
Source 1



Official US maps showing the alleged nuclear missile sites in Cuba, October 1962

Source 1 - page 2



Source 2

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CERTAIN OF HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES

By telegraph:

U.K.Mission New York

B.I.S. New York

Washington

[Emergency]

U.K.Del.N.A.T.O.

Moscow

[Priority]

Brussels The Hague Oslo

Belgrade Berne

Helsinki Stockholm Vienna

Bucharest Prague Sofia Warsaw Berne Benghazi UKDIS Geneva Tripoli Tunis Algiers

Cairo

Khartoum Rabat

Addis Ababa Bangkok Djakarta Rangoon Saigon

Tokyo

No. 421 Guidance October 23, 1962

EMERGENCY

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

D. 11.48 a.m. October 24. 1962

Part of a speech by the British Foreign Secretary on the reasons for the crisis in Cuba, October 23rd 1962

Source 2 - page 2

"When an international situation is so tense and so raw as it is following Russia's action in Cuba and the United States response to it the only words which are worth speaking are those which may help to contribute a solution of the problems.

"The first essential is to recognise that international Communism as practised by Russia today is both opportunist and two-faced. We have lately had examples of these two techniques. In the Congo the Russians sought to establish control of that African country, in which few Russians had previously set foot, within a few days of the breakdown of local government. In Cuba they stepped in last year to take advantage of a situation which was already explosive. In Berlin they created a crisis where, but for their action, there was no need for any crisis at all. The purpose of all these adventures is undoubtedly one thing - that is to increase the area of Communist domination. We do not like in this country to believe ill of our neighbours, but the evidence is overwhelming that that is the Communist objective and unless we understand the broad strategy of Communism we will come to the wrong decisions when confronted by individual situations.

- 2 -

"By putting medium-range and intermediate range ballistic missiles into Cuba Russia is deliberately placing her own power in a position to do three things - to threaten the United States, to threaten the Caribbean, and beyond those two, to threaten South America. We must recognize that this is plainly an act of power.

Part of a speech by the British Foreign Secretary on the reasons for the crisis in Cuba, October 23rd 1962

Source 2 - page 3

"I hope the Russians will see in time where their policy is leading. I can promise them this: immediately she settles down to negotiate, Russia will find the most ready response from our government. The President of the United States is clearly looking forward to the day when we can get round the table and work out solutions of all our difficulties in negotiations which are genuine.

"Meanwhile I can only say to our own countrymen that the Prime Minister and myself, upon whom the main burden of docision must fall, will, once we have checked the present fever, play our full part in an attempt to end the cold war and do everything we possibly can to cooperate with all countries, and the Russians if they will come in, in the creative tasks of peace.

"One other alternative is there for us. As I venture to say to the United Nations only a few weeks ago: 'Man is now at the point of choice and the choice is this: whether we blow ourselves to bits or whether we sit down round the table and negotiate and negotiate again, however long that process lasts'.

"That is the choice we have before us today.

Part of a speech by the British Foreign Secretary on the reasons for the crisis in Cuba, October 23rd 1962

Source 3

J.I.C. (62)93(Fins1)

26th October, 1962

IMMEDIATE UK EYES ONLY

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

Object

The object of this short study is to comment on the US assessment of the Soviet offensive build-up in Cubs.

Basis of Assessment

2. The assessment is based entirely on photographic evidence so far released to us by the US authorities. A firm UK assessment is difficult until more basic data is available for detailed study by our own photo-interpreters. Our preliminary comments below are based on the immediate advice of staff officers working in this field who have had a brief opportunity to study some of the more significant original photographic cover. We would like to record here our appreciation of the US authorities for permitting this.

Surface-to-Surface Missile Launch Sites

3. IRBM

- (a) US Position: There are two launch areas located about 25 nm West of Havans, each of four pads, under construction, which might be ready for operational use by early December 1962.
- (b) Comment: If these are IRBM they will have a range of 2200 nm, extending from Hudson Bey through Californis to Lime, and be capable of striking a selection of strategic targets in the USA. We are satisfied that these two launch areas represent surface-to-surface missile sites capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads. On the basis of the evidence available we cannot positively identify the sites as being associated with the 2200 nm missile.

Source 4

Good Evening, My Fellow Citizens:

This government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles -- capable of travelling more than twice as far -- and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

. . .

Acting, therefore, in the defence of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive build-up, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation and port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back

. . .

Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. ... I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing the threat will be recognized.

Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert status.

Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security

. .

Source 4

Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the guarantine can be lifted.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man.

. . .

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months in which both our patience and our will will be tested -- months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing. ...

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right -- not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

Thank you and good night.

Extract from President Kennedy's TV broadcast announcing the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba

Source 5

Comrade Deputies, everyone remembers the tense days of October when mankind was anxiously listening to the news coming from the Caribbean. In those days the world was poised on the brink of a thermonuclear catastrophe. What created this crisis? How did it develop? What lessons must be learned from it? These questions call for a penetrating analysis which will help the peace-loving forces better to understand the obtaining situation and to define their tasks in the struggle for the further maintenance and consolidation of peace. But before passing over to this analysis, I should like to recall how the Cuban Revolution developed and how relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba took shape.

Having raised the banner of the people's anti-imperialist revolution, the freedom-loving Cuban people rallied behind their leader, Fidel Castro, and his comrades-in-arms, and by 1959 had cleared their land of the North American brigands and their accomplices. This was a truely heroic struggle worthy of admiration. The revolution in Cuba was a revolution of the working people and for the working people. In a brief

Relations of sincere friendship based on equality, respect for sovereignty and economic co-operation were established between the Soviet Union and Cuba from the very first few days of her new life. We could not fail to stretch out the hand of assistance to the Cuban people, our brothers in toil, our class brothers. The importance

Flouting generally accepted standards of international relations, the reactionary forces of the USA, from the first day of the victory of the Cuban revolution, have done everything to overthrow Cuba's Revolutionary Government and to restore their domination there. They broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, were and are conducting subversive activity, and established an economic blockade of Cuba.

Seeking to Justify its aggressive actions, American reaction is repeating that the crisis in the Caribbean was allegedly created by Cuba herself, adding that blame rests also with the Soviet Union, which shipped there rockets and IL-28 bombers. But is this so? It is true that we sent arms there at the request of the Cuban Government. But what motives guided us in so doing? Exclusively humanitarian motives. Cuba needed weapons as a means of deterring aggressors, and not as a means of attack. For Cuba was under a real threat of invasion.

Some people pretend that the rockets were supplied by us for an attack on the USA. This, of course, is not sensible reasoning. Why should we station rockets in Cuba for this purpose when we were and are able to strike from our own territory, possessing as we do the necessary number of intercontinental missiles of the required range and power?

The developments in the Caribbean confirmed that there was a threat of such aggression, By 20th October a large-scale build-up of US naval and air forces, paratroops and Marines had begun in the south of the USA, at the approaches to Cuba. The US Government sent reinforcements to its naval base at Guantanamo, situated on Cuban territory, Big military maneeuvres were announced in the Caribbean. In the course of these "manoeuvres" a landing was to be made on the island of Vieques. On 22nd October the Kennedy Administration announced a quarantine of Cuba. The word "quarantine", by the way, was merely a fig leaf in this case. Actually it was a blockade, piracy on the high seas.

Extracts from a speech by Soviet leader Khrushchev in December 1962 covering the causes and consequences of the Cuban Crisis

Source 6

The first time I fell in love with poetry - Mr Valentine was reading Keats 'La belle Dame Sans merci' out loud to us. We were in our third year, none of us 15 yet, and we were 'walking in the valley of the shadow of death'; I remember thinking just that , in just those words out of the psalm on the way to the school that morning. It was the time of the Cuba crisis and everybody was scared, even the grown-ups. No-one on the bus talked much, but those who did talked about nothing else and everyone's face was grim. On a placard outside the newsagents, black block capitals spelled WAR INEVITABLE. Even the newsreaders on television looked scared when they talked about 'the grave international situation'. As Mr Valentine read to us about ... the lake where no birds sang - out of the flat normal November sky behind his head we really expected that death. And the bombs might come falling. The poem hurt us. Everyone in the class felt it, even the science boys and the maths geniuses who hated English, and the sporty class captain and Mr Valentine himself. You could feel it in the silence and the shared held breath when the voice stopped.

One person's memories of the Cuban Crisis in October 1962

Source 7

Cuba (Previous Reference: C.C. (62) 62nd Conclusions, Minute 3) *2. The Prime Minister said that during the preceding days he had been in close consultation with President Kennedy about the development of the Cuban situation. In retrospect it was evident that the President had played his hand with great skill; he had in fact turned the usual Communist methods against themselves by observing to the full the proprieties of international consultation, e.g., in the United Nations, but by showing at the same time an unwavering determination to attain his objective of securing the removal of the offensive missiles from Cuba, with the implication that he would not shrink from the use of force in the last resort.

opinion had been calling for violent measures. President Kennedy had steered a difficult course between being driven into a premature use of force and appearing to waver in his determination. While reluctant to authorise an invasion of Cuba, he had shown great firmness in continuing to make preparations for it.

The Foreign Secretary said that if the United States had attacked Cuba there could be little doubt that the Soviet Government would have reacted in Berlin. There would then have been a real and immediate risk of nuclear war. In the public presentation of recent events it would be important to avoid engendering overoptimism. It would be necessary to point out that both the major

on disarmament, whether nuclear or conventional. A particular danger here was that the sense of relief engendered by the solution of the Cuban crisis might lead to demands for the elimination of nuclear weapons as the first stage of any disarmament plan. The West could not accept this, since it would leave a clear field to the massive conventional superiority of the Communist Powers: at all stages of any disarmament plan nuclear and conventional disarmament would have to be considered together. An agreement on missile bases would also present difficulty, since all the Russian bases of any importance were on their own soil. In short it would be necessary to point out realistically that the chances of international agreement on major issues had not been improved, but might have become worse because the West had more reason to be suspicious of Communist professions of good faith. The situation would of course be transformed if, on the basis of the Cuban precedent, the Soviet Government were now to accept the principle of verification on a wider front.

Extract from the minutes of a meeting of the British War Cabinet in March 1919. This extract contains comments from Winston Churchill about the situation in Russia at that time