(t)$ in pricing functions

Using the lower bound solar forecast, the reservation system is α_2 -competitive in social welfare where

$$\alpha_2 = 2 \max_{\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{T}} \left\{ \left(\frac{\bar{s}_\ell(t) + G_\ell(t)}{\underline{s}_\ell(t) + G_\ell(t)} \right) \ln \left(\frac{2R(U_g - \pi_\ell(t))}{L_g - \pi_\ell(t)} \right) \right\}.$$

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“Social welfare generated” \geq “Threshold value”

- Resulting competitive ratio is the maximum $\alpha(t)$ over all facilities, resources, and time.

Comparison with First-Come-First-Serve




Figure: Left: FCFS. Right: Online Mechanism

Conclusion

Online reservation system for **public** parking facilities via heuristic pricing functions in order to enable **smart charging**:

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1. Admission controller for **public** parking facility access
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3. Able to account for stochastic renewable generation
4. Robust to adversarially chosen arrival sequences and is α -competitive in social welfare to the optimal offline solution

Part 2

Constrained Thompson Sampling for Real-Time Electricity Pricing
with Grid Reliability Constraints

Demand Side Management



Demand side management is an increasingly popular control action that can be used to match consumption and generation

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Demand Side Management




Demand side management is an increasingly popular control action that can be used to match consumption and generation

- Distributed coordination algorithms to load shape exist
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- Pricing + observing is a simpler framework
- Can we propose a smarter approach within this framework?

System Description

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
System Description




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


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
Objective: minimize expected cost $\mathbb{E}[f(D_\tau(p_\tau), V_\tau)]$

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
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Load Flexibility Model

What can the aggregator do to simplify learning a population's load response $\mathbf{D}_\tau(\mathbf{p}_\tau)$?

- Flexible loads only show a limited number of "load signatures" and can be clustered
- Due to automation, each flexible load selects its cost minimizing profile
- Uncertainty in $\mathbf{D}_\tau(\mathbf{p}_\tau)$ is reduced to the uncertainty of the number of appliances in each cluster
- Denote the number of flexible appliances in cluster c as $a_c(\mathbf{p}_\tau)$

Stochastic Customer Response

- Random or exogenous parameters lead to variability in temporal and geographical behavior

Stochastic Customer Response


- Random or exogenous parameters lead to variability in temporal and geographical behavior
- We model the coefficients $a_c(\mathbf{p}_\tau)$ as random variables with parameterized distributions, ϕ_c , based on the posted price signal \mathbf{p}_τ and an unknown but constant parameter vector θ^*

Stochastic Customer Response

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- We model the coefficients $a_c(\mathbf{p}_\tau)$ as random variables with parameterized distributions, ϕ_c , based on the posted price signal \mathbf{p}_τ and an unknown but constant parameter vector θ^*
- θ^* represents the *true model* for the customers' sensitivity to the price signals

System Description


System Description



Objective: minimize expected cost $\mathbb{E}[f(D_\tau(p_\tau), V_\tau)]$
Subject to: operational constraints of the grid

How can we solve this without knowing $D_\tau(p_\tau)$?

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




Objective: minimize expected cost $\mathbb{E}_{\{\phi_c\}_{c \in C}} [f(\mathbf{D}_\tau(\mathbf{p}_\tau), \mathbf{V}_\tau)]$
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


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If θ^* was known...




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


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
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Wholesale Electricity Market



Select next daily price signal:
 $\hat{\mathbf{p}}_\tau = \operatorname{argmin}_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbb{P}_{\{\phi_c\}_{c \in \mathcal{C}}} [f(\mathbf{D}_\tau(\mathbf{p}_\tau), \mathbf{V}_\tau) | \theta^*]$
Subject to:


$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{P}_{\{\phi_c\}_{c \in \mathcal{C}}} [u_\tau(t) \geq u_{min}^{min} | \theta^*] &\geq 1 - \mu \\ \mathbb{P}_{\{\phi_c\}_{c \in \mathcal{C}}} [u_\tau(t) \leq u_{max}^{max} | \theta^*] &\geq 1 - \mu \\ \mathbb{P}_{\{\phi_c\}_{c \in \mathcal{C}}} [f_\tau(t) \leq S^{max} | \theta^*] &\geq 1 - \mu\end{aligned}$$

Observe daily exogenous parameter \mathbf{V}_τ

Next Day: $\tau = \tau + 1$


Aggregator

$\hat{\mathbf{p}}_\tau$



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Wholesale Electricity Market



Multi-Armed Bandit

- Aggregator can only learn the consumers' responses (θ^*) by experimenting with different price signals


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Multi-Armed Bandit

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- Goal is to develop a strategy for selecting price signals that balances this trade-off and minimizes the cumulative cost over a given time span

Constrained Thompson Sampling (Con-TS-RTP)



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
Constrained Thompson Sampling (Con-TS-RTP)

- Assumption 1: Finitely many price signals
- Assumption 2: Finite prior, *grain of truth*
- Assumption 3: Unique optimal price signal
- Under assumptions 1-3, Gopalan, et al. [1] proved that the number of suboptimal actions can be bounded and Moradipari, et al. [2] extended this result to account for exogenous parameters, \mathbf{V}_τ

[1]: A. Gopalan, S. Mannor, Y. Mansour, 2014


[2]: A. Moradipari, C. Silva, M. Alizadeh, 2018

Con-TS-RTP



Con-TS-RTP with Modified Reliability Constraints

Wholesale Electricity Market



Reliability of Con-TS-RTP

- Assumption 4: $\text{KL}[\ell(\mathbf{D}(\mathbf{p}); \mathbf{p}, \theta^*), \ell(\mathbf{D}(\mathbf{p}); \mathbf{p}, \theta)] \geq \xi^*$

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Under assumptions 1-4, the Con-TS-RTP algorithm with modified reliability constraints will uphold the distribution grid operational constraints with probability at least $1 - u$ each day.

Simple Comparison




Figure: Unconstrained vs constrained Thompson Sampling for load shaping with a maximum power constraint

Radial Distribution System Test Case

Learning the True Parameter

Radial Distribution System Test Case

Learning the True Parameter




Figure: Evolution of the aggregator's knowledge of the true parameter.

Radial Distribution System Test Case

Performance





Figure: Left: Regret at node 10 with $\nu = 0.1$. Right: Deviation of node 10's demand from a specific daily target profile.

Radial Distribution System Test Case

Performance




Figure: Distribution system constraint violations avoided by using Con-TS-RTP instead of an unconstrained TS.

Radial Distribution System Test Case

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


Figure: Regret curves for various system reliability metrics. Each curve is an average of 20 independent simulations.

Conclusion

Con-TS-RTP: an [online learning and pricing](#) strategy based on [Thompson Sampling](#) for an electricity aggregator attempting to learn customers' electricity usage models while implementing a load shaping program via real-time dispatch signals.


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Con-TS-RTP: an **online learning and pricing** strategy based on **Thompson Sampling** for an electricity aggregator attempting to learn customers' electricity usage models while implementing a load shaping program via real-time dispatch signals.

Furthermore, Con-TS-RTP accounts for the **operation constraints of a distribution system** to ensure adequate service and to avoid potential grid failures.

Future Plans

Timeline



Future Plans

Virtual Shared Energy Storage

- On-site energy storage systems are emerging in the market

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
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- *Virtual Shared Energy Storage* would require a scheduling and pricing mechanism for charging, discharging, and capacity
- Charging and discharging profiles *cancel* each other
- Incentivize diverse usage patterns to enable charge/discharge cancellations

Thank you!

- Mahnoosh Alizadeh
- Committee
- Gustavo Cezar
- Smart Infrastructure Systems Lab
- UCSB ECE graduate students

Other Work

Stanford Marguerite Shuttle



Route Name	Daily Trips	Trip Miles
C Line	33	7.00
C Limited	11	4.60
MC Line (AM/PM)	46	3.00
MC Line (Mid Day)	11	5.10
P Line (AM/PM)	56	2.50
P Line (Mid Day)	11	4.00
Research Park (AM/PM)	24	10.40
X Express (AM)	12	1.20
X Line	44	4.60
X Limited (AM)	10	2.00
X Limited (PM)	10	1.50
Y Express (PM)	20	1.20
Y Line	44	4.60
Y Limited (AM)	10	2.40
Y Limited (PM)	10	2.00
Totals	352 trips/day	1431.50 miles/day

Figure: Left: Primary service area for Stanford University's Marguerite Shuttle. Right: Stanford Marguerite Shuttle Route Information

Other Work

SLAC & Google Workplace Smart Charging

- Goal: Implement EV load shifting to minimize electricity cost and to ensure total EV charging load does not exceed transformer capacity
- Utilizing scenario generation and stochastic programming to schedule EV charging
- Currently working on implementing algorithm at a SLAC test site and then a Google parking lot

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- Each day the algorithm samples $\tilde{\theta}_\tau$ from the prior distribution, and selects an price signal assuming that the sampled parameter is the true parameter
- The algorithm then makes an observation dependent on the selected price and the hidden parameter and updates the parameter's distribution π_τ based on the new observation

Performance Evaluation: *Regret*

(Pseudo) Regret:

$$R_{\mathcal{T}} = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{\tau=1}^{\mathcal{T}} f(\mathbf{D}_{\tau}(\mathbf{p}_{\tau}), \mathbf{V}_{\tau}) - \sum_{\tau=1}^{\mathcal{T}} f(\mathbf{D}_{\tau}(\mathbf{p}^{\star}), \mathbf{V}_{\tau}) \right]$$

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Alternative:

$$\sum_{\mathbf{V} \in \mathcal{V}} \sum_{\mathbf{p} \in \{\mathcal{P} \setminus \mathbf{p}^{\mathbf{V}, \star}\}} N_{\mathcal{T}}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{V}) = \sum_{\tau=1}^{\mathcal{T}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\mathbf{p}_{\tau} \neq \mathbf{p}^{\mathbf{V}_{\tau}, \star}\}}$$

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
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 - $\text{KL}[\ell(\mathbf{D}(\mathbf{p}); \mathbf{p}, \theta^*), \ell(\mathbf{D}(\mathbf{p}); \mathbf{p}, \theta)] \geq \xi^*$
- Under assumptions 1-4, Gopalan, et al. [1] showed that the mass of the true parameter will not decrease below a certain threshold
 - $\pi_\tau(\theta^*) \geq \pi_{min}^{\xi^*} \quad \forall \tau$

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- With ν chosen such that $\nu \leq \mu \pi_{min}^{\xi^*}$, the total mass of the incorrect parameters ($\theta \neq \theta^*$) in the prior π_τ can never be large enough to satisfy the constraint's inequality without the true parameter also satisfying the constraint

Experimental Evaluation



Line	R ($10^{-3}\Omega$)	X ($10^{-3}\Omega$)	S ^{max} (KVA)	Line	R ($10^{-3}\Omega$)	X ($10^{-3}\Omega$)	S ^{max} (KVA)
1	24.2	48.2	54	20	129.5	30.9	10.8
2	227.3	743.5	84	21	15.1	5.4	14.4
3	76.3	18.2	10.8	22	50.8	12.1	10.8
4	43.6	142.7	84	23	69.1	16.5	10.8
5	25.8	84.4	84	24	31.6	11.2	14.4
6	10.5	10.7	40.2	25	96.3	23	10.8
7	23.2	23.6	40.2	26	110.7	112.6	40.2
8	75.1	26.7	14.4	27	2.1	0.7	14.4
9	114.4	27.3	10.8	28	242.1	86.2	14.4
10	110.8,3	67.7	14.4	29	27.3	27.8	40.2
11	63.7	22.7	14.4	30	174.6	62.1	16.2
12	278.7	99.2	14.4	31	43	15.3	10.8
13	254.2	10.8,5	14.4	32	207.8	74	10.8
14	21.8	5.2	10.8	33	109.4	38.9	14.4
15	57.3	20.4	14.4	34	50.5	18	14.4
16	126.7	45.1	14.4	35	165.2	58.8	14.4
17	48.6	11.6	10.8	36	49.5	17.6	14.4
18	95.1	22.7	10.8	37	5.8	2.1	14.4
19	137.3	32.8	10.8				

Figure: Radial Distribution System and Parameters

LinDistFlow Equations

$$d_{i,\tau}^P(t) + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{K}_i} f_{j,\tau}^P(t) = f_{\mathcal{A}_i,\tau}^P(t); \quad \forall t, \tau, i$$

$$d_{i,\tau}^Q(t) + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{K}_i} f_{j,\tau}^Q(t) = f_{\mathcal{A}_i,\tau}^Q(t); \quad \forall t, \tau, i$$

$$u_{\mathcal{A}_i,\tau}(t) - 2(f_{i,\tau}^P(t)R_i + f_{i,\tau}^Q(t)X_i) = u_{i,\tau}(t); \quad \forall t, \tau, i$$