

# SUDAN CRISIS

## Situational Analysis

May 5, 2025



## About this Report

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### Purpose

This report provides a comprehensive overview of the current humanitarian situation, focusing on both operational environment factors and sectoral analysis. It aims to support informed decision-making for humanitarian partners and stakeholders.

### Methodology

The Situation Hub's analytical process uses a structured Human-in-the-Loop workflow that combines automated analysis retrieval through GANNET—DFS's AI-powered humanitarian assistant—with expert review by the DFS analysis team. GANNET automates the extraction and generation of crisis-related insights based on structured prompts, which are aligned with a tailored analytical framework. These outputs are then reviewed, validated, and refined by analysts to ensure accuracy, contextual relevance, and operational utility. The workflow is organized into four key phases: planning and setup, ongoing operations, quality assurance, and system evolution, ensuring a balance between speed and analytical rigor.

### Planning, Setup & Quality Control

In the planning phase, analysts develop a contextualized analytical framework—largely based on the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF)—and convert it into structured prompts for AI-assisted data extraction. These prompts are refined over time to improve output quality. Data sources are vetted for reliability, and translations are reviewed for accuracy. Using a centralized Content Management System (CMS), analysts review and curate AI-generated outputs, validate them against external sources, and make refinements to enhance clarity and relevance. The CMS enables collaborative editing, version tracking, and ensures outputs align with humanitarian needs.

### Bias Mitigation

To minimize bias, the team diversifies data sources, cross-verifies information, and continuously evaluates the AI's performance. Analysts play a crucial role in identifying and correcting inaccuracies, especially in automated categorization. Future improvements aim to enhance source credibility checks and sentiment analysis, further strengthening the reliability of the Situation Hub's outputs.

### Landing Page Overview

The SituationHub landing pages use a standardized yet customizable template to deliver consistent, comprehensive crisis overviews. These pages integrate static content with dynamic data from sources like ACLED and DTM via open APIs, enabling interactive visuals with real-time updates. Regular reviews and verification with in-country partners ensure accuracy, while manual updates are used for sources not connected to APIs.

### Media Monitoring

The media monitoring process has evolved from a manual, list-based approach to an AI-assisted system integrated into the CMS. This allows analysts to efficiently review, filter, and contextualize media narratives, while automation helps track emerging trends.

### **About GANNET**

GANNET is a humanitarian information management system designed to support coordination and response planning. It provides tools for data collation, analysis, and visualization to help humanitarian actors access and utilize critical information for their operations. GANNET is committed to improving the effectiveness of humanitarian action through better information management.

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# Operational Environment

## Economy

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### Current Economic Situation

Lebanon remains in a deep economic crisis characterized by a severe contraction in GDP to about \$18 billion and inflation reaching 180% as of March 2025. The crisis is compounded by banking restrictions that have frozen approximately \$100 billion in deposits. High-level officials, including Finance Minister Yassine Jaber and the newly appointed Central Bank Governor Karim Souaid, are negotiating an IMF rescue package centered on an Extended Facility Agreement of \$3 billion—conditional on rapid reform implementation and legislative amendments, with joint parliamentary sessions scheduled ahead of the IMF conference from 21 to 26 April 2025.

### Post-Conflict Economic Landscape

In the post-conflict era, Lebanon faces severe economic challenges with GDP dropping from \$20 billion in 2023 to \$18 billion in 2025 and sustained inflation at 180% by March 2025. Banking reforms—aimed at restructuring the sector and lifting restrictions on \$100 billion of frozen deposits which have been in place since 2019—are under discussion with expected parliamentary approval by mid-April 2025. The agricultural sector is especially hard hit, needing an estimated \$263 million in reconstruction funds (with \$95 million earmarked for 2025/2026) and supportive local initiatives such as a cooperative in Saida (hiring 50 youth in March 2025 with a \$2 million Qatari fund). Additionally, foreign aid is under strain; a 90-day suspension of USAID programs in January 2025 and subsequent funding cuts by several European countries are notable, even as the IMF offers conditional support of \$3 billion over 46 months. Efforts to reintegrate the workforce, such as the 'Return to the Cedar' initiative, have struggled, registering only 2,000 returnee applications against an expected 10,000, while about 15% of the working population has migrated over the past five years.

### Stability of Currency and Bank System

Lebanon's monetary system is under intense pressure with the Lebanese pound depreciating sharply from its pre-crisis rate of approximately 1,507.5 LBP/USD to between 89,000 and 90,000 LBP/USD in both official and parallel markets. Bank deposits have fallen from \$170 billion in 2019 to an estimated \$125 billion by March 2025, and inflation remains in the triple digits despite a slight downward trend following the end of monetary financing by the Bank of Lebanon. Urgent reform measures include the adoption of draft banking laws expected to be approved mid-April, aimed at restructuring the sector, unifying exchange rates, and protecting depositors (noting that 5% of accounts hold 65% of deposits, around \$81 billion in 2023). A full audit of the central bank is underway under Governor Karim Souaid, revealing a decline in reserves from \$31 billion in August 2019 to \$8 billion in July 2023, a capital gap of \$51.3 billion as of February 2025, and an earlier foreign exchange gap of \$71.9 billion, all of which are critical for unlocking the IMF rescue plan.

### Employment

Employment challenges are acute, with trade unions and labor representatives meeting on 11 April 2025 to discuss minimum wage issues amid an economic collapse. While raising wage ceilings to \$1,000 has been deemed unfeasible, many citizens are struggling on incomes as low as \$300. The impact on businesses is evident, as seen in a Beirut-based software start-up that dismissed 20 employees in April 2025. Broader labor

market trends indicate a 15% reduction in the workforce since 2020, highlighting the urgent need for reforms and targeted incentives to stem the ongoing attrition.

## Politics

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### Governance Structures and Rule of Law

Recent developments in Lebanon illustrate a complex interplay between institutional reforms, legislative initiatives, and enduring challenges in transparency and accountability. Notable milestones include the election of President Joseph Aoun on 9 January 2025 with 99 out of 128 votes and the appointment of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on 8 February 2025, leading a government of 24 ministers confirmed by 95 votes on 26 February 2025. A directive issued on 15 March 2025 requires municipalities to prepare financial reports by May, underscoring efforts to enhance public sector accountability. Legislative initiatives are underway, including a draft law aimed at guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary to reinforce constitutional protections and a reform package that seeks to amend the bank secrecy law and address a financial gap in line with international expectations and IMF negotiations initiated in March 2025. At the same time, longstanding challenges persist, such as weak implementation of anti-corruption measures despite the existence of bodies like the national anti-corruption commission (NACC) and the public procurement authority (PPA). Structural transparency deficits have been highlighted in cases like the municipality of Baalbek, where 5,000 aid submission names included 1,400 duplicates, suggesting potential manipulation. Furthermore, breaches related to the constitutional separation of powers and a judicial decision by investigating judge Bilal Hillawy in Beirut against former Central Bank Governor Riad Salama for the alleged embezzlement of \$44 million testify to the ongoing tensions between reformist intentions and systemic obstacles.

### Political Freedoms and Recent Laws

On 7 April 2025, local newspapers reported several significant measures that impact political freedoms and the legal landscape. Among these, plans by the Minister of Communications to impose new charges on Internet-related services point to increased state oversight of digital communications. In parallel, Hezbollah continues to restrict media professionals in the southern suburbs of Beirut by requiring explicit permission from an official media office for filming. Additionally, an exception remains in place regarding the travel ban on Gulf nationals amid the context of Israeli strikes—exemplified by an Israeli attack in Saida and the assassination of a Hamas official. A symposium titled 'Independence and Reform of the Judiciary' was scheduled for 10 April 2025 at the headquarters of the Cultural Council of Southern Lebanon in Beirut, signaling efforts to strengthen constitutional and judicial protections. Legal actions have also been initiated against 151 activists, including 82 Lebanese, who are accused of charges such as communication with the enemy and incitement to violence, reflecting the politically charged use of penal laws.

### Influence of Non-State Actors and Political Factions

The political landscape in Lebanon has experienced a notable intensification of factional dynamics and the influence of non-state actors. On 2 April 2025, a meeting of the Lebanese Forces raised concerns regarding an unbalanced city council reflective of growing fragmentation. This is compounded by the rise of independent political groups such as Beirut Madinati, which, building on historical support that yielded 47,000 votes in 2016, has recently attracted hundreds of participants at public meetings. Discussions initiated on 28 March 2025 for a sovereignist alliance between the Lebanese Forces and moderate Sunni groups have underscored deep internal divisions among moderates, further highlighting entrenched factionalism. Additionally, the orchestration of disinformation campaigns via social networks and partisan media has been employed by non-state actors to

manipulate public opinion and exacerbate political fragmentation, adding further complexity to the informal power networks operating alongside formal political structures.

### Public Trust in State Institutions

Multiple detailed accounts from early to mid-April 2025 point to a significant erosion of public trust in state institutions. Reports note chaotic handling of issues such as street parking in Beirut and a disorganized municipal approach that has revived calls for measures like re-adoption of parking meters. The financial sector is under strain, evidenced by a dramatic fall in digital currencies and a reluctance among jewellers to trade gold alloys. The Salam government's allocation of £50 billion to municipalities, backed by promises of enhanced transparency from President Aoun, is being closely scrutinized by both elected representatives and citizens. A poll commissioned by the Ministry of Information in April 2025 revealed that 62% of the population considers traditional political parties ineffective. Events such as Hezbollah's gathering of 5,000 people in Haret Hreik on 30 March 2025 and the rising social media momentum for groups like Beirut Madinati, which recently garnered 10,000 subscribers, illustrate alternative mobilizations amid deep-seated institutional disillusionment. Moreover, municipal consultations have noted an 8% surge in voter registration in March 2025, even as official reports highlight severe disruptions in public services: Beirut experienced electricity cuts limiting service to 4 hours per day, water supply available only 3 days per week, and waste collection reaching just 60% of neighborhoods. Historical issues further compound these challenges, with past corruption scandals—such as the diversion of \$400 million in Covid-19 aid in 2021 and the disappearance of \$300 million in public funds in 2023—continuing to undermine confidence, despite recent IMF negotiations initiated in March 2025 by the new leadership.

### Role of Marginalized Groups

Evolving political and socio-economic scenarios in Lebanon have underscored both challenges and opportunities for participation among historically disadvantaged and socially excluded groups. In municipal elections, the Beirut City Council is structured to reserve 12 seats for Christians and 12 for Muslims, yet recent trends show shifting engagement patterns. In April 2025, a poll in Beirut highlighted widespread dissatisfaction with traditional parties, a factor that has spurred the rise of independent lists such as Beirut Madinati, which has mobilized support via public meetings and experienced an 8% increase in voter registration in Shia areas. Qualitative narratives have documented that some Christian communities have boycotted elections and voiced deep-seated mistrust of longstanding sectarian practices. Migrant communities—comprising domestic workers and refugees—continue to face severe marginalization. One account detailed the plight of Pavani, a Sri Lankan domestic worker whose situation became perilous following Israeli airstrikes, with only a 30-minute warning, compounded by passport confiscation and language barriers impeding healthcare access. In response, humanitarian actors such as MSF have deployed community health educators from within these migrant groups, leading to a reported doubling of mentalhealth consultations at a Bourj Hammoud clinic compared to the previous year. These findings are further supported by evidence of economic vulnerability, with 72% of respondents in some surveys expressing an urgent need for cash assistance, highlighting the intersecting challenges of social exclusion and crisis-level livelihoods.

## Security And Stability

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### Security Overview

Lebanon's security environment remains highly volatile, with a series of incidents underscoring persistent armed and cross-border threats. On 2 April, a violent attack near Kaem el-Loz destroyed a house and wounded three civilians, followed by rocket strikes targeting Kiryat Shmona on the next day. Intelligence also indicates



that weapons caches, such as one discovered near Rmeich in March, continue to be found. Additionally, Israeli incursions and robust smuggling networks are compounding internal security challenges. International figures, including US envoy Morgan Ortagos, have called for urgent disarmament measures for non-state armed groups, emphasizing the impact of illicit arms circulation on the overall stability for civilians, aid workers, and humanitarian operations.

## Security Forces and Law Enforcement

On 9 April 2025, a Lebanese army unit operating near Rasm al-Hadath, close to Baalbeck, conducted a targeted operation against human trafficking in the Bekaa region. This operation led to the arrest of a smuggler, identified by the initials M.D., along with 17 Syrian nationals attempting an illegal border crossing along the 375-kilometer border with Syria—a trend noted since early 2025. The increased deployment of army units since the November 2024 ceasefire with Israel underscores ongoing efforts to curb illegal migration and smuggling, despite challenges such as a 70% budget cut since 2020 and outdated equipment. The Lebanese Armed Forces, comprising around 80,000 personnel, received a pledge of \$200 million from the United States in March 2025 to bolster their capabilities, although delays in fund disbursement have affected operational readiness. Furthermore, urban security forces like the Beirut Guard regiment have faced issues such as inter-agency harassment and reduced street-level presence, prompting Minister of the Interior Ahmed El-Hajjar to initiate retraining programs aimed at improving coordination and professional performance.

## Demography

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### Demographic Overview

The latest demographic data for Lebanon highlights substantial shifts in population structure, household composition, and migration trends with important implications for humanitarian planning. In 2025, the Central Statistical Office reported that 45% of residents are over 50 years old, up from 35% in 2019, underscoring an aging population. Concurrently, community centres in Jounieh have experienced a 50% loss of young volunteers over a two-year period, and municipalities in southern villages like Bint Jbeil observed a 40% decline in residents under 30, evidencing a steep youth exodus and deepening generational divide. A study by Saint Joseph University in March 2025 revealed that 55% of immigrant parents now live alone, compared to 30% in 2020, indicating significant changes in household structures. Furthermore, in Beirut, the case of a 62-year-old retiree reflects broader dependency challenges, with the Ministry of Social Affairs reporting that 35% of elderly households rely on younger family members. Migration trends further exacerbate these dynamics, as a study by AUB in March 2025 found that 450,000 Lebanese aged 18 to 35—70% of whom are university graduates or qualified professionals—have left the country since 2019, with an additional 80,000 departures recorded by IOM between January 2024 and March 2025. Lastly, data from the Displacement Tracking Matrix Round (reported on 10 April 2025) shows there are 91,955 internally displaced persons, with a gender split of 49% male and 51% female, and an age breakdown that includes 35% under 18, 35% female adults, and 30% male adults. This comprehensive portrait of demographic trends is crucial for tailoring both short-term humanitarian interventions and long-term development strategies.

## Socio-Cultural

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## Socio-Cultural Overview

The Lebanese context is marked by deep-seated socio-cultural dynamics intertwined with historical, sectarian, and tribal narratives. In the post-Taif Agreement era, many Christians have experienced an identity loss and are now moving away from a victimhood narrative toward one of national and political partnership, while parts of the Shi'a community continue to grapple with feelings of exclusion and unresolved identity issues. The entrenched political system, reinforced by patronage and clientelist networks, mobilizes communal bonds through sectarian and tribal affiliations, often suppressing dissent and exacerbating internal narratives of marginalization. Quantitative and qualitative data from early 2025 further illustrate these dynamics. A civil war anniversary poll (March 25–April 2) revealed that 51.7% of respondents fear a recurrence of conflict and 63.3% support transitioning to a secular state, with 42.5% reporting personal or family harm through deaths, injuries, property damage, or forced displacement. Additionally, demographic shifts, including an increase in residents over 50 years (from 35% in 2019 to 45% in 2025) and a 50% reduction of young volunteers in community centres in areas like Jounieh, together with concerns over a potential 10% drop in diaspora remittances affecting 300,000 households, underscore the enduring impact of historical and cultural legacies on community resilience and vulnerability.

## Gender Dynamics

Gender dynamics in Lebanon reveal stark vulnerabilities that compound existing economic and social crises. In April 2025, a 62-year-old retired woman from Beirut, surviving on \$40 a month while supporting her two daughters abroad, illustrated the precarity faced by older women in the midst of economic hardship. Migrant domestic workers, largely women and subjected to the restrictive kafala system, experience exploitation and abuse; for example, Sri Lankan domestic worker Pavani was rendered homeless and exposed to risks of rape, kidnapping, and robbery following Israeli airstrikes in late September 2024. With IOM Lebanon reporting that around 70% of displaced migrant workers are women, additional studies highlight that 85% of displaced women have seen an increase in unpaid care work, with 52% of those displaced after September 23, 2024 being particularly affected. The scarcity of basic hygiene products further undermines their health and dignity, accentuating the intersection of economic hardship, systemic inequities, and gender-based violence.

## Impact of Socio-Cultural Drivers on Aid

Humanitarian aid delivery in Lebanon is deeply influenced by entrenched cultural norms and social hierarchies. Aid distribution is often managed through sectarian networks, as evidenced by a Baalbek report where a municipal data file of 5,000 names contained 1,400 duplicate entries, suggesting manipulation and bias in beneficiary selection. Erosion of community cohesion is also evident in urban settings such as Jounieh, where a significant loss of young volunteers from community centres and the discontinuation of neighborhood festivals have weakened informal support networks. Language barriers further complicate efficient aid delivery; initiatives at the Bourj Hammoud clinic now routinely incorporate translation services and community health educators to address challenges faced by non-Arabic speaking migrant workers. These factors, coupled with traditional gender roles that increase unpaid care work for displaced women, demonstrate that socio-cultural drivers not only shape the structure and trust within communities but also have a direct impact on the effectiveness and equity of humanitarian interventions.

## Environment

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### Environmental Conditions

Lebanon is currently experiencing dynamic and fluctuating weather conditions. Forecasts indicate partly clouded skies with medium to high cloud cover, accompanied by a persistent dust wave. Active dusty winds have been observed in the northern region with speeds reaching up to 70 km/h and projections of 60–80 km/h. Daytime temperatures, initially above seasonal averages, are expected to gradually drop by Thursday to below seasonal norms. This cooling trend is coupled with rising humidity, which is causing heavy fog formation on the highlands at night. Sporadic, muddy rainfall is forecast, with potentials for lightning, thunder, and even light snow at altitudes between 1600 and 1800 meters. Additionally, daily temperature ranges vary significantly by location, with reports of 15°C to 24°C in some areas, and coastal and inland regions recording ranges of 13–23°C and 9–22°C respectively, influenced by warm air blocks in the south and cold air masses in the north.

## Environmental Challenges

Lebanon faces significant environmental challenges compounded by disruptions in basic services. Waste management services are insufficient, with only 60% of neighborhoods having access and costs of 100,000 LL per household. Public services are also affected: electricity is supplied for only 4 hours a day at a monthly cost of 300,000 LL, and safe drinking water is available merely 3 days a week for 150,000 LL per month. Climate-related stresses further aggravate the situation, as early wildfires have been reported – one occurring on a Wednesday evening in the forested Al-Kayda al-Labaniya area, and another on a Saturday in the Mount Lebanon area during a prolonged heat wave. Severe and atypical heat waves are drying out soils, thereby increasing risks of fires, while disrupted water services force communities to rely on unsafe or untreated water sources, heightening public health concerns.

## Environmental Risks and Mitigation

Lebanon is encountering a range of environmental hazards driven by both natural phenomena and climate change. Non-seasonal rains have led to flooding in urban areas like Beirut, and sudden temperature drops are damaging agricultural crops. The risk of fires is exacerbated by long droughts, desertification trends, and extreme temperature fluctuations. In response, the government has declared a state of emergency in the forestry sector. Measures announced by the Minister of Agriculture and Environment, including a project nearing its final phase aimed at reducing fire risks—particularly in vulnerable zones such as Mount Lebanon and Akkar where strong pentagon winds worsen fire hazards—reflect ongoing mitigation efforts. A recent meteorological alert also warns that a cold front is expected to bring active winds (60–80 km/h) and several consecutive days of muddy, light rain. Forecasted temperature drops may lead to snowfall at elevations around 1600–1800 meters, prompting advisories for citizens, especially those with respiratory conditions, to exercise caution.

## Conflict

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### Overview of the Ongoing Armed Conflict

In early April 2025, the conflict in Lebanon has continued to cause significant humanitarian and infrastructural damage despite a ceasefire established on 27 November 2024. A press conference on 8 April 2025 by MP Hassan Fadallah detailed that between 28 November 2024 and 7 April 2025, targeted Israeli strikes on houses, vehicles, and fields resulted in 186 civilian deaths and 480 injuries. UNIFIL reported a persistent Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon, including regular strikes and the discovery of unauthorized weaponry, all in defiance of Security Council resolution 1701. Additionally, a border incident on 9 April 2025 near Rasm al-Hadath highlighted ongoing security challenges with incidents of arms trafficking and human smuggling jeopardizing civilian safety and humanitarian access.

## Conflict Stakeholders

Key actors in the conflict include the Lebanese army. Non-state armed groups, notably Hezbollah, continue to exert influence despite domestic and international pressures; for example, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has demanded a strict six-month deadline for Hezbollah's complete disarmament in areas north and south of the Litani River. External involvement is also significant, with U.S. diplomatic pressure—exemplified by Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagos—and an American-led military technical mechanism involving the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL, France, Israel, and local municipalities working to enforce international resolutions and curb unauthorized military activities.

## Peace Negotiations

Efforts toward peace have been complicated by ongoing military incidents. On 8 April 2025, MP Hassan Fadallah publicly condemned continued Israeli airstrikes following the ceasefire, underscoring breaches of UN resolution 1701 and calling for renewed dialogue on Lebanon's defensive strategy. On 10 April 2025, government representatives including President Joseph Awn and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam reiterated their commitment to a disarmament process—especially targeting Hezbollah's armament—and the restoration of full state authority. Discussions have focused on confining arms to areas north and south of the Litani River, supported by UNIFIL monitoring and U.S. diplomatic efforts. However, persistent violations and intermittent provocations continue to complicate ongoing negotiations with Israel regarding border demarcation and the withdrawal of occupying forces.

## Conflict Outlook

Recent events point to a volatile security situation despite formal ceasefire arrangements. An airstrike near Kaem el-Loz on 2 April 2025 destroyed a house and wounded three civilians, soon followed by rocket fire targeting Kiryat Shmona, highlighting the fragile nature of the ceasefire—already marred by over 1,100 documented violations since late 2024 that previously resulted in 84 civilian deaths and more than 280 injuries. Diplomatic initiatives are ongoing, with discreet negotiations reported on 6 April 2025 by an American diplomat in Beirut and President Joseph Awn calling for increased international support on 8 April. Proposals for a negotiated timetable for Hezbollah disarmament are under discussion, although there remains a risk that any misstep could provoke further military responses. UNIFIL, now operating with 10,000 troops, strives to monitor incidents amid the discovery of weapons caches. The humanitarian outlook is similarly grim, with nearly 900,000 internally displaced people, severe infrastructure damage, an inflation rate reaching 150%, and unemployment at 40%, compounded by external pressures including ongoing American–Iranian negotiations.

# Displacement

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## Displacement Overview

The latest Mobility Snapshot report, produced on 10 April 2025 with data collected up to 4 pm on 09 April 2025, provides a detailed account of displacement trends in Lebanon. The report highlights that 967,485 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their communities, although these figures represent a single temporal snapshot as many remain in motion. A total of 91,955 IDPs (51% female, 49% male) were recorded, including 1,275 registered in 20 collective sites. District-level analysis reveals distinct patterns: for example, 70% of the IDPs originally come from El Nabatieh with 47% having fled outside its governorate, while in the South governorate 20% of originating IDPs experienced 75% movements internally. Return movement data further identify El Nabatieh district hosting 264,483 returnees (27% of the total), Sour district 204,874 (21%), and Saida district 158,185 (16%). Cross-governorate dynamics are notable, with 81% of returns occurring in



different governorates from the IDPs' origin; notably, 48% of IDPs departed from Beirut and returned outside its governorate. Complementary cadastral data report 346,209 IDP arrivals and 113,729 departures in designated districts. Housing figures show that around 23% of IDPs reside in host settings, 73% in rental housing, approximately 3% in second houses, and less than 1% in collective sites or other informal arrangements.

## Living Conditions of the Displaced Population

Assessments across vulnerable regions such as Akkar, Bekaa, Baalbek-EI Hermel, and the South reveal severe challenges impacting the displaced. Rapid needs assessments indicate that many homes are damaged and shelter conditions are insecure and overcrowded. Quantitatively, 72% of respondents have expressed an urgent need for cash assistance; only 58% of households achieve an acceptable food consumption score, while 84% rely on crisis-level livelihoods coping strategies. Access to basic services is compromised, with significant deficiencies in water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure across regions, further compounded by escalating protection risks including incidents of child labor, harassment, and deteriorating mental health. Limited livelihood opportunities and sporadic security incidents exacerbate the overall vulnerability of these populations.

## Drivers of Displacement

Multiple factors are driving displacement in Lebanon. On 8 April 2025, President Joseph Aoun officially called for urgent international support to secure Lebanon's borders amid escalating regional tensions and prolonged conflict effects. On 9 April 2025, a border operation in Rasm al-Hadath resulted in the arrest of a smuggler (identified as M.D.) and the interception of 17 Syrian nationals attempting an illegal crossing. Additionally, the Displacement Tracking Matrix (Round 84, with data collected up to 09 April 2025) underscores that conflict-related violence, security concerns, and political instability are key catalysts for both primary and secondary displacement. These drivers are set against a backdrop of periodic Israeli raids, economic collapse, and ongoing challenges in humanitarian funding.

## Integration

Detailed displacement tracking as of early April 2025 indicates that 91,955 IDPs were recorded across 24 districts in all eight governorates, with housing integration illustrating that approximately 23% of these individuals live in host settings, 73% in rental housing, and around 1% in collective sites. Return movement data further complicate integration efforts, as out of 967,485 returned IDPs, 81% arrived in governorates different from their origin. Significant district-level concentrations include 264,483 returnees in El Nabatieh (27% of total), 204,874 in Sour (21%), and 158,185 in Saida (16%). Integration initiatives face challenges from limited economic opportunities and access to social services. For instance, the "Return to the Cedar" program, launched in March 2025 to promote local investment via tax exemptions, received only 2,000 applications against an expected 10,000, reflecting obstacles in attracting returnees under current economic conditions. Furthermore, IOM reports note that while many Lebanese citizens have repatriated quickly post-airstrikes, many migrants continue to confront significant challenges in securing employment and adequate housing, emphasizing the need for enhanced community-led interventions and systemic support.

## Humanitarian Access

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### Humanitarian Access Overview

On 9 April 2025, a targeted border operation in Rasm al-Hadath near Baalbeck resulted in the arrest of 17 Syrian nationals and a Lebanese smuggler (M.D.) amid intensified efforts along the nation's 375-kilometer border to

control illegal passage. These security actions, along with ongoing border checks in high-priority zones such as Baalbek-Hermel, underscore an environment of escalated military measures that could impact aid delivery. A Displacement Tracking Matrix snapshot published on 10 April 2025 recorded 91,955 internally displaced persons (with a nearly equal gender split), providing precise data critical for planning humanitarian assistance. In an address on 8 April 2025, political leaders including President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam called for international support to secure borders and dismantle smuggling networks, highlighting the need for enhanced humanitarian aid within a framework challenged by legal, regulatory, and security constraints.

## Barriers to Humanitarian Access

Multiple obstacles restrict humanitarian access in Lebanon. Politically, international donors have conditioned future reconstruction and aid on the Lebanese government achieving exclusive state control over all weapons north and south of the Litani River—a stipulation emphasized by Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji and communicated by US envoy Morgan Ortagus. Operational obstacles include significant delays in disbursing promised funds; for example, a US pledge of US\$200 million made in March 2025 remains undisbursed. Physical barriers are evident with widespread infrastructure damage, such as disruption to water services from damage to 45 water stations and segments of water networks, with repair costs estimated at approximately USD 160 million affecting around 1.5 million people. Additionally, bureaucratic challenges are highlighted by non-transparent aid distribution practices, exemplified by a beneficiary list in Baalbek containing 1,400 duplicated names out of 5,000. Security risks persist as well, with around 50 Israeli raids reported since the start of the year and sporadic violations of ceasefire protocols further restricting safe access for humanitarian workers.

## Humanitarian Access Gaps

Recent assessments reveal significant gaps in humanitarian access. Detailed tracking from the Displacement Tracking Matrix (Round 84 Report, with data collected until 09 April 2025) recorded 91,955 IDPs across 326 cadasters in 24 districts, with 76% concentrated in five key districts (El Nabatieh, Sour, Saida, Aley, and Bent Jbeil). Additionally, returned IDP figures reached 967,485, including 264,483 in El Nabatieh and 204,874 in Sour, indicating widespread displacement and vulnerability. The humanitarian response is further hampered by acute funding shortfalls: a 90-day suspension of USAID programs initiated in January 2025—programs that previously contributed over \$123 million in 2023—along with cuts from European donors (including the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and Switzerland). Specific sector gaps include the health sector needing an additional \$278 million to support 3.7 million individuals (2.3 million targeted for direct aid) and the WaSH sector where UNICEF secured less than USD 4 million against a requirement of USD 12 million to maintain essential services. Moreover, migrant populations face compounded vulnerabilities due to language barriers and limited referral options for basic needs such as shelter, food, and mental health support.

## Information, Communication and AAP

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### Information Landscape

A comprehensive data tool was produced by IOM on 10 April 2025 (data collected until 4 pm on 09 April 2025) as part of Displacement Tracking Matrix Round 84, providing a detailed snapshot of internal displacement in Lebanon. The report of 91,955 internally displaced persons (IDPs) across 24 districts details housing arrangements with 73% of IDPs in rental housing, about 23% in host settings, minimal figures in collective sites, and a small percentage in secondary residences. It also includes granular district-level mapping, gender

disaggregation showing a near-even split (51% female), and records trends in return movements with 967,485 IDPs having returned, including both cross- and intra-governorate flows. The methodology, following the DTM Global Methodological Framework and triangulating multiple data sources (including DRM/LRC and government data), emphasizes transparency and evidence-based humanitarian monitoring.

## Communication Channels

Information exchange among humanitarian actors, journalists, and affected populations in Lebanon is characterized by a combination of digital and in-person channels. Journalists, for instance, have formed dedicated digital groups such as the 'Information Coordination' group based in Wassab with over 480 members, enabling rapid incident verification within as little as 10 minutes using official sources and field reports. Alternative press initiatives, particularly in Saida, and coordination efforts during crisis moments rely on platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram to share real-time updates. Additionally, political actors use Facebook, anonymous Twitter accounts, and WhatsApp groups to spread disinformation, highlighting the need—emphasized by figures like Sabine Hatem—for a unified digital information platform to overcome delays and fragmentation in official data dissemination.

## Barriers to Information

Several challenges hamper access to critical information in Lebanon. There is no unified information platform, leaving aid, financial, and crisis-related data scattered across sources such as the Official Gazette and Cabinet meeting minutes. Journalists sometimes experience delays of over a month to obtain accurate details and are forced to rely on personal relationships with officials. Information is also often published in technical formats that are not accessible to the general public, as seen in instances of manipulated data during aid distribution (e.g., a case in Baalbek where 5,000 names were reduced to 1,400 unique entries). Furthermore, language barriers among migrant communities—illustrated by limited translation services at MSF's Bourj Hammoud clinic—further restrict access to essential information.

## Misinformation and Rumors

There has been a widespread and organized spread of false information aimed at deepening internal divisions and inciting panic. Disinformation campaigns, documented notably by Al 3arabi Al Jadid on 9 February 2025, have employed networks on Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, TikTok, and Instagram to disseminate manipulated narratives that exaggerate facts and stir sectarian tensions. Specific instances include false social media claims of a building collapse in the southern suburbs due to Israeli targeting—which was later refuted—and fake text warnings of an imminent Israeli attack in Jabshit, later debunked by UNIFIL. Efforts to counter these trends include the establishment of fact-checking platforms like Lebanon Fact-Checkers and Libnanews Fact-Checking, alongside UN peacekeeping forces implementing structured, fact-based communication strategies.

## Accountability Needs and Transparency

Concerns over transparency and accountability in humanitarian operations are evident in multiple accounts. Sabine Hatem has highlighted that the absence of a unified information platform hampers public oversight and forces stakeholders to rely on personal relationships for obtaining financial and aid-related details, with data often presented in technical and scattered formats. Specific cases include the Baalbek aid distribution where 5,000 names were manipulated to yield only 1,400 entries, and an Emergency Commission's electronic platform that fails to adequately track funding sources or allocation details. These issues, compounded by ad hoc methods of data dissemination during crisis times, underscore the systemic need for accessible feedback and complaint mechanisms to ensure accountable humanitarian response.

## Legal and Policy

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## Legal and Policy Framework

Lebanon has implemented a comprehensive set of legal and policy measures to address its multifaceted crisis. At the national level, laws are being rigorously enforced to protect vulnerable populations and secure borders. For example, on 9 April 2025, a Lebanese military unit intercepted a suspicious van in Rasm al-Hadath near Baalbeck, arresting a smuggler (identified as M.D.) along with 17 Syrian nationals and seizing the vehicle. This operation, part of a broader effort that intensified after the ceasefire in November 2024, aims to counteract illegal migration, human trafficking, and the proliferation of unauthorized weapons. In high-level speeches, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam affirmed their commitment to demilitarize armed groups and ensure the state's monopoly over military force, underscoring adherence to United Nations Resolution 1701 (2006). Additionally, national reforms are underway to update security and judicial measures, lift banking secrecy, and implement financial reforms in line with international legal commitments and oversight requirements.

## Humanitarian Impact of Legislation

State actions have combined strict border security measures with humanitarian protection obligations. The 9 April 2025 operation in Rasm al-Hadath not only demonstrates enforcement capability but also raises concerns regarding the treatment of vulnerable individuals, as Lebanon—as a signatory to the Geneva Convention—is legally bound to avoid expelling refugees to dangerous areas. Public statements by President Joseph Aoun on 8 April, which highlighted the operation as a display of state firmness while calling for increased international support, further indicate the delicate balance between securing borders and upholding humanitarian and refugee protection standards.

## International Agreements Impacting the Crisis

International agreements play a critical role in shaping Lebanon's crisis response. A ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon, implemented on 27 November 2024 after nearly 14 months of hostilities, mandated a 60-day cessation of hostilities and required the redeployment of Lebanese Armed Forces to vacated areas in southern Lebanon. This agreement, alongside UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) which calls for the disarmament of non-state actors, has prompted multinational oversight involving UNIFIL, the United States, France, and Israel. This international framework is further reinforced by obligations from financial and regulatory bodies, such as the International Financial Action Task Force, and recent donor conditions exemplified by the January 2025 suspension of USAID programs that previously contributed over \$123 million in aid.

## Limitations of Current Policies

Several gaps within Lebanon's legal and policy frameworks undermine effective humanitarian assistance and crisis resolution. While anti-corruption laws and institutions like the National Anti-Corruption Commission exist, challenges such as insufficient technical and financial capacity and political resistance hamper transparency and effective aid distribution. Notable issues include duplicate entries in aid recipient lists and poor inter-ministerial coordination, particularly in budget alignment across sectors. Furthermore, legislative hurdles obstruct comprehensive banking reforms, with stalled draft laws facing objections from various interest groups and unresolved financial gaps exceeding \$72 billion. Border control policies also show limitations, as evidenced by the same 9 April 2025 military operation, indicating persistent challenges in curbing smuggling and trafficking. The abrupt 90-day suspension of USAID funding in January 2025 further compounds these systemic shortcomings, leaving the humanitarian sector underfunded and highlighting the need for robust policy reform.



## Sectoral Analysis

### Food Security and Livelihoods

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#### Access to Food and Market Functionality

Early 2025 reports indicate significant regional variations in market functionality in Lebanon. According to the WFP Market Functionality Index, Beirut and Mount Lebanon achieved a score of 10 in February 2025, indicating fully normal market conditions, while the South, Bekaa, and Baalbek-EI Hermel experienced a decline from an MFI of 7.3 in January 2025 to 6.3 in February 2025, attributed to price fluctuations in non-cereal food items. Notably, EI Nabatieh improved from an MFI of 1.1 in November 2024 to 6.3 in January and February 2025, and Akkar along with the North maintained stable scores of 7.3 since December 2024. Severe inflationary pressures were also documented, with the Food Price Index rising by 6.8% in January 2025 compared to the previous year. Detailed analyses revealed increases in beverage (14.1%), fruit (13.2%), legumes (9.8%), oils and fats (8.5%), canned fish (7.6%), cereals (7.5%), and fresh poultry (7.4%), while dairy prices rose marginally (0.5%); egg and sugar prices dropped by 12.6% and 2.8%, respectively. Regional disparities were further highlighted by annual increases of 12% in the South and 11% in Baalbeck-Hermel. Additionally, severe supply disruptions were noted: as of November 25, 2024, 80% of shops in EI Nabatieh, 83% in the South, and 63% in the southern Beirut suburbs were non-operational, undermining household purchasing power and access to nutritious food.

#### Coping Mechanisms

Households in Lebanon have resorted to drastic coping strategies in response to profound food insecurity and economic constraints. Assessments from early 2025 show that only 58% of households achieved an acceptable food consumption score, while up to 84% relied on crisis-level livelihood coping strategies. In conflict-affected areas such as Baalbek-EI Hermel, South, and Nabatieh, widespread income losses and disrupted livelihoods have forced families to reduce meal portions, cut back on essential expenditures, and in some cases, seek external food assistance or migrate in search of better opportunities. The displacement of communities and destruction of agricultural assets have further compelled farming households to abandon their lands and opt for lower-quality or less preferred foods.

#### Livelihood Disruption

Economic and conflict-related disruptions have severely impacted livelihood opportunities across Lebanon. Non-agricultural sectors have suffered from market damage, disrupted supply chains, and the destruction of income-generating assets. For instance, a Beirut-based software startup dismissed 20 employees in April 2025, and a garment factory in Zahlé closed after losing 30 technical staff. A March study by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce revealed that 65% of SMEs are struggling to find qualified staff, reflecting broader challenges in labor demand. Significant brain drain has been noted, with the health sector losing 2,500 doctors and 3,000 nurses (a 25% reduction), the education sector losing 1,800 teachers over three years, and an estimated 40% of IT engineers emigrating. Additionally, the "Return to the Cedar" program, aimed at encouraging local investment through tax exemptions, attracted only 2,000 applications versus an expected 10,000. Reports also indicate that over 200,000 Lebanese have already left the country, and the International Labour Organization estimates a 15% reduction in the working population since 2020, collectively undermining household incomes and overall economic stability.

#### Impact on Agricultural Activities and Production

The agricultural sector in Lebanon has been critically affected by ongoing conflict. As of October 8, 2024, the National Council for Scientific Research estimated that around 19,000 hectares of agricultural land were damaged. FAO reported that between September 23 and November 1, 2024, 336 agricultural sites, including 74 irrigated areas, were directly impacted by aerial strikes and shelling, with 221 strikes affecting grasslands in the Baalbek and Bekaa regions. Financial losses in the agriculture and food security sector have been significant, with the World Bank estimating total losses at \$742 million, broken down into \$34 million from destroyed irrigated crops, \$11 million from damaged irrigation systems, and \$16 million from livestock losses; separate figures reference an overall loss of \$586 million. Urgent recovery needs have been identified; FAO estimates that approximately \$263 million is required for reconstruction and recovery, with a priority allocation of \$95 million for 2025/2026. Furthermore, Minister of Agriculture Nizar Hani emphasized the need for a scientific reallocation of production based on an 'agricultural atlas' to guide crop production regionally and to support small-scale agriculture aimed at revitalizing rural livelihoods.

### Food and Livelihood Needs and Current Response

Needs assessments in regions such as Akkar, Bekaa, and the South reveal critical gaps in both food assistance and livelihood support. Quantitative findings indicate that only 58% of households achieved an acceptable food consumption score, while 84% resorted to crisis-level coping strategies; 72% of respondents expressed an urgent need for cash assistance. The deterioration of livelihood opportunities is evident with a significant reduction in non-agricultural income sources, disrupted markets, and rising debt, compounded by a high demand for skills training in agriculture, trades, and business. Additionally, assessments report that nearly half of the cadasters in Baalbek-El Hermel and 52 out of 61 in the South and Nabatieh face major challenges, with reported damage to shops and equipment further undermining economic activity. Humanitarian response efforts are hampered by recent funding cuts, including the suspension of U.S. foreign development assistance in January 2025—which halted USAID-funded projects that provided over \$123 million in aid in 2023—and similar reductions in European support. These combined factors emphasize the urgent need for better-coordinated, transparent, and adequately funded initiatives to restore household food security and rebuild sustainable livelihoods.

## Education

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### Learning Environment and Facility Conditions

On Wednesday, 9 April, a high-level meeting was held at the Ministry of Education building in Beirut where Qatar's Minister of Education confirmed ongoing support for the Lebanese education sector. Discussions focused on restoring balance to a system weakened by past crises, including efforts to rehabilitate schools after the 4 August explosion and to reconstruct facilities damaged in the recent Israeli conflict. Qatar's contributions – channelled through the Qatar Development Fund, the Country Fund for Scientific Research Care, and the Education Above All Foundation – have supported school rehabilitation, teaching costs, and university grants. Additionally, the meeting highlighted challenges in the educational infrastructure such as severe budget strains, with the Ministry's current allocation of approximately US\$2.5 million for public school and office rents now facing a potential doubling under a new rental law set for implementation in April 2025.

### Access to Education and Barriers

Recent reports indicate severe disruptions in Lebanon's education sector that are impeding students' access to continuous schooling. A cycle of teacher strikes has emerged, predominantly among contract staff, in response to unsustainable wage levels and inadequate social support. Financial constraints, including a budget decree

from the previous government and the impending new rental law that will significantly increase operational costs, further exacerbate the strain on educational services, thus posing a barrier to maintaining a consistent and quality learning environment.

### Education Needs and Current Response

The urgent needs in Lebanon's education sector were underscored during the high-level meeting on 9 April, where comprehensive support for all levels of education was affirmed. Stakeholders emphasized the need for enhanced educational curricula, strengthened mental health programs within schools, and expanded scientific and research collaborations. A joint educational cooperation agreement between Qatar and Lebanon is in its final stages and is expected to be signed soon, marking a step toward coordinated technical and material support. In a related development, Minister of Education Rima Karami called for a minute of silence on Monday, 14 April, following the national anthem across schools, high schools, vocational institutes, and universities. This commemorative gesture is intended to foster national unity and serve as a catalyst for reform by encouraging educational activities that reflect on difficult national histories, including the lessons of the Taif Agreement.

## Health

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### Availability and Access to Healthcare Services

Lebanon faces severe challenges in accessing healthcare services marked by a patchwork system. UNRWA operates 27 primary healthcare centres nationwide that provide critical maternal and child health services to Palestine Refugees—populations excluded from the public system. Meanwhile, consultations with private providers can cost between US\$50 and US\$70, not including transportation. Additionally, conflict-related disruptions have led to blocked roads, damaged infrastructure, and disrupted supply chains for medications, anesthesia, surgical equipment, and ICU beds, compounding financial and logistical barriers for families already struggling to afford even basic care. Projections indicate that by 2025 approximately 3.7 million people will require health assistance with an estimated funding need of US\$278 million.

### Disease Outbreaks

Lebanon's public health landscape is strained by concurrent communicable disease challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic, by 2024, had resulted in 1,243,838 confirmed cases and 10,952 deaths, further straining essential services. In parallel, cholera re-emerged in October 2022 for the first time in nearly three decades, particularly affecting northern regions such as Akkar and Baalbeck. By January 15, 2023, the Ministry of Public Health recorded 6,129 suspected cholera cases with 23 deaths, and vaccination campaigns initiated in November 2022 eventually controlled transmission. However, concerns remain for 2024 and 2025 with reports of up to 40,000 cases in one year, a 50% increase in cholera-related injuries and deaths (with figures reaching at least 810,000 cases and 5,900 deaths in 2024), and isolated confirmed cases such as a patient in Akkar treated on October 14, 2024, indicating ongoing sanitation and outbreak risks.

### Health System Challenges

Prolonged conflict and significant funding cuts have critically undermined Lebanon's healthcare system. Since October 2023, there have been 158 reported attacks on healthcare facilities, resulting in the loss of 241 healthcare workers and injuring 292 others. The violence has forced the complete closure of 133 primary health centres and 8 hospitals, while blocked roads and damaged infrastructure have severely disrupted supply chains for essential medical supplies and equipment. A major funding setback occurred with a 90-day suspension of U.S. foreign development assistance in January 2025—ending USAID projects that provided over US\$123

million in 2023—and similar funding reductions from European donors, culminating in an estimated funding gap of US\$278 million for 2025. These systemic challenges have escalated barriers to care and increased risks for civilians amid ongoing conflict and economic instability.

## Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS)

The ongoing conflict has precipitated a significant surge in mental health and psychosocial support needs. A January 2025 UNICEF survey reported that 72% of caregivers observed anxiety among children while 62% noted signs of depression. World Vision International estimates that over 88,400 children urgently require mental health intervention. Studies by UN Women highlight the psychosocial toll on women and girls, with 85% reporting an increase in unpaid care work post-displacement (notably for those displaced after September 23, 2024). In response, humanitarian actors such as Médecins Sans Frontières in Beirut's Bourj Hammoud have integrated mental health services into their care models, offering psychiatric consultations and referrals for emergencies. However, challenges remain in referring patients—particularly within migrant communities affected by restrictive systems like kafala—underscoring gaps in comprehensive psychosocial support.

## Health Needs and Current Response

The multifaceted healthcare crisis in Lebanon is characterized by acute needs across emergency care, chronic disease management, and maternal and child health services. Coordinated responses involve international and local actors. The suspension of U.S. foreign development assistance in January 2025 and subsequent funding cuts by European countries have left an estimated 3.7 million individuals in need (with 2.3 million targeted for support) and contributed to a US\$278 million funding gap for 2025. The continued attacks on healthcare facilities—with 158 reported incidents since October 2023, additional fatal attacks noted in November 2024, and conflict-related civilian casualties in early 2025 (including 84 deaths and 280 injuries)—have further eroded service capacity. Despite these challenges, efforts remain active: WHO estimates that public hospital services currently meet roughly 60% of needs, UNRWA's primary healthcare centres continue to provide essential services, and mobile clinics along with targeted interventions by MSF and other NGOs are operational. Moreover, displacement exacerbates the crisis; for example, the Displacement Tracking Matrix recorded 91,955 internally displaced persons on April 10, 2025, highlighting the widespread geographic impact and the pressing need for enhanced, coordinated healthcare interventions.

## Nutrition

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### Availability and Access to Nutrition Services

Malnutrition remains a critical challenge in Lebanon, with significant barriers affecting access to nutrition services. Routine maternal and child healthcare services are primarily provided by UNRWA through a network of 27 primary healthcare centres serving Palestine refugees. For example, Walaa, a 35-year-old Palestine refugee from Nahr El Bared camp, recounted receiving routine prenatal check-ups that included blood pressure and blood sugar monitoring as well as supplementation with iron and folic acid. Following delivery—where UNRWA covered 90% of the hospital costs—she continues to benefit from regular follow-ups for her infant, including weight monitoring and vaccination services. Additionally, rising healthcare costs in the private sector, exemplified by a private gynecologist consultation costing between US\$50 and US\$70 (excluding transportation), alongside increasing food prices, further hinder the community's access to proper nutritional support.

### Nutrition Needs and Current Response



According to the 2024 LIMA report, 5% of children under five in Lebanon suffer from moderate to severe underweight, with disaggregated rates of 2% for Lebanese children, 8% for Syrian refugees, and 4% for Palestinian refugees. Nearly 50% of young children exhibit at least one micronutrient deficiency—most notably zinc, vitamin A, iron, and vitamin D—while over two-thirds of adolescent girls and non-pregnant women experience deficiencies in vitamin D, iron, zinc, folate, and vitamin B12. Developmental delays are reported in 30% of Lebanese children, 40% among Syrian refugees, and over 80% in Palestinian children under two. Deteriorating food security, following a ceasefire and compounded by disrupted supply chains, has led to critical shortages in regions such as the Bekaa and Baalbek governorates, with food prices surging by 20.86% by January 2025. These factors, along with challenges in accessing nutritious food and inadequate feeding practices, underline the significant gaps in the current nutrition response in Lebanon.

## WASH

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### Availability of Water Sources

Lebanon's water infrastructure has suffered extensive damage due to the conflict, with approximately 45 water stations and major sections of water and wastewater networks rendered inoperative. This has disrupted the supply of safe drinking water to an estimated 1.5 million people, including displaced Syrians in informal settlements. Even in areas where networks remain intact, widespread electricity shortages have prevented water pumping to households. Additionally, movement restrictions and security concerns during hostilities have hindered access to natural springs, while supply chain disruptions have affected bottled water distribution. In South Lebanon, there have been reports of water contamination, raising serious health concerns.

### Access to Sanitation Facilities and Hygiene Practices

The conflict has severely disrupted water and sanitation services, forcing communities to ration water or resort to unsafe sources due to market closures and supply chain issues. Displaced populations face added challenges as economic constraints make basic hygiene products such as soap, shampoo, and sanitary pads unaffordable, with women and girls particularly affected. A displaced woman in a Beirut collective shelter described the harsh reality: 'We are only allowed to shower once a week. We place the water in the sun in the school playground, so our children don't have to shower with cold water.' Additionally, funding for WaSH services has drastically fallen short, with UNICEF securing less than USD 4 million of the USD 12 million needed, further undermining essential sanitation and hygiene practices.

### Waste Management and Vector-Borne Disease Risks

Recent municipal assessments (March 2025) reveal that solid waste management is severely inadequate. Waste collection services charge 100,000 LL monthly and cover only 60% of neighborhoods, with collection suspended in 40% of areas. This insufficient waste management, coupled with overburdened sewage networks, has led to unsanitary conditions that facilitate water contamination and create breeding grounds for disease-carrying vectors. The health risks are underscored by a confirmed cholera case in Akkar, where a patient from Samouniya began treatment on 14 October 2024 for severe acute watery diarrhea and dehydration.

### Main WASH Needs and Humanitarian Response

Comprehensive assessments in regions such as Baalbek-EI Hermel, Akkar, and Bekaa highlight critical challenges in water, sanitation, and hygiene due to conflict-related disruptions and infrastructural damage. Communities, especially those dependent on natural springs, face safety concerns that limit water collection. Widespread supply chain disruptions have resulted in water rationing, reliance on unsafe water, and reports of

contamination—particularly in South Lebanon. Economic hardships further exacerbate the situation by rendering essential hygiene products unaffordable, a situation poignantly illustrated by the account of a displaced woman in Beirut who noted families are limited to weekly showering. Compounding these challenges, municipal data indicate that public drinking water is available only three days per week at a cost of 150,000 LL per household. Humanitarian responses are constrained by significant funding shortfalls, with UNICEF's WaSH funding in informal settlements at less than USD 4 million against a USD 12 million requirement. This multidimensional crisis underscores the urgent need for infrastructure rehabilitation, increased humanitarian financing, and coordinated measures to restore reliable water supply and sanitation services.

## Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI)

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### Damage to Housing and Shelter Needs

Multiple reports confirm that housing infrastructure across Lebanon has sustained severe damage, leaving many homes—especially in the Bekaa, Baalbek-EI Hermel, and Southern regions—inadequate for safe living. The deterioration is compounded by insecure tenure and delayed shelter rehabilitation due to funding shortcomings. Vulnerable individuals, such as Pavani in Beirut who was turned away from shelters because of her non-Lebanese status, highlight the human impact of these failures. In addition to physical damage from conflict, returning populations face risks from unexploded ordnance and deteriorating infrastructure, underscoring the urgent need for coordinated rebuilding efforts and targeted shelter assistance.

### Living Conditions in Camps or Settlements

Recent findings reveal that residents in informal settlements and displacement camps face compounded hardships. Inadequate basic infrastructure in these areas has led to significant deficits in WaSH services; for instance, UNICEF managed less than USD 4 million of the USD 12 million required, resulting in limited access to clean water, proper sanitation, and hygienic facilities. Numerous families continue living in temporary and overcrowded settings: detailed assessments indicate that among displaced populations residing in host settings, 23% of IDPs are affected—with 38% of these reported as living in overcrowded conditions—while 73% rely on rental housing and less than 1% live in collective sites. Testimonies from displaced individuals describe drastic measures such as being allowed to shower only once a week and using improvised water storage methods to avoid cold water, further highlighting the severe challenges in these living conditions.

### NFI and Shelter Needs and Current Response

Monitoring efforts from early April 2025 paint a complex picture of the shelter landscape amid ongoing humanitarian challenges. The Displacement Tracking Matrix – Mobility Snapshot (Round 84 Report, 10 April 2025) documented nearly 91,955 IDPs residing in a mix of shelter arrangements, while other monitoring data recorded 967,485 internally displaced persons returning to their communities. These returns are marked by diverse housing arrangements, similar to those observed in informal settlements. In response, humanitarian actors including organizations such as MSF have distributed essential non-food items—emergency kits, hygiene products, and household essentials—to vulnerable groups residing in overcrowded and substandard shelters. However, response efforts are undermined by significant funding gaps and logistical challenges, including a recent 90-day USAID funding freeze imposed in January 2025 that halted multiple support projects, leaving critical needs unmet.

### Impact on civilians

Reports from early April 2025 highlight a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Lebanon. The Displacement Tracking Matrix (Round 84, data collected up to 09 April 2025 and published on 10 April 2025) recorded 91,955 internally displaced persons across 326 cadasters in 24 districts, along with 967,485 returned IDPs. Key return concentrations include 264,483 in the El Nabatieh district (27% of returns), 204,874 in the Sour district (21%), and 158,185 in the Saida district (16%). Additionally, on 9 April 2025, a Lebanese army operation in Rasm al-Hadath near Baalbeck led to the arrest of a smuggler (identified by the initials M.D.) while 17 Syrian nationals were intercepted during an illegal border crossing. Such incidents contribute to forced evictions, disruptions in movement, damaged infrastructure, and reduced access to safe water, sanitation, healthcare, and economic stability, thereby intensifying the risks of psychological trauma, food insecurity, and long-term displacement among civilians.

### Factors Driving protection risks

The crisis is further complicated by a porous 375-kilometer border and increasing trafficking activities. A notable incident on 9 April 2025 in Rasm al-Hadath saw the arrest of a smuggler (M.D.) along with 17 Syrians attempting an illegal crossing, reflecting broader concerns regarding illegal migration and human trafficking. High-level political calls for enhanced international support were made on 8 April 2025 by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, emphasizing the need to secure the border and dismantle smuggling networks amid ongoing regional instability, economic deprivation, and rising exploitation risks.

### Psychological and mental health impacts

Multiple reports outline a severe psychological toll on the affected populations. A UNICEF survey from early 2025 found that 72% of caregivers observed significant anxiety in their children, with 62% noting signs of depression. World Vision International estimated that over 88,400 children require urgent mental health support due to displacement and traumatic exposure. Similarly, a UN Women study reported that 85% of surveyed women experienced heightened stress and anxiety from bombings and shelling, with 52% of those displaced after late September 2024 facing increased unpaid care work. Additionally, MSF data indicated that psychiatric consultations doubled in 2024 compared to the previous year, while challenges such as language barriers and inadequate referral mechanisms contribute to the growing mental health crisis.

### Protection Needs and Current Response

The evolving displacement and conflict have significantly increased protection risks, including incidents of child labor, harassment, and widespread mental health challenges, while awareness of available services remains limited. In response, humanitarian actors and community-based mechanisms have been mobilized. For instance, migrant community leaders have collaborated with MSF teams to distribute essential relief items, operate overcrowded shelters and mobile clinics—with specific translation services to enhance mental health support and emergency referrals. However, significant challenges persist for vulnerable groups, particularly migrant workers under the kafala system, as legal and safe space options remain scarce. The fluid displacement patterns documented by the DTM emphasize the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian action addressing legal, psychosocial, and shelter needs.

### Child Protection concerns

Child protection remains a critical concern amidst the ongoing crisis. A UNICEF survey in January 2025 revealed that 72% of caregivers reported significant anxiety among children and 62% observed signs of

depression. World Vision International estimates that more than 88,400 children require urgent mental health support due to displacement and trauma. Furthermore, the border operation on 9 April 2025 in Rasm al-Hadath, which involved the arrest of a smuggler (M.D.) and 17 Syrian nationals—among whom children were also present—highlights the heightened risks of exploitation, unsafe conditions, and incidents of child labor in the crisis.

### Violence against women and girls

Numerous accounts detail severe gender-based violence affecting migrant and displaced women and girls. Detailed cases describe sexual harassment and both physical and psychological abuse, with vulnerable domestic workers experiencing exploitation exacerbated by the kafala system. Specific incidents include the sexual harassment of a migrant domestic worker (identified as Martha) *and the abuse suffered by another woman (Makdes)*, while reports indicate that some, like Pavani\*, were driven to resort to survival strategies such as sex work following prolonged wage theft, isolation, and abuse. Additionally, nighttime evacuation warnings in late September 2024 left workers exposed to risks including rape, kidnapping, and further abuse. These challenges are compounded by systemic barriers that limit access to legal and psychosocial support, underscored by UN Women findings where 85% of surveyed women reported increased stress, and 52% of those displaced after September 23, 2024 experienced additional unpaid care burdens.

## Vulnerable Groups / Special Needs Groups

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### Unaccompanied and Separated Children

No specific details were provided regarding unaccompanied or separated children in the current reports.

### Pregnant and Lactating Women

In Lebanon, organizations like UNRWA are providing targeted maternal healthcare services for vulnerable groups such as Palestine Refugees. A notable case involves a 35-year-old refugee mother from Nahr El Bared camp who received comprehensive prenatal care—including routine blood pressure and sugar level monitoring, nutritional supplements (iron and folic acid), and self-care counseling. UNRWA covered 90% of her hospital delivery costs, and she continues to benefit from postnatal follow-up care such as regular baby weighing, timely vaccinations, and necessary treatments. This intervention is critical given the high cost of private maternal care (US\$50–US\$70 per consultation excluding transportation), widespread food insecurity, malnutrition, and increased risks from gender-based violence that compound health complications for pregnant and lactating women.

### Adolescents and Youth

Early 2025 reports underscore severe challenges among Lebanon's youth. A UNICEF survey in March 2025 found that 82% of individuals aged 18–30 see no future in Lebanon. Additionally, a study by the American University of Beirut revealed that over a span of six years, 450,000 Lebanese—predominantly between 18 and 35 and largely comprised of university graduates or qualified professionals—have emigrated, with an extra 80,000 departures recorded between January 2024 and March 2025. The exodus is contributing to significant workforce losses, notably in the health sector (with 2,500 doctors and 3,000 nurses, representing 25% of the workforce, leaving) and education disruptions, as public schools have lost 30% of students due to teacher shortages. Local initiatives, such as an agricultural cooperative in Saida employing 50 young people with a \$2 million Qatari fund, have emerged to counteract youth unemployment and economic decline.



## People with Disabilities

No specific details were provided regarding the challenges faced by people with disabilities in the current reports.

## Elderly

Recent data from 2025 indicate that 45% of Lebanon's residents are over 50 years old—a significant increase from 35% in 2019. This aging demographic faces multiple challenges, including economic hardship, limited mobility, and social isolation. For example, a 62-year-old retired woman in Beirut lives on only \$40 a month after her daughters emigrated to Germany. Furthermore, ministry figures show that 35% of elderly households depend on younger family members for support. Combined with escalating malnutrition risks and restricted access to stable healthcare and essential services, these issues contribute to increased neglect and exclusion from aid programs.

## Displaced

Data from early April 2025 highlight ongoing challenges for displaced populations in Lebanon. IOM's Mobility Tracking Round 84 report (with data up to 09 April 2025) identified 91,955 internally displaced persons (IDPs) across 24 districts. Housing assessments reveal that 73% of these IDPs are living in rental housing, 23% in host settings, and about 1% in collective sites. Additionally, overall figures record 967,485 returned IDPs, even as many migrant workers continue to struggle to secure safe shelter. An IOM emergency appeal further estimates that 176,000 migrants, approximately 70% of whom are women, are in urgent need of support. These populations face significant challenges in finding employment, adequate housing, and timely legal regularization, compounded by difficulties accessing healthcare (including referrals for hospitalization and psychiatric emergencies) and WASH services amid sporadic hostilities.

## Minorities

Migrant communities in Lebanon are experiencing systematic discrimination, social exclusion, and targeted abuse. A prominent case involves a Sri Lankan domestic worker whose employer confiscated her passport, leaving her stranded during escalating hostilities and forcing her to seek refuge in multiple locations in Beirut. Additional accounts describe dehumanizing conditions—including verbal, physical, and sexual abuse—reported by Médecins Sans Frontières, with some migrants having to sleep on balconies during winter. Language barriers exacerbate these challenges, as many migrants are compelled to engage in urgent health or legal consultations in Arabic, often leading to isolation. In response, initiatives such as translation services and the employment of community health educators from migrant communities have been implemented at clinics like the MSF facility in Bourj Hammoud. Despite these efforts, restrictive policies such as the kafala system and ongoing funding constraints continue to limit access to legal protections and comprehensive psychosocial support for these minority groups.

## Acronyms

<b>ACLED</b>	The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
<b>ANERA</b>	American Near East Refugee Aid
<b>ATGM</b>	Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
<b>AOAV</b>	Action on Armed Violence
<b>AOR</b>	Area of Responsibility
<b>AWD</b>	Acute watery diarrhoea
<b>BBC</b>	British Broadcasting Corporation
<b>CAFI</b>	Call to Action Field Implementation
<b>CCCM</b>	Camp coordination and camp management
<b>CFR</b>	Centre for Preventive Action
<b>CP</b>	Child Protection
<b>CRSV</b>	Conflict-related sexual violence
<b>DFS</b>	Data Friendly Space
<b>DRC</b>	Danish Refugee Council
<b>DTM</b>	Displacement Tracking Matrix
<b>ECD</b>	Early Childhood Development
<b>ECP</b>	Escola de Cultura de Pau
<b>ERW</b>	Explosive remnants of war
<b>ESCWA</b>	The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>FCS</b>	Food Consumption Score
<b>FEWSNET</b>	The Famine Early Warning Systems Network
<b>FGD</b>	Focused Group Discussion
<b>GAM</b>	Global Acute Malnutrition
<b>GBV</b>	Gender-based violence
<b>GDP</b>	Gross domestic product
<b>HNO</b>	Humanitarian Needs Overview
<b>HRP</b>	Humanitarian Response Plan
<b>HRW</b>	Human Rights Watch
<b>ICG</b>	International Coordination Group on Vaccine Provision
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDF</b>	Israeli Defence Forces
<b>IDMC</b>	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person
<b>IED</b>	Improvised explosive device
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INGO</b>	International non-governmental organisation
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>IPC</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>ISW</b>	Institute for the Study of War
<b>IYCF</b>	Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices
<b>KII</b>	Key Informant Interview
<b>LBP</b>	The Lebanese Pound
<b>LRP</b>	Lebanon Response Plan
<b>LMAC</b>	Lebanon Mine Action Centre
<b>MAG</b>	Mines Advisory Group
<b>MEHE</b>	Minister of Education and Higher Education
<b>MHPSS</b>	Mental health and psychosocial support services
<b>MoEHE</b>	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
<b>MoSA</b>	Ministry of Social Affairs
<b>MSF</b>	Medecins Sans Frontieres
<b>MSNA</b>	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment
<b>NCDs</b>	Non-Communicable Diseases
<b>NDVI</b>	Normalised difference vegetation index (vegetative health)
<b>NFI</b>	Non-food item
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NRC</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>OTP</b>	Outpatient therapeutic feeding programs
<b>PHCCs</b>	Primary Health Care Centres
<b>PIN</b>	People in need
<b>PLO</b>	Palestine Liberation Organization
<b>PLW</b>	Pregnant and Lactating Women
<b>PM</b>	Protection Monitoring
<b>PRL</b>	Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon
<b>PSEA</b>	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
<b>PTSD</b>	Post-traumatic stress disorder
<b>PwD</b>	People with Disability
<b>RNA</b>	Rapid Needs Assessment
<b>SAM</b>	Severe acute malnutrition
<b>SDR</b>	Secondary Data Review
<b>SEA</b>	Sexual exploitation and abuse
<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual and gender-based violence
<b>SMEB</b>	Standard Minimum Expenditure Basket
<b>SOGIESC</b>	Sexual Orientations, Gender Identities, and Expressions
<b>SRH</b>	Sexual and reproductive health
<b>SSA</b>	Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care
<b>STIs</b>	Sexually Transmitted Infections
<b>TSFP</b>	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Program
<b>UASC</b>	Unaccompanied and Separated Children

<b>UAV</b>	Unarmed Aerial Vehicles
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNFPA</b>	The United Nations Population Fund
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNRWA</b>	The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNW</b>	UN Women
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for Development
<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded ordnance
<b>VASyR</b>	Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
<b>VPDs</b>	Vaccine Preventable Diseases
<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>WASH</b>	Water, sanitation and hygiene
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization