


# Political Polarization and Fractionalisation from Rational Values-Based Inference in an Agent-Based Graph Network

Nicolas Navarre, Julie Pedersen, Adam Moore

## Background

- Political polarization is identity-based<sup>1-3</sup>
- Political identities can be communicated through signals<sup>4,5</sup> → **signal mechanism** (e.g., moral values) required to
  - mediate **signal generation** and **inference**
  - update as a function of **self** and **social influence**
- **Moral values** as a signal mechanism: they are (a) distinct for liberals and conservatives<sup>6-13</sup> (b) malleable<sup>14-15</sup>, (c) sensitive to ingroup alignment<sup>16</sup>, and (d) facilitate political communication<sup>17-2</sup>

## Methods



### Moral Value inference :

#### Individual:

$$\alpha_{i, m, t+1} = \alpha_{i, m, t} + \sum_a \begin{cases} \frac{1}{N-1} e^{-w_{i \rightarrow a, m, t}}, & \text{if } S_{a, t-1} = m \\ \delta_{S_{a, t-1}=m}, & \text{if } a = i \end{cases}$$


$$\beta_{i, m, t+1} = \beta_{i, m, t} + \sum_a \begin{cases} \frac{1}{4(N-1)} e^{-w_{i \rightarrow a, m, t}}, & \text{if } S_{a, t-1} \neq m \\ \frac{1}{4} \delta_{S_{a, t-1} \neq m}, & \text{if } a = i \end{cases}$$

#### Other agents:

$$\alpha_{i \rightarrow a, m, t+1} = \begin{cases} \alpha_{i \rightarrow a, m, t} + 1, & \text{if } S_{a, t} = m \\ \alpha_{i \rightarrow a, m, t}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


$$\beta_{i \rightarrow a, m, t+1} = \begin{cases} \beta_{i \rightarrow a, m, t} + \frac{1}{4}, & \text{if } S_{a, t} \neq m \\ \beta_{i \rightarrow a, m, t}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

## Results



## Research questions

1. Can we use an agent-based graph network to measure group homogeneity through moral values-based inference?
2. How do group-level moral values change over time between political identities in this formulation?
3. How do initial latent moral identities influence ability to find groups of similar moral values?



### Simulation Details

- 50 simulations:  
Number of agents:  $N \sim \text{Normal}(100, 15)$ ; 1500 time steps
- Initial **moral values** randomly assigned from MFQ responses evenly split between conservative and liberal responses –other agents were assigned random priors
- **Signals** were generated by selecting largest **moral values** sample between two competing moral values (dilemma)
- Each agent observes all other agent and **infers** both **individual** and **other agents**' moral values
- Individual agents are **influenced** by their own generated **signals**

### Discussion

- Total group homogeneity is possible contrary to previous results using rational inference tools and previous moral value<sup>22-23</sup>
- Graph clustering may be a viable path for measuring dynamically changing groups

### Future Directions

1. Evaluate effect of self-influence
2. Incorporate explicit ingroup inference
3. Update signaling process to include more complex decision patterns (e.g., maximize ingroup homogeneity)

### Conservative

