This article reports on an effort to explore the differences  
between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are  
often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and  
naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the  
obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes mar-  
velous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map  
the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill  
from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude  
that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment  
requires an assessment of the predictability of the environ-  
ment in which the judgment is made and of the individual’s  
opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment.  
Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judg-  
ment accuracy.  
Keywords: intuition, expertise, overconfidence, heuristics,  
judgment  
In this article we report on an effort to compare our  
views on the issues of intuition and expertise and to  
discuss the evidence for our respective positions. When  
we launched this project, we expected to disagree on many  
issues, and with good reason: One of us (GK) has spent  
much of his career thinking about ways to promote reliance  
on expert intuition in executive decision making and iden-  
tifies himself as a member of the intellectual community of  
scholars and practitioners who study naturalistic decision  
making (NDM). The other (DK) has spent much of his  
career running experiments in which intuitive judgment  
was commonly found to be flawed; he is identified with the  
“heuristics and biases” (HB) approach to the field.  
A surprise awaited us when we got together to con-  
sider our joint field of interest. We found ourselves agree-  
ing most of the time. Where we initially disagreed, we were  
usually able to converge upon a common position. Our  
shared beliefs are much more specific than the common-  
place that expert intuition is sometimes remarkably accu-  
rate and sometimes off the mark. We accept the common-  
place, of course, but we also have similar opinions about  
more specific questions: What are the activities in which  
skilled intuitive judgment develops with experience? What  
are the activities in which experience is more likely to  
produce overconfidence than genuine skill? Because we  
largely agree about the answers to these questions we also  
favor generally similar recommendations to organizations  
seeking to improve the quality of judgments and decisions.  
In spite of all this agreement, however, we find that we are  
still separated in many ways: by divergent attitudes, pref-  
erences about facts, and feelings about fighting words such  
as “bias.” If we are to understand the differences between  
our respective communities, such emotions must be taken  
into account.  
We begin with a brief review of the origins and  
precursors of the NDM and HB approaches, followed by a  
discussion of the most prominent points of contrast be-  
tween them (NDM: Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsam-  
bok, 1993; HB: Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002;  
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Next we present some claims  
about the conditions under which skilled intuitions de-  
velop, followed by several suggestions for ways to improve  
the quality of judgments and choices