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20

The Legislative, Organizational, and Beneficiary Consequences of State-Oriented Challengers

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After years of neglect, scholars have now turned their attention to the consequences of social movements (compare the reviews of McAdam et al. 1988 with Giugni 1998; see also Amenta et al. 1999; Cress and Snow 2000; Earl 2000; Amenta et al. 2002; Meyer forthcoming). Much of this work has focused on the external consequences of social movements, especially those relating to states and struggles over legislation. This is not surprising as many challengers come into being to alter the relationship between states and specific groups, and other challengers often require some state action in order to further their cultural or other goals that are not mainly state related. Despite this recent work, a recent review (Giugni 1998) suggests that research findings have yet to accumulate at the same pace as in other areas in social movement research.

Perhaps part of the reason is that there are many different potential consequences of social movements and trying to make sense of the state-related consequences alone raises specific and difficult conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues. Conceptually speaking, scholars have to address the meaning of "success" or "influence" for challengers that make state-related claims. It may be more difficult to forge agreement on this issue than on other concepts movement scholars address, such as resource mobilization, participation, or collective identity. The possible consequences of social movements are many, and scholars' understandings of them have tended to be broad and not tailored to fit state-related circumstances. Theoretically, scholars need to address what matters – beyond some degree of mobilization and plausible claims-making – in explaining the state-related impacts of challengers. Each is necessary, but neither seems sufficient to realize gains for challengers addressing states. In comparison to mobilizing supporters, fashioning identities among them, or achieving recognition from targets, most state-related consequences of challengers are not as directly related to the efforts expended by challengers;

explaining challengers' state-related consequences requires addressing and understanding other actors inside and outside states who may be pressing in similar or different directions, considerably complicating the issue. Methodologically, scholars need to assess the individual impact of challengers or their impact in interaction with the other many potential influences on state outcomes. Causal arguments in this area can be complicated, making assessing them more difficult. Yet because it is already difficult to study phenomena as evanescent and often poorly recorded as social movements, scholars often engage in case studies that place informational restrictions on the appraisal of their arguments.

In this chapter we review the literature on state-oriented and legislative consequences of social movements as they apply to a variety of beneficiary groups and movement organizations. In doing so we address the ways that scholars of social movements have approached the peculiar conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues in understanding these state-related consequences. In our review we also refer to the comparative academic literature on policymaking – which indicates that social movements usually play a minor role, with other factors, such as political institutions, party systems and actors, and public opinion, held to be more important (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Burstein 1998; Hicks 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001; reviews in Amenta et al. 2001; Amenta 2003). These studies are often comparative or follow policy for long periods of time, or both, whereas most studies about social movements concern one country or one movement or challenger over a relatively brief period of time. Complicated though the issues surrounding the state-related consequences of challengers are, we offer suggestions for ways of addressing them.

Before going further, it is worth saying that we see the impact of states on social movements as a recursive process (Amenta et al. 2002; Meyer forthcoming; see also Soule et al. 1999). States influence social movements, which always are begun in a political context that favors action in some times and places rather than others, that favors certain forms of organization and lines of actions over others, and certain types of political identities over others. States, and some other longstanding political institutions like political parties, tend to dwarf social movements in terms of size, resources, and power, and the structure and activities of states influence lines of organization and action among movements by making some more likely to be productive than others. Social movements in turn attempt to influence states by mobilizing people and resources and claims around specific strategic lines of action. Challengers contest state policies, laws, bureaucracies, rules, and institutions in order to make gains for those whom they represent. This collective action in turn often influences the state through legislation. For analytical reasons and the purposes of this volume we mainly discuss the second process below.

State-Related Consequences of Social Movements: Conceptual Issues

Despite the fact that many challengers are mainly state-oriented or have important goals or claims that require state action, states are not typically well conceptualized as a target of social movement activity. For the most part, the academic literature on

the consequences of social movements concerns either the successes or failures of challengers, as they perceive them and in a broad way. These successes and failures generally refer to new benefits and recognition generated from various targets. In what follows, we discuss this literature as it applies to states and the political process and refer explicitly to new advantages through states, especially through legislative activity relating to the beneficiary groups of challengers, as well as recognition or representation through states as they apply to movement organizations. These conceptual issues are important to making sense of what scholars seek to explain regarding the state-related consequences of social movements.

"Success," "New Advantages," "Acceptance," "Power," and "Collective Goods"

In designating the consequences of social movements, William Gamson's (1975, 1990) two types of success greatly influenced later studies and have since been modified by scholars focusing on state-related consequences of social movements. Gamson considers success in new advantages, his first type, as meaning whether a challenger's goals or claims were mainly realized. Burstein et al. (1995) modify this program-based understanding of new advantages by applying it to state action. They see a state-oriented challenger as being successful in this way according to the degree to which it gets its legislation based on its program on the political agenda, influences its passage into policy, or helps to ensure its enforcement, as well as the degree to which the legislation has intended effects (see also Banaszak 1996). Acceptance, Gamson's second type, was gained when a challenger was recognized as a legitimate representative of a constituency by the target of collective action, altering the relationship between a challenging organization and the groups it attempts to influence. For Gamson's state-oriented challengers, this meant some basic acknowledgment by governmental officials that the challenger was legitimate. Other scholars have pressed further in specifically addressing access to the state, including specifying "procedural" gains (Kitschelt 1986) and "representation" (Cress and Snow 2000). Yet others propose an additional dimension of "structural" gains (Kitschelt 1986; Burstein et al. 1995) to address more substantial and long-term gains in access. In general, these more substantial gains in access to states concern ongoing connections between states and social movement organizations or other organizations related to movements.

Despite these modifications, each definition of success has liabilities. Gamson's concept of new advantages places limits on the consideration of possible impacts of challenges. It may be possible, notably, for a challenger to fail to achieve its stated program – and thus be deemed a failure – but still to win substantial new advantages for its constituents. This is especially likely for challengers with far-reaching goals. There may also be unintended consequences that influence beneficiary groups, and challengers may do worse than fail. In addition, in democratic states some form of basic recognition or acceptance of challenging organizations is highly probable. What is more, the understanding of acceptance as constituting a success – given that it may lead to nothing for the challenger's constituency – has been contested (Piven and Cloward 1977). As a result scholars focusing on the impact of challengers on states have not as frequently dealt with acceptance as an object of explanation

(see Gamson 1990: appendix) or have seen it mainly as a potential means of gaining new advantages (Ragin 1989; Amenta et al. 1992).

Some scholars of the impact of social movements have addressed the state explicitly by addressing gains in power. For the most part, however, these do not go beyond the limited ideas of new benefits and access. Craig Jenkins (1982) suggests a three-part scheme based on short-term changes in political decisions, alterations in decision-making elites, and long-term changes in the distribution of goods. The first and third are different forms of new benefits, while the second is connected to the idea of access or acceptance. Herbert Kitschelt (1986) argues social movements can achieve substantive, procedural, and structural gains, with the first two analogous to Gamson's categories. The third type is a "transformation of political structures," which suggests more fundamental change, including that provided by a new political party, but is not well specified. These ideas need to be better connected to specific state structures and processes to make sense of the impact of challengers on the state.

To address some of these issues other scholars start with an alternative based on the concept of *collective goods*, or group-wise advantages or disadvantages from which nonparticipants in a challenge cannot be easily excluded (Olson 1965; Hardin 1982). Collective goods can be material, such as categorical social spending programs, but can also be less tangible, such as new ways to refer to members of a group. Social movement organizations almost invariably claim to represent a group extending beyond the leaders and adherents of the organization and most make demands that would provide collective benefits to that larger group (Tilly 1999). According to the collective benefit standard, a challenger can have considerable impact even when it fails to achieve what it is seeking. It also can address the possibility that challengers would have negative consequences (collective bads) or negligible ones, such as achieving a program that did not realize its intended effect to benefit constituents (Amenta and Young 1999a). Scholars working from this standard tend to refer to the "consequences" or impacts of social movements rather than successes or failures.

New Advantages as State-Related Collective Benefits

We build on these approaches by employing some of the ideas regarding new benefits and collective goods and connecting them to political sociology concepts of the state, employing a three-level approach (Amenta and Young 1999a; Amenta et al. 2002). From this perspective, the greatest sort of impact is the one that provides a group, not necessarily organizations representing that group, continuing leverage over political processes. These sorts of gains increase the returns to routine collective action of a challenger. These gains are usually at a structural or systemic level of state processes. Most collective action, however, is aimed at a more medium level – benefits that will continue to flow to a group unless some countering action is taken. These generally involve major changes in policy and the bureaucratic enforcement and implementation of that policy. The most minor impact is to win a specific state decision or legislation with no long-term implications for the flows of benefits to the group. In each case, new legislation is required to secure the benefits. The difference is in the content of the legislation and what it means regarding the flow of collective benefits to groups represented by challengers. Although collective action

in practice may be aimed at different levels simultaneously, these distinctions offer a basis for analyses of state-related gains by social movements for constituent groups.

These levels of collective benefits can be related back to the characteristics of states (Amenta et al. 2002), including the structure of the polity, state bureaucracies, and policies. Social movements may have an impact on the structure of the polity, on the degree to which authority is centralized or divided among levels of government or according to functions at the central and other levels of government. Social movements may also contest other system-wide features of states, such as their democratic practices and electoral rules. At a more middle level, both in terms of the likely stability of the change and its effects across groups are changes in state bureaucracies. The creation or major alteration of a state domestic bureaucracy has great implications for the implementation of all policy under its purview and the development of future policies. Finally, there are new state policies. These can range quite dramatically, however, from those that are short-term and apply to few people and at one point in time to others that may apply to large numbers of people and groups and backed with legislation and bureaucratic authority. The levels of influence do not line up perfectly with the most structural and systemic aspects of the state, but there is a rough correspondence.

At the highest level, a challenger may gain structural reforms of the state that give the represented group increased influence over political processes. These gains are a kind of metacollective benefit, as they increase the productivity of all future collective action of the group. For instance, challengers sometimes demand the devolution of political authority, which can aid territorial minorities, and have also pressed for various direct democratic devices, with notable results achieved in many US states and in Switzerland. Gains in the democratization of state processes are perhaps the most important that social movements can influence and have the greatest systemic effects. Winning the right to vote or the protection of that right for low-income or other disfranchised groups increases the productivity of future state-directed collective action by such groups (Piven and Cloward 1989; Tilly 1998). Many of the most prominent social movements and challengers have sought this basic goal, including movements of workers, women, and, in the United States, the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Banaszak 1996).[1]

By contrast, state policies are institutionalized benefits that provide collective goods in a routine fashion to all those meeting specified requirements. Once enacted and enforced with bureaucratic means, categorical social spending programs, notably, provide benefits in such a manner (Amenta 1998). The beneficiaries gain rights of entitlement to the benefits, and legal changes and bureaucratic reinforcement of such laws help to ensure the routine maintenance of such collective benefits. Under these circumstances, the issue is privileged in politics, is effectively removed from the political agenda, and the political system becomes biased in favor of the group. For the situation to change some other person or group must challenge the institutionalized benefits. A bureaucracy would have to be targeted and altered, if not captured, or new legislation would have to be passed rescinding benefits – a process that becomes more difficult as time passes as bureaucracies are reinforced and people organize their lives around the programs (Pierson 1994). Regulatory bureaucracies that are products of challenger mobilizations may push on their own to advance mandates in the absence of new legislation, as in the case of state labor commissions (Amenta 1998) or in affirmative action (Skrentny 1996; Bonastia

2000). Policies, however, vary widely in their implications. At a low level, challengers may win something specific and minor for their constituency group, such as a short-run or one-time benefit – which is often criticized as insubstantial (Lipsky 1968; Piven and Cloward 1977) and designed more to assure a public audience than to aid the beneficiaries of a challenger. Such minimal benefits imply limited rights for the groups to which the benefits pertain.

Through their policies states can ratify or attempt to undermine potential collective identities or help to create new ones, sometimes on purpose, often inadvertently. To be valuable a new identity should aid in elevating and defining group members, in relation to other members of the group and those outside, and the identity must receive a kind of societal endorsement or recognition. Insofar as a challenger constructs a new collective identity that extends to a beneficiary group and provides psychological rewards such as pride, winning affirmations of this identity is a potentially important accomplishment (for a review, see Polletta and Jasper 2001). Although states do not hold a monopoly on recognizing new identity claims, states do provide many influential and authoritative communications that can greatly influence identities, and state actors are often in the vanguard of recognizing new identity claims, frequently recognizing these claims by way of changes in policy (Amenta and Young 1999a). These results can range from a challenger's constituency gaining greater respect through official governmental representations to having the group recognized as such in state policies. The state's role in defining racial categories, for instance, has been at times the target of social movements. In the United States, activists attempting to legitimate a multiracial identity were able to alter questions in the 2000 census. Similarly, activists in Brazil fought successfully for the inclusion in the 1991 census of racial questions in the hopes of achieving greater recognition of the special status of black Brazilians (Nobles 2000). However accomplished, gains in collective identity may influence later attempts to gain collective benefits taking other forms, such as pecuniary rewards or legal rights, or may reinforce existing ones.

Dividing the process of creating new laws containing collective benefits into the agenda setting, legislative content, passage, and implementation of legislation simplifies analysis and also makes it easier to judge the impact of challengers (Kingdon 1984; Burstein et al. 1995; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Amenta and Young 1999b). If a challenger, for instance, inserts its issue onto the political agenda, it can be seen as having increased its probability of winning some collective benefits for its larger constituency. This has been called "sensitizing" the "institutional agenda" (Kriesi et al. 1995).[2] The value of the benefits would be unknown, however, until legislative alternatives had been developed. As far as legislative content is concerned, a challenger can work to increase the value of collective benefits included in any bill that makes it onto the agenda. Once the content has been specified, moreover, challengers can influence individual legislators to vote for the bill and thus influence the probability of gaining specified collective benefits. From there the program must be implemented, and the more secure the implementation the greater the probability of collective benefits over the long run.

To put it another way, if a challenger has an impact on any one of these processes it would increase the expected value of collective benefits for the beneficiary group. Unless all processes are negotiated successfully – placing the issue on the agenda, writing a bill with collective benefits, passing the bill, *and* seeing its implementation

– no collective benefits will result. Influence in implementation depends on successfully negotiating these other steps. It seems that it will be only very rarely that a challenger can influence all of these processes. That said, for a challenger to influence the placement of an issue on the agenda, to increase the collective benefits in legislation, to affect the probabilities that elected officials might support such legislation, or to reinforce the implementation of legislation, each of these is a kind of beneficial impact in itself. Often, though, challengers have to bid to influence policies once they are already institutionalized in ways that harm the interests of their constituents.

State-Related Benefits to and Connections with Social Movement Organizations

A second sort of consequence, the "acceptance" (Gamson 1975) or "representation" (Cress and Snow 2000) achieved by challenging organizations, can also be related systematically back to states and collective benefits. These consequences apply specifically to challenging organizations, and to the extent that state action recognizing these organizations influences the form or resources of challenger organizations, they also influence their potential to gain future collective benefits for their constituents. This of course assumes that organized challengers effectively represent some group; this may not always be the case, as organizational leaders may form different interests from broader constituencies (Piven and Cloward 1977; cf. Gamson 1975). Even for challenging organizations that do faithfully press in the interests of a larger constituency, gaining official representations remains one step removed from gaining collective benefits through the state.

Gamson's idea of acceptance may, however, be too broadly drawn to capture the sorts of representation sought by challengers attempting to influence democratic states. According to Gamson's understanding, a state-oriented challenging group was accepted if it was invited to testify before Congress, which is a fairly minimal connection to politics. More advanced forms of acceptance included negotiations, formal recognition, and inclusion, which meant placing members of the challenging organization in the organization of the antagonist. Although challenging organizations and interest groups can gain access to politicians and may receive various sorts of certification, very rarely do states and their leaders directly negotiate with challengers or other organized actors for that matter over the creation of policy – which is the purview of elected officials and their appointees. In addition, most democratic states are formally open to challenging groups; there is no analogous situation to having an employer refusing to recognize a union organization. Organizations that accept the legitimacy of democratic states are not best described as their antagonists. Frequently challengers seek to gain attention from states regarding an ignored issue, attempting to have their voice heard among competing claims. The claims that many challengers make, such as demands for social spending, regulation, or enforcement, may have societal opponents that are highly diffuse, such as taxpayers or automobile owners.

More important and plausible for state-oriented challengers is a version of Gamson's inclusion, which would amount to the placing of challengers in state positions. The two main ways that challengers can gain such inclusion are through election or appointment. Challengers can become candidates for office, riding the

backing of the challenging organization to election, or can stand as representatives of new political parties. More likely in the American setting, given the inability of third political parties to gain a footing in the US polity, is for challenging organizations' representatives to be appointed to state positions. The most likely scenario here is to be selected for study commissions designed to address a specific issue or problem. More influential are positions in regular governmental bureaucracies. As is the case for other, better politically situated groups, it is possible for social movement organizations to capture bureaucracies and run them in favor its constituency. Although most bureaucracies are staffed by long-term civil-service employees, social movement representatives can be appointed as political employees at the top of state bureaucracies and guide their ruling-making and enforcement procedures. In assessing the representation of challengers in bureaucracies, care is needed to distinguish among actual participants in challenges and those who are largely members of the challenger's target constituency. Also, any members of these groups are liable to be captured by the mission of the bureaucracy, which is not necessarily going to be the same as the interests or preferences of the challenger's constituency. By gaining representation in legislative offices and bureaucracies, challengers can influence policies for their constituencies throughout the process, including placing programs on the agenda, helping to specify their content, aiding their passage, and supporting their enforcement.

State policies can also aid challenging organizations, just as policies may aid their constituencies. Policies that aid challenging organizations can often be seen as flows of resources and rights between states and challenger organizations, including everything from rights to organize to taxation exemptions and funding, with the more important legislation insuring long-term flows of resources or recognition to organized challengers. Movements may also attempt to gain recognition and legitimation for altered or new movement organizations, which might include political parties, political lobbying, or educational organizations (see discussions in Clemens 1997; Burstein 1999). The formation by movements of political parties is something like the structural change discussed by Kitschelt (1986) (see also Dalton 1995; Schwartz 2000), but the creation of political parties or other organizations with established relationships with states remains one step removed from structural change in the state itself.

Collective action may be intended to win or may result in winning higher-order rights through the state that advantage a group in its conflicts with other groups (Skocpol 1985). The state may be used as a "fulcrum" in this sense (Tarrow 1998) by groups not mainly state-oriented. The general way to differentiate this sort of benefit from the other types is that it increases the probability of the impact of collective action by a group with regard to its targets outside the state. Labor movements, notably, often focus on the state to ensure rights to organize and engage in collective bargaining with businesses and business associations. In the United States equal employment opportunity laws provided advantages for the civil rights movements in fighting discrimination by private corporations (Burstein 1991, 1998). By outlawing a set of practices and providing a legal remedy for class of employees, they created another channel for protest, and by creating a bureaucracy that has influenced the outcomes of these legal cases, they have provided additional resources and legitimation for the movement. A second way the state may be used as a fulcrum is in transnational protest (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Challengers blocked in one country

may appeal to sympathetic organizations in other countries. These other actors can apply pressure on their governments in order to change the policies of the original state. This "boomerang pattern" of activism can be found in the Latin American human rights advocacy network, which includes Latin American organizations appealing to solidarity groups around the world, resulting in international pressure on Latin American governments.

Accounting for the State-Related Consequences of Challengers

There are four main arguments designed to explain the impact of social movements on states. The claims that stand out most in the literature are the following: (1) the simple hypothesis that mobilization or collective action in itself is likely to be effective (Jenkins 1982; McCarthy and Zald 2002); (2) that once mobilized certain forms of challenger organization or strategies, including framing strategies, are more effective than others (Gamson 1990; cf. Piven and Cloward 1977; see also Cress and Snow 2000; Ganz 2000; Andrews 2001); (3) that political opportunities or favorable political contexts result in benefits for mobilized challengers (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Goldstone 1980; Kitschelt 1986); (4) that the collective action of mobilized challengers is politically mediated – combinations of specific forms of mobilization, action, and political conditions determine whether movements have consequences (Piven and Cloward 1977; Amenta et al. 1992; Skocpol 1992; Amenta et al. 1994; Kriesi et al. 1995; Amenta et al. 1999). Like other arguments in the literature on social movements, the arguments about the impacts of social movements have not always been clearly geared toward specific outcomes. Thus scholars link these various factors to all manner of different "successes" or "outcomes" of social movements relatively indiscriminately. In what follows we discuss the various perspectives and some of the evidence regarding their claims with respect to state-related outcomes.

The first argument is that whatever aids a group's mobilization will lead to its making gains, as mobilization of various sorts will aid movements in whatever they do. To look at it another way, the mobilization of various resources is needed to engage in collective action, and collective action, wherever aimed, is designed and expected to bring a certain amount of collective benefits (Tilly 1978). This line of argumentation is consistent with rational choice discussions of collective action problems, in that they view the main issue for social movements as overcoming free-rider disincentives to participation (Olson 1965; Chong 1991). The ability to mobilize different sorts of resources is key for the impact of movements and mobilization of resources and membership has been shown to influence some state-related consequences in different research (Rucht 1999; see review in McCarthy and Zald 2002). However, mobilization seems to be necessary to have influence over states, as there seems to be no connection between size of a mobilized challenger and gaining new benefits (Kitschelt 1986; Gamson 1990). This does not seem surprising in that bids to influence the state and other political institutions through legislation require several steps to be negotiated, and many additional actors and institutions bear on the process.

A second point of view addresses the impact of relatively well mobilized challengers and focuses on conditions largely under the control of challengers.

Associated with Gamson (1990), this line of argumentation is that specific strategies and goals of collective action and forms of challenger organization are more likely to produce success. In his study of 53 randomly selected social movement organizations spanning American history before World War II, Gamson (1990) found notably that limited goals, the use of "constraints," selective incentives, and bureaucratic forms of organization (see also Staggenborg 1991) were more likely to produce new advantages. In contrast, goals and strategies aiming at "displacement" – in which a movement seeks to destroy or replace its opponent – were likely to fail. Most other scholars following Gamson's lead and employing the data from his remarkable research project have also focused on relative merits of different sorts of strategies or forms of challenger organization, but because of the nature of Gamson's study their ability to examine the role of various political contexts is limited. What is more, the efforts of Gamson and others employing his data do not distinguish between states and other targets of challengers. Also, the arguments are based on the US case and thus may be geared explicitly to the contexts facing US challengers before World War II.

Other scholars have focused on aspects of either the social movement's form of organization or its strategies. One famous statement was Piven and Cloward's (1977) argument that organization in poor people's movements undermines their ability to gain concessions (see also Button 1989; review of research in Skocpol and Amenta 1986). Others have advanced Gamson's opposing argument about the importance of organization in social movement success by focusing on the sorts of "mobilizing structures" (McAdam et al. 1996) or social movement organizations likely to produce gains. It has been argued that resourceful movement infrastructures led to gains in policy implementation for the civil rights movement in the South (Andrews 2001), that innovative organizational forms can lead to gains for challengers and transformations of political institutions (Clemens 1997), and that movement organizations with greater strategic resources are likely to prevail over others (Ganz 2000).

Part of a challenger's strategy singled out for special attention among scholars in this area concerns claims-making and framing – which have been deemed essential by some to making gains for state-oriented challengers. Cress and Snow (2000) argue notably that for a challenger to have an impact it is necessary for it to employ resonant "prognostic" and "diagnostic" frames (see also Snow and Benford 1988). This means that to gain results challengers need to identify problems and pose credible solutions to those problems that play to state actors and other third parties as well as to be able to mobilize participants. Tilly (1999) argues in a somewhat similar vein that a movement's public displays of "worthiness" are critical to a movement's impact, along with its unity, numbers, and commitment, which he refers to as WUNC. Worthiness incorporates aspects of Gamson's (1992) "injustice frame," but also encompasses aspects of appearance and moral standing. Suffering should be shown to be "undeserved" because social movements rarely achieve goals as a direct result of their actions. Political identities need to be created and recognized, and the ability to produce WUNC increases the likelihood of recognition from state actors. There remains, however, the difficulty of assessing the plausibility of frames independent of their apparent influence in convincing policymakers.

Additionally, through various framing devices, a challenger may be able to elicit general support by sensitizing "public attitudes" (Kriesi et al. 1995). An issue that

becomes framed, either by the social movement or others, as part of high-profile policy domain may become more difficult for social movements to influence, however (Burstein 1999). Issues in these policy domains are those that are closely tied to the national cleavage structure, involve high levels of material resources, contest current power relations, involve the 'national interest,' or have electoral relevance (Kriesi et al. 1995). In these areas, there are more likely to be powerful nonstate actors working in opposition and state actors may be able to expend more resources to block movement demands. Additionally, where public opinion in opposition to the movement is strong and deeply held, elected officials may be reticent to offend constituents and accede to demands (Burstein 1998, 1999).

A third argument attempts to take into account contextual influences by claiming that once a challenger is mobilized the main thing influencing its impact is the political context or "opportunity structure" (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995; for a general review of this literature, see chapter 4 in this volume). This line of argumentation has both systemic and dynamic components to it, and sometimes it is also argued that systemic political contexts greatly influence or determine the strategies of challengers. Kriesi et al. (1995) take the most systemic view, arguing that the openness and capacity of states largely determines whether a state-related movement will have an impact and whether or not it will be proactive or reactive. When states have both inclusive strategies and strong capacities, challengers are most likely to achieve "proactive" impacts. Under weak states, by contrast, reactive impacts are more probable, as the state lacks the capacity to implement policies. These arguments build on Kitschelt (1986), who argued that the varying impacts of antinuclear power challengers in four countries depended on a state's "implementation capacities" – the ability of the state's bureaucratic infrastructure to carry out policy. These capacities would presumably vary, however, from issue to issue. In an open polity, as in the case of a federal system, the multiplicity of targets may increase the likelihood that a challenger will be recognized by at least one state actor, and thus there may be less reliance on disruptive protest (Kitschelt 1986). Rucht (1989) found a wider variety of protest tactics in the environmental movement in federalist Germany than in centralized France.[3]

These analyses of the role of systemic political contexts have the advantage of being applicable in comparative studies. The more overarching arguments have been criticized, however, on the grounds that all manner of social movements with different strategies have developed within similar countries (Dalton 1995; Tarrow 1996) and that within any country differences in impacts have varied over time. Arguments regarding systemic political contexts have also been criticized on the grounds that they take a too abstract view of states and political opportunity structures. Notably, focusing on the overall openness of polities and strength of states ignores conceptual and theoretical developments in political sociology literatures that have addressed the influence of polities and states in more fine-grained ways (Amenta et al. 2002).

Along these lines, others argue that longstanding characteristics of states and political institutions influence the prospects of challenges generally and encourage certain forms and strategies, but do not completely determine them. Important factors include the polity structure, the democratization of state institutions, electoral rules and procedures, and state policies (see review in Amenta et al. 2002). These aspects of states influence forms of challenger representation, as well as the

tactics of challengers. These arguments tend to drop the weak/strong state and open/closed polity dichotomies and refer to specific aspects of polity and political actors.

The centralization and division of power between each branch of government also has an impact on social movement organizations. An autonomous court system with veto power over the legislative branch, for example, may lead to an emphasis on legal mobilizations, which may either increase the overall level of protest or shift focus away from more mass-based protests. Multiple points of access is a two-edged sword, however, as multiple points of access also means multiple points of veto. The level of democracy has important consequences for the forms that mobilization will take place. Specifically, the greater the exclusion from the democratic process, the more likely noninstitutional forms of protest will take place (Amenta and Young 1999a). This is not always the case, however, as groups may instead transform and extend the definition of institutional behavior. The presuffrage women's movement, for example expanded the organizational repertoire for protest groups by adopting a multiplicity of legitimate, but previously nonpolitical organizational forms (Clemens 1993). The basis for exclusion from the democratic process increases the likelihood that groups will form along these identities, such as the African American civil rights in the American context (McAdam 1982) and workers in the European one (Katznelson 1981).

Electoral rules may have the greatest impact on the relationship between social movements and the party system. Winner-take-all systems, such as in the US, discourage the formation and legitimacy of new political parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and discourage party movements (Schwartz 2000). Initiative and referendum procedures increase the likelihood that organizations will be single-focused. In addition, states can also provide a variety of resources for specific social movements that can vary from concrete items, such as a desk and phone (Cress and Snow 2000) to more abstract resources, such as legitimacy (Edwards and Marullo 1995).

On the dynamic side, the political opportunity argument focuses on alterations in political conditions that improve the productivity of collective action of challengers (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). In their study of farmworkers' mobilization and collective action, Jenkins and Perrow (1977) found that changes in the political context influenced their growth and impact, through the rise to power of favorable political regimes and through the support of liberal organizations like organized labor. In his reanalysis of Gamson's data, Goldstone (1980) argued that challengers' success was determined by the timing of national crises. In his study of the civil rights movement, McAdam (1982, 1983, 2000) argued that favorable political conditions were necessary for its gains – which were based on tactical innovations. Once political conditions turned against the movement, however, no further advances were possible. Amenta et al. (1994) found that Share Our Wealth had an impact on US taxation policy, but only when both the president and Congress were sympathetic to reform, understood as being a super-majority of Democrats (see also Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Costain 1992). In short, according to the strongest form of this argument, mobilized challengers have impacts largely because they engage in collective action at the right time.

This line of argumentation has the advantage of addressing some of the problems faced by the systemic views – that challengers have varied over time in making state-related gains. This argumentation has suffered, however, in comparison with the systemic view of political contexts in being able to specify what constitutes a

favorable context. The main candidates – polity openness, instability of elite alliances, the presence of elite allies for challengers, declines in capacities and propensities for repression (McAdam 1996; see also Tarrow 1996) – are drawn so widely as to be difficult to operationalize (Amenta et al. 2002). It is difficult to show beforehand whether political contexts are becoming definitely more favorable or not and to compare different contexts across time and place with respect to their friendliness to challengers. And without being able to specify in advance what would constitute evidence of a favorable change in the political context, scholars can point to almost anything in the political background as constituting evidence of such a favorable change.

Finally, many scholars have developed different political mediation models of social movement consequences, which build on arguments concerning strategy, organizational form, and political contexts (Piven and Cloward 1977; Amenta et al. 1992; Skocpol 1992; Amenta et al. 1994; Amenta et al. 1999; Lipset and Marks 2000). The basic point of this argument is that the collective action of challengers is politically mediated. In a democratic political system, mobilizing relatively large numbers of committed people is probably necessary to winning new collective benefits for those otherwise under-represented in politics. So, too, are making plausible claims regarding the worthiness of the group and the usefulness of its program. Yet challengers' action is more likely to produce results when institutional political actors see benefit in aiding the group the challenger represents. To secure new benefits, challengers will typically need help or complementary action from like-minded state actors, including elected officials, appointed officials, and state civil servants. And so challengers need to engage in collective action that changes the calculations of relevant institutional political actors, such as elected officials and state bureaucrats, and challengers need to adopt organizational forms that fit political circumstances. State actors need in turn to see a challenger as potentially facilitating or disrupting their own goals – which might range from augmenting or cementing new electoral coalitions, to gaining in public opinion, to increasing the support for the missions of governmental bureaus.

Political mediation arguments are generally less concerned to identify individual organizational forms, strategies, or long-term or short-term political contexts that will always or usually help challengers to win collective benefits. Instead the idea is that certain organizational forms and collective action strategies will be more productive in some political contexts rather than others. Some examples may help to underscore the logic behind this sort of argument – which often relies on quite different mechanisms of influence. Taking a dynamic view of political contexts, Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that the disruptive and spontaneous collective action by poor people in times of electoral instability would produce concessions in their classic treatment of US challenges in the mid-twentieth century. A specific sort of action (mass turmoil) for challengers with a specific constituency (the poor) is likely to gain results (increased social spending) in a specific, short-term political context (electoral instability). In her examination of organized groups throughout US history, Skocpol (1992) argues that to have influence the forms of challengers and other mass-based interest organizations need to fit the divided nature of the American political context, a systemic condition. US organizations need to have a wide geographical presence to influence Congress, which is based on district representation. In this manner challengers and other groups relying on large numbers can

overcome the obstacles to policy change in the American polity. Lipset and Marks (2000) argue that the failure of socialist movements in the United States resulted from a combination of difficult systemic political conditions for the establishment of new parties and flawed strategies. Kriesi et al. (1995) highlight the importance of the "interaction context" between political opportunity structures and mobilization. Here, political authorities react to the opportunity structure to create a system of incentives for social movements. These "concrete opportunities" created by elites influence movement strategy, size, and outcomes.

The most extensive discussion of this sort suggests that challengers need to moderate strategies and forms to address political circumstances widely. The standard distinction between disruptive and assimilative strategies is dropped in favor of addressing variations in assertiveness of action (Amenta 2002; Amenta et al. 1999), with assertive meaning the use of increasingly strong sanctions, something akin to Gamson's "constraints." If the political regime is supportive and the domestic bureaucrats are professionalized and supportive, limited protest based mainly on the evidence of mobilization is likely to be sufficient to provide increased collective benefits. The challenger needs merely to demonstrate that it has support, through time-honored activities such as writing letters, rallies, or petitioning, as well as public awareness campaigns. Members of a reform-oriented regime are likely to use the evidence of mobilization and modest protest as a confirmation of the beneficiary group's relative importance in an electoral coalition. Domestic bureaucrats are likely to portray the mobilization as indicating the need for the augmentation or greater enforcement of its program. If the regime hopes to add to its coalition or if domestic bureaucrats have a mission that is not yet realized, those groups best mobilized are likely to win the greatest benefits in public policy for their constituencies.

By contrast, achieving collective benefits through public policy is likely to be more difficult if neither a supportive regime nor administrative authority exists. Although this understanding of the political context is a dynamic one that takes into account short-run and medium-term changes in political contexts, it can also be related back to systemic and structural characteristics of political systems, notably political institutional conditions that make the establishment of a reform-oriented regime or bureaucratic capacities difficult. When the regime is opposed to the challenger or sees no benefit in adding its beneficiary group to its coalition and when state bureaucracies in the area are hostile or absent, the sorts of limited protest listed above are likely to be ignored or have a limited effect. As political circumstances become more difficult, more assertive or bolder collective action is required to produce collective benefits. Sanctions in assertive institutional collective action threaten to increase or decrease the likelihood of gaining or keeping something valuable to political actors – often positions – or to take over their functions or prerogatives. The institutional collective action of challengers works largely by mobilizing large numbers of people behind a course of activity, often one with electoral implications. This collective action may be designed to convince the general public of the justice of the cause and influence elected and appointed officials in that manner, but may also demonstrate to these officials that a large segment of the electorate is willing to vote or engage in other political activity mainly on the basis of a single key issue.

Challengers also benefit by targeting their actions to fit the administrative or legislative context. If the relevant state bureaucratic actors are present and either

supportive or neutral and the political regime is not supportive of the challenger's group, collective action will be most productive if it focuses on elected officials. Such action might induce those who would otherwise be indifferent or hostile to legislation to support it or at least not to challenge it. If the political regime is supportive or neutral and domestic bureaucrats are either absent or hostile to the challenger's constituency, bureaucratic capabilities must be created or existing bureaucratic actors must be sanctioned. They might respond by providing feasible proposals that increase the collective benefits to the group represented by the challenger. These theoretical claims are more flexible than those based mainly on strategies and political conditions alone, and have the advantage of specifying political conditions and making links between systemic political contexts and more short-term ones. But they are somewhat more complex than one or two factor approaches, and thus more difficult to appraise, and like the others require specifying the strategies likely to work in different political contexts.

Methodological Issues

Analyzing the state-related consequences of social movements often provides a series of methodological problems that can hinder empirical appraisals of theoretical claims, whatever form they take. Establishing a challenger's impact on states is straightforward in principle. It means to demonstrate that state-related collective goods would not have appeared in the way that they did in the absence of the challenger. To determine why a movement had consequences often means determining first whether it had any consequences and which ones – not an easy task. Where the state is concerned usually more than one set of actors is making claims and taking action in areas of concern to social movements, making it difficult to sort out causal influence. This problem is aggravated by the fact that scholars typically study individual movements or organizations, making it difficult to rule out plausible, but alternative explanations. In part because of the great scarcity of information on social movements, no one has followed Gamson in examining a random sample of movements or movement organizations. Often neglected, too, even by Gamson, are means to ascertain whether and the degree to which the mobilization and action of any challenger had an impact on collective goods. The researcher has to show that the challenger has caused the collective benefits and address the surrounding issues (see Amenta et al. 1992; Kriesi et al. 1995; Giugni 1998; Amenta and Young 1999b; Tilly 1999; Earl 2000).

Because actors aside from challengers are influencing the state and other conditions may also influence outcomes of interest to the constituencies of challengers, collective benefits may result for reasons that have little to do with challengers. This is troublesome in that many theoretical claims apply both to the rise of challengers and what they are expected to influence. Alterations in political contexts are often claimed to influence the rise of challengers (McAdam et al. 1988; McAdam 1996) as well as what they attempt to effect. Similarly, shifts in public opinion may influence both the rise of social movements and what they may be explaining (Burstein 1999). Research indicates, for instance, that various economic and political conditions and actors aside from challengers, as well as public opinion, influence social spending policy (reviews in Amenta et al. 2001; Amenta 2003). These other determinants

have to be taken into account in assessing the impact of challengers on achieving collective benefits.

The ways that establishing impact has been handled in the literature on social movements have not been completely satisfactory. Gamson (1990) counted a challenger as having achieved new advantages merely if its agenda was mainly fulfilled within 15 years of the challenge's demise. Calling a realized agenda a success or claiming that other pro-social movement collective benefits demonstrate the impact of a challenger without demonstrating that the challenger made them happen, however, risks overstating the influence of a challenger. A premature declaration of success or impact disregards the potential that other conditions have influenced both social protest and the collective benefits – or that some combination of outside actors and social movement influenced the effect. Other researchers do worse by merely assuming that anything that happens somewhere close in time to a collective action campaign was a result of it (see review in Burstein 1993).

The tendency of researchers in this area to attribute results to collective action without demonstrating them is probably due to the fact that researchers are engaged in case studies (see Ragin and Becker 1992). Case studies in turn are typically beset by the so-called identification problem – too many potential causes chasing too few pieces of information (Lieberson 1992). For that reason researchers of movement impacts need to employ techniques current in social science to extend case studies in order to make their claims more plausible. Most of these techniques employ historical or other comparisons to increase the leverage of studies (Giugni 1998; Amenta and Young 1999b; Earl 2000). Researchers with information on a smaller number of cases or with questions that cannot be easily addressed by large-scale research can always employ time-honored ways of making the most of these empirical materials (Amenta 1991). Like any research involving causal statements, research on the impacts of challenges should be designed to appraise specific claims, either those devised by a researcher or those extant in the literature. To do that requires maximizing variation in the conditions deemed to be most influential (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Alternatively, scholars can attempt to explain positive cases, by appraising alternative paths or combinations of causes that might lead to them (Ragin 2000). Theoretical arguments on the impact of challengers have lagged behind theoretical arguments concerning their mobilization, making precise methodological prescriptions is difficult.

The most systematic way to ascertain the potential impact of challengers and to appraise alternative arguments is by way of gaining information from a large number of ecological units (Snyder and Kelly 1979). This is possible because challengers typically attempt to have an influence in more than one place at a time; movements have been increasingly national and international in their scope. This approach relies on gaining information on variation in a movement organization's presence and activities, other potential determinants of collective benefits, and the benefits themselves. If information on each of these is available, all important potential causal conditions can be taken into account in attempting to explain variations in outcomes. This has been the approach of many researchers, who sometimes employ cross-national and over-time analyses, especially regarding strike activity (Hicks and Misra 1993) or examine one movement across a series of polities (Dalton 1995). But scholars mainly rely on examining campaigns of one challenger across subnational units, such as states (Amenta et al. 1992; Amenta et al. 1994;

McCammon et al. 2001), provinces (Banaszak 1996), counties (Amenta et al. 1999; Andrews 2001), or over-time analyses of one country alone (Soule et al. 1999). Employing inferential statistical methods on these units makes it possible to assess the impact of a challenger relative to those of other relevant conditions and to appraise specific arguments about forms of challenge and outcome. For causal claims that are interactive or combinational, such as those described above, interactive specifications should be employed or like means.

To appraise propositions, any number of other small-N comparisons might be made. Interactions can be readily modeled by way of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). This technique has the advantage of being usable in the absence of large numbers of cases and can address combinational and multiple causation (Ragin 1987; Amenta and Poulsen 1994). This has been used to good effect in reanalyses of Gamson's data (Ragin 1989). It has also been employed in other studies of state-oriented consequences of social movements across US states (Amenta et al. 1992; Amenta and Poulsen 1996) and cities (Cress and Snow 2000). In each case, combinations of determinants were found to lead to new gains for challengers. This form of analysis can also incorporate a time dimension, by employing time-sensitive measures (see also Caren and Panofsky 2002). Needless to say, scholars have also employed small-N cross-national comparisons (Kitschelt 1986; della Porta 1996) to appraise or develop arguments, with these small-N comparisons sometimes buttressed by quantitative analyses (Banaszak 1996). Some other likely sorts of comparisons are made between challengers mobilized in different ways in a given place and time (Clemens 1997), and between places in which challengers are and are not mobilized, or are mobilized in different ways (Amenta et al. 1999). Making a choice among these sorts of comparisons depend on the propositions being appraised.

In historical inquiries of the impact of one challenger or a few challengers, researchers have options that go beyond assuming that challengers always have impacts. Standard techniques include juxtaposing the trajectory of the challenger's mobilization and different forms of collective action to outcomes of interest and, like Gamson, examining the views of participants, contemporary observers, and historians. A lack of a correlation between action and outcome probably would indicate a lack of impact. So, too, might a historical consensus that a challenger was ineffective. However, a positive correlation would not necessarily mean causation, and witnesses can be divided or biased in opinion. Analysts can go further than these preliminary historical analyses. Most arguments about the impact of collective action specify theoretical mechanisms, indicating linkages between various causes and effects. Scholars can take advantage of this by tracing historical processes to address whether hypothesized theoretical mechanisms occur and thus appraise specific lines of argument (Bennett and George 1997; Tilly 1999; Andrews 2001). Although these analyses may not make it possible to discount alternative explanations, they can be buttressed by making comparisons of processes across movements (McAdam et al. 2001) or collective action campaigns (Marwell and Oliver 1988; Amenta 2002).

Analyses of the political process in the development of legislation can be useful, particularly in ascertaining whether a challenger had an impact or not. To make a convincing claim, any historical analysis would need to demonstrate that the challenger achieved one or more of the following: changed the plans and agendas of political leaders; had an impact on the content of the proposals as devised by

executives, legislators, or administrators; or influenced disinterested representatives key to the passage of proposed legislation (Amenta et al. 1999; see also Burstein et al. 1995). Making such a case would require understanding political leaders' agendas and the content of legislative programs prior to the challenge as well as assessing how legislators might have voted in its absence. New legislation must also be implemented, and movements can influence the speed and nature of this process as well. This sort of technique is possible in settings where these processes are often quite separate, as in the US polity, but would require some modification for use in other polities.

Conclusion

Scholars have pursued issues surrounding the impact of social movements, especially state-related impacts. As we have seen, however, understanding the state-related consequences of social movements poses several difficult conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems. The problems stem mainly from the fact that to have an impact on states, challengers depend on many actors inside and outside states and are further removed from these processes than most outcomes of concern to movements. For that reason scholars need to think specifically about the state-related consequences of social movements. This means conceptualizing these impacts beyond the standard ideas of new advantages and acceptance. It also means theorizing in ways that take into account other key actors and institutions. From there scholars need to devise methodological strategies to ascertain the impact of challengers and appraise often complex arguments about their influence.

Despite the fact that much social movement activity is aimed at states, conceptualizations of the potential consequences of this collective action have not relied enough on conceptual developments in political sociology scholarship on states. Instead, social movement scholars have focused on broad notions of new advantages and the acceptance of social movement organizations, as might be applied to any target of a challenge. Progress has been made, however, in connecting the standard concepts of new advantages and acceptance to conventionally understood aspects of states. Thinking about state related new advantages as collective benefits in particular makes it possible to connect possible consequences of challengers with transformations in state structures and policies. Similarly, because states only rarely negotiate with challengers, it is useful thinking about the different ways that connections can be forged between challengers and the state, including challenger representation in state institutions.

Making sense of potential impacts of challengers on states is necessary for constructing theoretical arguments as they constitute what is to be explained. As we have seen, theoretical arguments regarding the consequences of social movements tend to assume a certain level of resource mobilization. Some arguments focus on the strategies of social movement organizations, as well as their form and goals. Key among these strategies are claims-making and framing. Other scholars have argued that mobilized challengers have impacts based on systemic, structural, or changing political opportunities or contexts. Yet others have attempted to combine issues of strategy, organization form, and political context by examining the politically mediated effects of movements. These theoretical arguments attempt to take

into account actors other than social movement organizations that are often found to be influential in the literature on the determinants of public policy and other alterations in the relations between states and societies.

Because of the many potential causal factors connected to state-related outcomes, the complexity of theoretical arguments concerning the influence of challengers on them, and information limitations that often lead to small-N studies, methodological difficulties have constrained research in this growing area of study. Yet there are a number of ways out, and these are being employed by scholars. Standard means for sorting out competing arguments include employing cross-national or subnational units for quantitative analyses. Scholars with medium-N research designs can employ Boolean techniques, which also allow for the appraisal of multiple and combinational causation and can be altered to take time into account. Small-N studies can analyze in detail one movement across polities or similar challengers within a given polity to appraise arguments. A variety of over-time and historical techniques can be employed to appraise the mechanisms of theoretical arguments, addressing whether linkages occur and in hypothesized order. It may be true that there has been a relative lack of progress in this area, despite all the recent attention to it (Giugni 1998), and perhaps this is due to the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological obstacles facing scholarship on the state-related consequences of challengers. Yet recent conceptual, theoretical, and methodological developments provide great promise, and there seem to be few major hurdles standing in the way of accumulating knowledge in this growing area of study.

Notes

1 It seems less likely that struggles over other aspects of electoral processes would increase the leverage of groups in this way. For instance, challengers seeking to gain direct democratic devices, such as the initiative, referendum, and recall, would not automatically provide groups a greater likelihood of achieving collective benefits through the state. Whatever gains that might be made along these lines would likely be situational. In the US case, these reforms were designed to break the power of the major political parties over political processes and their control over the development of state bureaucracies and policies. American parties were hierarchically organized and more oriented toward patronage and economic advantages than to issues, which were kept off political agendas (Mayhew 1986). The results of these mobilizations were uneven, with some western states and scattered municipalities gaining reforms (Shefter 1977; Finegold 1995; Clemens 1997). The advantages of such mobilizations for groups would seem to come only where patronage-oriented parties had a stranglehold over politics; mobilizations over electoral processes otherwise would not seem likely to provide political leverage for politically uninfluential groups.

2 This can be contrasted with sensitizing the "systemic agenda" (Kriesi et al. 1995), which is bringing an issue to the public's attention, or raising its "salience" (Burstein 1998, 1999).

3 Some scholars have proposed other "opportunity structures," such as the cultural ones (Banaszak 1996) and economic and gender-based opportunities (McCammon et al. 2001), that are also held to promote the productivity of collective action by challengers.

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