# **ASSIGNMENT NO: A6**

#### 1. TITLE:

A Write a program in python/ Java/ Scala/ C++/ HTML5 to implement password data encryption. Use encryption method overloading (any to methods studied)

### 2. PREREQUISITES:

- Latest version of 64 Bit Operating Systems Open Source Fedora-19.
- Python 2.7

### 3. OBJECTIVE:

- To implement password data encryption.
- To study and Use encryption method overloading.

### 4. Mathematical Model:

Let S be the solution perspective of the class Weather Report such that

S={s, e, i, o, f, DD, NDD, success, failure}

s=Start of program

e =the end of program

i=Plaintext data password

o= Encrypted data password

f= Found/Not Found

DD=Deterministic data

NDD=NULL

Success- plaintext encrypted

Failure- plaintext not encrypted

Computational Model

### 5. Theory:

**"Encryption"** is the conversion of electronic data into another form, called cipher text, which cannot be easily understood by anyone except authorized parties.

The primary purpose of encryption is to protect the confidentiality of digital data stored on computer systems or transmitted via the Internet or other computer networks. Modern encryption algorithms play a vital role in the security assurance of IT systems and communications as they can provide not only confidentiality, but also the following key elements of security:

- o Authentication: the origin of a message can be verified.
- o Integrity: proof that the contents of a message have not been changed since it was sent.
- o Non-repudiation: the sender of a message cannot deny sending the message.
- While security is an afterthought for many PC users, it's a major priority for businesses of any size. It has to be when the Phenomenon Institute tells us that security breaches are costing companies millions every year.
- Even if you don't have millions to lose, protecting what you do have should be a high priority.

- There are several forms of security technology available, but encryption is one that everyday computer users should know about.
- How Encryption Works
- Encryption is an interesting piece of technology that works by scrambling data so it is unreadable by unintended parties. Let's take a look at how it works with the emailfriendly software PGP (or GPG for you open source people).

## **Password Hashing**

 $\label{eq:hash} $$ hash("hello") = 2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824 \\ hash("hbllo") = 58756879c05c68dfac9866712fad6a93f8146f337a69afe7dd238f3364946366 \\ hash("waltz") = c0e81794384491161f1777c232bc6bd9ec38f616560b120fda8e90f383853542 \\ hash("waltz") = c0e81794384491161f177660b120fda8e90f3860b120fda8e90f660b120ff6060b120ff6060b120ff6060b120ff6060b12$ 

Hash algorithms are one way functions. They turn any amount of data into a fixed-length "fingerprint" that cannot be reversed. They also have the property that if the input changes by even a tiny bit, the resulting hash is completely different (see the example above). This is great for protecting passwords, because we want to store passwords in a form that protects them even if the password file itself is compromised, but at the same time, we need to be able to verify that a user's password is correct.

The general workflow for account registration and authentication in a hash-based account system is as follows:

- 1. The user creates an account.
- 2. Their password is hashed and stored in the database. At no point is the plain-text (unencrypted) password ever written to the hard drive.
- 3. When the user attempts to login, the hash of the password they entered is checked against the hash of their real password (retrieved from the database).
- 4. If the hashes match, the user is granted access. If not, the user is told they entered invalid login credentials.
- 5. Steps 3 and 4 repeat everytime someone tries to login to their account.

In step 4, never tell the user if it was the username or password they got wrong. Always display a generic message like "Invalid username or password." This prevents attackers from enumerating valid usernames without knowing their passwords.

It should be noted that the hash functions used to protect passwords are not the same as the hash functions you may have seen in a data structures course. The hash functions used to implement data structures such as hash tables are designed to be fast, not secure.

Only **cryptographic hash functions** may be used to implement password hashing. Hash functions like SHA256, SHA512, RipeMD, and WHIRLPOOL are cryptographic hash functions.

It is easy to think that all you have to do is run the password through a cryptographic hash function and your users' passwords will be secure. This is far from the truth. There are many ways to recover passwords from plain hashes very quickly. There are several easy-to-implement techniques that make these "attacks" much less effective. To motivate the need for these techniques, consider this very website. On the front page, you can submit a list of hashes to be cracked, and receive results in less than a second. Clearly, simply hashing the password does not meet our needs for security.

### **Adding Salt**

Lookup tables and rainbow tables are ways to break hashes, only work because each password is hashed the exact same way. If two users have the same password, they'll have the

same password hashes. We can prevent these attacks by randomizing each hash, so that when the same password is hashed twice, the hashes are not the same.

We can randomize the hashes by appending or prepending a random string, called a salt, to the password before hashing. As shown in the example above, this makes the same password hash into a completely different string every time. To check if a password is correct, we need the salt, so it is usually stored in the user account database along with the hash, or as part of the hash string itself.

The salt does not need to be secret. Just by randomizing the hashes, lookup tables, reverse lookup tables, and rainbow tables become ineffective. An attacker won't know in advance what the salt will be, so they can't pre-compute a lookup table or rainbow table. If each user's password is hashed with a different salt, the reverse lookup table attack won't work either.

### To Store a Password

- 1.Generate a long random salt using a CSPRNG.
- 2.generate hash using standard cryptographic hash function such as SHA256
- 3.key stretching using PBKDF2 inpust name = standard cryptographic hash function such as SHA256, password = hash generated, salt = salt, round = 10000 aleast, dklen = 64 atleast length of derived key
  - 4. Save both the salt and the hash in the user's database record.

#### To Validate a Password

- 1. Retrieve the user's salt and hash from the database.
- 2. Prepend the salt to the given password and hash it using the same hash function.
- 3.Compare the hash of the given password with the hash from the database. If they match, the password is correct. Otherwise, the password is incorrect.

### **Making Password Cracking Harder: Slow Hash Functions**

Salt ensures that attackers can't use specialized attacks like lookup tables and rainbow tables to crack large collections of hashes quickly, but it doesn't prevent them from running dictionary or brute-force attacks on each hash individually. High-end graphics cards (GPUs) and custom hardware can compute billions of hashes per second, so these attacks are still very effective. To make these attacks less effective, we can use a technique known as **key stretching**.

The idea is to make the hash function very slow, so that even with a fast GPU or custom hardware, dictionary and brute-force attacks are too slow to be worthwhile. The goal is to make the hash function slow enough to impede attacks, but still fast enough to not cause a noticeable delay for the user.

Key stretching is implemented using a special type of CPU-intensive hash function. Don't try to invent your own—simply iteratively hashing the hash of the password isn't enough as it can be parallelized in hardware and executed as fast as a normal hash. Use a standard algorithm like PBKDF2 orbcrypt.

These algorithms take a security factor or iteration count as an argument. This value determines how slow the hash function will be. For desktop software or smartphone apps, the best way to choose this parameter is to run a short benchmark on the device to find the value

that makes the hash take about half a second. This way, your program can be as secure as possible without affecting the user experience.

If you use a key stretching hash in a web application, be aware that you will need extra computational resources to process large volumes of authentication requests, and that key stretching may make it easier to run a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on your website. I still recommend using key stretching, but with a lower iteration count. You should calculate the iteration count based on your computational resources and the expected maximum authentication request rate. The denial of service threat can be eliminated by making the user solve a CAPTCHA every time they log in. Always design your system so that the iteration count can be increased or decreased in the future.

If you are worried about the computational burden, but still want to use key stretching in a web application, consider running the key stretching algorithm in the user's browser with JavaScript. The Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library includes PBKDF2. The iteration count should be set low enough that the system is usable with slower clients like mobile devices, and the system should fall back to server-side computation if the user's browser doesn't support JavaScript. Client-side key stretching does not remove the need for server-side hashing. You must hash the hash generated by the client the same way you would hash a normal password.

#### **RSA**

RSA is a public-key encryption algorithm and the standard for encrypting data sent over the internet. It also happens to be one of the methods used in our PGP and GPG programs. Unlike Triple DES, RSA is considered an asymmetric algorithm due to its use of a pair of keys. You've got your public key, which is what we use to encrypt our message, and a private key to decrypt it. The result of RSA encryption is a huge batch of mumbo jumbo that takes attackers quite a bit of time and processing power to break.

### **Algorithm**

The RSA algorithm involves four steps: key generation, key distribution, encryption and decryption.

RSA involves a *public key* and a *private key*. The public key can be known by everyone and is used for encrypting messages. The intention is that messages encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted in a reasonable amount of time using the private key.

The basic principle behind RSA is the observation that it is practical to find three very large positive integers e,d and n such that with modular exponentiation for all m:

$$(m^e)^d \equiv m \pmod{n}$$

and that even knowing e and n or even m it can be extremely difficult to find d.

Additionally, for some operations it is convenient that the order of the two exponentiations can be changed and that this relation also implies:

$$(m^d)^e \equiv m \pmod{n}$$

### **Key distribution**[edit]

To enable Bob to send his encrypted messages, Alice transmits her public key (n, e) to Bob via a reliable, but not necessarily secret route. The private key is never distributed.

## **Encryption**[edit]

Suppose that Bob would like to send message *M* to Alice.

He first turns M into an integer m, such that  $0 \le m < n$  and gcd(m, n) = 1 by using an agreed-upon reversible protocol known as a padding scheme. He then computes the ciphertext c, using Alice's public key e, corresponding to

$$c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$$

This can be done efficiently, even for 500-bit numbers, using modular exponentiation. Bob then transmits c to Alice.

## **Decryption**[edit]

Alice can recover m from c by using her private key exponent d by computing

$$c^d \equiv (m^e)^d \equiv m \pmod{n}$$

Given m, she can recover the original message M by reversing the padding scheme.

# **Key generation**[edit]

The keys for the RSA algorithm are generated the following way:

- 1. Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q.
  - For security purposes, the integers *p* and *q* should be chosen at random, and should be similar in magnitude but 'differ in length by a few digits'<sup>[2]</sup> to make factoring harder. Prime integers can be efficiently found using a primality test.
- 2. Compute n = pq.
  - *n* is used as the modulus for both the public and private keys. Its length, usually expressed in bits, is the key length.
- 3. Compute  $\varphi(n) = \varphi(p)\varphi(q) = (p-1)(q-1) = n (p+q-1)$ , where  $\varphi$  is Euler's totient function. This value is kept private.
- 4. Choose an integer e such that  $1 < e < \varphi(n)$  and  $gcd(e, \varphi(n)) = 1$ ; i.e., e and  $\varphi(n)$  are coprime.
- 5. Determine d as  $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$ ; i.e., d is the modular multiplicative inverse of e (modulo  $\varphi(n)$ )
- This is more clearly stated as: solve for d given  $d \cdot e \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$
- e having a short bit-length and small Hamming weight results in more efficient encryption most commonly  $2^{16} + 1 = 65,537$ . However, much smaller values of e (such as 3) have been shown to be less secure in some settings.<sup>[13]</sup>
- *e* is released as the public key exponent.
- *d* is kept as the private key exponent.

The *public key* consists of the modulus n and the public (or encryption) exponent e. The *private key* consists of the modulus n and the private (or decryption) exponent d, which must be kept secret. p, q, and  $\varphi(n)$  must also be kept secret because they can be used to calculate d.

• An alternative, used by PKCS#1, is to choose d matching  $de \equiv 1 \pmod{\lambda}$  with  $\lambda = \text{lcm}(p-1, q-1)$ , where lcm is the least common multiple. Using  $\lambda$  instead of  $\varphi(n)$  allows more choices for d.  $\lambda$  can also be defined using the Carmichael function,  $\lambda(n)$ .

Since any common factors of (p-1) and (q-1) are present in the factorisation of pq-1,<sup>[14]</sup> it is recommended that (p-1) and (q-1) have only very small common factors, if any besides the necessary 2.<sup>[15][2][16]</sup>

Note: The authors of RSA carry out the key generation by choosing d and then computing e as the modular multiplicative inverse of d (modulo  $\varphi(n)$ ). Since it is beneficial to use a small value for e (i.e. 65,537) in order to speed up the encryption function, current implementations of RSA, such as PKCS#1 choose e and compute d instead.<sup>[2][17]</sup>

# Example[edit]

Here is an example of RSA encryption and decryption. The parameters used here are artificially small, but one can also use OpenSSL to generate and examine a real keypair.

1. Choose two distinct prime numbers, such as

$$p = 61_{\text{and}} q = 53$$

2. Compute n = pq giving

$$n = 61 \times 53 = 3233$$

3. Compute the totient of the product as  $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$  giving

$$\varphi(3233) = (61-1)(53-1) = 3120$$

4. Choose any number 1 < e < 3120 that is coprime to 3120. Choosing a prime number for e leaves us only to check that e is not a divisor of 3120.

Let 
$$e=17$$

5. Compute d, the modular multiplicative inverse of  $e \pmod{\varphi(n)}$  yielding,

$$d = 2753$$

Worked example for the modular multiplicative inverse:

$$d \times e \mod \varphi(n) = 1$$

$$2753 \times 17 \mod 3120 = 1$$

The **public key** is (n = 3233, e = 17). For a padded plaintext message m, the encryption function is

$$c(m) = m^{17} \mod 3233$$

The **private key** is (d = 2753). For an encrypted ciphertext c, the decryption function is

$$m(c) = c^{2753} \mod 3233$$

For instance, in order to encrypt m = 65, we calculate

$$c = 65^{17} \mod 3233 = 2790$$

To decrypt c = 2790, we calculate

$$m = 2790^{2753} \mod 3233 = 65$$

Both of these calculations can be computed efficiently using the square-and-multiply algorithm for modular exponentiation. In real-life situations the primes selected would be much larger; in our example it would be trivial to factor n, 3233 (obtained from the freely available public key) back to the primes p and q. Given e, also from the public key, we could then compute d and so acquire the private key.

Practical implementations use the Chinese remainder theorem to speed up the calculation using modulus of factors (mod pq using mod p and mod q).

The values  $d_p$ ,  $d_q$  and  $q_{inv}$ , which are part of the private key are computed as follows:

$$d_p = d \mod (p-1) = 2753 \mod (61-1) = 53$$
  
 $d_q = d \mod (q-1) = 2753 \mod (53-1) = 49$   
 $q_{\text{inv}} = q^{-1} \mod p = 53^{-1} \mod 61 = 38$   
 $\Rightarrow (q_{\text{inv}} \times q) \mod p = 38 \times 53 \mod 61 = 1$ 

Here is how  $d_p$ ,  $d_q$  and  $q_{inv}$  are used for efficient decryption. (Encryption is efficient by choice of a suitable d and e pair)

$$m_1 = c^{d_p} \mod p = 2790^{53} \mod 61 = 4$$
  
 $m_2 = c^{d_q} \mod q = 2790^{49} \mod 53 = 12$   
 $h = (q_{inv} \times (m_1 - m_2)) \mod p = (38 \times -8) \mod 61 = 1$   
 $m = m_2 + h \times q = 12 + 1 \times 53 = 65$ 

#### **Conclusion:**

Hence we have designed to design a program to implement password data encryption using encryption method overloading.

```
File: encryptPass.py
import hashlib
import sys
import os
import binascii
try:
  hash_name = sys.argv[1]
except IndexError:
  print('1st arg\n'+ str(hashlib.algorithms_guaranteed)+'\n2nd arg username','\n3rd arg
password')
else:
  try:
       username = sys.argv[2]
      passwd = sys.argv[3]
      password = bytes(passwd,'UTF-8')
  except IndexError:
       print('using default password: password')
      password = b'password'
  salt = os.urandom(32)
  chef_salt = binascii.hexlify(salt)
  filename = username+"_salt.key"
   salT_file = open(username+"_salt.key","w")
  print("Salt\n"+chef_salt.decode('utf-8'))
  salT_file.write(chef_salt.decode('utf-8'))
  salT_file.close()
  dk = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(hash_name, password, chef_salt, 100000,128)
  store_hash = binascii.hexlify(dk)
  filename = username+"_hash.hash"
  hash_file = open(username+"_hash.hash","w")
  print("hash\n"+store_hash.decode('utf-8'))
  hash_file.write(store_hash.decode('utf-8'))
  hash_file.close()
```

else:

print("Incorrect username or password")

```
File: verifyPass.py
import hashlib
import sys
import os
import binascii
try:
   hash_name = sys.argv[1]
except IndexError:
  print('Specify the hash name as the first argument.')
else:
   try:
       username = sys.argv[2]
       passwd = sys.argv[3]
      password = bytes(passwd,'UTF-8')
   except IndexError:
       print('using default password: password')
       password = b'password'
   #password = bytes(passwd,'UTF-8')
   salT_file = open(username+"_salt.key")
   chef_salt = salT_file.read()
   print("Salt\n"+chef_salt)
   dk = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(hash_name, password, bytes(chef_salt,'UTF-8'), 100000,128)
   hashk = binascii.hexlify(dk)
   new_hash = hashk.decode('utf-8')
   hash_file = open(username+"_hash.hash")
   old_hash = hash_file.read()
   print("hash\n"+old_hash)
   if new_hash == old_hash:
       print("The user "+username+" has used valid password")
```

```
envy@envy-vm:~/be-2$ python3 encryptPass.py
1st arg
{'sha1', 'md5', 'sha384', 'sha224', 'sha512', 'sha256'}
2nd arg username
3rd arg password
envy@envy-vm:~/be-2$ python3 encryptPass.py sha256 cybersecurity 110v3cy83453cu41ty
Salt
becf85585f32a32fa21e2c600ec1b90ee91e71407cd47c20fc661afa96d7837e
hash
9040251af5493315fdecb02661e44a321cebba914fa1e540d507e748f2f36525f918471baa12c9f48c62d8f7ba2
c13a94e76c3a7e06819f236104e91618058b330135466106e28ccdb67c95d494d87edbe252768d4e9885ff012dc
de01fab9ae0c04e1f14380eb3e0ac54e6dd8387e2bcc291b5560eff3b8b8074a8d3957f9df
envy@envy-vm:~/be-2$
envy@envy-vm:~/be-2$
envy@envy-vm:~/be-2$ python3 verifyPass.py sha256 cybersecurity 110v3cy83453cu41ty
Salt
becf85585f32a32fa21e2c600ec1b90ee91e71407cd47c20fc661afa96d7837e
hash
9040251af5493315fdecb02661e44a321cebba914fa1e540d507e748f2f36525f918471baa12c9f48c62d8f7ba2
{\tt c13a94e76c3a7e06819f236104e91618058b330135466106e28ccdb67c95d494d87edbe252768d4e9885ff012dc}
de01fab9ae0c04e1f14380eb3e0ac54e6dd8387e2bcc291b5560eff3b8b8074a8d3957f9df
The user cybersecurity has used valid password
envy@envy-vm:~/be-2$ python3 verifyPass.py sha256 cybersecurity 10v3cy83453cu41ty
Salt
becf85585f32a32fa21e2c600ec1b90ee91e71407cd47c20fc661afa96d7837e
hash
9040251af5493315fdecb02661e44a321cebba914fa1e540d507e748f2f36525f918471baa12c9f48c62d8f7ba2
c13a94e76c3a7e06819f236104e91618058b330135466106e28ccdb67c95d494d87edbe252768d4e9885ff012dc
de01fab9ae0c04e1f14380eb3e0ac54e6dd8387e2bcc291b5560eff3b8b8074a8d3957f9df
Incorrect username or password
envy@envy-vm:~/be-2$
```