**CONCLUSIONS**

Our primary goal in this paper was to design a mechanism to induce a GNE solution in the misinformation filtering game, where (i) each platform agrees to participate voluntarily, and (ii) the collective utility of the government and the platforms is maximized. We designed a mechanism and proved that it satisfies these properties along with budget balance. We also presented an extension of the mechanism with weaker technical assumptions.

Ongoing work focuses on improving the valuation and average trust functions of the social media platforms based on data. We also consider incorporating uncertainty in a platform’s estimates of the impact of their filter. These refinements of the modeling framework will allow us to make our mechanism more practical for use in the real world.

Future research should include extending the results of this paper to a dynamic setting in which the social media platforms react in real-time to the proposed taxes/subsidies. In particular, someone could develop an algorithm that the players can use to iteratively arrive at the Nash equilibrium. In such an algorithm, the social planner can receive additional information from the players while they iteratively learn the GNE. Then, she can use this information to change her allocations dynamically, allowing us to relax either Assumption 5 on monitoring of average trust, or Assumption 6 on the excludability of the platforms.