

# Models with Disaster Risk

Nicola Borri

LUISS

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## Barro (2006)

- This model accounts for the observed equity premium by introducing in the standard CCAPM rare disasters (i.e., low probability large aggregate negative shocks).
- Disasters:
  - economic events: the Great Depression, the Great Financial Crisis,
  - natural disasters: earthquakes,
  - epidemics of disease: Black Death, Covid-19.
- In economic terms, Barro (2006) argues that **wars** have been the most important economic disasters of the twentieth century globally.

# Wars are associated with a large drop in real GDP

TABLE I  
DECLINES OF 15 PERCENT OR MORE IN REAL PER CAPITA GDP

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
Part A: Twenty OECD Countries in Maddison [2003]

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Event	Country	Years	% fall in real per capita GDP
World War I	Austria	1913–1919	35
	Belgium	1916–1918	30
	Denmark	1914–1918	16
	Finland	1913–1918	35
	France	1916–1918	31
	Germany	1913–1919	29
	Netherlands	1913–1918	17
	Sweden	1913–1918	18
	United States	1913–1918	18
Great Depression	Australia	1928–1931	20
	Austria	1929–1933	23
	Canada	1929–1933	33
	France	1929–1932	16
	Germany	1928–1932	18
	Netherlands	1929–1934	16
	New Zealand	1929–1932	18
	Portugal	1929–1933	31
	Spain	1934–1936	15
Spanish Civil War	Spain	1935–1938	31
	United States	1934–1936	15
World War II	Austria	1944–1945	58
	Belgium	1939–1943	24
	Denmark	1939–1941	24
	France	1939–1944	49
	Germany	1944–1946	64
	Greece	1939–1945	64
	Italy	1940–1945	45
	Japan	1943–1945	52
	Netherlands	1939–1945	52
Aftermaths of wars	Norway	1939–1944	20
	Canada	1917–1921	30
	Italy	1918–1921	25
	United Kingdom	1918–1921	19
	United Kingdom	1943–1947	15
	United States	1944–1947	28

Figure 1: Economic Disasters and Economic Consequences (Barro, QJE 2006)

Large disasters are *rare*



Panel A: Contractions in Table I

Figure 2: Frequency of Disasters and Size of Contraction (Barro, QJE 2006)

In GDP terms, the impact of a pandemic is less severe




Figure 3: GDP cost of Covid-19 pandemic (Statista)


# Stocks tend to have a low payoffs when disasters hit

TABLE II  
STOCK AND BILL RETURNS DURING ECONOMIC CRISES

Event	Real stock return (% per year)	Real bill return (% per year)
<b>World War I</b>		
Austria, 1914–1918	—	–4.1
Denmark, 1914–1918	—	–6.9
France, 1914–1918	–5.7	–9.3
Germany, 1914–1918	–26.4	–15.6
Netherlands, 1914–1918	—	–5.2
Sweden, 1914–1918	–15.9*	–13.1
<b>Great Depression</b>		
Australia, 1928–1930	–3.6	8.2
Austria, 1929–1932	–17.3*	7.1
Canada, 1929–1932	–23.1*	7.1
Chile, 1929–1931	–22.3*	—
France, 1929–1931	–20.5	1.4
Germany, 1928–1931	–14.8	9.3
Netherlands, 1929–1933	–14.2*	5.7
New Zealand, 1929–1931	–5.6*	11.9
United States, 1929–1932	–16.5	9.3
<b>Spanish Civil War</b>		
Portugal, 1934–1936	13.4*	3.8
<b>World War II</b>		
Denmark, 1939–1945	–3.7*	–2.2
France, 1943–1945	–29.3	–22.1
Italy, 1943–1945	–33.9	–52.6
Japan, 1939–1945	–2.3	–8.7
Norway, 1939–1945	1.7*	–4.5
<b>Post-WWII Depressions</b>		
Argentina, 1998–2001	–3.6	9.0
Chile, 1981–1982	–37.0*	14.0
Indonesia, 1997–1998	–44.5	9.6
Philippines, 1982–1984	–24.3	–5.0
Thailand, 1996–1997**	–48.9	6.0
Venezuela, 1976–1984	–8.6*	—

Figure 4: Equity and Bill Returns during Crises (Barro, QJE 2006)

# US GDP fluctuates around an upward trend at least since WWII



**Figure 5:** US quarterly per capital GDP. Seasonally adjusted, blue-dashed line is HP-filtered trend. Data are from FRED for the period 1947 to 2024.

# Models with Disaster Risk

- Barro (QJE 2006) assumes that log consumption growth follows:



$$\begin{aligned}\Delta c_{t+1} &= \mu + \sigma \epsilon_{t+1} \quad \text{with probability } (1 - p) \\ &= \mu + \sigma \epsilon_{t+1} + \log(1 - b) \quad \text{with probability } p\end{aligned}$$

where  $\epsilon_{t+1} \sim i.i.d. N(0, 1)$  and  $b \in (0, 1)$ .

- $b$  is a *rare* disaster which causes **a permanent drop in consumption**  $\rightsquigarrow$  disasters are *costly*!
- Investors have standard CRRA preferences



# The disaster causes a permanent drop in consumption



## Risk-Free Rate (I/II)

- The risk-free rate follows from the standard Euler equation  $P = E(MX)$  and CRRA preferences:

$$R_t^f = \{E_t[M_{t+1}]\}^{-1} = \left\{E_t[\beta e^{-\gamma \Delta c_{t+1}}]\right\}^{-1}$$

which under the specified endowment process implies that:

$$\begin{aligned} R^f &= \left\{ \beta(1-p)e^{-\gamma\mu + (1/2)\gamma^2\sigma^2} + \beta p e^{-\gamma\mu + (1/2)\gamma^2\sigma^2 - \gamma \log(1-b)} \right\}^{-1} \\ &= \left\{ \beta e^{-\gamma\mu + (1/2)\gamma^2\sigma^2} [(1-p) + p(1-b)^{-\gamma}] \right\}^{-1} \end{aligned}$$

- Taking logs:

$$r^f = -\log \beta + \gamma\mu - (1/2)\gamma^2\sigma^2 - \log [(1-p) + p(1-b)^{-\gamma}] \quad (1)$$

## Risk-Free Rate (II/II)

- If  $p = 0$  (no disaster), then the risk-free rate is same as with CRRA and iid log consumption growth:

$$r^f = -\log \beta + \gamma\mu - (1/2)\gamma^2\sigma^2$$

- Assume  $p = 1/100 > 0$ ,  $b = 0.2$  and  $\gamma = 1$  (from Barro's paper), then:

$$\log [(1 - p) + p(1 - b)^{-\gamma}] = 0.0025 = 25bp$$

- Intuition:
  - $r^f$  is lower because investors save more for both intertemporal substitution and risk aversion effects,
  - the higher is  $b$  (disaster size), the lower is the risk-free rate.




Figure 6: Risk-free rate as function of disaster probability




Figure 7: Risk-free rate as function of disaster size

## Price-Dividend Ratio

- Since  $\Delta c$  is *i.i.d.* (i.e., disasters are unpredictable), the *PD* ratio is constant as in the standard CCAPM.

$$q \equiv \frac{P_t}{D_t} = E_t \left[ \beta \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{1-\gamma} \left( \frac{P_{t+1}}{D_{t+1}} + 1 \right) \right] = E_t \left[ \beta \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{1-\gamma} (1 + q) \right]$$

- After some simple algebra:

$$q = \beta(1 + q) \left[ e^{(1-\gamma)\mu + \frac{(1-\gamma)^2}{2}\sigma^2} \left( (1-p) + p(1-b)^{1-\gamma} \right) \right] \quad (2)$$

note: we compute the PD ratio because it is useful in the derivation of the (log) equity return in the model (i.e.,  $\log(ER^e)$ ).

## Expected Equity Return

- The expected equity return is:

$$\begin{aligned} E_t(R_{t+1}^e) &= E_t\left(\frac{P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}}{P_t}\right) = E_t\left(\frac{P_{t+1}/D_{t+1} + 1}{P_t/D_t} \frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t}\right) \\ &= \frac{1+q}{q} E_t\left(\frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t}\right) \\ &= \frac{1+q}{q} \left[ e^{\mu + (1/2)\sigma^2} (1 - p + p(1 - b)) \right] \end{aligned}$$

- We can derive the expected log equity return using (2) and taking the log of the equation above:

$$\log [E(R^e)] = -\log \beta + \gamma\mu - \frac{\gamma^2}{2}\sigma^2 + \gamma\sigma^2 + \log \left[ \frac{1 - p + p(1 - b)}{1 - p + p(1 - b)^{1-\gamma}} \right] \quad (3)$$

# Equity Premium

- The (log) equity premium is then:

$$\log \left( \frac{ER^e}{R^f} \right) = \gamma \sigma^2 + \log \left[ \frac{(1 - p + p(1 - b))(1 - p + p(1 - b)^{-\gamma})}{1 - p + p(1 - b)^{1-\gamma}} \right] \quad (4)$$

- The term in the square brackets comes from the default premium and is equal to zero if  $p = 0$ .



# Equity Premium and the Disaster Probability

- The derivative of the (log) equity premium  $r^e$  with respect to  $p$  is:

$$\frac{\partial r^e}{\partial p}(p) = \underbrace{-\frac{b}{1-pb}}_{\leq 0} + \underbrace{\frac{b(1-b)^{-\gamma}}{[1-p+p(1-b)^{-\gamma}][1-p+p(1-b)^{1-\gamma}]} }_{\geq 0} \quad (5)$$

- Note that for small  $p$  we have:

$$\frac{\partial r^e}{\partial p}(0) = -b + b(1-b)^{-\gamma} > 0$$

- Intuition:
  - for  $p$  small, an increase in  $p$  increases the risk premium,
  - for  $p$  large, risk premium drops because *uncertainty drops* even though disaster is large.




Figure 8: Equity premium as function of disaster probability and size




Figure 9: Equity Premium as function of disaster probability for fixed  $b = 0.2$

TABLE V  
CALIBRATED MODEL FOR RATES OF RETURN

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	No disasters	Baseline	Parameters		Low $q$	Low $\gamma$	Low $\rho$	
			Low $\theta$	High $p$				
$\theta$ (coeff. of relative risk aversion)	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	
$\sigma$ (s.d. of growth rate, no disasters)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	
$\rho$ (rate of time preference)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
$\gamma$ (growth rate, deterministic part)	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025
$p$ (disaster probability)	0	0.017	0.017	0.025	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017
$q$ (bill default probability in disaster)	0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	
Variables								
Expected equity rate	0.128	0.071	0.076	0.044	0.071	0.051	0.061	
Expected bill rate	0.127	0.035	0.061–0.007		0.029	0.015	0.025	
Equity premium	0.0016	0.036	0.016	0.052	0.042	0.036	0.036	
Expected equity rate, conditional	0.128	0.076	0.081	0.052	0.076	0.056	0.066	
Face bill rate	0.127	0.037	0.063–0.004		0.031	0.017	0.027	
Equity premium, conditional	0.0016	0.039	0.019	0.056	0.045	0.039	0.039	
Price-earnings ratio	9.7	19.6	17.8	37.0	19.6	27.8	24.4	
Expected growth rate	0.025	0.020	0.020	0.018	0.020	0.015	0.020	
Expected growth rate, conditional	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.020	0.025	
Levered results (debt-equity ratio is $\lambda = 0.5$ )								
Expected equity rate	0.129	0.089	0.084	0.071	0.092	0.069	0.079	
Equity premium	0.0024	0.054	0.024	0.078	0.063	0.059	0.054	
Expected equity rate, conditional	0.129	0.096	0.091	0.080	0.099	0.076	0.086	
Equity premium, conditional	0.0024	0.059	0.028	0.084	0.068	0.059	0.059	

Figure 10: Model Results (Barro, QJE 2006)

## Gourio (2008)

- Barro (QJE 2006) assumes that disasters are permanent.
- However, in the data, disasters are usually followed by recoveries.
- Gourio (AER 2008) shows that the effect of recoveries hinges on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES):
  - when the IES is low, recoveries may increase the equity premium implied by the model,
  - when it is high, the opposite happens.

TABLE 1—MEASURING RECOVERIES  
(In percent)

Years after trough	All disasters (57 events)		Disaster greater than 25% (27 events)	
	Growth from trough	Loss from previous peak	Growth from trough	Loss from previous peak
0	0	−29.8	0	−41.5
1	11.1	−22.8	16.1	−32.7
2	20.9	−16.8	31.3	−24.2
3	26.0	−13.7	38.6	−20.4
4	31.5	−10.2	45.5	−16.9
5	37.7	−6.1	52.2	−13.4

*Note:* The table reports the average of (a) the growth from the trough to 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 years after the trough and (b) the difference from the current level of output to the previous peak level, for 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 years after the trough.

Figure 11: Disasters and Recoveries (Gourio, AER 2008)




FIGURE 1. LOG GDP PER CAPITA (IN 1990 DOLLARS) FOR FOUR COUNTRIES: GERMANY, NETHERLANDS, THE US, AND CHILE

Note: The disaster start (end) dates are taken from Barro (2006), and are shown with a vertical full (dashed) line.

## Figure 12: Disasters and Recoveries (Gourio, AER 2008)

TABLE 2

Probability of a recovery $\pi$	0.00	0.30	0.60	0.90	1.00
IES = 0.25	3.31	4.62	5.91	7.19	7.64
IES = 0.50	3.31	3.30	3.03	2.26	1.68
IES = 1	3.31	2.69	1.94	1.00	0.54
IES = 2	3.31	2.42	1.52	0.63	0.30

*Notes:* Unconditional log geometric equity premium, as a function of the IES and the probability of a recovery. This table sets risk aversion at 4 and the other parameters as in Barro (2006).

Figure 13: Equity Premium and IES (Gourio, AER 2008)



# Intuition I

- To understand the result, recall the present value identity in the case of power utility:

$$\frac{P_t}{C_t} = E_t \sum_{k \geq 1} \beta^k \left( \frac{C_{t+k}}{C_t} \right)^{1-\gamma}$$

- The fact that a recovery may arise can increase or decrease the stock price today depending on whether  $\gamma > 1$  or  $\gamma < 1$  (recall: IES in the case of power utility is  $1/\gamma$ ).

## Intuition II

- Good news about the future has two effects:
  1. on the one hand, it increases future dividends, which increases the stock price today (cash-flow effect),
  2. but on the other hand, it increases interest rates, which lowers the stock price today (discount-rate effect).
- The second effect (discount-rate) is stronger when interest rates rise more for a given change in consumption, i.e., when the IES is low.

## Other relevant papers

- Some other relevant papers in the strand of the asset pricing literature incorporating disasters:
  - Lettau et al. (2014): downside risk CAPM
  - Wachter (2013): rare disasters and stock market volatility
  - Gabaix (2012): time-varying severity of disasters
  - Farhi and Gabaix (2016): rare disasters and exchange rates
  - Bernstein et al. (2019): climate risk and asset prices

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