

Quantum Information Processing: from Theory to Practice

Lecture 7: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

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Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Cryptographically Secure Communication
- 3 Public vs private keys
- 4 BB84 QKD Protocol
- 5 Eavesdropper detection

Introduction

- **Cryptography** refers to the techniques necessary to protect data exchange and guarantee secure communication. Three different names are used interchangeable in the field: **cryptography**, **cryptology**, and **cryptanalysis**.
- **Cryptology** studies communication over insecure channels and related problems. **Cryptography** is the process of designing systems to protect and obscure transmitted information, while **cryptanalysis** deals with techniques for breaking these systems.
- **Coding theory** is often used to describe cryptography, but this can cause confusion. Actually, it
 - ▶ refers to the representation of input information symbols using output symbols called code symbols;
 - ▶ covers three fundamental applications¹, which are **source compression**, **data secrecy**, and **error correction**;
- Note that, in any real-world system, error correcting codes are used in conjunction with encryption, since the change of a single bit is enough to destroy the message completely in a well-designed cryptosystem.

¹In recent decades the term coding theory has been mainly associated with error-correcting codes

Cryptographically Secure Communication

Secure communication using cryptography happens, roughly, in three phases:

- ① **Authentication** refers to the process in which two parties validate the identity of each other to verify they are really the ones who want to communicate with and not somebody else
- ② **Key generation** is used by the parties to encode their messages
- ③ **Data encryption & decryption**, which consists in encoding the message and encrypt the data sent to the other party where it will be decrypted

Three Phases

Phase 1: Authentication



Alice



Bob


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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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The last one is quite important!

For communication, we use either a *public key* or a *pre-shared secret*. These can be used as an authentication device.

Three Phases

Phase 2: Key generation



Alice



Bob

- Alice and Bob need to acquire or make a cryptographyc “key”.
- The key is used for encrypting the message.
- Keys should be changed often to ensure that the data is encrypted in a secure manner.

Three Phases

Phase 3: Data encryption and decryption



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Three Phases


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
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
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Public Key Cryptography




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- Quantum computers can, in principle, break the encryption with relative ease!

Private Key Cryptography

Alternatively, Alice and Bob can communicate securely via the use of a **private key**.




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Bob

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
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
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


Private key
used to encrypt
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- For example, Bob encrypts his message and sends it to Alice

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
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
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- This is known as “One Time Pad” (Vernam Cipher)


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
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
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
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
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
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- Requires a **large** amount of key bits.
- Remaining question: **How do we distribute the private key?**

Protocol

- The BB84 is a QKD protocol where Alice and Bob communicate through a public **quantum** channel as well as their public classical channel.



- Alice generates two n -bit strings:

$$a = a_1 \ a_2 \ \dots \ a_n$$

$$b = b_1 \ b_2 \ \dots \ b_n$$

- Alice creates a quantum state according to these bit strings as described in the following.

Encoding

- From each two bits from a and b Alice generates one qubit.
- The whole state Alice creates is given by

$$|\psi\rangle = \bigotimes_{k=1}^n |\psi_{a_k b_k}\rangle \quad \begin{aligned} |\psi_{00}\rangle &= |0\rangle, & |\psi_{01}\rangle &= |+\rangle \\ |\psi_{10}\rangle &= |1\rangle, & |\psi_{11}\rangle &= |-\rangle \end{aligned}$$

- It can be seen that the bit coming from the bit string b determines the basis of the encoding:
 - If $b = 0$ she prepares the qubit in the Z basis (computational basis);
 - If $b = 1$ she prepares the qubit in the X basis (Hadamard basis).
 - Then a_k chooses which state from the basis she prepares.
- Note that the encoded states are not orthogonal

$$\langle\psi_{00}|\psi_{01}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}},$$

which means that the states are not perfectly distinguishable.

Encoding

What does it mean to be distinguishable?

- Consider the two **orthogonal states**

$$|\psi_{00}\rangle = |0\rangle \quad |\psi_{10}\rangle = |1\rangle$$

and measure them in the Z basis.

- In this case they are orthogonal and we can perfectly distinguish them:
 - The measure of $|\psi_{00}\rangle = |0\rangle$ always gives +1
 - The measure of $|\psi_{10}\rangle = |1\rangle$ always gives -1
- The two states can always be distinguished!**
- Also true for $|\psi_{01}\rangle = |+\rangle$ and $|\psi_{11}\rangle = |-\rangle$ when measured in the X basis.

What does it mean to be distinguishable?

- Consider now the two non-orthogonal states

$$|\psi_{00}\rangle = |0\rangle \quad |\psi_{01}\rangle = |+\rangle$$

and measure them in the Z basis.

- In this case we have that the measure of
 - $|\psi_{00}\rangle = |0\rangle$ always gives +1, which is fine
 - $|\psi_{01}\rangle = |+\rangle$ gives +1 in 50% of the cases and -1 in the other 50%. If we get -1 we can say that we know the state is $|+\rangle$ but if we get +1, we are unsure whether the state is $|+\rangle$ or $|0\rangle$.
- In this sense, the states are not-distinguishable.
- Measuring in the X basis does not help.
- There is no measurement basis that perfectly distinguishes these states!

Encoding example

Consider an example when $n = 5$.


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Alice's operations

string <i>a</i>	0	1	1	0	1
string <i>b</i>	1	1	0	0	1
basis	<i>X</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>X</i>
encoded qubits	$ +\rangle$	$ -\rangle$	$ 1\rangle$	$ 0\rangle$	$ -\rangle$


Bob's measurements

Alice sends the encoded qubits to Bob over the quantum public channel.



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
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
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
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
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


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- Bob generates his own random bit string:

$$b' = b'_1 b'_2 \dots b'_n$$

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
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- He measures the received qubits according to b'

Bob's measurements

Bob measures the qubits to produce bit string a' .



If $b'_k = 0$, Bob measures in the Z basis.

If $b'_k = 1$, Bob measures in the X basis.

This allows Bob to generate his own random bit string a'


According to the k th measurement:

If k th outcome is $+1$, then $a'_k = 0$.

If k th outcome is -1 , then $a'_k = 1$.

New key

Alice and Bob announce the strings b and b' over a public channel.



When $b_k = b'_k$, keep the bits a_k, a'_k .

When $b_k \neq b'_k$, discard the bits a_k, a'_k .

This produces new shorter keys \bar{a}, \bar{a}' such that

$$\bar{a} = \bar{a}'$$

Now they are sharing a key they can use in the next step, which is encryption of the data!

Encoding example

Consider the case when $n = 5$

string a	1	0	0	1	1
string b	1	0	1	1	0
basis	X	Z	X	X	Z
encoded qubits	$ -\rangle$	$ 0\rangle$	$ +\rangle$	$ -\rangle$	$ 1\rangle$
string b'	1	1	1	0	0
Bob's basis	X	X	X	Z	Z
string a'	1	0/1	0	0/1	1

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Summary

- ➊ Alice generates random n -bits strings a, b .
- ➋ Alice encodes each bit a_k in the Z basis if $b_k = 0$, and in the X basis if $b_k = 1$.
- ➌ Alice sends the quantum state to Bob.
- ➍ Bob measures each qubit in Z or X basis at random.
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- ➏ Results of measurements where Alice's and Bob's bases agree are used as a secret key.

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
This protocol works under ideal conditions.

What happens when Eve tries to eavesdrop?

Introducing the eavesdropper

Eve wants to discover the secret key.


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
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
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
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
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No-cloning theorem does not allow Eve to replicate Alice's quantum states.

Eavesdropper detection

Eve **has to measure** the quantum states.

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Alice's basis	X	Z	X	X
Eve's basis	X	X	Z	X
Disturbance	No	Yes	Yes	No

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
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Alice's basis	X	Z	X	X
Eve's basis	X	X	Z	X
Disturbance	No	Yes	Yes	No

When Eve guesses wrong, the basis is changed!


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
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
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
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Eavesdropper detection

Can Alice and Bob detect the existence of Eve?



In one qubit system, the probability that the eavesdropper is detected is $1/4$ in ideal case.

- Eve chooses different basis from Alice's bases ... $1/2$
- Bob chooses the same basis as Alice's bases ... $1/2$
 - In both the two cases, Alice and Bob can detect the existence of Eve with probability $1/4$

Eavesdropper detection

In an n qubit system, the probability that Alice and Bob can successfully detect Eve is

$$P(n) = 1 - \left(\frac{3}{4}\right)^n$$

When $n = 25$ the probability goes to 0.999.

