
COMP.SEC.300-2024-2025-1 Secure Programming

Nea Parjanen

Spur + ABUSEIPDB IP Address Check Mozilla Extension

Checks simultaneously if the IP Address is a VPN and which country it is from using two IP checker websites



What is this used for?

In cyber security related work

Why it should be secure?

- API key management
- Extensions used in attacks
- Every code needs to be secure



Report IP

Bulk Reporter

AbuseIPDB » 82.149.81.31

Check an IP Address, Domain Name, or Subnet e.g. 85.156.59.100, microsoft.com, or 5.188.10.0/24

82.149.81.31 was not found in our database

ISP

Packethub S.A.

Usage Type

Data Center/Web Hosting/Transit

ASN

Unknown

Domain Name

packethub.net

Country



City

Milan, Lombardy

IP info including ISP, Usage Type, and Location provided by IPInfo. Updated biweekly.

REPORT 82.149.81.31

WHOIS 82.149.81.31

82.149.81.31 - Nord VPN

82.149.81.31 belongs to the Nord VPN anonymization network. Nord VPN users route traffic through 82.149.81.31 to obscure their traffic from ISPs and mask their identity from servers on the internet.

♣ Unlock The Full Data >>>

Few Devices Online


This IP address (82.149.81.31) is not being used by many devices. The low device count for 82.149.81.31 indicates that it may be privately allocated to specific customers. Datacenter IPs like 82.149.81.31 can be used in fake user or bot activity which is not accounted for in this metric. IP Addresses that have fewer unique users are generally less effective at anonymizing activity online.


DATACENTER

This IP is owned by PacketHub S.A. and is hosted in Monte Carlo, MC. This IP belongs to DATACENTER infrastructure. Datacenter IPs like 82.149.81.31 typically route user traffic when they are acting as a VPN, Proxy, Cloud Gateway or are performing some automated activity.

IP Abuse Reports for **82.149.81.31**:

This IP address has not been reported. File Report





My API key Before securing it

Hardcoded API key

After securing it

- Encrypted API key in local storage with **AES-GCM** encryption
 - PBKDF2 key with PIN, random salt and IV
- DecryptedAPIkey is inmemory only.

My sanitations and validations

Before securing it

- Attacker could input malicious code to input fields
- The AbuseIPDB API could send harmful information

After securing it

- When setting up API key the format is validated for API key and the PIN code.
- Trust but verify: All fetched information via API is escaped.

Mozilla extension security measures Before securing it After securing it

- Attacker could run scripts from dev tools
- The extension could be permissioned to do something harmful

- content_security_policy
 blocks sources that are not
 relevant and scripts.
- Only relevant permissions are given to extension which are used

Code stuff



Used to register the extension

content security policy




permissions



Opens stored IP in spur.us and opens the AbuseIPDB window

On right click opens shortcut menu

The main algorithm




IP validation ipv4/ipv6

Decrypting API key API key: AES-GCM PIN: PBKDF2

Encrypting API key API key: AES-GCM PIN: PBKDF2 browser.storage.local

Makes random salt + IV Encrypts the API key



Shows the UI for API setup

options.html


Calls background.js functions to validate Highlighted IP Escapes all API information

AbuseIPDB info fetcher



Asks for PIN SPUR + ABUSEIPDB IP ADDRESS CHECK MOZILLA

Shows the UI for AbuseIPDB window





API fetch HTML escaping

```
// Escapes dangerous HTML characters that could go through API
     function escapeHtml(text) {
         return text.replace(/[&<>"']/g, match => { // Replace if any of these characters are present
             const escapeMap = {
                 "&": "&",
                "<": "&lt;",
                ">": ">",
10
                "\"": """,
11
                "'": "'"
12
13
14
15
             return escapeMap[match] | match;
16
17
         });
18
```

```
try {
              // Creates random salt 16 bytes -> Harder to guess the PIN
              const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));
47
49
              // Creates a random IV with 12 bytes -> Encryption is unique with the same key
              const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
50
51
              // String to binary: e.g 1234 -> list of bytes
52
              const enc = new TextEncoder();
53
54
55
              // Takes the user entered PIN and makes it a crypto key
              const baseKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
                  "raw",
                               // raw binary of the PIN
57
                  enc.encode(pin), // PIN string -> PIN binary
                  { name: "PBKDF2" }, // We use PBKDF2 from the library
                                      // Do not allow exporting
                  false,
                  ["deriveKey"] // Can generate another key with this key
              // Create a secure AES-GCM key using the PIN which uses PBKDF2
              const aesKey = await crypto.subtle.deriveKey(
                      name: "PBKDF2",
                                           // Using PBKDF2
                                     // Adding salt prevents rainbow table attacks
                      salt: salt.
                      iterations: 100000, // Defends from brute-force, doing the thing many times
                      hash: "SHA-256"
                                           // Using secure hash function
70
                  },
                                                   // Key made using the PIN
                  baseKey,
                  { name: "AES-GCM", length: 256 }, // Makes AES key
                                                 // key can't be extracted
74
                  false.
                  ["encrypt", "decrypt"]
                                                 // key can be encrypted/decrypted
76
```



PBKDF2

Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2

= Turns PIN code to a strong key

AES-GCM

Advanced Encryption Standard Galois/Counter Mode

Widely used symmetric encryption algorithm (Encrypts data with confidentiality + integrity)



Extension permissions

```
"content_security_policy": "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; connect-src <a href="https://api.abuseipdb.com/">https://api.abuseipdb.com/</a>; img-src 'self';",
```

```
"permissions": [
 "contextMenus",
 "storage",
 "tabs",
 "notifications",
 "https://api.abuseipdb.com/",
 "https://spur.us/context/*"
```

My learnings: Literally everything

AbuseIPDB API integration

Making of Mozilla extension

Secure API key handling

 Security measures for Mozilla Extensions All implementation of other security stuff

• TESTING?

 Usage of ChatGPT in learning to program

Thank you!

Spur us + ABUSEIPDB check Mozilla Extension

