

# Demystifying and Mitigating Cross-Layer Deficiencies of Soft Error Protection in Instruction Duplication

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









#### Soft Errors




#### Software Solutions

Software solution is more flexible and cost-effective.



## Error Detection by Duplicating Instructions (EDDI)


- **EDDI** duplicates instruction at *compile time* and detects errors at *run time*.
- Compiler-level transformation, hence program-agnostic.



EDDI-protected code

#### Fault Model


- Single-bit flip, which is accurate enough to evaluate SDC
- Errors in computation units/data path
- One fault per program execution
- Memory errors can be protected by ECC, so do not consider




## Fault Injection Methodology

IR: Instructions that contains return value


```
%3 = icmp slt i32 %1, %2
%4 = load i32* %1, align 4
%5 = mul i64 1, %4
...
```



Assembly: Instructions whose computation destination is a register



#### Motivation: Code transformation from IR to Assembly




**Transformation** 

IR-level EDDI may not provide full protection on Assembly-level!


### Motivation: Code transformation from IR to Assembly

Compare of: SDC coverage evaluation at <u>IR</u> and <u>Assembly</u> level




## Motivation: Code transformation from IR to Assembly

Compare of: SDC coverage evaluation at <u>IR</u> and <u>Assembly</u> level




- Application specific SDC coverages
- SDC coverage gap in IR and Assembly protection
  - Assembly level
  - IR level


LLVM SDC coverage often **over- estimates** Assembly level benefits.





#### **Transformation**




### Why penetrated: 1. Store Penetration









### Why penetrated: 2. Branch Penetration




## Why penetrated: 3. Comparison Penetration




## Why penetrated: 4. Call Penetration



## Why penetrated: **5. Mapping Penetration**






## Flowery 🌸

□Goal: Boost assembly level protection via IR level


□Obsevations:

□IR level offers simple instruction **tracking and modification**□IR level can alter assembly-level **register allocation** 



## Flowery


#### □ Eager Mode of Store




Original FDDI

Eager Mode Checker Position


- □Key insight: Reallocate the store instruction.
- Result: Move the temporary value to a register without extra computations.





## Flowery

#### □Anti-Comparison Duplication Optimization



#### **Evaluation**


#### **□SDC** coverage

Optimized assembly level


Assembly level

IR level


X-axis: protection level Y-axis: SDC coverage








(d) Basicmath



(b) Pathfinder



(c) Patricia

#### **EDDI Protection efficiency is significantly enhanced**

#### Conclusion

- □ We observe **EDDI protection deficiencies** across IR and Assembly levels.
- ☐ There are **5 penetration cases** responsible for such deficiencies.
- □ We propose **Flowery**, which is a set of IR-level modifications.
- □ Flowery can mitigate such deficiencies with no obvious overhead.
- □ Open source: <a href="https://github.com/hyfshishen/SC23-FLOWERY">https://github.com/hyfshishen/SC23-FLOWERY</a>







