Mid Sem

Graded

Group

ABHAYA PRATAP SINGH ANANYAE KUMAR BHARTARI NAVEEN KUMAR MATHUR

View or edit group

Total Points

48 / 50 pts

Question 1

DES

Resolved 15 / 15 pts

- + 15 pts Correct using alternate solution
- ✓ + 2 pts Mention and explain about the difference of XOR being 1111

- → + 5 pts Brief analysis of algorithm for key extraction (can relate with lecture)
 - 4 pts Changes in analysis not specified due to change in S1. If you have not mentioned that prbability 14/64 would change to 1 (for example in slide 2 and 3 of Lecture 7)
 - + 0 pts Wrong Answer / Missing Solution

C Regrade Request Submitted on: Mar 17

Sir, we wrote that probability would change to 1 with explanation and thoughtful analysis to be the same as in the lectures, so we wrote in reference the lecture numbers and slide numbers.

But our marks for not writing probability change in S1 had been deducted, and about analysis, sir, told not to repeat anything similar that was taught in class (mark the reference for so).

Ok

Reviewed on: Mar 17

- - + 0 pts Incorrect
- **2 pts** prove that your algorithm works correctly. Not that there exists only one key.
- C Regrade Request

Submitted on: Mar 17

Sir, in the problem, the task was to retrieve the key using the specification in guestion only. If it were written explicitly in question also to prove correctness, we would have written so. As the task was to find the key deducting (-2), marks would be harsh considering the mean is just 43.07.

the 2nd rubric asks for a proof of correctness.

Reviewed on: Mar 17

Question 3

Invertible Matrices 20 / 20 pts

- ullet + **7 pts** Find the key using $x,y\in G$ satisfying the properties.
- - + 0 pts Incorrect or NA

C	Question assigned to the following page: <u>1</u>	

CS641

Modern Cryptology Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur

Group Number: Naveen Kumar Mathur (190535), Abhaya Pratap Singh (190019), Ananayae Kumar Bhartari (190129)

Mid Semester Examination

Date of Submission: March 10, 2021

Question 1

Consider a variant of DES algorithm in which the S-box S1 is changed as follows:

For every six bit input α , the following property holds: $S1(\alpha) = S1(\alpha \oplus 001100) \oplus 1111$.

All other S-boxes and operations remain the same. Design an algorithm to break four rounds of this variant. In order to get any credit, your algorithm must make use of the changed behavior of S1.

Solution

Let the two inputs be **a** and **b** Given that,

$$s1(\alpha) = s1(\alpha \oplus 001100) \oplus 1111$$

If **XOR** of two inputs **a** and **b** is 001100 then, S1 is updated like this and all procedure same as lecture

$$a \oplus b = 001100$$

 $b = a \oplus 001100$
 $s1(a) = s1(b) \oplus 1111$
 $s1(a) \oplus s1(b) = 1111$

C	Question assigned to the following page: <u>1</u>	

For every input pair with **XOR 001100**, the output **XOR** is **1111** with probability 1. Now proceed as given in lec. 6, 7 for 4-round DES.





Question 2

The SUBSET-SUM problem is defined as follows:

```
Given (a_1, ..., a_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n and m \in \mathbb{Z}, find (b_1, ..., b_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n such that \sum_{i=1}^n a_i b_i = m if it exists.
```

This problem is believed to be a hard-to-solve problem in general. Consider a hypothetical scenario where Anubha and Braj have access to a fast method of solving SUBSET-SUM problem. They use the following method to exchange a secret key of AES:

Anubha generates an n=128 bit secret key k. She then chooses n positive integers a_1, \ldots, a_n such that $a_i > \sum_{1 \le j < i} a_j$. She computes $m = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i k_i$ and sends $(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n, m)$ to Braj, where k_i is ith bit of k. Upon receiving numbers $(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n, m)$, Braj solves the SUBSET-SUM problem to extract the key k.

Show that an attacker Ela does not need to solve SUBSET-SUM problem to retrieve the key k from $(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n, m)$.

Solution

Claim: Only 1 key with such specifications exist

Proof: Let there exist **two distinct keys** or sequence b_i s and b'_i s. such that, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i b_i = \mathbf{m} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i b'_i$ differing by at least one bit.

Then, traversing both sequences and finding first differing bit from last. Now suppose, $b_k = 1$ and $b'_k = 0$ (k is the position where they differ first from last) .

 \implies a_k must have been included in the subset of sum m corresponding to the sequence b_i but not in subset corresponding to b'_i

But we are given in the problem, $a_k > \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} a_i$ $\implies \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} a_i.b_i + a_k > \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} a * b_i$

So, here lies contradiction. So there exist a unique key.



Algorithm to find the Key

- First set a counter and start traversing the sequence **a**.
- Traverse till an element more than **m** is found.
- Now set sum = m.
- If counter stops at some a_k , such that $a_k == sum$.
- Then key will be $b_i = 0 \ \forall \ 1 \le \mathbf{i} \le \mathbf{n} \ \&\& \ \mathbf{i} \ne \mathbf{k}$ and $b_k = 1$.
- If $a_k \neq m$, then substract a_k from sum i.e,

```
\mathbf{sum} = \mathbf{m} - a_k
```

• Now repeat the above steps to find the unique key untill sum become **0** then return b.

```
# code for algorithm discussed in problem 2
def key_finder(a,m):
    b=[0]*128
    sum=m
    while(sum>0):
        id=0
        for i in range(len(a)):
             if(a[i]<=sum):</pre>
                 id+=1
             else:
                 break
        if(a[id-1]==sum):
            b[id-1]=1
             sum=0
        else :
            b[id-1]=1;
            sum-=a[id-1]
        if(sum==0):
             break
    return b
```

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Question 3

Having falled to arrive at a secret key as above, Anubha and Braj try another method. Let G be the group of $n \times n$ invertible matrices over field F, n = 128. Let a, b, $g \in G$ such that $ab \neq ba$. The group G and the elements a, b, g are publicly known. Anubha and Braj wish to create a shared secret key as follows:

Anubha chooses integers ℓ , m randomly with $1 < \ell$, $m \le 2^n$, and sends $u = a^\ell g b^m$ to Braj. Braj chooses integers r, s randomly with 1 < r, $s \le 2^n$, and sends $v = a^r g b^s$ to Anubha. Anubha computes $k_a = a^\ell v b^m = a^{\ell+r} g b^{m+s}$. Braj computes $k_b = a^r u b^s = a^{\ell+r} g b^{m+s}$. The secret key is thus $k = k_a = k_b$.

Show that even this attempt fails as Ela can find k using u and v.

Hint: Show that Ela can

- 1. find elements x and y such that xa = ax, yb = by, and u = xgy,
- 2. use x, y, and v to compute k.

Solution

Lemma: 1

$$a, x \in G, xa = ax \iff ax^{-1} = x^{-1}a$$

as a, $x \in G$ both x and a are invertible.

hence,

$$xa = ax \iff a = x^{-1}ax \iff ax^{-1} = x^{-1}a$$

We have to solve this system of equation

$$xa = ax$$
 —-(i)

$$by = yb$$
 —-(ii)

$$u = ugy$$
 —-(iii)

We know that each of these equation admit infinitly many solution independently and a unique solution will be common to all that unique solution is what we want to find [unique sol. $x = a^l$, $y = b^m$]

$$a^{l}.a = a^{l+1} = a.a^{l}$$
—(i)

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$$b^m.b = b^{m+1} = b.b^m$$
 —(ii)
 $u = a^l.g.b^m$ ——(iii)

Hence, this is the only unique solution to all three equations.

we can cast the two variable equation into 1 variable by

$$u = xgy$$

$$x^{-1}.u = gy \iff x^{-1} = gyu^{-1}$$

It is possible as x, g, $y \in G$, hence ,Inverse exists.

Using Lemma 1;

$$x^{-1}.a = a.x^{-1}$$

$$g.y.u^{-1}.a = a.g.y.u^{-1}$$
—(i)

by = yb —(ii) Therefore, this is a system of equation in y only,

hence, we write (i) and (ii) as

$$g.y.u^{-1}.a - a.g.y.u^{-1} = 0$$

$$by - yb = 0$$

Now, y equals to

$$\begin{bmatrix} y_{11} & y_{12} & \cdots \\ y_{21} & \cdots & \cdots \\ \cdots & y_{128,128} \end{bmatrix}$$

Hence we can make 2X128X128 equation from (i) and (ii), but,

the number of variables are 128X128, so no. of equation are more than no. of variables,

Hence, Two cases are possible

either a unique solution exist or no solution exist,

But as we have shown before a solution exist.

Therefore, we will find a unique solution.

This solution can be found by GAUSS ELIMINATION method.

Hence we have found the unique *y*.

Now,
$$x^{-1} = g.y.u^{-1}$$

 $\implies x^{-1}$ is determinable, hence x is also determinable.

We have found x, y namely a^l , b^m .

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$$\mathbf{k} = xvy$$
as $\mathbf{k} = a^{(l+r)}gb^{(m+s)}$

$$\mathbf{k} = xa^{r}gb^{s}y = xvy$$

Ela can determine the values easily.

More over we can sometime skip this lengthy process if both a, b admit two different eigen values s.t.

$$\frac{\ln \lambda_a}{\ln \lambda_a'} \neq \frac{\ln \lambda_b}{\ln \lambda_b'}$$

where λ_a , λ'_a are eigen values of a and λ_b , λ_b' are eigen values of b.

We can say that, y_1 be eigen-vector of a^T corresponding to λ_a y_2 be eigen-vector of a^T corresponding to λ'_a a and a^T have same eigenvalues

 x_2 be the eigen-vector of b corresponding to λ_b'

Now

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{u} &= a^l g b^m \\ [a^T.y_1 &= \lambda_a.y_1] \text{ , After Taking transpose : } [y_1{}^T.a &= y_1{}^t.\lambda_a] \\ \text{Then , } y_1^T \mathbf{u} x_1 &= y_1^T a^l g b^m x_1 \\ y_1^T \mathbf{u} x_1 &= \lambda_a^l y_1^T g x_1 \lambda_b^m \end{aligned}$$

$$\lambda_a^l \lambda_b^m &= \frac{y_1^T.u.x_1}{y_1^T.g.x_1}$$

Taking In both sides

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$$1.\ln \lambda_a + \text{m.ln}\lambda_b = \frac{(y_1^T.u.x_1)}{(y_1^T.g.x_1)}$$

Similarly

$$1.\ln \lambda_a' + \text{m.ln}\lambda_b' = \frac{y_2^T.u.x_2}{y_2^T.g.x_2}$$

We obtain two simultaneous equations that can be solved easily.

So, we can find **l**, **m**

$$\mathbf{k} = a^l \mathbf{v} b^m$$

as shown earlier.

(Question assigned to the following page: <u>3</u>	

References

For Question 1: Lecture no.6 slide no. 10 onwards to lec. 7 and upto slide 8.