


## Lab 03-1.malware


1. Did you find any interesting resources? If so, how did you extract it?

One of the resources in the resource section was a DLL. I extracted the nested DLL file using FileAlyzer2.



2. List at least 3 imports or sets of imports you haven't seen before, what their purpose is (from MSDN), and how the malware might use them.

- I. *ADVAPI32.dll (from DLL found in resources)* This provides advanced access to core Windows components like the registry. The malware can use this API to change, add, or delete registry values.



- II. *OLE32.dll* (from DLL found in resources) The OLE DLL is used for Object Linking and Embedding, which allows for objects created in one application to be embedded in other applications. The malware uses this library to initialize COM functionality, evident by the import of *CoInitialize* function.
  - III. *KERNEL32.dll* The portable executable imports functions like *CreateFileW* and *WriteFile* from the kernel DLL, indicating there may be some easy host-based signatures for this malware sample.
2. List at least 3 strings that stick out to you and describe how they might relate to malicious activity.
- I. <http://blog.rpis.ec/> This could be a callback or C&C server used by the malware
  - II. *regsvr32 /s C:\Windows\atidrv.dll* This command is used to register a new DLL in the Windows registry. This could be the malicious DLL that was nested in the resources section found in the PE.
  - III. *SetUnhandledExceptionFilter* This function has the ability to supersede the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process. This could allow malware to take control of a process if it is able to raise an error.
3. What persistence mechanism is used by this malware? What host-based signatures can you gather from this?

Upon running, this malware creates a DLL at *C:\Windows\atidrv.dll*. It then runs the command found at 3.2 to register the DLL (using the */s* flag to do so silently). The presence of this file is a strong host-based signature.

4. What is the CLSID served by this malware?

The CLSID is 3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A. This was a Unicode string found in the malware sample in numerous locations.

5. What is the name of the COM interface that this malware makes use of?

This malware uses the *IWebBrowser2* COM interface. This is evident in the argument to the *CoCreateInstance* function at 0x10001B77 in the DLL.

```

10001B73
10001B73      loc_10001B73:
10001B73  8D 55 D4      lea     edx, [ebp+ppv]
10001B76  52           push    edx           ; ppv
10001B77  68 80 41 00 10 push    offset IID_IWebBrowser2 ; riid
10001B7C  6A 04        push    4             ; dwClsContext
10001B7E  6A 00        push    0             ; pUnkOuter
10001B80  68 A0 41 00 10 push    offset rclsid  ; rclsid
10001B85  FF 15 10 41 00 10 call    ds:CoCreateInstance
10001B8B  89 45 D0      mov     [ebp+var_30], eax
10001B8E  83 7D D0 00   cmp     [ebp+var_30], 0
10001B92  75 63        jnz     short loc_10001BF7


```

```

.rdata:10004180 ; IID IID_IWebBrowser2
.rdata:10004180 IID_IWebBrowser2 dd 0D30C1661h ; Data1
.rdata:10004180 ; DATA XREF: sub_10001AD0+0
.rdata:10004180 ; sub_100020B0+31to
.rdata:10004180 dw 0CDAFh ; Data2
.rdata:10004180 dw 11D0h ; Data3
.rdata:10004180 db 8Ah, 3Eh, 0, 0C0h, 4Fh, 0C9h, 0E2h, 6Eh; Data4

```

In these screenshots, the IID is already renamed to IWebBrowser2. A simple google search for the IID as shown below reveals the interface being used.



6. What two COM functions does this malware call from the above COM interface and what are they used for? (hint: Check the PMA book)

The two COM functions this malware calls are put\_Visible and Navigate. This creates a visible Internet Explorer window, and navigates to a random URL listed higher up in the function.

```

10001BBB mov     ecx, [eax]
10001BBD mov     edx, [ebp+ppv]
10001BC0 push    edx
10001BC1 mov     eax, [ecx+IWebBrowser2Vtbl.put_Visible]
10001BC7 call    eax
10001BC9 push    0
10001BCB push    0
10001BCD push    0
10001BCF push    0
10001BD1 lea     ecx, [ebp+var_34]
10001BD4 call    sub_10001550
10001BD9 push    eax
10001BDA mov     ecx, [ebp+ppv]
10001BDD mov     edx, [ecx]
10001BDF mov     eax, [ebp+ppv]
10001BE2 push    eax
10001BE3 mov     ecx, [edx+IWebBrowser2Vtbl.Navigate]
10001BE6 call    ecx
10001BE8 mov     [ebp+var_4], 0FFFFFFFh
10001BEF lea     ecx, [ebp+var_34]

```


```

10001AF8 mov     [ebp+var_38], ecx
10001AFB mov     [ebp+var_28], offset aHttpRpis_ec ; "http://rpis.ec/"
10001B02 mov     [ebp+var_24], offset aHttpRpis_ecBin ; "http://rpis.ec/binexp"
10001B09 mov     [ebp+var_20], offset aHttpsTwitter_c ; "https://twitter.com/RPISEC"
10001B10 mov     [ebp+var_1C], offset aHttpsWww_faceb ; "https://www.facebook.com/RPI-Computer-S"...
10001B17 mov     [ebp+var_18], offset aHttpBlog_rpis_ ; "http://blog.rpis.ec/"
10001B1E mov     [ebp+var_14], offset aHttpSecurity_c ; "http://security.cs.rpi.edu/courses/bine"...

```

## Lab 03-2.malware

1. What is the md5sum? What of interest does VirusTotal report?



VirusTotal reports this file as a Trojan. Some of the names reported are *Troj.W32.Generic!c*, *Trojan.DarkHotel.1*, *Win32:Trojan-gen*.

2. List at least 3 imports or sets of imports you haven't seen before, what their purpose is (from MSDN), and how the malware might use them.
  - I. *PeekNamedPipe* This function allows the caller to view the data in a pipe without altering the pipe. This could allow malware to spy on other processes' network connections, open file streams, and user input/output.
  - II. *GetDriveType* This function allows a program to determine the types of logical drives connected to the computer (fixed, removable storage, network file share, etc.) Malware can use this function to determine what drives to act on, i.e. a worm trying to spread over a network file share.
  - III. *Sleep* The sleep function allows a thread to be suspended for a specified amount of time. Malware can use this function if it is waiting on the user to perform a certain action, and it does not want to bring attention to itself by using computing resources.
3. List at least 3 strings that stick out to you and describe how they might relate to malicious activity.
  - I. *SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run* This is the registry key that is used for autostarting programs at login. It can be used as a form of persistence for malware.

- II. *cmd.exe* The command prompt executable launches a shell which could be used remotely by an attacker.
- III. *%4d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d* This seems to be a timestamp format string from the C/C++ malware code, indicating that timestamps and/or logging could be an important feature of the malware.

#### 4. What persistence mechanism is used by this malware? What host-based signatures can you gather from this?

The malware adds itself to the *HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run* registry value, which contains a list of all the programs that launch when a user logs in. The malware's hash is the easiest and most indicative host-based signature. Any applications in this registry value that share a hash (program names can be easily changed) with the malware are malicious.

### Malware Functionality: Listing processes

#### 5. What is the address of the subroutine that handles this functionality?

*sub\_402310* (address 0x402310) is the subroutine that handles this functionality. It does so through using a while loop, and the *ProcessFirst* and *ProcessNext* functions.

```

; int __cdecl sub_402310(SOCKET s)
sub_402310 proc near

hSnapshot= dword ptr -234h
buf= byte ptr -230h
var_130= dword ptr -130h
var_12C= dword ptr -12Ch
pe= PROCSENTRY32 ptr -128h
s= dword ptr 4

sub     esp, 238h
push    ebx
push    0             ; th32ProcessID
push    2             ; dwFlags
mov     [esp+244h+pe.dwSize], 128h
call    CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
lea     ecx, [esp+23Ch+pe]
mov     [esp+23Ch+hSnapshot], eax
push    ecx           ; lppe
push    eax           ; hSnapshot
mov     [esp+244h+var_12C], 1
call    Process32First
mov     ebx, [esp+23Ch+s]
test    eax, eax
jz      loc_4023F8

```

```

mov     eax, [esp+248h+hSnapshot]
lea     edx, [esp+248h+pe]
push    edx           ; lppe
push    eax           ; hSnapshot
call    Process32Next
test    eax, eax
jnz     loc_402360

```

## 6. What is the command ID?

The command ID for this function is 0x7.

```

00401796
00401796      loc_401796:      ; case 0x7
00401796 A1 80 AA 40 00      mov     eax, 5
0040179B 50                push    eax                ; 5
0040179C E8 6F 0B 00 00      call   sub_402310          ; Call Procedure
004017A1 83 C4 04          add     esp, 4              ; Add
004017A4 E9 12 FF FF FF      jmp     loc_4016BB          ; default

```

## 7. Does the subroutine return anything to the attacker, if so, what?

The subroutine returns the process ID and name back to the server. The name is XOR'd with 0x55 (85 in base 10) as shown below, presumably to mitigation detection when inspecting web traffic.

```

00402360
00402360      loc_402360:      ; edi has process name
00402360 8D BC 24 44 01 00+lea    edi, [esp+248h+pe.szExeFile]
00402367 83 C9 FF          or      ecx, 0FFFFFFFh    ; Logical Inclusive OR
0040236A 33 C0            xor      eax, eax          ; Logical Exclusive OR
0040236C 8D 54 24 18      lea     edx, [esp+248h+buf] ; edx contains 248+buf var
00402370 F2 AE          repne scasb                ; Compare String
00402372 F7 D1          not      ecx                ; One's Complement Negation
00402374 2B F9          sub     edi, ecx            ; Integer Subtraction
00402376 8B C1          mov     eax, ecx
00402378 8B F7          mov     esi, edi            ; esi also contains process name
0040237A 8B FA          mov     edi, edx            ; edi now contains 248+buf variable
0040237C C1 E9 02          shr     ecx, 2              ; Shift Logical Right
0040237F F3 A5          rep movsd                ; process name copied from esi to edi (which is 248+buf var)
00402381 8B C8          mov     ecx, eax
00402383 83 E1 03          and     ecx, 3              ; Logical AND
00402386 F3 A4          rep movsb                ; Move Byte(s) from String to String
00402388 8B 8C 24 28 01 00+mov     ecx, [esp+248h+pe.th32ProcessID]
0040238F 89 8C 24 18 01 00+mov     [esp+248h+var_130], ecx

00402398
00402398      loc_402398:
00402398 8A 4C 04 18      mov     cl, [esp+eax+248h+buf]
0040239C 80 F1 55          xor     cl, 55h             ; Logical Exclusive OR
0040239F 8B 4C 04 18      mov     [esp+eax+248h+buf], cl
004023A3 40              inc     eax                ; Increment by 1
004023A4 3D 00 01 00 00      cmp     eax, 256            ; Compare Two Operands
004023A9 7C ED          jnl     short loc_402398    ; Jump if Less (SF!=OF)

```

## 8. Name 3 Windows API calls (besides send/recv) used and how they might contribute to the functionality.

This subroutine calls 3 Windows API functions besides *send/recv*. These are *CreateToolhelp32Snapshot*, *ProcessFirst*, and *ProcessNext*. The first function creates a

snapshot of all running processes on the system, and the *ProcessFirst* and *Next* functions iterate through the processes, fetching information to be sent back to the attacker.

## Malware Functionality: Interactive remote shell

### 5. What is the address of the subroutine that handles this functionality?

The functionality is split between two subroutines, 0x402490 and 0x4017D7.

### 6. What is the command ID?

The command IDs are 0x9 and 0xA (10).

### 7. Does the subroutine return anything to the attacker, if so, what?

The 0x9 subroutine spawns a new process (shell) and returns a Pipe handle for 0xA to use. 0xA receives a command, XOR's it with 0x55 to decrypt it, runs the command, and pipes the output back to the attacker (XOR'd again with 0x55).

### 8. Name 3 Windows API calls (besides send/recv) used and how they might contribute to the functionality.

- I. *CreatePipe* Creates a named pipe, and returns a handle to the read and write end. This is used in the future to input commands to the remote shell and to read the command's output.
- II. *PeekNamedPipe* Reads the content of a pipe without modifying its contents. This is used by the subroutine to read the output of a remote shell command.
- III. *WriteFile* This function is used by the subroutine to write to the pipe created in 0x402490.

## Malware Functionality: Upload file

### 5. What is the address of the subroutine that handles this functionality?

The address of the subroutine that handles the file uploading functionality is 0x402210.



**6. What is the command ID?**

The command ID is 0x6.

**7. Does the subroutine return anything to the attacker, if so, what?**

The subroutine returns a copy of the specified file to the attacker. Before sending the file back to the C&C server, the file's data is XOR'd with 0x55.

**8. Name 3 Windows API calls (besides send/recv) used and how they might contribute to the functionality.**

The functions *CreateFile*, *CreateFileMapping*, and *MapViewOfFile* are used to open a specified file with read permissions, and map the file into the process's memory for XOR-ing and exfiltration.

**9. Did the networking guys miss anything? Briefly name/describe 3 more functionalities offered by the malware. Provide the command IDs.**

- I. *Command ID 1* Returns a list of all logical drives and their type (fixed/removable/network storage/etc.).
- II. *Command ID 2* Returns information on every file in the system using a combination of the *FindFirstFile*, *FindNextFile*, and *SHGetFileInfoA* functions.
- III. *Command ID 4* Deletes a specified file.

The status and/or output of the above commands are all returned to the attacker using the *send* socket function.