


# "Terminal Tiger POMDP"


Problem terminates on/after OL or OR

Infinite Horizon for a terminal action  $U^a(s) = R(s,a)$




OL

OR



$b(TR)$

If you want to relate this to terminal states



$$U^{OL}(s) = R(s, OL) + \gamma U(\text{terminal}) \\ = R(s, OL)$$

$$U(\text{terminal}) \equiv 0$$

Find pure Nash Equilibria:

$(c,c)$  is the only pure Nash equilibrium:

	a	b	c
a			
b			
c			

$$\pi^1(c) = 0.3$$

$$\pi^1(b) = 0.7$$

$$\pi^2(c) = 0.02$$

$$\pi^2(b) = 0.98$$

is a mixed N.E.

PI has to be indifferent

Not the same as above

$$\begin{aligned} 5\pi^2(b) + 6\pi^2(c) &= u \quad \leftarrow \text{payoff for PI playing x} \\ 3\pi^2(b) + 1\pi^2(c) &= u \quad \leftarrow \text{payoff for PI playing y} \\ \pi^2(b) + \pi^2(c) &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

	b	c
x	5, ?	6, ?
y	3, ?	1, ?

	S	T
S	1, 1	3, 0
T	0, 3	2, 2

PI indifferent

PI: S

$$1\pi^2(S) + 3\pi^2(T) = u$$

$$0\pi^2(S) + 2\pi^2(T) = u$$

$$\pi^2(S) + \pi^2(T) = 1$$

$$\pi^2(S) + \pi^2(T) = 0$$

$$\pi^2(S) + \pi^2(T) = 1$$

X

