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# 1.0. Introduction

The purpose of this document is to describe in detail the features and functions of the ACS Smart Card Operating Systems Version 3 (ACOS3) developed by Advanced Card Systems Ltd.

## 1.1. Features

- Full 32, or 72 Kbytes of EEPROM memory for application data.
- Compliance with ISO 7816 parts 1, 2, 3; supporting the T=0 direct protocol.
- ISO7816-2 compliant 8-contact module.
- High-speed transmission possible (9.6 to 223.2 kbps) with modifiable ATR.
- DES / 3DES and MAC capabilities.
- Five secret codes + issuer code.
- PIN code that can be updated by card holder.
- Key pair for mutual authentication.
- · Session key based on random numbers.
- FIPS140-2 compliant hardware-based random number generator.
- Binary files and record files are available for user data storage.
- Secure messaging option ensures transmission of user data is secured against eavesdropping, replay attack and unauthorized modifications.
- Highly secured e-Purse for payment applications.
- Completely backward compatible with ACOS1 / ACOS2 cards.

# 1.2. Technical Specifications

The following are the technical properties of the ACOS3 card:

#### 1.2.1. Electrical

- Operating at 5V DC +/-10% (Class A) and 3V DC +/-10% (Class B)
- Maximum supply current: <10 mA</li>
- ESD protection: ≤ 4 KV

#### 1.2.2. **EEPROM**

- Capacity: ACOS3-32: 32 Kilobytes (32,768 bytes)
   ACOS3-72: 72 Kilobytes (73,728 bytes)
- EEPROM endurance: 100K erase/write cycles
- Data retention: 10 years

# 1.2.3. Environmental

- Operating temperature: -25 °C to +85 °C
- Storage temperature: -40 °C to +125 °C



# 1.3. History of Modification

December 2005	ACOS3-16 revision 1.0
April 2007	ACOS3-16 revision 1.01 - Modification of the ATR for backward compatibility
August 2007	ACOS3-16 revision 1.03  - Extra ISO7816-3 guard time during transmission for enhanced reader compatibility  - Enhancement added for 223.2 kbps communication support
October 2007	ACOS3-16 revision 1.06 - Added read/write record offset feature Added maximum code retry counters feature.
November 2007	ACOS3-24 revision 1.07  - Expanded user storage capacity to 24 Kbyte.  - Added Transparent (Binary) file structure.  - Added Secure Messaging for user data files.
January 2008	ACOS3-64 revision 1.08 - New product option with expanded storage capacity of 64 Kbyte.
July 2008	ACOS3-24 revision 1.09 ACOS3-64 revision 1.10 - Enhancement added for ATR communication support Added get card version information in GetCardInfo function.
June 2009	ACOS3 revision 1.16  - New product options with user storage capacity of 32 and 72 Kbyte.  - Allows for 64 files to be stored.  - Uses FIPS 140-2 compliant Hardware Random Number Generator  - Issuing START SESSION clears authentication state for enhanced security.




# 2.0. Chip Life Cycle

During the whole life cycle of the chip-card, three phases and two different operating modes can be distinguished:

- Manufacturing State
- Personalization State
- User State
- User State Issuer Mode

The card is at any moment in one of these four states. The following diagram shows the possible transitions between the four states:



The actual chip life cycle state is determined by the card operating system immediately after a reset. The life cycle state does not change during the operation of the card. Clear card command can be issued in the personalization state and manufacture state to clear the card of all data except the manufacturer data and IC code. However, this command will not be able to be used after user state.

# 2.1. Manufacturing State

The *Manufacturing State* is effective from the moment of chip manufacturing until an associated fuse (i.e., a certain bit in the EEPROM), the *Manufacturer Fuse*, has been programmed.

The IC is presented to the card in plain, without encryption.

All commands are available in manufacturer state. In addition, the *Manufacturer File* (FF01<sub>H</sub>) can only be written in this state.

The manufacturer file contains 2 records of 8 bytes each associated to the manufacturing state. In this file, it contains the Manufacturer Fuse. After programming the Manufacturer Fuse, the card enters the Personalization state and the manufacturer File is read-only. Data unique to each card and common card data can be programmed, such as, card manufacturer identification, card serial number, etc. The card does not interpret the data.

In this state, the card's data and keys can be erased by calling the CLEAR CARD command. This command will physically erase the EEPROM memory except for the IC code and manufacturer file.



Once the manufacturer fuse has been blown and the manufacturing state has thus been terminated, there is no possibility of resetting the card back into the manufacturing state.

## 2.2. Personalization State

The *Personalization State* is effective from the moment of termination of the manufacturing state until an associated bit in the EEPROM, the so-called *Personalization Bit,* has been programmed.

In this state, the card's data and keys can be erased by calling the CLEAR CARD command. This command will physically erase the EEPROM memory except for the IC code and manufacturer file. Re-personalization of the card is possible.

In the Personalization State, any write access to Internal Data Files, as well as the read access to the Security File is only possible after the presentation of the correct IC code. The card manufacturer writes the IC code in the Manufacturing State.

The IC is presented to the card in plain, without encryption. The Authentication Process should not be executed prior to programming the correct keys in the Personalization State.

The following data items are written to the memory in the Personalization State:

- The Personalization File, containing 3 records of 4 bytes each associated to the Personalization State, including the Option Registers. This area can only be written in the Personalization State. After programming the Personalization Fuse, the Personalization File is read-only. Data unique to each card and common card data can be programmed in the Personalization File, such as, card issuer identification, card application code, etc. The first 10 bytes of the Personalization File are transmitted in the Historical Bytes in the Answer-to-Reset.
- Secret Codes and Keys
- The File Definition Blocks of the required User Data Files.
- The Account Data Structure (if enabled by the respective option bit)
- The Personalization Bit to change the card life cycle from the Personalization State to the User State.

Once the Personalization Bit has been programmed and the Personalization State has thus been terminated, there is no possibility of resetting the card back into the personalization state.

## 2.3. User State

*User State* designates the normal operating mode of the card. Two types of user states are distinguished – User State and User State - Issuer Mode. The User State is effective from the moment of termination of the personalization state. Most card holder operation should occur in this state.

A submission of the Issuer Code changes the operation mode to Issuer Mode. This privileged mode allows access to certain memory areas, which are otherwise not accessible.



# 3.0. EEPROM Memory Management

The user EEPROM memory area provided by the card chip is fully usable for user data storage. There is an additional EEPROM area that stores internal card configuration data.

- The User Data Memory stores the data of the card under the control of the application.
- The internal card configuration data is used by the card operating system to manage card functionalities.

## 3.1. Data Files

Access to both the Internal Data Memory area and the User Data Memory area is possible within the scopes of data files and data records. Data files in the Internal Data Memory are referred to as *Internal Data Files*. Data files in the User Data Memory are called *User Data Files*.

Data files are the smallest entity to which individual security attributes can be assigned to control the read and write access to the data stored in the EEPROM.

Data files are either of record type or transparent type.

A record data file contains N data records. The record number must be specified when a record (or data within a record) is read from or written to a file. A data file can contain up to 255 records. The record length can be different for different files but is always fixed within a file. Access to record files is done by issuing READ or WRITE RECORD.

A transparent data file contains a continuous block of EEPROM and it is accessed by providing a length and offset to be read or written within the block. It is also referred to as a binary file. The commands to access this file type are READ or WRITE BINARY.

Internal Data files are of RECORD type only. The file structures of the Internal Data Files (file size, file identifier, record length, security attributes) are defined by the operating system and cannot be changed. The file structure for the User Data Memory is determined in the card personalization. After programming the parameter N OF FILE in the Personalization State, the file structure is fixed.

Access to all files is possible only through the READ RECORD/BINARY and WRITE RECORD/BINARY commands. The operating system does not keep track of which records have actually been written through the WRITE RECORD/BINARY command. The data returned by the card in response to a READ RECORD/BINARY command are the actual data read from the EEPROM memory, regardless of whether that data have ever been written.

Each file is identified by two bytes File Identifier. The File Identifier is assigned to the file when the file is being defined during the Personalization State. The operating system does not perform any checking on the uniqueness of each File Identifier. If the same identifier has been assigned to more than one file, a malfunction of the card may occur.

A value of  $FF_H$  of the first byte of the file identifier is used for Internal Data Files and cannot be used for User Data Files.

Before any READ or WRITE RECORD/BINARY access to a file, the file must be opened through the SELECT FILE command. Only one file is selected at any time. The READ and WRITE RECORD/BINARY commands refer to the most recently selected file.

# 3.2. Data File Access Control

Two security attributes are assigned to each Data File: the Read Security Attribute and the Write Security Attribute. Security attributes define the security conditions that must be fulfilled to allow the respective operation:

A Security Attribute is defined in one byte as follows:

bit 7							bit 0
IC	PIN	AC5	AC4	AC3	AC2	AC1	AC0

Each bit of the byte represents a code. If the bit is set to '1', the corresponding code must have been



submitted. If the bit is set to'0', the corresponding code is irrelevant for the access condition. Please see the Section 3.3.4 for the definition of the specific codes.

- The Read Security Attribute controls the read access to the data in a file through the READ RECORD/BINARY command. If the security condition specified in the Read Security Attribute is not fulfilled, the card will reject a READ command to that file.
- The Write Security Attribute controls the write access to the data in a file through the WRITE RECORD/BINARY command. If the security condition specified in the Write Security Attribute is not fulfilled, the card will reject a WRITE command to that file.

The Read Security Attribute and the Write Security Attribute for each data file specify which Application Code, if any, must have been submitted correctly to the card to allow the respective operation, and whether the Issuer Code and/or the PIN code must have been submitted.

A logical OR function applies to the specified Application Codes, AC x, i.e., if more than one Application Code is specified in a security attribute, the security condition is fulfilled if any one of the specified Application Codes has been correctly submitted.

A logical AND function applies to the PIN and the IC code, i.e., if PIN and/or IC are specified in a security attribute, the PIN and/or IC code(s) must have been submitted in addition to the specified Application Codes(s).

Application Code AC0 can be specified in the Security Attribute, but cannot be submitted to the card. It is thus possible, for example, to completely write protect a file by specifying AC0 in the Write Security Attribute of that file.

For Internal Data Files, the security attributes are fixed in the card operating system. For User Data Files, the security attributes of a file are stored in the associated File Definition Block.

The following table lists examples of security conditions that can be specified for User Data Files:

Security Attribute	Security Condition
-	No restriction; free access
AC x	Access only after correct submission of AC x
AC x, AC y, AC z	Access only after correct submission of AC x or AC y or AC z
IC	Access only after submission of IC
PIN	Access only after submission of PIN
PIN, IC	Access only after submission of PIN and IC
AC x, IC	Access only after submission of AC x and IC
AC x, PIN, IC	Access only after submission of AC x, and PIN and IC
AC x, AC y, PIN	Access only after correct submission of AC x or AC y, and PIN
AC0	No access

AC x requires Application Code x

PIN requires PIN code IC requires Issuer Code

#### 3.3. Internal Data Files

With exception of the Account Data Structure, which has associated a special set of commands, the memory areas of the Internal Data Memory are processed as data files.

The attributes of the Internal Data Files are defined in the card operating system and cannot be changed. However, the security attributes depend on the card life cycle state.



The following Internal Data Files are defined:

		Fi	es	Record	
Memory Area	Internal File ID	Manufacturing State	Personalization State	User State	Organization
MCU-ID File	FF 00 <sub>H</sub>	R: FREE W: NO ACCESS	R: FREE W: NO ACCESS	R: FREE W: NO ACCESS	2 x 8 bytes
Manufacturer File	FF 01 <sub>H</sub>	R: FREE W: IC	R: FREE W: NO ACCESS	R: FREE W: NO ACCESS	2 x 8 bytes
Personalization File	FF 02 <sub>H</sub>	R: FREE W: IC	R: FREE W: IC	R: FREE W: NO ACCESS	3 x 4 bytes
Security File	FF 03 <sub>H</sub>	R: IC W: IC	R: IC W: IC	R: NO ACCESS W: IC	12 x 8 bytes
User File Management File	FF 04 <sub>H</sub>	R: FREE W: IC	R: FREE W: IC	R: FREE W: IC	N_OF_FILE x 7 bytes
Account File	FF 05 <sub>H</sub>	R: FREE W: IC	R: FREE W: IC	R: IC W: IC	8 x 4 bytes
Account Security File	FF 06 <sub>H</sub>	R: FREE W: IC	R: FREE W: IC	R: NO ACCESS W: IC	4 x 8 bytes
ATR File	FF 07 <sub>H</sub>	R: FREE W: IC	R: FREE W: IC	R: FREE W: NO ACCESS	1 X 36 bytes
User File Data Area	File IDs: xx yy <sub>H</sub> xx ≠ FF <sub>H</sub>		According to th	e file definitions	

#### 3.3.1. MCU ID File

The MCU ID File contains two records of eight bytes each. The contents of this file are determined during the chip manufacturing process and cannot be altered.

The first record contains an 8 byte unique serial number of the chip. The second record contains ACOS3's revision number– namely ACOS3 Revision XX.YY ZZ (41 43 4F 53 03 XX YY ZZ<sub>H</sub>).

XX is the major version

YY is the minor version

ZZ is the user EEPROM capacity in kilobytes

This file is always free for READ access but not WRITE accessible.


# 3.3.2. Manufacturer File

The Manufacturer File comprises two records of eight bytes each that are written in the Manufacturing State of the card life cycle. After termination of the Manufacturing State, this file is read-only and free for READ access.

The termination of the Manufacturer State is indicated by writing a '1' into the MSB of byte 1 of the first record in the Manufacturer File (Manufacturer Fuse). After the next reset of the card, the Manufacturing State can never again be entered.



Manufacturer File, first record:



Only the bits in M, A, B are interpreted by the operating system.

INQ\_ACC\_MAC flag affects the INQUIRY ACCOUNT command only. A one in this flag makes the composition of the MAC calculation including the credit and debit transaction reference. Please refer to the section of INQUIRY ACCOUNT for the details.

RECORD\_NUMBERING flag affects the record numbering system of the whole card. This flag when one indicates that the records are numbered from 1 to N, a zero in this flag indicates that the records are numbered from 0 to N-1 (where N is the number of records in the file).


# 3.3.3. Personalization File

The Personalization File comprises 12 bytes, arranged as 3 records of 4 bytes each.

The Personalization File is written during the Personalization State of the card life cycle. After termination of the Personalization State, this file is read-only and free for READ access.

The termination of the Personalization State is indicated by writing a '1' into the MSB of byte 4 of the first record in the Personalization File (Personalization Bit). The change of state will be effective immediately after the next reset of the card.

Personalization File:



The first three bytes of the first record of the Personalization File are used to set certain parameters and to enable/disable optional features of the card operating system.

Byte 1 is called the *Option Register* and contains five option bits:

	bit 7							bit 0	
	INQ_AUT	TRNS_AUT	REV_DEB	DEB_PIN	DEB_MAC	PIN_ALT	3DES	ACCOUNT	
ACCOUNT  This bit indicates whether the Account Data Structure is available in the card. If the bit is not set, indicating that the Account Data Structure is not present, the memory space required for storing the Account Data Structure and the associated security data is available for User Data Files and the Account processing commands cannot be executed.									
3DE	ES	This bit indicate DES will be secure message.	performed.	If the bit is					
PIN	This bit determines whether the PIN code can be changed through the CHANGE PIN command. If the bit is set, the PIN code can be changed after it has successfully been submitted to the card.								
DEE	B_MAC	This bit indic						•	



the data transmitted as MAC checksum in the DEBIT command.

DEB PIN This bit indicates whether the PIN code must be submitted for the DEBIT command. If

the bit is set, the DEBIT command is only carried out after the PIN code has

successfully been submitted to the card (see 'DEBIT').

REV\_DEB This bit determines whether the card can execute the REVOKE DEBIT command. If

the bit is not set, the card will reject the REVOKE DEBIT command. (See 'REVOKE

DEBIT')

TRNS AUT This bit determines whether the Account Transaction processing requires the

previous completion of the mutual authentication process, and the use of the current Session Key in the computation of the MAC cryptographic checksums. If the bit is set, the mutual authentication must have been executed prior to any Account Transaction command and the MAC cryptographic checksum must be DES encrypted with the

current session key before it is sent to the card.

INQ\_AUT This bit determines whether the INQUIRE ACCOUNT command requires the previous

completion of the mutual authentication process, and the use of the current Session Key in the computation of the MAC cryptographic checksum returned by the card in response to this command. If the bit is set, the mutual authentication must have been executed prior to the execution of the INQUIRE ACCOUNT command and the MAC cryptographic checksum is DES encrypted with the current session key before it is

returned by the card.

NOTE: By enabling the options controlled by the bits TRNS\_AUT and INQ\_AUT, a *Unique Key per Transaction* scheme can be used with the Account transaction processing. This provides a very high security level.

Byte 2 is called the Security Option Register and contains seven option bits:

bit 7							bit 0
IC_DES	PIN_DES	AC5_DES	AC4_DES	AC3_DES	AC2_DES	AC1_DES	-

These bits specify for the corresponding Secret Codes (IC, PIN, AC1...AC5), whether the codes are presented to the card in plain or encrypted. If a bit is set to '1', the corresponding code submitted in the SUBMIT CODE command must be encrypted with the current session key before it is presented to the card. This means, the Mutual Authentication as described later in this document must have been completed.

If a bit is set to '0', the corresponding code is submitted in plain without encryption.

The bit PIN\_DES also determines whether encryption is used with the CHANGE PIN command. If the bit is set, the new PIN code must be encrypted with the current session key before it is submitted in the CHANGE PIN command.

For security reasons it is highly recommended that in any application the IC must be submitted in encrypted form in the User State!

NOTE: The *Option Register* and the *Security Option Register* are evaluated by the ACOS3 operating system only after a card reset. After changing any option bit during the card personalization, a card reset must be performed in order for the change to take effect.

Byte 3 only has one significant bit:

N\_OF\_FILE This value specifies the number of data files allocated in the File Data Area. The card operating system expects that accordingly N\_OF\_FILE File Definition Blocks have been written as records in the User File Management File. The maximum number of files allowed in ACOS3 is 64.

Only the first 4 bytes of the Personalization File are interpreted by the card operating system.

The first 8 bytes (2 records) of the Personalization File are transmitted in the Historical Bytes in the Answer-To-Reset. The last record of 4 bytes can be personalized with user data not shown in the ATR.



# 3.3.4. Security File

The Security File stores the following information:

- The key pair used for card authentication.
- The five Application Codes used for specific file access control.
- The Issuer Code IC.
- The PIN code.
- Error counters for limiting the number of unsuccessful code presentations and authentication.
- The seed for the random number generator.

The Security File can only be read during the Manufacturing State and the Personalization State of the card life cycle, after presentation of the correct IC.

# \*\*\* After termination of the Personalization State, there is NO possibility to read the Security File.

The Security File can be written in the Manufacturing State and in the Personalization State after presentation of the correct IC, and in the Issuer Mode of the User State.

The Security File comprises 14 records of 8 bytes length each and is organized as follows:

byte 1										byte 8			
Record 1		Issuer Code IC											
2							PI	N					
3					Aut	hentio	cation	Card	Key K	;			
4					Auth	entica	tion T	ermir	nal Key	K <sub>T</sub>			
5					Re	eserve	ed For	Futu	re Use.				
6					,	Applic	ation	Code	AC1				
7					,	Applic	ation	Code	AC2				
8					,	Applic	ation	Code	AC3				
9					,	Applic	ation	Code	AC4				
10					,	Applic	ation	Code	AC5				
11	CNT AC1	CNT AC3	CNT AC2	CNT AC5	CNT AC4	CNT IC	CNT PIN		CNT K <sub>T</sub>		CNT K <sub>rd</sub>	CNT K <sub>d</sub>	CNT K <sub>cr</sub>
12	SCN AC1												
13		Right half of 3DES Authentication Card Key K <sub>C</sub>											
14		Right half of 3DES Authentication Terminal Key K <sub>T</sub>							K <sub>T</sub>				

CNT xxx = Counter for the successive submission of wrong key / code xxx SCN xxx = Starting CNT value. (See Section 4.3.4 for more information)

NOTE: Caution must be taken when writing record #11 and #12 during card personalization (especially for the IC). Inadvertently writing a wrong value to this record may permanently lock the codes and render it useless!

NOTE: Record number 12 is available in ACOS3 version 1.04 or above.



NOTE: Record numbers 13 and 14 are available in ACOS1 version 3.0 or above only (It is available in ACOS3). The right half of the authentication keys is stored here. When single DES option is selected, these records are not used but present.

# 3.3.5. User File Management File

The User File Management File consists of N\_OF\_FILE records of 7 bytes each and stores a File Definition Block for an allocated User Data File in each record.

The File Definition Blocks are written during the Personalization State of the card life cycle. After termination of the Personalization State, this file is free for read access and can be written after the Issuer Code has been submitted.

The sequence of File Definition Blocks in the User File Management Area is not relevant. When the SELECT FILE command is issued, the card operating system searches all File Definition Blocks for one whose File Identifier entry matches the value specified in the SELECT FILE command.

The Card Operating System does not provide any error checking on the File Definition Blocks nor does it check the consistency of the number of file definition blocks written with the parameter N\_OF\_FILE. Any inconsistency of these data can lead to a malfunction of the card.

#### 3.3.6. User File Data Area

The User File Data Area stores the data written to the User Data Files. Security attributes are attached to User Data Files, which control the access to the data in the files.

User Data Files cannot be deleted. Once allocated, the memory space for a User Data File is reserved and cannot be released when the file is no longer used.

#### 3.3.7. Account File

The Account File stores the Account Data Structure used for highly secure payment applications.

If the option bit ACCOUNT in the option registers is not set, this file is not processed by the card operating system and the memory space is available for User Data Files.

The Account File can be written during the Manufacturing and Personalization State of the card life cycle after presentation of the correct IC code. After Termination of the Personalization State, this file can be written after the Issuer Code has been submitted.

The Account File contents are explained in detail in Section 3.6 and Section 4.5 explains the account transaction processing.

# 3.3.8. Account Security File

The Account Security File stores the four secret keys used for the calculation of the MAC cryptographic checksums used in connection with the Account processing commands.

The Account Security File can only be read during the Manufacturing State and the Personalization State of the card life cycle.

# \*\*\* After termination of the Personalization State, there is NO possibility to read the Account Security File.

The Account Security File can be written in the Manufacturing State and in the Personalization State after presentation of the correct IC code, and in the Issuer Mode.

If the option bit ACCOUNT in the option registers is not set, this file is not processed by the card operating system and the memory space is available for storage User Data Files.

The Account Security File contents are explained in detail in Section 3.6.1 and Section 4.5 explains the transaction processing.

#### 3.3.9. ATR File

The application developer can change the card's Answer-To-Reset string by setting the customized ATR into this file. The file contains 1 36-byte record. The 1<sup>st</sup> byte of this record allows the speed of the

card to be customized. The second and subsequent bytes allow changes to the historical bytes of the ATR. If these fields are found to be invalid, the card OS will then use the default values in the ATR. Please see Section 5.0 for more information.

# 3.4. User Data Files

User Data Files are allocated in the Personalization State of the card life cycle. There are two types of User Data Files, Record and Binary files. Record files are specified by number of records and a fixed record length. Binary files are specified by a file size and accessed via offsetting into the file.

The data stored in a User Data File can be read through the READ RECORD / BINARY command and updated through the WRITE RECORD / BINARY command when the security conditions associated to the data file are fulfilled.

User Data Files are defined by writing the corresponding File Definition Blocks in the records of the User File Management File during the Personalization State. It is not possible to change the number of records of a file once any of the User Data Files has been used. User will be able to access these data as long as it's within the capacity of the card.

A User Data Record File can contain up to 255 records of maximum of 255 bytes record length each. A User Data Binary File can have a specified size up to the length of the card.

Care must be taken by the card issuer to assure that the memory space allocated for all User Data Files does not exceed the available memory space! ACOS3 does not check the available memory space at the time of allocation. Writing and reading beyond the capacity of the card will be rejected by the card.

#### 3.4.1. User File Definition Block

Each User Data File is described in an associated File Definition Block which contains the file identifier, record length/number (or file length) and security attributes and flags. The security attribute bytes are specified in Section 3.2. Each File Definition Block comprises 7 bytes:

byte 1	byte 2	byte 3	byte 4	byte 5 / 6	byte 7
Record Length	Number of Records	Read Security Attribute	Write Security Attribute	File Identifier	File Access Flags
			OR		
File Length (High Byte)	File Length (Low Byte)	Read Security Attribute	Write Security Attribute	File Identifier	File Access Flags

The two types of User Data File correspond to the Record and Binary file types respectively and it is distinguished by the File Access Flag field described below.

The File Definition Blocks of all files are stored in the User File Management File. They can be read through READ RECORD commands after selection the User File Management File with the SELECT FILE command.

The number of records in the User File Management File is given by the value of the parameter N OF FILE in the option register.



The File Access Flag contains the following fields:

b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	b0	Meaning
0								Record File type – byte 1 and 2 of User File Definition Block specifies Record Length and Record Number respectively
1								Binary File type – byte 1 and 2 of User File Definition Block specifies File Length
	1							Read requires Secure Messaging
		1						Write requires Secure Messaging
			0	0	0	0	0	Reserved for future use

On default, File Access Flags will be  $00_H$  which will correspond to record file type and no secure messaging required. This will be backward compatible to previous versions of ACOS1/2/3.

#### 3.4.2. User File Allocation

For the allocation of User Data Files in a new card, follow the steps as listed below. It is assumed that the IC has been presented to the card prior to this operation such that the Internal Data Files can be written.

- 1. Use the SELECT FILE command with file ID = FF 02<sub>H</sub> to select the Personalization File.
- 2. Write the number of User Data Files required to the option register N\_OF\_FILE, which is the third byte of the first record of the Personalization File, to allocate the required space (number of records) in the User File Management File.
- 3. Use the SELECT FILE command with file ID = FF  $04_{\rm H}$  to select the User File Management File
- 4. Write the N\_OF\_FILE file definition blocks to the User File Management File with the WRITE RECORD command. Write the seven bytes of each File Definition Block at once.
- 5. Now the User Data Files can be selected and read and written.

## 3.5. Data File Access

The process of data file access is identical for Internal Data Files and for User Data Files.


#### 3.5.1. SELECT FILE

The SELECT FILE command can be executed any time. The specified file - if existent - will be selected and the previously selected file - if any - will be closed. If the specified file does not exist, the card returns an error code and does not change the status of a currently selected file. The security conditions specified for the newly selected file are not checked in the SELECT FILE processing and the Mutual Authentication need not be completed prior to the execution of the SELECT FILE command. After a card reset, no file is selected.

The SELECT FILE command is carried out as follows:

Card Accepting Device	Command / Response	Card
	SELECT FILE	
•	File Identifier	
		Check whether file exists
		Close currently selected file
		Select new file





File Identifier Two bytes file identifier of the file to be selected

#### 3.5.2. READ RECORD / BINARY

The READ RECORD / BINARY command can be executed once a file has been selected through the SELECT FILE command.

The security conditions associated to the currently selected file are checked prior to the execution of the command by the card. If the security conditions are not fulfilled (i.e., the specified secret codes have not been submitted to the card), the command is rejected by the card.


For READ RECORD, data from only one record can be read in each READ RECORD operation. The number of bytes and offset to be read is specified in the command.

For READ BINARY, the number of bytes and offset to be read is specified in the command.

The maximum number of bytes to be read is equal to the record length.

If the number of bytes read (= N) is smaller than the record length, the first N bytes of the record are returned by the card.

The READ RECORD command is carried out as follows:



Record No. One byte logical record number

Offset The byte to start reading from within the record

Length Number of data bytes to be read from the record, max. 255

Data Record data, *Length* bytes

The READ BINARY command is carried out as follows:

Card Accepting Device	Command / Response	Card
_	READ BINARY	
•	Offset, Length	
		Check file access condition
		Check file length
		Read data staring at offset
4	OK / Error	
•	Data	•



Length Number of data bytes to be read

Offset The byte to start reading from within the file

Data Record data, Length bytes

#### 3.5.3. WRITE RECORD / BINARY

The WRITE RECORD command can be executed once a file has been selected through the SELECT FILE command.


The security conditions associated to the currently selected file are checked prior to the execution of the command by the card. If the security conditions are not fulfilled (i.e., the specified secret codes have not been submitted to the card), the command is rejected by the card.

For WRITE RECORD, data can be written to only one record in each WRITE RECORD operation. The number of bytes and offset to be written in the record is specified in the command.

For WRITE BINARY, the number of bytes and offset to be written is specified in the command.

The maximum number of bytes to be written is equal to the record or file length.

The WRITE RECORD command is carried out as follows:




Record No. One byte logical record number

Offset Offset in the record to begin writing.

Length Length of data to write

Data bytes of Length bytes to be written to the record

The WRITE BINARY command is carried out as follows:



Offset Offset in the file to begin writing.

Length Length of data to write

Data Data bytes of Length bytes to be written to the file



## 3.6. Account Data Structure

The Account Data Structure - *Account*, for short - is dedicated for the use in applications in which a numeric value representing some 'amount' must be securely processed. The Account is stored in the Account File.

In the User State of the card life cycle, the data in the Account cannot be manipulated by WRITE instructions like the data in User Data Files. A set of dedicated instructions is available for the processing of the Account, i.e. for adding value to and subtracting value from the balance in the Account and for reading the current balance.

Different access conditions can be specified for adding to, subtracting from and reading the Account.

Critical Account operations, for example, CREDIT, are carried out under strict security control conditions, as explained below in 'Account Transaction Processing'.

The Account Data Structure in the Account File has the following form:

	byte 1			byte 4
Record 1	TRANSTYP 0		BALANCE 0	
2	ATC 0		CHKSUM 0	00
3	TRANSTYP 1		BALANCE 1	
4	ATC 1		CHKSUM 1	00
5	MAXBAL			00
6	AID			
7	TTREF_C			
8	TTREF_D			

**TRANSTYP** 

Together with the balance values is stored the type of transaction that resulted in that balance value. This information is updated when the balance value is updated. The following transaction types are distinguished: CREDIT, DEBIT, and REVOKE DEBIT.

**BALANCE** 

Balance value is three bytes long, can store a value of up to 16.8 Million (2^24-1). Only positive integer values are possible for the Balance.

ATC

The Account Transaction Counter ATC is incremented before each transaction to give a unique electronic signature for each transaction. Together with the Account ID AID, the ATC builds the Account Transaction reference ATREF, which is used in the calculation of MAC cryptographic checksums to certify the execution of Account related commands by the card. When ATC reaches its maximum value (FF  $FF_H$ ), the operating system does not allow any further transaction.

**CHKSUM** 

The checksum is the least significant byte of the algebraic sum of the bytes of TRANSTYP, BALANCE and ATC, plus one.

MAXBAL

The Maximum Balance value is checked by the operating system when a CREDIT transaction is performed. If the sum of current balance plus the amount to be credited exceeded the Maximum Balance value, the card will reject the CREDIT command.

AID

The Account Identification is a four bytes value that is combined with the Account Transaction Counter (ATC) to give the six bytes ATREF:

byte 1		byte 4	byte 5	byte 6
	AID		AT	C

The AID is written once in the Personalization State of the card life cycle. It is never modified.



TTREF-C

command.

account indicates the data set used in the most recent transaction.

The Terminal Transaction Reference - Credit is provided by the Card Accepting Device when a CREDIT transaction is executed. It is only stored but not interpreted by the card. The Card Accepting Devices can evaluate this information, for example, to reject a card that has been credited by an unauthorized terminal.

The Terminal Transaction Reference - Debit is provided by the Card Accepting TTREF-D Device when a DEBIT or REVOKE DEBIT transaction is The TTREF-D is stored in the Account when a DEBIT transaction is executed. The REVOKE DEBIT command will only be executed if the TTREF-D submitted with the command is identical with the stored TTREF-D. This identity proves that the same terminal that issued the preceding DEBIT command issued the REVOKE DEBIT

TRANSTYP, BALANCE and ATC are stored two times to prevent a loss of this important information when a power-fail or a card reset occurs during a transaction. The larger of the two ATC values in the

The checksum is used to verify the integrity of the data in the Account. The checksum is calculated when the account data are updated in a transaction. The checksum is verified by the card operating system before any transaction is executed.

NOTE: If the checksum is found incorrect, the card allows the execution of transactions only in the Issuer Mode, i.e., after the submission of the Issuer Code IC.

#### 3.6.1. **Account Processing Keys**

The encryption keys used in the computation of MAC cryptographic checksums with the Account processing are stored as records in the Account Security File (FF06<sub>H</sub>) as follows:

#### **Key storage for Single DES**

	byte 1 byte 8
Record 1	K <sub>D</sub>
2	K <sub>CR</sub>
3	K <sub>CF</sub>
4	K <sub>RD</sub>

 $K_{D}$ The DEBIT key, used in the computation of the MAC for the DEBIT command

 $K_{CR}$ The CREDIT key, used in the computation of the MAC for the CREDIT command

The CERTIFY key, used in the computation of the MAC with the INQUIRE  $K_{CF}$ 

ACCOUNT command

The REVOKE DEBIT key, used in the computation of the MAC for the REVOKE  $K_{RD}$ 

**DEBIT** command

NOTE: keys are 8-byte long



# **Key storage for Triple DES**

	byte 1 byte 8
Record 1	Right half of K <sub>D</sub>
2	Right half of K <sub>CR</sub>
3	Right half of K <sub>CF</sub>
4	Right half of K <sub>RD</sub>
5	Left half of K <sub>D</sub>
6	Left half of K <sub>CR</sub>
7	Left half of K <sub>CF</sub>
8	Left half of K <sub>RD</sub>

K<sub>D</sub> The DEBIT key, used in the computation of the MAC for the DEBIT command
 K<sub>CR</sub> The CREDIT key, used in the computation of the MAC for the CREDIT command
 K<sub>CF</sub> The CERTIFY key, used in the computation of the MAC with the INQUIRE ACCOUNT command
 K<sub>RD</sub> The REVOKE DEBIT key, used in the computation of the MAC for the REVOKE

Note: keys are 16-byte long

**DEBIT** command



# 4.0. Security Architecture

The following security mechanisms are provided by the ACOS3 card operating system:

- Anti-tearing mechanism
- DES/3DES and MAC calculation
- Mutual Authentication and Session Key based on Random Numbers
- Secret Codes
- Secure Messaging for data files
- Secure Account Transaction Processing

DES refers to the DEA algorithm for data encryption and decryption as specified in the standard ANSI X3.93. MAC refers to the algorithm for the generation of cryptographic checksums (DEA in Cipher Block Chaining mode) as specified in the standard ANSI X3.93.

Mutual Authentication is a process in which both the card and the Card Accepting Device verify that the respective counterpart is genuine. The Session Key is a result of the successful execution of the Mutual Authentication. It is used for data encryption and decryption during a 'session'. A session is defined as the time between the successful execution of a Mutual Authentication procedure and a reset of the card or the execution of another START SESSION command.

Secret Codes and the PIN code are used to selectively enable access to data stored in the card and to features and functions provided by the card, for example, the READ and WRITE commands.

Secure messaging ensures data transmitted between the card and terminal/server is secured and not susceptible to eavesdropping, replay attack and unauthorized modifications. This is achieved by signing the command and response with a MAC and encrypting command and response data.

The Account Transaction Processing provides mechanism for the secure and auditable manipulation of data in the Account Data Structure, in particular, the balance value.

#### 4.1. DES and MAC Calculation

All keys used in DES / 3DES and MAC calculation are 8 / 16 bytes long depending on Single / Triple DES selection in *Option Register*. The least significant bit of each byte of the key is not used in the calculation and is not interpreted by the card operating system.

# 4.2. Mutual Authentication and Session Key Generation

The Mutual Authentication is based on the exchange and mutual verification of secret keys between the Card and the Card Accepting Device. The key exchange is performed in a secure way by use of random numbers and DES data encryption.


ACOS3 maintains a dedicated pair of data encryption/decryption keys for the Mutual Authentication,  $K_T$ , called *Terminal Key*, and  $K_C$  called *Card Key*.

ACOS3 also provides a generator for the random numbers used in the Mutual Authentication process, RND<sub>C</sub>, called *Card Random Number*.

The session key is the final result of the Mutual Authentication process and it is based on the random numbers of both card and terminal.



The Mutual Authentication process is carried out as follows:



NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on the Option Register

Calculation of Session Key K<sub>S</sub> also depends on the encryption selected.

If single DES option has been selected

 $K_S = DES (DES (RND_C, \#K_C) \oplus RND_T, \#K_T)$ 

If Triple DES option has been selected,

Left half of  $K_S = 3DES$  (3DES (RND<sub>C</sub>, #K<sub>C</sub>), #K<sub>T</sub>)

Right half of  $K_S = 3DES (RND_T, \#(reverse K_T))$ 

Where #(reverse K<sub>T</sub>) is obtained by exchanging the Left and Right half of K<sub>T</sub>

RND <sub>C</sub> Eight bytes random number generated by the Card

RND T Eight bytes random number generated by the Card Accepting Device

 $K_{C}$  Card Key  $K_{T}$  Terminal Key  $K_{S}$  Session Key

The successful completion of the Mutual Authentication is recorded in the card. The resulting Session Key  $K_S$  is used for all data encryption and decryption during the same session.

The Mutual Authentication between Card and Card Accepting Device must be completed in the specified order. If any other card command is sent to the card interrupting the Mutual Authentication procedure as specified above, the card will abort the Mutual Authentication process and erase any intermediate data resulting from the preceding Mutual Authentication commands. The terminal must restart the complete Mutual Authentication procedure from the START SESSION command.

If after a successfully completed Mutual Authentication procedure the card receives the START SESSION command, it erases the previous session key and the complete Mutual Authentication procedure must be repeated to define a new session key. The current security status of the card will be maintained, i.e., Secret Codes that have successfully been submitted to the card need not be submitted again.



The card maintains an error counter CNT  $K_T$  to count and limit the number of consecutive unsuccessful executions of the AUTHENTICATE command:

- The error counter is incremented by one each time the AUTHENTICATE operation fails, i.e., a wrong  $K_T$  is presented to the card.
- The error counter is reset to SCN K<sub>T</sub> when the AUTHENTICATE operation is successful.
- If the error counter reaches a value of 8 (eight), the card will not execute the command AUTHENTICATE any longer. In this case, all related security mechanisms (e.g., the submission of Secret Codes) may be blocked. This condition is irreversible and can render the card unusable.

The error counter is stored in the Security File. The value of the counter is returned in the card response if a wrong  $K_T$  is used in the AUTHENTICATE command.

The Card Random Number  $RND_C$  is derived in a complex non-predictable mathematical process from the Random Number Seed stored in the Security File. The Random Number Seed is internally updated by the Operating System after each START TRANSACTION command.

### 4.3. Secret Codes

Secret codes stored in the card are used to restrict the access to data stored in user data files and to certain commands provided by the card. Secret codes must be presented to the card in order to be able to read data from or write data to user data files and to execute certain privileged card commands.

ACOS3 provides the following secret codes:

- Five Application Codes (AC)
- One Issuer Code (IC)
- One PIN Code (PIN)

# 4.3.1. Application Codes

Five Application Codes (AC1...AC5) are available to control the access to the data stored in data files. Each Application Code is eight bytes long.

An option bit in the Security Option Register in the Personalization File specifies for each code whether the code must be submitted to the card in plain or encrypted with the current session key.

#### 4.3.2. Issuer Code

The Issuer Code is provided to control access to data files and to privileged card functions; it is eight bytes long.

An option bit in the Security Option Register in the Personalization file specifies for the IC whether it must be submitted to the card in plain or encrypted with the current session key.

#### 4.3.3. PIN code

The PIN Code is provided to control access to data files.

The PIN is eight bytes long. The PIN is presented to the card with the SUBMIT CODE command. Depending on the corresponding option bit PIN\_DES in the Security Option Register, the PIN is DES encrypted with the current session key before the presentation to the card, or it is presented in plain.

The PIN code can be changed with the CHANGE PIN command if setting the PIN\_ALT option bit in the option register has enabled this option. Depending on the option bit PIN\_DES, the new code is DES encrypted with the current session key before it is written to the card, or it is written in plain.


#### 4.3.4. Secret Code Submission and Error Counters

Depending on the setting of the corresponding bit in the Security Option Register, a code is submitted



to the card in plain or DES-encrypted with the current session key.

If the option bit xx DES for the code XX is set, the code is presented as follows:



NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on selected Option Register

Code No. Reference to the particular code that is submitted with the command:

1 ... 5 = Application Codes AC1...AC5

6 = PIN

7 = Issuer Code IC

Other values for Code No. are not allowed and will be rejected by the card.

Code The eight bytes secret code to be submitted

K<sub>S</sub> The current session key

If the option bit xx\_DES is not set, the DES encryption of the code is not necessary and the code is submitted in plain:

Card Accepting Device	Command / Response	Card
	SUBMIT CODE	_
	Code No., Code	
		Verify code
4	OK / Error	
		•

Code No. Reference to the particular code that is submitted with the command:

1 ... 5 = Application Codes AC1...AC5

6 = PIN

7 = Issuer Code IC

Other values for Code Number are not allowed and will be rejected by the card.

Code The eight bytes secret code to be submitted

The card maintains an error counter CNT xx for each secret code to count and limit the number of consecutive unsuccessful executions of the SUBMIT CODE command:

- The error counter for a particular code is incremented by one each time the SUBMIT CODE operation for that code fails, i.e., a wrong secret code is submitted to the card.
- The error counter for a particular secret code is reset to SCN xx when the SUBMIT CODE operation for that code has successfully been executed.
- If the error counter reaches a value of eight (8), the card will reject the command SUBMIT CODE for that code.

The error counters CNT xx and starting counters SCN xx are stored in the Security File. The counter value for a particular code is returned in the response by the card to an unsuccessful SUBMIT CODE



operation.

The terminal key  $K_T$  and all codes have default maximum number of retries of 8. This can be customized by modifying the Starting CNT Value (SCN xxx) and the current Error Counter (CNT xxx). For example, to change the maximum number of retries for PIN to 3, the nibble corresponding to PIN in record #11 and record #12 can be written with 5.

**IMPORTANT:** Care must be taken when writing to record #11 and record 12. If any CNT or SCN are written with the nibble 8 or above, that code would be locked. If  $CNT_{IC}$  is greater than or equals to 8, the card would become permanently locked.


# 4.3.5. Change PIN Code

The PIN code can be changed in the User state with the command CHANGE PIN if the option bit PIN ALT is set.

To program a new PIN code in the card, the current PIN code must have been submitted first.

For security reasons, the CHANGE PIN command can only be executed immediately after a Mutual Authentication process. No other command must have been executed between the Mutual Authentication and the CHANGE PIN command. Otherwise, the command is rejected.

If the option bit PIN\_DES is set, the changing of the PIN code is carried out as follows:




NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on selected Option

PINnew The new PIN code

K<sub>S</sub> The current session key

If the option bit PIN\_DES is not set, the DES<sup>-1</sup> encryption of the new PIN is not necessary and the changing of the PIN code is carried out as follows:



# 4.4. Secure Messaging

ACOS3 Version 1.07 and above support secure messaging (SM) for data files. Secure messaging ensures data transmitted between the card and terminal/server is secured and not susceptible to eavesdropping, replay attack and unauthorized modifications. User data file can be specified (in  $FF04_H$ ) that secure messaging is required for READ / WRITE RECORD / BINARY commands. Almost all the other commands can also use secure messaging initiated by the terminal. The commands that do not accept secure messaging are START SESSION, MUTUAL



#### AUTHENTICATION and GET RESPONSE.

**Note:** Issuing the START SESSION command will clear the authentication state. A mutual authentication will have to be performed again to re-establish the session.


The SM employed in ACOS3 both encrypts and signs the data transmitting into and out of the card. The card will interpret the terminal command is in SM mode if the CLA of the command has the secure messaging bits set.

Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.7 discuss the constructs used in secure messaging. Section 4.4.8 details the exact constructs of secure messaging commands and response. Section 4.4.9 lists the secure messaging return codes.


#### 4.4.1. Notations

To describe the secure messaging adequately, there are some notations to be introduced in this section. Card commands are basically input and output commands – called ISO-IN and ISO-OUT. Some commands have both input and outputs. The terminal needs to call GET RESPONSE to retrieve the outputs for ISO7816-3 T=0 protocol. This is called an ISO-IN-OUT command. The following are the possible ISO7816 part 3 communications protocol command and response pairs.

#### Commands:



#### Responses:




The class (CLA) byte stated above does not have the secure messaging bits set.

The modified CLA\* for secure messaging in Section 4.4.8 has the secure messaging bits b3 and b2 set to 1. That is, the original CLA OR  $0C_H$ .

P3 is the normal length of the command data.


P3\* will be the length of the command data under secure messaging.

The following figure shows the command transformation of a command without data (ISO-OUT) to a secure messaging APDU command:






The following figure shows the command transformation of a command with data (ISO-IN) to a secure messaging APDU command:



The following figure shows the response transformation:



If there is no response data, that field does not appear in the response output.

The components necessary to compute secure messaging are explained in the sections below. The terms TL and TLP are *Tag-Length* and *Tag-Length-Padding* respectively described in Section 4.4.7.

# 4.4.2. Secure Messaging Key

The key used in secure messaging is the session key,  $K_S$ , computed in Section 4.2. Therefore, mutual authentication between ACOS3 and the terminal must be performed before secure messaging. The secure messaging key is either DES or 3DES depending on the session key generated (which depends on the 3DES bit in the option register).

# 4.4.3. Sequence Number

The sequence number (seq#) is used as the initial vector in the CBC calculation. The start of the sequence number is the increment of the random number of the LAST TWO bytes of the Start Session command padded with 6 NULL bytes. The response data is the increment of the command sequence number.

If a command is sent from the terminal to the card SM'ed with seq#, and secure messaging is successful, the card will reply with a MAC computed with seq# + 1. The next secure messaging command to send will use seq# + 2. When the sequence number reaches 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF  $FF_{H}$ , the next number would be 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  $FF_{H}$ .

# 4.4.4. Authentication and Integrity

The COS and terminal will use the SM key and DES / 3DES in CBC mode to compute the MAC. For



the purpose of this section, this notation would denote MAC computations:

SIGN\_CBC (data to sign, Initial Vector = seq#)

Only the first 4 bytes of the resultant MAC are used for the command and response data. When a SM command is sent to the card, the card will first verify the  $MAC_{cmd}$  with the command and command data. The COS will execute the command only if the  $MAC_{cmd}$  is verified. This will ensure that the data is genuinely from the terminal.

If the MAC<sub>cmd</sub> verification failed (status word =  $6988_H$ ), the sequence number n would have been incremented. The next command should use n + 1. In the case that the sequence number is out of synchronization between the terminal and card, a new session key can be re-established.

# 4.4.5. Confidentiality

The COS and terminal will use the SM key and DES / 3DES in CBC mode to compute the encryption. The following notation denotes the secure messaging encryption:

ENC\_CBC (plaintext to encrypt, Initial Vector = seq#)

After verifying the MAC<sub>cmd</sub> the COS will decrypt the command data encrypted by the terminal. This command data will be written to the card based on the write binary or record command.

# 4.4.6. Padding

DES and 3DES algorithms have an input block size of 8. An appropriate padding is necessary. If the data to sign or encrypt is not in a multiple of 8, an  $80_H$  byte is appended followed by 0 to 6  $00_H$  to make the data to sign to be a multiple of 8 bytes. If the data to sign or encrypt is a multiple of 8, then no padding is applied. For data encryption, a padding-content indicator will indicate how many (0-7) bytes of padding are applied.

# 4.4.7. Secure Messaging Data Object

Secure Messaging Data Objects (SMDOs) are necessary to describe the data elements unambiguously when transferring in SM mode. The following SMDOs are supported in ACOS3 Secure Messaging:

TAG	LENGTH	DESCRIPTION
87 <sub>H</sub>	Var.	Padding-content indicator byte followed by cryptogram
89 <sub>H</sub>	4	Command header (CLA* INS P1 P2)
8E <sub>H</sub>	4	Cryptographic checksum
97 <sub>H</sub>	1	Original P3 in an ISO-out command
99 <sub>H</sub>	2	Processing status word (Sw1 Sw2) of the command.


The exact usage of these SMDOs is stated in the next section with the possible command and response data pair for SM.

# 4.4.8. Secure Messaging Semantics

In order to send out a secure messaging command, the normal APDU of Section 4.4.1 will be modified with SMDOs. The following three subsections show how those modifications are to be done.

#### 4.4.8.1. ISO-IN

In commands such as WRITE RECORD and BINARY, the commands are extended with SMDOs as follows:



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**Bytes** 

padding, Seq#)

 $\begin{array}{l} P3^*=3+n^*+2+4\\ L_{87}=n^*+1 \text{ (Length of Tag }87_{H})\\ Pi=Padding indicator: 00-No padding is used in encrypted data\\ 01-07_{H}-Number of padding bytes used in encrypted data\\ n^*=P3+length \text{ (padding)}=P3+Pi\\ Seq\#=\text{previous Seq\#}+1\\ Encrypted Data=ENC\_CBC \text{ (<Command Data> padding, Seq\#))}\\ MAC_{cmd}=SIGN\_CBC \text{ (<89}_{H} \text{ 04}_{H} \text{ CLA* INS P1 P2> <87}_{H} \text{ L}_{87} \text{ Pi Encrypted Data>} \end{array}$ 

Since the maximum of P3\* must be less than 255, with the MAC, padding and the SMDO, the original P3 must be less than or equal to 240 bytes.


If the command accepts secure messaging, the key has been established and the MAC $_{cmd}$  is correct, the response will be  $610C_{H}$ . Note that  $610C_{H}$  may not actually mean that the command is successful. It merely means that the Secure Messaging is successful. A subsequent call to GET RESPONSE will yield the actual Status Words stating success or error. The GET RESPONSE must have P3 =  $0C_{H}$  exactly. Otherwise  $6C0C_{H}$  will be replied without SM.

The response to GET REPONSE is as follows:

The field Sw1Sw2 is the actual status word returned for the command. The last status word  $9000_{H}$  states that the GET RESPONSE is successful.

#### 4.4.8.2. ISO-OUT


The ISO-out commands effectively become an ISO-in command when the SM field is set.



If the command accepts secure messaging, the key has been established and the  $MAC_{cmd}$  is correct, the response will be  $61xx_H$ . Same as ISO-in, the status word of  $61xx_H$  only means that SM on the command is successful. The actual success of the overall command will depend on the SW1SW2 data object when a subsequent GET RESPONSE is called with P3 = xx, where xx can be 15-FD<sub>H</sub>.

Note the get response must be called with P3 = xx exactly, else  $6Cxx_H$  will be returned. The original data out n must be less than or equal to 240 bytes. Else, error status  $6700_H$  will be returned.

The response is as follows:




02<sub>H</sub> Sw1 Sw2> padding, Seq#)

#### 4.4.8.3. ISO-IN-OUT

**Bytes** 

**Bytes** 

In commands such as INQUIRE ACCOUNT and DEBIT, the commands are extended with SMDOs as follows:




Since the maximum of P3\* must be less than 255, with the MAC, padding and the SMDO, the original P3 must be less than or equal to 240 bytes.

If the command accepts secure messaging, the key has been established and the  $MAC_{cmd}$  is correct, the response will be  $61xx_H$ . Same as ISO-in, the status word of  $61xx_H$  only means that SM on the command is successful. The actual success of the overall command will depend on the SW1SW2 data object when a subsequent GET RESPONSE is called with P3 = xx, where xx can be 15-FD<sub>H</sub>.

Note the get response must be called with P3 = xx exactly, else  $6Cxx_H$  will be returned. The original data out n must be less than or equal to 240 bytes. Else, error status  $6700_H$  will be returned.

The response is as follows:

padding, Seg#)



Seq# = Seq# of SM command + 1 Encrypted Data = ENC\_CBC (<Response Data> padding, Seq#))

 $n^* = P3 + length (padding) = P3 + Pi$ 

 $MAC_{rsp}$  = SIGN\_CBC (<89<sub>H</sub> 04<sub>H</sub> CLA\* INS P1 P2> <87<sub>H</sub> L<sub>87</sub> Pi Encrypted Data> <99<sub>H</sub> 02<sub>H</sub> Sw1 Sw2> padding, Seq #)



# 4.4.9. SM specific return codes

The following table lists the specific SM return codes:

SW1	SW2	Meaning
61	XX	SM successful, call GET RESPONSE to retrieve xx bytes.
67	00	The original P3 is greater than 240 bytes. SMDO overflow.
68	82	Secure messaging not allowed.
69	82	Condition of use not satisfied – Secure Messaging required but not present.
69	85	The Session Key has not been established.
69	87	Expected secure messaging data objects missing.
69	88	The MAC <sub>cmd</sub> does not match the data.
6C	XX	Get Response with xx byte as P3 is expected. Please re-issue Get Response with P3=xx.

# 4.5. Account Transaction Processing

Associated to the Account are four keys:

- The Credit Key K<sub>CR</sub>
- The Debit Key K<sub>D</sub>
- The Certify Key K<sub>CF</sub>
- The Revoke Debit Key K<sub>RD</sub>

The keys are stored in the Account Security File.

The keys are used in the calculation and verification of MAC cryptographic checksums on commands and data exchanged between the card and the Card Accepting Device in the Account processing.

All keys are 8 bytes long. The least significant bit of each byte of the keys is not used in the calculation and not interpreted by the card operating system.

Debit Key, Credit Key and Revoke Debit Key have each associated an error counter CNT  $K_{xx}$  to count and limit the number of consecutive unsuccessful executions of the transaction commands:

The error counter for a key is incremented by one each time a command using the key fails due to a wrong key used by the Card Accepting Device.

The error counter is reset to CNT  $K_{xx}$  when a command using the key is successful.

If the error counter of a command reaches a value of eight (8), the card will reject any further commands using that key.

The error counters CNT  $K_{xx}$  for the transaction processing keys are stored in the normal Security File. Anti-tearing protection is done on the update to prevent a loss of this important information during update.

Four different transaction types can be executed on the Account Data Structure under security conditions:

- INQUIRE ACCOUNT
- DEBIT
- REVOKE DEBIT
- CREDIT

The Account Data Structure can be read as a record oriented file in the Manufacturing State, in the Personalization State and in the User State after presentation of the Issuer Code IC. In the normal User State, a WRITE access to the Account is possible only through the special Account processing



commands. WRITE RECORD access is possible after presentation of the Issuer Code IC.

As an additional feature for very security critical applications, the option bits TRNS\_AUT and INQ\_AUT in the Option Register will enforce Mutual Authentication to be carried out prior to Account Processing.

If the option bit TRNS\_AUT is set, the CREDIT, DEBIT and REVOKE DEBIT commands can only be executed by the card after a successful completion of Mutual Authentication. The MAC cryptographic checksum is encrypted with the current Session Key before it is transmitted to the card.

If the option bit INQ\_AUT is set, the INQUIRE ACCOUNT command can be executed only after a successful completion of the Mutual Authentication. The MAC cryptographic checksum returned by the card is encrypted with the current Session Key.

## 4.5.1. INQUIRE ACCOUNT

In the INQUIRE ACCOUNT transaction, the card returns the current balance value together with other relevant account information and a MAC cryptographic checksum on the relevant data. This signature can be regarded as a certificate issued by the card on the current balance and on the immediately preceding transaction. The key to be used in the generation of the MAC cryptographic checksum can be specified.

To prevent a replay of the response from a previous INQUIRE ACCOUNT command, the card-accepting device can pass a reference value to the card to be included in the MAC calculation.

If the option bit INQ\_AUT is set, the Mutual Authentication process must have been completed prior to the execution of the INQUIRE ACCOUNT command.

The INQUIRE ACCOUNT transaction is carried out as follows:

Card Accepting Device	Command / Response	Card
_	INQUIRE ACCOUNT	
•	Key No., Reference	<b>—</b>
4	if INQ_AUT = 0:	
•	Balance, ATREF, Transaction Type, max. Balance, TTREF-C, TTREF-D, MAC <sub>4</sub> [(Reference, Transaction Type, Balance, ATREF, <u>TTREF-C</u> , <u>TTREF-D</u> ), #Key No]	·
4	if INQ_AUT = 1:	
	Balance, ATREF, Transaction Type, Max. Balance, TTREF-C, TTREF-D, ENC <sub>4</sub> {MAC[(Reference, Transaction Type, Balance, ATREF, <u>TTREF-C</u> , <u>TTREF-D</u> ), #Key No], #K <sub>S</sub> }	

Note: Underlined fields are included only when the INQ\_ACC\_MAC flag in the Manufacturer File is equal to one.

NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on selected Option Register

Reference Four (4) bytes reference value supplied by the card-accepting device to be

included in the calculation of the MAC cryptographic checksum

Key No. Reference to the Account key to be used in the calculation of the MAC

cryptographic checksum:

 $0 = Debit Key K_{D1}$  $1 = Credit Key K_{CR}$ 

2 = Certify Key K<sub>CF</sub>

3 = Revoke Debit Key  $K_{RD}$ 



Other values are not permitted and will be rejected by the card.

Balance Current balance value

ATREF Account Transaction Reference of last transaction

Transaction Type One byte specifying the type of the last transaction performed on card:

1 = DEBIT

2 = REVOKE DEBIT

3 = CREDIT

Max. Balance The maximum allowed balance value in the card

TTREF-C Terminal Transaction Reference of the last CREDIT transaction
TTREF-D Terminal Transaction Reference of the last DEBIT transaction

MAC<sub>4</sub> The first 4 bytes of MAC cryptographic checksum using the key specified by *Key* 

No.

ENC<sub>4</sub> The first 4 bytes of the MAC cryptographic checksum using the key specified by

Key No. encrypted with the current Session Key Ks.

If INQ\_ACC\_MAC flag in Manufacturer file is zero, the first two blocks (16 bytes) will be used to calculate the MAC cryptographic checksum. If INQ\_ACC\_MAC flag is one, all three blocks (24 bytes) will be used to calculate the MAC cryptographic checksum.

1 <sup>st</sup> block			2 <sup>nd</sup> block	
3 <sup>rd</sup> block				
byte 1		byte 8	byte 1	byte 8
Reference	Transactioan Type	Balance	ATREF	00 00
TTREF-C	TTREF-D			·

NOTE: ACS writes The INQ\_ACC\_MAC flag before the devices are being shipped. It is not changeable by the card issuer.

#### 4.5.2. **DEBIT**

In a DEBIT transaction, the balance in the Account is decreased by the specified amount. The maximum amount that can be debited to the Account is the current balance value. Negative balance values are not allowed.

Different security conditions can be specified for the DEBIT transaction to allow for different security requirements. The security conditions for the DEBIT transaction are specified in the DEB\_MAC and DEB\_PIN option bits in the options register.


Proper setting of these option bits can specify four different security conditions:

DEB_MAC	DEB_PIN	Security Condition
0	0	no security checking; the DEBIT transaction can always be executed
0	1	the PIN code must have been submitted to the card prior to the execution of the DEBIT transaction
1	0	the MAC cryptographic checksum is required with the DEBIT transaction
1	1	the MAC cryptographic checksum with the DEBIT transaction is required <b>and</b> the PIN code must have been submitted to the card

If the option bit TRNS\_AUT is set, the Mutual Authentication process must have been completed prior to the execution of the DEBIT command.



The DEBIT transaction is carried out as follows:



NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on selected Option Register

TTREF Terminal Transaction Reference for this DEBIT transaction

++ATREF Account Transaction Reference for this transaction;

INS ACOS3 instruction code for DEBIT command

Amount Amount to be debited to the Account

K<sub>D</sub> Debit Key

 $MAC_4$  The first 4 bytes of a MAC cryptographic checksum using  $K_D$  as the key.

ENC<sub>4</sub> The first 4 bytes of MAC cryptographic checksum using K<sub>D</sub> encrypted with the

current Session Key Ks.



# Note: The transaction counter in the card is <u>incremented</u> <u>before</u> the transaction is being executed!

The sixteen bytes data string on which the MAC cryptographic checksum is calculated is composed as follows:

1 <sup>st</sup> block			2 <sup>nd</sup> block		
byte 1		byte 8	byte 1	byte 8	
Е6н	Amount	TTREF-D	ATREF	00 00 <sub>H</sub>	

If the option bit DEB\_MAC is not set, the 4 bytes of MAC cryptographic checksum must be transmitted in the command to the card but they are not evaluated by the operating system. The card will accept any value transmitted.

#### **Debit Certificate**

To make sure that the DEBIT command is indeed executed, the terminal may request for a DEBIT CERTIFICATE from the card. The DEBIT Certificate is a MAC cryptographic checksum computed by the DEBIT KEY and the following data block:

1 <sup>st</sup> block				2 <sup>nd</sup> block	
byte 1			byte 8 byte 1		byte 8
01н	New Balance	Amount Debited	ATC	TTREFD	00 00 00н


#### 4.5.3. REVOKE DEBIT

A REVOKE DEBIT is only possible after a DEBIT transaction and applies always to the immediately preceding DEBIT transaction. The REVOKE DEBIT transaction can be executed to annul a DEBIT transaction, for example, if the amount debited was found wrong later on. As a result of the transaction, the balance value that was valid before the last DEBIT transaction is restored.


The REVOKE DEBIT transaction is enabled and disabled by the option bit REV\_DEB in the option register.

If the option bit TRNS\_AUT is set, the Mutual Authentication process must have been completed prior to the execution of the REVOKE DEBIT command.

The REVOKE DEBIT transaction is carried out as follows:







NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on selected Option Register

INS ACOS3 instruction code for REVOKE DEBIT command

Balance Balance value to be restored (= balance before the preceding DEBIT transaction)

TTREF-D Terminal Transaction Reference used in the preceding DEBIT transaction

++ATREF Account Transaction Reference for this transaction;

K<sub>RD</sub> REVOKE DEBIT key

MAC<sub>4</sub> The first 4 bytes of a MAC cryptographic checksum using K<sub>RD</sub> as the key.

ENC<sub>4</sub> The first 4 bytes of MAC cryptographic checksum using K<sub>RD</sub> encrypted with the

current Session Key Ks.

# Note: The transaction counter in the card is <u>incremented</u> <u>before</u> the transaction is being executed!

The sixteen bytes data string on which the MAC cryptographic checksum is calculated is composed as follows:

	1 <sup>st</sup> b	lock	2 <sup>nd</sup> block		
byte 1		byte 8	byte 1	byte 8	
E8 <sub>H</sub>	Balance	TTREF-D	ATREF	00 00 <sub>H</sub>	


#### 4.5.4. CREDIT

In a CREDIT transaction, the balance in the Account is increased by the specified amount. The maximum allowed the new balance must not exceed balance value MAXBAL as stored in the Account Data Structure. Otherwise, the card will reject the CREDIT command.


The CREDIT transaction is always carried out under high security processing.

If the option bit TRNS\_AUT is set, the Mutual Authentication process must have been completed prior to the execution of the CREDIT command.

The CREDIT transaction is carried out as follows:







NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on selected Option Register

TTREF Terminal Transaction Reference for this CREDIT transaction

++ATREF Account Transaction Reference for this transaction;
INS ACOS3 instruction code for CREDIT command

Amount Amount to be credited to the Account

K<sub>CR</sub> CREDIT key

MAC<sub>4</sub> The first 4 bytes of a MAC cryptographic checksum using  $K_{CR}$  as the key. ENC<sub>4</sub> First four bytes of MAC cryptographic checksum using  $K_{CR}$  encrypted with the

current Session Key Ks

Note: The transaction counter in the card is <u>incremented</u> <u>before</u> the transaction is being executed!

The sixteen bytes data string on which the MAC cryptographic checksum is calculated is composed as follows:

	1 <sup>st</sup> b	lock	2 <sup>nd</sup> block		
byte 1		byte 8	byte 1	byte 8	
E2 <sub>H</sub>	Amount	TTREF-C	ATREF	00 00 <sub>H</sub>	

## 4.6. Anti-Tearing Mechanism

Anti-tearing mechanism help protects card data and security in the event that the card is suddenly powered down or pulled out during a card operation.

When writing user data into the card, ACOS3's anti-tearing mechanism ensures the operation is performed atomically. That is, data is either completely written or the target writing area is left at its previous state before the write operation. The account data file is protected similarly when performing CREDIT/DEBIT/REVOKE DEBIT commands.

When verifying secret codes and performing mutual authentication, the card ensures that the error counter is decremented before the comparison is performed (and reverts back to the maximum value if the verification/authentication is successful). This helps protect the card from side channel attacks. Please note that while this method provides a strong protection against the card's secret code and keys, it does require additional erase/write cycles of the EEPROM even if the verification / authentication is successful. Hence, care should be taken to treat code verification or mutual authentication as an EEPROM write operation.



## 5.0. ISO Compliance and Answer-To-Reset

After a hardware reset (e.g., power up), the card transmits an Answer-To-Reset (ATR) in compliance with the standard ISO 7816, part 3. ACOS3 supports the protocol type T=0. The protocol type selection function is not implemented.

The direct convention is used for the coding of the bits in the communication with the card, i.e., logic level ONE corresponds to the Z state of the I/O line.

Fourteen bytes of data are transmitted in the historical bytes as described below.

The following data are transmitted in the ATR:

TS	T0	TA <sub>1</sub>	TB <sub>1</sub>	TD <sub>1</sub>	14 Historical Bytes
3Вн	ВЕн	11 <sub>H</sub>	00н	00н	

The 14 bytes string transmitted in the historical bytes is composed as follows:

T1	T2	Т3	T4	T5	Т6	T7	Т8	Т9	T10	T11	T12	T13	T14
41 <sub>H</sub>	01 <sub>н</sub>	10 <sub>н</sub> 20 <sub>н</sub> 38 <sub>н</sub>	Option r	egisters		Persona	ılization Fil	e bytes 4	l – 8		Life- cycle State	90 <sub>H</sub>	00 <sub>H</sub>

Lifecycle State Codes the current card lifecycle state in a single byte

0: User State

1: Manufacturing State2: Personalization State

Version Bytes The contents of the version bytes are:

 $T1 = 41_H = ACOS$ 

 $T2 = 01_H = Version 1$ 

 $T3 = 10_H / 20_H / 38_H = Revision 1.0 / Revision 2.0 / Revision 3.8$ 

Option Registers The contents of the three bytes option registers:

T4 = Option Register

T5 = Security Option Register

T6 = N OF FILE

Personalization File EEPROM memory

5 bytes following the Option Registers of the Personalization File in the

NOTE: For compatibility reasons ACOS3 version bytes will stay the same as ACOS1 revision 3.8.

## 5.1. Customizing the ATR

There are two ways of customizing ACOS3's ATR. The first way is to add personalization information to the Personalization File FF  $02_H$  byte 1 to byte 8. This will be fetched upon power-up in the default ATR's historical bytes stated in the previous section.

In ACOS3, additional capabilities allow for the modification to the card's transmission speed or completely customizing the historical bytes based on the application developer's preference. These ATR modifications are achieved by writing to the internal file FF  $07_H$  after submission of the IC code.

As stated in Section 3.3.9, the first byte of the record in FF  $07_H$  denotes the customized transmission rate of the card. More specifically, this field states the different clock rate conversion factor and baud rate adjustment factor that will appear on TA1 field of the ATR. When a smart card reader powers up the card, it will read the ATR at about 9,600 bps. The reader will then determine from the ATR TA1 value to determine if it will perform a Protocol and Parameters Selection (PPS) to negotiate a higher transmission rate with the card. Note that the actual transmission rate will depend on the card reader's capability and its oscillator.



The second byte states the length of the modified historical bytes. Notice that after the customizing the historical bytes this way, they will no longer correspond to Options Registers, Personalization File or the Life Cycle State.

ACOS3 interprets FF 07<sub>H</sub> as follows:

Byte Number	Valid Values	Description		
1	96 <sub>H</sub> 19 <sub>H</sub> 18 <sub>H</sub> 95 <sub>H</sub> 94 <sub>H</sub> 93 <sub>H</sub> 92 <sub>H</sub> 11 <sub>H</sub> Any other values	The following are the reference baud rates*:  - 223,200 bps  - 192,000 bps  - 115,200 bps  - 111,600 bps  - 55,800 bps  - 27,900 bps  - 13,950 bps  - 9,600 bps (default for backward compatibility reasons)  - Use the default baud rate of 9,600 bps		
2	00 <sub>H</sub> – 0F <sub>H</sub> Any other values	<ul> <li>The length of the modified historical bytes.</li> <li>No modifications are made. The card will use the default historical bytes of the previous section.</li> </ul>		
3-17	Any	This field will depend on the length set in byte number 2. This can be used for customized historical bytes dependent on the application developer's preference.		

<sup>\*</sup> Based on an external clock frequency of 3.5712 MHz.

#### For example:

To set the ATR to high speed  $(96_H)$  and 2 bytes identifier  $(1234_H)$  in the historical characters, perform the following:

- Submit IC code (assuming default IC code): 80 20 07 00 08 41 43 4F 53 54 45 53 54<sub>H</sub>
- 2. Select FF 07<sub>H</sub>: 80 A4 00 00 02 FF 07<sub>H</sub>
- 3. Write 4 bytes to the ATR file including the 1 byte for the speed, 1 byte for the length of the historical characters, and 2 bytes identifier:  $80 D2 00 00 04 96 02 12 34_H$
- 4. Reset the card. The ATR is now 3B B2 96 00 00 12 34<sub>H</sub>.

<sup>\*</sup> Please see ISO7816 Part 3 for more information about ATR formation.



## 6.0. COMMANDS

This section describes in detail the format of all ACOS3 commands and the possible responses.

The command descriptions use the APDU representation. All numeric values are given in HEX.

A summary of the status codes returned by the card is given in Appendix A. Secure messaging can be added to any commands except START SESSION, MUTUAL AUTHETNCATION and GET RESPONSE. To use SM on any other commands, please see Section 4.4 for more information.

Command	INS	Description
START SESSION	84 <sub>H</sub>	Start the mutual authentication process
AUTHENTICATE	82 <sub>H</sub>	Performs mutual authentication between card and terminal and compute a session key
GET RESPONSE	C0 <sub>H</sub>	Get response data available in the card
SUBMIT CODE	20 <sub>H</sub>	Submit a secret code
CHANGE PIN	24 <sub>H</sub>	Change the PIN secret code
GET CARD INFO	14 <sub>H</sub>	Get card's serial number
CLEAR CARD	30 <sub>H</sub>	Clears the card back to personalization state
SELECT FILE	A4 <sub>H</sub>	Select a data file for reading and writing
READ RECORD	B2 <sub>H</sub>	Read data from a record of the currently selected record file
WRITE RECORD	D2 <sub>H</sub>	Write data to a record of the currently selected record file
READ BINARY	B0 <sub>H</sub>	Read data from currently selected binary file
WRITE BINARY	D0 <sub>H</sub>	Write data to the currently selected binary file
INQUIRE ACCOUNT	E4 <sub>H</sub>	Read the balance and other account information
CREDIT	E2 <sub>H</sub>	Credit the account
DEBIT	E6 <sub>H</sub>	Debit the account
REVOKE DEBIT	E8 <sub>H</sub>	Revoke the preceding debit transaction



## 6.1. START SESSION

To get a random number from the card and start the mutual authentication process to produce the Session Key  $K_S$ .

### Command:

CLA	CLA INS		P2	P3	
80	84	00	00	08	

## Response:

Data	SW1 SW2
$RND_C$	Status

RND<sub>C</sub> Eight bytes card random number

#### **Status Codes:**

SW1	SW2	Meaning
69	83	Terminal Authentication Key $K_T$ is locked, authentication process cannot be executed



## 6.2. AUTHENTICATE

To submit the encrypted random number to the card and initiate the computation of the session key. Please see Section 4.2 for more information.

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA	
80	82	00	00	10	$ENC(RND_C, \#K_T)$	$RND_T$

ENC(RND<sub>C</sub>,#K<sub>T</sub>) Eight bytes card random number encrypted with Terminal Key K<sub>T</sub>

RND<sub>T</sub> Eight bytes terminal random number

NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on the selection in *Option* Register Response:

SV	/1 SW2
5	Status

## **Specific Status Codes:**

SW1	SW2	Meaning
69	85	START SESSION not executed immediately before AUTHENTICATE command
63	Cn	Key $K_T$ not correct; $n = remaining number of re-tries$
61	80	Issue GET RESPONSE with P3 = 8 to get the encrypted terminal random number

To get the response, execute the GET RESPONSE command:

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3
80	C0	00	00	08

#### Response:

Data	SW1 SW2
ENC(RND <sub>T</sub> ,#K <sub>S</sub> )	Status

 $ENC(RND_T, \#K_S)$ 

Eight bytes terminal random number  $\mathsf{RND}_\mathsf{T}\,\mathsf{DES}\text{-encrypted}$  with Session Key  $\mathbf{K}_\mathbf{S}$ 

NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on the selection in *Option Register* Specific Status Codes:

SW1	SW2	Meaning
69	85	AUTHENTICATE not executed prior to the GET RESPONSE command



## 6.3. GET RESPONSE

To retrieve the response data to an APDU case 4 command (incoming and outgoing data).

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3
80	C0	00	00	Len

Len The expected response data length

## Response:

SW1	SW2	
Sta	itus	

## **Specific Status Codes:**

SW1	SW2	Meaning
90	00	O.K.
6C	nn	Wrong expected data length - issue command again with P3 = nn
69	85	No data available
62	81	Part of the data may be corrupted

The GET RESPONSE command must be issued **immediately** after the receiving 61 nn from a previous command.



## 6.4. SUBMIT CODE

To submit a secret code – Application Code, PIN or Issuer Code – to the card.

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA
80	20	Code No.	00	08	Code or ENC(Code,#K <sub>S</sub> )

Code No. Code reference:1...5 = AC1...AC5

6 = PIN 7 = IC

Code Eight bytes Code

ENC(Code #K<sub>s</sub>) Eight bytes Code encrypted with Session Key

NOTE: If the corresponding option bit  $xx_DES$  in the Security Option Register is set, code XX is submitted DES encrypted. If the option bit is not set, the code is submitted in plain without encryption.

NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on the selection in Option Register

#### Response:

SW1 SW2 Status

SW1	SW2	Meaning
63	Cn	Wrong Code; n = remaining number of re-tries
69	83	The specified Code is locked
69	85	Mutual Authentication not successfully completed prior to the SUBMIT CODE command



## 6.5. CHANGE PIN

To set a new PIN code in the card.

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA
80	24	00	00	08	PIN or ENC <sup>-1</sup> (PINnew, #K <sub>S</sub> )

PINnew New PIN
Ks Session Key

NOTE: If the option bit PIN\_DES is 0, the PIN code is  $\underline{not}$  DES encrypted with  $K_s!$ 

NOTE: ENC shall be DES or 3DES depending on the selection in *Option Register* **Response:** 

SW1 SW2 Status

SW1	SW2	Meaning
69	82	PIN not submitted prior to issuing this command
69	85	Mutual Authentication not completed immediately prior to this command
69	66	Command not available; option bit not set



## 6.6. GET CARD INFO

To get the card's serial number, size of user EEPROM or the revision information. These data are also available in MCD-ID file, FF  $00_H$ .

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3
		00		08
80	14	05	00	00
		06		08

#### Response:

If P1 is 00<sub>H</sub>, the card's serial number is returned:

Data	SW1 SW2
8 byte card's serial number	Status

The card's serial number is the equivalent to the first record of MCU ID File described in Section 3.3.1.

If P1 is  $05_{\text{H}}$ , the card's size of user EEPROM is returned:

SW1	SW2
Sta	atus

If P1 is 06<sub>H</sub>, the ACOS3's revision number is returned:

Data	SW1 SW2
8 byte card's revision number	Status

The card's revision number is the equivalent to the second record of MCU ID File described in Section 3.3.1.

SW1	SW2	Meaning
67	00	Wrong P3
6F	00	P1 or P2 invalid
90	XX	If P1 is 05 <sub>H</sub> , then 90 XX is returned where XX is the size of user EEPROM in hexadecimal.



## 6.7. CLEAR CARD

To clear the card's data, secret codes and authentication keys except the manufacturer file and IC code. This function is only available after successful verification of IC code and when the card is in manufacturing state or personalization state.

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3
80	30	00	00	00

## Response:

SW1	SW2	
Sta	ntus	

SW1	SW2	Meaning
69	82	IC code not satisfied or card is in user state.



## 6.8. SELECT FILE

To select a data file for subsequent READ / WRITE RECORD / BINARY commands.

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA
80	A4	00	00	02	File ID

File ID Two bytes file identifier

## Response:

SW1	SW2	
Sta	itus	

SW1	SW2	Meaning
6A	82	File does not exist
90	00	Internal Data File has been selected
91	nn	User Data File has been selected. The corresponding File Definition Block is stored in record no. nn in the User File Management File (FF 04 <sub>H</sub> )



## 6.9. READ RECORD

To read a number of bytes – from an offset up to the record length – from one record in the currently selected file.

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3
80	B2	Rec No.	Offset	Len

Rec No. Logical record number to be read.

0..N-1 if RECORD\_NUMBERING flag in Manufacturer file is zero

1..N if RECORD\_NUMBERING flag in Manufacturer file is one

Offset From that record to start reading from.

Len Number of data bytes to be read.

#### Response:

Data	SW1 SW2
Byte 1 Byte N	Status

Byte 1 ... Byte N Data bytes read from the record

SW1	SW2	Meaning
67	00	Specified Len plus Offset is larger than record length
69	81	Command incompatible with file structure
69	82	Security status not satisfied – Secret code(s) not submitted
69	85	No file selected
6A	83	Record not found – file too short
6F	00	I/O error; data to be accessed resides in invalid address



## 6.10. WRITE RECORD

To write a number of bytes – from an offset up to the record length – to one record in the currently selected file.

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA
80	D2	Rec No.	Offset	Len	Byte 1 Byte N

Rec No. Logical record number to be read.

0..N-1 if RECORD\_NUMBERING flag in Manufacturer file is zero

1..N if RECORD\_NUMBERING flag in Manufacture file is one

Offset From that record to start writing from.

Len Number of data bytes to be written to the record *Rec No.* 

Byte 1 ... Byte N Data bytes to be written.

#### Response:

SW1 SW2 Status

SW1	SW2	Meaning
67	00	Specified Len plus Offset is larger than record length
69	81	Command incompatible with file structure
69	82	Security status not satisfied – Secret code(s) not submitted
69	85	No file selected
6A	83	Record not found – file too short
6F	00	I/O error; data to be accessed resides in invalid address



## 6.11. READ BINARY

To read a number of bytes – from an offset up to the record length – from one record in the currently selected file.

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3
80	В0	Offset High	Offset Low	Len

Offset From the start of file to start reading from. High is the most significant

byte. While Low is the least significant

Len Number of data bytes to be read

#### Response:

Data	SW1 SW2
Byte 1 Byte N	Status

Byte 1 ... Byte N Data bytes read from the record

SW1	SW2	Meaning
67	00	Specified Len plus Offset is larger than file length
69	81	Command incompatible with file structure
69	82	Security status not satisfied – Secret code(s) not submitted
69	85	No file selected
6A	83	File too short – Offset is larger than the file length
6F	00	I/O error; data to be accessed resides in invalid address



## 6.12. WRITE BINARY

To write a number of bytes – from an offset up to the file length – to the currently selected file.

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA
80	D0	Offset High	Offset Lo	Len	Byte 1 Byte N

Offset From the start of file to start writing from. High is the most significant

byte. While Low is the least significant

Len Number of data bytes to be written.

Byte 1 ... Byte N Data bytes to be written.

## Response:

SW1	SW2	
Sta	itus	

SW1	SW2	Meaning
67	00	Specified Len plus Offset is larger than file length
69	81	Command incompatible with file structure
69	82	Security status not satisfied – Secret code(s) not submitted
69	85	No file selected
6A	83	File too short – Offset is larger than the file length
6F	00	I/O error; data to be accessed resides in invalid address



## 6.13. INQUIRE ACCOUNT

To read the relevant information from the Account:

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA
80	E4	Key No.	00	04	Reference

Key No. Reference to the key to be used in the calculation of the MAC cryptographic

checksum

Reference Four bytes arbitrary reference data

Response:

SW1	SW2	
Sta	itus	

#### **Specific Status Codes:**

SW1	SW2	Meaning	
6A	86	Key No. invalid	
69	85	Mutual Authentication has not been completed	
61	19	Issue GET RESPONSE with P3 = 19	

To get the response, execute the GET RESPONSE command:

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3
80	C0	00	00	19

#### Response:

	Data						SW1 SW2
MAC4	Trans. Type	Balance	ATREF	Max. Balance	TTREF-C	TTREF-D	Status

MAC4 First 4 bytes of MAC cryptographic checksum on the account data and the

reference

Trans. Type One byte coding the type of the most recent transaction

Balance Three bytes current balance value

ATREF Six bytes Account Transaction Reference

Max. Balance Three bytes maximum allowed balance value

TTREF-C Four bytes Terminal Transaction Reference – Credit
TTREF-D Four bytes Terminal Transaction Reference – Debit



SW1	SW2	Meaning
69	85	No data available; the INQUIRE ACCOUNT command was not executed immediately prior to the GET RESPONSE command
62	81	Account data may be corrupted



## **6.14. CREDIT**

To credit the Account:

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA
80	E2	00	00	0B	MAC : Amount : TTREF

MAC Four bytes MAC cryptographic checksum on the command

Amount Three bytes value of amount to be credited TTREF Four bytes Terminal Transaction Reference.

## Response:

W1 SW2 Status

SW1	SW2	Meaning
69	F0	Data in account is inconsistent – no access unless in Issuer Mode
6A	82	Account does not exist
6F	10	Account Transaction Counter at maximum – no more transaction possible
63	Cn	MAC cryptographic checksum is wrong n = remaining number of retries
6B	20	Amount too large
69	83	Credit Key locked
69	85	Mutual Authentication has not been completed



## 6.15. **DEBIT**

To debit the Account:

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA
80	E6	00 01	00	0B	MAC : Amount : TTREF

If P1 is 01, ACOS3 will return a 4-byte Debit Certificate.

MAC Four bytes MAC cryptographic checksum on the command

Amount Three bytes value of amount to be debited TTREF Four bytes Terminal Transaction Reference.

## Response:

SW1	SW2	
Sta	itus	

SW1	SW2	Meaning
69	F0	Data in account is inconsistent – no access unless in Issuer Mode
6A	82	Account does not exist
6F	10	Account Transaction Counter at maximum – no more transaction possible
63	Cn	MAC cryptographic checksum is wrong n = remaining number of retries
69	82	Security status not satisfied – PIN not submitted
6B	20	Amount too large
69	82	PIN not submitted
69	83	Debit Key locked
69	85	Mutual Authentication has not been completed
61	04	Debit successful, issue GET RESPONSE with P3=04 to get Debit Certificate.



## 6.16. REVOKE DEBIT

To revoke the most recent DEBIT command:

#### Command:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	P3	DATA
80	E8	00	00	04	MAC

MAC

Four bytes MAC cryptographic checksum on Balance, TTREF-D, ATREF

## Response:

SW1	SW2	
Sta	itus	

SW1	SW2	Meaning
69	F0	Data in account is inconsistent – no access unless in Issuer Mode
6A	82	Account does not exist
6F	10	Account Transaction Counter at maximum – no more transaction possible
63	Cn	MAC cryptographic checksum is wrong n = remaining number of re-retries
6A	82	Account does not exist
69	F0	Data in account is inconsistent – no access unless in Issuer Mode
69	66	Command not available (option bit not set)
69	83	Revoke Debit Key locked



## 7.0. Card Personalization

This section describes the general procedure in the personalization of an ACOS3 smart card. While the card personalization may be carried out in separate processing steps, the personalization process generally requires the execution of the steps described below.

The personalization of a new ACOS3 smart card is suggested to be carried out according to the following sequence:

- 1. Power up and reset the card
- 2. Submit the default Issuer Code IC (the code is communicated to the card issuer by ACS; the code may be different for different batches of cards supplied)
- 3. Select the Security File (File ID = FF 03<sub>H</sub>) and write the required secret codes and authentication keys. Caution: It is vitally important to not lose these codes and keys. If the codes and keys (especially the issuer code) cannot be verified, the card may become locked.
- 4. Select the Personalization File (File ID = FF 02<sub>H</sub>) and write the required settings to the Option Register and the parameter N\_OF\_FILE. Caution: Do not accidentally set the Personalization Bit and do not change the Security Option Register at this stage!
- 5. Select the User File Management File (File ID = FF 04<sub>H</sub>) and write the File Definition Blocks for the required User Files (WRITE RECORD command) with the required security attributes.
- 6. Select the individual User Files, submit the required code verification, and initialize the data in the files as required (WRITE RECORD command).
- 7. If applicable, select the Account File (File ID = FF 05<sub>H</sub>) and initialize the relevant data in the Account File (WRITE RECORD command). Verify the contents of the Account File (READ RECORD command).
- 8. If applicable, select the Account Security File (File ID = FF 06<sub>H</sub>) and initialize the account processing keys (WRITE RECORD command). Verify the contents of the Account Security File (READ RECORD command).
- 9. Select the Security File (File ID = FF 03<sub>H</sub>) and initialize all keys and codes (WRITE RECORD command). Verify the contents of the Security File (READ RECORD command)
- 10. Select the Personalization File (File ID = FF 02<sub>H</sub>) and initialize the Security Option Register and the remaining bytes of the Personalization File. Set the Personalization Bit (WRITE RECORD command). Verify the contents of the Personalization File (READ RECORD command). Caution: Do not accidentally change the value of the Option Register and N\_OF\_FILE.
- 11. Perform a card reset. The chip life cycle state as indicated in the ATR should be 'User State'.
- 12. The correct personalization can be verified by submitting the secret codes and keys programmed in the card (AUTHENTICATE, SUBMIT CODE commands) and reading/writing the allocated data files and executing the Account commands.

## 7.1. Sample Card Personalization

The following is an example of a simple card personalization. Depending on the design of the application, the personalization may be different. It may be easier to build customized personalization using the Card Tools application provided with ACS software development kits.

This simple card personalization creates:

- one record file 41 00<sub>H</sub> of 10 records and 255 bytes in length with free read / AC1 write access.
- one binary file 41 01<sub>H</sub> of 1 kilobyte in length with PIN read / write access.
- · activate the purse file with 0 value

```
; Reset and get ATR
3B BE 11 00 00 41 01 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 90 00
; submit default IC code
80 20 07 00 08 41 43 4F 53 54 45 53 54 (9000)
; Select and write the security codes
80 A4 00 00 02 FF 03 (9000)
; Write secret issuer code
80 D2 00 00 08 <8-byte IC>(9000)
; Write secret PIN code
80 D2 01 00 08 <8-byte PIN> (9000)
; Write secret application code 1 (AC1)
80 D2 05 00 08 <8-byte AC1> (9000)
;Select and write personalization file
80 A4 00 00 02 FF 02 (9000)
; Write 2 for N_OF_FILES
80 D2 00 02 01 02 (9000)
; Select and write user file management file
80 A4 00 00 02 FF 04 (9000)
; Write the two files
80 D2 00 00 07 FF 0A 00 02 41 00 00 (9000)
80 D2 01 00 07 04 00 60 60 41 01 80 (9000)
; Select and write personalization data to file 4100_{	exttt{H}}
80 A4 00 00 02 41 00 (9100)
; Submit AC1
80 20 01 00 08 <8-byte AC1> (9000)
; Write some personalization data to the records
80 D2 00 00 XX <Some data> (9000)
; Initialize the purse file
80 A4 00 00 02 FF 02 (9000)
80 D2 00 00 01 01 (9000)
80 A4 00 00 02 FF 05 (9000)
80 D2 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 (9000)
80 D2 01 00 04 00 00 01 00 (9000)
80 D2 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 (9000)
80 D2 03 00 04 00 00 01 00 (9000)
80 D2 04 00 04 00 03 E8 00 (9000)
; Initialize the purse key file
80 A4 00 00 02 FF 06 (9000)
80 D2 00 00 08 <8-byte debit key> (9000)
80 D2 01 00 08 <8-byte credit key> (9000)
80 D2 02 00 08 <8-byte certify key> (9000)
80 D2 03 00 08 <8-byte revoke debit key> (9000)
; After full testing, lock the card to user state
80 A4 00 00 02 FF 02 (9000)
80 D2 00 03 01 80 (9000)
; Reset card and get ATR
3B BE 11 00 00 41 01 38 01 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00
```



# Appendix A. Status Codes

The following is a summary of the status codes returned by the card.

SW1	SW2	Meaning
90	00	Command executed successfully.
91	nn	User Data File has been selected. The corresponding File Definition Block is stored in record no. nn in the User File Management File (FF 04 <sub>H</sub> )
61	nn	Command Successful – Issue GET RESPONSE command with P3 = nn to get response data
62	81	Data returned in response to the INQUIRE ACCOUNT command may be incorrect due to corrupted data in the Account Data Structure
63	Cn	Security related command failed – EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATION failed; incorrect Secret Code submitted; incorrect key used in CREDIT MAC generation; n = number of remaining trials
67	00	Wrong P3
68	82	Secure messaging not allowed.
69	66	Command not available (Manufacturing State, option bit not set, etc.)
69	81	Command incompatible with file structure
69	82	Security status not satisfied - Secret Code, Issuer Code or PIN not submitted - Secure Messaging required but not present.
69	83	Key or Secret Code is locked - no more verification or submission possible
69	85	Conditions of use not satisfied - no data for GET RESPONSE command available; CREDIT/DEBIT command executed without previous START TRANSACTION; Mutual Authentication not completed; no file selected; Session Key not established for Secure Messaging; Secure Messaging Command expected.
69	87	Expected secure messaging data objects missing
69	88	The Secure Messaging MAC <sub>cmd</sub> does not match the data.
69	F0	Account data inconsistent / transaction interrupted - access to account only in privileged mode possible
6A	82	File does not exist; account not available
6A	83	Record not found - file too short
6A	86	P1-P2 incorrect
6B	20	Invalid amount in CREDIT/DEBIT command
6C	nn	Issue GET RESPONSE command with P3 = nn to get response data
6D	00	Unknown INS
6E	00	Invalid CLA
6F	00	I/O error; data to be accessed resides in invalid address
6F	10	Account Transaction Counter at maximum - no more DEBIT or CREDIT transaction possible