


CS 310: Algorithms

Lecture 2

Instructor: Naveed Anwar Bhatti



Chapter 1: Introduction and Some Representative Problems

Unstable pair

- Def. Given a perfect matching M , course instructor c and a TA applicant a form an **unstable pair** if both
 - c prefers a to the assigned TA
 - a prefers c to the assigned course

$$M = \{(CS100 - \text{Charlie}), (CS200 - \text{Bob}), (CS300 - \text{Alice})\}$$

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

Course instructors' preference list

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	
Alice		CS 200	CS 100	CS 300
Bob		CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

TA applicants' preference list

(CS100 – Bob) and (CS100 – Alice) are unstable pair

Unstable pair – Through Bipartite Graph

- Def. Given a perfect matching M , course instructor c and a TA applicant a form an **unstable pair** if both
 - c prefers a to the assigned TA
 - a prefers c to the assigned course

$$M = \{(CS100 - \text{Charlie}), (CS200 - \text{Bob}), (CS300 - \text{Alice})\}$$

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

Course instructors' preference list

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob		CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

TA applicants' preference list


(CS100 – Bob) and (CS100 – Alice) are unstable pair

Unstable pair – Through Bipartite Graph

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100	CS 300
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

$$M = \{(CS100 - Charlie), (CS200 - Bob), (CS300 - Alice)\}$$



(CS100 – Bob) and (CS100 – Alice) are unstable pair



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob
CS 200	Bob	Alice

1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200

But first...

A brown circular icon containing the text "CS300" in white.



Charlie



More Administrivia...

We can have **Surprise Quizzes**

*if attendance drops below 50%



Assignments will be **individuals**

Assignments will be **non-coding** based

TAs almost finalized (*Perfect and Stable-Matching found*)

Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design



1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob
CS 200	Bob	Alice
CS 300	Alice	Bob
		Charlie
		Charlie

1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200
		CS 300

Select Course $c \in C$
 CS 100



Alice



Bob



Charlie

Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100	CS 300
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

Select Course $c \in C$

CS 100



Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c

Alice



Alice



Bob



Charlie

Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob		CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

Select Course $c \in C$


CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c

Alice

If a is free then assign

(CS 100 – Alice)



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

→


	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob		CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

Select Course $c \in C$
 CS 200

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c

If a is free then assign



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

→


	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob		CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

Select Course $c \in C$
 CS 200

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c
 Bob

If a is free then assign



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

Select Course $c \in C$


CS 200

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c

Bob

If a is free then assign

(CS 200 – Bob)



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie




	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

Select Course $c \in C$
 CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c

If a is free then assign



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie


	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



Select Course $c \in C$
CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c
Alice

If a is free then assign



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300




Select Course $c \in C$
CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c
Alice

If a is free then assign
Already assigned

We need to add additional condition



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100		CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	


Select Course $c \in C$
CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c
Alice

If a is free then assign
Already assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Now what? We need to
clarify this condition



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300




While Course $c \in C$ is free
CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300




While Course $c \in C$ is free
 CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c
 Alice

If a is free then assign
 Already assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Stuck in loop. We need
to modify this condition



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie




	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100		CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free
 CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed
 Bob

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie




	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob	CS 100		CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free
 CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed
 Bob

If a is free then assign
 Already assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob		CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200



While Course $c \in C$ is free


CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob		CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign

(CS 300 – Charlie)

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob		CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200



While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign

(CS 300 – Charlie)

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



$$M = \{(CS100 - Alice), (CS200 - Bob), (CS300 - Charlie)\}$$

Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie




	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob		CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free
CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed
Charlie

If a is free then assign



Observation 1. Course instructors make offer to TA applicants in decreasing order of preference

Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 100
Bob		CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign

(CS 300 – Charlie)

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



$$M = \{(CS100 - Alice), (CS200 - Bob), (CS300 - Charlie)\}$$

Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100	CS 300
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign
(CS 300 – Charlie)

What if a prefer
 c to c' ?

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



Let try new example – Worst Case Scenario



1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob
CS 200	Bob	Alice
CS 300	Alice	Bob
		Charlie
		Charlie
		Charlie

1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300
Bob	CS 300	CS 100
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200
		CS 300


While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet proposed

If a is free then assign


Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



Alice



Bob



Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free


CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Alice

If a is free then assign


Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



Alice



Bob



Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 100


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Alice

If a is free then assign

(CS 100 – Alice)

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300


While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 200

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet proposed

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free


CS 200

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Bob

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 200


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Bob

If a is free then assign

(CS 200 – Bob)

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie




	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free
 CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free


CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Alice

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free
 CS 300


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Alice

If a is free then assign

Already assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Alice

If a is free then assign

Already assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Alice

If a is free then assign

Already assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free





		1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie	
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie	
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie	

		1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob		CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free


CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet proposed

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free





	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 100


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Bob

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free





	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Bob

If a is free then assign

Already assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free





	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Bob

If a is free then assign

Already assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free


CS 200

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet proposed

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 200


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Alice

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



Stable Matching – Moving Towards Algorithm Design

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 200

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Alice

If a is free then assign

Already Assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 200

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Alice

If a is free then assign

Already Assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200


While Course $c \in C$ is free
 CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
 not yet proposed

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200



While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Bob

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300
Bob		CS 300	CS 100
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Bob

If a is free then assign

Already Assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Bob

If a is free then assign

Already Assigned

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free





1 st		2 nd		3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie	
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie	
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie	

1 st		2 nd		3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob		CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free


CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet proposed

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free





1 st		2 nd		3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie	
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie	
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie	

1 st		2 nd		3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob		CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 100


Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free





	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Charlie

If a is free then assign

(CS 100 - Charlie)

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free





	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300


While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign



Observation 2. Once a TA applicant is assigned to a course (matched), the applicant never becomes unassigned (unmatched); only “trades up”

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



1 st		2 nd		3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie	
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie	
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie	

1 st		2 nd		3 rd
Alice		CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob		CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie		CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has
not yet proposed


Charlie

If a is free then assign

(CS 100 - Charlie)

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



No unstable pair



Gale-Shapely deferred acceptance algorithm


GALE-SHAPELY (*preference lists of course instructors and TA applicants*)

- 1 **INITIALIZE** M to empty matching
- 2 **While Course** $c \in C$ is free
- 3 $a \leftarrow$ Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c *to whom c has not yet offered*
- 4 **If** a **is free then assign**
5 Add $c - a$ to matching M
- 6 **Else if** a **prefers c to c'** **then assign a to c and c' gets free**
7 Replace $c' - a$ with $c - a$ in matching M
- 8 **Else if** a **prefers c' to c then c remains free**
9 a rejects offer made by c
- 11 **RETURN** stable matching M

Gale-Shapely deferred acceptance algorithm

GALE-SHAPELY (*preference lists of course instructors and TA applicants*)

- 1 **INITIALIZE** M to empty matching
- 2 **WHILE** (Course $c \in C$ is free and has not offered to every applicant)
- 3 $a \leftarrow$ Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet offered
- 4 **IF** (a has not received TAship offer before)
- 5 Add $c - a$ to matching M
- 6 **ELSE IF** (a prefers c to a previously offered course by instructor c')
- 7 Replace $c' - a$ with $c - a$ in matching M
- 8 **ELSE**
- 9 a rejects offer made by c
- 11 **RETURN** stable matching M



Lloyd Shapley

In 2012, **Nobel Memorial Prize** in Economic Sciences was awarded to Lloyd S. Shapley "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design".

COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE STABILITY OF MARRIAGE

D. GALE* AND L. S. SHAPLEY, Brown University and the RAND Corporation

1. **Introduction.** The problem with which we shall be concerned relates to the following typical situation: A college is considering a set of n applicants of which it can admit a quota of only q . Having evaluated their qualifications, the admissions office must decide which ones to admit. The procedure of offering admission only to the q best-qualified applicants will not generally be satisfactory, for it cannot be assumed that all who are offered admission will accept.

original applications:
college admissions and
opposite-sex marriage

Thanks a lot



If you are taking a Nap, **wake up.....Lecture Over**