

Security: Network Attacks

Mendel Rosenblum

Network Attacks

- "man in the middle" threat model
- Attacker has access to network communication between browser and server
- Passive attacks:
 - Eavesdrop on network traffic
- Active attacks:
 - Inject network packets
 - Modify packets
 - Reorder, replay packets
 - Block packets

Cryptography to the rescue

- Solution: use encryption to prevent eavesdropping and detect active attacks.
 - Old idea: Scramble the information before transmitting it, unscramble when received
- Traditional encryption:
 - Symmetric keys (same key on both ends)
 - Key distribution problem: how can we exchange keys without meeting in person?
- Public-key encryption helps with the key distribution problem
 - Each principal (user, program, etc.) has two encryption keys, one public, one secret
 - Information encrypted with one can only be decrypted with the other.
Encrypt with public key: Only principle can access
Encrypt with secret key: Know that it comes from principle
- Public-key encryption is slower than symmetric encryption
 - Use public-key to exchange symmetric key

How to find the public key for a particular server?

Can't just ask it for its public key?

Don't know if the entity we're asking is really the server we want!

Certificate authority: well-known, trusted server that certifies public keys.

Certificate: a document encrypted with the secret key of a certificate authority

- Identifies a particular service along with its public key

Certificate authorities

- Certificate authorities establish self as well known services on Internet
 - Browsers hard-wired to accept certificates from dozens of authorities
- Internet services compute keys, gives the public key to a certificate authority along with proof of identity
- Certificate authority returns a certificate for that service
- Service can pass along this certificate to browsers
 - Browser can validate the certificate came from the certification authority and see who the certification authority thinks the browser is talking to.
- Trust: Browser trusts to certification authority

GeoTrust Global CA
Google Internet Authority G2
mail.google.com



mail.google.com

Issued by: Google Internet Authority G2

Expires: Monday, May 16, 2016 at 5:00:00 PM Pacific Daylight Time

✔ This certificate is valid

▼ Details

Subject Name

Country US
State/Province California
Locality Mountain View
Organization Google Inc
Common Name mail.google.com

Issuer Name

Country US
Organization Google Inc
Common Name Google Internet Authority G2

Serial Number 2797369391266126961
Version 3

Signature Algorithm SHA-256 with RSA Encryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Parameters none

Not Valid Before Wednesday, February 17, 2016 at 2:29:10 AM Pacific Standard Time
Not Valid After Monday, May 16, 2016 at 5:00:00 PM Pacific Daylight Time

Public Key Info


Algorithm Elliptic Curve Public Key (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
Parameters Elliptic Curve secp256r1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)
Public Key 65 bytes : 04 AC 53 1D F3 96 E0 AD ...
Key Size 256 bits
Key Usage Encrypt, Verify, Derive
Signature 256 bytes : 99 42 91 0C 86 27 F3 0D ...

OK

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) & Transport Layer Security (TLS) - **HTTPS**

- Protocol used for secure communication between browsers and servers
- Browser uses certificate to verify server's identity
- Only one way: SSL/TLS does not allow the server to verify browser identity
- Uses certificates and public-key encryption to pass a secret session-specific key from browser to server

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) & Transport Layer Security (TLS) Overview



Excuses for not using HTTPS for all Web traffic?

- Expensive: slows down web servers - more cycles per connection
 - Can now offload to networking hardware
- Breaks in-the-middle web page caching
- Today over 90% of HTTP traffic uses HTTPS
 - Industry moving to "HTTPS Everywhere"

Problem: SSL stripping

- Common use pattern: user browses site with HTTP, upgrades to HTTPS for checkout.
- Active network attacker interposes on communication
- When server returns pages with HTTPS links, attacker changes them to HTTP.
- When browser follows those links, attacker intercepts requests, creates its own HTTPS connection to server, and forwards requests via that.
- As a result, the attacker sees all client packets (e.g., passwords).
- Browser provides feedback to user about whether HTTPS is in use, but most users won't notice the difference.

Problem: Mixed content

- Main page loaded with HTTPS, but some internal content loaded via HTTP (e.g. `<script src="http://.../script.js">`).
 - Network attacker can modify content to attack page.
- Some browsers help to notify users:
 - IE7: displays dialog for user, doesn't show SSL lock.
 - Firefox: displays lock icon with "!"
 - Chrome: did show warning, now just shows same as HTTP
- Common developer error: over-specified URLs:
`<script src="http://www.site.com/library.js">`
Instead, don't specify explicit protocols (or even site):
`<script src="/library.js">`

Problem: "Just in time" HTTPS

- Login page displayed with HTTP
 - Form posted with HTTPS
 - Appears secure but it isn't:
 - Active attack corrupts login page (send password someplace else during form post)
 - SSL stripping during form post: nothing indicates that the actual connection didn't use SSL
- Solution: before server returns HTML for login page, check for HTTPS; if page fetched via HTTP, redirect to the HTTPS version

Problem: Bad certificate

- If a certificate is bad/unknown, browser issues warning dialog:
 - Most users can't understand, so they just click OK.
 - Some browsers warn repeatedly, but users will still just click through.
 - This enables various network attacks.