


CS 310: Algorithms

Lecture 3

Instructor: Naveed Anwar Bhatti





Chapter 1: Introduction and Some Representative Problems



Teaching Assistants – FINALIZED (S2)



Mohammad Jaffer Iqbal
24100064@lums.edu.pk
Thursday (12-1:30pm);
Friday (10am-11:30am)
Venue: Will mention venue in office
hours email



Shehryar Khan
24100181@lums.edu.pk
Tuesday/Thursday 1:00 PM — 3:00 PM
Venue: Will mention venue in office
hours email




Aashish Jai 24100036@lums.edu.pk M/W (2:30 - 3:30). Friday (By request) Venue: Varying (Will Email)



Gale-Shapely deferred acceptance algorithm

GALE-SHAPELY (preference lists of course instructors and TA applicants)

```
INITIALIZE M to empty matching
    WHILE ( Course c \in C is free and has not offered to every applicant )
3
        a \leftarrow Select Highest Preference a \in TA of c to whom c has not yet offered
4
       IF (a has not received TAship offer before)
5
           Add c - a to matching M
6
       ELSE IF (\alpha prefers c to a previously offered course by instructor c')
           Replace c' - a with c - a in matching M
8
       ELSE
9
            a rejects offer made by c
   RETURN stable matching M
```







UC Berkeley

UCLA

Stanford



Stable Matching - Moving Towards Algorithm Design



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100	CS 300
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign

(CS 300 – Charlie)

CS200

CS300

CS300

Alice

Bob

Charlie

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free

Stable Matching – Moving Towards <u>Algorithm Design</u>

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free


CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign

(CS 100 - Charlie)



Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



Proof of correctness: Termination

Claim. Algorithm terminates after "close to" n^2 iterations of WHILE loop Proof.

- Each time through the while loop a course instructor offers TAship to a new applicant.
- In worst case, each course instructor offer TAship to each applicant
- There can n^2 possible offers at most


Formula for exact number of **worst case** iteration for Gale-Shaply algorithm is:

$$n(n-1)+1$$
 How?

7



Proof of correctness: Termination




	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

n(n-1)+1 Why we said "close to" n^2 ?



Proof of correctness: Termination

n(n-1)+1 Why we said "close to" n^2 ?



n	n^2-n+1	n^2
0	1	0
500	249501	250000
1000	999001	1000000
1500	2248501	2250000
2000	3998001	400000
2500	6247501	6250000
3000	8997001	9000000
3500	12246501	12250000
4000	15996001	16000000
4500	20245501	20250000
5000	24995001	25000000



Proof of correctness: Matching

Claim. Gale-Shapely outputs a matching

Proof.

- Course instructor makes an offer only if unmatched \Rightarrow matched to \leq 1 TA applicant
- TA applicant keeps only best course based on his/her preference ⇒ matched to ≤ 1 course



Proof of correctness: Perfect Matching

Claim. In Gale-Shapely matching, each course is assigned a TA

Proof. [by contradiction]

- Suppose for the sake of contradiction, that some course instructor $c \in C$ is not assigned a TA upon termination of the Gale-Shapely algorithm
- Then some TA applicant, say $a \in A$, is not assigned to a course upon termination
- By Observation 2, a was never offered TAship for any course

But, c offers TAship to every applicant, since c ends up without a TA.

Claim. In Gale-Shapely matching, each TA applicants is assigned to a course

Proof. [by counting]

- By previous claim, all n courses are assigned TA (each course is matched to a TA)
- Thus, all n TA applicants get matched



Proof of correctness: Stability

Claim. In Gale-Shapely matching M^* , there are no unstable pairs.

Proof. Consider any pair c-a that is not in M^*

 Case 1: c never made an offer to a Course instructors \Rightarrow c prefers its assigned TA a'to a \leftarrow $\Rightarrow c - a$ is not unstable

make TAship offers in decreasing order of preference

• Case 2: c made an offer to a.

 \Rightarrow a rejected c (either right away or later)

TA applicants only \Rightarrow a prefers its assigned course c' to c trade up

 $\Rightarrow c - a$ is not unstable

• In either case c-a is not unstable

 M^*

c - a'

a - c'




Do all executions of Gale-Shapely lead to the same stable matching?

- A. No, because the algorithm is non-deterministic
- B. No, because an instance can have several stable matchings
- C. Yes, because each instance has a unique stable matching
- D. Yes, even though an instance can have several stable matchings, Gale-Shapely returns the matching that is optimal w.r.t. course instructor



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Scan the QR code to vote or go to https://forms.office.co m/r/wfi11eMgfi



Stable Matching - Moving Towards Algorithm Design



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100	CS 300
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



While Course $c \in C$ is free

CS 300

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet proposed


Charlie

If a is free then assign

(CS 300 – Charlie)

Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free





Stable Matching - Moving Towards Algorithm Design





	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 300	CS 100	CS 200
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

While Course $c \in C$ is free


CS 100

Select Highest Preference $a \in TA$ of c to whom c has not yet proposed

Charlie

If a is free then assign

(CS 100 - Charlie)



Else if a prefers c' to c then c remains free

Else if a prefers c to c' then assign a to c and c' gets free



Understanding the solution Optimality wr.t. the course instructor preference

• For a given problem instance, there may be several stable matchings

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100	CS 300
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

Course instructors' preference list

TA applicants' preference list

An instance with two stable matchings $M = \{(CS100 - Alice), (CS200 - Bob), (CS300 - Charlie)\}$



Understanding the solution Optimality wr.t. the course instructor preference

• For a given problem instance, there may be several stable matchings

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100	CS 300
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

Course instructors' preference list

TA applicants' preference list

An instance with two stable matchings

$$M = \{(CS100 - Alice), (CS200 - Bob), (CS300 - Charlie)\}$$

$$M' = \{(CS100 - Bob), (CS200 - Alice), (CS300 - Charlie)\}$$



TA applicant pessimality

Q. Does Course instructor-optimality come at the expense of the TA applicants?

A. Yes

TA applicant-pessimal assignment. Each TA applicant receives the worst valid partner (not always)



Who is the best valid partner for **W** in the following instance?

- A. {A-W, B-X, C-Y, D-Z}
- B. {A-X, B-W, C-Y, D-Z}
- C. {A-X, B-Y, C-W, D-Z}
- D. {A-Z, B-W, C-Y, D-X}
- E. {A-Z, B-Y, C-W, D-X}
- F. {A-Y, B-Z, C-W, D-X}

(all 6 matchings are stable)

	1 st	2 nd	3rd	4 th
Α	Υ	Z	X	W
В	Z	Y	W	X
С	W	Υ	X	Z
D	X	Z	W	Y


	1 st	2 nd	3rd	4 th
W	D	Α	В	С
Х	С	В	Α	D
Y	С	В	Α	D
Z	D	Α	В	С



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Only people in my organization can respond, Record name

1. Who is the best valid partner for W in the following instance?





Scan the QR code to vote or go to https://forms.office.co m/r/9CnTDDP2k3



Which stable matchings can be found through Gale-Shapely algorithms

out of these six matchings

F. {A-Y, B-Z, C-W, D-X}

	1 st	2 nd	3rd	4 th
A	Υ	Z	X	W
В	Z	Y	W	X
С	W	Υ	X	Z
D	X	Z	W	Υ

	1 st	2 nd	3rd	4 th
W	D	Α	В	С
Х	С	В	Α	D
Y	С	В	Α	D
Z	D	Α	В	С



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Only people in my organization can respond, Record name

1. Which stable matchings can be found through Gale-Shapely algorithms out of these six...





Scan the QR code to vote or go to https://forms.office.co m/r/aLkFEW7UAi Stable matching problem. Given n course instructors and n TA applicants, and their preference lists, find a stable matching if one exists.

Theorem. [Gale-Shapely 1962] The Gale-Shapely algorithm guarantees to find a stable matching for any problem instance.



Stable roommate problem

Q. Do stable matching always exist?

A. Not always

Stable roommate problem.

- n people; each person ranks others from 1 to n-1
- Assign roommate pairs so that no unstable pairs

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Α	В	С	D
В	С	Α	D
С	Α	В	D
D	Α	В	С

No perfect matching is stable

$$A-B,C-D$$
 \Rightarrow $B-C$ unstable $A-C,B-D$ \Rightarrow $B-A$ unstable $A-D,B-C$ \Rightarrow $A-C$ unstable

Observation. Stable matching not always exist



Lie for gain?

Suppose each **TA** knows the preference lists of every other **TA** before the propose-and-reject algorithm is executed. Which of the following is true?

- A. No, course instructor can improve by falsifying its preference list
- B. No, student can improve by falsifying their preference list
- C. Both A and B
- D. Neither A nor B



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Only people in my organization can respond, Record name

1. Suppose each TA knows the preference lists of every other TA before the propose-and-reject...

No course instructor can improve by falsifying its preference list

14%

11%

No student can improve by falsifying their preference list

Both A and B

9%

Neither A nor B

67%

57 responses






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	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie






	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie






	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie






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Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie






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Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie






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Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie


	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie







	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



Original

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 100	CS 300
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300

Now

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
CS 100	Alice	Bob	Charlie
CS 200	Bob	Alice	Charlie
CS 300	Alice	Bob	Charlie

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Alice	CS 200	CS 300	CS 100
Bob	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300
Charlie	CS 100	CS 200	CS 300



Stable Matching Problem

- Selecting teaching assistants (TA) for courses TA-course matching problem
- Matching medical students to hospitals
- Matching employers to applicants for job hiring
- College admission matching students to colleges
- Content delivery networks assigning users to web servers



A modern application

Content delivery networks. Distribute much of world's content on web.

- User. Preferences based on latency and packet loss.
- Web server. Preferences based on costs of bandwidth and co-location.
- Goal. Assign billions of users to servers, every 10 seconds.



Algorithmic Nuggets in Content Delivery


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This article is an editorial note submitted to CCR. It has NOT been peer reviewed.

The authors take full responsibility for this article's technical content. Comments can be posted through CCR Online.

ABSTRACT


This paper "peeks under the covers" at the subsystems that provide the basic functionality of a leading content delivery network. Based on our experiences in building one of the largest distributed systems in the world, we illustrate how sophisticated algorithmic research has been adapted to balance the load between and within server clusters, manage the caches on servers, select paths through an overlay routing network, and elect leaders in various contexts. In each instance, we first explain the theory underlying the algorithms, then introduce practical considerations not captured by the theoretical models, and finally describe what is implemented in practice. Through these examples, we highlight the role of algorithmic research in the design of complex networked systems. The paper also illustrates the close synergy that exists between research and industry where research ideas cross over into products and product requirements drive future research



Slide credit: Kevin Wayne. Theory of Algorithms (COS423) www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spring18/cos423



Thanks a lot



If you are taking a Nap, wake up.....Lecture Over