Chapter 2

The History of International Terrorism

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This chapter deals with the origin, birth and history of terrorism and its evolution in five distinct phases. The first section deals with the origin of the word terror and terrorism and traces its history from first known instances of terrorism until mid 20th century. The next section deals with the transcendence of terrorism across national boundaries followed by an examination of terrorism in the immediate post World War years. The fourth section examines the Latin American model of the 1960s and examines the theories espoused by Carlos Marighella and Earnest Guevara followed by the phase where terrorism largely targeted civilians. In the last section, the changes, which are taking place in international terrorism following the end of the Cold War, are examined.

Origin and Growth

Expressions such as *terror, terrorise, terrible* or *terrorism* derive from the Latin verb *terrere* meaning to tremble or to cause to tremble. Etymologists claim that English words like *terrorism terrorist* and *terrorise* came into usage only after the French revolution (1793–1798) when words like *terrorisme, terroriste, terroriser* had developed.[1] In 1798, the supplement of the *Dictionnaire of the academic Francaise* defined terrorism as system, regime, *regime de la terreur*. This was the historic period when physical violence was used in Europe to change the status quo and to bring about a

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[1] Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism,* (London: Macmillan, 1974), p.9.

new social order and at least initially, the term had a positive connotation. Gradually, the meaning shifted to denote 'reign of terror' and eventually to a system of terror.

Historically there has been no consensus about the relationship between terror and terrorism. The most widely held views are that terror can occur without terrorism, but terrorism cannot occur without the element of terror.[2] Terror forms an element of numerous forms of ordinary crime but terrorism, is an act, which goes beyond the affected victim. If terror is a natural phenomenon, "terrorism is the conscious exploitation of it."[3]

The first known terrorist groups in human history, namely the Zealots-Sicarii, assassins and thugs, emanated out of strong religious convictions. These groups, specially the Zealots as well as the Assassins, were the first groups to use terrorism as a political weapon. In the first century CE Zealots-Sicarri, a Jewish group, was actively pursuing terrorism against the Romans with devastating consequences. Their objective of a popular uprising ended with the destruction of the Second Jewish Temple in 70 CE and led to Diaspora. Even though the outcome was negative, the Zealots initiated the usage of terrorism to pursue specific political objectives.[4]

The second category, assassins or Ismailis-Nizari operated from 1090 to 1275 and according to Jessica Stern observed:

> Their objective like that of some of today's violent Islamist extremist was to spread a purified version of Islam. Their technique was to stab their victims in broad day light, which made the assailants escape all but

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[2] John Richard Thackrah, *Encyclopaedia of Terrorism and Political Violence*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), p.256.

[3] Ibid.,p.257

[4] Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorist*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.15

impossible. They considered their own life to be sacrificial offerings. Their targets were prominent politicians who had refused to accept the new preaching. The assassins seriously threatened the governments of several nations including the Turkish Seljuk Empire in Persia and Syria.[5]

Thugs form the third category of terrorists and operated in certain parts of India for well over six centuries until they were crushed in late 19th century. Despite their prolonged existence and widespread presence, they lacked any political motives and therefore, they fall into the category of criminalism than terrorism. The usage of religion to 'legitimize their acts of brutality' as highlighted by Wilkinson[6], alone does not make thugs terrorists.[7]

In modern times, political terrorism has been classified into three categories: revolutionary terror, sub-revolutionary terror and repressive terror.[8] The mid- and late-18th century marked the beginning of a European and ultimately worldwide diffusion of a popular revolution ideology. This magnetic new revolutionary ideology also provided an ideological justification for *revolutionary terror*, which became the just and lawful. Violence thus was sanctified in the name of general will.[9]

Revolutionary terror uses political and terrorist violence to bring about a revolution or political change. According to John Richard Thackrah, it has four main attributes

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[5] Ibid., This position reflects the conventional view vis-à-vis Ismailis, propagated primarily by the Crusaders.

[6] Wilkinson, n.1, p.46.

[7] Despite the absence of political motives, thugs are continued to be portrayed as terrorists. For example, see, Stern, n.4, p.15.

[8] Thackrah, n.2, p.p194

[9] Wilkinson, n.1, p.36.

- It is always a group and not an individual phenomenon.

- Its usage is often justified by some revolutionary ideology,

- It has leaders who are capable of mobilizing public opinion; and

- Its purpose is to establish alternative institutional structures [10]

The French Jacobians developed the idea of applying maximal violence against the forces of autocracy and traditionalism. In Russia, which had no past experience of revolutionary movement, soon imbibed the French revolutionary ideas of popular insurrection as the essential strategy for a popular egalitarian revolution. The Russian revolutionaries fought an autocratic government in 1878-1881 and again in the early years of the 20th century.

Terrorism in Russia developed in several stages and began with sporadic acts of armed defence in resisting arrests and as a reaction against individual police officers who had maltreated arrested revolutionaries.[11] The formation of *Land and Liberty* in 1872 in St. Petersburg by a group of peasants marked a new beginning in Russia. This revolutionary society, first of its kind, was committed to bring about an economic revolution from below 'by militant methods.'[12] Initial reservations over the use of terrorist operations to pursue revolutionary movement lost their momentum partly due to the belief, "terrorist operations were far more effective in promoting the revolution if only because of the tremendous publicity they received, very much in contrast to illegal propaganda and organizational work which had no visible effect."[13]

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[10] Thackrah, n.2, p.195

[11] Walter Lacquer, *Terrorism*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholsan, 1977), p.33.

[12] Robert B Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, (London: Macdonald and James, 1975), p.312

[13] Lacquer, n.11, p.33.

As a result, at the turn of the 19th century, Russian intellectual elite began to view terrorist violence as the only effective way to modernize the Russian society. For example, Nicholas Morozov's conception of the role of terror in Russia was not limited to putting an end to the existing tyranny but was viewed as the continuing system of permanent struggle, 'popular, historical, and traditional.'[14] The acquittal of Vera Zasulich, who made an unsuccessful attempt on the Governor of St. Petersburg, reflected the prevailing tolerance vis-à-vis terrorism. Overruling overwhelming evidence of her involvement, the jury found Zasulich innocent because they agreed with her 'humane' motives, to protest the ill-treatment of political prisoners. Gradually this sympathy for the motives of terrorists gained wider acceptance among the Russian population.[15]

The second major wave of terrorism in Russia was sponsored by the Social Revolutionary Party. Beginning with the assassination in 1902 of Sipyagin, the Minister of Interior, this phase primarily witnessed a series of targeted-killing. After reaching its peak in 1906, the terror campaign began to wane. The third and final wave of political terror began following the Bolshevik revolution in November 1917 but was quickly suppressed.[16]

As Wilkinson argued, when movements are purely terroristic, as was the case of the Social Revolutionary Party (SRP) in Russia during 1905-08, they are unable to transform themselves into engines of social change.[17] As an auxiliary weapon in the hands of revolutionaries fighting autocratic regimes, terrorism proved to be an effective

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[14] Zeev Ivianski, "The terrorist Revolution: Roots of Modern Terrorism," in David C. Rapoport, *Inside Terrorist Organisation*, (London: Frank Cass, 1988), p.138

[15] Lacquer, n.11, p.41.

[16] Ibid., p.12.

[17] Wilkinson, n.1, p.74

instrument for social change. Revolutionaries tended to apply terrorism as a weapon against autocracy for a limited period to bring about their objectives. Terrorism was a vehicle to attain power but did not become an instrument to retain power.

This benevolent view of terrorism changed as the 19th century Europe witnessed a host of high-profiled assassination of monarchs, members of the aristocracy and government officials by the anarchists and social revolutionaries.[18] They created not only political instability but also widespread anxiety among the population. Motivated by political revolt, social uprising or religious protests, these terrorist acts were pursued by small-dissatisfied groups and individuals who pursued terrorism against their political enemies. At times, such acts were conducted through the help of secret societies. In the absence of a coherent strategy, assassinations quickly lost popular support. However, with the passage of time similar acts in Spain and the US enjoyed the support of specific social groups and paved the way for what was subsequently called *working class terrorism*.[19] In Spain, it took the form of *agrarian* and *industrial* terrorism. Before the outbreak of World War-I there were systematic terrorist campaigns on the fringes of Europe, in Russia, the Balkans and in different form in Spain.[20] Even the non-European world was not safe from such assassination, though the menace was less, partly because it was politically a less attractive target. Random political killings in Egypt took a definitive

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[18] Prominent among them are, terrorist attack on the Emperor or Germany, King of Spain and King of Italy in 1878; Assassination of President Carnot of France in 1894; Premier of Spain in 1897; Empress of Austria in 1898; King of Italy 1900; and President of US in 1901.

[19] For example those practiced by Molly Magiues and Western Union of Mineworkers.

[20] Lacquer, n.11, p.15.

turn in the 1930s and 1940s when the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to a more organized assassination campaign.[21]

International Terrorism

By the end of the World War I, anarchism had outgrown its phase and terrorism transcended national boundaries and transformed into a transnational phenomenon. It appealed to various nationalist and separatist groups in Europe and elsewhere as an effective means of sensitizing their grievances and gaining wider recognition and acceptance. The 1920s witnessed 'systematic terrorism' gaining influence on the fringes of the emerging Fascist movements. Even though the acts of terrorism, especially assassinations were fewer in number, they were beginning to assume regional importance. The assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Barthou in Marseilles in April 1934 was clearly a case of international terrorism where "at least four governments were involved the League of Nations intervened; resolutions were passed and committees were established with a view to combating terrorism on an international basis."[22]

The immediate post-Second World War years witnessed a host of terrorist activities under the rubric of nationalist struggle against imperial and colonial powers. The British were the targets in Palestine (1945-47), Egypt over Suez (1950s) and in Cyprus (1955-59). These groups achieved decisive victories and managed to achieve political successes vis-à-vis the British. Indeed these were the only examples where terrorism *alone* was sufficient to bring about a political or social change. The

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[21] Ibid, p.17.

[22] Ibid.

asymmetrical weakness vis-à-vis the British coupled with widespread popular support enabled these groups to successfully employ terrorism. British war-weariness and the public unwillingness to pursue expensive conflict in colonies gave terrorist groups a psychological edge. In the words of H. Hess , terrorism "means a series of intentional acts of direct , psychological violence, which at indeterminable points but nevertheless systematically ,with the aim of psychic effect, are conducted within the framework of a political strategy."[23]

At the same time, terrorism has its limitations. While it might have proved effective against colonialism and foreign rule, its record of accomplishment against indigenous autocratic regimes has been different. The success of terrorist acts pre-supposed that the government or regime in power was not violently suppressing groups challenging its authority. When Third World authoritarian regimes resorted to terrorism as means of suppression, a new style of totalitarian system emerged.[24]

Moreover, even in the context of national liberation, terrorism had its limits. Much of the post-war national liberation struggles achieved their political objectives through means other than terrorism. National independence and sovereignty often were obtained through political struggle rather than through systematic campaign of terrorism.[25] The transition from colonial status into independence was brought about by political pressures and diplomatic manoeuvres rather than through terrorist atrocities. Terrorism, for example, had arguably a limited role in the British withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent.

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[23] Thackrah, n. 2, p.63

[24] Lacquer, n11, p.11

Terrorism, the Latin American model

In the 1960s Latin America, especially Che Guevara became a model for various terrorist groups in the world. Terrorism was to be deployed primarily as a means of provoking massive repressive response from the government, which in turn would lead to the alienation of the popular support for the government. The theory of foco, which embraces the concept that it was the armed action of militants that can produce the revolutionary situation, was first practised by Che Guevera in Bolivia in 1967. Che Guevara looked to Bolivia as the nucleus of a revolution that would eventually spread throughout Latin American. He however, failed to win local and urban support principally due to his belief that revolution came from above. At the same time, he proved to be an inspiration for guerrilla warfare in both Latin American and elsewhere.[26] His advocacy of guerrilla warfare was primarily aimed at the rural population and, over the years, the same strategy was shifted and adopted into urban guerrilla warfare. Critics of Guevara have argued that because rural areas are on the periphery, guerrilla actions in far flanged areas would not attract necessary attention. Away from centres of power, rural guerrilla warfare would not bring about the necessary impact upon the central government. Hence to be effective, the critics have argued, the guerrilla warfare could maximise its impact only by moving to the urban locale and by attacking and undermining the immediate powerbase of the regime. This shift to urban locale also affects the nature of guerrilla warfare and its targets in the urban areas.

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[25] Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: the problems of Response" in Gutleridge William, *The New Terrorism*, (London: Mansell Publishing House, 1986), p.5.

[26] Ross E. Butler, "Terrorism in Latin America" in Yonah Alexander, Ed *International Terrorism National, Regional and Global Perspective*, (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1976), p.46.

The 1970s witnessed a new phase of terrorism when innocent civilians became the principle target of various terrorist groups seeking to promote their political demands or goals. Until then terrorism was directed primarily against specific individuals representing or associated with the regime. Even the guerrilla warfare, both rural and urban, largely kept the civilians out of their scope. Though civilians were killed during guerrilla warfare, they were not the intended targets.

At another level, in the 1970s terrorism became a more organized phenomenon and was sucked into Cold War politics. As a result, during this period most of the known terrorist groups have enjoyed or benefited from close political, ideological or military support from Cuba or USSR. A number of terrorist groups, primarily Palestinians, were being trained by professionals in both these countries. Towards the end of the decade with the Soviet involvement in Angola and Mozambique, a number of African groups were also enlisted their support.[27]

In the mid-1970s, the various Palestinian groups, spearheaded by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) dominated international terrorism and continued their sway until well into the next decades. By late 1980s, a number of international developments brought about a fundamental shift among the Palestinians. Their leader Yasser Arafat gradually distanced himself from terrorism and looked to political means to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict based on UN resolutions. This position proved effective when both sides initiated the Oslo process in 1993. At least in the initial years, the PLO distanced itself from terrorism and even cooperated with Israel in cracking down on groups such as Hamas that were conducting a terror campaign against Israel. In other

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[27] Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network*, (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholsan, 1981), p.15

words, the Oslo process was an example for erstwhile groups relying on terrorism to abandon that path and try to seek the same objectives through political dialogue and compromise.

Post-Cold War Terrorism

Terrorism, which peaked during Cold War, continued even after the end of the ideological divide. Undeniably international terrorism assumed new and different characteristics. As political component diminished, terrorism came to be dominated by issues such as religious fervour, racist considerations and financial motives. Other than an amalgamation of host of grievances against the dominant powers, primarily the US, most of the post-Cold War terrorist groups lack a coherent political plan. Some of the high-profiled terrorist groups such as *al-Qaida* highlight this new trend. The willingness of diverse groups to cooperate with one another or rally around specific populist positions does not hide the absence of a common political formulation.

Second, religion has re-emerged as a fulcrum of international terrorism. If religious was a banner in the past, it has become the primary motive leading to "holy or sacred terror."[28] Indeed, one could notice that a number of terrorist groups with secular-nationalist background do contain important strands of religious elements; for example, *Irgun* (pre-state Israel), EOKA, (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston) (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), Front de Liberation National (National Liberation

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[28] David C. Rapoport, "Sacred terror: A contemporary example from Islam", in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies. Theologies, States of Mind*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.103

Front) (FLN) (Algeria). However, religiously inspired terrorist groups tend to be more violent than their erstwhile secular counterparts.[29]

> There is a wide spread tendency ... to explain examples of sacred terror by more familiar political or economic categories... these explanations certainly have value but they are normally offered by distant observers of the conflict while those engaged in it use a theological picture of the world which we must understand in its own terms.[30]

Thus since the end of the Cold War, religion has become the dominating incentive for terrorism and theology has taken over revolutionary zeal as the guiding principle for terrorism.

The background of leading terrorists bears out this strategic shift. During the Cold War years, professionals with technical background and expertise often led various Palestinian groups that indulged in terrorism; PLO leader Yasser Arafat studied civil engineering in King Faud University in Egypt;[31] Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) leader George Habash received a medical degree from the American University of Beirut; and Abu Nidal studied engineering in University of Cairo. All of them used secular nationalism rather than religious ideology to justify their acts of terrorism.

In the post Cold War, era terrorist groups, especially in the Middle East were headed by religious clerics. Skilfully using their religious knowledge and mass appeal,

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[29] Stern, n.4, p.17

[30] David C. Rapoport, *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, (London: Frank Cass, 1988), p.7

[31] Until the early 1980s, Arafat was primarily seen in the West as a leading light of international terrorism but was hailed as an international statesman when he gave up armed struggle and sought a political settlement with Israel.

they initiate and indoctrinate their followers into terrorism. Those lacking a formal legal religious title or position justify terrorism on theological grounds. They include: the blind cleric Egyptian Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who was accused of masterminding terror campaigns in US; Hamas led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin; the Lebanese resistance movement Hezbollah led by Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah; the Taliban led by self-proclaimed clergy Mullah Omar; and Osama Bin Laden, though not a clergy, invokes religion to pursue and rationalize his terror acts.

Bruce Hoffman traces the beginning of 'modern' religious terrorism to the emergence of two Iranian-backed Shia organisations *al-Dawa* and the Committee for Safeguarding Islamic Revolution in the 1980s.[32] The following decade saw an upsurge of religious-terrorist groups when Islamic as well as various 'obscure religious sects and cults' indulged in terrorism. If in the 1980s only two out of 64 active groups could be categorized as religious terrorist groups, in 1995 this figure rose to 46 percent when 26 out of 56 groups come under this category.[33] Even though Islamic radical terrorist groups draw widespread criticisms, a number of non-Islamic religious groups/sects have also indulged in terrorism; for example, Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, Christian Patriots, right wing militias (Oklahoma bombing 1995); Sikh militants in India; and attempts by Jewish extremists to blow up the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

The rise of religious terrorism is an irony of Cold War. At the heights of Cold War the conflict, the US employed Islamic religious zealots to undermine and humble the Soviet Union and created the Afghan Mujahideen. Islam was seen an effective means of neutralizing, weakening and eventually defeated what President Ronal Reagan described

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[32] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (London: Indigo, 1999), p.90
[33] Ibid.

as the Evil Empire. As a result, during the Afghan War the US poured large quantities of small arms and weapons in to Afghanistan, trained hundreds of young Afghan Mujahideen into waging a holy war against Moscow and presented them to the outside world as freedom fighters. Scores of young Muslim youths were trained and brainwashed to wage a jihad against the infidel communist. The religious fervour did not end with the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and those who survived the decade long war diverted their attention to other troubled spots. The Afghan Arabs' extended their operations to Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Burma, Egypt, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uzbekistan Yemen and US.

Third, terrorism ceases to be an attractive instrument of foreign policy and hence there is a noticeable decline in the state sponsorship of terrorism. As the US State Department was forced to admit, with the singular exception of Iraq the entire Arab and Islamic world, including those often branded as terrorists by the US, had condemned the September 11 attacks.[34] Increased awareness, effective counter-measures, growing international disapproval and high political costs have lessened the past enthusiasm of the states to pursue terrorism as a means of furthering national interests. The disintegration of some states and the weakening of the central authority in others have further eroded state-sponsorship of terrorism. Thus states, which in the past hosted wanted terrorists have been less inclined to continue their hospitality and some of the notable examples, are:

- In 1994, Sudan handed over Carlos the Jackal to the French authorities and the following year Yemen extradited his accomplice to Germany;

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[34] *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001,* http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10292.pdf, downloaded on March 3, 2002.

- In 1995 Pakistan extradited Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, suspected of masterminding the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing to the US;

- In November 1998 Syria expelled Abdullah Ocalan after Turkey threatened a military confrontation over this issue;

According to a study by a British institute, the number of state-sponsored terrorism has declined from 73 in 1988 to 10 in 1994.[35]

Four, the decrease in state sponsorship does not correspond to a decline in terrorist incidents because the state sponsored terrorist "have been replaced" by freelance extremists who receive/provide support from outside the boundaries. As some states receded from active involvement in promoting terrorism, individuals and groups begun to occupy primacy in the post-Cold War terrorism. Not governed by international treaty or regime, they are immune from restrictions that the international system imposes upon the state. Not only have terrorist groups proliferated but they also operate independent of the state authorities or any international regime. Driven by their narrow agenda, the terrorist groups forge common cause with organized criminal elements both inside and outside their respective countries and establish a network of finances, arms and logistical support.

Five, commercial consideration as opposed to ideological currents, play an important role in post-Cold War international terrorism. The Russian support to Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) terrorist groups in Turkey and Ahmed Shah Massud in Afghanistan were primarily motivated by economic calculations.[36] The narcotic trade that flourishes in

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[35] Harvey W. Kushner, "The new terrorism", in Harvey W. Kushner, Ed. *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), n.2, p.19

[36] Lucy Mathiack and Lora Lumpe, "Government gun-running to guerrillas", in Lora Lumpe, *Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms*, (London: Zed, 2000), pp.66-67. For a detailed discussion

Afghanistan sustains the operations of various religious extremist and criminal elements in this region.[37] By the time the Cold War had ended, many terrorist groups have developed an independent financial base and supply network that the end of state-sponsorship was not missed. In short, "elaborate international networks have developed, organized criminals, drug traffickers, arms dealers, and money launderers, creating an infra structure for catastrophic terrorism around the world."[38] Such a kind of co-operation, nexus or ideological affinity exists between various terrorist groups and organisations; for example Irish Republic Army (IRA)-Croatian rebels, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), and Hamas-Hezbollah.

Six, since the end of the Cold War there are repeated speculations in the West about nuclear weapons falling into the hands of nationalist extremists or political radicals who might resort to direct nuclear terrorism or might become conduits for other states or terrorist groups.[39] The disintegration of Soviet Union had exasperated this anxiety when political fluidity inhibited the central authority from exercising its authority in the newly independent states.

In 1994, a small quantity of weapon grade plutonium smuggled from Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk, not far from Moscow, was intercepted in

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on the role of small arms upon international terrorism see, Tara Kartha, *Tools of Terror: Light Weapons and India's Security*, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999)

[37] Peter Tomsen, "Geopolitics of an Afghan settlement", *Perceptions*, vol.5, no.4, December 2000-February 2001, p.103

[38] Ashton Carter, John Deutch and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic terrorism: Tackling the new danger" *Foreign Affairs* Vol.77, No.6, November-December 1998, p.81

[39] *Programme for the Promotion of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) Newsbrief* (Southampton), no. 37, 1/ 1997, p.11

Germany.[40] There are fears both in Russian and in the West that Chechen separatists might try to launch a terrorist attack on Russian nuclear facilities.[41] In March 1995, Japanese apocalyptic religious sect Aum Shinrikyo became the first organization to use weapon of mass destruction for its terrorist campaign. The cooperation between some Pakistani nuclear scientists and members of the *al-Qaida* once again raise the prospects of terrorist groups gaining access to WMD.

Conclusion

Terrorism has been a phenomenon for centuries. Over the years, there has been a discernible change in its nature and character. Its lethality is increasing and so its undetectablity. Contrary to the present negative connotations, terrorism was seen as positive development towards social change. It was associated with the idea of democracy and freedom when the revolutionaries were the ones known to employ terrorism. By the 1930s, the meaning had changed again when it was referred to the means employed by the state against their citizens.

After the World War II, terrorism was seen as a tool in the hands of anti-colonial forces struggling for self-determination and independence. The 1960s and 70s was the age of the ethnic and separatist groups who used terrorism largely to support their struggle. During the Cold War terrorism was largely a game plan of the superpowers in their bid to out manoeuvre one another. This was also the beginning of state sponsored terrorism and a low cost war. Towards the end of the 20th century, impact of science and

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[40] Ibid.,no.32, 4/1995, p.15.

[41] Ibid.

technological advancement brought in the spectre of 'catastrophic' terrorism. A weapon of mass destruction is now available to the terrorists.

Terrorism thus has traversed a wide path from being a tool in the hands of individuals as in the time of Assassins and thugs to becoming a part of part of state and then a non-state phenomenon. Terrorism in the past emanated from various ideological considerations. However, over time, the political goals were diluted and thereby blurring the true intensions and motives behind terrorism.