

POLI342: The Politics of Organized Interests / Fall 2003
Instructor: David Lowery, Pearsall Professor of Political Science
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Office Hours: TBA

The Topic

This course will examine the role of interest organizations in all of their varied forms – social movements, institutions, associations, and membership groups – in American politics at all levels. In doing so, we will examine theories and empirical research on how organized interest organizations in the first place, are governed internally, enter and then interact with each other within populations or interest communities, and seek to influence government policy through electoral activity and lobbying legislatures, executives, and courts. Throughout, we will seek to determine if organized interests ultimately undermine or facilitate the play of democratic politics. Finally, we will consider a number of reform proposals to either control or enhance the influence of organized interests in American politics. The objective of the course, then, is to become familiar with the full range of issues about the politics of organized interests addressed by political science and the theories and methods they employ to examine these topics.

Class Procedures and Grading

The course will be conducted through discussion, with a strong emphasis on presentations by students. Several required readings are assigned each week. In addition to discussing these, at least two students per class will be assigned to prepare a one page report – to be distributed to all students – on a either a specific major work on the topic or a specific question provided by me. Students will present these in class with discussion to follow.

Student grades will be determined on the basis of three criteria. First, students will over the course of the term prepare a research proposal on a topic appropriate to this class. These proposals are due at the time of the final exam. However, the last two class sessions will be devoted to student presentation of these reports with discussion to follow. The proposal will count for 40 percent of the final grade. An outline for these proposals is attached to this syllabus. Second, the in-class reports discussed earlier will cumulatively account for 30 percent of the final grade. And third, class participation will account for 30 percent of the final grade. Importantly, I reserve the option of changing this percentage distribution early in the term depending on the number of students who enroll in the class. If larger (or fewer) numbers of students enroll, fewer (or more) reports will be prepared by individual students. The proportions of the grade allocated to the three grading criteria will be adjusted accordingly. In general, the expected grade for graduate students who are doing what they are supposed to be doing is a P. L and H grade will be reserved for poor or exceptionally good performance, respectively.

Textbooks

The required texts – listed below – are available at the University Bookstore. Other required readings will be available in the 2nd Floor Library of Hamilton Hall a week (perhaps more) in advance of the class they are listed for.

- John R. Wright. 1995. Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence.

New York: Addison-Wesley. ISBN 0-321-12187-2.

- Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox. 1999. Interest Groups in American Campaigns. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. ISBN 1-56802-392-8.
- Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth Leech, 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-05915-2.
- Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton. ISBN 0-393-97708-0.
- Ken Kollman. 1998. Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-01741-7.
- Virginia Gray and David Lowery 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-472-08718-5.

Readings and Schedule

I. The Politics of Interest Organizations: An Overview (Sept. 2)

Required:

Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth Leech, 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 9.

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, Chapter 1.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

John R. Wright. 1995. Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence. New York: Addison-Wesley. Chapter 1.

Recommended:

David Truman. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapters 1 thru 3.

Arnold, Douglas R. 1982. "Overtilled and Undertilled Fields in American Politics." Political Science Quarterly. 97: 91-103.

Tierney, John. T. 1994. Interest Group Research: Questions and Approaches." In Representing Interests and Interest Group Representation, eds. William Crotty, Mildred A. Schwartz, and John C. Green. Lanham, New York: University Press of America, pp.37-45.

Allen J. Cigler. 1994. "Research Gaps in the Study of Interest Groups." In Representing Interests and Interest Group Representation, eds. William Crotty, Mildred A. Schwartz, and John C. Green. Lanham, New York: University Press of America, pp. 29-36.

Allen J. Cigler. 1991. Interest Groups: A Subfield in Search of an Identity. In Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 4, ed. William Crotty, 99-135. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University.

David Lowery and Virginia Gray. 2003. "A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests." Political Research Quarterly. In Press.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery. 2002. "From Belle Zeller to The Hollow Core: Is There Any Connection Here?" State Politics and Policy Quarterly. 2: 388-410.

II. The Mobilization of Interest Organizations (Sept. 9)

Required:

Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth Leech, 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 4.

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, Chapter 2.

Mancur Olson. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Chapters 1, 2, and 7.

John Mark Hansen. 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership." American Political Science Review. 79: 79-96.

Robert Salisbury. 1969. "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups." Midwest Journal of Political Science. 13: 1-32.

David Lowery, Virginia Gray, Jennifer Anderson, and Adam J. Newmark. 2002. "Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April.

Recommended:

Terry M. Moe. 1980. "A Calculus of Group Membership." American Journal of Political Science. 24: 593-632.

Jocelyn Elise Crowley and Theda Skocpol. 2001. "The Rush to Organize: Explaining Associational Formation in the United States." American Journal of Political Science. 45: 813-829.

Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson. 2000. "A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Volunteerism in the United States." American Political Science Review. 94: 527-546.

Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York: Macmillan.

Robert D. Putnam. 2000. Bowling Alone. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Gerald Marwell and Ruth E. Ames. 1979. "Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free Rider Problem." American Journal of Sociology. 85: 1335-1360.

Gerald Marwell and Ruth E. Ames. 1980. "Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experiences, and the Free Rider Problem." American Journal of Sociology. 85: 926-937.

Gerald Marwell, Pamela E. Oliver, and Ralph Prahl. 1988. "Social Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass III." American Journal of Sociology. 94: 502-534, 1988.

Gerald Marwell and Ruth E. Ames. 1981. "Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods IV." Journal of Public Economics. 15: 295-310.

David Truman. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 4.

Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Terry M. Moe. 1980. The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Terry M. Moe. 1981. "Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups." Journal of Politics. 43: 531-543.

Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson. 1961. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations." Administration Science Quarterly. 6: 129-166.

Terry M. Moe. 1980. The Organization of Interests. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Joan Estaban and Debraj Ray. 2001. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox." American Political Science Review. 95: 663-672.

Lawrence Rothenberg. 1992. Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 thru 5.

Jack L. Walker Jr. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professionals, and Social Movements. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan. Chapters 1 thru 3, 10.

III. The Maintenance of Organized Interests (Sept. 16)

Required:

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, Chapters 3 and 4.

Robert Salisbury. 1969. "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups." Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (1): 1-32.

Paul A. Sabatier and Susan M. McLaughlin. 1990. "Belief Congruence Between Interest-Group Leaders and Members: An Empirical Analysis of Three Theories and a Suggested Synthesis." Journal of Politics. 52: 914-935.

Robert C. Lowry. 1997. "The Private Production of Public Goods: Organizational Maintenance, Managers' Objectives, and Collective Goals." American Political Science Review. 91: 308-323.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Chapters 9.

Recommended:

David Truman. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapters 5 thru 7.

David Lowery and Virginia Gray. 1996. How Similar are State and National Interest Organizations? Comparative State Politics. 18 (February): 1-16.

John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert Salisbury. 1993. The Hollow Core. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1 thru 6.

Scott Ainsworth and Itai Sened. 1993. "The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences." American Journal of Political Science. 37: 834-866.

Susanne Lohmann. 1991. "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action." American Political Science Review. 85: 319-333.

Jack L. Walker Jr. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professionals, and Social Movements. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan. Chapter 5.

Lawrence Rothenberg. 1992. Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 6 and 7.

William P. Browne. 1990. "Organized Interests and their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain." Journal of Politics. 52: 477-509.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery. 1997. Life in a Niche: Mortality Anxiety Among Organized Interests in the American States. Political Research Quarterly. 50 (March): 25-47.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery. 1996. A Niche Theory of Interest Representation, Journal of

Politics, 58 (March): 91-111.

IV. Communities of Organized Interests: Density (Sept. 2)

Required:

Virginia Gray and David Lowery 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Chapters 3 thru 7.

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, Chapter 5.

Anthony Nownes. 2003. "The Population Ecology of Interest Group Formation." British Journal of Political Science. in press.

Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech. 2001. "Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics." Journal of Politics. 63: 1191-1213.

David Lowery and Virginia Gray. 2001. "The Expression of Density Dependence in State Communities of Organized Interests." American Politics Research, 29 (4): 374-391.

Virginia Gray, David Lowery, Matthew Fellowes, and Jennifer Anderson. 2003. "Understanding the Demand-Side of Lobbying: Interest System Energy in the American States." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of State Politics and Policy Conference, Tucson, March.

Recommended:

David Lowery and Virginia Gray. 1995. The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States. American Journal of Political Science, 39 (February): 1-29.

Jennifer Anderson, Adam Newmark, Virginia Gray, and David Lowery. 2003. "Mayflies and Old Bulls: Demographic Volatility and Experience in State Interest Communities." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April.

David Lowery and Virginia Gray. 1997. How Some Rules Just Don't Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists. Public Choice. 91: 139-147.

Jennifer Wolak, Adam Newmark, Todd McNolty, David Lowery, and Virginia Gray. 2002. "Much of Politics is Still Local: Multi-State Lobbying in State Interest Communities." Legislative Studies Quarterly, 27 (4): 527-556.

Howard E. Aldrich, Udo Staber, Catherine Zimmer, and John J. Beggs. 1990. "Minimalism and Organizational Mortality: Patterns of Disbanding Among U.S. Associations, 1990-1983." In Organizational Evolution: New Directions, ed. Jitendra V. Singh, 21-52. Newbury Park, California: Sage.

Howard E. Aldrich, Catherine Zimmer, Udo Staber, and John J. Beggs. 1994. "Minimalism,

Mutualism, and Maturity: The Evolution of the American Trade Association Population in the 20th Century." In Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations, eds. Joel A. C. Baum and Jitendra V. Singh, 223-238. New York: Oxford University Press.

Brasher, Holly, David Lowery, and Virginia Gray. 1999. "State Lobby Registration Data: The Anomalous Case of Florida (and Minnesota too!)." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 24: 303-314.

Jennifer Wolak, David Lowery, and Virginia Gray. 2001. "California Dreaming: Outliers, Leverage, and Influence in Comparative State Political Analysis." State Politics and Policy Quarterly. 1: 255-272.

Scott Ainsworth. 1993. "Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence." Journal of Politics. 55: 41-56.

V. Communities of Organized Interests: Diversity and Bias (Sept. 30)

Required:

John R. Wright. 1995. Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence. New York: Addison-Wesley. Chapter 2.

Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth Leech, 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapters 5 and 6.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Chapter 8.

David Lowery and Virginia Gray. 2002. "Sisyphus Meets the Borg: Economic Scale and the Inequalities in Interest Representation." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, September.

David Lowery and Virginia Gray. 1998. "The Dominance of Institutions in Interest Representation: A Test of Seven Explanations." American Journal of Political Science. 42 (1): 231-255.

David Lowery and Virginia Gray. In Press. "Bias in the Heavenly Chorus: Interests in Society and Before Government." Journal of Theoretical Politics.

Recommended:

Robert Salisbury. 1984. "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions." American Political Science Review. 81: 64-76.

Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1984. What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality and the American Pressure System. Journal of Politics 46 (4): 1006-1032.

David Lowery and Virginia Gray. 1998. "Representational Concentration and Interest Community

Size: A Population Ecology Interpretation.” Political Research Quarterly. 51 (4): 919-944.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery. 2001. "The Institutionalization of State Communities of Organized Interests." Political Research Quarterly. 54 (2): 265-284.

Virginia Gray, David Lowery, and Jenny Wolak. In Press. “Demographic Opportunities, Collective Action, Competitive Exclusion, and the Crowded Room: Lobbying Forms Among Institutions.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly.

E. E. Schattschneider. 1960. The Semisovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Jack L. Walker Jr. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professionals, and Social Movements. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan. Chapter 4.

Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney. 1986. Organized Interests and American Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney. 1983. More of the Same: Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change. Journal of Politics 45 (2): 351-373.

Jeffrey Berry. 1999. New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery. 1996. Environmental Limits on the Diversity of State Interest Group Systems: A Population Ecology Simulation. Political Research Quarterly. 76 (March): 103-118.

VI. Lobbying the Public: Context, Framing, and Ideas (Oct. 7)

Required:

Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, and David C. Kimball. 2002. “Organized Interests and Issue Definition in Policy Debates.” In Interest Group Politics. Allen J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. Washington, CQ Press.

Andrew Rich and R. Kent Weaver. 1998. "Advocates and Analysts: Think Tanks and the Politicization of Expertise", In Interest Group Politics. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Lucig Danielson and Benjamin I. Page 1994. “The Heavenly Chorus: Interest Group Voices on TV News.” American Journal of Political Science. 38: 1056-1078.

Arthur Lupia. 1992. “Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information.” The American Political Science Review. 86: 390-403.

David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb. 1992. “Framing and Claiming the Homelessness Problem.” New England Journal of Public Policy. 8: 49-65.

Recommended:

E. E. Schattschneider. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Gary Mucciaroni. 1994. "Problem Definition and Special Interest Politics in Tax Policy and Agriculture." In The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda. David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, eds. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

Clyde Brown and Herbert Waltzer. 2002. "Lobbying the Press: 'Talk to the People Who Talk to America.'" In Interest Group Politics. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Andrew Rich. 2001. "Think Tanks and Advocacy by Experts in the States." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30-September.

James N. Druckman. 2001. "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" Journal of Politics. 63: 1041-1066.

David Truman. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 8.

VII. Lobbying the Public: Money and Electoral Campaigns (Oct. 14).

Required:

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, Chapter 9.

Richard N. Engstrom and Christopher Kenny. 2002. "The Effects of Independent Expenditures in Senate Elections." Political Research Quarterly. 55: 885-905.

Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox. 1999. Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering. Washington: CQ Press.

Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger, and Brian E. Roberts. 1994. "The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986." American Political Science Review. 88: 911-926.

Neil F. Mitchell, Wendy L. Hansen, and Eric Jepsen. 1997. "The Determinants of Domestic and Foreign Corporate Political Activity." Journal of Politics. 59: 1096-1072.

Gary C. Jacobson. 1990. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments." American Journal of Political Science. 34: 334-335.

Ansolobehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Micky Tripathi. 2000. "Are PAC Contributions Motivated by Access? New Evidence from the Lobby Disclosure Act." Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Recommended:

Thomas J. Rudolph. 1999. "Corporate and PAC Contributions in House Elections: Measuring the Effects of Majority Party Status." Journal of Politics. 61: 195-206.

Elizabeth R. Gerber. 1999. The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. Princeton, New Jersey: University of Princeton Press.

Frank Sorauf. 1994. Inside Campaign Finance. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Gary C. Jacobson. 1999. "The Effect of the AFL-CIO's 'Voter Education' Campaigns on the 1996 House Election." Journal of Politics. 61: 185-194.

Gary J. Andres, Gary J.. 1985. "Business Involvement in Campaign Finance: Factors Influencing the Decision to Form a Corporate PAC." PS. 18: 156-181.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery. 1997. "Reconceptualizing PAC Formation: It's Not a Collective Action Problem, and It May Be an Arms Race." American Politics Quarterly. 25 (3): 319-346.

Thomas J. Rudolph. 1999. "Corporate and PAC Contributions in House Elections: Measuring the Effects of Majority Party Status." Journal of Politics. 61: 195-206.

Thomas Gais. 1996. Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

David M. Hart. 2001. "Why Do Some Firms Give? Why Do Some Give a Lot? High-Tech PACS, 1977-1996." Journal of Politics. 63: 1230-1239.

Timothy McKeown. 1994. "The Epidemiology of Corporate PAC Formation, 1975-84." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 24: 153-168.

Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger, and Brian E. Roberts. 1991. "The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation." Southern Economic Journal. 57: 727-738.

Craig Humphries. 1991. "Corporations, PACs and the Strategic Link Between Contributions and Lobbying Activities." Western Political Quarterly. 44: 353-372.

Marick F. Masters, Gerald D. Keim. 1985. "Determinants of PAC Participation Among Large Corporations." Journal of Politics. 47: 1158-1173.

David Truman. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapters 9 and 10.

Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox. 1993. "Seeds for Success: Early Money in Congressional Elections." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 18: 535-551.

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. 2001. Special Interest Politics. Boston: MIT Press.

Herbert B. Asher, Eric S. Heverling, Randall B. Ripley, and Karen Snyder. 2001. American

Labor Unions in the Electoral Arena. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

David Broder. 2000. Democracy Derailed. New York: Harcourt, Inc.

Darrell West. 2000. Checkbook Democracy: How Money Corrupts Political Campaigns. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

VIII. Lobbying the Legislature: Access and Influence (Oct. 21)

Required:

Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interest and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Subcommittees." American Political Science Review. 84: 797-920.

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, Chapter 6.

Christopher Witko. 2002. "PACs, Legislative Context and Congressional Decision-Making." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April.

David Austen-Smith. 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Access." American Political Science Review. 89: 566-581.

Smith, Richard A. 1995. "Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 20: 89-139.

Gregory Wawro. 2001. "A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Votes." American Journal of Political Science. 45: 563-579.

Michelle L. Chin, Jon R. Bond, and Nehemia Geva. 2000. "A Foot in the Door: An Experimental Study of PAC and Constituency Effects on Access." Journal of Politics. 62 534-549.

Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented." American Political Science Review. 80: 89-106.

Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth Leech, 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 7.

John R. Wright. 1995. Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence. New York: Addison-Wesley. Chapter 4 and 5.

John R. Wright. 2002. "PAC Contributions and Voting on Tobacco Policy in the U.S. Congress, 1981-2000." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April.

Recommended:

John R. Wright. 1990. "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives." American Political Science Review. 84: 417-438.

John R. Wright. 1985. PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective." American Political Science Review. 79: 400-414.

David Austen-Smith. 1990. "Information Transmission in Debate." American Journal of Political Science. 34: 124-152.

David Austen-Smith. 1993. "Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes." American Journal of Political Science. 37: 799-833.

David Truman. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 11.

John Mark Hansen. 1991. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Jack L. Walker Jr. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professionals, and Social Movements. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan. Chapter 7.

Bauer, Raymond, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter. 1963. American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton Press.

John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert Salisbury. 1993. The Hollow Core. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Chapters 7 thru 11.

John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert Salisbury and Robert L. Nelson., 1990. "Inner Circles or Hollow Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems." Journal of Politics. 52: 356-389.

Dennis P. Quinn and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1991. "Business Political Power: The Case of Taxation." American Political Science Review. 85: 851-874.

Jeffrey M. Berry. 1977. Lobbying for the People. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lawrence Rothenberg. 1992. Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 9 thru 11.

Laura Langbein and Mark Lotwis. 1990. "The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money: Gun Control in the U.S. House, 1986." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 15: 413-440.

IX. Lobbying Legislatures: Strategies and Tactics (Oct. 28)

Required:

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, Chapter 8.

Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth Leech, 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in

Politics and in Political Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 8.

John R. Wright. 1995. Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence. New York: Addison-Wesley. Chapter 3.

Ken Kollman. 1998. Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Marie Hojnacki. 1997. "Interest Groups' Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone." American Journal of Political Science. 41 (1): 61-87.

Thomas Romer and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." American Journal of Political Science. 38: 745-769.

Kevin B. Grier and Michael C. Munger. 1993. "Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and Senate Incumbents, 1980-1986." Journal of Politics. 55: 615-643.

Marie Hojnacki and David Kimball. 1998. "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress." American Political Science Review. 92: 775-790.

Marie Hojnacki and David Kimball. 1999. "The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee." Journal of Politics. 61 (4): 999-1024.

Hojnacki, Marie. 2000. "The Changing Process of Direct Lobbying." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 27-30.

Recommended:

David Truman. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 12.

Ken M. Goldstein. 1999. Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ken Kollman. 1997. "Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional Committees." American Journal of Political Science. 41: 519-544.

Kevin W. Hula. 1999. Lobbying Together. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Elisabeth Gerber. 1996. "Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives." American Journal of Political Science. 87: 639-656.

David Austen-Smith and John Wright. 1994. "Counteractive Lobbying." American Journal of Political Science. 38: 25-44.

Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech. 1996. "The Multiple Ambiguities of 'Counteractive Lobbying'." American Journal of Political Science. 40: 521-542.

Jack L. Walker Jr. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professionals, and

Social Movements. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan. Chapter 6.

David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright. 1996. "Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying." American Journal of Political Science. 40: 543-564.

Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech. 1996. "Good Theories Deserve Good Data'." American Journal of Political Science. 40: 565-569.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery. 1998. To Lobby Alone or in a Pack: Foraging Behavior Among Organized Interests. American Politics Quarterly. 26: 5-34.

William P. Browne. 1995. Cultivating Congress: Constituents, Issues, and Interests in Agricultural Policymaking. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

X. Lobbying the Executive Branch (Nov. 4)

Required:

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 144-156.

Mark A. Peterson. 1992. "The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns of Interest Group Liason." American Political Science Review. 86: 612-625.

Daniel P. Carpenter. 2002. "Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval." American Journal of Political Science. 46: 490-505.

Steven J. Balla and John R. Wright. 2001. "Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy." American Journal of Political Science. 45: 799-813.

Larry B. Hill. 1991. "Who Governs the Administrative State: A Bureaucratic-Centered Image of Governance." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 1: 261-294.

William C. Mitchell and Michael C. Munger. 1991. "Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey." American Journal of Political Science. 35: 512-546.

Susan Webb Yackee. 2003. "Interest Group Influence and Bureaucratic Responsiveness in Policy Implementation." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April.

Recommended:

Brian J. Gerber and Paul Teske. 2000. "Regulatory Policymaking in the American States: A Review of Theories and Evidence." Political Research Quarterly. 53: 849-886.

Marver H. Bernstein. 1955. Regulating Business by Independent Commissions. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

George Stigler. 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation." Bell Journal of Econometrics and

Management Science. 2: 3-21.

Gary S. Becker. 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 98: 371-400.

Robert Barro. 1973. "The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model." Public Choice. 14: 19-42.

Sam Peltzman. 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." Journal of Law and Economics. 19: 211-240.

William T. Gormley, Jr. 1983. "Policy, Politics, and Public Utility Regulation." American Journal of Politics Science. 27: 86-105.

Arnold Fleischmann and Carol A. Pierannunzi. 1990. "Citizens, Development Interests, and Local Land-Use Regulation." Journal of Politics. 52: 838-853.

David Truman. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapters 13 and 14.

Jack L. Walker Jr. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professionals, and Social Movements. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan. Chapters 8 and 9.

John E. Chubb. 1983. Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The Politics of Energy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

XI. Lobbying the Judicial Branch (Nov. 11)

Required:

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 156-166.

Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright. 1988. "Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court." American Political Science Review. 82: 1109-1127.

Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright. 1990 "Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?" Journal of Politics. 52: 782-806.

Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright. 1998. "Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate." American Journal of Political Science. 42: 499-523.

Donald R. Songer and Ashlyn Kuersten. 1995. "The Success of Amici in State Supreme Courts." Political Research Quarterly. 48: 31-42 (1995).

Gregory A. Caldeira, Marie Hojnacki, and John R. Wright. 2000. "The Lobbying Activities of Organized Interests in Federal Judicial Nominations." Journal of Politics. 62: 51-69.

Recommended:

Kevin T. McGuire and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1993. "Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court." American Journal of Political Science. 87: 746-755.

Melinda Gann Hall. 1987. "Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study." Journal of Politics. 49: 1117-1124.

Lee Epstein and C. K. Rowland. 1991. "Debunking the Myth of Interest Group Invincibility in the Courts." American Political Science Review. 58: 206-217.

James F. Spriggs, II and Paul J. Wahlbeck, 1997. "Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme Court." Political Research Quarterly. 50: 365-386.

Donald R. Songer and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1993. "Interest Group Success in the Courts: Amicus Participation in the Supreme Court." Political Research Quarterly. 46: 339-354.

Karen O'Connor and Lee Epstein. 1983. "The Rise of Conservative Interest Groups." Journal of Politics. 45: 479-489.

Donald R. Songer and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1992. "Who Wins on Appeal? Uppercuts and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals." American Journal of Political Science. 36: 235-258.

Reginald S. Sheehan, William Mishler, and Donald R. Songer. 1992. "Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court." American Political Science Review 86: 464-471.

Martha A. Derthick. 2002. Up In Smoke. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Kevin T. McGuire. 2000. "Lobbyists, Revolving Doors and the U.S. Supreme Court." The Journal of Law and Politics. 16: 113-137.

Kevin T. McGuire. 1993. The Supreme Court Bar. Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia.

David Truman. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 15.

Susan M. Olson. 1990. "Interest Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond the Political Disadvantage Theory." Journal of Politics. 52: 854-882.

XII. Organized Interests, Policy and Political Outcomes, and Proposed Reforms (Nov. 18)

Required:

John R. Wright. 1995. Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence. New York: Addison-Wesley. Chapters 6 and 7.

Scott H. Ainsworth. 2002. Analyzing Interest Groups. New York: W. W. Norton, Chapter 10.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Chapters 10, 11, and 12.

Virginia Gray, David Lowery, Matthew Fellowes, and Andrea McAtee. 2002. "Public Opinion, Public Policy, and Organized Interests in the American States." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the State Politics and Policy Conference, Milwaukee, March.

Recommended:

Mark A. Smith. "Public Opinion, Elections, and Representation with a Market Economy: Does the Structural Power of Business Undermine Popular Sovereignty?" American Journal of Political Science. 1999. 43: 842-863.

John J. Coleman. 2001. "The Distribution of Campaign Spending Benefits Across Groups." Journal of Politics. 63: 916-934.

Ken Goldstein and Paul Freedman. 2002. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Turnout: New Evidence for a Simulation Effect." Journal of Politics. 64: 721-740.

Adam J. Newmark. 2002. "Personal Relations and the Importance of Information in State Lobbying." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Savannah, November.

Jan Leighley. 1996. "Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation." Journal of Politics. 58: 447-463.

Paul Burstein. 2003. "The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda." Political Research Quarterly. 56: 29-40.

Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McConnell, Grant. 1966. Private Power and American Democracy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

G. William Domhoff. 1990. The Power Elite and the State. Aldine de Gruyter.

Mark A. Smith. 2000. American Business and Political Power. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Truman, David B. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 16.

Annelise Anderson, 2000. Political Money. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press.

Anthony Corrado. 2000. Campaign Finance Reform. New York: The Century Foundation Press.

Diana Dwyer and Victoria A. Farrar-Myers. 2001. Legislative Labyrinth. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Bradley A. Smith. 2001. Unfree Speech. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Margaret F. Brinig, Randall G. Holcombe, and Linda Schwartzstein. 1993. "The Regulation of Lobbyists." Public Choice. 77: 377-384.

David Lowery and Virginia Gray 1997. "How Some Rules Just Don't Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists." Public Choice. 91: 139-147.

Cynthia Opheim. 1991. "Explaining the Differences in State Lobbying Regulation," Western Political Quarterly. 44: 405-421.

Virginia Gray and David Lowery. 1995. Interest Representation and Democratic Gridlock. Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 (November): 531-552.

John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert Salisbury. 1993. The Hollow Core. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Chapter 12.

Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter. 1963. American Business and Public Policy. New York: Atherton.

Mancur Olson. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sam Peltzman, Sam. 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." Journal of Law and Economics. 19: 211-240.

Susanne Lohmann. 1998. "An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests." American Political Science Review. 92: 775-790.

XIII. Student Presentations of Research Proposals (Nov. 25)

XIV. Student Presentation of Research Proposals (Dec. 2)

Interest Group Texts (for reference)

Alan Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis. 1998. Interest Group Politics. 5th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald S. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox. 1998. The Interest Group Connection. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House.

Mark P. Petracca. 1992. The Politics of Interests. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Anne Costain and Andrew McFarland. 1998. Social Movements and American Political Institutions. Lanham: Roman and Littlefield.

Philip A. Mundo. 1992. Interest Groups: Cases and Characteristics. Nelson-Hall Publishers.

Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox. 1999. Interest Groups in American Campaigns. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Jeffrey M. Berry. 1997. The Interest Group Society. New York: Longman.

H. R. Mahood. 2000. Interest Groups in American National Politics. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Anthony J. Nownes. 2001. Pressure and Power: Organized Interests in American Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

William P. Browne. 1998. Groups, Interests, and U.S. Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Ronald Hrebenar. 1997. Interest Group Politics in America. 3rd ed. M. E. Sharpe.

David Lowery and Holly Brasher. 2003. Organized Interests and American Government. Boston: McGraw Hill.

James Q. Wilson. 1973. Political Organizations. New York: Basic Books.

Outline of a Model Ph.D. Proposal or Paper¹ *(Proposal – 20 to 25 pages)*

1. Introduction

- Provide a clear statement of the "why" question motivating the research.
- Justify the question. Why should we be interested substantively and/or theoretically?
- Outline the thesis to follow indicating what will be in each section.

2. Literature Review

- Identify the literatures bearing on answering the "why" question you have posed.
- Summarize and critique each in terms of method and major findings.
- Identify why there is a gap in the literature necessitating your research.

3. Theory

- Identify and fully explain your answer to the "why" question you have proposed, theoretically defining all of the major concepts. Why should your answer be valid?
- Contrast your answer to competing or complementary answers to the "why" question, again defining all of the concepts theoretically.
- Discuss any additional factors that must be controlled for in the analyses that follow, again defining all concepts theoretically.
- Provide a summary of the conceptual model to be tested.

4. Analysis

- Justify the unit of analysis and research design employed in your empirical investigation.
- Operationalize all of the theoretical concepts identified in the previous section, fully discussing the reliability and validity of the measures.
- Provide univariate analyses of the key variables used in the analysis.
- Present the multivariate analysis or analyses, fully discussing all of the results.

5. Conclusion

- Summarize your major research findings.
- Discuss why they are a contribution to the study of your "why" question.
- Identify and discuss the limitations of your analysis.
- Identify future research flowing from your findings.

1. All of the identified elements should be found in the final thesis. For the proposal, parts 1 and 2 should be largely completed, and part 3 should be in solid draft form. In the proposal, part 4 will indicate work that is proposed to be done rather than completed work, and part 5 should be written in terms of what you expect to find and hope to contribute.