

## Homework #4

Due date: **10 December 2021**

### Notes:

- Note that there are five attached files: “RSA\_Oracle\_client.py” for Question 1, “RSA\_OAEP.py” and “RSA\_OAEP\_client.py” for Question 2, “ElGamal.py” for Questions 3 & 4 and “DSA.py” for Questions 5 and 6.
- You are expected to submit your answer document as well as a separate Python code for each question. Do not modify the source codes that are given to you and do not submit them. You must import them to your sources as they are, do not solve the questions in those files.
  - Source files to submit: Q1.py, Q2.py, Q3.py, Q4.py, Q5.py, Q6.py
- Print out your numerical results in integer format, without “-e”. (We do not want to see results like 1.2312312341324523e+24).
- Winzip your programs and add a readme.txt document (if necessary) to explain the programs and how to use them.
- Name your winzip file as “cs411\_507\_hw04\_yourname.zip”
- Create a PDF document explaining your solutions briefly (a couple of sentences/equations for each question). Also include your numerical answers (numbers that you are expected to find). Explanations must match source files. Please also add the same explanations as comments and explanatory output.

- (20 pts)** Consider a deterministic RSA Oracle that is implemented at the server “cryptlygos.pythonanywhere.com/RSA\_Oracle/”. Connect the server using `RSA_Oracle_Get()` function, and it will send a ciphertext  $c$ , modulus  $N$  and public key  $e$ . You are expected find out the corresponding plaintext  $m$ . You can query the RSA Oracle with any ciphertext  $\bar{c} \neq c$  using the python function `RSA_Oracle_Query()`, and it will send the corresponding plaintext  $\bar{m}$ . You can send as many queries as you want as long as  $\bar{c} \neq c$ . Then, check your answer using `RSA_Oracle_Checker()`  
You can use the Python code `RSA_Oracle_client.py` to communicate with the server.

I choose randomly  $r = 30$ . It does not matter what did I choose. We know  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  are multiples of each other. So encrypted  $c_1$  and  $c_2$ . Since  $m_2 = (m^{*e} * x^{*e}) \bmod n$  and we  $e*d = 1 \bmod \phi(n)$ . when we take  $e*d$  as exponent  $(r^{*ed} * m^{*ed}) \bmod N = r*m \bmod N$ . So,  $m_1 = r*m \bmod N$ . As a result I used relationship between  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ , encrypted  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  applied formula and change base of formula as  $rm$

$e*d = 1 \bmod \phi(n)$  change base as  $m*r$

$(r^{*ed} * m^{*ed}) \bmod N = r*m \bmod N = m_2$

{'m\_':

18287477167346339561913746475360599955421600698845450651759703375514552203  
814128795969387063288218065129092150}

message:

60958257224487798539712488251201999851405335662818168839199011251715174012  
7137626532312902109607268837636405

b'Bravo! You find it. Your secret code is 65695'

messagetext: Bravo! You find it. Your secret code is 65695

Congrats

2. (20 pts) Consider the RSA OAEP implemented at the server [http://cryptlygos.pythonanywhere.com/RSA\\_OAEP](http://cryptlygos.pythonanywhere.com/RSA_OAEP). By using the `RSA_OAEP_Get()` function get your ciphertext (`c`), public key (`e`) and modulus (`N`). The RSA-OAEP implementation at the server is given in the file "`RSA_OAEP.py`", in which the random number `R` is an 8-bit unsigned integer.

I select a random four decimal digit PIN and encrypt it using RSA. Your mission is to find the randomly chosen PIN. You can use the Python code `RSA_OAEP_client.py` to communicate with the server.

since `c`, `N` and `e` are given in the question and I know range of `m` (4 digit so range is 1000) and `R` I range ( $2^7, 2^8-1$ ) since 8 bit unsigned integer. also given the source code. By using nested loop I found `m` and `R`. I check my answer to `RSA_OAEP_Checker`. It is correct.

PIN\_ : 8211, R : 130

```
{'c':
11352871632598964629356838860088839410463425369482314036274872077619009
180504, 'N':
75912732707060243642078909648401302780483043992228012220203806825283170
905549, 'e': 65537}
M = 8211
R = 130
Congrats
```

3. (10 pts) Consider the ElGamal encryption algorithm implemented in the file "`ElGamal.py`", which contains a flaw. We used this implementation to encrypt a message using the following parameters:

`q` = 21951366550493000718261853105201996539940614036945856492989212434043

`p` =

19088517355831130409934748378779805905302705641965364159942125090101617  
 99975302701818966798354528918628523029441864160503682524067809739739523  
 04043595070715594043892482165997787657197138464583053698006362742220168  
 30546342326148389081626885189560815658702360521026851058633029338654212  
 43714153248167871823317078513925980737349818011430897694478440665517540  
 06255395274462668748032735120045083082893838173662613857114711446785176  
 08879306099468067802238512104280975543754563520312324843005014163082784  
 86706749306383133223230788507203013300913700383314510553853774057307370  
 0482783653386269696771584777005458361676730195269

`g` =

11087495091603530820155897131840473261858409884534929785120936970350376  
 59834044289688357464174469647962847262434235927215163753913689593361793  
 90305203914071844167089070134876151918097100789097413593600008572563950

44892863044815125384716347435813066195815485624291719443466688879049424  
00791184444633880624418592233021031270794382539211558447026770527340518  
02239534092327598870055016955978239282077553105785546036019197246668095  
27816369888108811510878478538472275092154183239479881736342603225650419  
11277466551676624011800253272537259320592302769935164641119415859076391  
6065051068576064011732461215932399447248837314410

**public key (h) =**

98732037791782449173585738221087148662255645750938083812135220550996269  
05048574718377079843991839510388942447133846967681289456819947370683826  
28603050350281850071815481158793767153887039702039469691684647739659826  
17430477742224019706487459212528763340520244344259560828951137273700274  
72890009184908903484272749740481915199204657643903755451357580121147257  
48919054090278301411984618992540495713579651863596237507088245986545812  
74430357722122932554282640340496354906122615733878875248888020671649049  
93484937321856473479363757660548251755432575453310770104973287194502039  
014525475315126375676115874359038819330713241291

And the resulting ciphertext is

**r =**

13239165462296247473198286084973383864996378253136557740429521719144063  
83182172917779939930595084842901016459154257856268402394624109630113974  
68731251853378852497076591684939427893138197446673356190457539005062403  
69136086623859500236018345087286259769447189948020380571433737454919151  
20257122023840190268531617316065266472881480273028686271650185613047486  
15978345573944100642206602629510864733812138720010018120892451772953239  
99087622201098124683901064700236434898763210368066565620049984903773379  
38904650891780570675707459917391297553726134190621376340947927642183161  
8970202312256091485549555360990937615951232838268

**t=**

29280452183829134574436841440121192521587026069356504060827229090437502  
22063535952568445399246549338686535905837513361362432352310427915617009  
88951279870088942537729008874317926727314888524372408731094089634092103  
26318262933018181961310077228118136187521393649127662643150456938744441  
32957516084576903717991215125921734695027091167528772436766134863043017  
91824830771168126440524765508203739226544881266746681692174908432802975  
07654911129780161720779447115753845604489858091677998829769121658248700  
25790728459775008685965071079143643944588549757339336699279861653817076  
680172669373971736606326598544835667466271193204

Can you find the message?

Yes, since we know  $k$  is a random number between 1 and  $q-1$ . I create a loop to find  $k$  depend on  $r = g^k \bmod p$  equation. When I found  $k$ , I used it and

$t = h^k \bmod p$  equation to find message. My  $k$  and message are:

$k : 64278$

message: I am gonna make him an offer he cannot refuse

—

4. (10 pts) We encrypted two messages  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  using ElGamal encryption algorithm given in "ElGamal.py", however, it contains a flaw and we lost  $m_2$ .

$q = 1367176787662174613885987459588219879372220953507$

$p =$

12367332389124286717751409681958023646549727406345898432524105584401115  
32241450548588645213717746491050188229711169826507159411178810355528157  
26337827743610567394319322651354827890393410346287094867949471330649611  
35314435028020280399469925285118964937173665627961895598865090409245523  
2405972031238033017555179

$g =$

40462122118872181945378921352487072939516952018662735686055484614731377  
30024129679327419401533067787456191386225703234931919531045428857993189  
77831726993684766176439355920665365929642039967646173934977630301024546  
45553889589858508155863659008244138450734103034330653704886415203645218  
198502091410748740351645

$(message_1, r_1, t_1) = (b'I am gonna make him an offer he cannot refuse',$

35813661127331527469358400061602362468584884055947523542303622721572499  
08666312496219775973257012829953850416555947179942023015615136135565768  
77688425582079130001730700815455797827567591161809324984483902594026320  
02506904042755369723913250346319397461924695165447086327416600659876669  
982364749540300843612970,  
43627224218115797228289249475921032907034220460492356111895503936082854  
41816825041649707294134747199474372797325464232558545358408174079990636  
02998440418026542203284314119516166793469955598432642546280685016132929  
59454582118556805666347691733714922031589614165107379883775596944798653  
631705811795089241771123)

$(message_2, r_2, t_2) = (b'????????????????????????????????????',$

35813661127331527469358400061602362468584884055947523542303622721572499  
08666312496219775973257012829953850416555947179942023015615136135565768  
77688425582079130001730700815455797827567591161809324984483902594026320  
02506904042755369723913250346319397461924695165447086327416600659876669  
982364749540300843612970,  
59568136192782011408009242720680905545649092959799624506306565197404304  
77504942407392993409599925085203647233193851018647091657112428687538063  
60664717325176286420842837300958204263948269554791374473141738781633562  
10255723448544422838075151255799212982176663283015298786493199577089152  
00631529408344007611288)

Can you recover  $m_2$  using the given settings? If yes, demonstrate your work.

Since  $r_1 = r_2 = r$  and  $m_1$  is known plaintext, we can find  $m_2$  by using the formula:

$t_1/m_1 \equiv \beta^k \equiv t_2/m_2 \pmod{p} \Rightarrow m_2 = (t_2 m_1)/t_1 \pmod{p}$ . you can see my code implementation of Q4.py. my answer is:

```
m2:
96928302129849365517846198241613279401367102954269953482679461610816578
6147584985094094249886701190566804838203669396484740329991713
Well, it was more like a command, no was not an option!
```

5. (20 pts) Consider the DSA scheme implemented in the file “DSA.py”. The public parameters and public key are:

**q** = 21050461915163064005698472752818467960484664222419461240422905587329  
**p** =

16635001268424770248362496020878982794855973042727123110276218221363115  
 24853212165692699849532442288420190054690824729942252986702025779530591  
 56033991197841238179775514759387498436307470908055513031878231189178701  
 07061292013527768094302098323705503978319951833567419037832636219099472  
 14254039067931608434125302079707267438675083165816159141364389867078805  
 04091973526325187625121048274055764701312958323181996487958617151547860  
 17505168792207090684639374274256123402219808087541722302681946268933484  
 82428641177480000004487324994182896574459481735793738810363610755121352  
 0018336143107199947863581191230243194303971728193

**g** =

40931620979660749096873470202098280877933876738788631265223700153125135  
 19384142780904183350879136499577997486930584564361373787892130310216018  
 41984495312049017317816796121062649530217902210296634640163356870134181  
 39503460178797459143542359051500977332066584366856779278758638554247370  
 78133856082288012444874515641657250388958820689890965646458323419139946  
 04332904195872831552155924295687686237830596535191981309628250139994665  
 07735818600000634616943372297605742900641097353826256749772710865565841  
 15485005391564506450111814727077599886511786891728656704219642617413639  
 064440921727292947646859466643167910307728438276

**public key - beta** =

33300014245030443259321976761361272666893919950919130156725973810883631  
 95443636436214100590508995319643488427125424686523948044137259202338907  
 64670393459854801740832318401792488664896286474431696492411302218619895  
 03569639078914852477771636476713904471978591173834732362248668124572814  
 18747109659529110082818277631210752087862841216075741167889905488089669  
 42318570402085239628131043375095357374570562932388371209766986764420837  
 21774774274786789105907171094330714417631182022066560133544918764055781  
 83340130479272394166426285634289785202101955376163382958091547009006419  
 080716225036628147308639272669903679362104917651

You are given two signatures for two different messages as follows:

(message<sub>1</sub>, r<sub>1</sub>, s<sub>1</sub>) = (b"Asking questions during the lectures helps you understand Crypto",  
260444855760506318805841590364189311211267498403457607938240440795,  
15045429964567421250403275656320025283600046882519690784113588548158)  
(message<sub>2</sub>, r<sub>2</sub>, s<sub>2</sub>) = (b"Keep your friends close, but your enemies closer",  
260444855760506318805841590364189311211267498403457607938240440795,  
14016151436550334193141059702675072658308100333231844563375725796770)

Can you find the private key?

Since r<sub>1</sub>=r<sub>2</sub>=r. I used  $a = (s_1 h_2 - s_2 h_1)(r(s_2 - s_1))^{-1} \bmod q$  to find private key(a). to find h<sub>1</sub> and h<sub>2</sub> I used SHAKE128. R and s<sub>1</sub> and s<sub>2</sub> are given in the question. So I just apply equation. My answer is

private key:

18011493590957919843196654272530256451916130571913898417508651137437

6. (20 pts) Consider the DSA scheme implemented in the file "DSA.py". The public parameters and public key are:

**q** = 1274928665248456750459255476142268320222010991943

**p** =

94399082877738640356344835093633851742226810946548058167594106609599304  
10148337619860162864464557897866586774337151621354955901750927001378526  
28251248881697386920885609199950755091463798028663470213532995799952807  
12578946802331952341703103059527013530389111994085951544456654086033481  
582042901134498773988127

**g** =

74757613048887093209741634228228425902948572222965683892966782829654298  
80079178908486135670434637124492120193881888089964734897492545195345027  
93005145946428963437513890858384665833844529025644779811271175052595853  
03938871436241327714244689153971542398500058515599232922200606171788427  
214873986464441516423273

**public key - beta** =

93910788220122222642484838539579554500745218470968665334596813695469448  
86235023857738438187102424298184377435789154539420500484576343932422250  
73275980083797933646389625186320359798816290641392473648855423990861417  
00571273995885016154289072399549849469820245719380344768068416334880508  
02767414373595444261997

You are given two signatures for two different message as follows:

(message<sub>1</sub>, r<sub>1</sub>, s<sub>1</sub>) = (message1 = b'Erkay hoca wish that you did learn a lot in the  
Cryptography course',

780456265196245442017019073827244628033034896446,  
214154189471546244965139202160125045302874348377)

## CS 411-507 Cryptography

(message<sub>2</sub>, r<sub>2</sub>, s<sub>2</sub>) = (b'Who will win the 2021 F1 championship, Max or Lewis?',  
927294142715241205623350780659879368622965215767,  
151110642214296558517943730901561426792280910589)

Can you find my private key? (**Hint:** I ran out of random numbers for the signature of the second message)

Yes, since  $r_1 \neq r_2$ . We can claim that  $k_2 = x * k_1$ . I applied that formula:  
 $a = (s_1 h_2 - s_2 h_1 x)(s_2 r_1 x - s_1 r_1)^{-1} \bmod q$ . Since  $x$  is unknown which gives us the coefficient between  $k_1$  and  $k_2$ . Firstly, I try loop range  $1 < x < 50$  and I could not find any answer so I increased the range  $1 < x < 100$ . To check every possible of  $a$ . I used the formula:  $\beta = g^{**}a \bmod p$ .

So, my answer is:

$x$ : 63

$a$ : 66568624500090235129890566130399211243633217014

$a$  is my private key and  $x$  is coefficient between  $k_1$  and  $k_2$ :  $k_2 = 63 * k_1$