



SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND LANGUAGE SCIENCES

MIND, MATTER & LANGUAGE

PHIL08014

Degree Examination

Exam Date: Monday 21st December 2015 **From** 14:30 **To:** 16:30

Exam Diet: December 2015

Please read full instructions before commencing writing

- Answer **three** questions in total. Exactly **one** question must be from section **A: Philosophy of Mind**. Exactly **two** questions must be from section **B: Philosophy of Language**.

Special instructions

- **BARCODE INSTRUCTIONS FOR CANDIDATES:**

You have been provided with a set of barcode labels

- (1) Leave the named label on the sheet
- (2) Place one **anonymous** barcode label to the front of each script book
- (3) Please also write your exam number in the space provided on the front of the script book

Special items

- School supplied barcodes

This paper will be marked anonymously

Convenor of Board: Dr David Levy

External Examiner: Professor Max de Gaynesford

Please turn over

Students must answer **three (3)** questions in total.

Section A: Philosophy of Mind. Answer exactly ONE (1) question

1. 'I can doubt the existence of the physical world. I can't doubt the existence of my mind. Therefore my mind must be distinct from the physical world.' Is this a good argument for Substance Dualism?
2. What is the intentional stance? Imagine a Martian super-physicist who can explain and predict your behaviour without adopting the intentional stance. How does this Martian physicist pose a problem for Dennett's view? Can Dennett provide a successful response?
3. What is eliminative materialism? Is this view self-refuting?
4. Clark and Chalmers claim that a smartphone, notebook, or other cognitive technology could, if properly integrated with the workings of your biological brain, count as part of the physical circuitry of your mind. Are they right? Discuss the main arguments for and against such a view.

Section B: Philosophy of Language. Answer exactly TWO (2) questions

5. What is Frege's Puzzle and how is Frege's theory of *sense* and *reference* supposed to solve this puzzle?
6. What is Russell's theory of descriptions and what are the primary motivations for it?
7. What, according to Kripke, are the problems with the descriptivist analysis of proper names? Are there any good responses on behalf of the descriptivist?
8. What is the causal theory of reference? Discuss at least one of the problems for this theory.
9. What, according to Austin and Searle, are the problems with analyzing meaning in terms of truth conditions? Do these arguments show that truth conditional semantics is hopeless?
10. What is a conversational implicature and what distinguishes a conversational implicature from literal meaning? Furthermore, what is the difference between *conversational* implicatures and *conventional* implicatures?

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