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Education

2016-2021 (expected)	European University Institute (EUI), Florence, Italy PhD in Economics – <i>Essays in applied micro-econometrics</i> Research interests: <i>Migration, political economy and public economics</i> Supervisors: Andrea Ichino, Andrea Mattozzi (EUI) and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (EHESS, external supervisor)
2016-2017	European University Institute (EUI), Florence, Italy MRes in Economics
2014-2015	Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (GSE), Barcelona, Spain MSc in Economics
2012-2014	Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris/ Sciences Po, Paris, France Masters in International Affairs
2009-2012	University College London (UCL), London, UK BSc (Econ) Economics (Hons)

Working Papers

“Early voting experiences and habit formation” (with Elias Dinas, Vicente Valentim and Mark Franklin), Conditionally accepted at Political Science Research & Methods

Abstract:

Research has shown that first-time voting experiences affect subsequent voting behavior, with salient elections boosting subsequent turnout and non-salient ones suppressing it. We challenge this view. Following research on the context-dependent nature of habit formation, we argue that all elections should affect subsequent turnout in elections of the same type. Comparing individuals that differ only in how salient their first eligible election was (Presidential or Midterm), we find support for this expectation. Individuals are more likely to vote for, and be interested in, elections of the same type as their first voting experience. Leveraging voting age laws in the US, we also show that such laws affect subsequent participation by changing the type of election individuals are first eligible for.

Work in Progress

“The impact of campaign financing rules on candidates’ selection and electoral outcomes: evidence from France” (with Vincent Pons and Clémence Tricaud)

Abstract:

This paper investigates the effects of electoral campaign financing rules on electoral outcomes. Using a rich dataset of French municipal and departmental elections since 1995, we test whether campaign expenses reimbursement by the state and spending limits affect electoral outcomes. Candidates face campaign spending ceilings and are eligible for reimbursement if and only if they obtain more than 5 percent of the votes, in districts hosting more than 9,000 inhabitants. We use a regression discontinuity design around the population threshold to test whether these campaign funding rules affect the pool of competing candidates, electoral competitiveness, and the identity of the winner. Our results show that campaign funding rules level out the playing field and, so, reduce incumbency advantage and increase electoral competitiveness as well as the winning probability of candidates with fewer alternative means to fund their campaigns. The reimbursement of campaign expenditures (instead of spending limits) is the factor driving our results.

“Migration and redistributive spending: Evidence from English local authorities” (with Lars Ludolph)

Abstract:

In this paper, we analyse the quantitative effects of the migration wave from Central- and Eastern European countries following their EU accession in 2004 on English local authority spending, with a focus on expenditure items linked to redistribution. We apply a difference-in-difference estimation strategy and find that migrants did not have an effect on total service provision per capita, and only marginally impacted on local authority funding sources. Once we zoom into the different expenditure items, we find that local authorities experiencing relatively larger migration inflows saw their spending shares on means-tested items decrease in relative terms. Specifically, local

authorities shifted their spending away from social care towards education services. We find no evidence that these shifts are driven by mechanisms that reflect a change in the willingness to redistribute income. Rather, we find evidence that migrants' need for services differs from that of the local population due to their differing socio-economic characteristics.

"Term limits and accountability: Evidence from Italy" (with Pietro Panizza)

Abstract:

Term limits are a common institutional provision in many democracies aimed at mitigating moral hazard and hidden action problems that may worsen with time. We study the impact of re-election incentives on local public spending, corruption and vote-buying. While a rich theoretical literature investigates the role of re-election incentives on policy outcomes, very few empirical studies assess the effectiveness of term limits on accountability because of the difficulty to disentangle the effects of re-election incentives from other characteristics such as ability or experience. We bridge this gap by studying the impact of the introduction of the possibility to run for an additional term in Italian municipalities below 3,000 inhabitants on local public budgets. Exploiting the before/after 2014 and discontinuous policy variation at 3,000 inhabitants, we show that introducing a third term causes an increase in local government spending, particularly for mayors that would otherwise be lame ducks. These increases are concentrated in current and capital expenditures and are matched by increases in revenue with little fiscal incidence, thereby keeping deficits constant and possibly increasing re-election probabilities. Mayors who suddenly become twice re-eligible also react by increasing capital expenditures and expanding the deficit. Finally, the sudden longer horizon of these mayors also induces an increase in waste collection related spending, a result we are currently investigating. These results confirm that re-eligibility concerns and the horizon of leaders in power are important determinants of local public finances and that term limits may have an important disciplining effect.

"An independent Institution? Political ideology and budget allocation in the European Union"

Abstract:

This project seeks to provide new evidence on the determinants of the European Union's (EU) budget allocation to member-states. While an important stream of literature has studied the determinants of budget allocation and Pork barrel politics in the United States, barely any work has been done at the EU level, particularly when focussing on its executive branch, with the notable exception of Gehring and Schneider (2018) who find that the nationality of Commissioners matters when determining budget allocation at the European level. The focus and contribution of this project is to study the impact of partisan lines at the EU level, a relatively less integrated union than the Federal model of the US.

Focussing on EU Agriculture funds - for which the Commission has most discretion - and constructing an ideological distance measure between the Commissioner for Agriculture and each countries' head of State, this paper demonstrates that ideological proximity between Heads of States and the Commissioner positively impacts the share of agriculture funds countries receive as a share of the total agriculture amount the commission spends on – especially in years preceding elections. These results suggest that Commissioners engage in tactical distribution of EU funds and provides good evidence in support of partisan theories of budget allocation at a less integrated level.

Policy publication

["Macroeconomic Imbalances, France 2014"](#), European Economy occasional papers 178, March 2014, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission (Among the main contributors)

Invited seminars and presentations

2021	APSA Annual meeting - upcoming; MPSA Annual Meeting – Virtual presentations; Migration Policy Centre – Migration Working Group – Florence, Italy
2020	EP@P, Economics & Politics at Paris - Virtual presentation at Sciences Po, Paris; EPSA 2020 – Virtual presentation; EUI Microeconometrics working group – Virtual presentation; EUI 4th year PhD student forum – Florence, Italy
2019	APSA Annual Meeting – Washington DC, USA; 3rd Workshop in Political Economy and Public Economics - Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich, Germany; EP@B, Economics & Politics at Bruxelles – ULB, Brussels, Belgium; EUI Microeconometrics working group – Florence, Italy
2018	EUI 2nd year PhD student forum & EUI Microeconometrics working group – Florence, Italy

Work experience

April – June 2019	John Hopkins University (JHU) , Bologna Italy Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Econometrics Senior Teaching Assistant to Prof. Christopher Gilbert Answered course related questions during office hours and via email Graded student presentations and essays
September 18 – January 2019	John Hopkins University (JHU) , Bologna Italy Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Microeconomics Senior Teaching Assistant to Prof. Matteo Alvisi Gave in-class review sessions of lectures to 1st year Master students reviewing theoretical concepts and solving practice exercises Answered course related questions during office hours and via email Graded the mathematical section of mid-term and final exams
January – March 2018	European University Institute (EUI) , Florence, Italy Department of Economics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Microeconomics III (graduate), Teaching Assistant to Prof. Andrea Mattozzi Gave in-class corrections and graded Micro III problem sets of 1st year PhD researchers in economics at the EUI Answered course related questions during office hours and via email
September 15 – August 2016	European Central Bank (ECB) , Frankfurt, Germany Directorate General Economics – Monetary Policy – Monetary Policy Strategy Division <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trainee Research Assistant in the Strategy Issues Section (STI)
October 13 – February 2014	European Commission , Brussels, Belgium Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EC Blue Book trainee within the unit focussing on the French economy
July – September 2011	Moelis & Company , London, UK Investment Banking Division <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summer analyst

Grants & Scholarships

2016	EUI PhD researchers' grant
2017-2020	French government authority and École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) grant

Miscellaneous

Languages	French: Native speaker; English: Bilingual speaker; German: Strong; Mandarin: Intermediate; Danish: Intermediate spoken, Italian: Intermediate; Spanish: Beginner
Software skills	MS Office Pack & Stata (advanced)

References

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