Exam\_3

Stern

7/8/2021

##1 clear environment

rm(list=ls(all=TRUE))

##2 Use the WDI package to download data on female labor force participation for all countries for the years 2010-2015. Save the data frame as female\_lfp. (Hint: you may will need to Google the indicator.) #<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS>

library(WDI)  
female\_lfp = WDI(country = "all",  
 indicator = c("SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS"), # indicator from web   
 start = 2010, end = 2015, extra = FALSE, cache = NULL)

##3 rename variable to flfp

library(tidyverse)

## ── Attaching packages ─────────────────────────────────────── tidyverse 1.3.1 ──

## ✓ ggplot2 3.3.3 ✓ purrr 0.3.4  
## ✓ tibble 3.1.2 ✓ dplyr 1.0.6  
## ✓ tidyr 1.1.3 ✓ stringr 1.4.0  
## ✓ readr 1.4.0 ✓ forcats 0.5.1

## ── Conflicts ────────────────────────────────────────── tidyverse\_conflicts() ──  
## x dplyr::filter() masks stats::filter()  
## x dplyr::lag() masks stats::lag()

female\_lfp <-   
 female\_lfp %>%  
 rename(flfp = SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS)

##4 Collapse female\_lfp by the mean value for flfp for each country. When you do, keep the ISO-2 country code in your data frame as well as the country name. Name your resulting data frame collapsed\_flfp.

collapsed\_flfp <-  
 female\_lfp %>%  
 group\_by(country, iso2c) %>%  
 summarize(flfp = mean(flfp, na.rm=TRUE))

## `summarise()` has grouped output by 'country'. You can override using the `.groups` argument.

##5 Use R to show which countries have average female force participation rates for the 2010-2015 period that are less than 15%.

##6. Use R to present a map of the world of using collapsed\_flfp, using the viridis color scheme. #load libraries and set world and border maps

library(rio)  
library(googlesheets4)   
library(labelled)   
library(data.table)

##   
## Attaching package: 'data.table'

## The following objects are masked from 'package:dplyr':  
##   
## between, first, last

## The following object is masked from 'package:purrr':  
##   
## transpose

library(varhandle)   
library(ggrepel)   
library(geosphere)   
library(rgeos)

## Loading required package: sp

## rgeos version: 0.5-5, (SVN revision 640)  
## GEOS runtime version: 3.8.1-CAPI-1.13.3   
## Linking to sp version: 1.4-2   
## Polygon checking: TRUE

library(viridis)

## Loading required package: viridisLite

library(mapview)   
library(rnaturalearth)   
library(rnaturalearthdata)   
library(devtools)

## Loading required package: usethis

library(remotes)

##   
## Attaching package: 'remotes'

## The following objects are masked from 'package:devtools':  
##   
## dev\_package\_deps, install\_bioc, install\_bitbucket, install\_cran,  
## install\_deps, install\_dev, install\_git, install\_github,  
## install\_gitlab, install\_local, install\_svn, install\_url,  
## install\_version, update\_packages

## The following object is masked from 'package:usethis':  
##   
## git\_credentials

library(raster)

##   
## Attaching package: 'raster'

## The following object is masked from 'package:data.table':  
##   
## shift

## The following object is masked from 'package:dplyr':  
##   
## select

## The following object is masked from 'package:tidyr':  
##   
## extract

library(sp)   
library(sf)

## Linking to GEOS 3.8.1, GDAL 3.2.1, PROJ 7.2.1

library(Imap)

##   
## Attaching package: 'Imap'

## The following object is masked from 'package:purrr':  
##   
## imap

library(rnaturalearthhires)  
library(ggsflabel)

##   
## Attaching package: 'ggsflabel'

## The following objects are masked from 'package:ggplot2':  
##   
## geom\_sf\_label, geom\_sf\_text, StatSfCoordinates

world <- ne\_countries(scale = "large", returnclass = "sf")  
  
world\_borders <- st\_read("world border shape files/World\_Borders.shp")

## Reading layer `World\_Borders' from data source   
## `/Users/nathanstern/Documents/DataScienceForSocialSciences/Exam\_3/world border shape files/World\_Borders.shp'   
## using driver `ESRI Shapefile'  
## Simple feature collection with 246 features and 11 fields  
## Geometry type: MULTIPOLYGON  
## Dimension: XY  
## Bounding box: xmin: -180 ymin: -90 xmax: 180 ymax: 83.6236  
## Geodetic CRS: WGS 84

borders <- st\_transform(world\_borders, "+proj=longlat +ellps=WGS84 +datum=WGS84")  
rm(world\_borders)

#drop NAs

collapsed\_flfp <- na.omit(collapsed\_flfp, select=c("country", "iso2c",  
 "flfp"))


#remove non countries and make map

collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(2),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(2),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(5),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(31),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(32),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(49:52),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(57:61),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(59),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(73:74),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(76),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(77:80),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(94:97),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(95),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(100:102),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(111:114),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(128),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(129:130),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(125),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(136:137),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(150),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(154:155),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(158:160),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(178),]  
collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(185),]

library(countrycode)  
collapsed\_flfp$iso2c = countrycode(sourcevar = collapsed\_flfp$country,  
 origin = "country.name",  
 destination = "iso2c",  
 warn = TRUE)

## Warning in countrycode(sourcevar = collapsed\_flfp$country, origin = "country.name", : Some values were not matched unambiguously: Channel Islands, South Asia

collapsed\_flfp <- collapsed\_flfp[-c(33),]  
  
collapsed\_flfp <-   
 collapsed\_flfp %>%  
 rename(ISO2 = iso2c)  
  
merged\_data = left\_join(borders, collapsed\_flfp, by=c("ISO2"))  
setnames(merged\_data, "flfp", "FLFP")  
  
final\_data <- na.omit(merged\_data, select=c("FLFP"))  
  
#make map  
final\_map = ggplot() +  
 geom\_sf(data = world) +  
 geom\_sf(data = final\_data, aes(fill=`FLFP`)) + scale\_fill\_viridis(option = "viridis") +  
 ggtitle("Female Labor Force Participation Rate (flfp), 2010-2015") + theme(plot.title = element\_text(hjust = 0.5)) +  
 theme\_void()  
final\_map



##7

South eastern Africa appears to have this cluster if high flfp.

##9. In a Shiny app, what are the three main components and their subcomponents? The three components are the ui, the server function, and the execute. The ui has a message, the server has an input and output.

##10 Pull this .pdf file from Mike Denly’s webpage. It is a report that Mike Denly and Mike Findley prepared for the US Agency for International Development (USAID). [5 points]

library(pdftools)

## Using poppler version 20.12.1

library(tidyr)   
library(tidytext)   
library(dplyr)   
library(stringr)   
library(ggplot2)  
  
mytext = pdf\_text("https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\_docs/PA00TNMJ.pdf")  
print(mytext)

## [1] " PHOTO BY SEROUJ OURISHIAN\n\n\n\n\nINTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF\nLAW IN ARMENIA\nAn Evidence Review for Learning, Evaluation and\nResearch Activity II (LER II)\n\n\nFEBRUARY 2019\n\nDISCLAIMER: The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for\nInternational Development or the United States Government.\n"   
## [2] "This document was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development,\nDemocracy, Human Rights and Governance Center under the Learning, Evaluation and Research\nActivity II (LER II) contract: GS10F0218U/7200AA18M00017.\n\n\n\nPrepared by:\n\nThe Cloudburst Group\n8400 Corporate Drive, Suite 550\nLandover, MD 20785-2238\nTel: 301-918-4400\n"   
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## [4] " 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1\nThis evidence review covers two separate topics: Integrity Systems and the Rule of Law. As context,\nArmenia has substantial challenges with respect to all forms of corruption. In that sense it is like other\ncountries in the region. And yet there may be a model in Georgia’s reforms to address corruption. With\nrespect to the rule of law, the conditions in Armenia declined in the 1990s but have been relatively\nstable in the 2000s, with some particular improvement in recent years with regard to judicial\nindependence. Improvements in access to legal representation and in the professionalization of lawyers,\nin particular, may have made a positive impact on perceptions of judicial independence. Rule of law\nreforms in terms of improving contract enforcement, regulation, and equal application of commercial\nlaw would correspond with the priorities currently being laid out by the Armenian administration. Both\nintegrity systems and rule of law have been key areas of focus and, while seeing some reforms, they also\ncould benefit from further attention. After providing some background on each area, we turn to a\ndiscussion of the challenges, possible solutions, and ideas about sequencing. We devote considerable\nattention to the menu of options facing countries similar to Armenia, where possible identifying specific\nsimilar post-transition countries. Among the paths forward to consider, we note:\n\n• Integrity Systems:\n\n − Engagement with Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME) Associations. Engaging with SME\n associations constitutes a particularly promising path to gradually erode state capture in\n Armenia.\n\n − Instituting a lottery system to start with randomized audits would likely be beneficial for\n Armenia. By randomizing the audit schedule and keeping it frequent, the threat of an audit\n could deter corrupt behavior and make audits less susceptible to political forces.\n\n − As we highlight in the Governance Evidence Review also under this tasking (USAID, 2018),\n addressing petty corruption is a less risky way to start an anti-corruption effort. It may be best\n to start any anti-corruption initiatives at the lower level, with the objective of gradually shifting\n norms, thereby making it easier to tackle grand corruption over the longer term.\n\n − Armenia should ensure that all government employment contracts require signing of codes of\n ethics and compliance with disclosure requirements regarding assets, conflicts of interest, and\n tax records, which can be used in conjunction with external audits, making those ethics\n commitments enforceable and actionable. This recommendation is not only applicable to\n national-level civil servants but also subnational employees and persons with discretionary\n positions in government.\n\n\n\n\n1 This Evidence Review was prepared by Michael Denly (University of Texas at Austin), Michael Findley (University of Texas at\nAustin), Vepa Rejepov (University of Texas at Dallas), and Rachel Wellhausen (University of Texas at Austin). We would like to\nthank the following Research Affiliates at the University of Texas at Austin’s: Innovations for Peace and Development for\nresearch assistance: Rachel Boles, Evelin Caro Gutierrez, Erica Colston, Hannah Greer, Paige Johnson, Judy Lane, Amanda Long,\nAmila Lulo, Felipa Mendez, Tyler Morrow, Tomilayo Ogungbamigbe, Mobin Piracha, JP Repetto, Ethan Tenison, Adityamohan\nTantravahi, and Luisa Venegoni.\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 1\n"   
## [5] " − Addressing transparency too early in the process could be risky because it alerts people to\n problems and deters citizen from taking public action in a situation of state capture. They may\n want to institute transparency reform later in the process.\n\n\n\n• Rule of Law:\n\n − Reform of the courts to go beyond judicial independence and instead to greater court\n efficiency and administration would likely be important. Numerous positive and negative\n examples, from Kyrgyzstan to the Baltics, illustrate the importance of taking a holistic view, and\n eschewing a pure focus on judicial independence.\n\n − Much attention could be given to the development of Bar Associations that could improve the\n overall quality and commitment of judges to the rule of law.\n\n − While legal education has generally improved over the years, greater independence from\n national government standards and directives would be helpful for establishing greater rule of\n law.\n\n − The Armenian government may want to consider expanded engagement with a variety of civil\n society actors, including think tanks and other forward-thinking non-governmental actors.\n Taken together, the collective set of non-governmental actors may encourage greater progress\n towards better governance and democratization.\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 2\n"   
## [6] " 2. INTRODUCTION\n 2.1. CORRUPTION, INTEGRITY SYSTEMS, AND ARMENIA: AN OVERVIEW\nBefore turning our focus to Armenia, we first define corruption and outline the various components of\nan integrity system. The most-cited definition of corruption is “the misuse of public office for private\ngain”.2 It maps well to bribery, which entails a supply side (i.e., those providing the bribes—the private\nsector) and a demand side (i.e., those accepting/requesting the bribes—the public sector).3 As we detail\nin Table 1, though, corruption entails much more than bribery, and not all types of corruption entail a\ntransaction between the public and private sectors. For example, collusion and financial fraud are\ncorrupt activities that mostly do not involve the public sector.\n\nMore fundamentally, corruption relates to societal power dynamics and has a very strong cultural\ndimension (Fukuyama and Recanatini, 2019). What some societies consider “corrupt” may be legal or, if\nnot, highly tolerated in others (Kaufmann and Vicente, 2011). The extent of legal campaign financing in\nmany countries provides one example. Another comes from Indonesian dictator Suharto, who once told\nformer World Bank President James Wolfensohn: “What you consider corruption, I consider family\nvalues” (Wolfensohn, 2010). Although Suharto was clearly one of the most corrupt people to ever\ninhabit the earth,4 the quote is emblematic of the larger problem of corruption. Drawing on insights\nfrom evolutionary biology, Fukuyama (2011, 2018) compellingly argues that controlling corruption is so\ndifficult because it is against humans’ natural instincts.5 These are among the reasons why corruption is a\nbehavioral norm that is extremely hard to break (Fisman and Golden, 2017).\n\nTABLE 1: DIFFERENT TYPES OF CORRUPTION\n\nTerm Definition\n\nBribery “The explicit exchange of money, gifts in kind, or favors for rule breaking or as payments\n for benefits that should legally be costless or be allocated on terms other than the\n willingness to pay. [It i]ncludes both bribery of public officials and commercial bribery of\n private firm agents” (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016, 8).\n\nKickbacks “Payment made secretively to a buyer or seller who has directed a contract or facilitated a\n transaction or appointment illicitly. It can also refer to the way a person in a supervisory\n position takes a portion of a worker’s wage in return for a certain benefit, as when a\n supervisor arranges for a worker to get a job” (Søreide, 2014, 2).\n\nCoercion/extortion “[I]mpairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party\n or the property of the party to influence improperly the actions of a party” (World Bank,\n 2016, 3).\n\nNepotism Hiring a family member for a job, instead of on the basis of merit.\n\nCronyism Hiring one’s friends, instead of hiring on the basis of merit.\n\nFinancial fraud “[A]ny act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly\n misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid\n an obligation” (World Bank, 2016, 3).\n\n\n2 For a discussion of the various definitions of corruption, refer to Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) and Fisman and Golden\n(2017).\n3 For a discussion, see Dixit (2016).\n4 See, for example, Fisman (2001).\n5 More specifically, the successful control of corruption entails the construction of rational political order (see Weber, 1978),\n\nwhich does not entail giving benefits to family, friends, lineage, clans, etc. (Fukuyama, 2011, 2018).\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 3\n"   
## [7] "Term Definition\n\nElectoral fraud “[M]anipulation of election results, through vote buying or threats to the election, or by\n falsification or destruction of votes” (Rose- Ackerman and Palifka, 2016, 8).\n\nPetty corruption Bribery by public officials when citizens try to “access basic goods or services in places like\n hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies” (Transparency International,\n 2009).\n\nGrand corruption “Collusion among the highest levels of government that involves major public sector\n projects, procurement, and large financial benefits among high-level public and private\n elites” (Bauhr and Charron, 2018).\n\nState capture When “private interest significantly influences a state’s decision-making process through\n illicit and nonobvious channels” (Søreide, 2014, 2).\n\nCollusion “An arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose,\n including to influence improperly the actions of another party” (World Bank, 2016, 3).\n\nObstruction Impeding a corruption investigation, such as by destroying evidence, giving false\n statements, coercing a witness not to cooperate, etc. (World Bank, 2016, 3).\n\nPatronage “Civil servants and politicians who, when exercising their authority, favor ethnic groups,\n relatives, or citizens from the same area of the country, instead of acting neutrally, as\n formal rules prescribe” (Søreide, 2014, 2).\n\n\n\nWe define integrity systems to encompass state-level institutions, rules, and arrangements that aim to\nprevent or mitigate corruption. In terms of state-level institutions, most states, including Armenia, have\nsome form of a dedicated anti-corruption office and a supreme audit institution to supplement the\njudiciary.6 These institutions of horizontal accountability can be effective at rooting out corruption when\nthey rely on measures such as those in Table 2. Armenia benefits from a number of these measures, but\nthe country’s anti-corruption office is not politically independent, and state capture of the bureaucracy is\na problem that Armenia is having difficulty overcoming (Paturyan and Stefes, 2017).\n\nTABLE 2: SELECTED ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES\n\nMeasure Description\n\nFinancial Management\n\nInternal audit Audits conducted within an organization, usually by dedicated staff.\n\nExternal audit Audits conducted by an independent third-party, such as a specialized audit firm.\n\nTechnical audit Audits conducted, often on infrastructure projects, to determine the extent to which\n a contractor follows procurement tender specifications (see Olken, 2007).\n\nProcurement\n\nRed flags Indicators to detect potential collusion, bid-rigging, illegal subcontracting\n arrangements, beneficial ownership violations, etc.\n\n\n\n\n6The ensemble of these institutions constitutes the core of what scholars refer to as horizontal accountability, which\nrefers to the ability of a state’s bureaucracy to keep checks on itself (O’Donnell, 1998).\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 4\n"   
## [8] "Measure Description\n\nIntegrity due Analysis of bidders and implementing environments before contract awards. Robust\ndiligence integrity due diligence includes some form of political economy analysis, to identify key\n players and obstacles to reform, as well as how to address potential challenges.\n\nIntegrity pacts and One- or two-way disclosures by bureaucrats and/or bidders not to engage in\npledges corruption; disclosure of all payments made in connection with the relevant\n procurement; and sanctions in case which leave both subject to legal penalties in case\n of violation (Transparency International, 2013).\n\nEthics and Transparency\n\nConflict of interest Rules or legislation to prevent undue influence in procurement as well as in hiring (e.g.\nprovisions nepotism, cronyism).\n\nCodes of ethics Agreements, often included in employment contracts, to ensure that corrupt\n violations have a legal basis for dismissal, reprisal, or sanction.\n\nAsset disclosure Provisions to track the extent to which bureaucrats and politicians financially benefit\n from their positions of power.\n\nAccess to Laws to ensure that when citizens request information from the government, and the\ninformation laws requested information falls within certain pre-approved classes of information, the\n government must in turn freely provide that information to citizens within a fair\n timeframe.\n\nPublic lobby Rules or legislation to ensure that watchdog organizations, non-governmental\nregisters organizations, and the media can track who is influencing policy and to what extent.\n\nAnti-corruption Training of government employees on codes of ethics, anti-corruption legislation, and\ntraining relevant internal rules for each agency. Training is generally more effective when given\n according to specific time frames.\n\nLegislation Related to…\n\nWhistleblowers Rules to ensure that those who disclose corrupt acts do not suffer any adverse\n consequences.\n\nMoney laundering Legislation to deter illicit financial flows and enrichment, including via shell companies\n (Findley, Nielson and Sharman, 2014).\n\nTaxation Legislation to strengthen taxation capacity, as well as related bureaucratic structures\n to ensure optimal performance of tax collectors (Khan, Khwaja and Olken, 2016,\n 2019).\n\n\n\nTo provide some context on corruption dynamics in Armenia and the region, we turn to a few graphical\nrepresentations. Figure 1 uses the Worldwide Governance Indicators, to compare Armenia with other\ncountries in the post-Soviet space that experienced similar large-scale social movement activity directed\nat government reform by tracking their scores on control of corruption over time, from 1990-2017.\nThe indicator measures “[r]eflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for\nprivate gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites\nand private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2015). Years are on the x-axis and control of\ncorruption scores are on the y-axis. Here, higher values indicate greater control of corruption. As is\nevident, and consistent with other measures reported below, Georgia has been very successful in\nincreasing its control of corruption. Armenia, while not at the bottom, has demonstrated gradual\nimprovement over time, but has significant room for improvement.\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 5\n"   
## [9] "Whereas Figure 1 measures the control of corruption, in Figure 2 below we see estimates of corruption\nin Armenia, 1990-2017. Here, higher values indicate higher levels of different types of corruption. We\nreport the overall Political Corruption measure as well as sub measures for Executive Corruption and\nPublic-Sector Corruption. The overall measure includes executive (with specific attention to both\nbribery and embezzlement), legislative, and judicial corruption. It intends to cover both petty (low-level)\ncorruption and grand (large-scale) corruption, bribery and theft, and corruption intending to influence\nlaw making and corruption intending to influence law implementation. To remind the reader, these\nscores are based on input from country experts and thus draw on more than observable events in the\nnews, for example, making them particularly valuable.\n\n\n\n\n Figure 1: Plotting Regional Corruption Scores for Armenia from the\n Worldwide Governance Indicators\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 6\n"   
## [10] " Figure 2: Plotting Corruption Scores for Armenia from V-Dem\n\n\n\n\nIn general, Political Corruption in Armenia (Figure 2) grew sharply from independence until just after\n2000, and then leveled off at high rates. V-Dem experts’ perceptions of Political Corruption did\nmeaningfully decline from 2016-2017. The trend in Executive Corruption parallels the overall trend,\nincluding the decline from 2016-2017. While in the years immediately after independence, Public Sector\nCorruption was higher than Executive Corruption, since around 2000 Public Sector Corruption has\nbeen meaningfully lower. It has also been declining in the period from around 2007 to 2017 and not just\nin the 2016-2017 year. As a point of comparison, corruption levels today on all indicators are at or\nabove where they were around 2000.\n\nFigure 3 also compares Armenia with the same set of other countries in the post-Soviet space by\ntracking their scores on Political Corruption over time, from 1990-2017. Figure 3 is in some ways the\nopposite of Figure 1, but note that the two graphs are based on different data sources (Figure 1 from\nthe Worldwide Governance Indicators and Figure 3 from V-Dem). Years are on the x-axis and Political\nCorruption scores are on the y-axis. Political Corruption captures both “petty” and “grand” corruption,\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 7\n"   
## [11] "including both bribery and theft, that influences law making and implementation (see again Figure 2). The\nblack shapes on the graph indicate the year in which the significant social movement activity directed at\ngovernment reform took place. The year in which the social movement activity took place in Kyrgyzstan\nand Ukraine does not precede a notable improvement in the overall trend in either country. Political\nCorruption meaningfully declined following events in Moldova in 2009, although it is now back at its\nprevious level. Most notably, Political Corruption declined dramatically following the Georgian\ntransition. Corruption in Georgia in recent years has hovered around the level it dropped to following\nthe transition, but that drop was so meaningfully large as to put it on a totally different trajectory than\nthe other countries experiencing wide-scale social movement activity directed at government reform in\nthe figure. The Georgian case gives a proof-of-concept that significant anti-corruption gains are possible\n\n\n\n Figure 3: Plotting Regional Corruption Scores for Armenia from V-Dem\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 8\n"   
## [12] "in the immediate aftermath of such broad social pressure, and those gains need not erode over time.\nArmenia’s Political Corruption trend is included for context; it is among the lowest until the mid-2000s,\nand by 2017 its corruption level is clustered with the four countries other than Georgia.\n\nTwo key lessons stand out in these graphs. First, Armenia has substantial challenges with respect to\ncorruption. On different measures of corruption (Figure 2), Armenia is high in all respects. As such\naddressing corruption will be a key challenge in upcoming years. Second, while most comparison\ncountries also experience a great deal of corruption, Georgia has been able to address corruption\nconcerns and exercise more control, at least since about 2003 or 2004. Georgia in some respects may\nprovide a model for how Armenia can address corruption challenges especially if Armenia can follow\nGeorgia’s approach to addressing petty corruption. (See USAID 2018 for more details on this\ncomparison.)\n\n\n\n 2.2. THE RULE OF LAW AND ARMENIA: AN OVERVIEW\nRule of law is a concept central to governance, but one that is often poorly defined (Shklar, 1987).\nUnder a minimalist definition, rule of law means that there are written, appropriate, and publicly\npromulgated regulations of civil and criminal activities in a state, and that the judiciary and any other\nstate institutions impartially apply them (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009; O’Donnell, 2004, 33). In its\nideal form, the rule of law curtails the arbitrary use of power and institutionalized tampering (Krygier,\n2016). Stein (2009, 302) expands on this, adding under rule of law, stable, codified law is “superior to all\nmembers of society”; “is just and protects human rights and dignity”; and that the law is created and\nrefined in the context of democratic practices. Once concepts from democracy, political equality, and\nhuman rights are included in the definition of rule of law, it is clear that the rule of law contains a social\ndimension (Fukuyama, 2010). Thus, expanded definitions of rule of law can face political pushback from\ndomestic populations, especially if and when the boundaries of rule of law are influenced by external\nactors (Belton, 2005; Shklar, 1987). In many countries in Latin America, for example, citizens fear how\nstate authorities will use the law to pursue improper ends (Scartascini et al., 2010).\n\nConflict over the definition of rule of law has had real effects as international and domestic actors have\nengaged in reform in recent years. Problems with rule-of-law reform strategies often result from “pitfalls\ninherent in a definition based on institutional attributes” (Belton, 2005, 3). During the beginning of post-\nSoviet transition in the 1990s, countries throughout the region contended with outside actors pushing\nthem to adopt a certain set of institutions, with the expectation that adopting the right institutions\nmeant achieving rule of law (Roland 2007, Transition and Economics). In the 2000s, the European Union\nsent post-communist countries looking to join “many mixed signals” regarding rule of law (Mineshima,\n2002, 86). Current best practices acknowledge that there are many possible institutional arrangements\nthat can achieve good political and development outcomes (Rodrik, 2007). Accordingly, most\ncontemporary attempts to measure rule of law are based on perceptions, or the ends to be\naccomplished, rather than the institutional means to get there. For its part, the European Union has\nmoved to more ends-based definitions of rule of law as well; the European Union has instructed\ncountries looking to join to develop “their own ‘brand’ of rule of law and democracy that reflects their\nindividual situations, histories, and cultures” (Mineshima, 2002, 86-87). Like post-communist countries\nthat have acceded to the European Union, Armenia too has had to develop its own ‘brand’ of rule of\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 9\n"   
## [13] "law. Now, in the context of the popular protest and government change around the social movement\ninspired government reforms, it is clear that its ‘brand’ has been insufficient.\n\nFigures 4 and 5 illustrate trends in rule of law based on data collected by the World Bank for Armenia\nand other countries in the region that have experienced notable popular protest leading to concentrated\ngovernment reform efforts (albeit with varying success). They also include Romania and Bulgaria, which\nwe see as relevant comparisons for Armenia for the purposes of considering rule of law developments.\nAs we discuss further below, Romania and Bulgaria were notably lacking in rule of law at the time of\ntheir accession to the European Union in 2007 and continue to undertake specific rule-of-law reforms.\nEuropean Union and other external support have thus played an important role in these countries with\na specific focus on developing the rule of law, making their experiences relevant for Armenia today.\n\n\n\n Figure 4: Plotting Regional Rule of Law Scores for Armenia from\n the Worldwide Governance Indicators\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 10\n"   
## [14] " Figure 5: Plotting Judicial Independence Survey Scores for Armenia\n and Region from the WEF Global Competitiveness Index\n\n\n\n\nFigure 4 reports values on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators rule of law measure\nfrom 2002-2016. The black dots in Figure 4 mark the year in which the country in question experienced\nsignificant popular protest that had a notable impact on electoral outcomes, where applicable. The\nreported indicator is an outcome-based indicator of rule of law that measures “perceptions of the\nextent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality\nof contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime\nand violence.” Armenia did not experience very notable improvement in the indicator over the period,\nalthough it made considerable gains in 2015-2016. These recent gains moved it ahead of Moldova, the\ncountry which it most closely tracked over the period. Ukraine has been relatively stable throughout the\nperiod. Kyrgyzstan’s rule of law fell precipitously in the 2000s and then improved in the 2010s, but it\nremains at the lowest level of the countries considered. It is Georgia that has notably improved its rating\nconsistently over time; we discuss their experience more below (see also USAID 2018). Georgia started\nat the lowest level of this set of countries in 2002 but since 2014 has reached levels better than Romania\nand Bulgaria, both member states of the European Union. Romania has made steady improvement over\nthe period although has somewhat leveled out in terms of progress since around 2004. Bulgaria has\nmade less regular improvement in the period, and as of 2016, was at a level closer to that of Armenia\nthan that of Georgia and Romania.\n\nFigure 5 reports values on the World Bank’s Judicial Independence measure from 2007- 2017. This is an\nindex (1-7) that measures how independent the judicial system is from “influences of the government,\nindividuals, or companies” (from survey data, compiled by the World Economic Forum Global\nInformation Technology Report). With respect to this measure, Armenia has improved steadily over the\nperiod, moving from among the lowest of this group of countries to among the highest, behind only\nRomania and Georgia, and higher than Bulgaria. Kyrgyzstan has also made considerable gains, moving to\naround the level of Armenia as of 2017 (discussed further below). Ukraine and Moldova remain quite\nlow and are increasingly separated from the rest of this group of countries. Note that with respect to\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 11\n"   
## [15] "the question of judicial independence in particular, Armenia has been doing considerably better than\nMoldova, as opposed to the general rule of law as measured in Figure 4 on which the two countries\ntrack more closely. We attribute this difference to active policies that Armenia has been undertaking in\nrecent years with regard to judicial institutions, as we detail below, in contrast to Moldova that has not\nimplemented significant policy changes in that area or with regard to rule of law more generally.\n\nFigure 6 plots the rule of law scores from V-Dem. This indicator has yet another definition somewhat\ndifferent from the concepts measured in Figures 4 and 5. Specifically, this measure answers the question:\n“To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced,\nand to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law?” It is composed of an\nindex of different V-Dem variables that speak to this question. It also extends back to 1990 whereas the\nprevious Figures begin in the 2000s. Armenia experienced declining rule of law throughout the 1990s\n\n\n\n Figure 6: Plotting Rule of Law Scores for Armenia and Region\n from V-Dem\n\n\n\n\nand then leveled off without very significant change since around 2002. This figure puts it on the level of\nUkraine in 2016, the two lowest ranking countries in this group. Both Georgia and to a lesser extent\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 12\n"   
## [16] "Kyrgyzstan showed significant improvements in the period (discussed further below). Per this measure,\nBulgaria has had a relatively high and steady rule of law, whereas Romania’s has grown over time, albeit\nwith a loss from 2015-2016. Still, the set of Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania are at a meaningfully higher\nlevel of rule of law than Armenia. Also of note is that, according to V-Dem and in contrast to the World\nBank’s WGI measure in Figure 4, rule of law in Moldova and Armenia diverged already in the mid 1990s,\nwith Moldova qualitatively higher throughout the period since then. Regardless, Moldova’s rating\nremains relatively stable, consistent with the fact that it has not undergone significant rule of law reform\nprograms like Georgia and Kyrgyzstan did.\n\nThe key takeaways from these three different indicators are that rule of law outcomes in Armenia\ndeclined in the 1990s but have been relatively stable in the 2000s, with some particular improvement in\nrecent years with regard to judicial independence. That improvement correlates in time with the\nformation of the Chamber of Advocates and the Public Defender’s Office in Armenia, which were seen\nas positive developments by independent observers that aided “the protection of human rights and\nindividual freedoms in the country.”7 Of note, in its 2012 report on political rights and civil liberties in\nArmenia, Freedom House focused on rule of law concerns in terms of the unequal application of the\nlaw, and they particularly pointed out problems in criminal law. Specifically, they noted that lawyers had\nlittle power to intervene especially in investigative and pre-trial phases of criminal procedures, and that\n“the role of lawyers is limited...throughout the whole process of investigation and trial” (Freedom\nHouse, 2012, 6). We suspect that improvements in access to legal representation and in the\nprofessionalization of lawyers made an important impact on perceptions of the equal application of the\nlaw that showed up in the judicial independence ratings in recent years. We expand on these intuitions\nbelow.\n\nIn an interview at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2019, Prime Minister Pashinyan\ndiscussed transforming Armenia’s transition from a political change to an economic one. He outlined\npriorities including regulatory simplification, reform of the tax code and tax relief, and welfare-to-work\nprograms. In this context, he also discussed that Armenia seeks institutional support to “reform social\nand political life,” including renewed support from the European Union.87 We mention his interview\nhere to point out that rule of law reforms in terms of improving contract enforcement, regulation, and\nequal application of commercial law would correspond with the priorities currently being laid out by the\nArmenian administration.\n\n\n\n\n7 For more information: https://www.pf-armenia.org/event/human-rights-and-rule-law-armenia-police-brutality-\npolitical-prisoners-and-potential\n8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?time\_continue=236&v$=$2YHS9pknuVw\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 13\n"   
## [17] " 3. INTEGRITY SYSTEMS\n 3.1. TOP-DOWN VS. BOTTOM-UP VS. WHOLE-OF-SYSTEM\n APPROACHES TO ANTI-CORRUPTION\nThere is not one unique approach to anti-corruption. The extent to which any anti-corruption\nintervention has a positive or negative impact depends upon context. On that note, mere replication of\nWestern institutions and practices without due attention to context leads to sub-optimal results\n(Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, 2017).\n\nGenerally, whole-of-system, “big bang” approaches to anti-corruption are more effective than ones that\nare mostly top-down and bottom-up for a number of reasons (Rothstein, 2011a; Persson, Rothstein and\nTeorell, 2013; Fisman and Golden, 2017). First, the extent to which any governance reform—top-down\nor bottom-up—is effective is a function not only of the success of the particular intervention but also\nthe state’s institutions of horizontal accountability (Fox, 2015).9 Without enforcement, no initiative can\nbe successful. Second, in societies with norms of corruption, additional top-down monitoring by itself is\nalmost always not enough to change the norms. Monitoring relies on the existence of principled\nsupervisors to stop corruption among subordinates—a largely quixotic proposition in many corrupt\nsettings. To make matters more complicated, monitoring-related gains tend to be short-term in nature\n(Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003). These are two reasons why corruption is mostly not a monitoring\nproblem but a collective action problem (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2013).\n\nA collective action problem “arise[s] when the individual pursuit of self-interest generates socially\nundesirable outcomes” (Ferguson, 2013, 4). More generally, corruption is mostly a collective action\nproblem because most people in corrupt societies would benefit from having less corruption. By the\nsame token, reducing corruption is not in most people’s individual self-interest. That is not just the case\nfor those people who financially benefit from corruption but also those who are the victims of\ncorruption and must pay lots of bribes, etc.\n\nTwo reasons underpin why taking action against corruption is generally not in all citizens’ individual self-\ninterests. First, as Table 3 underscores, most countries developed the control of corruption over\nmany—often hundreds of—years. Therefore, most anti-corruption reforms and efforts fail or are at\nleast not do not produce tangible and visible changes in outcomes so as to inspire more reform in the\nshort-term.10 Second, taking action against corruption can carry costs such as intimidation, violence,\ninability to obtain government services, and being put on a blacklist.11 In short, from a cost-benefit\nperspective, taking action against corruption is generally not in individuals’ self-interest.\n\n\n\n\n9 For more on horizontal accountability, see O’Donnell (1998) and Section 3.2.2. of this paper (below).\n10 In more technical terms, anti-corruption reforms and efforts provide very noisy information environments.\n11 With respect to the blacklist, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez placed all citizens who signed a 2007 public petition\n\nagainst him on a blacklist. For about 12 years, the blacklist has not only prevented citizens who signed the petition from\nobtaining government jobs but also from obtaining jobs from private entities that rely on government contracts or have ties to\nthe government (Stokes et al., 2013).\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 14\n"   
## [18] "TABLE 3: COUNTRIES THAT HAVE AT LEAST MOSTLY OVERCOME CORRUPTION12\n\nCountry Critical How the Country Overcame Corruption Maintained?\n Periods\n\nDenmark 1658- Loss in a war against Sweden; top-down reform initiated Yes\n 1665, by kings; drafting of a new constitution following\n demonstrations\n 1814,\n 1849\n\nSweden 1810- Losing the 1808-1809 war against Russia, followed by a Yes\n 1850 series of reforms\n\nGreat 1780- Civil service reform; legislation; a secret ballot; suffrage Yes\nBritain 1883 reform, resulting in the decline of clientelism and more\n funds for public services\n\nFrance 1791- The French Revolution; gradual decline of patronage Yes\n 1975 appointments; construction of impartial institutions\n\nItaly 1992- The Clean Hands scandal, prompted by the arrest of one Maybe. Corrupt leaders\n 1996 well-connected individual, who provided information that remain electorally relevant\n led to the arrest of hundreds and changed the party\n system\n\nEstonia 1990- Tax reform; e-governance; procurement reform; Yes\n 1995 privatization\n\nGeorgia 2004- The Georgian Transition, followed by a “big bang” Yes, though with creeping\n 2008 approach from President Mikhail Saakashvilli (i.e., large- authoritarianism and human\n scale dismissal of civil servants, televised arrests, and e- rights issues\n governance)\n\nTunisia 2011- Citizen demonstrations over autocratic rule fueled the Mostly, though some\n 2014 Arab Spring and subsequent democratization patronage remains a\n challenge\n\nBotswana 1966- Excellent natural resource management; protection of Regular scandals imperil\n property rights; transparent policy-making; management progress\n present of potential ethnic tensions\n\nUnited 1870- The regulation of patronage appointments through the Yes, though the role of\nStates 1920 Pendleton Act; the press; the Progressivist movement; money in politics is significant\n successful prosecutions.\n\nHong Kong 1974- Egregious malfeasance by the head of police, which Yes\n 1977 prompted the creation of an independent anti-\n corruption agency and many subsequent arrests\n\nTaiwan 1992- Civil service reform; high-level corruption initiatives; Yes\n legislation; party system change\n\nSingapore 1959- Authoritarian leader Lee KwanYew pushed through a Yes\n 1990 series of reforms\n\nSouth 1961- Education; import-substitution industrialization that Yes\nKorea 2003 fueled economic growth; market reforms; legislation;\n protests\n\n\n\n12Sources: Therialt (2003), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Glaeser and Goldin (2007), Rothstein (2011b), Acemoglu and Robinson\n(2012), Grindle (2012), Weyland (2012), Camp, Dixit and Stokes (2014), Mungiu-Pippidi (2015, 2016), Rothstein and Teorell\n(2015), Teorell and Rothstein (2015), Fisman and Golden (2017), Fukuyama (2018), Masoud (2018).\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 15\n"   
## [19] "Country Critical How the Country Overcame Corruption Maintained?\n Periods\n\nJapan 1945- Loss of World War 2; MacArthur Plan Yes\n 1952\n\nChile 1984- Economic liberalization; privatization; loss of natural Yes\n 1990 resource rents; democratic and authoritarian legacies\n from previous periods\n\nUruguay 1984 Fiscal/tax system consolidation; privatization; a Yes\n democratic history; an educated and active citizenry;\n loss of patronage funds.\n\n\n\nThe relevance of the collective action paradigm to explain the persistence of corruption also helps us\nunderstand why, at its very core, corruption is a bottom-up problem (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2018).\nNevertheless, bottom-up solutions alone will generally not suffice. Whereas top-down, monitoring-\nbased approaches are reliant on individuals in leadership positions overcoming sticky behavioral and\ncultural norms, bottom-up approaches are prone to citizens free-riding on the actions of others.\n\nTo increase the probability of success against corruption, countries should combine top-down and\nbottom-up approaches to anti-corruption (Serra, 2012). As we highlight in the next section, the most\nsuccessful anti-corruption efforts, particularly in a setting of state capture, generally combine some form\nof monitoring with either overlapping institutions of horizontal accountability (not a current reality for\nArmenia); or measures to ensure that the monitoring can feasibly spur collective action (feasible for\nArmenia).\n\n\n\n 3.2. OVERCOMING STATE CAPTURE\nAs shown in Table 1, state capture refers to a situation in which private firms and interests monopolize\nthe state-level decision making (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003; Søreide, 2014). State capture does\nnot only elicit pernicious effects in terms of corruption and the rule of law, but it also tends to\ndemobilize citizens. When citizens perceive that the government is conferring special advantages to\nsome firms or oligarchs, citizens are generally less willing to engage in collective action against\ncorruption (Bauhr, 2017). That appears to be what happened to Armenia as well (Wickberg and\nHoktanyan, 2013). State capture is thus a form of corruption that is especially difficult to eradicate, and\nGeorgia and Estonia constitute the only states that mostly overcame state capture in the post-Soviet\nspace. To do so, each country combated corruption on multiple fronts through both top-down and\nbottom-up approaches, which we detail in Table 3 as well as the Governance Evidence Review also\nunder this tasking (USAID, 2018).\n\nANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES AND COMMISSIONS\nMany states attempt to remedy state capture through a dedicated anti-corruption agency or\ncommission. Unfortunately, there is very little literature that puts forth credible causal evidence on their\neffectiveness (Gans-Morse et al., 2018). That does not mean that dedicated anti-corruption institutions\ncannot be effective. Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s anti-corruption agencies, for example, provide a clear\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 16\n"   
## [20] "success stories, as does the United Nations’ International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala\n(CICIG) (Fisman and Golden, 2017, 226-228).\n\nAs a survey of 50 dedicated anti-corruption agencies by Recanatini (2011) showcases, these agencies\ntend to be very hard to compare. Often, they have significantly different functions, mandates, financial\nresources, and independence from the political process. Recanatini (2011) also finds that dedicated anti-\ncorruption agencies generally lack performance indicators. Paradoxically, at least in the successful cases\nof Hong Kong and Singapore, what seemed to inspire strong performance from dedicated anti-\ncorruption agencies were crises (Dixit, 2018; Quah, 2010). The crises paved the way for the anti-\ncorruption agencies to occupy a more prominent, important, and independent role. The parallel to\nArmenia given the social movement activity and protest of 2018 is ostensible.\n\nOne reason for pause concerns the fact that Armenia’s Anti-Corruption Commission is not politically\nindependent; in fact, the Prime Minister chairs the commission. To be clear, anti-corruption agencies or\ncouncils can be effective even if they are political nature. When these agencies are political, though, their\neffectiveness—and existence—is susceptible to the whims of the particular leaders in power.\n\nTake, for example, the case of Guatemala. Current President Jimmy Morales came into office praising\nthe United Nations’ International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Yet, when the\nCICIG started to investigate Morales’ family, Morales quickly changed his position and attempted to kick\nthe CICIG out of the country (The Economist, 2018, 2019). At least for the meanwhile, Guatemala’s\nSupreme Court appears to have stopped the move (Perez, 2019). If such a situation were to happen in\nArmenia, though, it is not clear that the judiciary is strong enough to be able to do the same. In short, as\nHidalgo, Canello and Lima-de Oliveira (2016) show through their study of Brazilian State Audit Courts,\npoliticians are generally very bad at policing themselves, especially when they have higher stations.\n\nAUDIT INSTITUTIONS, RANDOMIZED AUDIT SCHEMES, AND HORIZONTAL\nACCOUNTABILITY\nThere is robust causal evidence to support the effectiveness of audit institutions, notably in Brazil. Since\n2003, the country’s General Comptroller’s Office13 randomly selects 26-60 municipalities with\npopulations over 500,000 inhabitants for public expenditure audit through a lottery (Ferraz and Finan,\n2018).14 When administering the lottery, the General Comptroller’s Office invites members of the\npress, political parties, and civil society to ensure transparency (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 707).\n\nIn contrast to the Brazilian audit lottery program, most countries’ audit institutions select entities and\nindividuals for audit through legislatively-imposed mandates or performance- and risk-based systems.\nWith respect to the latter, although it may make logical sense to target high-risk individuals and entities\nbased on poor compliance history or high corruption risks, it is not always easy to do so in practice.\nEvidence suggests that audit agencies around the world have very different levels of independence and\nprofessionalism (Gustavson and Sundström, 2018). Accordingly, employees of audit institutions may not\nalways use risk-based audit systems in a manner that is fair, appropriate, or free from outside influences.\nTo be sure, auditor discretion is useful under some circumstances, including in developing countries\n\n\n\n\n13 Controlodaria Geral de Uniao (CGE) in Portuguese.\n14 In total, Brazil has 5,570 municipalities.\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 17\n"   
## [21] "such as India (Duflo, Greenstone, Pande, and Ryan, 2018), but situations of state capture such as that of\nArmenia generally call for randomized schemes.15\n\nThe random selection of municipalities for audits ensures that politics does not confound the impact of\naudits to uncover, expose, and mitigate corruption. Additionally, the random selection and timing of\naudits ensures that politicians cannot plan out corruption in advance, a concern that Bobonis, Fuertes\nand Schwabe (2016) document for Puerto Rico. Based on our review, Brazil appears to be the only\ncountry with systematic, randomized sub-national audits. Countries such as Indonesia (Olken, 2007) and\nMexico (De La O and García, 2014), however, have implemented randomized audit schemes for certain\nprograms.\n\nRandomized audit schemes are not just promising in terms of their benefits for unbiased evaluation but\nalso regarding the collective action against corruption that they have delivered. On that score, when the\nBrazilian General Comptroller’s Office audits municipalities at least two years before an election and\nensures that local radio reports the results, relatively corrupt mayors are much less successful at gaining\nreelection (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Randomized audits have also allowed researchers to uncover that\nhaving the prospect of reelection—as opposed to when reelection is not feasible by law—yields mayors\nto be less corrupt (Ferraz and Finan, 2011).16 Furthermore, Avis, Ferraz and Finan (2018) find that being\naudited in the past reduces future corruption in subsequent audits, and Zamboni and Litschig (2018)\ndocument that increasing audit risk deters corruption in procurement contracts.\n\nOne of the reasons why these randomized audit schemes are so successful in Brazil relates to their\noverlapping institutions of horizontal accountability. As above, Brazil has randomized audits through the\nComptroller General and certain state audit courts (Boas, Hidalgo and Melo, 2019). What makes those\naudits so powerful is the additional and effective support from the Federal Audit Court, Federal Public\nMinistry, Revenue Service Inspectors, the Federal Police, and the judiciary (Ferraz and Finan, 2018). That\naccounts for why successful corruption prosecutions have increased in recent years (Avis, Ferraz and\nFinan, 2018), at least for lower-ranking individuals (Hidalgo, Canello and Lima-de Oliveira, 2016).\n\nArmenia does not have such an effective ensemble of horizontal accountability institutions with\nrandomized schemes to ensure fairness. With respect to the judiciary, it is weak, poorly conceived by\ncitizens, and has difficulty regulating entrenched elites and insiders, who exercise monopoly power and\nmake it difficult for foreign competition in business (Lewis, 2017; Paturyan and Stefes, 2017). Armenia’s\nlegislation also confers immunity to prosecution for certain “legal persons” such as judges, something\nthat deters progress on state capture (OECD, 2018). By contrast, the Armenian Audit Chamber is\nmember of relevant international auditing standards organizations (INTOSAI, EUROSAI, and ASOSAI)\nand is attempting to overcome some of negative pressures with cooperation from USAID.17 Since 2018,\nthe Audit Chamber has benefitted from a new law that attempts to instill further independence in the\naudit process as well as a new, more autonomous chamber of auditors and accountants.18 While this\nprogress is notable, it remains to be seen whether these efforts can help overcome state capture.\n\n\n\n15 The only available cross-national data on audit institution independence and professionalism from Dahlström et al. (2015)\nrank Armenia toward the middle of distribution (38/114 on professionalism; 68/114 on independence).\n16 By law, Brazil only allows mayors to be reelected one time.\n17 http://old.armradio.am/en/2018/05/30/usaid-and-audit-chamber-of-armenia-to-cooperate/\n18 https://www.tert.am/en/news/2017/02/14/davit-ananyan/2278542\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 18\n"   
## [22] "MITIGATING THE INFLUENCE OF OLIGARCHS IN A SETTING OF STATE CAPTURE\nWhen oligarchs perpetrate state capture, it is especially necessary to mitigate their influence with a\nnumber of both top-down and bottom-up measures. In line with Johnston (2014, 48-49), overcoming\noligarch-perpetrated state capture requires two outcomes. First and foremost, it is necessary to open\nup “safe political and economic space” so that citizens and non-oligarchic businesses can operate\nwithout fear and trust each other. Opening up safe political and economic space, according to Johnston\n(2014, 49-51), entails: “a reduction of violence; credible law enforcement, courts, contract enforcement,\nproperty rights, and civil liberties; elections with real choices, in which votes are cast and counted\nhonestly; and a free or freer press.” Second, overcoming oligarch-perpetrated state capture requires\nsome form of “reform activism: enabling and encouraging people sharing grievances to act on these\nconcerns, voice opinions and demands, safely and with some chance of having real effects” (Johnston,\n2014, 48). Achieving some form of safe economic and political space as well as spurring reform activism\nis not easy, but some tools are particularly useful—particularly in a context such as Armenia with a\nweak judiciary.\n\nAUDITS, CODES OF ETHICS, AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS. Most governmental agencies\nhave some form an internal auditing department, led by in-house staff. In situations of oligarchic state\ncapture, in particular, it is necessary to complement internal audits with external audits: that is, audits\ncarried out by a third-party, usually a specialized audit firm. Since situations of state capture extend to\nthe private sector as well, it is often necessary to audit the auditors, too.19\n\nTo ensure government staff cannot avoid all audits, it is helpful to stipulate audit provisions in staff\nemployment contracts and require staff to sign codes of ethics as a condition of employment. These\ncodes of ethics should stipulate anti-nepotism and meritocratic recruitment provisions regarding hiring\nas well as a broad suite of measures against conflicts of interest (World Bank, 2000). Such provisions\nand measures, in turn, help shield bureaucrats’ careers from outside attempts to capture government\nprocurement contracts (Charron et al., 2017).\n\nProcurement is one of oligarchs’ primary vehicles for perpetuating state capture, and procurement does\nnot just pose a problem for staff who sit on bid evaluation committees. In situations of state capture,\noligarchs pressure or bribe staff of government agencies, who often serve as intermediaries for inside\ninformation to help secure government contracts.20 That is why disclosure requirements should pertain\nto all bidders and government agency staff, not just procurement and financial management staff. Ideally,\ndisclosure requirements should not just take the form of conflicts of interest declaration, required public\nlobby registers, integrity pacts or pledges, and management but also financial asset disclosure (see Table\n2).21 As we detail in the Governance Evidence Review also under this tasking (USAID, 2018), financial\nasset disclosure is even more effective when paired with transparency of tax records.\n\nCOMBATING COLLUSION, MONOPOLIES, CLIENTELISM, AND DARK MONEY. Collusive\narrangements are one of the hallmarks of state capture perpetrated by oligarchs. In procurement,\nprototypical collusive arrangements that strengthen oligarchs’ monopoly positions in both politics and\n\n19 For example, the World Bank’s Integrity Vice-Presidency investigators have found collusive arrangements between\nsupervising engineers and contractors in various international development projects (World Bank, 2011).\n20 Intermediaries are also called “middle men” or “agents”. For more on the role of intermediaries, refer to Drugov, Hamman\n\nand Serra (2014), Fredriksson (2014), Bayar (2005), Hasker and Okten (2008), and Hummel (2018).\n21 For more on asset disclosure, see Fisman, Schulz and Vig (2014) and World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and\n\nCrime (2015).\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 19\n"   
## [23] "markets include bid-rigging;22 downstream sub-contracting;23 fraudulent bid securities and performance\nguarantees;24 and bribery, kickback, and coercion schemes. Some of the most common forms of the\nlatter are “plata o plomo” (silver or lead) schemes, diffused most notably by Colombian drug lord Pablo\nEscobar (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella, 2006).\n\nOn the subject of dark money, it is one of the primary drivers of state capture. To mitigate its influence\non politics, preventive measures include those regarding campaign financing (Hummel, Gerring and Burt,\n2018), election monitoring (Hyde, 2011), lobbying (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014), and pre-election\nclientelistic practices (Stokes et al., 2013). With regard to campaign financing, under extreme\ncircumstances of state capture, it may be necessary to ban private financing of electoral campaigns and\nmake the campaign financing system entirely public (World Bank, 2000). Election monitoring, including in\nArmenia (Hyde, 2007), deters electoral fraud, something that undermines the legitimacy of democracy\nas a system of governance.25 Lobbying is generally very challenging to regulate appropriately, because the\nlegality and acceptance of certain practices are context-specific, and not all lobbying is zero-sum,\npernicious behavior.\n\nDark and misappropriated money also fuels clientelism: that is, “the exchange of selective benefits for\npolitical allegiance” (Lawson and Greene, 2014, 61). It takes the forms of vote-buying,26 turnout buying,27\nabstention-buying,28 double persuasion,29 legitimacy-buying,30 request-fulfilling,31 and patronage.32 A\ncombination of legislation and a desire on the part of elites to finance public services helped end the\npatronage spoils system and vote-buying in the United Kingdom (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Camp, Dixit\nand Stokes, 2014). Mexico has attenuated clientelism by closing secret loopholes in the budget and\nexerting greater surveillance of funds generated by its state-owned enterprises (Greene, 2007).\nAssuming there are available funds for misappropriation, though, politicians will not stop with\nclientelistic practices if their competition is doing them as well, even if clientelism is not that effective\n(Geddes, 1994; Muños, 2014).33 Similarly, many citizens in poorer countries are economically dependent\non clientelistic benefits and patronage jobs to the extent that citizens will engage in request-fulfilling and\n22 Typical displays of bid-rigging include monopolistic, economic cartel behavior, such as selective and coordinated bidding on\nprocurement contracts to divide-and-capture markets.\n23 Often, firms that do not meet tender requirements collude with firms that meet tender requirements, and then winning firms\n\nsub-contract parts of the contract to the ineligible firm.\n24 Oligarchs and monopolistic firms will often buy off or fabricate performance guarantees and bid securities in order to qualify\n\nfor procurement contracts for which they are not eligible. In settings of state capture, there is a particular risk of collusion\nbetween those offering the performance guarantees or bid securities and those receiving them (World Bank, 2011, 2010).\n25 For more on election monitoring and campaign financing, we refer readers to the Governance Evidence Review also\n\nunder this tasking (USAID, 2018).\n26 Vote-buying entails the selective exchange of material benefits (e.g., cash, food) or non-material benefits (e.g., services) for\n\npolitical support (e.g., Auyero, 1999; Stokes, 2005; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Hidalgo and Nichter, 2016).\n27 Turnout-buying entails parties distributing benefits to loyalists (e.g., Nichter, 2008; Larreguy, Marshall and Querubín, 2016).\n28 Abstention-buying entails parties distributing benefits to voters to not show-up to the polls (e.g., Gans- Morse, Mazzuca and\n\nNichter, 2014).\n29 Double persuasion entails paying potential voter to both vote and vote for a particular party (e.g., Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and\n\nNichter, 2014).\n30 Legitimacy-buying entails paying voters to turn out to the polls in a contested election that may be subject to boycott, such as\n\nthe one after the promissory coup in Honduras in 2009 (e.g., Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson, 2015;\nBermeo, 2016).\n31 Request-fulfilling entails citizens asking politicians and their brokers for clientelistic benefits, as opposed to politicians\n\ntargeting voters (Nichter and Peress, 2017).\n32 Patronage entails the selective exchange of public sector jobs for political support. Although patronage and clientelism are\n\noften used interchangeably, the phenomena are distinct (Fukuyama, 2014).\n33 As Muños (2014) details, clientelism continues in Peru, even though politicians know it is not effective, because the ability to\n\npromise clientelistic benefits is a signal of party strength to voters.\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 20\n"  
## [24] "thus resist the eradication of clientelism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Nichter and Peress, 2017). In\nArmenia, there are reports of clientelism (Paturyan and Stefes, 2017; Lewis, 2017), but it not does\nappear to be as significant—or at least is part of—the overall phenomenon of state capture in general.\n\nIn terms of the economic costs of dark money, they include money laundering and the proliferation of\nshell companies to hide and expropriate state and individual funds and assets. In general, the principle\nconcerns underlying the use of shell companies for money laundering include terrorism financing,\ncorruption, clientelism, tax evasion, and narco-trafficking, among others (Findley, Nielson and Sharman,\n2014). According to relevant risk assessments conducted by the U.S. State Department, the Financial\nAction Task Force (FATF), and others, the risks associated with money laundering are not high in\nArmenia. Armenia is not on the FATF “Anti-Money Laundering Deficient” list, for example. More\nbroadly, there are few concerns about money laundering for the purposes of terrorism financing. With\nthat said, some moderate concerns exist regarding the use of money laundering for tax evasion (likely\ntied to corruption), corruption more broadly, theft, and narco-trafficking (Know Your Country, 2019;\nFinancial Action Task Force, 2019; US Department of State, 2019). In recent years, Armenia has devoted\nsubstantial attention to this sector, making a number of changes to the public sector that aim to address\npolitical officials, the civil service, those in procurement, and include measures to prevent corruption,\nestablish better ethics, reporting and so forth (OECD, 2018). In general, then, Armenia does need to\ncontinue to focus some attention on its anti-money laundering laws and enforcement, but the risks\nshould not be overstated in this case.\n\nStrategies for addressing illicit financial activity are numerous, and face a fundamental problem that illicit\nfinancial behavior is inherently transnational whereas any given country can primarily make national-level\npolicy adjustments. Thus, before turning to specific domestic policy possibilities, we first note here that\nArmenia would need to identify means to better coordinate with international bodies such as the\nFinancial Action Task Force as well as with other countries not only regionally, but globally.\nDomestically, the three most prominent policy approaches include (1) empowering law enforcement\nagencies with substantial investigative authority, (2) establishing a national public registry of company\nbeneficial ownership, and (3) requiring corporate service providers including law firms to collect and\nhold identity information for all companies (Findley, Nielson, & Sharman 2014).\n\nEmpowering law enforcement agencies can be a useful step to the extent that the companies and bank\naccounts used for illicit purposes are located in Armenia and therefore in the jurisdiction of Armenian\nlaw enforcement. Even with strong law enforcement, however, if companies and/or bank accounts are\nset up anonymously (no beneficial ownership information provided) then law enforcement investigations\nare unlikely to arrive at anything but a dead end. Accordingly, it may be necessary for a registry of\ncompanies, which includes beneficial ownership data, to be established and actively used. If all companies\nthat are formed register beneficial ownership information, then law enforcement is much less likely to\nreach dead ends in their investigation of suspected criminals engaged in illicit financial activity.\nUnfortunately, company registries have done little more than serve archival functions for general\ncompany information, and have not required the inclusion of beneficial ownership data, and would need\nto be used much more actively and comprehensively to achieve any significant effect. The third, and\narguably best, way to address illicit financial behavior involves legislating and enforcing that corporate\nservice providers, including law firms, collect and store beneficial ownership information. International\nstandards already require this, and domestically Armenia will have greater success to the extent that it\nadheres to and enforces these standards. Even in the absence of a broad public registry, if corporate\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 21\n"   
## [25] "service providers collect and store the beneficial ownership information, then law enforcement\ninvestigations will be able to identify and use meaningful information. Moreover, domestically legislating\nand enforcing these standards may deter some potential criminals from using companies and accounts\nfor illicit financial behavior in the first place, though as noted above, it could shift domestic activity to\ntransnational locations. Each of these approaches thus holds promise, though none of them is a cure-all.\n\nRecently, Armenia has started to require that firms bidding on procurement contracts register their\nbeneficial ownership information (OECD, 2018). This is a great first step, but it remains to be seen\nwhether Armenia will use some of the above strategies to ensure that beneficial ownership information\nis not only collected but used. One way to do may be through collaboration with large firms that collect\nfirm-level beneficial ownership information on an international level such as Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) and\nWorld Compliance.34 Perhaps there is scope for public-private partnerships that would allow for\nseamless two-way exchange of beneficial ownership data that could be beneficial for Armenia, private\ninvestors, large organizations, and the compliance data organizations.\n\nINVOLVING NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY\nThe only way that the press, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), individuals, and watchdog\nagencies will consistently act against state capture is if there is a safe environment to do so. A first step\nto make an environment safer is to adopt legislation for whistleblower protection (Basu, Basu and\nCordella, 2016). To enforce whistleblowing is very challenging, though, as evidence from the United\nStates suggests (Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010). Accordingly, even though Armenia recently adopted\nwhistleblower legislation (OECD, 2018), it will likely take time for the legislation to become effective.\n\nTo ensure that intrepid members of the press and watchdog agencies can hold the government and\nbusiness to account, freedom of information laws are essential (Escaleras, Lin and Register, 2010; Islam,\n2006). Ideally, freedom of information laws need a trackable e-governance platform to accompany them.\nOtherwise, bureaucrats may not provide civil society with the information it needs to slowly erode the\ngrip of state capture. Armenia has recently made progress in this area, but the OECD (2018) reports\nthat there remains significant steps that the country can take.\n\nUnder some circumstances, it may also be possible to involve civil society in the fight against corruption\nthrough community-based/third-party monitoring, social audits, and hotlines. For further details, we\nrefer readers to the Governance Evidence Review also under this tasking (USAID, 2018).\n\n\n\n 3.3. PROMISING APPROACHES FOR ARMENIA\n\nENGAGEMENT WITH SMALL- AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SME) ASSOCIATIONS\nEngaging with SME associations constitutes a particularly promising path to gradually erode state capture\nin Armenia. As Yadav and Mukherjee (2016, 17-18) recount, SMEs do not only comprise a large portion\nof economies, but they are also a sector with financial incentives—and some resources—to undermine\nmonopolies. Like any association, SME associations are useful for mobilizing collective action, including\nagainst corruption, through rewards and punishments (e.g., fines).35 Generally, SME associations are not\n\n34 These are among the firms that keep track of Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML-CFT) and\nsanctions lists, and sell these data to big banks’ and organizations’ compliance/due diligence departments.\n35 In academic parlance, we are referring to selective incentives and sanctioning (see Olson, 1965; Ferguson, 2013; Sandler,\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 22\n"   
## [26] "too large such that they would fall victim to excessive member free-riding, a problem for generating\ncollective action in large groups. Given that Yadav and Mukherjee (2016) find that engagement with SME\nassociations is more effective in areas with high concentrations of such associations, any such approach\nin Armenia should start with SME associations in Yerevan.\n\nRANDOMIZED AND FREQUENT AUDITS\nInstituting a lottery system to start with randomized audits similar to those of Brazil (Ferraz and Finan,\n2018) would likely be beneficial for Armenia. By randomizing the audit schedule but keeping it\nfrequent,36 it would hinder politicians and bureaucrats from anticipating investigations and thereby\nchanging their behavior selectively. Additionally, randomizing audits would mitigate political influence in\naudit selection and help with evaluating whether audits truly work. When audits are not randomly\nassigned, it presents a myriad of evaluation challenges since corruption is one of the most endogenous\nphenomena to measure in all of social science. That is one principal reason why Gans-Morse et al.\n(2018) find—in a review of the corruption literature originally commissioned by USAID—that there is\nvery little causal evidence on what works in terms of anti-corruption efforts.\n\nADDRESSING PETTY CORRUPTION\nAs we highlight in the Governance Evidence Review also under this tasking (USAID, 2018), addressing\npetty corruption is a less risky way to start an anti-corruption effort. Low-level bureaucrats who request\nbribes in exchange for services generally do not enjoy the same immunity from the judicial system as\noligarchs and high-ranking public officials. Therefore, it is best to start any anti-corruption initiatives at\nthe lower level, with the objective of gradually shifting norms, thereby making it easier to tackle grand\ncorruption over the longer term. What’s more, it is possible to tackle petty corruption inexpensively,\nsuch as by sending plain-clothes police officers to government agencies.\n\nINSTITUTING REQUIRED CODES OF ETHICS AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS\nArmenia should ensure that all government employment contracts require signing of codes of ethics and\ncompliance with disclosure requirements regarding assets, tax records, and conflicts of interest. This\nprocess has begun (OECD, 2018), but could be developed further to include more than special\ncategories of staff and entrench the norms of ethical behavior. Even if internal audits are not effective at\nstemming corruption, the signing of the code of ethics should leave corrupt government employees\nvulnerable to prosecution through external audits.\n\n\n\n 3.4. SEQUENCING OF ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS OR ACTIONS\nThere is a robust debate in the academic literature about sequencing, with famous scholars eschewing\nsequencing formulas (e.g., Carothers, 2002, 2007; Diamond et al., 2014). Nevertheless, these critiques\nrelate more to the supposed existence of unique sequencing formula than about proposing specific\nreforms in sequence for any country. Although there are some roadmaps for addressing corruption\n(e.g., Mungiu-Pippidi, 2018), the advice of Johnston (2014) seems most relevant to the situation of state\ncapture in Armenia. As we highlight in Section 3.2, Armenia needs to open safe political and economic\nspace as a first priority, while encouraging reform activism as a second priority.\n\n\n2015).\n36 As Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) show in their audit study of hospitals in Argentina, the threat of an audit can deter\n\ncorrupt behavior. However, audits only work for a short time if authorities do not continue them.\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 23\n"   
## [27] "Perhaps the most promising measure of those that we highlight in Section 3.3 is that concerning\nengagement with SME associations that can foster collective action against corruption. Armenia has\nrecently made some progress on the World Bank Doing Business index (2019) that measures regulatory\nchallenges to business operation, but it is unclear that foreign direct investment substitutes for the role\nof domestic SMEs. For example, even powerful outside firms such as the French supermarket giant\nCarrefour have experienced great difficulties attempting to operate in Armenia (Paturyan and Stefes,\n2017). Accordingly, and given that corruption is at its very nature a behavioral norm (Fisman and\nGolden, 2017), the challenge to oligarchs must come from within. At least at first, actors with collective\naction potential and financial resources such as SME associations will be critical in leading the way.\n\nIn terms of other priorities, we would recommend that Armenia next institute the randomized and\nfrequent audits as well as the campaign on petty corruption, led by plain clothes police officers. With\nrespect to petty corruption, especially since the success of Armenia’s recent police reform is mixed\n(Shahnazarian and Light, 2018), it will be necessary to ensure that the police will not use their positions\nto extract bribes themselves (see Khan et al., 2016). With regard to audits, news reports suggest that\nUSAID has a fruitful relationship with the Armenian Audit Chamber, and that the Audit Chamber is\nopen to instituting reforms.37 Therefore, we see randomized audits as a feasible priority.\n\nAfter undertaking or at least starting the above reforms, then we would advocate focusing on\ntransparency-related measures. We suggest undertaking transparency-related reforms last because in\nsituations of state capture, knowing more about corruption can lead to demobilization of the masses\n(Bauhr and Grimes, 2014) as well as the elites (Croke et al., 2016). Of these transparency-related\nmeasures, the first set of priority measures are those regarding codes of ethics and disclosures relating\nto assets, conflicts of interest, and, lastly, tax policy transparency. As a final step, we would suggest that\nArmenia bolster its efforts to design a robust law and transparency portal for freedom of information\nrequests.\n\n\n\n\n37 See: http://old.armradio.am/en/2018/05/30/usaid-and-audit-chamber-of-armenia-to-cooperate/\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 24\n"   
## [28] " 4. RULE OF LAW\n 4.1. WHAT DOES THE BROADER LITERATURE ON TRANSITIONS\n (GLOBALLY) SAY ABOUT RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES WITH RULE\n OF LAW REFORMS?\nDecades of experience with political transition around the world have come to undermine the notion\nthat there might be any sort of “one-size-fits-all” universalism available to build robust political\ninstitutions and democratic practices (Rodrik, 2007). Failures and setbacks in rule of law reform\nprocesses are regularly traced back to badly designed strategies, coupled with insufficient and ineffective\nimplementation that cut programs off at the knees (Channell, 2006; Carothers, 2007; Stiglitz, 1998,\n2002). Poor outcomes have been associated with a means- rather than ends-approach to rule of law\n(Kleinfeld, 2012; Jensen and Heller, 2003), when actors build their strategy around setting up particular\nformal institutions rather than accomplishing particular goals (Mendelski, 2018). The general consensus\nis that a one-size-fit-all approach should be replaced with the notion that there are a variety of models\navailable and experimentation with institutional configurations is important (Bugarič, 2015a; Orenstein,\n2013; Sherman, 2009). The influence of history, culture, and previous institutions on rule of law reform\ntrajectories can be harnessed in the service of reform rather than being detrimental, especially if reform\nefforts rely in large part on domestic political and civil society actors (Mendelski, 2018; Prado and\nTrebilcock, 2009).\n\nDonor heterogeneity can prove a challenge in rule of law reform processes as well. For example, in\nrecent years the European Union and World Bank have prioritized judicial capacity building (Anderson,\nBernstein and Gray, 2005), which is generally defined as improving the ability of judges and those in the\nlegal system to do their jobs competently, whether through improving knowledge, skills, resources, or\neasing constraints that hamper them. The European Court of Human Rights has emphasized fair trials;\nthe Council of Europe has stressed improved judicial review (Mendelski, 2015), impartiality, and training;\nand the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has focused on law and order and\nminority rights (Mendelski, 2018). While all laudable goals, incoherence across missions of different\ninstitutions can undermine progress on any given goal, making rule of law reforms “complex, expensive,\nand challenging” (Mendelski, 2018). This point is aptly captured by one commentary that notes actors in\nthe rule-of-law-promotion field include “an army of multilateral and international agencies, lawyers,\nprivate foundations, legal and development consulting firms, human rights and civil society activists,\ngovernments, armed forces, and aid providers” (Mooney et al., 2010).\n\nIn general, organizing free and democratic elections is easier than creating constitutional democracy\nbased on the rule of law (Bugarič, 2015b). Citizens in new democracies may turn out to the polls but\nmay be less supportive of broader, necessarily more amorphous rule of law reforms (Bugarič, 2015a).\nYet we know that institutions, norms, and practices can be more effective than law on the books\n(Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer, 2000; La Porta, Rafael et al., 1999). So, buy-in from citizens is crucial to\nmoving from de jure to de facto rule of law reforms.\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 25\n"   
## [29] " 4.2. WHAT DOES THE REGIONAL (POST-SOVIET, EASTERN EUROPE)\n LITERATURE SAY? WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM SUCCESSFUL\n EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN SIMILAR\n CONTEXTS?\nIn the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, rule of\nlaw institutions began on a particularly shaky footing. Concepts including courts, media, human rights\norganizations, and even the idea of an ombudsman did not have established transitions in those systems\n(Bugarič, 2015a). The notable lack of institutional history among new countries in the region—whether\nsince the inter-war period, before World War I, or ever—is what sets their experiences apart from\nother transition settings in Latin America and elsewhere in the world (Bugarič, 2015a). Thus, a focus in\non the experiences and successes in the region can best help us understand the potential for rule of law\nreform in Armenia today.\n\nSince the 1990s, successful efforts to reform political institutions in the region generally bifurcated\nbetween Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Central and Eastern\nEuropean countries most proximate to Western Europe benefited from buy-in from the European\nUnion and targeted, special support in accession processes (Roland, 2000). The Baltics stood out among\ncountries born of the former Soviet Union as particularly successful in reforming their political\ninstitutions, not to mention their economic success. They, too, benefited from early buy-in from the\nEuropean Union, which specifically supported those countries it could most reasonably see, from an\nearly stage, as likely to accede to the European Union. A wide literature has analyzed the success of the\nCzech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and other countries in the first wave of European Union\nenlargement (Ekiert and Hanson, 2003; Vachudova, 2005; Grabbe, 2006; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008;\nLevitz and Pop-Eleches, 2010; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Levitz and Pop-Eleches, 2010), but we\nemphasize their proximity to the European Union and their ability to accede as an uncontroversial point\nthat makes them less relevant to Armenia’s experience.\n\nIn contrast, countries of the former Soviet Union have been considerably less successful with rule of law\nreforms. Also part of this less successful group are the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the west\nBalkans. Mendelski (2018) summarizes the literature on rule of law in transition and lists a set of\nvariables he sees as common to these less successful cases: politicized judicial systems; “defective”\nconstitutional review; weak separation of powers; weak or ineffective horizontal accountability of\ninstitutions; insufficient judicial capacity; judicial corruption; and low-quality legislation (Mendelski, 2015;\nPridham, 2005; Magen and Morlino, 2008; Mendelski, 2009).\n\nWe narrow our focus to a few countries that we see as most relevant to Armenia’s potential for rule of\nlaw reforms. First, we see the experiences of the countries in the second post-communist enlargement\nof the European Union—Romania and Bulgaria—as providing important points of comparison. This is\nbecause their delay was specifically about problems with rule of law, which made the European Union\nworried about its ability to maintain high democratic, rule-of-law standards within the boundaries of the\nEuropean Union (see discussion below). Second, we see the rule of law reform process in Georgia as\nthe most notable success that provides the most parallels to Armenia’s experience. Third, and in\ncontrast, we see setbacks in Ukraine as providing an important cautionary tale relevant to Armenia. We\nreview these countries’ experiences in the next sections.\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 26\n"   
## [30] "ROMANIA AND BULGARIA\nThe entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union was delayed; they constituted the next\nwave of expansion in 2007. Poverty in Romania and Bulgaria was one sticking point for the European\nUnion, as was the depth of corruption in their political systems (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008). The lack\nof independence of the judiciary and overall weakness of rule of law were popularly understood as key\npriorities that needed to be addressed for accession to take place. In general, as tension between judicial\nand political elites increased, the European Union took on more authority in implementing judicial\nindependence monitoring in Romania and Bulgaria (Coman, 2014). In particular, the European Union\nchanged its strategy and implemented a new policy in December 2006, called the Mechanism for\nCooperation and Verification (MCV). This allowed the European Union a means to accept the accession\nof Romania and Bulgaria, in January 2007, without denying their continued problems with the judiciary\nand corruption (Coman, 2014; Country Report: Bulgaria, 2011). Romania was given specific benchmarks\nregarding the fight against corruption as well as judicial reform. Bulgaria was given benchmarks regarding\ncorruption, judicial reform, and organized crime. Those benchmarks are detailed in Table 5. Romania\nand Bulgaria were to report on progress on these benchmarks in reports every six months after\naccession.\n\nThe European Union retained the right to suspend membership privileges for Romania or Bulgaria if\nthey were not assessed to have made sufficient progress on these benchmarks, although the European\nUnion has never done so (Trauner, 2009). Issues of corruption and weak rule of law continue to be of\nconcern in Romania and Bulgaria and to drive political dynamics within the European Union. In the\ncontext of this report, however, we highlight these benchmarks to illustrate the kinds of demands that\nthe European Union made. In particular, these benchmarks include few specific institutional\nrecommendations. That is, they are focused more on rule of law as an outcome rather than proscribing\ncertain institutions as the means to achieve that outcome. They also provide a mix of focus on bigger,\nharder to quantify goals, such as fighting corruption in local government, and specific, easier to measure\ngoals, like publishing the results of reform processes. We know that the success of rule of law reforms,\nlike any reform program, is tied to context, and that structural factors can generate divergence between\nthe experiences even of neighbors implementing otherwise similar strategies (Mendelski, 2015; Bugarič,\n2015b). The European Union attempted to strike a balance between providing flexibility in achieving\ngood rule of law outcomes, allowing for context to drive specific institutional forms, and providing key\nguidance on measurable goals as well as monitoring (Spendzharova and Vachudova, 2012).\n\nTABLE 5: BENCHMARKS38\n\nRomania Ensure a more transparent, and efficient judicial process, notably by enhancing the\n capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor\n the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes.\n Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets,\n incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions\n on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken.\n Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan\n investigations into allegations of high-level corruption.\n Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within\n the local government.\n\n\n\n\n38 Sources: European Commission (2007a and 2007b).\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 27\n"   
## [31] "Bulgaria Adopt constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the\n independence and accountability of the judicial system.\n Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and implementing a\n new judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. Report on the impact of\n these new laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the\n pre-trial phase.\n Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism,\n accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the\n results annually.\n Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of\n high-level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the\n publication of assets of high-level officials.\n Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the borders\n and within local government.\n Implement a strategy to fight organized crime, focusing on serious crime, money\n laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on\n new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas.\n\n\n\nWe also note the implication of these benchmarks in terms of the sequencing of reforms. Surely, the\nEuropean Union was constrained politically in terms of allowing Romania and Bulgaria to accede when\nthey did in 2007, as further delay carried threats for the European project (Vachudova, 2009).\nNonetheless, the European Union had prioritized using its leverage over these countries to push for\ninvestigations into high-level corruption before accession, as well as professionalization specifically in\nterms of non-partisan investigations, requiring continued effort on those fronts in the benchmarks. It had\nnot prioritized issues of transparency, reforms to civil procedure, and efficiency, as evidenced by the\nmore extensive demands the European Union made on these fronts in the benchmarks (without noting\nthat reforms would be “building on progress”). However, we advise caution in extrapolating whether\nsuch an ordering would be useful for Armenia. One can understand, politically, why the European Union\nwould want prominent corruption cases to be rooted out prior to accession, as allowing that into the\nEuropean Union could undermine the legitimacy of the pre-existing European project. But Armenia faces\nthe need to build legitimacy itself, which might exactly suggest delaying politically fraught trials of high-\nlevel corruption in exchange for more mundane, but easier-to-accomplish, procedural reforms. As\nreflected in the rest of this report, and our Governance Evidence Review (USAID, 2018), building on\nsuccess can be a useful general guide to sequencing.\n\nGEORGIA\nObservers agree that Georgia has made a stark turn-around in its rule of law and has corruption under\ncontrol; as of 2018, is near the level of democracy of post-communist countries that joined the\nEuropean Union (Aslund, 2018). Chapter 5 of Georgia’s 1995 constitution outlines judicial power. One\ninnovation in the constitution is that the establishment of ad hoc courts is prohibited, because there was\na fear that ad hoc courts could be abused especially with regard to human rights (Gogiberidze et al.,\n2015). In 1999, Georgia adopted new legislation governing civil, administrative, company, and criminal\nlaw. Once implemented this freed the judiciary “from control, dependence, and subordination to the\nexecutive branch of government” (Gogiberidze et al., 2015). Georgia also created appeals courts and\nchanged its Supreme Court into a court of cassation, that reviews only the legalities of appeals decisions\nand not the merits. Taken together, the reforms addressed “peculiarities of the Soviet court system”\nthat still exist in countries through the post-Soviet space. In particular, as discussed in Gogiberidze et al.\n(2015): (1) Prosecutors no longer have oversight over the courts. (2) The Chairman of the Supreme\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 28\n"   
## [32] "Court no longer has supervisory review over lower court decisions, which means that the Chairman can\nno longer of her/his own will choose to overturn long-since decided cases. This creates legal certainty\nand ends the problem of “never finished” disputes. (3) An administrative law chamber hears citizen\nappeals over the actions of state bodies. (4) The Supreme Court can no longer issue plenum resolutions,\nor normative resolutions that are binding on lower courts. (5) The court process is transparent, with a\nMedia Group at the Supreme Court that is staffed by mass media and civil society representatives. As\nthese improvements became institutionalized, perceptions of rule of law improved markedly in Georgia\nover the 2000s.\n\nRule of law practices further improved in 2013, after parliamentary elections brought the Georgian\nDream-led government into power. In particular parliament reformed the High Council of Justice\n(HCoJ), which has the authority to appoint or dismiss judges and initiate disciplinary proceedings against\njudges. There are 15 members of the HCoJ, which is led by the Chairman of the Supreme Court.\nPreviously, the Chairman controlled candidate nominations. Now, six members are elected by secret\nballot in parliament, from candidates nominated by legal NGOs, law schools, and the Georgian Bar\nAssociation. The remaining eight members are judges elected by secret ballot in the judiciary’s self-\ngoverning body, the Conference of Judges. Also in 2013, judges changed from holding ten-year terms to\nlifetime appointments following a probationary three-year period and evaluation by one judge and one\nnon-judge member of the HCoJ. This change was more controversial, receiving some pushback from\ninternational observers. Additionally, note that Georgia is in the process of moving from a presidential\nto a parliamentary system. In 2020, elections will be based on proportional representation with a 3\npercent threshold, increasing to a 5 percent threshold in 2024.\n\nIn terms of takeaways from Georgia’s experiences, Georgia’s decisions have moved very closely\ntogether with suggestions made by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, formally the European\nCommission for Democracy through Law. The Venice Commission was established in 1990 and has\nmade a considerable effort to promote rule of law reforms throughout its member states that include\nmost of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and many countries of the former Soviet Union.\nThe Venice Commission primarily provides states with legal advice via legal opinions on draft legislation\nor existing legislation, both of its own volition and in response to requests from member states (Venice\nCommission, 2014). The Venice Commission issues overall opinions as well, such as its “Rule of Law\nChecklist,” which prioritizes: de jure institutions; de facto legal certainty; preventing abuse of executive\npowers; equality before the law and non-discrimination; access to justice; fair trials; preventing\ncorruption; and collecting data (Rule of Law Checklist, 2016). Georgia has repeatedly worked with the\nVenice Commission over the years and has taken the Venice Commission’s advice very seriously\n(Hoffmann-Riem, 2014), although the Venice Commission did note that the probationary period for\njudges before lifetime appointments is “problematic” (Gogiberidze et al., 2015). In our view, the\ncoordination between Georgia and the Venice Commission is worthy of emulation as Armenia\nundergoes reforms.\n\nFor further discussion of the experience of Georgia, we refer the reader to the Governance Evidence\nReview also under this tasking (USAID, 2018) and the sections of this evidence review focused on\nIntegrity Systems.\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 29\n"   
## [33] "UKRAINE\nAslund, a prominent scholar of post-communist political and economic transition, sees “a battle of two\nsystems” in Ukraine: “democracy with rule of law or authoritarianism with pervasive corruption”\n(Aslund, 2018). He and others have documented how democracy rule of law has been losing the battle\nin Ukraine even in the immediate wake of its 2006 popular push for government reform. Observers see\nthat domestic “veto players” have been the problem. Veto players are actors in the political arena that\nare able to deny, or veto, a change and therefore continue the status quo (Tsebelis, 2002). Another way\nto characterize the problem is one of state capture, in which individuals, groups, or firms in the private\nor public sectors can influence the formulation and implementation of law “to their own advantage as a\nresult of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials” (World Bank,\n2000, xv). We describe the situation in Ukraine here as a cautionary tale for Armenia. Note that a\nsimilar story holds in Moldova since its population organized in pursuit of government reform:\n“Moldova’s pro-democracy and pro-European ruling coalition has been unable to implement effectively\nmuch-needed reforms” due to state capture (Tudoroiu, 2015, 655).\n\nPetrov and Serdiuk (2008) focus on the domestic veto players that were able to stop change in Ukraine,\nwho they identify as “bureaucrats, extremist political parties, and the political elite supported by strong\nindustrial and financial capital” (222). The problem after Ukraine’s social movement activity in 2006 was\nthat these kinds of actors were present in the coalition that emerged, and they were resistant to\ndemocratization and rule of law reforms for fear of losing their privileged economic and political\npositions. The result, in a nutshell, was that “rule adoption proved to be very difficult for Ukraine”\n(221). Veto players specifically focused on maintaining their control over the judiciary and the police in\nthe post-transition period. Policy reforms in those areas was mostly limited to some action regarding\nadministrative capacity to combat corruption and reform the police (Petrov and Serdiuk, 2008).\n\n(Kuzio, 2016, 703-704) specifically blamed several phenomena for the lack of progress in rule of law\nreform after the 2006 social movement inspired changes. First, prosecutors and other high-ranking legal\nofficials were kept in place as “guarantors of immunity” for politicians and oligarchs that were tied to the\nousted regime. Without personnel turnover, reformers found little support within the judiciary. Second,\nthe popular push for government reform continued to use “opaque backroom deals,” a longstanding\nfeature of “Ukraine’s political and judicial life,” which undermined broader calls for transparency and\nformalization. Third, Kuzio claims a “contemptuous attitude to citizens” among “Ukraine’s not-so-post-\nSoviet ‘elites’...[who] are narcissistic, unwilling to listen, and arrogant.” Relatedly, Burlyuk (2015) reports\n“a low demand for (the rule of) law among Ukrainian political and business elites, legal professionals and\nthe wider population” which exposes “obstacles to meaningful legal change at the level of power\nstructures, professional and popular social norms” (Burlyuk, 2015, 1). Suffice it to say that reforms\nappear to have been stymied by a disconnect between the popular forces that pushed the transition and\nthe tactics and priorities of the actors who held political power and were capable of pushing reform.\nAnd, the Ukrainian citizenry as a whole did not put the same emphasis on rule of law as the specific\npopular forces behind the transition, which eroded the ability of popular pressure to change elite\nbehavior.\n\nNonetheless, we note that external pressure helped Ukraine to enact some “slow and difficult” rule\nadoption. In particular, new European anti-corruption standards helped generate momentum for\nimplementing some anti-corruption legislation in Ukraine. Moreover, the Council of Europe and\nEuropean Union conditionality on aid contributed to adoption of new rules on civil freedoms and human\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 30\n"   
## [34] "rights, including abolition of the death penalty (Petrov and Serdiuk, 2008, 221-222). There is precedent\nthat pressure from international actors can help overcome roadblocks put up by veto players.\n\n 4.3. BEYOND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, WHICH INSTITUTIONS AND\n PRACTICES ARE KEY TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF RULE OF LAW IN\n RELEVANT CONTEXTS? INCLUDING:\n\nCOURT EFFICIENCY/ADMINISTRATION\nIn several countries, the process of building up efficient, well-administered courts has been associated\nwith the development of specific formal institutions. For example, Hungary and Poland each created a\nNational Judicial Council (NJC) to ensure the independence of the judiciary, while at the same time\ncreating a new, formal hierarchy to help with the efficiency of court organization and administration by\nmoving oversight from the Ministry of Justice to the NJCs (Coman, 2014; Bobek, 2007; Fleck, 2012).\nSome see it as a mistake that the Czech Republic did not make the same kind of institutional change\n(Coman, 2014; Bobek, 2007).\n\nKyrgyzstan provides an example of a coordinated, holistic effort by actors throughout society coming\ntogether to improve judicial administration as part of the bigger push for reforming rule of law. While\nthere was not much progress on rule of law reforms in the wake of the 2005 social movement inspired\ngovernment reforms, substantial rule of law reform attempts have taken place in recent years. In 2012,\nby presidential decree, a “Council on Judicial Reform” was organized that included leaders of all\nparliamentary factions; representatives of the judicial and executive branch; legal experts; academics; and\ncivil society representatives. The Council was tasked with drafting proposals on priority areas of judicial\nreform, including the organization and internal procedures of courts as well as law enforcement agency\nactivity. The Council developed task forces to create new versions of the criminal code; the criminal\nprocedural code; the civil procedural code; the penal code; and the civil code on misdemeanors. They\nalso drafted a law “On enforcement procedures and the status of enforcement agents,” “On legal aid\nguaranteed by the state,” and laws on the responsibility of judges. This considerable amount of work\nwas done over several years.\n\nIn 2015, draft bills were brought to parliament. International agencies, including the UN Development\nProgram, supported this work throughout the process (UNDP, 2015). Our interpretation is that the\ncoordinated efforts and buy-in from across the political spectrum contributed to the speed and\neffectiveness of this Council. It also appears that the concepts of efficiency and administration were\nnested within the greater reform effort, and that actors in Kyrgyzstan at least did not see them as\nreasonably hived off into a separate set of goals divorced from updating the content of the law.\n\nIn the post-Soviet Baltic countries, fraught relations with the Russian ethnic minorities have led\nreformers to in many ways exclude ethnic Russians from political and judicial systems (Mendelski, 2016;\nKalnins, 2014; Council of Europe: European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, 2008; Steen,\n2010). This allowed reformers to maximize efficiency by avoiding detrimental political competition and\nthe fragmentation of institutions, but at the expense of inclusion. Of course, Armenia’s society is marked\nby its homogeneity, although the Russian language remains important as the most common second\nlanguage and often the one spoken by elites. In general, we emphasize that any exclusionary policies\nwould trade off efficiency against broader democratic principles.\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 31\n"   
## [35] "BAR ASSOCIATION DEVELOPMENT\nIn Armenia, the 2004 Law on Advocacy first established admission to the bar as a prerequisite for\npracticing law (Urumova, 2008). It merged three preexisting bar associations into a single, unified bar,\nthe Chamber of Advocates. In general, the notion of creating a unified professional society, especially in\nthe legal field, has widespread and longstanding support in the literature (Merton, 1958; Smokler, 1983;\nSullivan, 2015).\n\nPer the 2004 Law, the Chamber of Advocates has objectives including: raising the reputation of the\nprofession among the public; monitoring and ensuring compliance with the Chamber’s Code of\nConduct; coordinating legal education; and providing pro-bono aid. Its 12-member board is elected for\n2-year terms. Observers note that distrust of the judicial system is a pervasive problem in post-\ncommunist countries (Kühn, 2016). Building a strong reputation for the legal profession has been a\npriority in other countries too, for example, Brazil (Cunha et al., 2018). Some go so far as to see the\nunification of the profession, and increasing respect for it, as a goal of a “social movement” that should\nbe prioritized by professional associations (Sullivan, 2015). Raising the stature of legal professionals can\nimprove judicial relations with society as well as foster the next generation of legal professionals\n(Sullivan, 2015).\n\nOne important area in which professional legal associations can contribute is in fulfilling the goal of\nproviding pro-bono legal support. The Armenian constitution guarantees legal assistance to everyone\nand commits that it will be at the state’s expense if so prescribed by law; the criminal and civil code spell\nout the procedures. The Law on Advocacy created the basis for a national Public Defender’s Office,\nwhich is part of the Chamber of Advocates but funded by the state, with attorneys receiving monthly\nsalaries “equal to that of a prosecutor of Yerevan City Community” (Article 45). The Head of the Office\nis elected by secret ballot in the Chamber of Advocates and must have at least 10 years of experience.\nTo date, the Chamber of Advocates relies heavily on donor funds to undertake its mission by, for\nexample, using funds from the American Bar Association and the Council of Europe to facilitate training\ncourses in Yerevan and the regions. According to the USAID/Armenia Mid-Term Evaluation of the\nChamber of Advocates 2007-2011 Strategic Plan Implementation, attorneys have increasing reputations\nin Armenia, and more people are choosing to use licensed attorneys because of increasing\nprofessionalism (Urumova, 2008).\n\nWhat are the best practices for international actors to promote development of bar associations\nabroad? The actions of the Law Society of England and Wales provide some examples: they have done\nletter writing campaigns, awareness-raising activities, institutional partnerships with local bar\nassociations, and rule-of-law development projects that especially network with local NGOs (Waters\nand Barnes, 2010). In Central and Eastern Europe in particular, the European Union and Council of\nEurope have promoted legal communities to provide judges and prosecutors opportunities to socialize,\nexchange views, and share information. Piana (2009) notes that including lawyers and private attorneys\nin these communities would be even more effective in building community to achieve European rule-of-\nlaw goals. We also note that international actors might be able to counter possible local political or\nother resistance to their activities by leaning on the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of\nLawyers (OSCE, 1990). Among other priorities, this document includes emphasis on professional\nassociations providing ongoing training, including ethical training; and a focus on providing legal services\nto all members of society, including rural residents who might otherwise not have access to the\nprofessionalism present in major metropolitan centers.\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 32\n"   
## [36] "LEGAL EDUCATION\nLegal education in Armenia has been improving particularly since 2005, when Armenia joined the\nBologna Declaration on the European Space for Higher Education and launched reforms improving\naccreditation processes and alignment with European standards (Urumova, 2008). However, as of the\nmost recent report we could find in 2008, law schools have little autonomy over setting their\ncurriculum and instead must follow the model approved by the Ministry of Education and Science. The\ncurriculum “remains largely theoretical, with little or no multidisciplinary or practical courses”\n(Urumova, 2008, 5). But, already in 2008 there were content improvements, including that legal writing\nand analysis is part of the Master’s program at the Yerevan State University Law School with plans to\nexpand teaching of it to the Bachelor’s program. Additionally, clinical legal education is expanding\nbeyond Yerevan to the regions. Legal resources are available through published legislation as well as the\nIRTEK database that already in 2008 was becoming “increasingly affordable.”\n\nTo sit for the bar examination in Armenia, a person must have a law degree and two years “employment\nexperience in a legal position” (Law on Advocacy Articles 28 and 29). This employment requirement is\noften met through internships with law firms or solo practitioners. The bar exam includes a written and\noral portion and is administered by the Chamber of Advocates. The Chamber of Advocates has invited\ninternational NGO monitors to observe the bar examination; as reported by the Chamber of\nAdvocates, after its 2007 examination the monitors commended the Chamber “for its effective planning\nand transparent implementation of the examination” (Urumova, 2008, 6). An attorney’s license is\nsuspended if the attorney holds elected office or if the attorney is part of the military.\n\nIn terms of best practices on legal education and its promotion, it is first important to note that many\nobservers highlight the importance of bottom-up, general legal education not just for legal professionals\nbut also in terms of civic education. Bugarič (2015b) and others argue that “a bureaucratic and elite-\ndriven approach to rule-of-law building” contributed to “shallow institutionalization” of rule-of-law\nnorms and practices even in the most successful transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe\n(Bugarič, 2015b; Elbasani and Šabić, 2018; Guasti, Dobovsek and Azman, 2012). Piana (2009), a regular\ncommentator on judicial development in Central and Eastern Europe, argues that judges in the region\nhave become “trans-/supra-nationalized, i.e., domestic judges have become accountable to external ac-\ntors.” This notion contributes to views in the region that include distrust of judges among the general\npublic and superior attitudes of domestic politicians toward judges (Kühn, 2016).\n\nSpecific to legal education for those practicing law, Bugarič (2015a) argues that the combination of\nliberal education and training and strict selection criteria is necessary to guarantee both quality and\nindependence in the judiciary and civil service more generally. Others caution, however, that education\nin a Western-oriented, liberal tradition must be couched within attention to local cultural norms\n(Kraychinskaya, 2016; Magen, 2009; Mooney et al., 2010). Observers note that US-led reforms to legal\neducation have been successful when they have changed the “process rather than the content” of legal\neducation, highlighting and importing the “pragmatic US education style” (Nicola, 2018). For example, in\nBulgaria, success has been achieved with process reforms that address “inherited practices characterized\nby patrimonialism and political clientelism” and emphasize professional standards instead (Delpeuch and\nVassileva, 2016). Smith (2008), a US judge, argues that US judges have been particular good conduits of\nsuch messages as they have conducted rule-of-law education through lectures abroad (Smith, 2008).\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 33\n"   
## [37] "THINK TANK AND CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND SUPPORT\nThe importance of engagement with civil society is a common thread in the literature on rule of law\nreform processes (Elbasani and Šabić, 2018; Schedler, Diamond and Plattner, 1999; Wunsch, 2016;\nGrigorescu, 2006; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010; Joireman, 2016). Observers argue that in the process of\nenlarging the European Union, the speed and conditionality of reforms including rule of law reforms left\nlittle room for the involvement of civil society groups, to the detriment of the process (Bugarič, 2015a).\nHowever, civil society in Croatia broke this mold during its accession procedure: the civil society there\nwas already quite active and was seen to have capitalized on the European Union’s focus on rule of law\nreforms both during and after accession negotiations (Elbasani and Šabić, 2018; Kuris, 2013; Wunsch,\n2016). In contrast, through its ongoing and as-yet-unsuccessful accession negotiations with the European\nUnion, Albanian civil society has not found synergies with the European Union. Albanian civil society,\nwhich receives a considerable amount of foreign funding, has “remained in a vicious cycle of political\nservices and conflict of interest” and thus has not augmented efforts by the European Union to push\njudicial reform (Elbasani and Šabić, 2018; Sampson, 1996; BTI, N.d.).\n\nIn general, donors have moved away from defining civil society as NGOs in particular toward an\ninclusive understanding, including trade unions; faith-based groups; and community groups. However,\ndonors differ in whether they include think tanks, academics, or not-for- profit consulting groups as part\nof the broader conceptualization of civil society. According to the UN Development Program, Norway,\nSweden, and Australia define civil society as “an arena of social interaction,” separate from the state and\nthe market, which tends to exclude more research-based organizations. In contrast, the World Bank,\nthe European Commission, the UK, and Ireland see civil society “as the sum of nongovernmental and\nnot-for-profit organizations” (UNDP, 2012, 6). Best practices with regard to engaging think tanks\nalongside NGOs in civil society thus diverge based on different donor conceptualizations.\n\nIn its 2012 report on Donors’ Civil Society strategies, the UN Development Program highlights the\nstrategy by which Dutch donors engaged in Armenia. In 2006, the World Bank and the Netherlands\ntogether supported the Civil Society Program implemented by the Open Society Institute Assistance\nFoundation Armenia (OSIAFA). OSIAFA in turn funded three partnership member organizations to\nmonitor public procurement processes in Armenia and fight discrimination against marginalized groups.\nInterestingly, the Dutch/World Bank funding to OSIAFA broadly focused on goals related to the\nMillennium Challenge Account (MCA) compact in Armenia, which is the bilateral United States\ndevelopment assistance program started under the Bush Administration in 2002 (UNDP, 2012). In short,\nthe Dutch strategy built directly on American programs, working in concert with the World Bank,\nthrough a local civil society organization, and further through three “subcontracted” civil society\norganizations. Per the UNDP review of donor strategies, such complex engagement with a variety of\ncivil society actors on a given project is not uncommon (UNDP, 2012).\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 34\n"   
## [38] " 4.4. HOW CAN GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS\n WORK TOGETHER MOST EFFECTIVELY TO PROMOTE THE ROL IN\n POST-TRANSITION SETTINGS? WHAT APPROACHES MAY WORK\n BEST IN ARMENIA?\nTo understand what kinds of collaborations may work best in Armenia, we focus here in some depth on\nthe relationship between European institutions and post-communist countries in the region when it\ncomes to rule of law promotion.\n\nObservers credit the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in\nEurope (OSCE) with success in playing “crucial roles in ensuring democratic and transparent elections”\nin post-communist countries (Hamilton and Meister, 2017, 159-160). With regard to improving rule of\nlaw, the CoE and OSCE are credited with “fighting against violations of rights and freedoms of citizens”\nby emphasizing the development of grassroots Armenian civil society organizations (Hamilton et al,\n2017, 159-160). This accords with our general assessment that strong civil society forces in Armenia are\na powerful conduit through which international actors can effect change. It appears that the CoE and\nOSCE’s focus on deploying resources in their expertise of election monitoring, combined with\nsupporting civil society in accomplishing its goals, have made positive impacts.\n\nTotal European Union assistance to Armenia exceeded USD1 billion by 2017 (Hamilton and Meister,\n2017). The European Union has developed its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) program to guide\nits interactions with its near neighbors that are not and will not become part of the European Union.\nAmong post-communist countries, this includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and\nUkraine. The ENP’s main priorities are “good governance, democracy, rule of law, and human rights,”\nwith three additional priorities: “economic development for stabilization; the security dimension; and\nmigration and mobility” (EC, 2016). The ENP highlights that its methods on promoting civil society\nactors in the process of reform and democratization, and particularly local civil society organizations\nthat can engage with local, public authorities (EC, 2016). The overall ENP began in 2003 and was\nreviewed in 2011 after the ‘Arab Spring,’ since the other core set of ENP countries are in North Africa\nand the Middle East. Since around 2015, the revised ENP has focused on a more country-specific,\ndifferentiated approach, as well as increasing the “ownership” that partner country governments (and\nactual European Union member states) have in the actual functioning of the program (EC, 2016). By its\nown evaluation, the European Union sees the best approach to a country like Armenia as one that\nincludes national Armenian government actors in its outreach activities even as it focuses on funding and\nsupporting civil society in its relations with local officials.\n\nSince 2009, the European Union has had an element of ENP called the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which\norganizes relationships with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. In 2014 to 2017, EUR\n2.8 billion European Union funds were distributed to these countries under this program. Since 2015,\nEaP goals are focused on cooperation in four areas: stronger governance, described as “strengthening of\ninstitutions and good governance”; stronger economy; better connectivity; and stronger society (EU,\n2016). The EaP developed a list of “20 deliverables for 2020.” With regard to governance, these were\n(1) to strengthen rule of law and anti-corruption mechanisms, and (2) support the implementation of\nkey judicial reforms, in addition to (3) support the implementation of public administration reform, and\n(12) stronger security cooperation. The European Union has dealt with fallout from European Union\ncitizens and people in these countries that are concerned about the motives and structure of the EaP\nprogram. For example, in a Factsheet on “Myths about the Eastern Partnership,” the European Union\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 35\n"   
## [39] "addresses “MYTH 5: EU money is being lost due to corruption.” The text describes that European\nUnion funds are subject to strict monitoring and reporting procedures and it further emphasizes that\n“the fight against corruption: reform of the judiciary; constitutional and electoral reforms; the overall\nimprovement of the business climate; and reform of public administration” is “one of the top priorities\nsupported by the EU in partner countries” (EU, 2017). In broad strokes, the European Union’s priorities\nalign with many of the priorities being espoused by the post-transition leadership in Armenia. And, the\nEuropean Union has a deep set of institutions organizing relations between it and Armenia while also\nemphasizing support of civil society in its interactions with local public officials.\n\nRecent commentary on the success of the European Union in the Eastern Partnership countries is\nmixed. Some critics point out that there is not a correlation between improvement in rule of law overall\nand the ENP and EaP (Mendelski, 2016; Pridham, 2005; Dimitrov, 2014; Elbasani, 2013; Magen and\nMorlino, 2008; Börzel and Pamuk, 2012; Kalnins, 2014; Mendelski, 2012, 2013; Parau, 2015; Fagan, 2005;\nNoutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Piana, 2009; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2014; Sadurski, 2004). One particular\nconcern is that the European Union’s empowerment of certain domestic elites in the course of its ENP\nand EaP programs have resulted in competition between domestic actors and fragmentation in domestic\ninstitutions (Way, 2015; Higley and Burton, 2006; Higley and Bayulgen, 2003); similar concerns have\nresulted from Russia’s relationships in the region as well (Mendelski, 2016).39\n\nCommentators do see the European Union has achieved success in improving judicial capacity in EaP\ncountries and promoting updates to the written law (Anderson, Bernstein and Gray, 2005). In doing so,\nconditions written into European Union programs have been effective when they take into account\nspecific domestic conditions, particularly historical legacies and political stability, while also making sure\nthat the recipient government has the institutional capacity, administrative capacity, and informal\ninstitutions/norms in place that make success possible (Mendelski, 2018, 2009, 2015; Kühn, 2011; Beers,\n2010; Mendelski and Libman, 2014). Further, the consistency of external donor conditionality (Dallara,\n2014; Sadurski, Czarnota and Krygier, 2006), for example the consistency of the message that the\nEuropean Union prioritizes rule of law reform in EaP countries, is seen as important (Mendelski, 2018,\n2015, 2016; Kochenov, 2008; Dimitrov, 2014; Toneva-Metodieva, 2014). However, improvements to\njudicial capacity and written law have moved alongside what some observers see as declining judicial\nimpartiality, accountability and integrity (Magen and Morlino, 2008; Hipper, 2015; Mendelski, 2012, 2013;\nSchönfelder, 2005; Bobek and Kosar, 2013), although understanding causality and generalizability is\ndifficult (Mendelski, 2015). Nonetheless, one understanding is that a key problem is that change agents\nor veto players have captured reformed judicial structures has created politicization during and after the\nreform process and undermined judicial independence (Mendelski, 2018; Pridham, 2005; Magen and\nMorlino, 2008; Mendelski, 2015; Dallara, 2014; Bozhilova, 2007; Socjologiczne, 2011).\n\nAdditionally, a creative and holistic approach to measurement of progress may be important to success\nin programming in Armenia. Mendelski (2018) sees improvements in rule of law in the EaP countries in\nterms of the “inner quality of law, such as stability, coherence, generality and enforcement\ncharacteristics of laws” (Mendelski, 2018). However, these outcomes are not part of common\nevaluation metrics and are not emphasized in the indicators captured by the World Bank and Freedom\nHouse on which progress is often gauged. The idea of creating a coherent and stable body of law is\n\n\n\n39 Note: Russia has generally empowered different domestic actors than the European Union countries.\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 36\n"   
## [40] "particularly important in post-communist settings like Armenia that, again, have only been operating\nunder the priorities associated with the concept of rule of law since the 1990s.\n\n 4.5. IS THERE A PREFERRED SEQUENCING OF RULE OF LAW REFORMS\n AND STAKEHOLDER ACTIONS IN POLITICAL TRANSITION\n SETTINGS SIMILAR TO ARMENIA?\nWriting on the specific topic of legal reform assistance in post-communist countries, Alkon (2002)\nspecifically decried what she calls “Cookie Cutter Syndrome.” She notes that “there is no magic pill or\nquick road to legal and judicial reforms” (Alkon, 2002). Since 2002, this position has come to occupy the\nmainstream of scholarly and practitioner thought: most analysts express reluctance to make specific\nsequencing advice, even seeing it as counterproductive.\n\nInstead, the literature emphasizes tradeoffs that reformers need to keep in mind during reform\nprocesses rather than specific sequencing advice. In particular, reformers are advised to balance\nindependence and accountability, because successful reform processes must still be developed within the\ncontext of the political system and democratic practices (Coman, 2014). Analysts of European Union\nenlargement claim that the European Union did successfully empower reformers, but those reformers\nwere too unaccountable; as a result, they accumulated power and went on to abuse it (Mendelski, 2015;\nComan, 2014; Kipred, 2011; OSCE, 2009; Sigma Montenegro, 2012; Seibert-Fohr, 2012; OSCE, 2012).\n\nHowever, Alkon (2002) makes an important argument that we see as particularly relevant to the\ncontext of Armenia today. She emphasizes that Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a crucial\ncomponent of any legal reform process in the post-communist world. ADR is dispute resolution outside\nthe context of litigation. In a developed democracy with strong rule of law, ADR would entail parties\nmaking the choice to employ a mediator, arbitration, or another kind of negotiated process to\nadjudicate a dispute rather than using the court system. However, when the court system itself is\nunderdeveloped, Alkon (2002) sees it as important to develop these kinds of ADR alternatives. They can\nbe cheaper, more straightforward, and more in line with other kinds of dispute resolution that already\nexist in the cultural or institutional context of the country. Indeed, Alkon (2002) emphasizes that a legal\nsystem need not be built around dispute resolution through formal litigation in an adversarial setting.\nEven if a country is committed to building rule of law based on a robust, adversarial-based legal system,\nmaintaining and growing ADR options can help fill the gap while formal institutions are being reformed.\nThus, Alkon (2002) makes a strong argument that ADR can reinforce rule of law reforms rather than\nundermine them. Putting resources into ADR throughout the reform process, and especially early in the\nreform process, is therefore important.\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 37\n"   
## [41] " 5. CONCLUSION\nThere are many lessons to be learned from the literature on integrity systems and the rule of law. Each\nsub sector is, of course, difficult to address in its own right. And yet, numerous countries, including\nthose in the region of Armenia, have at least experimented with a variety of reforms. As we discussed in\nthis report, we expect that the following reforms would be very useful to consider:\n\n• Integrity Systems:\n\n − Engagement with Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME) Associations. Engaging with SME\n associations constitutes a particularly promising path to gradually erode state capture in\n Armenia.\n\n − Instituting a lottery system to start with randomized audits would likely be beneficial for\n Armenia. By randomizing the audit schedule and keeping it frequent, the threat of an audit\n could deter corrupt behavior and make audits less susceptible to political forces.\n\n − As we highlight in the Governance Evidence Review also under this tasking (USAID, 2018),\n addressing petty corruption is a less risky way to start an anti-corruption effort. It may be best\n to start any anti-corruption initiatives at the lower level, with the objective of gradually shifting\n norms, thereby making it easier to tackle grand corruption over the longer term.\n\n − Armenia should ensure that all government employment contracts require signing of codes of\n ethics and compliance with disclosure requirements regarding assets, conflicts of interest, and\n tax records, which can be used in conjunction with external audits making those ethics\n commitments enforceable and actionable.\n\n − Addressing transparency too early in the process could be risky because it alerts people to\n problems and deters citizen from taking public action in a situation of state capture. They may\n want to institute transparency reform later in the process.\n\n• Rule of Law\n\n − Reform of the courts to go beyond judicial independence and instead to greater court\n efficiency and administration would likely be important. Numerous positive and negative\n examples, from Kyrgyzstan to the Baltics, illustrate the importance of taking a holistic view, and\n eschewing a pure focus on judicial independence.\n\n − Much attention could be given to the development of Bar Associations that could improve the\n overall quality and commitment of judges to the rule of law in Armenia.\n\n − While legal education has generally improved over the years, greater independence from\n national government standards and directives would be helpful for establishing greater rule of\n law.\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 38\n"   
## [42] " − The Armenian government may want to consider expanded engagement with a variety of civil\n society actors including think tanks and other forward-thinking non-governmental actors.\n Taken together, the collective set of non-governmental actors may encourage greater progress\n towards better governance and democratization.\n\n\n\n\nUSAID.GOV INTEGRITY SYSTEMS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ARMENIA: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW | 39\n"   
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##11

armeniatext=as.data.frame(mytext, stringsAsFactors = FALSE)  
armeniatext$page=c(1:59)  
colnames(armeniatext)[which(names(armeniatext) == "mytext")] <- "text" #change column

##12

armeniatext=armeniatext %>%   
 unnest\_tokens(word, text)  
data(stop\_words)  
armeniatext <- armeniatext %>% anti\_join(stop\_words)

## Joining, by = "word"

##13

armenfreq <- armeniatext %>%   
 count(word, sort = TRUE)  
head(armenfreq)

## word n  
## 1 law 276  
## 2 corruption 242  
## 3 rule 206  
## 4 armenia 195  
## 5 european 105  
## 6 political 102

top 5 = law, corruption, rule, armenia, european

##15

library(dplyr)  
library(rvest)

##   
## Attaching package: 'rvest'

## The following object is masked from 'package:readr':  
##   
## guess\_encoding

hot100exam <- "https://www.billboard.com/charts/hot-100"  
hot100exam <- read\_html(hot100exam)

#16

body\_nodes <- hot100exam %>%   
 html\_node("body") %>%   
 html\_children()  
body\_nodes

## {xml\_nodeset (37)}  
## [1] <div class="header-wrapper ">\n<header id="site-header" class="site-head ...  
## [2] <div class="site-header\_\_placeholder"></div>  
## [3] <script>\n var PGM = window.PGM || {};\n PGM.config = PGM. ...  
## [4] <main id="main" class="page-content"><div id="charts" data-page-title="T ...  
## [5] <div class="ad\_desktop dfp-ad dfp-ad-promo " data-position="promo" data- ...  
## [6] <div class="ad-container footerboard footerboard--bottom">\n <div cla ...  
## [7] <footer id="site-footer" class="site-footer"><div class="container foote ...  
## [8] <div class="biz-modal">\n <div class="biz-modal\_\_content">\n < ...  
## [9] <script>\n window.CLARITY = window.CLARITY || [];\n</script>  
## [10] <div class="ad\_clarity" data-out-of-page="true" style="display: none;">< ...  
## [11] <script>\n\n window.top.pageLevelKeys = {};\n window.top.pageAdZon ...  
## [12] <script type="text/javascript" async="async" data-cfasync="false" src="h ...  
## [13] <script type="text/javascript">\n let detectDevice = function() {\n ...  
## [14] <script src="https://cdn.cookielaw.org/opt-out/otCCPAiab.js" type="text/ ...  
## [15] <script>\n\n function loadEUScript(source, attributes = {}) {\n\n ...  
## [16] <script src="https://geolocation.onetrust.com/cookieconsentpub/v1/geo/lo ...  
## [17] <script src="https://www.billboard.com/assets/1624920239/js/vendors\_/art ...  
## [18] <script src="https://www.billboard.com/assets/1624920239/js/vendors\_/clo ...  
## [19] <script src="https://www.billboard.com/assets/1624920239/js/vendors\_/rea ...  
## [20] <script src="https://www.billboard.com/assets/1624920239/js/vendors\_/rea ...  
## ...

body\_nodes %>%   
 html\_children()

## {xml\_nodeset (9)}  
## [1] <header id="site-header" class="site-header " role="banner"><div class="s ...  
## [2] <div class="header-wrapper\_\_secondary-header">\n<nav class="site-header-l ...  
## [3] <div id="charts" data-page-title="THE HOT 100" data-chart-code="HSI" data ...  
## [4] <div class="footerboard-wrapper">\n <div class="ad\_desktop\_placeho ...  
## [5] <div class="container footer-content">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class="cover-image ...  
## [6] <div class="container">\n\t\t<p class="copyright\_\_paragraph">© 2021 Billb ...  
## [7] <div class="container">\n\t\t<p class="station-identification">\n\t\t\tBI ...  
## [8] <div class="container">\n\t\t\n\n\n <div class="ad\_desktop dfp-ad dfp- ...  
## [9] <div class="biz-modal\_\_content">\n <button class="biz-modal\_\_close ...