

1 **Title:** The Potential Effect of Ending CDC Funding for HIV Tests: A Modeling Study in 18
2 States

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44 **40 Word Summary**

45 A complete cessation of CDC-funded HIV testing could cause a 10% increase in infections by
46 2030 across 18 U.S. states, with this impact disproportionately affecting rural states. Mobilizing
47 access to alternative HIV testing would be critical to mitigating this impact.

48 **Abstract:**

49 **Background:**

50 Timely HIV diagnosis and treatment is critical to preventing transmission. The US Centers for
51 Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides funding for HIV testing to local health
52 departments and community organizations. We sought to estimate the number of additional HIV
53 infections that would result from ending or interrupting CDC funding for HIV tests in US states.

54 **Methods:**

55 We used a validated model of HIV transmission to simulate HIV epidemics in 18 US states. We
56 projected incidence forward under three scenarios where all CDC-funded HIV testing ends in
57 October 2025 and (1) never resumes, (2) returns to previous levels between January and
58 December 2027, and (3) returns from January to December 2029. We calculated the excess
59 incident HIV infections compared to a scenario where CDC-funded testing continues
60 uninterrupted.

61 **Results:**

62 If CDC funding for HIV tests were to end on October 1, 2025, we project 12,719 additional HIV
63 infections across 18 states by 2030 (95% Credible Interval 4,547 to 21,896) – an increase of
64 10%. The projected effects varied by state, ranging from a 2.7% increase in Washington (1.0 to
65 4.7%) to a 29.9 increase in Louisiana (9.4 to 59.9%). States that perform more CDC-funded tests
66 and states with more rural HIV epidemics were projected to see greater rises in incidence.

67 **Conclusions:**

68 Disruptions to CDC-funded HIV testing would substantially increase new infections, particularly
69 in states with more rural epidemics. These findings demonstrate the value of the CDC's HIV
70 testing activities in curbing the spread of HIV in the US.

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74 **Introduction:**

75 HIV imposes a substantial health burden in the US, with over one million persons living with
76 HIV as of 2023¹. Timely diagnosis and treatment of HIV is critical to preventing transmission^{1,2–}
77 ⁴. People with HIV (PWH) who are virally suppressed on antiretroviral therapy are non-
78 infectious. Even before treatment, PWH reduce behaviors associated with transmission once they
79 are aware of their status^{5,6}.

80 The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) financially supports the bulk of HIV
81 testing by state and local health departments, as well as supporting testing by community-based
82 organizations⁷. In 2021, CDC funding supported 1,736,850 tests, resulting in 8,149 new HIV
83 diagnoses⁸. While CDC's testing data are not directly comparable to its surveillance data, these
84 diagnoses correspond to over 20% of the 35,763 total diagnoses recorded in the US in 2021. In
85 some states, this ratio is much higher, approaching 50% (or more) of diagnoses in South
86 Carolina, Alabama, and Tennessee^{1,8}.

87 In general, HIV testing is an efficient means of HIV prevention. CDC-funded tests are
88 particularly efficient and are disproportionately used in demographic subgroups with high rates
89 of HIV infection⁷. These CDC-funded HIV testing activities, however, may be subject to funding
90 cuts in the future⁹.

91 Disruptions to CDC-funded HIV testing could have a significant impact on HIV incidence in the
92 US¹⁰. Mathematical models can be a useful tool to help forecast the impacts of HIV health
93 policy^{11,12}. We used a validated model of HIV transmission in the US to project the potential
94 impact of the cessation or interruption of CDC-funded HIV testing on state-level HIV-epidemics.

95 **Methods:**

96 Model Structure:

97 The Johns Hopkins Epidemiologic and Economic Model (JHEEM) is a validated, dynamic,
98 compartmental model of HIV transmission that has been calibrated to cities and states in the US
99 and is stratified by age, sex, race/ethnicity, and risk-status for HIV acquisition^{11,13}.

100 To represent the impact of CDC-funded HIV testing, we expanded the JHEEM to simulate, for
101 each demographic stratum, (1) the proportion of HIV tests that are funded by the CDC and (2)
102 the proportion of new diagnoses that are made by CDC-funded HIV tests. These proportions
103 were each modeled using a logistic equation, parameterized with terms for age, race, sex, risk
104 factor, and time (see Supplement).

105 Study Setting:

106 We simulated HIV epidemics in 18 states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia,
107 Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Ohio South Carolina,
108 Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. These states were chosen for geographic

109 distribution and balance of urban/rural composition, mix of Medicaid expansion status, and
110 prioritization in the *Ending the HIV Epidemic* initiative¹⁴.

111 **Model Calibration:**

112 JHEEM's calibration has been described previously; briefly, we ran an Adaptive Metropolis
113 Sampler for 1,000,000 iterations in each state and retained a set of 1,000 well-fitting
114 simulations¹¹. These simulations reproduce local epidemiological measures of the epidemic,
115 including new diagnoses, prevalent cases, and proportion of the general population who report
116 being tested for HIV during the preceding year.

117 For each of the 1,000 base JHEEM simulations per state, we ran another Adaptive Metropolis
118 Sampler for 300 iterations to calibrate the parameters for the logistic models for the proportion of
119 HIV tests funded by CDC and the positivity among CDC-funded HIV tests. We derived prior
120 distributions based on national data and formulated a likelihood for two calibration targets drawn
121 from annual CDC HIV Testing reports from 2011 to 2019: (1) the number of CDC-funded tests
122 in each state and (2) the rate of positivity (excluding known cases) among CDC-funded tests (see
123 Supplement)¹⁵.

124 **Modeled Scenarios**

125 In addition to a scenario where CDC funding for HIV tests continues uninterrupted, we
126 simulated three scenarios (Supplement Figure S1): (1) "Cessation" - CDC funding for HIV tests
127 stops on October 1, 2025, and CDC-funded tests linearly decline to zero by December 31, 2025;
128 (2) "Brief Interruption" - CDC-funded testing ends as in "Cessation", but then resumes in 2027,
129 rising linearly from zero on December 31, 2026, to previous daily volumes by December 31,
130 2027. (3) "Prolonged Interruption" - CDC-funded testing ends as in "Cessation", but then
131 resumes in 2029, rising linearly from zero on December 31, 2028, to previous daily volumes by
132 December 31, 2029. (Supplement Figure S1)

133
134 In the absence of CDC funding, presumably some individuals who would otherwise have
135 received a CDC-funded HIV test would get tested by other means, such as private insurance or in
136 an emergency department. However, this proportion is not well characterized: no studies to our
137 knowledge have examined the withdrawal of public funding for HIV tests. One evaluation of the
138 roll-out of a CDC-funded program to distribute HIV self-tests indicated that, of the 206,637
139 survey respondents who took one or more CDC-funded self-tests, 52% had not been tested in the
140 past year¹⁶.

141 To quantify this uncertainty, each of the 1,000 simulations per state sampled a different value of
142 a parameter representing the proportion of CDC-funded tests that would be replaced through
143 other means. We sampled these values from a beta distribution with a mean of 50% based on
144 results from the CDC's self-test program and a wide 95% confidence interval of 20% to 80%.

145 In all scenarios, we projected the HIV epidemic in each state to 2030, assuming continuation of
146 current trends in transmission, suppression, uptake of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP), and
147 testing not funded by the CDC, with randomly sampled variation¹¹.

148 Outcomes:

149 Our primary outcome was the projected relative excess incident HIV infections from 2025 to
150 2030:

$$\frac{HIV\ Incidence_{reduced\ testing} - HIV\ Incidence_{baseline}}{HIV\ Incidence_{baseline}}$$

151 where the “baseline” scenario assumes continued CDC-funded testing at its current trajectory.
152 Secondary outcomes included (a) the absolute number of excess HIV infections from 2025 to
153 2030, (b) the absolute and relative number of infections through 2035, and (c) the number of
154 CDC-funded tests foregone per excess infection from 2025 to 2030. For each outcome in each
155 state, we calculated the mean across 1,000 simulations and the 95% credible interval (CrI),
156 defined as the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of those simulation results.

157 Secondary Analyses:

158 To evaluate potential determinants of state-level variation, we calculated Spearman correlation
159 coefficients between our primary outcome (relative projected excess incident HIV infections
160 from 2025 to 2030) and four factors (averaged for each state across simulations): (1) the
161 proportion of HIV tests in 2025 that the CDC funded; (2) the proportion of HIV diagnoses in
162 2025 that were made with CDC-funded tests; (3) the transmission rate of HIV in 2025; and (4)
163 the “urbanicity” of each state’s HIV epidemic in 2021, defined as the mean across counties
164 (weighted by each county’s fraction of statewide HIV prevalence) of the proportion of people
165 living in urban areas (per the 2020 census)¹⁷. Because we modeled only 18 states, we calculated
166 a univariate correlation with each determinant separately. We visualized these relationships using
167 scatterplots.

168 Sensitivity Analyses:

169 To assess the sensitivity of our primary outcome to influential parameters in each state, we
170 calculated partial rank correlation coefficients, across the 1,000 simulations in each state, for
171 parameters that governed either (a) the proportion of HIV tests funded by the CDC, (b) the
172 proportion of diagnoses made with CDC-funded tests, or (c) the proportion of CDC-funded tests
173 that would be obtained by other means if funding ends. We assessed the impact of each
174 parameter by calculating the primary outcome among the 200 simulations with the highest values
175 of each parameter vs. the 200 simulations with the lowest values (see Supplement)¹⁸.

176 Web Tool:

177 All simulations are available through our interactive web tool at www.jheem.org/cdc-testing.

178 **Results:**

179 Our simulations closely matched the number of CDC-funded HIV tests and positivity rate by
180 state (Supplement Figures S2-7 and online at www.jheem.org/cdc-testing). If CDC funding for
181 tests continues uninterrupted, our model projects 128,900 incident infections from 2025 to 2030
182 across all 18 states (95% CrI 123,565 to 135,535), and 222,706 infections by 2035 (95% CrI
183 210,324 to 237,189).

184 If CDC-funded testing ends permanently in 2025 (“Cessation”), we project 12,719 excess HIV
185 infections by 2030 across the 18 states (95% CrI: 4,547 to 21,896) - an increase of 9.9% (95%
186 CrI 3.6 to 16.9%) compared to continuation of current testing volume, despite plausible levels of
187 replacement tests through other sources of testing. This negative impact varied substantially by
188 state, ranging from a 2.7% increase in HIV infections in Washington state (95% CrI 1.0 to 4.7%)
189 to a 29.9% increase in Louisiana (95% CrI 9.4 to 59.9%) - illustrated in Figures 1, 2, and 3 and
190 online at www.jheem.org/cdc-testing. If CDC-funded testing does not resume, we project 33,691
191 excess infections by 2035 (95% CrI 11,327 to 60,161) – an increase of 15.1% (95% CrI 5.2 to
192 26.9% - see Supplement Figure S8).

193 If CDC funding for tests were to be restored in 2029 and testing returns to current levels by the
194 end of that year (“Prolonged Interruption”), our model projects 10,601 (95% CrI 3,866 - 17,896)
195 excess HIV infections by 2030, an increase of 8.2% (95% CrI 3.0 to 13.9%) across the 18
196 selected states. By 2035, we project 6.4% more infections (95% CrI 2.4 to 10.7%) than if testing
197 had continued uninterrupted. If CDC-funded testing returns to baseline levels by the end of 2027
198 (“Brief Interruption”), the model projects 5,012 (95% CrI 1,939 to 8,061) excess infections by
199 2030, an increase of 3.9% (95% CrI 1.5 to 6.3%). By 2035, we projected new infections to be
200 2.8% higher (95% CrI 1.1 to 4.5%).

201 We project that the increases in infections would accrue more in young adults, with an estimated
202 13% (95% CrI 5 to 22%) increase in incidence among 13-34-year-olds by 2030 versus 6% (95%
203 CrI 2 to 11%) among those over age 35. Excess infections are also projected to be higher among
204 men who have sex with men (11% increase, 95% CrI 4 to 20%) and heterosexual men (9%
205 increase, 95% CrI 3 to 16%) than among women (7%, 95% CrI 3 to 12%). We do not project
206 significant differences by race, with an expected 11% increase in infections (95% CrI 4 to 19%)
207 among Black adults, 9% (95% CrI 3 to 15%) among Hispanic adults, and 9% 95% CrI (3 to
208 16%) for non-Black, non-Hispanic adults.

209 Among all parameters in the model, the proportion of diagnoses made by CDC-funded tests at
210 the state level and the proportion of the state’s HIV tests that the CDC funded had the highest
211 correlation with the projected impact of ending CDC funding for HIV testing (Spearman
212 correlation coefficients: 0.94 and 0.71). The impact of cessation of CDC-funded testing was also
213 negatively correlated (-0.58) with the urbanicity of states’ HIV epidemics: The more a state’s
214 HIV epidemic was situated in rural areas, the greater the impact of removing CDC funding for
215 HIV tests (Figure 4).

216 Across all states, we project that 9.9 million HIV tests would be foregone from 2025 to 2030 in
217 the “Cessation” scenario, yielding one excess infection for every 913 tests not funded by the
218 CDC (95% CrI 453 to 2,145). The projected efficiency of CDC-funded tests varies between
219 states, ranging from 137 (95% CrI 63 to 327) tests not done per one excess infection in Ohio to
220 4,396 (95% CrI 2,194 to 10,064) tests not done per one excess infection in Maryland
221 (Supplement Figure S9).

222 The proportion of CDC-funded tests that would be done otherwise if CDC funding ends was
223 strongly associated with the projected impact of funding cessation, with a partial rank correlation
224 coefficient less than -0.99 in all states (Supplement Figure S10). In simulations where the lowest
225 quintile (11 to 36% of CDC-funded tests) would still be performed in the absence of CDC
226 funding, we project 19,145 excess cases between 2025 and 2030 (95% CrI 17,618 to 20,455).
227 Conversely, in simulations where 63 to 88% of tests would still be performed, 6,620 (95% CrI
228 5,456 to 7,925) excess infections are projected to occur if all CDC-funded HIV testing ends
229 (Figure 5; Supplement Figures S11-13).

230 **Discussion:**

231 We used a mathematical HIV transmission model to estimate the impact of disruptions to CDC
232 funding for HIV tests in 18 US states. Across all states, we project that complete cessation of
233 CDC-funded HIV testing would lead to more than 12,000 additional HIV infections from 2025
234 to 2030 – a 10% increase vs. if testing continues uninterrupted. The excess would accrue over
235 time, reaching 15% more infections by 2035. Even temporary interruptions to testing would also
236 result in substantially more infections by 2030: an 8% increase if testing resumes in 2029 and a
237 4% increase if testing resumes in 2027. These projections assume there is some level (on average
238 50% across simulations) of replacement testing within the community; incidence would likely
239 increase substantially if alternative access to testing did not materialize. The projected
240 percentage of excess infections varied substantially between states, reaching as high as 30% by
241 2030 (9 to 60%) in Louisiana, the state with the highest proportion of HIV tests funded by the
242 CDC.

243 Differences between states were most closely correlated with the number of tests funded by the
244 CDC and the proportion of a state’s diagnoses that were made with CDC-funded tests. The
245 impact of ending CDC funding for HIV tests was also correlated with the urban/rural distribution
246 of HIV in the state: states with a more rural epidemic tended to have higher projected increases
247 in incidence from disruptions to CDC-funded testing.

248 Our projections depended on the degree to which HIV tests would still be performed if CDC-
249 funded tests become unavailable. If less than 36% of currently-CDC-funded tests are still
250 performed in the absence of CDC funding, we project 19,145 excess infections from cessation of
251 CDC-funded HIV testing versus 6,620 if more than 63% of such tests are still performed. The
252 true proportion of CDC-funded tests that would be performed in the absence of CDC funding is
253 unknown; there are no studies to our knowledge on the effects of widespread reductions in

254 publicly funded HIV testing. We incorporated this uncertainty into our analysis by sampling a
255 range of possible values across the 1,000 simulations in each state. Notably, it may be that
256 cessation of public testing results in more efficient testing (for example, if people continue to
257 prioritize tests that are more likely to be positive) or less efficient testing (if people at highest
258 risk are also those least likely to still get tested). We therefore sampled a broad range around a
259 mean of 50% of CDC tests being performed regardless: 95% of simulations had a value from 20
260 to 80%. Fundamentally, this quantity is uncertain, and our analysis reflects this uncertainty in
261 broad credible intervals around our projections. The importance of this parameter implies that, if
262 CDC funding for HIV tests does end, efforts to mobilize access to other means of HIV testing
263 will be critical to mitigate the impact on local HIV epidemics.

264 There are few other published estimates of the impact of the CDC's HIV testing activities.
265 Hutchinson, et al., used a transmission model to estimate that CDC-funded HIV tests averted
266 3,381 new infections nationwide from 2007 to 2009, during which 2.8 million people were tested
267 (824 people tested per infection averted)¹⁹. This is lower than the 12,719 infections averted over
268 five years in 18 states that we project, although similar to our aggregate 913 tests per infection
269 averted. Our model differs from Hutchinson, et al., in that it simulates transmission dynamics
270 over time, such that an averted infection can also avert other infections through subsequent
271 averted transmission. More recently, the CDC estimated that HIV prevention programs
272 (including both testing and other prevention programs) prevented 9,000 infections between 2017
273 and 2021 - again lower than our estimate, in part due to the lack of incorporation of a dynamic
274 modeling approach²⁰.

275 As with any modeling study, our approach has several limitations. First, we focused on incident
276 infections only; however, delayed diagnosis of HIV can also lead to increased morbidity and
277 mortality. Second, we only model 18 US states. While the majority of HIV diagnoses in 2024
278 were made in these states, they may not reflect the full heterogeneity of HIV epidemics across
279 the US. Third, in our interruption scenarios, we assume that CDC testing activities would return
280 to their previous levels within a year, but it is possible that programs might recover more slowly.
281 Finally, our projections assume no concurrent changes to HIV prevention and control efforts in
282 the US. This is unlikely to be true; other disruptions to prevention activities would likely
283 accompany cessation of CDC-funded testing, and future changes to Medicaid coverage may
284 impact HIV screening and treatment.

285 Our approach also has several strengths. Using state-level models allows us to capture local-level
286 heterogeneity in HIV epidemics and the particular ways they interact with testing funded by the
287 CDC. Our Bayesian calibration process enables us to robustly recapitulate historical trends and
288 characterize uncertainty in future projections. Finally, our projections are all available in an
289 interactive web tool at jheem.org/cdc-testing, allowing local decision makers to consider the
290 potential impact of changes to CDC testing programs in their setting.


291 In summary, using an HIV transmission model in 18 states, we project that even brief
292 interruptions to CDC-funded HIV testing could lead to more than 5,000 excess HIV infections
293 by 2030. Complete cessation of testing could lead to more than 13,000 additional infections over
294 this time frame. These effects varied across states, with states that use more CDC-funded tests
295 and states with more rural epidemics expected to see greater increases in transmission. These
296 findings demonstrate the importance of maintaining CDC-funded testing activities in curbing the
297 spread of HIV in the US.

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301 **Figure 1. Projected HIV Infections in Illinois, Texas and Louisiana if CDC-funded HIV
302 Testing is Disrupted**



303

304 Sample projections for Illinois, Texas, and Louisiana. Y-axes give the projected number of
305 infections. Lines denote the mean across 1,000 simulations; ribbons give the 95% CrI. Green
306 represents uninterrupted “Continuation” of CDC funding for HIV testing. In the other scenarios,
307 funding stops in October 2025. In the “Cessation” scenario (navy blue), CDC-funded tests never

308 resume. In “Prolonged Interruption” (orange), CDC-funded tests return to prior levels from
309 January to December 2029. In “Brief Interruption” (light blue), testing recovers from January to
310 December 2027. States chosen to represent three states across the spectrum of relative excess
311 incidences. Times of reintroduction of testing (2027 and 2029) are shown as vertical dashed red
312 lines.

313

314 **Figure 2. Projected Excess HIV Infections if CDC-funded HIV Testing is Disrupted**

State	Continuation	Cessation		Prolonged Interruption		Brief Interruption	
	Number of Incident Infections	Number of Excess Infections	Relative Excess Infections*	Number of Excess Infections	Relative Excess Infections*	Number of Excess Infections	Relative Excess Infections*
Louisiana	4,632 (3,895 - 5,396)	1,387 (429 - 2,823)	29.9% (9.4 - 59.9%)	1,081 (349 - 2,138)	23.3% (7.7 - 45.2%)	432 (155 - 780)	9.3% (3.5 - 16.3%)
Missouri	2,885 (2,461 - 3,289)	623 (187 - 1,261)	21.5% (6.7 - 42.8%)	513 (158 - 1,011)	17.7% (5.7 - 34.0%)	228 (78 - 410)	7.9% (2.8 - 13.9%)
Mississippi	2,561 (2,171 - 3,013)	515 (186 - 978)	20.2% (7.4 - 37.5%)	432 (160 - 802)	16.9% (6.2 - 30.9%)	201 (76 - 345)	7.9% (3.0 - 13.4%)
South Carolina	3,135 (2,730 - 3,529)	532 (176 - 1,016)	17.0% (5.8 - 31.1%)	450 (153 - 836)	14.4% (5.0 - 25.9%)	217 (82 - 382)	6.9% (2.6 - 11.8%)
Tennessee	5,348 (4,390 - 6,463)	883 (289 - 1,652)	16.5% (5.6 - 30.4%)	722 (244 - 1,330)	13.5% (4.6 - 24.2%)	323 (119 - 557)	6.1% (2.3 - 10.5%)
Alabama	3,915 (3,408 - 4,371)	595 (194 - 1,120)	15.2% (5.1 - 28.1%)	494 (167 - 915)	12.6% (4.4 - 22.8%)	226 (83 - 397)	5.8% (2.2 - 9.9%)
Arizona	3,854 (3,254 - 4,532)	474 (161 - 904)	12.3% (4.1 - 22.8%)	382 (134 - 715)	9.9% (3.3 - 17.9%)	173 (65 - 300)	4.5% (1.6 - 7.5%)
Georgia	12,268 (10,760 - 14,479)	1,316 (466 - 2,301)	10.7% (3.9 - 18.1%)	1,144 (412 - 1,994)	9.3% (3.4 - 15.6%)	587 (220 - 995)	4.8% (1.8 - 7.7%)
Texas	24,644 (21,675 - 28,703)	2,303 (835 - 4,120)	9.4% (3.4 - 16.1%)	1,867 (693 - 3,305)	7.6% (2.8 - 13.0%)	837 (328 - 1,424)	3.4% (1.3 - 5.7%)
California	16,813 (14,542 - 19,692)	1,434 (488 - 2,607)	8.5% (3.1 - 14.7%)	1,234 (426 - 2,224)	7.3% (2.7 - 12.6%)	626 (229 - 1,090)	3.7% (1.4 - 6.2%)
Ohio	4,371 (3,668 - 5,219)	354 (126 - 646)	8.1% (3.0 - 14.5%)	300 (108 - 541)	6.9% (2.5 - 12.2%)	146 (56 - 254)	3.3% (1.3 - 5.7%)
Florida	19,827 (17,435 - 22,839)	1,330 (483 - 2,407)	6.7% (2.4 - 11.4%)	1,139 (418 - 2,032)	5.7% (2.1 - 9.7%)	581 (223 - 996)	2.9% (1.1 - 4.8%)
New York	10,592 (9,173 - 12,397)	497 (171 - 920)	4.7% (1.7 - 8.2%)	427 (149 - 785)	4.0% (1.4 - 7.0%)	215 (76 - 390)	2.0% (0.7 - 3.5%)
Wisconsin	1,468 (1,170 - 1,802)	64 (23 - 119)	4.3% (1.5 - 8.1%)	55 (20 - 103)	3.8% (1.4 - 7.0%)	28 (11 - 52)	1.9% (0.7 - 3.5%)
Kentucky	1,365 (1,153 - 1,661)	55 (19 - 106)	4.0% (1.4 - 7.0%)	48 (16 - 92)	3.5% (1.2 - 6.2%)	26 (9 - 49)	1.9% (0.7 - 3.2%)
Illinois	5,125 (4,373 - 6,029)	174 (62 - 320)	3.4% (1.2 - 5.9%)	150 (53 - 274)	2.9% (1.1 - 5.1%)	77 (28 - 138)	1.5% (0.5 - 2.6%)
Maryland	2,692 (2,202 - 3,273)	90 (33 - 155)	3.4% (1.2 - 5.8%)	79 (29 - 134)	2.9% (1.1 - 5.0%)	43 (16 - 71)	1.6% (0.6 - 2.7%)
Washington	3,404 (2,815 - 3,983)	92 (34 - 157)	2.7% (1.0 - 4.7%)	83 (31 - 140)	2.4% (0.9 - 4.2%)	47 (18 - 78)	1.4% (0.5 - 2.3%)
Total	128,900 (123,565 - 135,535)	12,719 (4,547 - 21,896)	9.9% (3.6 - 16.9%)	10,601 (3,866 - 17,896)	8.2% (3.0 - 13.9%)	5,012 (1,939 - 8,061)	3.9% (1.5 - 6.3%)
		0%				30%	


315 The “Continuation” column gives the mean and 95% CrI, across 1,000 simulations, for projected
316 incident HIV infections from 2025-2030 if CDC funding for HIV tests continues uninterrupted.
317 The columns labeled “Number of Excess Infections” give the mean and 95% interval of the
318 absolute number of excess HIV infections expected from 2025-2030 under three scenarios where
319 funding is stopped in October 2025: “Cessation” (funding does not resume), “Prolonged
320 Interruption” (testing returns to prior levels from January to December 2029), and “Brief
321 Interruption” (testing recovers from January to December 2027). The columns labeled “Relative
322 Excess Infections” give the percent change in projected incident infections, relative to
323 “Continuation”. Cells are shaded according to the relative excess infections.

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327 **Figure 3. Projected Excess HIV Infections if CDC-funded HIV Testing is Disrupted**




328

329 Boxplots display the projected percentage increase in new infections under three scenarios in
330 which CDC funding for HIV testing ends in October 2025: “Cessation” (navy blue) – funding
331 does not resume; “Prolonged Interruption” (orange) – testing returns to prior levels from January
332 to December 2029; “Brief Interruption” (light blue) – testing recovers from January to December
333 2027. The value along the x-axis represents the relative increase in cases vs. a scenario where
334 CDC-funded HIV tests continue uninterrupted. The dark vertical lines indicate the mean
335 projection across 1,000 simulations, the boxes indicate interquartile ranges (IQR), and whiskers
336 cover the 95% CrI. *The CrI has been truncated at 40%.

337

338 **Figure 4. State-level Variation in Excess HIV Infections if CDC-funded HIV Testing Ends**




339 Each circle represents one state. The y-axis represents the average relative increase in projected
 340 HIV infections from 2025 to 2030 if CDC funding for HIV testing ends in October 2025 versus
 341 continuation at current levels, averaged across 1,000 simulations. The x-axis represents the
 342 average proportion of 2025 diagnoses that were made with CDC-funded tests (Panel

343 A), the average proportion of all tests in 2025 that were funded by the CDC (Panel B), the
344 average transmission rate in 2025 (Panel C), or the proportion of prevalent HIV cases in 2021
345 that fell into rural areas with the state (Panel D). The size of the circle is proportional to the
346 number of projected new diagnoses in 2025. Cities are shaded according to the proportion of
347 prevalent cases that fall into urban areas. Correlation denotes the Spearman rank correlation.

348

349 **Figure 5: Excess HIV Infections 2025-2030 if CDC Funding for HIV Tests Ends, According
350 to the Proportion of CDC-Funded Tests Performed Without CDC Funding**



351
352 Boxplots display the projected percentage increase in new infections under stratified by the
353 simulated proportion of people who would be tested regardless of whether CDC-funded tests are
354 available. Colors denote: “Cessation” (navy blue) – funding does not resume; “Prolonged
355 Interruption” (orange) – testing returns to prior levels from January to December 2029; “Brief
356 Interruption” (light blue) – testing recovers from January to December 2027. The value along the
357 x-axis represents the relative increase in cases vs. a scenario where CDC-funded HIV tests
358 continue uninterrupted. The dark vertical lines indicate the mean projection across 1,000
359 simulations, the boxes indicate interquartile ranges (IQR), and whiskers cover the 95% CrI.

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373 reproduce this analysis can be found at https://github.com/tfojo1/jheem_analyses/.

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