PROGRESS WITH THE INDUSTRIAL ACTUATOR REAL DATA BENCHMARK STUDY

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- What was done?
- What faults?
- Human factor fault
- Data file structure
- Added value
- End remarks

DAMADICS Workshop

ROBUST METHODS IN FAULT DIAGNOSIS

HULL

January 25, 2002

What was done?

Concise progress report between September and December 2001

- 19 successful artificial fault simulation sessions in sugar factory Lublin
- Upgrading factory equipment with the instruments necessary to perform demanded experiments
- Installing the SCADA system suited for Damadics purposes
- Acquiring the 32 process data between October 29 and November 22,2001 (sampling time 1s)
- Post processing the data to achieve transferable data files.
- Identifying records from faulty states
- Fault specification
- Publishing the data in the internet http://diag.mchtr.pw.edu.pl/damadics

What faults were introduced?

Control valve faults

- f₁ valve clogging
- f₂ valve or valve seat sedimentation
- f₃ valve or valve seat erosion
- f₄ increase of valve or bushing friction
- f₅ external leakage (leaky bushing, covers)
- f₆ internal leakage (valve tightness)
- f₇ medium evaporation or critical flow

Pneumatic servo-motor faults

- f_s twisted servomotor's rod
- f₉ servomotor's housing or terminals tightness
- f₁₀ servomotor's diaphragm perforation
- f₁₁ servomotor's spring fault

Positioner faults

- f₁₂ electropneumatic transducer fault
- f₁₃ rod displacement sensor fault
- f₁₄ pressure sensor fault
- f₁₅ positioner spring fault




General faults/external faults

- f₁₆ positioner supply pressure drop
- f₁₇ unexpected pressure change across the valve
- f₁₈ fully or partly opened bypass valves
- f₁₉ flow rate sensor fault

Steam boiler


(synoptic overview)

Water level control loop



Control loop tag: LC74_20

Evaporation station



Thin juice level control loop in the first section of evaporation station:

LC51_03


Thick juice flow control loop at the outlet of the fifth section of evaporation station: FC57_03

Development and Application of Methods for Actuator Diagnosis in Industrial Control Systems, FP5 DAMADICS Project

Data files structure


Principles

- Each data file contains data acquired from one day.
- Data are structured in a form of a matrix (86400 rows x 33 columns) of real numbers.
- First column contains time stamp (number of seconds passing from hour 0:00:00).
- Columns are related to the process variables while rows are corresponding to the time stamps.
- NaN string represents dummy data in the case of data lack (if any)




Control loop quality statistic evaluation

(off-line diagnostics)



Evaporator


(I-st section)



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
Control loop quality statistic evaluation

(off-line diagnostics)




Faulty situation vivisection

(human factor fault)





(bypass valve leakage)





Scenario:


 Partly opening the V2 bypass valve. (Valve internal and external leakage simulation)

























Fault f19* - Flow rate sensor fault in Actuator 2





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



Fault f19* - Flow rate sensor fault in Actuator 2



















Fault f19 – Flow rate sensor fault in Actuator 3




Remark to f19* – Flow rate sensor fault in Actuator 2 (rather flow feedback fault)

Actuator 2 works in flow control loop. Please pay attention that the flow signal available in DAMADICS data file is fault free. The fault was introduced only in the feedback of control loop.




Remark to f19 – Flow rate sensor fault in Actuator 3




Fault free state

(additional profits – Kv value identification)



Faulty state

(Kv virtual change due to simulation of leckage)



End remarks

The generation of hardware artificial faults can be dangerous for the process. Therefore not all known and identified faults can be simulated.

Data acquired from three actuators from sugar factory in autumn 2001 as well as detailed artificial fault specification are available from the web http://diag.mchtr.pw.edu.pl/damadics.

Experiments done are time and money expensive.