

Symmetric Encryption Revisited

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Agenda: Symmetric Encryption Revisted

1. Modes of operation
2. Security definitions for privacy
 - ▶ IND-CPA: definition and example attacks
 - ▶ IND-CPA security of CTR and CBC modes
 - ▶ IND-CCA: definition and example attacks

Recall Syntax of Symmetric Encryption

Syntax

A symmetric encryption scheme $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ is a triple of algorithms.

alg	input	output	notation	maybe randomized?	maybe stateful?
\mathcal{K}	-	key K	$K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$	yes	no
\mathcal{E}	$K \in \text{Keys}(\mathcal{SE})$ $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$	ciphertext $C \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$	$C \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{E}_K(M)$	yes	yes
\mathcal{D}	$K \in \text{Keys}(\mathcal{SE})$ $C \in \{0, 1\}^*$	plaintext $M \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$	$M \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_K(C)$	no	no

Correctness

For all $K \in \text{Keys}(\mathcal{SE})$ and all $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$,

$$\Pr \left[C = \perp \text{ OR } \mathcal{D}_K(C) = M : C \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{E}_K(M) \right] = 1.$$

Modes of operation

OTP is impractical. Most symmetric encryption schemes use block ciphers as building block.

Let E be a block cipher.

idea

$$C \leftarrow E_K(M)$$

- ▶ But oftentimes, M is longer than the block length and/or isn't of the length multiple of the block length!
- ▶ So we need to figure out how to chop up M and/or pad it.
- ▶ There are many methods to do this. These methods are called **modes of operation**.

Electronic Code Book mode (ECB): key generation


Encryption scheme in ECB mode is **deterministic** and **stateless**.

Let $E : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a block cipher.

$\mathcal{K} : K \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k ; \text{ return } K$


[This key generation algorithm will be used for all modes of operation.]

ECB: encryption and decryption



$\mathcal{E}_K(M)$:

- if $(|M| \bmod n \neq 0 \text{ or } |M| = 0)$
then return \perp
- Break M into n -bit blocks $M[1] \dots M[m]$
- for $i \leftarrow 1$ to m do
 $C[i] \leftarrow E_K(M[i])$
- $C \leftarrow C[1] \dots C[m]$
- return C




$\mathcal{D}_K(C)$:

- if $(|C| \bmod n \neq 0 \text{ or } |C| = 0)$
then return \perp
- Break C into n -bit blocks $C[1] \dots C[m]$
- for $i \leftarrow 1$ to m do
 $M[i] \leftarrow E_K^{-1}(C[i])$
- $M \leftarrow M[1] \dots M[m]$
- return M

Cipher Block Chaining mode ($CBC\$$): encryption and decryption

Encryption scheme in $CBC\$$ mode is **randomized** and **stateless**.



$\mathcal{E}_K(M)$:


- if $(|M| \bmod n \neq 0 \text{ or } |M| = 0)$
then return \perp
- Break M into n -bit blocks $M[1], \dots, M[m]$
- $C[0] \leftarrow IV \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$
- for $i \leftarrow 1$ to m do
 $C[i] \leftarrow E_K(C[i-1] \oplus M[i])$
- return $C[0] \parallel \dots \parallel C[m]$

$\mathcal{D}_K(C)$:

??

Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC): encryption and decryption

Encryption scheme in CBC mode is **deterministic** and **stateful**.



$\mathcal{E}_K(M)$:

- if $(|M| \bmod n \neq 0 \text{ or } |M| = 0)$
then return \perp
- Break M into n -bit blocks $M[1], \dots, M[m]$
- static $ctr \leftarrow 0$; $C[0] \leftarrow ctr$; $ctr \leftarrow ctr + 1$
- for $i \leftarrow 1$ to m do
 $C[i] \leftarrow E_K(C[i-1] \oplus M[i])$
- return $C[0] \parallel \dots \parallel C[m]$

$\mathcal{D}_K(C)$:

??

Counter mode

idea

Try to be like OTP but use block cipher to generate the pad.



As usual, there are two versions:

apply the block cipher to a random value \implies *CTR\$*

apply the block cipher to a counter \implies *CTRC*



Counter mode (*CTRC*): encryption and decryption

Encryption scheme in *CTRC* mode is **deterministic** and **stateful**.



$\mathcal{E}_K(M)$:

- If $(|M| = 0)$ or $(|M| \bmod n \neq 0)$ then return \perp
- Parse M into n -bit blocks $M[1], \dots, M[m]$
- static $ctr \leftarrow 0$; $C[0] \leftarrow ctr$
- $ctr \leftarrow ctr + m$
- if $ctr - 1 > 2^n - 1$ then return \perp
- For $i = 1$ to m do
- $C[i] \leftarrow E_K(\langle \llbracket C[0] \rrbracket + i - 1 \rangle) \oplus M[i]$
- Return $C[0] \parallel \dots \parallel C[m]$







$\mathcal{D}_K(C)$:

??

Counter mode ($CTR\$$): encryption and decryption

Encryption scheme in $CTR\$$ mode is **randomized** and **stateless**.



Security definitions for **privacy**

Issues in privacy

Setting:

- ▶ First pick a key: $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$
- ▶ sender and receiver know K
- ▶ adversary A does **not** know K
- ▶ adversary A can capture ciphertexts

What's considered **insecure**?

Definition for privacy: attempt 1

key recovery

From the ciphertexts, A can get K .

- ▶ For sure, this is true:
A breaks key recovery \Rightarrow scheme is insecure
- ▶ What about the inverse?
- ▶ counterexample: can you think of an encryption scheme secure under key recovery but does nothing to hide the message?

Definition for privacy: attempt 2

plaintext recovery

From the ciphertexts, A can get M .

What if the message format is such that some bits are more important than others?

In this case, what if A can't get the whole message M but can get at those important bits?

Definition for privacy: attempt 3

partial information recovery

From the ciphertexts, A can get partial information about M .

But which bits do we want to protect???

- ▶ 1st bit?

- ▶ i -th bit?

For example, suppose

the i -th bit of the plaintext is 0 iff we want to sell stock

- ▶ sum of all bits?

Bottom line :

We don't want to make assumptions about data format!

Definition for privacy

- We need to approach this more directly:

Q : What would an ideal encryption scheme look like?

A : An angel delivers your messages, i.e.
no partial information gets leaked!

- We want to approximate this.
[but we can't help but leak the length of M]

So we aim for this :

A secure scheme shouldn't let A relate ciphertexts of messages of the same length.

Examples of insecure scheme: ECB

A can get information even if A can't break the block cipher.

example

$0^n =$ don't fire missile

$1^n =$ fire missile

Suppose the two commands are to fire missiles.

1. A sees the first ciphertext C_0 followed by a missile.
2. A sees the second ciphertext C_1 , which looks exactly the same as C_0 .
3. What would A do??

Bottom line :

For ECB, ciphertexts of messages with the same contents look exactly the same!

Definition for privacy: first lesson

A secure encryption scheme cannot be both deterministic and stateless.

- ▶ one message should correspond to many possible ciphertexts.
- ▶ This is **not** what's historically done.

Indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks

IND-CPA

Idea

- ▶ Pick a hidden bit b at random.
- ▶ Let A choose two messages.
- ▶ One of the messages will get encrypted.
- ▶ The resulting ciphertext is given to A .
- ▶ A guesses what b is.

IND-CPA

Subroutine *Initialize*

$b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\} ; K \xleftarrow{\$} KG$

Subroutine *Enc*(M_0, M_1)

If $|M_0| \neq |M_1|$ then return \perp

Return $\text{Enc}_K(M_b)$

Subroutine *Finalize*(d)

Return $(d = b)$

Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{SE}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(A)$

Initialize

$d \xleftarrow{\$} A^{\text{Enc}}$

Return *Finalize*(d)

ind-cpa advantage

The **ind-cpa advantage** of an adversary A mounting a chosen-ciphertext attack against SE is

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SE}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(A) = 2 \cdot \Pr \left[\text{Exp}_{\text{SE}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(A) \Rightarrow \text{true} \right] - 1 .$$

IND-CPA: observations

- ▶ \mathcal{SE} is **secure against IND-CPA** if an adversary restricted to **practical** amount of resources can't obtain **significant** advantage.
- ▶ **resources** are
 1. time
 - ▶ the running time of A (over all coins of A and all return values)
 - ▶ size of A's code
 - ▶ time spent by A to read bits returned from oracle (return values in unit time)
 2. number of bits queried
[length of query (M_0, M_1) = max length of M_0 and M_1]
 3. number of queries submitted

Bottom line : IND-CPA captures privacy.

IND-CPA: observations

As we'll see,

- IND-CPA \Rightarrow key recovery is hard.
- \Rightarrow message recovery is hard.
- \Rightarrow partial information recovery is hard.
- ...

Example IND-CPA attacks

Proposition : ECB is insecure.

Let $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. Let $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ be the ECB encryption scheme based on E . Then, there exists an ind-cpa adversary A such that,

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{SE}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(A) = 1$$

and A runs in time $O(n)$ and asks 1 query totalling $2n$ bits.

Notice

ECB is bad *even if* E is a perfectly good block cipher!
This is a **design flaw!**

Proposition :

Any deterministic and stateless schemes are insecure.

Let $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ be the deterministic, stateless symmetric encryption scheme.

Assume that there's an integer m such that the plaintext space of the scheme contains at least 2 distinct strings of length m . Then, there is an adversary A such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{SE}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(A) = 1$$

and A runs in time $O(m)$ and asks 2 queries totalling $2m$ bits.

Proposition : CBCC is insecure.

Let $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$.

Let $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ be the CBCC scheme based on E .

Then, there exists A such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{SE}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(A) = 1$$

and A runs in time $O(n)$ and asking 2 queries totalling $2n$ bits.

Indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks

IND-CCA: idea

- ▶ Similar to IND-CPA except that we also **let A ask for decryption of ciphertexts of its choice.**
- ▶ But to prevent a trivial attack, we do **not** let A ask for the decryption of the ciphertexts that it got back from the encryption oracle.
- ▶ Similar to IND-CPA, we also allow multiple adaptive queries.

IND-CCA: Left-or-right indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks: formal definition

Subroutine *Initialize*

$b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\} ; K \xleftarrow{\$} KG ; S \leftarrow \emptyset$

Subroutine *Enc*(M_0, M_1)

If $|M_0| \neq |M_1|$ then return \perp

Return $\text{Enc}_K(M_b)$

Subroutine *Dec*(C)

If $C \in S$ then return \perp

Return $\text{Dec}_K(C)$

Subroutine *Finalize*(d)

Return ($d = b$)

Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}_{\text{SE}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(A)$

Initialize

$d \xleftarrow{\$} A^{\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}}$

Return *Finalize*(d)

ind-cca advantage

The **ind-cca advantage** of an adversary A mounting a chosen-ciphertext attack against SE is

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{SE}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(A) = 2 \cdot \Pr \left[\mathbf{Exp}_{\text{SE}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(A) \Rightarrow \text{true} \right] - 1 .$$

Example IND-CCA attacks

Proposition : $CTR\$$ is insecure against chosen-ciphertext attacks.

Let $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ be a family of functions. Let $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ be the $CTR\$$ encryption scheme based on E . Then, there exists an ind-cca adversary A such that,

$$Adv_{\mathcal{SE}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(A) = 1$$

and A runs in time $O(n + l)$ plus the time for one application of E and asks 1 query totalling l bits to the encryption oracle and 1 query totalling $n + l$ bits to the decryption oracle.

Note

$CTR\$$ is secure against IND-CPA but insecure against IND-CCA.

Proposition : $CBC\$$ is insecure against chosen-ciphertext attacks.

Let $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a family of functions. Let $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ be the $CBC\$$ encryption scheme based on E . Then, there exists an ind-cca adversary A such that,

$$Adv_{\mathcal{SE}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(A) = 1$$

and A runs in time $O(n)$ plus the time for one application of E and asks 1 query totalling n bits to the encryption oracle and 1 query totalling $2n$ bits to the decryption oracle.

Note

$CBC\$$ is secure against IND-CPA but insecure against IND-CCA.

Proving positive results

$CTR\$$ and $CTRC$ are secure under IND-CPA

proposition: $CTRC$ is secure under IND-CPA

Let $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^I \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^L$ be a family of functions and let $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ be the $CTRC$ encryption scheme. Let A be an **ind-cpa adversary** that runs in time at most t and asks at most q queries, these totalling at most σ L -bit blocks. Then there exists a **prf adversary** B such that

$$Adv_{\mathcal{SE}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(A) \leq Adv_E^{\text{prf}}(B) .$$

Furthermore B runs in time at most $t' = t + O(q + (I + L)\sigma)$ and asks at most $q' = \sigma$ oracle queries.

proposition: $CTR\$$ is secure under IND-CPA

Let $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^I \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^L$ be a family of functions and let $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ be the $CTR\$$ encryption scheme. Let A be an **ind-cpa adversary** that runs in time at most t and asks at most q queries, these totalling at most σ L -bit blocks. Then there exists a **prf adversary** B such that

$$Adv_{\mathcal{SE}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(A) \leq Adv_E^{\text{prf}}(B) + \frac{0.5\sigma^2}{2^I} .$$

Furthermore B runs in time at most $t' = t + O(q + (I + L)\sigma)$ and asks at most $q' = \sigma$ oracle queries.

$CBC\$$ is secure under IND-CPA

proposition

Let $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a family of functions and let $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ be the $CBC\$$ encryption scheme. Let A be an ind-cpa adversary that runs in time at most t and asks at most q queries, these totalling at most σ n -bit blocks. Then there exists a $\text{prf adversary } B$ such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{SE}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(A) \leq \text{Adv}_E^{\text{prf}}(B) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2^{n+1}}.$$

Furthermore B runs in time at most $t' = t + O(q + n\sigma)$ and asks at most $q' = \sigma$ oracle queries.