

KARL
MARX
FREDERICK
ENGELS

Collected
Works



Volume 16
Marx and Engels
1858 - 1860

C o n t e n t s

Preface	XV
---------------	----

KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS W O R K S

August 1858-February 1860

1858

August

1. <i>K. Marx.</i> The English Bank Act of 1844	3
2. <i>K. Marx.</i> Commercial Crises and Currency in Britain	8
3. <i>K. Marx.</i> History of the Opium Trade	13

September

4. <i>K. Marx.</i> History of the Opium Trade	17
5. <i>K. Marx.</i> Another Strange Chapter of Modern History	21
6. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Anglo-Chinese Treaty	28
7. <i>K. Marx.</i> British Commerce and Finance	33
8. <i>K. Marx.</i> Mazzini's New Manifesto	37
9. <i>K. Marx.</i> A New French Revolutionary Manifesto	41
10. <i>K. Marx.</i> The British and Chinese Treaty	46

October

11. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Question of the Abolition of Serfdom in Russia	51
12. <i>K. Marx.</i> The King of Prussia's Insanity	54
13. <i>F. Engels.</i> Russian Progress in Central Asia	59
14. <i>K. Marx.</i> The King of Prussia's Insanity	65
15. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Prussian Regency	70
16. <i>K. Marx.</i> Affairs in Prussia	74
17. <i>K. Marx.</i> Affairs in Prussia	78
18. <i>F. Engels.</i> Russia's Successes in the Far East	82
19. <i>K. Marx.</i> Mr. John Bright	87

November

20. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Prosecution of Montalembert	91
21. <i>K. Marx.</i> The New Ministry	96
22. <i>K. Marx.</i> The New Ministry	101
23. <i>K. Marx.</i> Affairs in Prussia	106
24. <i>K. Marx.</i> Project for the Regulation of the Price of Bread in France	110
25. <i>K. Marx.</i> Affairs in Prussia	115
26. <i>F. Engels.</i> Europe in 1858	120

December

27. <i>K. Marx.</i> Affairs in Prussia	125
28. <i>K. Marx.</i> Question of the Ionian Islands	129
29. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Excitement in Ireland	134
30. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Emancipation Question	139
I	139
II	144

1859

January

31. <i>K. Marx.</i> On Italian Unity	148
32. <i>K. Marx.</i> The War Prospect in Europe	154
33. <i>K. Marx.</i> Affairs in Prussia	158
34. <i>K. Marx and F. Engels.</i> The Money Panic in Europe	162
35. <i>K. Marx.</i> Louis Napoleon's Position	167
36. <i>F. Engels.</i> The French Army	171

February

37. <i>F. Engels.</i> German Resources for War	177
38. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Austrian Hold on Italy	183
39. <i>K. Marx.</i> The State of British Manufactures	190
40. <i>F. Engels.</i> Chances of the Impending War	197

March

41. <i>K. Marx.</i> The New British Reform Bill.....	202
42. <i>K. Marx.</i> The State of British Manufactures	206
43. <i>F. Engels.</i> Po and Rhine	211
I	215
II	218
III	241
IV	250
44. <i>K. Marx.</i> Peace or War	256
45. <i>K. Marx.</i> A Sigh from the Tuileries	258
46. <i>K. Marx.</i> The War Prospect in France	261
47. <i>K. Marx.</i> The War Prospect in Prussia	267
48. <i>K. Marx.</i> A Historic Parallel	271

April

49. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Proposed Peace Congress	274
50. <i>K. Marx.</i> Great Trouble in Indian Finances	279
I	279
II	283
51. <i>F. Engels.</i> War Inevitable	287
52. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Proposed Peace Congress	290
53. <i>K. Marx and F. Engels.</i> The State of the Question.—Germany Arming	295
54. <i>F. Engels.</i> Prospects of the War	299
55. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Financial Panic	303

May

56. <i>K. Marx.</i> Fair Professions	307
57. <i>K. Marx.</i> Austria, Prussia and Germany in the War	310
58. <i>F. Engels.</i> The War	315
59. <i>K. Marx.</i> Highly Important from Vienna	320
60. <i>F. Engels.</i> The War—No Progress	327

61. <i>F. Engels.</i> Fighting at Last	332
62. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Battle of Montebello	338
63. <i>K. Marx.</i> A Prussian View of the War	341
64. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Campaign in Italy	346
65. <i>F. Engels.</i> Strategy of the War	349
66. <i>K. Marx.</i> Mazzini's Manifesto	354

June

67. <i>F. Engels.</i> Progress of the War	360
68. <i>F. Engels.</i> Military Events	364
69. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Austrian Defeat	368
70. <i>F. Engels.</i> A Chapter of History	372
71. <i>K. Marx.</i> Spree and Mincio	380
72. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Austrian Withdrawal to the Mincio	384
73. <i>F. Engels.</i> The News from the War	388
74. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Battle at Solferino	392

July

75. <i>F. Engels.</i> Historical Justice	396
76. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Battle of Solferino	400
77. <i>K. Marx.</i> Erfurtery in the Year 1859	404
78. <i>K. Marx.</i> What Has Italy Gained?	407
79. <i>K. Marx.</i> On Ernest Jones (from the "Political Review" of <i>Das Volk</i>)	410
80. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Peace	412
81. <i>K. Marx.</i> Introductory Note to the "Memoir on Russia, for the Instruction of the Present Emperor"	415
82. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Treaty of Villafranca	416
83. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Italian War. Retrospect	421
I	421
II	426
III	431
84. <i>K. Marx.</i> Truth Testified	435
85. <i>K. Marx.</i> Invasion!	439
86. <i>K. Marx.</i> The French Disarmament	442

Late July-middle of August

87. <i>K. Marx.</i> Quid pro Quo	445
I	445
II	450

Contents

IX

III	454
IV	461

August

88. <i>F. Engels.</i> Karl Marx, <i>A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy</i>	465
I	465
II	472
89. <i>K. Marx.</i> British Commerce	478
90. <i>K. Marx.</i> Louis Napoleon and Italy	482
91. <i>K. Marx.</i> Population, Crime, and Pauperism	487

September

92. <i>K. Marx.</i> Manufactures and Commerce	492
93. <i>K. Marx.</i> Kossuth and Louis Napoleon	497
94. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Future of Italy	504
95. <i>K. Marx.</i> The New Chinese War	508
I	508
II	512
III	517
IV	521
96. <i>K. Marx.</i> To the Editor of <i>The Free Press</i>	525

October

97. <i>K. Marx.</i> Electoral Corruption in England	526
98. <i>K. Marx.</i> A Radical View of the Peace	532

November

99. <i>K. Marx.</i> Trade with China	536
100. <i>K. Marx.</i> Trouble in Germany	540
101. <i>K. Marx.</i> The Invasion Panic in England	545

December

102. <i>F. Engels.</i> Progress of the Moorish War	548
--	-----

1860

January

103. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Moorish War	552
--	-----

February

104. <i>F. Engels.</i> Savoy and Nice	557
105. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Moorish War	561
106. <i>F. Engels.</i> Savoy, Nice and the Rhine	567
I	571
II	579
III	593
IV	601

FROM THE PREPARATORY
MATERIALS

107. <i>K. Marx.</i> Symptoms of the Revival of France's Internal Life	613
108. <i>F. Engels.</i> The Italian War. 1859	615
109. <i>K. Marx.</i> On the Division of Labour	617

APPENDICES

110. The French Slave Trade	621
111. Statement by the Editorial Board of the Newspaper <i>Das Volk</i>	624
112. Gatherings from the Press	625
113. Note by the Editorial Board of <i>Das Volk</i>	635
114. Political Review	636

NOTES AND INDEXES

<i>Notes</i>	641
<i>Name Index</i>	697
<i>Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature</i>	730
<i>Index of Periodicals</i>	750
<i>Subject Index</i>	755
<i>Glossary of Geographical Names</i>	767

ILLUSTRATIONS

Title-page of Frederick Engels' pamphlet <i>Po and Rhine</i>	213
Northern Italy and Switzerland (map)	224-25
The Italian war of 1859 (map).....	432-33
Part of a page from <i>Das Volk</i> containing Frederick Engels' review of Karl Marx's work <i>A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy</i>	467
The war in Morocco, 1859-60 (map)	549-50
Title-page of Frederick Engels' pamphlet <i>Savoy, Nice and the Rhine</i>	569



TRANSLATORS:

RICHARD DIXON: Works 79; From the Preparatory
Materials 108, 109; Appendices 111

HENRY MINS: Works 43, 64, 68, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 83,
85, 87, 106; Appendices 112, 113, 114

SALO RYAZANSKAYA: Works 88

Preface

Volume 16 of the *Collected Works* of Marx and Engels contains works written between August 1858 and February 1860. They consist mainly of articles published in the then progressive *New-York Daily Tribune* (and in many cases reprinted in the special issues, the *New-York Weekly Tribune* and the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*), and in the German-language London weekly *Das Volk*, which was for a short time the newspaper of the exiled German revolutionary workers. The present volume also includes Engels' pamphlets *Po and Rhine* and *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine*.

The works belonging to 1858 deal with the final period of the first capitalist world economic crisis which began in 1857 and embraced all the leading European countries and the USA.

As Marx and Engels had foreseen, the crisis gave an impetus to the working-class and democratic movements and also to the national liberation struggles of the oppressed peoples. By late 1858 and early 1859 a new revolutionary upsurge had begun in Europe, broadly reflected in the works contained in this volume. A revolutionary situation was developing in a number of countries. The masses, particularly the working class, were growing increasingly active. The question arose of the national unification of both Germany and Italy, and it was clear in each case that only a democratic solution of it would correspond to the interests of the masses. Marx's and Engels' theoretical and practical activity during this period was therefore aimed at preparing the international working class for new class struggles.

In elaborating revolutionary theory Marx and Engels paid particular attention to the development of economic theory. June

1859 saw the publication of Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (see present edition, Vol. 30). This work was a landmark in the creation of Marxist political economy. For Marx had by now elaborated the theory of surplus value (see present edition, Vol. 29), which completed the proof of the inevitability of the replacement of capitalism by a higher social order, socialism. Lenin described the Preface to this work as having formulated "the fundamental principles of materialism as applied to human society and its history" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 55).

The present volume contains Engels' review—published in August 1859 in *Das Volk*—of Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in which he pointed out that Marx had laid the foundations for a completely new political economy, which differed radically from bourgeois economics.

Engels' review explained the basic features of Marx's method for studying such important economic categories as those of commodity and money. He showed that in the Preface the materialist conception of history was not only made the scientific foundation of the revolutionary working-class world outlook, but also the essential methodology for the fruitful study of economic and other social processes. Marx had subjected the Hegelian dialectical method to criticism as early as the 1840s, and Engels emphasised the fundamental difference between materialist dialectics and Hegel's dialectics. It had been essential, he pointed out, to free Hegel's dialectics from its mystical form. "Marx was and is the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel containing Hegel's real discoveries in this field, and of establishing the dialectical method, divested of its idealist wrappings, in the simple form in which it becomes the only correct mode of the development of thought" (see this volume, pp. 474-75).

Engels among other things laid stress on the dialectical relationship of the logical and historical approaches to the analysis of phenomena in political economy and the other social sciences. Logical analysis, which effects a certain abstraction from concrete details, is essential. However, it must not be reduced to arbitrary and purely speculative abstractions but must be based on the consistent application of the historical method. The logical method, Engels explained, "is indeed nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and of interfering contingencies. The point where this history begins must also be the starting point of the train of thought, and its further progress will be simply the reflection, in abstract and theoretically consistent form, of the course of history" (p. 475).

The present volume consists mainly of journalistic items by Marx and Engels. Revolutionary journalism was at that period one of the main means of propagating Marxist ideas and the strategical and tactical principles of the working-class and democratic movement. Marx and Engels attached special importance to this at a time when the political situation in Europe was growing increasingly tense and new revolutionary events were imminent.

The work of Marx and Engels in this sphere became particularly intense in the summer of 1859, when they were able to write for the weekly *Das Volk*. The history of this newspaper and Marx's and Engels' association with it forms an important episode in their struggle for a working-class party.

The urgent requirements of the working-class movement impelled them to engage increasingly in the practical aspect of this struggle. It was essential to expose circles hostile to the working class, to promote in every possible way the liberation of workers from the influence of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, and ensure the working class an independent role in bringing about any bourgeois-democratic transformations in contemporary society. The question of using the press for communist propaganda became more urgent in the new conditions. So when, in May 1859, Marx was invited to write for the new weekly *Das Volk*, which began publication on May 7, 1859 as the organ of the German Workers' Educational Society and other London societies of German workers, he promised its editor, Elard Biscamp, his firm support. He took part in editing the articles, raising funds for the newspaper and selecting material for it.

From a small paper reflecting the interests of a narrow circle of German refugees in London, *Das Volk* began to turn into a militant revolutionary organ speaking for the working class. This enabled Marx and his associates to establish closer relations with it in June 1859. At the beginning of July Marx became to all intents and purposes the editor and manager of the paper, which had finally committed itself to the proletarian revolution.

In the columns of *Das Volk* Marx and Engels examined questions of the revolutionary theory and tactics of the working class. The newspaper published Marx's Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* and also, as mentioned above, Engels' review of this book.

Each issue of *Das Volk* contained "Political Reviews", evidently written by Elard Biscamp and Wilhelm Liebknecht. But as soon as

Marx took over the management of the newspaper he began to help with the editing of this section, and parts of it were written by him. In particular, the extract "On Ernest Jones" from one of these reviews, published in this volume, was written by Marx, who revealed in it the causes of the final decline of the Chartist movement.

Das Volk responded to current working-class struggles. Thus it reported the London building workers' strike at the end of July 1859, which played an important role in rousing the British working class to action. One of the "Political Reviews" pointed out that the British bourgeoisie's attempt to compel workers to renounce the revolutionary struggle could only "make the already deep rift between labour and capital even wider" (p. 637).

Marx regarded the struggle against petty-bourgeois ideology as one of the newspaper's most important tasks. Its reviews "Gatherings from the Press", written by Marx with Biscamp's participation, satirised the philistinism and nationalism of articles by German petty-bourgeois democrats—Gottfried Kinkel and others—in their London organ *Hermann* (pp. 625-34).

In the columns of *Das Volk* Marx and Engels were able to express their revolutionary views more freely than in the *Tribune*, where they were hampered by the paper's bourgeois bias. Marx and Engels used *Das Volk* to condemn the foreign and domestic policies of the ruling classes in the European states, to unmask reaction and uphold revolutionary principles.

Das Volk ceased publication on August 20, 1859, despite Marx's tremendous efforts to keep it going. However, in spite of its brief existence, the newspaper made a considerable contribution to the propagation of the ideas of scientific communism and the principles of the working-class party.

One of the main subjects of Marx's and Engels' writings during this period were the events in Italy. In July 1858 Napoleon III and the Prime Minister of Piedmont, Cavour, whose policies reflected the desire of the liberal nobility and bourgeoisie to unite Italy under the Savoy dynasty, concluded a secret agreement for a joint war against Austria. Although the war preparations were conducted in the greatest secrecy, Marx and Engels predicted the inevitability of an armed conflict between France and Piedmont, on the one hand, and Austria, on the other, many months before it actually broke out. They revealed the true reasons that had led Louis Bonaparte and his supporters after the

Crimean war to embark upon a new military escapade, pointed to the diplomatic moves by the European powers aimed at exacerbating the conflict and drew attention to the war preparations by the hostile states.

As soon as *Das Volk* was set up, their articles on the Italian question, which had originally appeared in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, began to be published in the new weekly too. They also became more politically pointed.

Marx and Engels strongly supported the revolutionary method of solving the Italian question. In the article "On Italian Unity" written at the beginning of January 1859 Marx expressed the conviction that "the burning hate of the Italians toward their oppressors, combined with their ever-increasing suffering, will find vent in a general revolution" (p. 148). Exposing the anti-democratic nature of the dynastic plans for uniting the country, Marx supported the truly patriotic forces in Italy, which he called the "national party". He hoped that the Italian democrats would succeed in uniting around them the middle and petty bourgeoisie, the progressive intelligentsia, the peasantry, and the still numerically small working class, and in "initiating the great national insurrection" (p. 153). Only in this way, Marx believed, would it be possible to achieve the national liberation and unification of Italy on a truly democratic basis, and also solve the social and political questions—eliminate the vestiges of feudalism, abolish monarchist regimes, etc.—in the interests of the masses.

In the articles "The War Prospect in Europe", "The Money Panic in Europe", "Louis Napoleon's Position", "Peace or War", "The War Prospect in France" and others, Marx and Engels revealed the attempts to prevent the outbreak of revolution by unleashing a new war. Marx and Engels believed that it was the task of the proletarian revolutionaries to use the developing war situation, created by the ruling classes, for strengthening the revolutionary movement, and if a war were unleashed, to do everything possible to turn it into a revolutionary war against the existing reactionary regimes.

In analysing the information which appeared in the press, Marx and Engels gave an accurate forecast of the progress and outcome of the imminent hostilities. Engels did so, in particular, in the articles "The Austrian Hold on Italy" and "Chances of the Impending War".

The present volume includes Engels' pamphlet *Po and Rhine*, written with the aim of outlining the position of the proletarian

revolutionaries on questions connected with the Italian crisis and the impending war between Austria and France and exposing the various chauvinist theories used to justify both the aggressive policy of Napoleon III and Austrian rule in Northern Italy.

Po and Rhine, published in April 1859, is a model analysis of complex international problems. As his pamphlet was intended for the general public, including the bourgeois reader, Engels concentrated on military history and strategy. Nevertheless, this work also trenchantly advocates the revolutionary-democratic unification of Italy and Germany and shows that the policies of the ruling classes in the states involved in the conflict were incompatible with the true national interests of the Italian and German peoples.

Engels championed these national interests from the standpoint of proletarian internationalism, at the same time exposing the nationalistic ideology of the ruling classes and their chauvinist conceptions of the superiority of some peoples over others. Thus he firmly denounced the idea, widespread among reactionary circles in Germany, particularly the Austrophile section of the bourgeoisie, of creating a "Central European great power" under the aegis of Austria. The supporters of this idea, Engels noted, argued that the Germans were destined to rule the world. They spoke condescendingly of the Romanic peoples as being degenerate and declared that the Slavs were unfit for independent statehood.

Engels criticised the theory of "natural frontiers" invoked by those who argued that Austria should retain Northern Italy because the Po was, allegedly, such a natural frontier. He ardently supported the liberation of Lombardy and Venice from Austrian oppression and showed that the granting of independence to Italy would benefit Germany both politically and militarily. "Instead of seeking our strength in the possession of foreign soil and the oppression of a foreign nationality, whose future only prejudice can deny, we should do better to see to it that we are united and strong in our own house" (p. 240).

Engels strongly attacked the aggressive plans of Napoleon III, stressing that Bonapartism, as one of the bulwarks of European reaction, was a serious obstacle to the national unification of Italy and Germany. The national interests of the German and Italian peoples were gravely threatened by the territorial claims of the ruling Bonapartist circles and their plans to redraw the map of Europe in favour of France, which they too sought to justify by

referring to the false concept of "natural frontiers". To solve the national tasks facing the Germans and Italians, Engels noted, a resolute struggle against Bonapartism was needed.

Engels' work is one of his finest writings as a military theoretician and military historian. In it he analysed the military scene in Italy and on the Rhine and expressed a number of important strategic and tactical ideas. His conclusions were based on a careful study of military history, in particular of the wars which had been fought in Northern Italy and the adjoining areas, from the campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte and other French generals to the operations of the Austrian army against Italy in 1848. In his analysis Engels paid great attention to the Italian and, in particular, the Swiss campaign by Russian forces under the command of Suvorov in 1799. He called Suvorov's passage through the Alps "the most impressive of all Alpine crossings in modern times" (p. 222).

After the outbreak of the Italian war (as the Austro-Italo-French war was called at the time) in April 1859, Marx and Engels continued to develop the viewpoint they had expressed during the initial period of the Italian crisis before the commencement of hostilities. They regarded the war of France and Piedmont against Austria as a continuation of the anti-democratic policies of the ruling Bonapartist circles. Louis Napoleon and his entourage, they emphasised, needed this war to delay the collapse of the Bonapartist regime in France by comparatively easy victories over an "external foe", to win popularity by playing demagogically on the slogan "free Italy from Austrian rule" and the "principle of nationalities". Stripping Louis Napoleon of the hypocritical mask of "the liberator of Italy", Marx and Engels exposed his counter-revolutionary designs with respect to the Italian national movement. Like the Austrian Empire, Bonapartist France, they wrote, was emphatically opposed to the independence and unification of Italy. The war unleashed by Napoleon III was a masked intervention against the popular revolutionary movement for Italian unity. In his article "Louis Napoleon and Italy" Marx compared this war with the French expedition of 1849 aimed at restoring the power of the Pope, an expedition initiated by Louis Bonaparte, then President of the French Republic. Marx pointed out that for Louis Napoleon "the war ... was only another French expedition to Rome—on a grander scale in all respects, to be sure, but in motive and results not dissimilar to that 'Republican' enterprise" (p. 482).

All Marx's and Engels' articles on the Italian war are full of ardent support for the struggle of the Italian people against foreign rule. Marx approved of the manifesto of the Italian revolutionary Mazzini, which exposed the demagogic manoeuvres of Louis Napoleon, and published a translation of it in the *New-York Daily Tribune* (see this volume, pp. 354-59). Marx and Engels saw the anti-Austrian operations of the volunteer detachments led by the great Italian patriot Garibaldi as a splendid example of popular resistance to foreign rule and of a true war of liberation. Garibaldi, Engels wrote, "does not seem afraid of that dash, which Napoleon III warns his soldiers not to indulge in" (p. 360). In the article "Strategy of the War" Engels rated Garibaldi very highly as a revolutionary military commander.

In the articles "The War", "Fighting at Last", "Progress of the War", "Military Events", "A Chapter of History", "The Battle at Solferino", "The Italian War. Retrospect" and others, Engels gave an all-round review of the military campaign of 1859, making frequent excursions into the history of warfare and drawing some important theoretical conclusions. For example, in the article "The Campaign in Italy", published in *Das Volk*, Engels notes the changes that have taken place since the period of the Napoleonic wars in the conduct of warfare due to the development of a system of entrenched camps and fortresses to protect state frontiers, and also to the introduction of railways and shipping lines making it possible to speed up considerably the transport and concentration of troops. Engels uses this example to reveal the connection between the development of productive forces and methods of warfare.

In the articles "The French Disarmament", "The Invasion Panic in England" and others, Marx showed that the policy of military gambles pursued by the rulers of the Second Empire was the source of ever new conflicts and wars. In a number of articles Marx and Engels also criticised the reactionary forces that gave diplomatic support to France during its preparations for the war in Italy and in the period of the fighting. This applies first and foremost to the agreement between Louis Napoleon and Palmerston, which left Napoleon III free to carry out his Italian adventure. The agreement concluded between Bonapartist France and Tsarist Russia in March 1859, Marx and Engels stressed, served the same purpose.

The Italian war produced a social upsurge in Prussia and other states of the German Confederation. Napoleon III's war against

Austria was rightly regarded in Germany as the prelude to encroachments on German territory, in particular, the left bank of the Rhine. In the press, at mass meetings and in clubs demands were made for the organisation of national resistance to Napoleon III's aggressive plans. The national upsurge in Germany in 1859 again brought to the fore the question of the unification of the numerous German states.

Marx and Engels worked out the tactics of the working class on this question, linking them closely with the position of proletarian revolutionaries on the Italian conflict. Proceeding from the fact that Bonapartism was one of the main obstacles to the unification of Germany and that the fall of the Second Empire was an important prerequisite for a European revolution, they considered it essential that Prussia and the other German states should take part in the armed struggle against Bonapartist France. "While decidedly taking part for Italy against Austria, they cannot but take part for Austria against Bonaparte," wrote Marx in the article "The War Prospect in Prussia" (p. 269). But needless to say, their tactics by no means envisaged support for the reactionary regime of the Austrian Empire or its rule in Italy. Marx and Engels never ceased to denounce the Habsburgs as butchers of the freedom of the Italian and other oppressed peoples.

Marx and Engels believed that military action by the German states against France would create the conditions, independently of the will of the governments of these states, for the dynastic war to turn into a revolutionary war. The defeat of France might in this case lead to a revolutionary explosion in Europe. The result would be the destruction not only of the Bonapartist regime in France, but also of the reactionary regimes in Austria itself, Prussia and the other states of the German Confederation, and the unification of both Germany and Italy in a revolutionary, democratic way. Developing this idea, Marx noted in the article "Spree and Mincio" that an alliance of Prussia and Austria in the situation that had arisen "*means revolution*" (p. 381).

In this article, and also in the articles "Austria, Prussia and Germany in the War" and "A Prussian View of the War", Marx branded the neutral policy of the Prussian Government as one which aided and abetted Bonapartism. His article "Quid pro Quo", based on an analysis of numerous facts and documents, makes this point with particular force. In it Marx showed that what lay behind the diplomatic manoeuvring of the Prussian rulers at the time of the Italian war, manoeuvring which greatly assisted Napoleon III, was first and foremost the fear of a revolutionary

upsurge in Germany if the German states joined in the war. This policy, disguised as one of neutrality, was also calculated to weaken Prussia's rival, Austria, in the struggle for supremacy in Germany. For the sake of this, Prussia's rulers ignored the all-German national interests. Marx pointed out that by its manoeuvring and refusal to enter the war Prussia hoped "by trickery eventually to gain hegemony in Germany at a discount" (p. 452). The results of this double-faced policy, he noted, were most unfortunate for Prussia itself.

Marx's article "Erfurtery in the Year 1859" (the title contains an ironic allusion to the Prussophile plans of the Erfurt Parliament of 1850 and the attempt to revive them) attacked the support given by wide circles of the German bourgeoisie to the idea of Germany's unification under the hegemony of the Prussian Junkers. The very course of history, Marx pointed out, presented Germany with a choice: either the urgent tasks of national unification would be carried out in a revolutionary way, or they would be effected from above by the ruling Junker circles, with the help of the bourgeoisie, in the form and by the methods which were in keeping with their interests. Marx noted that one could not discount the possibility of the counter-revolutionary classes prevailing, in which case the unification of Germany would have to be carried out by the reactionary forces, i.e. the Prussian ruling clique, acting as the revolution's mandatory. But this clique could perform the tasks of the revolution, in particular, that of unifying the country, only in a distorted way. Marx warned that in the hands of reaction the "programme of the revolution turns into a satire on the relevant revolutionary efforts" (p. 404). Thus already in 1859 Marx called attention to the danger of allowing the reactionary circles to take over the initiative in unifying Germany.

The results of the Italian war, which ended with the signing on July 11, 1859 of the Preliminary Treaty of Villafranca (most of its terms were later adopted at Zurich), were the subject of Marx's articles "What Has Italy Gained?", "The Peace", "The Treaty of Villafranca", "Louis Napoleon and Italy" and others, and of Engels' pamphlet *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine*. Napoleon III concluded peace so hastily, Marx noted, because, against the will of its instigators, the war "was tending to become a revolutionary war" (p. 413). At the same time the Treaty of Villafranca clearly revealed that Louis Napoleon's aims were opposed to the cause of Italian liberation and unification. Marx stressed how humiliating the treaty was for the

Italians: Lombardy was transferred first to France and then “as a French gift to the Savoy dynasty” (p. 418), Napoleon providing himself with compensation for it in the form of Savoy and Nice. Venice remained in Austrian hands, as did the strategically important quadrilateral of fortresses (Mantua, Legnago, Verona and Peschiera). Despite his promises, the French Emperor “has left Austria seated almost as firmly as ever on the neck of Italy” (p. 414). In addition Napoleon III sought to place the Pope, the main inspirer of reaction in Italy, at the head of the proposed Italian Confederation and to restore the deposed dukes of Tuscany, Modena and Parma.

Marx stressed that the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Villafranca did not lessen the danger of armed conflicts breaking out in Europe as a result of the adventurist policy of the ruling classes in Bonapartist France and other states. He emphatically condemned the war preparations that were being made under the pretext of securing peace. “Of all the dogmas of the bigoted politics of our time,” he wrote in the article “Invasion!” which examined the possibility of the British Isles being occupied by Napoleon III’s army, “none has caused more harm than the one that says ‘In order to have peace, you must prepare for war’” (p. 439). Revealing the social roots of the Italian crisis, Marx pointed out that the ruling circles in the European states that resorted to this “cunning perfidy” had turned their countries into military camps and created an international situation in which “every new peace pact is regarded as a new declaration of war” (*ibid.*).

As Marx and Engels had foreseen, the war ended in a betrayal of Italy’s interests. Bonapartist France and Austria concluded a deal to which Piedmont was admitted only some time later, as a special favour by Napoleon III. Not one of the main questions of the bourgeois revolution was solved. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that in 1859 it proved impossible to turn “a modestly liberal movement ... into a tempestuously democratic one”, as Lenin put it (*Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 142), the events of that year promoted an upsurge of the national liberation movement in Italy in the following year, 1860.

In April 1860 Engels published the pamphlet *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine* in which he showed the extent to which the conclusions formulated by him in *Po and Rhine* had been confirmed by the outcome of the Italian war.

The immediate reason for writing this work was the attempt by the pro-Bonapartist press to justify France’s annexation of Savoy

and Nice. Engels demonstrated the invalidity of attempts to justify on linguistic, ethnographical and military grounds the claims of individual states to this or that territory, without taking into account the will and interests of the population. In the historical situation at that time, Engels noted, the annexation of Savoy and Nice by France meant that France's counter-revolutionary rulers were acquiring new military strongholds, thus consolidating the anti-democratic regime of the Second Empire. In addition, such acts were whetting the appetites of Bonapartist circles for other territories, including the Rhine, and creating precedents for further acts of aggrandisement.

In examining the alignment of forces in the international arena at that time and the tasks of the revolutionary democrats in the struggle against the reactionary monarchist bloc led by Bonapartist France and supported by Russian Tsarism, Engels combined in an exemplary way a patriotic defence of the interests of the progressive development of Germany with a consistently internationalist approach to the problems of national and revolutionary development.

Engels in no way identified the ruling circles with the peoples of the countries then forming the counter-revolutionary camp, nor did he make the slightest attempt to impose the responsibility for aggressive policies on the masses. On the contrary, within each of these countries Engels sought to pinpoint the forces the European revolution could count on. Thus, in making a sharp distinction between official Russia and the revolutionary Russia of the people, Engels expressed the hope that in their clash with Tsarism and the other counter-revolutionary powers the working class and democracy would this time find an ally in the Russian peasantry, which had entered the movement after the Crimean war. He wrote in *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine*: "The contest that has now broken out in Russia between the ruling and the oppressed classes of the rural population is already undermining the entire system of Russian foreign policy. That system was only possible so long as Russia had no internal political development. But that time is past" (p. 609).

Among the other problems treated in the journalistic writings of Marx and Engels of this period the consequences of the economic crisis of 1857-58, the domestic development of Britain, France, Prussia and Russia, and the situation in the colonial world stand out in particular. Many of these writings were sequels to articles written on the same subject in earlier years and developed the ideas expressed in them.

In a number of his articles Marx describes the specific features of the economic crisis of 1857-58 in Britain during its final stage, and also analyses the effects of the crisis. Marx shows that British industry and commerce were not only hit by the internal crisis, which to some extent paralysed Britain's economy, but were also adversely affected by crises in other countries and parts of the world. Using Britain as an example he shows the harmful effect of the crisis on the condition of the working masses.

Marx's articles "The English Bank Act of 1844", "Commercial Crises and Currency in Britain" and "British Commerce and Finance", written in August-September 1858, contain strong criticism of the British Free Traders, who advocated the abolition of tariffs as a panacea for all crises. Marx revealed the futility of attempts by bourgeois economists to find a remedy for crises, refuted their simplistic explanation of the origin of the 1857 crisis and of crises in general, and drew some important conclusions concerning the theory of crises. The true causes of the crisis, he remarked, lay not in excessive speculation and abuse of credit, as bourgeois economists, including the ideologists of Free Trade, argued, but in the socio-economic conditions peculiar to capitalism. Crises, he pointed out, "are inherent in the present system of production", "so long as the system lasts, they must be borne with, like the natural changes of the seasons" (p. 34).

Analysis of Britain's economic and political situation occupies an important place in this volume. Marx's articles "The State of British Manufactures", "Population, Crime, and Pauperism", "British Commerce" and "Manufactures and Commerce" trace the operation of the increased concentration of production and the cyclic nature of its development on the basis of official British statistics. Analysing the current figures of British imports and exports, Marx notes a specific feature of the development of the British economy, namely that "England, in regard to the markets of the world, develops its function as money-lender still more rapidly than its function as manufacturer and merchant" (p. 494).

In his articles "Electoral Corruption in England", "The New British Reform Bill" and others, Marx reveals the anti-democratic nature of the British political system. "The real Constitution of the British House of Commons might be summed up in the word *Corruption*" (p. 526). He shows that Disraeli's Bill introduced in February 1859 reduced the new parliamentary reform to a number of minor changes in the electoral system and aimed, above all, at preserving the monopoly of political power enjoyed by the landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie and the lack of political

rights of the working class. "On first view it will be understood that all these new franchises, while admitting some new middle-class sections, are framed with the express purpose of excluding the working classes, and chaining them to their present station of political 'pariahs'" (p. 204).

Marx criticised the existing factory legislation in Britain, which left many convenient loopholes for the factory-owners.

Some of the articles by Marx and Engels in this volume expose the colonial policy of capitalist states, primarily Britain, and describe the national struggle of the oppressed peoples, which reached considerable scope during this period.

Marx and Engels saw Ireland as one of the centres of revolutionary ferment. There was no peace there after the defeat of the national liberation movement in 1848. Conditions were maturing for a new national liberation struggle, which in the early sixties took the form of the Fenian movement. In the article "The Excitement in Ireland" (December 1858), Marx wrote of the increased activities of the secret peasant organisation, "the Ribbon Society", in response to the violence and arbitrariness of the landlords and their agents, and the setting up of the patriotic Phoenix Club by revolutionary intellectuals who took part in the events of 1848 (the establishment of the Club was a prologue to the founding of the Fenian Brotherhood). Marx wrote that to blame the Irish for producing such secret societies for the struggle against the oppressors "would be as judicious as to accuse woodland of producing mushrooms" (p. 137).

A striking instance of the British ruling circles trampling on the vital interests of the peoples of economically backward countries was the opium trade in China, which Marx discusses in the two articles entitled "History of the Opium Trade". The British "civilisers" had monopolised the smuggling of opium and turned it into a goldmine. The British Government, which claimed to oppose the opium trade, had in fact established a monopoly of opium production in India and taken it over, legalising the sale of opium to contraband merchants, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century was receiving a vast income from this source. The finances of the British Government in India, Marx concludes, were closely dependent not merely on the opium trade with China, but on the illicit nature of this trade.

In the article "Great Trouble in Indian Finances" Marx exposes Britain's policy of rapine in India and points out the disastrous

effects of British rule. In particular, he notes the destruction of local industry by the mass import of British cotton fabrics and yarn. He examines the consequences of the British colonisers' brutal suppression of the national liberation uprising in India in 1857-59 and points out that the vast expenditure this entailed, and also the need to maintain a large armed force in India, placed a heavy tax burden on the British people.

The volume also contains articles on the domestic situation in France. Marx and Engels pointed out that the regime of Napoleon III was maintained by the same methods by which it had been set up, namely, police terrorism. But even such a despotic regime as the monarchy of Napoleon III, Marx noted, could not rely on brute force alone. The flirting with the various classes, the deceit and the demagogery continued throughout the existence of the Second Empire. Marx wrote that the French Emperor was trying at one and the same time to play the part of a protector of the French peasants, "a sort of socialist providence to the proletarians of the towns" and the "savior of property" of the French bourgeoisie (p. 114). Marx regarded the attempts of Bonapartist circles to bribe the French working class as particularly dangerous, and constantly warned against them.

At the end of 1858 Marx wrote a series of articles describing the position in Prussia in connection with the appointment of the Prince of Prussia (the future King William I) as Regent, the beginning of whose regime was hailed as the dawn of a "new era" by the liberals. But Marx showed that the Regent's liberalism was a sham. In the articles "The King of Prussia's Insanity", "The Prussian Regency", "Affairs in Prussia" and "The New Ministry" he exposed the Hohenzollern dynasty as the suppressor of all progressive trends. The Prussian monarchy and the reactionary Prussian Constitution had turned the people's rights into a dead letter. Marx exposed the domination of the bureaucracy which had penetrated all spheres of social life in the Prussian state. The feudal monarchist system, he pointed out, was able to survive in Prussia only owing to the cowardly liberalism of the Prussian bourgeoisie, which was always prepared to accommodate itself to the reactionary policies of the ruling circles.

In the late 1850s Marx and Engels began to give close attention to the development of events in Russia. They became increasingly convinced that the position of Tsarism had weakened after the Crimean war. The war had not only revealed the economic and political backwardness of Tsarist Russia, but also stimulated the rapid growth of unrest among the serfs, which was undermining

the foundations of the feudal, serf-owning system. As already stated, in *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine* Engels spoke of the revolutionary aspirations of the Russian peasantry. Marx and Engels touched upon this question in earlier works too. Thus, at the end of 1858 Marx wrote the articles "The Question of the Abolition of Serfdom in Russia" and "The Emancipation Question", and Engels the article "Europe in 1858". Already in these articles Marx and Engels regarded Russia as a country on the verge of a popular, anti-serf revolution, and were saying that the mass movement in Russia was assuming a dangerous character for the autocracy. Studying the international situation in the latter half of 1858, Marx expressed the idea that revolutionary Russia was a potential ally of the revolutionary movement in the West. The revolutionary movement among the peasant masses in Russia, in Marx's opinion, threatened to turn into a mighty explosion. The reform which the ruling classes themselves were thinking to introduce in order to avert an outbreak of revolution would not remove the question of revolution. Marx was firmly convinced that soon "the Russian 1793 will be at hand", which would be a "turning point in Russian history, and finally place real and general civilization in the place of that sham and show introduced by Peter the Great" (p. 147).

Marx foresaw that the abolition of serfdom which was being prepared by the Tsarist Government would only be a half measure, like all such reforms introduced from above, merely a step along the path of essential bourgeois transformations in Russia, and would not solve all the pressing questions. These could be finally solved only as the result of revolution.

In their later works Marx and Engels continued to show great interest in the growing popular ferment in Russia and analysed in detail the place of the Russian revolutionary movement in the overall European revolutionary process.

The section "From the Preparatory Materials" contains items by Marx and Engels which were published recently for the first time (in Russian): the unfinished draft of Marx's article "Symptoms of the Revival of France's Internal Life", a draft of his lecture "On the Division of Labour" which he delivered to German workers in London in the autumn of 1859, and also Engels' chronological notes "The Italian War. 1859".

The Appendices include articles and notes in the writing of which Marx took part. They throw light on his efforts to turn the newspaper *Das Volk* into a working-class organ.

* * *

This volume contains a total of 109 works by Marx and Engels, including a short item published in the London newspaper *The Free Press*. Sixteen of them—fifteen written in German and one in English—are published in English for the first time (Engels' pamphlets *Po and Rhine* and *Savoy, Nice and the Rhine*, eleven articles from the newspaper *Das Volk* and three items in the section "From the Preparatory Materials"). Of the remaining works, written in English, eighty have not been reproduced in English since their first publication. During the preparation of the volume the authorship of the extract entitled "On Ernest Jones (from the "Political Review" of *Das Volk*)" was established for the first time. Almost all the materials published in the Appendices are also appearing for the first time in English.

In studying the concrete historical material contained in Marx's and Engels' articles one should bear in mind that they used as sources for their articles on current events newspaper information which sometimes proved to be inaccurate. Besides, as we know from Marx's and Engels' letters, the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune* frequently took liberties with the text of their articles, particularly those which were printed as leaders. In the present edition all known cases of interference by the editors are indicated in the footnotes. If an article was published without a title and Marx also gave it no title in his Notebook, the editors of this volume have provided one, which is given in square brackets.

The volume was compiled, the text prepared and the notes written by Tatyana Andrushchenko in the case of works originally written in English, and Boris Krylov for works originally written in German. The preface is by Boris Krylov, and the volume as a whole was edited by Lev Churbanov (CC CPSU Institute of Marxism-Leninism). The name index, the indexes of quoted and mentioned literature and of periodicals, and the glossary of geographical names were prepared by Tatyana Gutina and Yelena Vashchenko; the subject index was compiled by Marlen Arzumanov; Olga Korolyova took part in the general work of preparing the notes and indexes.

The English translations were made by Henry Mins (International Publishers), Richard Dixon and Salo Ryazanskaya (Progress Publishers), and edited by J. S. Allen (International Publishers), Maurice Cornforth and Nicholas Jacobs (Lawrence and Wishart), Richard Dixon, Lydia Belyakova and Victor Schnittke (Progress

Publishers), and Norire Ter-Akopyan, scientific editor (USSR Academy of Sciences).

The volume was prepared for the press by Lydia Belyakova, Nadezhda Rudenko, Lyudgarda Zubrilova and the assistant editor Lyudmila Mikhailova (Progress Publishers).

K A R L M A R X
and
F R E D E R I C K E N G E L S

W O R K S

August 1858-February 1860

New-York Tribune.

Vol. XVIII.....No. 5409.

NEW-YORK, MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 1858.

PRICE TWO CENTS.

Karl Marx

[THE ENGLISH BANK ACT OF 1844]¹

It will be recollect that in 1857 the British Parliament was hastily called together in consequence of the suspension of the Bank Charter Act,² which, by letter of Nov. 12, in the midst of the monetary panic, the Premier and the Chancellor of the Exchequer^a had assumed the responsibility of decreeing. The Indemnity bill once passed,^b Parliament adjourned, leaving behind a select Committee appointed "to inquire into the operations of the Bank acts of 1844 and 1845, as well as into the causes of the recent commercial distress." The Committee had, in fact, sat since the beginning of 1857, and had already published two heavy volumes, one of evidence, the other appendix, both relating to the operations and effects of the Bank Acts of 1844-45.^c Its labors were almost forgotten when the occurrence of the commercial crisis recalled it to life, and afforded it an "additional element of inquiry." In the two heavy volumes to which we have referred, trade, just two months before its tremendous collapse, was declared to be "sound" and "safe." As to the working of Sir Robert Peel's Bank Act, Lord Overstone expressed himself before the Committee, on July 14, 1857, in these rather dithyrambic strains:

"By strict and prompt adherence," he said, "to the principles of the act of 1844, everything has passed off with regularity and ease; the monetary system is safe and unshaken; the prosperity of the country is undisputed; the public confidence in the

^a H. J. T. Palmerston and G. C. Lewis.—*Ed.*

^b On December 12, 1857.—*Ed.*

^c The reference is to *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, London, 1857, and *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, London, 1858.—*Ed.*

wisdom of the act of 1844 is daily gaining strength; and if the Committee wish for further practical illustration of the soundness of the principle on which it rests, or of the beneficial results which it has insured, the true and sufficient answer to the Committee is, look around you; look at the present state of trade of the country; [...] look at the contentment of the people; look at the wealth and prosperity which every class of the country presents; and then, having done so, the Committee may be fairly called upon to decide whether they will interfere with the continuance of an act under which those results have been developed.”^a

Six months later, the same Committee had to congratulate Government upon having suspended this very same act!

The Committee numbered among its members not less than five Chancellors or ex-Chancellors of the Exchequer, viz.: Mr. Disraeli, Sir G. C. Lewis, Mr. Gladstone, Sir Charles Wood, and Sir Francis Baring, backed by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Cardwell, two men long accustomed to find brains for Ministers of Finance. Beside these, all the magnates of the English bureaucracy had been added to it. In fact, it mustered about two dozen strong, and was a remarkable conclave of financial and economical wisdom. The questions to be decided were, first, the principles of the bank act, of 1844; secondly, the influence on commercial crises of the issue of bank-notes, payable on demand; and, lastly, the general causes of the recent distress. We propose, succinctly, to review the answers given to these different questions.

Sir Robert Peel, the Parliamentary godfather, and Lord Overstone, the scientific father, of the act of 1844,^b which prohibited the Bank of England from issuing notes beyond the amount of £14,500,000, save on the security of bullion, flattered themselves they had prevented such pressures and panics as had periodically occurred from 1815 to 1844. Twice in ten years their expectation has been baffled, despite the extraordinary and unexpected aid afforded to the working of the act by the great gold discoveries.³ In 1847 and 1857, as is shown by the evidence laid before the Committee, the panics were even of a more intense and destructive character than any ever witnessed before. Twice, in 1847 and 1857, the Government had to infringe the bank act, in order to save the bank and the monetary world revolving around it.

The Committee, it would appear, had to decide on a very simple alternative. Either the periodical violation of the law by the Government was right, and then the law must be wrong, or the law was right, and then the Government ought to be interdicted

^a *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts..., 1857*, p. 409.—*Ed.*

^b The Act of 1844 is based on Lord Overstone's proposals.—*Ed.*

from arbitrarily tampering with it. But will it be believed that the Committee has contrived to simultaneously vindicate the perpetuity of the law and the periodical recurrence of its infraction? Laws have usually been designed to circumscribe the discretionary power of Government. Here, on the contrary, the law seems only continued in order to continue to the Executive the discretionary power of overruling it. The Government letter, authorizing the Bank of England to meet the demands for discount and advances upon approved securities beyond the limits of the circulation prescribed by the Act of 1844, was issued on Nov. 12; but up to the 30th the Bank had, on a daily average, to throw into circulation about half a million of notes beyond the legal margin. On Nov. 20, the illegal surplus circulation had risen to about a million. What other proof was wanted of the mischievous futility of Sir Robert Peel's attempt at "regulating" the currency? The Committee are quite right in affirming "that no system of currency can secure a commercial country against the consequences of its own imprudence."^a But this sage remark is not to the point. The question was, rather, whether the monetary panic, which forms only one phase of the commercial crisis, may or may not be artificially aggravated by legislative enactments.

In justification of the Bank Act, the Committee say:

"The main object of the legislation in question was undoubtedly to secure the variation of the paper currency of the kingdom according to the same laws by which a metallic circulation would vary. No one contends that the object has not been attained."^b

We remark in the first place that the Committee decline to state their opinion as to the laws by which a metallic circulation would vary; because they were afraid "they would not be able to arrive at any conclusion without much difference of opinion."^c In the opinion of the bullionists, led by Sir Robert Peel, a merely metallic circulation would contract or expand in accordance with the state of the exchange—that is to say, gold would flow in with a favorable exchange, while it would leave the country with an unfavorable one. In the former case, general prices would rise; in the latter, they would fall. Now, supposing these violent fluctuations of prices to be inherent in a purely metallic circulation, Mr. J. S. Mill was certainly right in stating before the Committee^d that the condition to be aimed

^a *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, 1858, p. XXII.—Ed.

^b op. cit., p. XXV.—Ed.

^c op. cit., p. XXIII.—Ed.

^d *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, 1857, pp. 204-05.—Ed.

at by a paper currency was not to imitate but to correct and supersede such disastrous vicissitudes.

But the premises the bullionists proceed from in their reasonings have been proved to be imaginary. In countries where no credit operations exist, and consequently no paper circulation, as, comparatively speaking, was the case until recently in France, and is still the case on a much greater scale throughout Asia, private hoards of gold and silver are everywhere accumulated. When bullion is drained by an unfavorable exchange, these hoards open in consequence of a rise in the rate of interest. When the exchange turns, the hoards again absorb the surplus of the precious metals. In neither case, is a vacuum created in the currency, nor the opposite. The efflux and influx of bullion affect the state of the hoards, but not the state of the currency, and thus no action at all is exercised upon general prices. What, then, does the apology of the Committee amount to, that the Bank act of 1844, in periods of pressure, tends to create sudden fluctuations of prices which it falsely supposes would occur on the foundation of a purely metallic currency? But say the Committee, the convertibility of the notes, which it is the first duty of the Bank to maintain, is at least guaranteed by Sir Robert Peel's act. They add:

"The supply necessarily maintained in the coffers of that establishment under the provisions of the act of 1844, is greater than that which was ever maintained under circumstances of pressure in former times. During the crisis of 1825, the bullion fell to £1,261,000; in 1837 to £3,831,000, and in that of 1839 to £2,406,000, while the lowest points to which it has fallen since 1844 have been, in 1847 £8,313,000, and in 1857 £6,080,000."^a

In the first instance, the convertibility of the notes was upheld in all those panics, not because the Bank possessed bullion enough to realize its promises, but simply because it was not asked to pay them in gold. In 1825, for instance, the Bank withstood the run by issuing £1 notes. If the comparatively greater bullion reserves in 1847 and 1857 are considered as simply the consequences of the act of 1844, then, on the same reasoning, to the same act must be attributed the fact that in 1857 the bullion reserve, despite California and Australia, had sunk by more than £2,000,000 below the level of 1847. But, although possessed of twice or thrice the amount of gold which it had owned in 1825 and 1836, the Bank of England, thanks to the provisions of Sir Robert Peel's act, trembled in 1847 and 1857 on the verge of bankruptcy. According

^a *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts..., 1858, p. XXIII.—Ed.*

to the evidence of the Governor of the Bank;^a the entire reserve of the banking department on Nov. 12, 1857, the day of the issue of the Treasury Letter, was only £580,751, its deposits at the same time amounting to £22,500,000, of which near £6,500,000 belonged to London Bankers. But for the appearance of the Treasury Letter, the shop must have been shut up. To raise or reduce the rate of interest—and the Bank confesses that it had no other means of acting upon the circulation—is an operation which was applied before the passing of the act of 1844, and which, of course, might still have been applied after its repeal. But, says the Bank, the Directors want their virtue to be fortified by the act, and it would not be expedient "to leave them to their own unresisted wisdom and firmness."^b In ordinary times, when the act is notoriously a dead letter, they want to be fortified by the fiction of its legal operation, and in moments of pressure, the only moments in which it can operate at all, they want to get rid of it by a Government ukase.

Written on August 6, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5409, August 23, 1858 as a leading article

^a Th. M. Weguelin.—*Ed.*

^b op. cit., p. XXV.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[COMMERCIAL CRISES AND CURRENCY
IN BRITAIN]⁴

There is, perhaps, no point in Political Economy in which there exists more popular misapprehension than on the power which banks of issue are commonly supposed to wield, of affecting general prices through an expansion or contraction of currency. The idea that the banks had unduly expanded the currency, thus producing an inflation of prices violently to be readjusted by a final collapse, is too cheap a method of accounting for every crisis not to be eagerly caught at. The question, be it understood, is not whether banks may be instrumental in fostering a fictitious system of credit; but whether they possess the power of determining the amount of circulation in the hands of the public.

A principle which is not likely to be contested is, that the interest of every bank of issue prompts it to keep in circulation the greatest possible amount of its own notes. If any bank can be supposed to join the power to the will, it is certainly the Bank of England. Now, if we consider the period from 1844 to 1857, for instance, we shall find that, except in times of panic, the Bank, notwithstanding the privilege of throwing its notes into the market by the purchase of public stocks, and notwithstanding successive reductions in the rate of interest, has never been able to keep its notes in circulation up to the legal margin. But there is another phenomenon more striking still. During the period from 1844 to 1857, the general commerce of the United Kingdom has perhaps trebled. British exports we know to have been doubled during the last ten years. But, concurrently with this immense increase of trade, the circulation of the Bank of England has actually

diminished, and still continues gradually to decline. Take the following figures:

	Exports.	Circulation of Notes.
1845	£60,110,000	£20,722,000
1854	97,184,000	20,709,000
1856	115,826,000	19,648,000
1857	122,155,000	19,467,000

Thus, with exports increasing by £62,045,000, the circulation has fallen by £1,255,000, though during the same period, by dint of the Bank Act of 1844, the number of branches of the Bank of England was increasing, that of the country banks of issue competing with it was decreasing, and its own notes were converted into legal tenders for country banks. It might perhaps be supposed that the gold coin, supplied from new and fertile sources, was instrumental in displacing part of the Bank of England notes, by filling channels of circulation which these notes formerly occupied. In fact, Mr. Weguelin,^a in 1857 Governor of the Bank of England, stated to the Committee of the House of Commons that, on the part of the most competent persons, the increase in the gold currency for the six years then last elapsed was estimated at 30 per cent. The total gold circulation he believed now to amount to £50,000,000. This addition to the gold coin, however, was so little connected with the diminution of the paper currency, that on the contrary, the smaller denominations of notes, £5 and £10 notes, the only ones which could be superseded by coin in the retail trade and in the circulation going on between traders and consumers, have actually increased in number simultaneously with the increase of the metallic currency. The proportions of such increase are represented by the following table:

	Notes of £5 and £10.	Per cent of total Note circulation.
1845	£9,698,000	46.9
1854	10,565,000	51.0
1855	10,628,000	53.6
1856	10,680,000	54.4
1857	10,659,000	54.7 ^b

^a Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts..., 1857, p. 3.—Ed.

^b Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts..., 1858, p. XXVI.—Ed.

The diminution has thus been limited to the higher descriptions of bank notes, notes of £200 to £1,000 performing functions of domestic circulation from which coin, properly so called, is almost shut out. Such was the saving effected in the use of those notes that, notwithstanding the extension of commerce, the general rise of prices, and the increase in the small paper currency, the aggregate note circulation went on gradually declining. From £5,856,000, to which they had amounted in 1852, the number of bank notes of £200 to £1,000 had sunk to £3,241,000 in 1857. While in 1844 they still formed 26 per cent, they furnished in 1854 but 20.5, in 1855 but 17.5, in 1856 but 16.9, and in 1857 but 16.7 per cent of the total circulation.^a

This new feature in the paper currency of Great Britain arose from the growing competition of the London joint-stock banks with the private banks, and from the accumulation of vast sums in their hands, consequent upon their practice of allowing interest on deposits. On the 8th of June, 1854, after a long but vain resistance, the London private bankers saw themselves forced to admit the joint-stock banks to the arrangements of the clearing-house, and, shortly after, the final clearing was adjusted in the precincts of the Bank of England. The daily clearances being now effected by transfers in the accounts kept by the several banks in that establishment, the large notes formerly employed by the bankers for the adjustment of their mutual accounts, lost a vast field of employment, and were consequently in great part thrown out of circulation. Meanwhile the nine joint-stock banks of London had increased their deposits from £8,850,774 in 1847 to £43,100,724 in 1857, as shown in their published accounts.^b Whatever influence, therefore, banks may have exercised upon the general tendency of trade, and upon prices, must have been effected by the management of their deposits, that is, by credit operations, instead of by an over-issue of notes, which they proved unable to keep up even to the old margin of circulation.

How little of real money, of Bank of England notes and gold, enters into the wholesale transactions of British trade, may be conclusively inferred from an analysis, forwarded to the Commons Committee by Mr. Slater, a member of one of the largest London firms, of a continuous course of commercial operations, extending over several millions yearly. The proportions of receipts and

^a loc. cit.—*Ed.*

^b op. cit., p. V.—*Ed.*

payments are reduced to the scale of £1,000,000 only, for the year 1856, and read as follows:

RECEIPTS.

In Bankers' drafts and Bills of Exchange payable after date	£533,596
In checks on Bankers payable on demand	357,715
In country Bankers' notes	9,627
Total	£900,938
In Bank of England notes	£68,554
In gold	£28,089
In silver and copper	1,486
In Post-Office orders	933
Total	£99,062
Grand total	£1,000,000

PAYMENTS.

By Bills of Exchange, payable after date	£302,674
By Checks on London Bankers	663,672
Total	£966,346
By Bank of England notes	£22,743
By gold	9,427
By silver and copper	1,484
Total	£33,654
Grand total	£1,000,000 ^a

These figures may be taken as an illustration of the British wholesale trade, which centers in London. It is here shown that of money received, Bank of England notes amount to less than 10 per cent, and gold and silver to only 3 per cent of the currency. Of the payments made, Bank of England notes are but 2 per cent, and gold and silver only 1 per cent of the currency. On the other hand, payments are received in a ratio of about 90 per cent, and are made at nearly 97 per cent in that portion of the currency formed by the credit and the capital of the traders themselves.

From an analysis of the issues of the New-York banks—say for the last six years—we must arrive at the same conclusion, viz.: that

^a op. cit., p. LXXI.—*Ed.*

the amount of notes in circulation is beyond the control of the banks themselves, and was actually contracting during the very epoch when trade expanded, and general prices underwent a process of inflation, resulting in a collapse. The vulgar notion, therefore, which refers the recent crisis, and crises generally, to an over-issue of bank notes, must be discarded as altogether imaginary.

Written on August 10, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5414, August 28, 1858 as a leading article

Karl Marx

HISTORY OF THE OPIUM TRADE⁵

The news of the new treaty^a wrung from China by the allied Plenipotentiaries has, it would appear, conjured up the same wild vistas of an immense extension of trade which danced before the eyes of the commercial mind in 1845, after the conclusion of the first Chinese war.⁶ Supposing the Petersburg wires to have spoken truth, is it quite certain that an increase of the Chinese trade must follow upon the multiplication of its emporiums? Is there any probability that the war of 1857-8 will lead to more splendid results than the war of 1841-2? So much is certain that the treaty of 1843, instead of increasing American and English exports to China proved instrumental only in precipitating and aggravating the commercial crisis of 1847. In a similar way, by raising dreams of an inexhaustible market and by fostering false speculations, the present treaty may help preparing a new crisis at the very moment when the market of the world is but slowly recovering from the recent universal shock. Beside its negative result, the first opium-war succeeded in stimulating the opium trade at the expense of legitimate commerce, and so will this second opium-war do, if England be not forced by the general pressure of the civilized world to abandon the compulsory opium cultivation in India and the armed opium propaganda to China. We forbear dwelling on the morality of that trade, described by Montgomery Martin, himself an Englishman, in the following terms:

“Why, the slave trade was merciful compared with the opium trade: We did not destroy the bodies of the Africans, for it was our immediate interest to keep them alive; we did not debase their natures, corrupt their minds, nor destroy their souls.

^a Published in *The Times*, No. 23109, September 27, 1858.—Ed.

But the opium seller slays the body after he has corrupted, degraded, and annihilated the moral being of unhappy sinners, while every hour is bringing new victims to a Moloch which knows no satiety, and where the English murderer and Chinese suicide vie with each other in offerings at his shrine.”^a

The Chinese cannot take both goods and drug; under actual circumstances, extension of the Chinese trade resolves into extension of the opium trade; the growth of the latter is incompatible with the development of legitimate commerce—these propositions were pretty generally admitted two years ago. A Committee of the House of Commons, appointed in 1847 to take into consideration the state of British commercial intercourse with China, reported thus:

“We regret that the trade with that country has been for some time in a very unsatisfactory condition, and that the *result of our extended intercourse has by no means realized the just expectations* which had naturally been founded in a *free access to so magnificent a market*. We find that the difficulties of the trade do not arise from any want of demand in China for articles of British manufactures, or from the increasing competition of other nations; *the payment for opium absorbs the silver to the great inconvenience of the general traffic of the Chinese, and tea and silk must in fact pay the rest.*”^b

The Friend of China, of July 28, 1849, generalizing the same proposition, says in set terms:

“The opium trade progresses steadily. The increased consumption of teas and silk in Great Britain and the United States would merely result in the increase of the opium trade; the case of the manufacturers is hopeless.”

One of the leading American merchants in China reduced, in an article inserted in Hunt’s *Merchant’s Magazine*, for January, 1850, the whole question of the trade with China to this point:

“Which branch of commerce is to be suppressed, the opium trade or the export trade of American or English produce?”

The Chinese themselves took exactly the same view of the case. Montgomery Martin narrates:

“I inquired of the Taoutai^c at Shanghai which would be the best means of increasing our commerce with China, and his first answer to me, in presence of Capt. Balfour, Her Majesty’s Consul, was: ‘Cease to send us so much opium and we will be able to take your manufactures.’”^d

^a R. M. Martin, *China; Political, Commercial, and Social*, Vol. II, London, 1847, p. 261.—*Ed.*

^b *The Economist*, No. 209 (supplement), August 28, 1847, pp. 1014-15.—*Ed.*

^c High official.—*Ed.*

^d R. M. Martin, op. cit., p. 258.—*Ed.*

The history of general commerce during the last eight years has, in a new and striking manner, illustrated these positions; but, before analyzing the deleterious effects on legitimate commerce of the opium trade, we propose giving a short review of the rise and progress of that stupendous traffic, which, whether we regard the tragical collisions forming, so to say, the axis round which it turns, or the effects produced by it on the general relations of the Eastern and Western worlds, stands solitary on record in the annals of mankind.

Previous to 1767 the quantity of opium exported from India did not exceed 200 chests, the chest weighing about 133 lbs. Opium was legally admitted in China on the payment of a duty of about \$3 per chest, as a medicine; the Portuguese who brought it from Turkey being its almost exclusive importers into the Celestial Empire.

In 1773, Colonel Watson and Vice-President Wheeler—persons deserving to take a place among the Hermentiers, Palmers and other poisoners of world-wide fame—suggested to the East India Company⁷ the idea of entering upon the opium traffic with China. Consequently, there was established a depot for opium in vessels anchored in a bay to the southwest of Macao. The speculation proved a failure. In 1781 the Bengal Government sent an armed vessel, laden with opium, to China; and, in 1794, the Company stationed a large opium vessel at Whampoa, the anchorage for the port of Canton. It seems that Whampoa proved a more convenient depot than Macao, because, only two years after its selection, the Chinese Government found it necessary to pass a law which threatens Chinese smugglers of opium to be beaten with a bamboo and exposed in the streets with wooden collars around their necks. About 1798, the East India Company ceased to be direct exporters of opium, but they became its producers. The opium monopoly was established in India; while the Company's own ships were hypocritically forbidden from trafficking in the drug, the licenses it granted for private ships trading to China contained a provision which attached a penalty to them if freighted with opium of other than the Company's own make.

In 1800, the import into China had reached the number of 2,000 chests. Having, during the eighteenth century, borne the aspect common to all feuds between the foreign merchant and the national custom-house, the struggle between the East India Company and the Celestial Empire assumed, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, features quite distinct and exceptional;

while the Chinese Emperor,^a in order to check the suicide of his people, prohibited at once the import of the poison by the foreigner, and its consumption by the natives, the East India Company was rapidly converting the cultivation of opium in India, and its contraband sale to China, into integral parts of its own financial system. While the semi-barbarian stood on the principle of morality, the civilized opposed the principle of pelf. That a giant empire, containing almost one-third of the human race, vegetating to the teeth of time, insulated by the forced exclusion of general intercourse, and thus contriving to dupe itself with delusions of Celestial perfection—that such an empire should at last be overtaken by the fate on occasion of a deadly duel, in which the representative of the antiquated world appears prompted by ethical motives, while the representative of overwhelming modern society fights for the privilege of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets—this, indeed, is a sort of tragical couplet, stranger than any poet would ever have dared to fancy.

Written on August 31, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5433, September 20, 1858
as a leading article

^a Tao Kuang.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

HISTORY OF THE OPIUM TRADE⁸

It was the assumption of the opium monopoly in India by the British Government, which led to the proscription of the opium trade in China. The cruel punishments inflicted by the Celestial legislator^a upon his own contumacious subjects, and the stringent prohibition established at the China custom-houses, proved alike nugatory. The next effect of the moral resistance of the Chinaman was the demoralization, by the Englishman, of the Imperial authorities, custom-house officers and mandarins generally. The corruption that ate into the heart of the Celestial bureaucracy, and destroyed the bulwark of the patriarchal constitution, was, together with the opium chests, smuggled into the Empire from the English storeships anchored at Whampoa.

Nurtured by the East India Company, vainly combatted by the Central Government at Pekin, the opium trade gradually assumed larger proportions, until it absorbed about \$2,500,000 in 1816. The throwing open in that year of the Indian commerce, with the single exception of the tea trade, which still continues to be monopolized by the East India Company, gave a new and powerful stimulus to the operations of the English contrabandists. In 1820, the number of chests smuggled into China had increased to 5,147; in 1821, to 7,000, and in 1824, to 12,639. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government, at the same time that it addressed threatening remonstrances to the foreign merchants, punished the Hong merchants,⁹ known as their abettors, developed an unwonted activity in its prosecution of the native opium consumers, and, at its custom-houses, put into practice more stringent measures. The final result, like that of similar exertions in 1794, was to drive the opium depots from a precarious to a more convenient basis of

^a Hien-Fung.—Ed.

operations. Macao and Whampoa were abandoned for the Island of Lintin, at the entrance of the Canton River, there to become permanently established in vessels armed to the teeth, and well manned. In the same way, when the Chinese Government temporarily succeeded in stopping the operations of the old Canton houses, the trade only shifted hands, and passed to a lower class of men, prepared to carry it on at all hazards and by whatever means. Thanks to the greater facilities thus afforded, the opium trade increased during the ten years from 1824 to 1834 from 12,639 to 21,785 chests.^a

Like the years 1800, 1816 and 1824, the year 1834 marks an epoch in the history of the opium trade. The East India Company then lost not only its privilege of trading in Chinese tea, but had to discontinue and abstain from all commercial business whatever. It being thus transformed from a mercantile into a merely government establishment, the trade to China became completely thrown open to English private enterprise, which pushed on with such vigor that, in 1837, 39,000 chests of opium, valued at \$25,000,000, were successfully smuggled into China, despite the desperate resistance of the Celestial Government. Two facts here claim our attention: First, that of every step in the progress of the export trade to China since 1816, a disproportionately large part progressively fell upon the opium-smuggling branch; and secondly, that hand in hand with the gradual extinction of the ostensible mercantile interest of the Anglo-Indian Government in the opium trade, grew the importance of its fiscal interest in that illicit traffic. In 1837 the Chinese Government had at last arrived at a point where decisive action could no longer be delayed. The continuous drain of silver, caused by the opium importations, had begun to derange the exchequer, as well as the moneyed circulation of the Celestial Empire. Heu Naetse, one of the most distinguished Chinese statesmen, proposed to legalize the opium trade and make money out of it; but after a full deliberation, in which all the high officers of the Empire shared, and which extended over a period of more than a year's duration, the Chinese Government decided that, "On account of the injuries it inflicted on the people, the nefarious traffic should not be legalized." As early as 1830, a duty of 25 per cent would have yielded a revenue of \$3,850,000. In 1837, it would have yielded double that sum, but then the Celestial barbarian declined laying a tax sure to rise in proportion to the degradation of his people. In 1853, Hien-Fung, the present

^a N. Allen, *An Essay on the Opium Trade*, Boston, 1850, p. 15.—*Ed.*

Emperor, under still more distressed circumstances, and with the full knowledge of the futility of all efforts at stopping the increasing import of opium, persevered in the stern policy of his ancestors. Let me remark, *en passant*, that by persecuting the opium consumption as a heresy the Emperor gave its traffic all the advantages of a religious propaganda. The extraordinary measures of the Chinese Government during the years 1837, 1838 and 1839, which culminated in Commissioner Lin's arrival at Canton, and the confiscation and destruction, by his orders, of the smuggled opium, afforded the pretext for the first Anglo-Chinese war, the results of which developed themselves in the Chinese rebellion, the utter exhaustion of the Imperial exchequer, the successful encroachment of Russia from the North, and the gigantic dimensions assumed by the opium trade in the South. Although proscribed in the treaty with which England terminated a war, commenced and carried on in its defense, the opium trade has practically enjoyed perfect impunity since 1843. The importation was estimated, in 1856, at about \$35,000,000, while, in the same year, the Anglo-Indian Government drew a revenue of \$25,000,000, just the sixth part of its total State income, from the opium monopoly. The pretexts on which the second opium war has been undertaken are of too recent date to need any commentary.

We cannot leave this part of the subject without singling out one flagrant self-contradiction of the Christianity-canting and civilization-mongering British Government. In its imperial capacity it affects to be a thorough stranger to the contraband opium trade, and even to enter into treaties proscribing it. Yet, in its Indian capacity, it forces the opium cultivation upon Bengal, to the great damage of the productive resources of that country; compels one part of the Indian ryots to engage in the poppy culture; entices another part into the same by dint of money advances; keeps the wholesale manufacture of the deleterious drug a close monopoly in its hands; watches by a whole army of official spies its growth, its delivery at appointed places, its inspissation and preparation for the taste of the Chinese consumers, its formation into packages especially adapted to the conveniency of smuggling, and finally its conveyance to Calcutta, where it is put up at auction at the Government sales, and made over by the State officers to the speculators, thence to pass into the hands of the contrabandists who land it in China. The chest costing the British Government about 250 rupees is sold at the Calcutta auction mart at a price ranging from 1,210 to 1,600 rupees. But not yet satisfied with this

matter of fact complicity, the same Government, to this hour, enters into express profit and loss accounts with the merchants and shippers, who embark in the hazardous operation of poisoning an empire.

The Indian finances of the British Government have, in fact, been made to depend not only on the opium trade with China, but on the contraband character of that trade. Were the Chinese Government to legalize the opium trade simultaneously with tolerating the cultivation of the poppy in China, the Anglo-Indian exchequer would experience a serious catastrophe. While openly preaching free trade in poison, it secretly defends the monopoly of its manufacture. Whenever we look closely into the nature of British free trade, monopoly is pretty generally found to lie at the bottom of its "freedom."

Written on September 3, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5438, September 25, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1392, September 28, 1858 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 890, October 2, 1858

Karl Marx

ANOTHER STRANGE CHAPTER OF MODERN
HISTORY¹⁰

London, Sept. 7, 1858

Some months ago I sent you a series of documents relating to the attempted betrayal of the Circassians by Mehemed Bey, alias Col. Bangya.^a A new chapter has since been added to this strange episode of the Circassian war; declarations and counter-declarations from the different parties involved giving rise, first, to serious feuds between the Hungarian and Polish emigrations at Constantinople, then to angry debates at the London headquarters of exiled Europe, as to the alleged complicity with Bangya of certain prominent personages. Fully aware of the interest attached by the revolutionary emigration of all shades and all nationalities to publications in the *Tribune*, I deliberately abstained from returning to the charge before the originals of some letters appearing in Constantinople papers, but the authenticity of which was afterward contested, had been shown to me, and before I had made sure of all the points at issue. However, I should consider it a breach of duty not to counteract the cowardly maneuvers intended to burke all further inquiry, and to throw a vail of mystery over the whole affair. If there exist a portion of the revolutionary emigration who think fit to conspire with the Russian Cabinet, and to side even with such professional spies as Bangya, let them come forward and have the courage of their opinions.

You will recollect that Bangya's confession, and the other papers attached to it, were brought to Constantinople by Lieut. Stock of the Polish detachment in Circassia, bearer of dispatches from Col.

^a See the article "A Curious Piece of History" (present edition, Vol. 15).—Ed.

Łapiński, his chief, and a member of the Military Commission which tried Bangya. Lieut. Stock stayed four months in Constantinople, to bear testimony to the truth of Łapiński's charges of treachery against Bangya, in case any judicial proceeding should be resorted to. In his confession, Bangya had identified Kossuth, Gen. Stein, Col. Türr, and the part of the Hungarian emigration, headed by Kossuth, with his own intrigues in Circassia. The Poles, at Constantinople, on receiving communication of the news and papers brought by Lieut. Stock, did not implicitly accept as true the charges made by Bangya against his countrymen, but distrusting their genuineness, resolved to keep the documents in their possession. While waiting for further news from Circassia, they limited themselves to the insertion in the *Presse d'Orient* of a short notice of the treason and condemnation of Mehemed Bey, alias Bangya. After the appearance of this paragraph they received visits from several Hungarians, amongst others from Col. Türr, who declared it to be an insult to himself, as a Hungarian, and to all the emigration. However, having read the papers which came from Circassia, Türr, after denials of a very unsatisfactory nature as to Bangya's assertions relating to his own complicity, exclaimed that Bangya ought to be hung, and begged that an emissary be sent to Sepher Pasha to press him to confirm and execute the sentence of the Commission. He was then allowed by the Poles to take with him a letter from Bangya exhorting his countrymen to abstain from all intervention in Circassia and from all intrigue against the Poles.

"As for our plans," says Bangya in this letter, "they are forever ruined, and I am at the mercy of Łapiński."^a

The Poles, not content with communicating the papers afterward printed in the *Tribune*, to Türr and other Hungarians, gave another unmistakable proof of their good faith. To ingratiate himself, after his condemnation to death, with his judges, by proving to them that he was ready to make a clean breast of all he knew, Bangya had revealed to Łapiński, the President of the Court Martial, all the history of the preparations of his countrymen against Austria. He told him the nature of their resources, the cities where they were forming arm-depots, and the names of the individuals in charge of them. The Poles at once informed the Hungarians of the danger which menaced them, showed them all the papers they had received on these matters, which have never

^a Quoted from *The Free Press*, No. 20, August 25, 1858.—Ed.

been published, and to assure them that they would ever be kept secret, proposed that they should be sealed up in their presence with their own seals. These papers are still in existence, with the seals unbroken. Among the individuals who put on these seals are Türr, Tüköry (Selim Agha), Thalmayr (Emin Agha) and other chiefs of the Kalmár emigration at Constantinople who subsequently signed manifestoes^a in vindication of Bangya.¹¹

Shortly after Türr's interview with the Poles, there appeared in the lithographed correspondence of Havas at Paris a telegraphic dispatch to the following effect:

"A letter of Col. Türr, received at Marseilles, gives the lie to the assertions of the *Presse d'Orient* relating to the treason and condemnation of Col. Mehemed Bey."

This paragraph was reproduced in most of the European prints. At the same time some Hungarians produced letters from Circassia in the office of the *Presse d'Orient* stating that Mehemed Bey was free, and in continued relations with Sepher Pasha. Bangya was presented to the public as a martyr to the cause of liberty; Col. Łapiński was accused of forgery and other crimes, and the Poles at Constantinople were made to appear his accomplices. Even ridiculous attempts at intimidating the Poles were resorted to. It was only then that the latter gave publicity to Bangya's confession and the papers attached to it in the *Tribune*^b and the London *Free Press*.^c Meanwhile, Bangya arrived at Constantinople, and presented himself at the office of the *Presse d'Orient*. The editors of that journal told him that they had published the news concerning him because they had not the least reason to doubt its veracity, but that they were ready to rectify it, if he was able to bring irrefutable proofs of its falsehood. Bangya contented himself with answering that all was false, that he was the victim of an intrigue, and then narrated a mass of details which he was not interrogated upon, as to the events in Circassia. On the question how he, a Turkish officer, the Circassian Commander-in-Chief, could have written a letter evidently destined for the Russian General Philipson, a letter sufficient to prove all the accusations preferred against him, he contrived to slip this dangerous ground by negligently replying that he was preparing

^a "Charge of Hungarian Treachery", *The Free Press*, No. 18, June 30, 1858.—*Ed.*

^b See the article "A Curious Piece of History" (present edition, Vol. 15).—*Ed.*

^c "Recent Treachery in Circassia", *The Free Press*, No. 16, May 12, 1858.—*Ed.*

an answer to the confession falsely attributed to him. He ended the conversation by promising to answer in the journal the charges brought against him; a proposal accepted on the condition that his letter should contain no individual attacks. A French officer, a French priest and an Armenian publicist were present at this meeting, and declared themselves willing to bear witness before any tribunal. In a second interview, on the 25th of April, Bangya handed over to the editors of the *Presse d'Orient* his letter, which, contrary to the agreement, vilified Col. Łapiński and Ibrahim Bey, while taking care to suppress the name of Lieut. Stock, who, unfortunately, was still remaining at Constantinople. After some alterations, insisted upon by the editors, had been made in the letter, it appeared in the *Presse d'Orient*. Its principal points are these:

"I have been the victim of an infamous intrigue on the part of Ibrahim Bey and Mr. Łapiński. It was on the 31st December last, toward evening, that Ibrahim Bey sent for me to his house for a private conversation. I went unarmed. Hardly had I entered the room of Ibrahim Bey, where I found my enemies assembled, than I was arrested, and during the same night conducted toward Aderbi. Being in the power of my enemies, my life and that of my whole family ran the greatest danger; but for the menaces of the Circassians I should have been assassinated. But at last, on the 19th of March, the Circassian chiefs set me at liberty, and it was the turn of Łapiński, Ibrahim Bey and Sepher Pasha himself, to trouble and to ask my pardon for all the evil they had done me. One word from me would have sufficed to make their heads roll in the dust.... As to the seizure of papers which proved treason, or a council of Circassian chiefs and European officers, any condemnation whatever,... all these fine things are the inventions of the correspondent, agent and gossip of Mr. Łapiński.... The pretended historical memoir of which you have the copy under your eyes, is a *romance fabricated in part at Constantinople* by Mr. T—, and revised by Mr. Łapinski. It is an intrigue prepared long since and combined since my departure for Circassia. This paper is destined to compromise an illustrious personage and to draw money from a great power."^a

Some days after the insertion of this his letter in the *Presse d'Orient*, Bangya, from reasons best known to himself, with a cool impudence characteristic of the man, declared in the *Journal de Constantinople* that the editor of the *Presse d'Orient* had modified his letter in such a way as to disable him from acknowledging its authenticity. Now, I have seen the original letter, I know Bangya's handwriting, and I can bear witness that all the modifications complained of are simply the substitution of initials for names and the addition of some introductory lines in which the editors of the *Presse d'Orient* are complimented on the exactitude of their

^a Bangya's letter, published in *La Presse d'Orient* on April 28, 1858, is quoted from *The Free Press*, No. 18, June 30, 1858.—Ed.

information. All Bangya wanted was to throw doubts into the public mind. Unable to utter anything further, he, as if *re bene gesta*,^a resolved to wrap himself up in the stubborn silence of persecuted virtue. Meanwhile there appeared two documents in the London papers—the one signed by the chiefs of the Hungarian emigration at Constantinople, the other by Col. Türr. In the former, the same men who had put their seals on the papers proving Bangya's guilt profess their belief that "Bangya will be able to justify himself," affect to "consider the affair of Mehemed Bey as an individual matter," and "as one devoid of all international character," while they stigmatize the friends of Col. Łapiński as "demons whose aim it is to sow discord between the two emigrations." Türr, who has, meanwhile, transformed himself into Achmet Kiamil Bey, declares in his letter:

"Hardly had I heard of the arrival of Mehemed Bey at Constantinople, when I went to see him, accompanied by Capt. Kabat (a Pole), and categorically inquired of him if the confessions contained in the memorandum which has been published in the newspapers were true. He replied that he had treacherously been arrested, and had been taken before a commission consisting of Poles, but that, after two sittings of this commission, M. Łapiński, the commander of eighty-two Poles in Circassia, had come to see him in his confinement, and had told him that all his confessions before the commission would be of no use; that to serve his (Łapiński's) plans it would be necessary for him (Mehemed Bey) to write with his own hand a memorandum, already written and arranged by Łapiński. *He* (Mehemed Bey) refused to write the first memorandum submitted to him, and which was the one the journals had published. Łapiński then modified it, and prepared a second, which he (Mehemed Bey) wrote and signed, under a threat to be shot, and thus to be disabled to defend himself against the accusations with which Łapiński was sure to stain his memory after his death. The original of this document has hitherto never been produced.

"After this declaration of Mehemed Bey, *I am not in a position to know which of the two is the scoundrel.*"^b

Now it will be seen at once that Türr asserts Bangya to have only signed his confession when compelled and menaced by Łapiński, while at the same time Bangya himself declares that his confession was fabricated at Constantinople, and even before his departure for Circassia.

All these maneuvers were at last put an end to by the arrival of letters of Sepher Pasha, and of a great number of Circassians. A deputation of the latter called on the editor of the *Presse d'Orient*, affirmed all the published details of Bangya's treachery, and

^a Everything was all right.—*Ed.*

^b "Charge of Hungarian Treachery", *The Free Press*, No. 18, June 30, 1858.—*Ed.*

declared themselves ready to bear testimony, by an oath on the Koran, to the truth of their assertions, before Bangya himself and any number of witnesses. Neither did Bangya dare to present himself before this tribunal of honor, nor did Türr, Tüköry, Kalmár, Veress and his other supporters, compel him to come forward and prove his innocence.

Still, during the Russian war, Mr. Thouvenel, the French Ambassador, had written to Paris for information concerning Bangya, and learned that he was a spy at the service of whoever would pay him. Mr. Thouvenel applied for his removal from Anapa, but Bangya defended himself by testimonials from Kossuth. To the appeal to the fraternity of nations in the Hungarian manifesto, to which we have referred, the Poles were justified in answering as follows:

"You talk to us of the fraternity of nations; we have taught you that fraternity in the defiles of the Carpathians, on all the roads of Transylvania, in the plains of the Theiss and of the Danube. The Hungarian people will not have forgotten it, as forgot it those constitutionalists who, in 1848, voted millions of florins and thousands of men against Italy—as forgot it those republicans who, in 1849, were begging a king from Russia—as forgot it those chiefs of the State who, in the midst of a war for independence and liberty, were crying out to expel from the Hungarian territory all the Wallachian people—as forgot it those market-place orators in their peregrinations through America. Did he^a at least tell the Americans—who paid him as they pay a Lola Montez or a Jenny Lind—did he tell them that he, the orator, was the first to leave his dying country, and that the last who abandoned that blood-stained land, just about to be covered with sorrows, was an old general, a hero and a Pole, Bem?"^b

To complete our relation we add the following letter of Col. Łapiński:

Col. Łapiński to ... Pasha—. [Extract.]

Aderbi, Circassia,—.

Sir: It is now nearly two years since I arrived here, yielding to your request and trusting to your word. I need not remind your Excellency how the latter has been kept. I have remained without arms, without clothes, without money, and even without a sufficiency of food.

All this, I trust, is not to be attributed to any ill-will on the part of your Excellency, but to other causes, and especially to your unfortunate connection with men who bear no interest to your country. During one year one of the most subtle of the Russian spies was forced upon me. With God's help I baffled his intrigues, showed him I knew him, and now I have him in my power. I entreat of your Excellency to break off all intercourse with the Hungarians; avoid especially Stein and Türr—they are Russian spies. The other Hungarians serve the Russians, partly unknowingly. Do not let yourself be deceived by any projects of

^a The reference is to Lajos Kossuth.—*Ed.*

^b *The Free Press*, No. 20, August 25, 1858.—*Ed.*

manufactories, mines, and extensive commerce. Every half-penny thus laid out would be thrown into the street, and that is just whither tend all the efforts of M. Türr, who only wishes your money to be spent in such a way that it may do no good to your country and no harm to the Russians. What we require here is: a gunpowder manufactory, a machine for striking money, a little printing press, a mill for grinding flour, and arms, which are not only bad here, but twice as dear as at Constantinople; even the bad saddles of the country cost twice as much as the French military saddles. As to mines it is altogether childish to think of them. Here every half-penny must be spent for the defense of the country, and not employed in speculations. Employ all your means in training troops; then not only will you be contributing to the welfare of your country, but you will obtain personal influence for yourself. Do not waste your means in trying to gain a party. The state of the country appears tranquil at present, but it is in reality fatal. Sepher Pasha and Naib^a are not yet reconciled, and that because the Russian spies prevent it. Do not regret the money you will spend in training troops here. It is the only money well spent. Do not think of cannons. Having been brought up in the artillery, I surely know their value. What I foretold before my departure, has happened. At first the Russians were surprised at the sound of them, now they laugh at them. Where I put two they put twenty; and if I have no regular troops to defend mine, the Russians will take them, as the Circassians do not know how to defend them, and we ourselves may be taken prisoners.

One last word. My men and myself are ready, Pasha, to devote ourselves to the defense of your country, and in eight months from hence I shall increase my detachment to 600 chasseurs, 260 horsemen, 260 artillery, if you send me what is necessary to equip and arm them.

If within two months I receive nothing, I shall embark and return to Turkey, and all the blame will rest upon you—not upon me or the Poles. I neither intend making use of nor deceiving the Circassians. If I cannot properly serve their cause and my own, I leave them.

I have sent Stock to Constantinople. It would be better for you to give him all you can, and send him back immediately. May God keep you under his protection. Put off nothing till the morrow, I beseech you. Lose not a moment; for dearly will you yourself pay for the time that is lost.

Lapiński^b

Written on September 7, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5436, September 23, 1858

^a Mohammed-Amin.—*Ed.*

^b *The Free Press*, No. 20, August 25, 1858.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[THE ANGLO-CHINESE TREATY]¹²

The unsuccessful issue, in a commercial point of view, of Sir Henry Pottinger's Chinese treaty, signed on August 29, 1842, and dictated, like the new treaties with China, at the cannon's mouth, is a fact now recollected even by that eminent organ of British Free Trade, the London *Economist*.^a Having stood forward as one of the staunchest apologists of the late invasion of China, that journal now feels itself obliged to "temper" the sanguine hopes which have been cultivated in other quarters. *The Economist* considers the effects on the British export trade of the treaty of 1842, "a precedent by which to guard ourself against the result of mistaken operations." This certainly is sound advice. The reasons, however, which Mr. Wilson alleges in explanation of the failure of the first attempt at forcibly enlarging the Chinese market for Western produce, appear far from conclusive.

The first great cause pointed out of the signal failure is the speculative overstocking of the Chinese market, during the first three years following the Pottinger treaty, and the carelessness of the English merchants as to the nature of the Chinese demand. The English exports to China which, in 1836, amounted to £1,326,000, had fallen in 1842 to £969,000. Their rapid and continued rise during the following four years, is shown by these figures:

1842	£969,000	1844	£2,305,000
1843	1,456,000	1845	2,395,000

^a Here and below see the article "The Commercial Effects of the Treaty with China. The Export Trade", *The Economist*, No. 784, September 4, 1858.—*Ed.*

Yet in 1846 the exports did not only sink below the level of 1836, but the disasters overtaking the China houses at London during the crisis of 1847 proved the *computed* value of the exports from 1843 to 1846, such as it appears in the official return tables, to have by no means corresponded to the value actually *realized*. If the English exporters thus erred in the quantity, they did not less so in the quality of the articles offered to Chinese consumption. In proof of the latter assertion, *The Economist* quotes from Mr. W. Cooke, the late correspondent of the London *Times* at Shanghai and Canton, the following passages:

"In 1843, 1844 and 1845, when the northern ports had just been opened, the people at home were wild with excitement. An eminent firm at Sheffield sent out a large consignment of knives and forks, and declared themselves prepared to supply all China with cutlery. [...] They were sold at prices which scarcely realized their freight. A London house, of famous name, sent out a tremendous consignment of pianofortes, which shared the same fate. What happened in the case of cutlery and pianos occurred also, in a less noticeable manner, in the case of worsted and cotton manufactures. Manchester made a great blind effort when the ports were opened, and that effort failed. Since then she has fallen into an apathy, and trusts to the chapter of accidents."

Lastly, to prove the dependence of the reduction, maintenance or improvement of the trade, on the study of the wants of the consumer, *The Economist* reproduces from the same authority the following return for the year 1856:

	1845.	1846.	1856.
Worsted Stuffs (pieces) ..	13,569	8,415	7,428
Camlets	13,374	8,034	4,470
Long ells	91,530	75,784	36,642
Woolens	62,731	56,996	38,553
Printed Cottons	100,615	81,150	281,784
Plain Cottons	2,998,126	1,859,740	2,817,624
Cotton Twist, 1bs.....	2,640,090	5,324,050	5,579,600

Now all these arguments and illustrations explain nothing beyond the reaction following the overtrade of 1843-45. It is a phenomenon by no means peculiar to the Chinese trade, that a sudden expansion of commerce should be followed by its violent contractions, or that a new market, at its opening, should be choked by British oversupplies; the articles thrown upon it being not very nicely calculated, in regard either to the actual wants or the paying powers of the consumers. In fact, this is a standing feature in the history of the markets of the world. On Napoleon's fall, after the opening of the European continent, British imports proved so disproportionate to the continental faculties of absorp-

tion, that "the transition from war to peace" proved more disastrous than the continental system itself.¹³ Canning's recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies in America, was also instrumental in producing the commercial crisis of 1825. Wares calculated for the meridian of Moscow, were then dispatched to Mexico and Colombia. And in our own day, notwithstanding its elasticity, even Australia has not escaped the fate common to all new markets, of having its powers of consumption as well as its means of payment over-stocked. The phenomenon peculiar to the Chinese market is this, that since its opening by the treaty of 1842, the export to Great Britain of tea and silk of Chinese produce has continually been expanding, while the import trade into China of British manufactures has, on the whole, remained stationary. The continuous and increasing balance of trade in favor of China might be said to bear an analogy to the state of commercial balance between Russia and Great Britain; but, then, in the latter case, everything is explained by the protective policy of Russia, while the Chinese import duties are lower than those of any other country England trades with. The aggregate value of Chinese exports to England, which before 1842 might be rated at about £7,000,000, amounted in 1856 to the sum of about £9,500,000. While the quantity of tea imported into Great Britain never reached more than 50,000,000 lbs. before 1842, it had swollen in 1856 to about 90,000,000 lbs. On the other hand, the importance of the British import of Chinese silks only dates from 1852. Its progress may be computed from the following figures:

	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.
Silk imp'd. lb.	2,418,343	2,838,047	4,576,706	4,436,862	3,723,693
Value£	—	—	3,318,112	3,013,396	3,676,116

Now take, on the other hand, the movement of the

BRITISH EXPORTS TO CHINA, VALUED IN POUNDS STERLING.

1834	£842,852	1836	£1,326,388
1835	1,074,708	1838	1,204,356

For the period following the opening of the market in 1842 and the acquisition of Hong Kong by the British, we find the following returns:

1845	£2,359,000	1853	£1,749,597
1846	1,200,000	1854	1,000,716
1848	1,445,950	1855	1,122,241
1852	2,508,599	1856, upward of	2,000,000

The Economist tries to account for the stationary and relatively decreasing imports of British manufacture into the Chinese market by foreign competition, and Mr. Cooke is again quoted to bear witness to this proposition. According to this authority, the English are beaten by fair competition in the Chinese market in many branches of trade. The Americans, he says, beat the English in drills and sheetings. At Shanghai in 1856 the imports were 221,716 pieces of American drills, against 8,745 English, and 14,420 of American sheetings, against 1,240 English. In woolen goods, on the other hand, Germany and Russia are said to press hardly on their English rivals. We want no other proof than this illustration to convince us that Mr. Cooke and *The Economist* are both mistaken in the appreciation of the Chinese market. They consider as limited to the Anglo-Chinese trade features which are exactly reproduced in the trade between the United States and the Celestial Empire. In 1837, the excess of the Chinese exports to the United States over the imports into China was about £860,000. During the period since the treaty of 1842, the United States have received an annual average of £2,000,000 in Chinese produce, for which we paid in American merchandise £900,000. Of the £1,602,849, to which the aggregate imports into Shanghai, exclusive of specie and opium, amounted in 1855, England supplied £1,122,241, America £272,708, and other countries £207,900; while the exports reached a total of £12,603,540, of which £6,405,040 were to England, £5,396,406 to America, and £102,088 to other countries. Compare only the American exports to the value of £272,708, with their imports from Shanghai exceeding £5,000,000. If, nevertheless, American competition has, to any sensible degree, made inroads on British traffic, how limited a field of employment for the aggregate commerce of foreign nations the Chinese market must offer.

The last cause assigned to the trifling importance the Chinese import market has assumed since its opening in 1842, is the Chinese revolution,¹⁴ but notwithstanding that revolution, the exports to China relatively shared, in 1851-52, in the general increase of trade, and, during the whole of the revolutionary epoch, the opium trade, instead of falling off, rapidly obtained colossal dimensions. However that may be this much will be admitted, that all the obstacles to foreign imports originating in the disordered state of the empire must be increased, instead of being diminished, by the late piratical war,¹⁵ and the fresh humiliations heaped on the ruling dynasty.

It appears to us, after a careful survey of the history of Chinese

commerce, that, generally speaking, the consuming and paying powers of the Celestials have been greatly overestimated. With the present economical framework of Chinese society, which turns upon diminutive agriculture and domestic manufactures as its pivots, any large import of foreign produce is out of the question. Still, to the amount of £8,000,000, a sum which may be roughly calculated to form the aggregate balance in favor of China, as against England and the United States, it might gradually absorb a surplus quantity of English and American goods, if the opium trade were suppressed. This conclusion is necessarily arrived at on the analysis of the simple fact, that the Chinese finances and monetary circulation, in spite of the favorable balance of trade, are seriously deranged by an import of opium to the amount of about £7,000,000.

John Bull, however, used to plume himself on his high standard of morality, prefers to bring up his adverse balance of trade by periodical war tributes, extorted from China on piratical pretexts. He only forgets that the Carthaginian and Roman methods of making foreign people pay,¹⁶ are, if combined in the same hands, sure to clash with, and destroy each other.

Written on September 10, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5446, October 5, 1858
as a leading article

Karl Marx
BRITISH COMMERCE AND FINANCE

London, Sept. 14, 1858

In reviewing the Report on the Crisis of 1857-58 of the Committee appointed by the House of Commons, we have, first, shown the ruinous tendencies of Sir Robert Peel's Bank act,^a and, secondly, done away with the false notion, attributing to banks of issue the power of affecting general prices by an arbitrary expansion or contraction of the paper currency.^b We arrive, then, at the question, What were the real causes of the crisis? The Committee state that they have established "to their satisfaction, that the recent commercial crisis in this country, as well as in America and in the North of Europe, was mainly owing to excessive speculation and abuse of credit." The value of this solution is certainly not in the least impaired by the circumstance that, to find it out, the world have not waited upon the Parliamentary Committee, and that all the profit society may possibly derive from the revelation must at this time be fully discounted. Granted the truth of the proposition—and we are far from contesting it—does it solve the social problem, or does it but change the terms of the question? For a system of fictitious credit to spring up, two parties are always requisite—borrowers and lenders. That the former party should at all times be eager at trading upon the other people's capital, and endeavor to enrich themselves at other people's risk, seems so exceedingly simple a tendency that the opposite one would bewilder our understanding. The question is rather how it happens that, among all modern industrial nations, people are caught, as it were, by a periodical fit

^a The reference is to the English Bank Act of 1844.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 3-7.—*Ed.*

of parting with their property upon the most transparent delusions, and in spite of tremendous warnings repeated in decennial intervals. What are the social circumstances reproducing, almost regularly, these seasons of general self-delusion, of over-speculation and fictitious credit? If they were once traced out, we should arrive at a very plain alternative. Either they may be controlled by society, or they are inherent in the present system of production. In the first case, society may avert crises; in the second, so long as the system lasts, they must be borne with, like the natural changes of the seasons.

We consider this to be the essential defect not only of the recent Parliamentary Report, but of the "Report on the Commercial Distress of 1847,"^a and all the other similar reports which preceded them—that they treat every new crisis as an insulated phenomenon, appearing for the first time on the social horizon, and, therefore, to be accounted for by incidents, movements and agencies altogether peculiar, or presumed to be peculiar, to the one period just elapsed between the penultimate and the ultimate revulsion. If natural philosophers had proceeded by the same puerile method, the world would be taken by surprise on the reappearance even of a comet. In the attempt at laying bare the laws by which crises of the market of the world are governed, not only their periodical character, but the exact dates of that periodicity must be accounted for. The distinctive features, moreover, peculiar to every new commercial crisis, must not be allowed to overshadow the aspects common to all of them. We should overstep the limits and the purpose of our present task, were we even to give the faintest outline of such an inquiry. This much seems undisputed, that the Commons' Committee, so far from solving the question, has not even put it in its adequate terms.

The facts dwelt upon by the Committee, with a view to illustrate the system of fictitious credit, lack, of course, the interest of novelty. The system itself was in England carried on by a very simple machinery. The fictitious credit was created through the means of accommodation bills. The latter were discounted principally by joint-stock country banks, which rediscounted them with the London bill brokers. The London bill brokers, looking only to the indorsement of the Bank, not to the bills themselves, in their turn relied not upon their own reserves, but upon the

^a *Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts...*, London, 1858 and *First Report from the Secret Committee on Commercial Distress*, London, 1848.—Ed.

facilities afforded to them by the Bank of England. The principles of the London bill brokers may be understood from the following anecdote, related to the Committee by Mr. Dixon, the late Manager Director of the Liverpool Borough Bank:

"In incidental conversation about the whole affair, one of the bill brokers made the remark that if it had not been for Sir Robert Peel's act the Borough Bank need not have suspended. In reply to that, I said that whatever might be the merits of Sir Robert Peel's act, for my own part I would not have been willing to lift a finger to assist the Borough Bank through its difficulties, if the so doing had involved the continuance of such a wretched system of business as had been practiced, and I said if I had only known half as much of the proceedings of the Borough Bank before I became a Managing Director, as you must have known, by seeing a great many of the bills of the Borough Bank discounted, you would never have caught me being a stockholder." The rejoinder to which was: "Nor would you have caught me being a stockholder; it was very well for me to discount the bills, but I would not have been a shareholder either."

The Borough Bank in Liverpool, the Western Bank of Scotland, in Glasgow, the Northumberland and Durham District Bank, into the operations of which three banks the Committee instituted the strictest inquiry, seem to have carried the palm in the race of mismanagement. The Western Bank in Glasgow, which had 101 branches throughout Scotland and connections in America, allowed to draw upon it for the mere sake of the commission, raised its dividend in 1854 from 7 to 8 per cent, in 1856 from 8 to 9 per cent, and declared a dividend of 9 per cent, still in June, 1857, when the greater part of its capital was gone. Its discounts which in 1853 were £14,987,000 had been increased in 1857 to £20,691,000. The rediscounts of the bank in London, amounting in 1852 to £407,000, had risen in 1856 to £5,407,000. The whole capital of the bank being but £1,500,000, the sum of £1,603,000 appeared on its failure, in Nov. 1857, to be owed to it by the four installment houses alone of McDonald, Monteith, Wallace and Pattison. One of the principal operations of the bank consisted in making advances upon "interests," that is to say, manufacturers were provided with capital, the security for which consisted in the eventual sale of the produce to be created through the means of the loan advanced. The levity with which the discount business was managed, appears from the circumstance that McDonald's bills were accepted by 127 different parties; only 37 being inquired about, the report on 21 of which turned out unsatisfactory or positively bad. Still McDonald's credit continued undiminished. Since 1848, a substitution was made in the books of the bank, by which debts were turned into credits, and losses into assets.

"The modes," says the Report, "in which this kind of disguise can be accomplished, will perhaps be best understood by stating the manner in which a debt called Scarth's debt, comprised in a different branch of the assets, was disposed of. That debt amounted to £120,000, and it ought to have appeared among the protested bills. It was, however, divided into four or five open credit accounts, bearing the names of the acceptors of Scarth's bill. These accounts were debited with the amount of their respective acceptances, and insurances were effected on the lives of the debtors to the extent of £75,000. On these insurances, £33,000 have been paid as premiums by the bank itself. These all now stand as assets in the books."

Lastly, on examination it was found that £988,000 were due to the bank from its own shareholders.

The whole capital of the Northumberland and Durham District Bank amounting to £600,000 only, nearly £1,000,000 were loaned by it to the insolvent Derwent Iron Company. Mr. Jonathan Richardson, who was the moving spring of the Bank, in fact the person who managed everything, was, although no direct partner in the Derwent Iron Company, very largely interested in that unpromising concern, as holding the royalties upon the minerals which they worked. This case presents, therefore, the peculiar feature of the whole capital of a joint-stock bank being eaten up with the single view to improving the private speculations of one of its managing directors.

These two samples of the revelations contained in the Committee's report reflect a rather dismal light on the morality and general conduct of joint-stock trading concerns. It is evident that those establishments, the rapidly growing influence of which on the economy of nations can hardly be overvalued, are still far from having worked out their proper constitution. Powerful engines in developing the productive powers of modern society, they have not, like the medieval corporations, as yet created a corporate conscience in lieu of the individual responsibility which, by dint of their very organization, they have contrived to get rid of.

Written on September 14, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5445, October 4, 1858

Karl Marx

MAZZINI'S NEW MANIFESTO

London, Sept. 21, 1858

The Genoese *Dio e Popolo*, the last republican paper edited on Italian soil, having finally succumbed before the incessant persecution of the Sardinian Government, Mazzini, nothing daunted, has got up an Italian paper at London, to appear twice a month, under the title of *Pensiero ed Azione* (Thought and Action).

It is from the last number of this organ that we translate his new manifesto, which we consider a historical document enabling the reader to judge for himself of the vitality and the prospects of that part of the revolutionary emigration marshaled under the banner of the Roman triumvir. Instead of inquiring into the great social agencies on which the Revolution of 1848-9 founded, and of trying to delineate the real conditions that, during the last ten years, have silently grown up and combined to prepare a new and more powerful movement, Mazzini, relapsing, as it appears to us, into his antiquated crotchetts, puts to himself an imaginary problem which, of course, cannot but lead to a delusive solution. With him the all-absorbing question remains still—why the Refugees, as a body, have failed in their attempts at renovating the world; and still he busies himself with advertising nostrums for the cure of their political palsy. He says:

"In 1852 I declared, in a memorandum addressed to the European Democracy, what ought to-day to be the watchword, the rallying cry of the party? The answer is very simple. It is comprised in the single word of *action*, but united, European, incessant, logical, bold action. You can get liberty only by getting the conscience of liberty, and that conscience you can conquer only by action. You keep your destinies in your own hands. The world is waiting for you. The *initiative* is everywhere where a people shall rise, ready to fight and to die, in case of need, for the salvation of all, writing upon its banners the signal: God, People, Justice, Truth,

Virtue. Rise for all and you will be followed by all. It is necessary that the whole party moralize itself. Every one may pursue the study of the solution which he believes he has caught a glimpse of, but let him not stand by his exclusive colors, let him not desert the great army of the future.... We are not Democracy; we are but its vanguard. We have but to clear its way. All we want is unity of plan, superintendence of labor.... Six years have elapsed since that appeal, and the question remains unaltered. The forces of the party have numerically increased, the unity of the party is not yet constituted. Some organized minorities, by their inexhaustible vitality and the horrors which they inspire to the heart of the enemy, prove the power of union; the great bulk of the party continues to be given up to disorganisation, insulation, and, consequently, to inactivity and impotence. Small groups of devoted men, unable to bear the disgrace of inactivity, fight here and there as *tirailleurs*,^a over the whole extent of the line, every one on his own account, for his own country, without a common understanding; too weak to vanquish, on any given point, they protest and die. The bulk of the army cannot come to their rescue; it has neither plan, nor means, nor chiefs.... The alliance of Governments had been broken for a moment. The Crimean war offered to the oppressed peoples an opportunity, which they ought to have seized upon with the rapidity of lightning; for want of organization they have allowed it to faint away. We have seen true revolutionists expect the emancipation of their countries from the presumed designs of a man who cannot touch on national questions and bid insurrections to rise without the certitude of perishing. We have seen Poles make themselves Cossacks in the service of Turkey,¹⁷ forgetting Sobieski and the historical mission Poland has fulfilled in Christian Europe. There were people, like the Roumans, fancying that diplomacy would build their unity,¹⁸ as if ever in the history of the world any nationality had originated in anything else than the battles of its sons. Others, like the Italians, resolved to wait until Austria had engaged in the struggle, as if Austria could take up any other position than that of armed neutrality. Greece alone rushed to action¹⁹; but without understanding that, against the accord of the Governments, no Greek national movement is possible without an accidental revolution, dismembering the forces, and without an alliance of the Hellenic element with the Slavo-Rouman element, in order to legitimate the insurrection. The want of organization and plans which I denounce, had never become more evident. Hence the mortal discouragement which sometimes spreads throughout our ranks. What can an individual, single-handed, insulated with weak means or no means at all, do for the solution of a problem which embraces Europe? Association alone can conquer it.... In 1848 we rose on ten points, in the name of all that is great and holy. Liberty, Solidarity, People, Alliance, Fatherland, Europe belonged to us. Later on, deceived, fascinated—I know not by which cowardly and culpable delusion we allowed the movements to become localized.... We repeated, we who had overthrown Louis Philippe, the atheist phrase which resumes his reign: *Chacun pour soi, chacun chez soi*.^b It was thus that we fell. Have we nothing learned from that bitter experience? Do we not know at this time of the day that union, and union alone, gives power?

"Man consists of thought and action. Thought not embodied in acts, is but the shadow of man; action not directed and sanctified by thought, is but the galvanized corpse of man—a form without a soul. God is God, because he is the absolute identity of thought and action. Man is only man, on the condition of approaching incessantly as far as possible to that ideal.... We cannot triumph by dividing our

^a Sharpshooters.—*Ed.*

^b Each for himself, each at home.—*Ed.*

party into thinkers and workers, into men of intelligence and men of action, by I know not what sort of immoral and absurd divorce between theory and practice, between individual and collective duty, between the writer and the conspirator or fighter.... All of us preach association as the watchword of the epoch of which we are the forerunners, but how many of us do associate themselves to their brothers to work with them in common? We all have on our lips the words, *tolerance, love, liberty*, and we separate from our companions because on this or that special question their solution diverges from our own. We clap our hands in enthusiasm at those who die in order to clear us the way for action; but we do not march on their footsteps. We find fault with the imprudence of attempts undertaken on a small scale; but we try not to realize them on vast and powerful proportions. We all deplore the want of material means in the hands of the party; but how many of us do periodically contribute their penny to a common chest? We explain our failures by the powerful organization of the enemy; but how few work to found the omnipotence of our party by means of a general uniform organization, which, while domineering the present, would reflect in itself the future?... Is there no means to get out of the present, deplorable, disorganized state of the party? All of us believe that thought is holy, that its manifestations ought to be free and inviolable; that the social organization is bad, if, from excess of material inequality, it condemns the workman to the part of a machine, and deprives him of intellectual life. We believe that human individual life is sacred. We believe that association is equally sacred; that it is the watchword expressing the special mission of our epoch. We believe that the State ought not to enforce but to encourage it. We look forward with enthusiasm to a future in which universalized association between the producers shall have put participation in the place of wages. We believe in the sanctity of labor, and think every society culpable in which a man willing to live by his labor is unable to do so. We believe in nationality, we believe in humanity.... By humanity we understand the association of free and equal nations on the double basis of independence for their internal development, and of fraternity for the regulation of international life and general progress. In order that the nations and humanity, such as we understand them, be able to exist, we believe that the map of Europe must be remade; we believe in a new territorial division, supplanting the arbitrary division, operated by the treaty of Vienna,²⁰ and to be founded on the affinities of language, tradition, religion, and the geographical and political condition of every country. Now, do you not think that these common creeds will suffice for a fraternal organization? I do not tell you to surrender one single doctrine, one single conviction. I say only. Let us together give battle to the negation of every doctrine; let us united carry a second victory of Marathon²¹ against the principle of Oriental immobility which to-day threatens to reconquer Europe. All men, to whatever republican fraction belonging, but approving of the sentiments I have just enumerated, ought to constitute an European party of action, of which France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Poland, Greece, Hungary, Roumania and the other oppressed nations ought to form so many sections; every national section to be constituted independently, with its separate chest; a Central Committee, with a central chest, to be formed of the delegates of the national sections, &c.

"The unity of the party once conquered, the European question dissolves into the question where to begin? In revolutions, as in war, victory depends on the rapid concentration of the greatest possible number of forces on a given point. If the party desires a victorious revolution, it ought to choose on the map of Europe that point on which the initiative is most easy, most effective, and thither to throw all the forces every section may dispose of. Rome and Paris are the two strategical

points from which the common action is to start. By her powerful unity, the souvenirs of her great revolution and of the Napoleonian armies, by the prestige which every movement at Paris exercises over the mind of Europe, France—although every truly revolutionary rising on her part be sure to concentrate against herself all the forces of the Governments of Europe—still remains the country whose initiative would, with the greatest certitude, rouse all other oppressed nations. Save this one exception, Italy is to-day the country visibly uniting in itself the characteristics of the initiative. The universality of opinion which pushes it on need not be demonstrated; there has existed there for ten years past a series of noble protestations altogether exceptional in Europe. The cause of Italian nationality is identical with that of all nations crushed or dismembered by the partition of Vienna. The Italian insurrection, by attacking Austria, would afford a direct opportunity to the Slav and Rouman elements, which, within the bosom of the Empire, strive to emancipate themselves of it. The Italian troops, disseminated throughout the most disaffected parts of the Empire, would support their movements. Twenty thousand Hungarians, the soldiers of Austria in Italy, would range themselves round our banner of insurrection. It is, therefore, impossible for an Italian movement to become localized. The geographical position of Italy, and a population of twenty-five millions, would secure the insurrectional movement sufficient duration to allow the other nations to profit from it. Austria and France, France and England, have not in Italy that uniformity of interests which alone could create the unity of their politics. Italy, being unable to rise without overturning Papacy, would, by its insurrection, solve the problem of liberty of conscience in Europe, and meet with the sympathy of all those who cherish that liberty."

Critical remarks on Mazzini's manifesto
were written by Marx on September 21,
1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5453, October 13, 1858

Karl Marx

A NEW FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY
MANIFESTO²²

London, Sept. 24, 1858

Last night, at a public meeting held in commemoration of the 66th anniversary of the establishment of the first French Republic, M. Félix Pyat read a remarkable "*lettre aux Mandarins de la France*," in which he fiercely denounces the want of moral courage displayed under the present regime by the literary class of France. In the outlines we propose giving of it, we have occasionally swerved from the letter of the original, in order to render more strikingly its spirit:

"In the night which has enveloped France since the invasion of the *coup d'état*, you, gentlemen of the press, are the most lost of souls. You undergo your punishment with a terrible patience and submission. You undergo it in silence, as if you deserved it; with resignation, as if it was to last forever. Is it possible? For ten years not an act, not a cry, not a word of protestation or hope. Strong and weak, age and youth, great and little, professor and disciple, all dumb, all crest-fallen. Not a single voice in the desert. In the French vocabulary there is no longer a word signifying liberty. Englishmen ask us whether French is still spoken in France, and we lower our heads. Even the press of Austria girds at you—even that of Russia bewails you. An object of pity and scorn for the Cossack himself, this press of France! Bonaparte has spit upon the sun and put it out. Who is to kindle again, or to replace that dead star? Suns wanting, there remain the volcanoes. If there is to be no more light, no more warmth from above, there is still the interior sun, the subterranean flame, the ray from below, the fire of the people. Already, we see blaze that Vesuvius, and therefore, do not despair."

Commencing his review of the French literary world with the members of the *Institut*,^a Mr. Pyat addresses them thus:

"Let us begin with those who are most completely dead, with the *Immortels*. (The members of the 'Institut' going by the name of the 'Immortels.') There they

^a The *Institut de France* consists of five Academies, the first being called the *Académie française*.—Ed.

are, the chairs, or rather the coffins, of the forty! Shadows of authors, mumbling shades of epigrams; defunct minds still galvanized by the reminiscences and the regrets of the past. There is he (Guizot), an old Ixion, enamoured of the doctrinal mist,²³ pursuing his constitutional chimera, whirling from Gaud to Frohsdorf,^a the vicious circle of the monarchial wheel, the symbol, packed in straw, of the 'Fusion.'²⁴ There is that other wizard, his contemporary (Cousin), retreated from the Sorbonne to the land of love, making, like Faust, amends for time lost, with a load of three score and more on his back, relapsing into youth, and devoting himself to the Margarets of the Fronde,²⁵ because of having been too much in love with eclecticism at the age of twenty! That other fellow there (Thiers), neither old nor young, with something unripe and something rotten about him, an oldish child, a petrified *perpetuum mobile*, having fluttered about art, politics and history—having carpéd at the Revolution, celebrated the Empire, and entombed twice the great man^b in the *Dôme des Invalides* and in his books²⁶; in one word, the national historian, the Taenia^c of history, the Tacitus in ordinary to the *cent-gardes*²⁷ licensed by his Majesty, and warranted on the part of the Government. And last, not least, that Homer without an *Iliad* (Lamartine), that Belisar without campaigns, who banished barbarian schoolmasters only, and sung the capture of Elvire only, historian of *Grasiella*, poet of the *Girondins*, troubadour of the Restoration, orator of the Republic, and honest pauper of the Empire.

"Let us pass from fossils to men. Let us look at the most lively among them—those at least who pretend to be so—to stand by principle, to unfurl their colors—Legitimists, Orleanists and Liberals. Another cemetery this. But there is something audible there. What? A sigh, a whine, an allusion. So far goes their breath. No farther. They pant, they weep; tears make no noise. It is but the revolt of silence, the audacity of sadness, and the courage of regrets. The Constitution is regretted; so is the Charter,²⁸ so Henry V, everybody and everything, down to the Duchesses,^d whom they themselves had bid to be gone. Béranger is embalmed; Voltaire revived from the death.... Béranger went to prison; Voltaire into exile. Their weepers go to church. To die for the ungrateful, say the brave *Débats*, is to die in vain, and they prefer living at any price.... We will not die, says the *Siecle*, save for moderation's sake. Who is wise in his generation will accept facts accomplished, and content himself with selling in the streets.... The very Brutuses among them will take to mongering opposition against Veuillot.²⁹ Yes, in the midst of this Nineteenth century, after three revolutions made in the name of the sovereignty of the people and of reason, 66 years after the revolution of September, 28 years after that of July, 10 years after that of February, in 1858, in France, they are discussing.... What? Miracles.... Oh, Lamennais, model of courage and honor, passionate lover of justice, who, the day after the battle of June, 1848, preferred breaking his pen rather than having it cut to the measure of the sword; who protested against the rich victor by the courageous cry, 'Silence for the poor'³⁰; who made his very age protest from the prison, and his death itself from the common ditch;³¹ thou wast but a coward and a fool! It is wisdom to write in order to say nothing; it is courage to speak in order to lie and betray, to keep peace with the regime of warnings, to conform to the diet prescribed by Doctor Fialin, to drink oil and treacle in the leading articles, and feed upon the legislative

^a A house near Vienna, residence of Count Chambord, pretender to the French throne.—*Ed.*

^b Napoleon I.—*Ed.*

^c Tapeworm.—*Ed.*

^d Duchesses of Berry and Orleans.—*Ed.*

debates of Piedmont and Belgium.³² All that time over, December will continue to dispose of the life, the rights, the future of France. Late representatives of the people, journalists, the best citizens, all that remains of the revolution, will be transported from the dungeons of Belle Isle³³ to those of Corsica, on the expiration of their punishment to be shipped off further still, to the burning sands of Cayenne,³⁴ as was done with Delescluze ... and such information even will have to be smuggled to France in the bottoms of the English press. Shame unheard of, even in Pagan Rome, even among the fanatics of Jiddah³⁵! A woman married and separated from her husband, arrives a stranger at Paris, is arrested and conducted to the guard-house; and now hark what the soldiers of December set about doing. We quote the official act of accusation. The Sergeant of the guard takes her up in the ward and vainly annoys her with his filthy importunities. Then he orders two of his chasseurs to enter the ward, and be more fortunate. The woman still resists the two. The Sergeant has her stretched in the barrack-room itself, on a bench, with a sack for her cushion. Then the candle is put out, and all the men, nine in number, the Sergeant and the Corporal at their head, ravish that woman, keeping her by the arms and by the legs, while she screams, 'My God, leave me, leave me!' The Sergeant, who gives the orders, as he sets the example, says: 'Take numerals each from the right to the left, everybody must pass in his turn.'... Then, afterward, two quarts of brandy are drunk at the expense of the victim. And those defenders of order, those saviours wearing medals, the prime of the nation, those chasseurs of Vincennes who made December, and who do now the work of violation by the number, platoon violation, they are committed to prison for six days, and to the payment of 16 francs damages. The violators are inviolable, and the journal that enregisters the fact is authorized to state that there are 'attenuating circumstances.' Long life to the Empereur! In truth, *The Times* is right; every man of sense and feeling must wish the total abolition of the French press, rather than see it the accomplice of such crimes. A lamp without flame, why should it smoke? Why deceive, why trouble opinion any more? Enough of lies, under the semblance of truth; enough of prostitution, with the airs of prudery; enough of cowardice, under the name of constancy; enough of corruption, under the mask of life. Hypocritic, histrionic mummies, do not longer counterfeit life, get yourselves buried, ... and, to think that these are still the best, those press men who, at least, plume themselves upon being partisans, one way or the other!... But what of the remainder? There are, first, the neutrals, insensible to collective life, withdrawn to the background of cool grottoes, there to coquet with art for art's sake, or with philosophy for philosophy's sake, a sort of hermits in ecstasy at a rhyme or a diagram, fops believing in form only, pedants sticking to abstraction, excusing their indifference by the worthlessness of the vulgar, yet allowing the imperial eagle to convey them little cakes and little crosses, suiciding themselves in their works as the insect does in its cocoon, caterpillars of vanity, chrysalids of egotism, with no heart in them, dying of self-love like Narcissus. Then there comes another gang who once did in revolutions, but now do in jobs.... Happy results of the empire of peace³⁶.... Once they served principles, now they serve the funds; once the parties, now the bankers; once they called themselves monarchy or republic, now they go by the name of the North Western or Great Eastern, subjects of the branch Mires or the house Millaud, legitimists in the pay of these Jewish dynasties, Levites³⁷ of the idols of the Bourse singing the scala of the Rentes and preaching the rights of the premium in the temple of the merchants, the tail of St. Simonism heading the choir before the altar of the golden calf again become god, and before the throne of the blackleg^a transformed into Caesar.... Fie! We smell the last ranks of the

^a Louis Bonaparte.—Ed.

literary world, official putrefaction, corpses in livery, ballooned skeletons, *Pays, Patrie, Moniteur, Constitutionnel*, the domestic pest dancing in a ring on the dung-yard of Augias."

In the second part of his "letter to the Mandarins," Mr. Pyat contrasts the active devotion of the French press at the times of the Restoration and Louis Philippe to its present total abdication. Under the regime of the octroyed charter,

"all did their duty, from the most illustrious to the most obscure. From Béranger to Fantau, from Magalon to Courier, Tay, Touy, Bert, Canchois, Chatelain, all went to the prison; some to St. Pélagie, some to Poissy. In the same way, under 'the best of Republics,' Lamenais got incarcerated, Raspail, Carrel, Marrast, Dupoty, Esquiros, Thoré—all the Republicans. Armand Carrel then, to his eternal honor, resisted force by force, covering his journal by his sword, and making Périer recoil before this memorable challenge: 'It is little, the life of a man killed furtively in the corner of a street; but it is much, the life of a man of honor who should be massacred in his own house by the *sbirria*^a of M. Périer, while resisting in the name of right. His blood would cry for vengeance. Every writer, penetrated by his own dignity, should oppose law to illegality, and force to force. Such is my duty, happen what may.'^b... However, if, since December, all 'the Mandarins' of France have withdrawn from the battlefield, the working class, and even the peasantry, have become the focus of political life. They alone bear the brunt of criminal persecutions, get up the conspiracies, take the offensive—unknown, anonymous, mere *plebs* as they are.... With them originated the affair of the Hippodrome,³⁸ and the attempts at insurrection that ran from Paris to Lyons, from St. Étienne to Bordeaux. At Angers, it was the *carriers*,^c at Châlon, it was the coopers—simple working men, who had acted on their own account, without any leaders from the upper classes."³⁹

As to the conspiracy of Châlon, Mr. Pyat gives some details hitherto unknown, with which we shall conclude these extracts. The chief of that conspiracy was a working man (cooper), thirty-two years of age, called Agénais. Mr. Lièvre, the public accuser, describes him thus to the Tribunal:

"This man is a working man, industrious, orderly, instructed, disinterested; consequently the more dangerous—the more worth attracting the eye of the police and the hand of justice. He had declared he would not bear that an Italian should have the honor of saving France.' In order to convince the Judges that that man ought to be put down the type of 'an enemy of family, religion and property,' Mr. Lièvre read the following letter, addressed from Algeria by Agénais to his mother, and intercepted by the Decembrist police: 'My African jailors, knowing my position with my family, have often placed myself between these alternatives—heart and head, feeling and duty. These trials were especially renewed whenever I received a letter from you, the effects of which they spied with lynx eyes. This lasted a long time. Finally, at the end of their tricks and tired of the struggle, a superior jailor, a

^a Police spies.—*Ed.*

^b *Le National*, January 24, 1832.—*Ed.*

^c Quarriers.—*Ed.*

high officer, came one evening to visit me in my cell, and after some words exchanged with me, ended by saying, "You will not bend, you shall be broken." "I may be broken," was my answer, "but I shall not bend." Some days later, I received communication of an order sending me to Cayenne. I had twelve hours to reflect. I turned them to advantage. Hence I have neither bent, nor was I broken. Man proposes and God disposes, always the old proverb. Congratulate you, therefore, upon having seen myself resist the allurements of your wishes, and having followed the inspirations of my conscience alone. That faithful counselor has often repeated to me that I live only by the heart and for duty, and that without them nothing would remain of me but a coarse envelope, and I feel every day more distinctly that this interior voice is that of the truth.... Such is my excuse with respect to my family.'

"An Imperial Procureur," remarks M. Pyat, "would certainly not have invented that."

Agénais, unwilling either to bend or to break, escapes from the bagno of Algiers in order to avoid that of Cayenne, gains by swimming to a ship and returns to Spain, thence to France, where he again repairs to Châlon, a faithful soldier of the Marianne, an obstinate champion of the Republic.

Written on September 24, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5458, October 19, 1858

Karl Marx

THE BRITISH AND CHINESE TREATY⁴⁰

London, Sept. 28, 1858

The official summary of the Anglo-Chinese treaty,^a which the British Ministry has at last laid before the public, adds, on the whole, but little to the information that had already been conveyed through different other channels. The first and the last articles comprise, in fact, the points in the treaty of exclusively English interest. By the first article, "the supplementary treaty and general regulations of trade," stipulated after the conclusion of the treaty of Nankin,⁴¹ are "abrogated." That supplementary treaty provided that the English Consuls residing at Hong Kong, and the five Chinese ports opened to British commerce, were to cooperate with the Chinese authorities in case any English vessels should arrive within the range of their consular jurisdiction with opium on board. A formal prohibition was thus laid upon English merchants to import the contraband drug, and the English Government, to some degree, constituted itself one of the Custom-House officers of the Celestial Empire. That the second opium war should end in removing the fetters by which the first opium war still affected to check the opium traffic, appears a result quite logical, and a consummation devoutly called for by that part of the British mercantile public which chanted most lusty applause to Palmerston's Canton fireworks.⁴² We are, however, much mistaken, if this official abandonment on the part of England of her hypocritic opposition to the opium trade is not to lead to consequences quite the reverse of those expected. By engaging the British Government to cooperate in the suppression of the opium traffic, the Chinese Government had recognized its inability to do so on its

^a *The Times*, No. 23109, September 27, 1858.—Ed.

own account. The supplementary treaty of Nankin was a supreme and rather desperate effort at getting rid of the opium trade by foreign aid. This effort having failed, and being now proclaimed a failure, the opium traffic being now, so far as England is concerned, legalized, little doubt can remain that the Chinese Government will try a method alike recommended by political and financial considerations—viz.: legalize the cultivation of the poppy in China, and lay duties on the foreign opium imported. Whatever may be the intentions of the present Chinese Government, the very circumstances in which it finds itself placed by the treaty of Tien-tsin, show all that way.

That change once effected, the opium monopoly of India, and with it the Indian Exchequer, must receive a deadly blow, while the British opium traffic will shrink to the dimensions of an ordinary trade, and very soon prove a losing one. Till now, it has been a game played by John Bull with loaded dice. To have baffled its own object, seems, therefore, the most obvious result of the opium war No. II.

Having declared “a just war” on Russia, generous England desisted, at the conclusion of peace, from demanding any indemnity for her war expenses. Having, on the other hand, all along professed to be at peace with China itself, she, accordingly, cannot but make it pay for expenses incurred, in the opinion of her own present Ministers, by piracy on her own part. However, the first tidings of the fifteen or twenty millions of pounds sterling to be paid by the Celestials proved a quieter to the most scrupulous British conscience, and very pleasant calculations as to the beneficial effects of the Sycee silver⁴³ upon the balance of trade, and the metal reserve of the Bank of England, were entered into by *The Economist* and the writers of money articles generally. But alas! the first impressions which the Palmerstonian press had given itself so much trouble to produce and work upon, were too tender to bear the shock of real information.

A “separate article provides that a sum of two millions of taels”^a shall be paid “on account of the losses sustained by British subjects through the misconduct of the Chinese authorities at Canton; and a further sum of two millions of taels on account of the expenses of the war.”

Now, these sums together amount to £1,334,000 only, while, in 1842, the Emperor of China had to pay £4,200,000, of which £1,200,000 was indemnity for the contraband opium confiscated,

^a *Tael*—a Chinese monetary unit; three taels are equal to one pound sterling.—*Ed.*

and £3,000,000 for the expenses of the war. To come down from £4,200,000, with Hong Kong into the bargain, to simple £1,334,000, seems no thriving trade after all; but the worst remains still to be said. Since, says the Chinese Emperor, yours was no war with China, but a "provincial war" with Canton only, try yourselves how to squeeze out of the province of Kwang-tung the damages which your amiable war steamers have compelled me to adjudge to you. Meanwhile, your illustrious Gen. Straubenzee may keep Canton as a material guaranty, and continue to make the British arms the laughing-stock even of Chinese braves. The doleful feelings of sanguine John Bull at these clauses, which the small booty of £1,334,000 is encumbered with, have already vented themselves in audible groans.

"Instead," says one London paper, "of being able to withdraw our 53 ships-of-war, and see them return triumphant with millions of Sycee silver, we may look forward to the pleasing necessity of sending an army of 5,000 men to recapture and hold Canton, and to assist the fleet in carrying on that provincial war which the Consul's deputy has declared. But will this provincial war have no consequences beyond driving our Canton trade to other Chinese ports?... Will not the continuation of it [the provincial war] give Russia a large portion of the tea trade? May not the Continent, and England herself, become dependent on Russia and the United States for their tea?"^a

John Bull's anxiety as to the effects of the "provincial war" upon the tea trade is not quite gratuitous. From McGregor's *Commercial Tariffs*^b it may be seen that in the last year of the former Chinese war, Russia received 120,000 chests of tea at Kiakhta. The year after the conclusion of peace with China the Russian demand fell off 75 per cent, amounting to 30,000 only. At all events, the costs still to be incurred by the British in distressing Kwang-tung are sure so to swell the wrong side of the balance that this second China war will hardly be self-paying, the greatest fault which, as Mr. Emerson justly remarks, anything can be guilty of in British estimation.

Another great success of the English invasion is contained in Art. 51, according to which

"the term barbarian is not to be applied to the British Government nor to British subjects in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese authorities."

^a "Treaties with China", *The Free Press*, No. 21, September 22, 1858.—*Ed.*

^b J. Mac-Gregor, *Commercial Tariffs and Regulations, Resources, and Trade of the Several States of Europe and America*, London, 1841-50. Quoted from *The Free Press*, No. 21, September 22, 1858.—*Ed.*

The Chinese authorities styling themselves Celestial, how humble to their understanding must not appear John Bull, who, instead of insisting on being called divine or Olympian, contents himself with weeding the character representing the word barbarian out of the official documents.

The commercial articles of the treaty give England no advantage not to be enjoyed by her rivals, and, for the present, dissolve into shadowy promises, for the greater part not worth the parchment they are written on. Art. 10 stipulates:

"British merchant ships are to be allowed to trade up the great river (Yang-tse), but in the present disturbed state of the Upper and Lower Valley, no port is to be opened for trade with the exception of Chin-kiang, which is to be opened in a year from the signature of the treaty. When peace is restored, British vessels are to be admitted to trade at such ports, as far as Hankow, not exceeding three in number, as the British Minister, after consulting with the Chinese Secretary of State, shall determine."

By this article, the British are in fact excluded from the great commercial artery of the whole empire, from "the only line," as *The Morning Star* justly remarks, "by which they can push their manufactures into the interior." If they will be good boys, and help the Imperial Government in dislodging the rebels from the regions now occupied by them, then they may eventually navigate the great river, but only to particular harbors. As to the new seaports opened, from "all" the ports, as at first advertised, they have dwindled down to five ports, added to the five ports of the treaty of Nankin, and, as a London paper remarks, "they are generally remote or insular." Besides, at this time of the day, the delusive notion of the growth of trade being proportionate to the number of ports opened, should have been exploded. Consider the harbors on the coasts of Great Britain, or France, or the United States, how few of them have developed themselves into real emporiums of commerce? Before the first Chinese war, the English traded exclusively to Canton. The concession of five new ports, instead of creating five new emporiums of commerce, has gradually transferred trade from Canton to Shanghai, as may be seen from the following figures, extracted from the Parliamentary Blue-Book on the trade of various places for 1856-57. At the same time, it should be recollected that the Canton imports include the imports to Amoy and Fu-chow, which are transhipped at Canton. [See Table on p. 50.]

"The commercial clauses of the treaty are unsatisfactory," is a conclusion arrived at by *The Daily Telegraph*, Palmerston's most abject sycophant; but it chuckles at "the brightest point in the

	British import trade to		British export trade from	
	Canton.	Shanghai.	Canton.	Shanghai.
1844.....	\$15,500,000	\$2,500,000	\$17,900,000	\$2,300,000
1845.....	10,700,000	5,100,000	27,700,000	6,000,000
1846.....	9,900,000	3,800,000	15,300,000	6,400,000
1847.....	9,600,000	4,300,000	15,700,000	6,700,000
1848.....	6,500,000	2,500,000	8,600,000	5,000,000
1849.....	7,900,000	4,400,000	11,400,000	6,500,000
1850.....	6,800,000	3,900,000	9,900,000	8,000,000
1851.....	10,000,000	4,500,000	13,200,000	11,500,000
1852.....	9,900,000	4,600,000	6,500,000	11,400,000
1853.....	4,000,000	3,900,000	6,500,000	13,300,000
1854.....	3,300,000	1,100,100	6,000,000	11,700,000
1855.....	3,600,000	3,400,000	2,900,000	19,900,000
1856.....	9,100,000	6,100,000	8,200,000	25,800,000 ^a

programme," viz.: "that the British Minister may establish himself at Pekin, while a Mandarin will install himself in London, and possibly invite the Queen to a ball at Albert Gate." However John Bull may indulge this fun, there can be no doubt that whatever political influence may be exercised at Pekin will fall to the part of Russia, which, by dint of the last treaty, holds a new territory, being as large as France, and, in great part, on its frontier, 800 miles only distant from Pekin. It is by no means a comfortable reflection for John Bull that he himself, by his first opium-war, procured Russia a treaty yielding her the navigation of the Amoor and free trade on the land frontier, while by his second opium-war he has helped her to the invaluable tract lying between the Gulf of Tartary and Lake Baikal, a region so much coveted by Russia that from Czar Alexei Michaelowitch down to Nicholas, she has always attempted to get it.⁴⁴ So deeply did the London *Times*^b feel that sting that, in its publication of the St. Petersburg news, which greatly exaggerated the advantages won by Great Britain, good care was taken to suppress that part of the telegram which mentioned Russia's acquisition by treaty of the valley of the Amoor.

Written on September 28, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5455, October 15, 1858; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1398, October 19, 1858

^a "What Commercial Treaties May Really Effect", *The Economist*, No. 785, September 11, 1858.—*Ed.*

^b "The Russian Despatch from China", *The Times*, No. 23085, August 30, 1858.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[THE QUESTION OF THE ABOLITION OF SERFDOM
IN RUSSIA]⁴⁵

The serious turn which the serf question now seems likely to take in Russia will be best understood from the extraordinary step the Czar, Alexander II, has been driven to, of summoning to St. Petersburg a sort of general representation of the nobles to discuss the abolition of serfdom. The labors of the "Chief Peasant Question Committee"⁴⁶ have proved little better than abortive, and only led to fierce quarrels among its own members, quarrels in which the Chairman of that Committee, the Grand Duke Constantine, sided with the old Russian party against the Czar. The Provincial Committees of nobles, in their turn, seem, for the greater part, to have embraced the opportunity afforded for the official discussion of the preparatory steps of emancipation, with the single view of baffling the measure. An abolitionist party certainly exists among the Russian nobles, but while it forms only a numerical minority, it is divided on the most important points. To declare against servitude, but to allow emancipation under such conditions only as would reduce it to a mere sham, appears the fashionable doctrine even with the liberal Russian nobility. In fact, this open resistance to, or lukewarm support of, emancipation appears natural enough on the part of the old slaveowners. Revenue falling off, diminution in the value of their landed property, and a serious encroachment on the political power they have been wont to wield, as so many minor autocrats revolving around the central autocrat, such are the immediate consequences they predict, and which they can hardly be expected to incur with eagerness. It has become impossible even now, in some provinces, to raise loans on the security of landed property, consequent upon the uncertainty prevailing as to the impending depreciation in the value of estates. A great part of the landed property in Russia is mortgaged to the State itself, and, say its owners, how shall we deal with our obligations to the Government? Many have private

debts weighing upon their estates. A great number live on the dues paid to them by their serfs established in the towns as merchants, traders, handicraftsmen and operatives. Their incomes, of course, would vanish with the disappearance of serfdom. There are also small Boyars who possess a very limited number of serfs, but, proportionately, a still smaller area of land. If the serfs, as must be in case of emancipation, receive each a strip of ground, the proprietors will be beggared. For the great land-owners from their standpoint, it is considered almost a question of abdication. The serfs once liberated, what actual bar against Imperial power will remain at their disposal? And then, how with the taxes, which Russia is so much in need of, dependent on the actual value of land? How with the Crown peasants? All these points are mooted, and form so many strong positions behind which the friends of serfdom pitch their tents. It is a story as old as the history of nations. In fact, it is impossible to emancipate the oppressed class without injury to the class living upon its oppression, and without simultaneously discomposing the whole superstructure of the State reared on such a dismal social basis. When the time of change arrives, much enthusiasm is at first manifested; joyful felicitation upon mutual good will is dealt in, with great pomp of words as to the general love of progress, and so forth. But so soon as words are to be exchanged for deeds, some retire in fright at the ghosts raised, while most declare themselves ready to stand and fight for their real or imaginary interests. It is but with the support of revolution or war that the legitimate Governments of Europe have ever been able to suppress serfdom. The Prussian Government dared to think of emancipating the peasantry only when smarting under the iron yoke of Napoleon; and even then the settlement was such, that the question had again to be handled in 1848, and, although in a changed form, remains a question still to be settled in a revolution to come.⁴⁷ In Austria, it was the revolution of 1848, and the Hungarian insurrection, but neither the legitimate government nor the good will of the ruling classes, that disposed of the question. In Russia, Alexander I and Nicholas, not from any motives of humanity, but from mere State reasons, attempted to effect a peaceful change in the state of the mass of the people,⁴⁸ but both failed. It must, in fact, be added that, after the revolution of 1848-49, Nicholas turned his back on his own former schemes of emancipation, and became an anxious adept of conservatism. With Alexander II, it was hardly a question of choice whether or not to awaken the sleeping elements. The war, bequeathed to him by his father, had devolved immense sacrifices upon the Russian

common people—sacrifices, the extent of which may be estimated from the simple fact that, during the epoch commencing in 1853 and ending in 1856, the paper money of forced currency was increased from three hundred and thirty-three millions to about seven hundred millions of roubles; all this increase of paper money representing, in fact, but taxes anticipated. Alexander II only followed the example set by Alexander I during the Napoleonic war, in cheering the peasantry with promises of emancipation. The war, moreover, led to a humiliation and a defeat, in the eyes at least of the serfs, who cannot be supposed to be adepts in the mysteries of diplomacy. To initiate his new reign by apparent defeat and humiliation, both of them to be followed by an open breach of the promises held out in war-time to the rustics, was an operation too dangerous even for a Czar to venture upon.

It appears doubtful whether Nicholas himself, with or without the Oriental war, would have been able any longer to shift off the question. Alexander II, at all events, was not so; but he supposed, nor was the supposition quite gratuitous, that the nobles, all of whom were accustomed to submit, would not recoil at his orders, and would even consider it a mark of honor to be allowed, through the instrumentality of their several committees, to act a part in this great drama. These calculations, however, have proved false. On the other hand, the peasantry, with exaggerated notions even of what the Czar intended doing for them, have grown impatient at the slow ways of their seigneurs. The incendiary fires breaking out in several provinces are signals of distress not to be misunderstood. It is further known that in Great Russia, as well as in the provinces formerly belonging to Poland, riots have taken place, accompanied by terrible scenes, in consequence of which the nobility have emigrated from the country to the towns, where, under the protection of walls and garrisons, they can bid defiance to their incensed slaves. Under these circumstances, Alexander II has seen proper in this state of things to convocate something like an assembly of notables. What if his convocation should form a new starting-point in Russian history? What if the nobles should insist upon their own political emancipation as a condition preliminary to any concession to be made to the Czar with respect to the emancipation of their serfs?

Written on October 1, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5458, October 19, 1858 as a leading article

Karl Marx

THE KING OF PRUSSIA'S INSANITY⁴⁹

Berlin, Oct. 2, 1858

In one of his tales, Hauff, the German novelist, narrates how a whole gossip-mongering, scandal-loving little town was startled out of its habitual state of self-complacency one fine morning by the discovery that the leading dandy, the lion, in fact, of the place, was but a monkey in disguise.^a The Prussian people, or part of them, seem, at this moment, to be laboring under the still less comfortable idea that all these twenty years past they have been ruled by a madman. There is a suspicion, at least, lurking in the public mind, of some such great dynastic mystification having been palmed off upon the faithful Prussian "subjects." It is certainly not, as John Bull and his able editors will have it, from the King's conduct, during the Russian war, that any such misgivings have arisen. His abstention from that bloody sham is, on the contrary, considered the sanest political act Frederick William IV has to boast of.

If a man, in any walk of life, however humble, all at once proves quite the reverse of what he was taken for, generally his angry and duped neighbors are sure to turn over the leaves of his history, rake up bygone stories, remember whenever there was something wrong with the fellow, stitch together the queer scraps and odd ends of the past, and at last arrive at the morbid satisfaction that all along they ought to have known better. Thus it is now recollected—and from personal knowledge I can attest the fact—that Dr. Jacobi, the leading physician of the Rhenish Lunatic Asylum at Siegburg, was, all at once, in the month of May, 1848, summoned to Berlin by Mr. Camphausen, the then head of the

^a W. Hauff, *Der Affe als Mensch*.—Ed.

ministry, to assist the King, who, as was then said, labored under an inflammation of the brain. The nervous system of his Majesty had, as the myrmidons of the new-fangled Cabinet whispered in very confidential circles, been rudely shaken by the days of March, and, especially, by the scene where the people placed him face to face with the bodies of the citizens killed in consequence of a preconcerted misunderstanding, forcing him to uncover his head before and implore mercy of those bloody and still warm corpses.⁵⁰ That Frederick William afterward recovered, there can be no doubt, but it is by no means clear that he has not remained, like George III, subject to periodical relapses. Some casual eccentricities in his behavior were passed over the more lightly as he was known to indulge rather freely in the libations which once drove frantic the priestesses of a certain god at Thebes.⁵¹

In October, 1855, however, when he visited Rhenish Prussia on the pretext of laying the foundation stones of the new bridge to be built over the Rhine at Cologne, strange rumors were bruited about concerning him. With his face shrunk together, his legs gone, his belly protuberant, and an expression of restless anxiety in his eyes, he looked like the specter of his former self. While speechifying, he faltered, stumbled over his own words, now and then lost the thread of his sentence, and altogether looked uncomfortable, while the Queen,^a close to his side, was anxiously watching all his movements. Contrary to his former habits, he received nobody, talked to nobody, and went nowhere but in company with the Queen, who had become quite inseparable from him. After his return to Berlin, there oozed out from time to time strange *on dits*^b as to the bodily injuries he had, in sudden fits of passion, inflicted on his own Ministers, on Manteuffel even. To lull public attention, the King was said to suffer from dropsy. Afterward, reports as to the misadventures incurred by him in his own gardens at Sans Souci, sometimes hurting an eye against a tree, at other times damaging a leg on a stone, became more and more frequent, and, as early as the beginning of 1856, it was insinuated here and there, that he labored under temporary attacks of insanity. It was more especially said that he fancied he was a non-commissioned officer, who had still to pass through the trial of what, in the technical language of the Prussian drill-sergeant, is called *Übungsmarsche*.^c Thence he used to run

^a Elizabeth.—*Ed.*

^b Rumours.—*Ed.*

^c Training marches.—*Ed.*

ill-omened races by himself in his parks at Sans Souci and Charlottenburg.

These and other reminiscences of a period of ten years are now being carefully connected. Why, it is asked, should not all that time an insane have been palmed off as King upon the Prussian people, since it is now confessed that for the last eighteen months at least Frederick William IV was kept on the throne despite his mental disease, and since, consequent upon the quarrels among the members of the royal family, the juggles played in his name by the Queen and the Ministers have been publicly exposed. In cases of insanity, arising from softening of the brain, the patients usually enjoy lucid intervals to the very moment of death. Such is the case with the King of Prussia, and this peculiar character of his insanity has afforded the fit opportunities for the frauds committed.

The Queen, always watching her husband, caught at every lucid interval of his mind to show him to the people, or make him interfere on public occasions, and drill him for the acting of the part he was to play. Sometimes her calculations were cruelly baffled. In the presence of the Queen of Portugal,^a who, as you will remember, celebrated her nuptials at Berlin, *per procura*,^b the King was to have publicly assisted at the church ceremonies. Everything was ready, and Ministers, aides-de-camp, courtiers, foreign ambassadors, and the bride herself, were waiting for him, when all at once, despite the desperate efforts of the Queen, he was overtaken by the hallucination of believing himself the bridegroom. Some queer remarks he dropped as to his singular destiny in being married again during the lifetime of his first spouse, and as to the impropriety of his (the bridegroom's) appearance in a military uniform, left his exhibitors no chance but to countermand the spectacle which had been announced.

The boldness of the Queen's operations may be inferred from the following incident: There exists still an old custom at Potsdam, according to which the fishermen once in the year pay to the King an old feudal tribute of fish. On that occasion, the Queen, to prove to the men of the people the falsehood of the rumors then freely circulating as to the state of the royal mind, dared to invite the foremost of these men to a fish dinner, to be presided over by the King himself. In fact, the dinner went off pretty well, the King muttering some words learned by rote, smiling, and, on the whole,

^a Stephanie.—*Ed.*

^b Literally: by proxy; here as a person representing the bridegroom.—*Ed.*

behaving properly. The Queen, anxious lest the scene so well got up should be spoiled, hastened to give the guests the signal of departure, when all at once the King rose, and in a thundering voice demanded to be put in the frying-pan. The Arabian tale of the man converted into a fish^a became a reality with him. It was exactly by such indiscretions, to venture upon which was one of the necessities of the Queen's game, that the comedy broke down.

I need not say that no revolutionist could have invented a better method of depreciating royalty. The Queen herself, a Bavarian princess, and sister of the ill-famed Sophia of Austria (the mother of Francis Joseph), had never been suspected by the public at large of being the head of the Berlin Camarilla. Before 1848 she went by the name of the "meek mother of the land" (*die milde Landesmutter*),^b was supposed to wield no public influence at all, and from the natural turn of her mind, to remain a complete stranger to politics. There was some grumbling at her supposed secret Catholicism, some railing at her commandership-in-chief of the mystical Order of the Swan, founded on her behalf by the King,⁵² but that was the whole stock of public aspersion she ever had to bear. After the victory of the people in Berlin, the King appealed to their forbearance in the name of the "meek mother of the land,"^c and that appeal did not fall flat upon his audience. Since the counter-revolution, however, the public appreciation of the sister of Sophia of Austria has undergone a gradual change. The person in whose name the magnanimity of the victorious people had been secured, happened to turn a deaf ear to the mothers and sisters whose sons and brothers had fallen into the hands of the victorious counter-revolution. While the "meek mother of the land" seemed to indulge the monarchic joke of having some poor militia men (*Landwehrleute*) executed at Saarlouis on the birthday of the King in 1850, at a time when the crime those men had committed, of defending popular rights, seemed already forgotten, her whole capital of sentimental religiosity was spent in public homage to the graves of the soldiers fallen in their attack upon the unarmed people of Berlin, and in similar acts of reactionary ostentation. Her fierce quarrels with the Princess of Prussia became also, by and by, subjects of public

^a *A Thousand and One Nights*. "The Fisherman and the Afreet".—Ed.

^b An expression from *Gedenkbuch an die silberne Jubel-Hochzeitsfeier ihrer königlichen Majestäten Friedrich Wilhelm IV und Elisabeth Ludovika von Preussen zu Potsdam am 29. November 1848*, Berlin, 1849, S. 353.—Ed.

^c "An Meine lieben Berliner [in der Nacht vom 18.-19. März 1848]."—Ed.

discussion, but it seemed quite natural that she, childless as she was, should bear a grudge against the haughty wife of the King's legitimate successor. I shall return to the subject.

Written on October 2, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5462, October 23, 1858; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1400, October 26, 1858 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 894, October 30, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Frederick Engels

RUSSIAN PROGRESS IN CENTRAL ASIA⁵³

A few weeks ago we noticed^a the immense step in advance taken by Russia, during the last few years, in Eastern Asia, on the Western shores of the Pacific. We shall now call the attention of our readers to a similar step in advance, taken by the same power, on another territory—that of Central Asia.

The probability of a collision of the two great Asiatic powers, Russia and England, somewhere half-way between Siberia and India, of a conflict between the Cossack and the Sepoy on the banks of the Oxus, has been often debated since, simultaneously, in 1839, England and Russia sent armies toward Central Asia.⁵⁴ The original defeat of these armies—a defeat caused in either case by the asperity of the country and its climate—for a while deprived these speculations of interest. England avenged her defeat by a successful but unproductive march to Cabul. Russia appeared to pocket her disgrace, but how little she gave up her plans and how successfully she obtained her ends, we shall soon see. When the late war broke out there was again the question raised, as to the practicability of a Russian advance to India; but little did the public know then where the Russian outposts stood, and where their advanced patrols were reconnoitering. Indian papers brought stray paragraphs of reported Russian conquests in Central Asia, but they were not heeded. Finally, during the Anglo-Persian war of 1856, the whole question was again discussed.

Matters, however, have been latterly, and are still, changing rapidly in Central Asia.^b When Napoleon in 1812, put down in his

^a See this volume, p. 50.—*Ed.*

^b *The Free Press* of November 24, 1858 gives the beginning of the article up to the words "When Napoleon in 1812..." as follows:

map Moscow for a base of operations in a campaign against India, he but followed Peter the Great. As far back as 1717, that far-sighted Prince who pointed out all the various directions for conquest to his successors, had sent an expedition against Khiva, which, of course, proved unsuccessful. The steppes of Turan remained undisturbed by Russia for a long while; but in the mean time the country between the Volga and the Ural River was peopled with Cossacks, and the Cossack line along the latter river established. Still, beyond that river, the suzerainty of Russia over the three hordes or nations of the Kirghiz remained purely nominal, and Russian caravans were plundered both by them and the Khivans, until, in 1833, General Vasily Perovsky was sent to Orenburg as commander-in-chief. He found the commercial

"I enclose *some extracts* from a memorandum which I have drawn up, on the latest progress of Russia in Central Asia. Part of these statements may perhaps be new to you, since the principal source from which they are derived—official Russian documents published at St. Petersburg in the Russian vernacular—have, so far as I know, not yet penetrated to England.

"The connexion between Lord *Palmerston's* acts and the encroachments by Russia on Central Asia becomes evident from simple attention to the chronological dates. For instance: in 1839, Russian progress in Khiva, despite a military defeat; in 1854, final success in Khiva, although Russia limited herself to a simple military demonstration and did not fire a gun; in 1856, while the progress through the Kirghiz steppe to South-Eastern Turan is quickly going on, a convergent movement in the Indian insurrection. In the Russian official documents, material facts (*faits accomplis*) only are stated; the underground agencies are, of course, studiously concealed, and the armed force which in the whole drama formed part of the scenery only, is represented as the principal actor. As you are perfectly acquainted with the diplomatic history of the case, I limit myself, in the extracts forwarded, to facts as represented by Russia herself. I have added some few considerations on the military bearings on India of the Russian progress in Central Asia.

"The question might be raised, why *Alexander II* has published documents respecting the Russian encroachments on Northern and Central Asia, documents which *Nicholas* used to anxiously conceal from the eyes of the world. Generally speaking, it may be said that *Alexander* finds himself in the position, not yet realised by his father, of initiating Europe into the secrets of Russia's 'Asiatic' destiny, and thus making Europe his professed cooperator in working out that destiny. Secondly, those documents are in fact accessible only to learned Germans who praise *Alexander's* condescension in contributing to the spread of geographical science. Lastly, after the Crimean war, the old Muscovite party was, stupidly enough, grumbling at the apparent loss of Russian prestige. *Alexander* answered them by publishing documents which not only show the immense material strides made by Russia during the last year, but the mere publication of which was an act of defiance, an asseveration of 'prestige,' such as *Nicholas* had never ventured upon."

The part of the article that follows this text is entitled "Notice of Russian Documents".—*Ed.*

relations of Russia with the interior and south of Asia completely interrupted by these plundering nomades, so that even the military escorts given for some years past to the caravans, had been insufficient to protect them. To put a stop to this, he organized, first, movable columns against the Kirghiz, and very soon after commenced establishing military stations of Cossacks in their territory. In a few years he thus brought them under the actual control and dominion of Russia, and then took up the old plans of Peter the Great against Khiva.

Having obtained the sanction of the Emperor,^a he organized a force of about a division (8,000 men) of infantry, with numerous bodies of half-regular Cossack and irregular Bashkir and Kirghiz horse. Fifteen thousand camels were brought together to carry provisions through the desert steppes. To undertake the expedition in Summer, was out of the question, on account of the scarcity of water. Thus Perovsky chose a Winter campaign, and moved in Nov., 1839, from Orenburg. The result is known. Snow-storms and excessive colds ruined his army, killed his camels and horses, and compelled him to retreat with very great loss. Still, the attempt fulfilled its ostensible purpose; for while England has never yet been able to avenge the murder of her Ambassadors, Stoddart and Conolly, at Bokhara, the Khan of Khiva^b released all Russian prisoners, and sent an embassy to St. Petersburg to seek for peace.

Perovsky then set to work to prepare a line of operations across the Kirghiz steppe. Before eighteen months had passed, scientific and engineering expeditions were busy, under military protection, surveying the whole country north of the Jaxartes (Syr-Darya), and Lake Aral. The nature of the ground, the best directions for roads, and the best sites for large wells, were explored. At short intervals these wells were bored or dug, and surrounded with fortifications of sufficient strength to withstand any attack of the nomadic hordes, and of sufficient capacity to hold considerable stores. Karabulak on the Or,^c and Irghiz on the river of the same name, served as central points of defense in the north of the Kirghiz steppe; between these and the towns on the Ural River the routes are marked by smaller forts and wells every ten or twelve^d miles.

^a Nicholas I.—*Ed.*

^b Alla-Kuly.—*Ed.*

^c More precisely, between the Or and the Irghiz.—*Ed.*

^d *The Free Press* has here "twenty" instead of "twelve".—*Ed.*

The next step was taken in 1847, by the erection of a fort on the Syr-Darya, about 45 miles above its mouth, which fort was called Aralsk. It could hold a garrison of a battalion and more. This very soon became the center of an extensive Russian agricultural colony on the lower part of the river and the adjoining shores of Lake Aral; and now Russia formally took possession of the whole country north of that lake and of the delta of the Syr-Darya. In 1848 and '49 the lake was for the first time accurately surveyed, and a new group of islands discovered, which were at once set apart for the headquarters of the Aral steam flotilla, the creation of which was taken in hand without delay. Another fort was erected on an island commanding the mouth of the Syr-Darya, and at the same time the line of communications from Orenburg to Lake Aral was further strengthened and completed.

Perovsky, who had retired from the Commandership of Orenburg in 1842, now returned to his post, and advanced in the spring of 1853 with considerable forces to Aralsk. The passage of the desert was effected without much trouble, and now the army marched up the Syr-Darya, while a steamer of light draft escorted its movements on the river. Arrived at Akmetchet, a fortress about 450 miles up its course and belonging to the Khan of Khokan,^a the Russians took it by assault and at once turned it into a stronghold of their own, and so successfully, that on its being attacked in December following by the army of Khokan, the assailants were completely defeated.

While in 1854 the attention of Europe was fixed upon the battles fought on the Danube, and in the Crimea, Perovsky, from his newly-gained base of operations on the Syr-Darya, advanced with 17,000 men against Khiva, but the Khan^b did not wait for his arrival on the Oxus. He sent Embassadors to the Russian camp who concluded a treaty, *by which the Khan of Khiva acknowledged the suzerainty of Russia*, and ceded to him the right of making peace and war, and supreme power over life and death, and the right to fix the routes of caravans, the duties and customs, and to make regulations for trade generally throughout Khiva forever. A Russian consul took up his seat at Khiva, and along with it assumed the functions of supreme arbiter, under the Russian Government, of all political matters belonging to Khiva.⁵⁵

^a Khudayar Khan.—*Ed.*

^b Mohammed-Emin.—*Ed.*

With the submission of Khiva, the conquest of Turan is virtually decided; perhaps, since then it has also been decided in reality. The Khans of Khokan and Bokhara^a have also sent embassies to St. Petersburg⁵⁶; the treaties concluded with them have not been published, but they may be pretty nearly guessed at. Whatever independence Russia may feel inclined to leave to these petty States whose sole strength lay in their inaccessibility, which now, for Russia at least, no longer exists, is of a merely nominal character; for a force of some 20,000 men, sent either from Khiva or Akmetchet, toward the more fruitful valleys of Upper Turan, would be quite sufficient to quell any attempt at opposition, and to march from one end of the country to the other. That Russia, in these regions, has not been idle since 1854, we may take for granted, although she keeps her doings secret enough, and after the rapid, silent and persevering progress she has made in Turan during the last twenty-five years, it certainly may be expected that her flag will soon wave over the mountain-passes of the Hindoo Koosh and Bolor Tagh.

The immense value of these conquests, in a military point of view, is in their importance as the nucleus of an offensive base of operations against India; and, indeed, with such an advance of the Russians in the center of Asia, the plan of attacking India from the North leaves the realm of vague speculation, and attains something like a definite shape. The tropical regions of Asia are separated from those portions which belong to the temperate zone, by a broad belt of desert passing from the shores of the Persian Gulf,^b right across that continent, to the sources of the Amoor. Leaving the Amoor country out of consideration this belt was until lately all but impassable by armies; the only imaginable route across it being that from Astrabad, on the Caspian, by Herat to Cabul and the Indus. But with the Russians, on the lower Jaxartes (Syr-Darya), and Oxus (Amu-Darya), and with military roads and forts, affording water and stores to a marching army, the Central Asiatic desert no longer exists as a military obstacle. Instead of the one unprepared route from Astrabad by Herat, to the Indus, Russia now has three different routes at her disposal, which, at no distant period, may be perfectly prepared for the march of an army. There remains, first of all, the old route by Herat, which, as matters now stand, cannot any longer be closed to Russia; secondly there is the Valley of the Oxus from Khiva to Balkh; thirdly, the Valley of the Jaxartes from Akmetchet to

^a Nasrulla Khan.—*Ed.*

^b The *New-York Daily Tribune* has here "the shores of the Baltic".—*Ed.*

Khojend, whence the force would have to strike across a well-watered and populated country, to Samarkand and Balkh. Herat, Samarkand and Balkh would form a capital base of operations against India. Balkh is only 500 miles from Peshawur, the North-Western outpost of the Anglo-Indian empire. Samarkand and Balkh belong to the Khan of Bokhara, who is even now at the mercy of Russia, and with Astrabad (which is either now occupied by Russians or may be occupied any day they like) and Balkh in the hands of Russia, Herat cannot be withheld from her grasp whenever she chooses to seize it. And as soon as this base of operations will be in her actual possession, England will have to fight for her Indian empire. From Balkh to Cabul is scarcely any further than from Cabul to Peshawur, and this one fact will show how small the neutral space between Siberia and India has now become.

The fact is, that if Russian progress goes on at the same rate and with the same energy and consistency as during the last twenty-five years, the Muscovites may be found knocking at the gates of India within ten or fifteen years. Once across the Kirghiz steppe, they get into the comparatively well cultivated and fruitful regions of Southeastern Turan, the conquest of which cannot be disputed to them, and which may easily support for years, without effort, an army of fifty thousand or sixty thousand men, quite strong enough to march anywhere up to the Indus. Such an army, in ten years, can completely subdue the country, protect the construction of roads, the colonization of a vast extent of land by Russian crown peasants (as is now done on Lake Aral), overawe all surrounding states, and prepare the base and line of operations for an Indian campaign. Whether such a campaign will ever be undertaken depends on political contingencies which are now only matters of remote speculation.^a

Written about October 8, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5471, November 3, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1404, November 9, 1858 and, with additions made by Marx, in *The Free Press*, Vol. VI, No. 23, November 24, 1858

^a Instead of the last sentence *The Free Press* has: "We defy any military man who has studied the geography of the country to deny it. And if we are right in this, then the struggle of 'the Cossack and the Sepoy' (if there be still Sepoys to fight for England), will not occur, as was expected, on the Oxus, but on the Cabul and Indus." —Ed.

Karl Marx

THE KING OF PRUSSIA'S INSANITY

Berlin, Oct. 12, 1858

It was to-day that the King left Berlin *en route* to Tyrol and Italy. Among the silent crowd waiting at the Potsdam Railway terminus to watch his departure there were many who, in 1840, had assisted at his coronation, and in his first public delivery of stump oratory, heard him solemnly swear that he would never allow a "Gallic bit of paper to interfere between him and his people."^a The same man had the misfortune not only to accept on his oath a "Gallic bit of paper"—a romantic byword this for a written charter or constitution—but to become himself the god-father of the Prussian Constitution, and, in a certain sense, to be dethroned by virtue of that same mischievous "bit of paper." You will have remarked the discrepancy existing between the King's rescript to the Prince of Prussia and the Prince's rescript to the Ministry. The King in his rescript says:

"Continuing to be personally hindered from conducting public affairs, I request your Royal Highness and Liebden for the time being, etc., to exercise the kingly power as Regent in my name, according to your best knowledge and conscience, and with responsibility to God alone."^b

The Prince, in his counter-rescript, says:

"In consequence of this Royal request and under virtue of Article 56 of the Constitution I being the next male heir to the throne, hereby take upon myself the

^a Friedrich Wilhelm IV, *Der 11. April 1847. Thron-Rede ... zur Eröffnung des Vereinigten Landtages*, Berlin, 1847, S. 6. See also this volume, p. 75.—*Ed.*

^b Here and below the quotations are from Friedrich Wilhelm IV, "Allerhöchster Erlass vom 7. Oktober 1858, betreffend die Aufforderung an Seine Königliche Hoheit den Prinzen von Preussen zur Uebernahme der Regentschaft".—*Ed.*

Regency of the country, and, according to Article 56 of the Constitution, convoke the two Houses of the Diet of the Monarchy.”^a

Now, in the Royal rescript, the King acts as a free agent, and, by his own free will, temporarily resigns. The Prince, however, refers at the same time to the “Royal request” and to “Article 56 of the Constitution” which assumes the King to be insane or captive, and, consequently, unable to install the Regency himself. The King, furthermore, in his rescript, calls upon the Regent to exercise his power “with responsibility to God alone,” while the Prince, by referring to the Constitution,^b leaves all the responsibility to the existing Ministry. According to the article quoted by the Regent, the “next heir to the throne,” has immediately to convoke the Chambers, which in a united sitting, are to decide on the “necessity of the Regency.” To take the latter power out of the hands of the Diet, the voluntary resignation of the King was insisted upon, but to become not altogether dependent upon the King’s caprices, the Constitution was referred to. Thus there is a flaw in the Regent’s claim as it professes to proceed from two titles, which extinguish each other. Article 58 of the Constitution declares that

“from the moment of his (the Regent’s) oath relative to the Constitution (before the united Diet), the existing Ministry remains responsible for all governmental acts.”

How does this tally with “the responsibility to God alone”? The acknowledgment of the King’s rescript is a pretext, because the Diet is convoked, and the convocation of the Diet is a pretext, because it is not to decide upon the “necessity” of the Regency. By the mere force of circumstances the Prince of Prussia, who, in 1850, declined taking the oath to the Constitution, sees himself now placed in the awkward position of not only accepting, but of appealing to it. It must not be forgotten that from the Autumn of 1848 to the beginning of 1850, the Absolutists, especially in the ranks of the army, had cherished, and occasionally, even openly avowed their plan of supplanting the vacillating King by the sober Prince, who, at all events, was not prevented by any elasticity of intellect, from possessing a certain strength of will, and who,

^a Wilhelm, Prinz von Preussen, Regent, “Erlass Seiner Königlichen Hoheit des Prinzen von Preussen vom 9. Oktober 1858, die Uebernahme der Regentschaft und die Einberufung der beiden Häuser des Landtages der Monarchie betreffend.”—*Ed.*

^b “Verfassungs-Urkunde für den Preussischen Staat. Vom 31. Januar 1850.”—*Ed.*

furthermore, by his conduct during the days of March, his flight to England, the popular odium centring upon him, and, lastly, his high deeds in the Baden campaign⁵⁷ seemed quite the man to represent strong government in Prussia, as Francis Joseph and the son of Hortense^a do on the Western and Eastern frontiers of the Hohenzollern domains. The Prince, in fact, has never altered his principles. Yet the slights he, and still more his wife, a disciple of Goethe, a cultivated mind, an ambitious and haughty character, have had to submit to, on the part of the Queen and her camarilla, could not but drive him into a somewhat oppositional attitude. The King's malady left him no alternative but to allow the Queen to rule or himself to accept the Constitution. Besides, there is now removed a scruple characteristic of the man, which weighed upon his mind in 1850. Then he was simply the first officer of the Prussian army, and that army swears fidelity to the King alone, but not to the Constitution. If, in 1850, he had taken the oath to the Constitution, he would have bound the army which he represented. As it is now, he may take the oath; but, if he likes, by the simple act of his resignation, he can enable his son to subvert the Constitution by help of the army. The very example of his brother's reign during the last eight years had, if any other stimulus were required, given sufficient proof that the Constitution imposed imaginary fetters only on the Royal prerogative, while, at the same time, it turned out quite a godsend in a financial point of view. Just think of the King's financial difficulties during the epoch from 1842 to 1848, the vain attempts at borrowing money through the *Seehandlung*,⁵⁸ the cool denials of a few millions of dollars on the part of the Rothschilds, the small loans refused by the united Diet in 1847, the complete exhaustion of the public treasury, and then, on the other side, compare the financial facilities met with even in 1850, the first year of the Constitution, when three budgets, with a deficit of 70,000,000, were covered at once by the Chambers in the wink of an eye. He, indeed, must be a great fool, who should lose hold of such a machinery for coining money! The Prussian Constitution has, as far as the people are concerned, only added the political influence of the aristocracy to the traditional power of the bureaucracy, while the crown, on the contrary, has been enabled to create a public debt, and increase the yearly budget by more than 100 per cent.

The history itself of that Constitution forms one of the most

^a Napoleon III.—Ed.

extraordinary chapters of modern history. At first there had been produced, on May 20, 1848, the sketch of a Constitution^a drawn up by the Camphausen Cabinet, which laid it before the Prussian National Assembly. The principal activity of that body consisted in altering the Government scheme. The Assembly was still busied with this work when it was disposed of by Pomeranian bayonets. On the 5th of December, 1848, the King octroyed a Constitution of his own, which, however, the times wearing still a rather revolutionary aspect, was only meant to act as a provisional quietus. In order to revise it, the Chambers were convoked, and their labors exactly coincided with the epoch of frantic reaction. These Chambers on a Prussian scale reminded one altogether of Louis XVIII's *chambre introuvable*.⁵⁹ Still the King vacillated. The "bit of paper," sugared as it was, perfumed as it was with loyalty, emblazoned as it was with medieval figures, still did not come up to the King's relish. The King tried everything to disgust the Constitution-mongers, while the latter were as firmly resolved to succumb to no humiliation, to take fright at no concession, to gain a nominal Constitution, whatever its contents, to ascend by cringing in the dust. In fact, the Royal messages, which followed each other like the discharges of a platoon fire, set aside, not the resolutions of the revising Chambers, because the latter kept up a merely passive attitude, but, on the contrary, the propositions successively made by the King's own Ministers, in the King's own name. To-day one paragraph was proposed by them. Two days later, after its acceptance by the Chambers, fault was found with it, and the King declared its alteration a condition, *sine qua non*. At last, tired of this game, the King, in his message of Jan. 7, 1850, resolved upon a last and definitive attempt at making his faithful subjects give up in despair their Constitutional aspirations. In a message, calculated to this effect, he proposed a string of amendments^b which, in all human probability, he could not suppose even the Chambers able to swallow. Still they were swallowed, and with good grace too. So there remained nothing but to have done with the thing, and proclaim the Constitution. The oath still smacked of the farcical contrivances by which the Constitution had been set afloat. The King accepted the Constitution, on the condition that he should "find it possible to rule with

^a "Verfassungs-Gesetz für den Preussischen Staat. Vom 20. Mai 1848."—Ed.

^b Friedrich Wilhelm IV, "Zusammenstellung der in der Allerhöchsten Botschaft vom 7. Januar 1850 vorgeschlagenen Abänderungen und Ergänzungen der Verfassung vom 5. Dezember 1848".—Ed.

it"^a; and the Chambers accepted this ambiguous declaration as an oath and a payment in full; the bulk of the people taking no interest at all in the transaction.

Such is the history of this Constitution. Of its contents I propose giving you a succinct sketch in another letter,^b since, by a strange concurrence of circumstances, that "airy nothing"^c has now become, at least, the ostensible basis of operations for the contending official parties, which in Prussia, as elsewhere, are destined to initiate the general movement, that in due time must appear upon the scene.

Written on October 12, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5465, October 27, 1858;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1401, October 29, 1858

^a Frederick William IV's speech at the sitting of both Prussian Chambers on February 6, 1850.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 74-77.—*Ed.*

^c Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Scene 1.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

THE PRUSSIAN REGENCY

Berlin, Oct. 13, 1858

After a severe struggle, the Prussian palace revolution has at last become a *fait accompli*. From a mere substitute and delegate of the King, the Prince of Prussia has been converted into the Regent of the State. The bad grace with which the Queen and the camarilla gave way, appeared even in the concluding scene of the dynastic drama. Herr von Westphalen, the Minister of the Interior, and their official representative, declined signing the decree,^a by which the King transfers the Royal power to his brother, resigned, and had to be replaced by Herr von Flottwell. On the other hand, the King has not abdicated unconditionally; but, as the decree runs, "for the time being, until I myself shall again be capable of executing the duties of my Royal office," and reserving "of the affairs of my Royal house, under my own authority, those concerning my own person." The one clause renders the power of Regent provisional, and the other continues the Queen's hold on the Royal purse-string. The conditional form of the surrender proves that, although forced to evacuate the stronghold of the position, the camarilla are resolved upon showing fight. It is in fact a public secret that, after the paralytic affliction that befell the King last week, his own physicians declared their despair of giving his life, under the most favorable circumstances, another year's respite. This declaration went far in determining Herr von Manteuffel to change sides and hoist the Prince of Prussia's flag. Being possessed of some cursory acquaintance with modern

^a Friedrich Wilhelm IV, "Allerhöchster Erlass vom 7. Oktober 1858, betreffend die Aufforderung an Seine Königliche Hoheit den Prinzen von Preussen zur Uebernahme der Regentschaft".—*Ed.*

history, he is aware that Mazarin's influence outlived Louis XIII. He knows that Perceval, although as the blind tool of the camarilla known under the name of the "King's Friends," and led by the Queen and the Duke of York, he had given great offence to the Prince Royal, nevertheless, despite the intrigues and the ill-forebodings of the Whig place-hunters, succeeded in ingratiating himself with the Regent (afterward George IV), and in preserving his post. It was this defection on the part of Manteuffel which forced the camarilla and the Junker party standing behind it to beat a retreat. Otherwise the Prince of Prussia would have been driven to the alternative either of wearing the borrowed mask only of royalty, or of an appeal to popular interference, the latter step being incompatible with his own principles, as well as the traditions of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Manteuffel's pliancy extricated him from that distressing dilemma. Whether he will prove grateful to the turncoat remains to be seen. The very fact that Manteuffel's name is indelibly blended with the defeat of the revolution of March, that he was the responsible editor of the Prussian *coup d'état*, and that his ministry appears, therefore, a living and continuous protest against popular "usurpation," may prevent the Prince, notwithstanding his personal grudges, from parting abruptly and ostentatiously with this "*Mann der rettenden That.*"^a

The contrast between the Prince and the King bears the regular domestic stamp of the Hohenzollern family. A comedian, more or less luxurious, more or less impregnated with Byzantine notions of theology, more or less coquetting with medieval romanticism, is always followed by a morose compound of the drill-sergeant, the bureaucrat and the schoolmaster. Such is the contrast between Frederick I and his son Frederick William I, between Frederick William II and Frederick William III, between the weak eccentricities of Frederick William IV and the sober mediocrity of the present Regent.

It is pretty generally expected, and the British press is busy in spreading the notion, that the advent of the Regent will give at once a contrary turn to the foreign policy of Prussia, emancipate it from Russian supremacy and draw it nearer to England. Now it is probable that, personally, the Prince Regent may amuse himself

^a "Man of the saving deed." Marx is paraphrasing the expression *ein Recht der rettenden That* ("a right of the saving deed") from a speech by the Bonn delegate Dahlmann made in the Frankfurt National Assembly on December 14, 1848.—*Ed.*

with similar ideas. The insulting manner in which Nicholas, at the Congress of Warsaw, treated the Count of Brandenburg, the Prussian Plenipotentiary and a near relative of the royal house—an insult which drove Brandenburg to suicide—has never been wiped out of the Prince's memory.⁶⁰ The sting of the personal affront was felt the more bitterly as, at the same time, Nicholas forced Prussia, and very unceremoniously too, to yield to the claims of Austria, to see an Austrian army marched to Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, and to eat dirt humbly before the eyes of all Europe. At a later epoch, at the time of the publication in England of the secret and confidential dispatches of the British Ambassador at Petersburg,^a the Prince, a man by no means of a forgiving temper, was again shocked at the affected contempt with which the late Emperor, in surveying the attitudes the great European powers were likely to assume in the case of a partition of the Turkish Empire, did not condescend even to mention Prussia. It is known that, after the first warlike moves, at an interview in Prague, the Prince of Prussia met the dictatorial haughtiness of his Muscovite brother-in-law with a dogged sullenness of his own. During the progress of the Russian war, the camarilla suspected the Prince of leaning to the side of the Western alliance, and, accordingly, subjected him to a system of personal *surveillance* and spying, which, by accident, became disclosed in a scandalous lawsuit at Potsdam. The Prince, on his part, had made sure that the chiefs of the camarilla and pet courtiers of the King, General von Gerlach and Cabinetsrath Niebuhr (the son of the great historian), acted as the direct agents of the Petersburg Government, kept it exactly informed of everything that passed in the Cabinet, and received from it orders, entering upon such details even as the collocation of the different *corps d'armée* throughout the monarchy. With the death of the Emperor Nicholas the reasons of personal antagonism disappeared. Alexander II, on the other hand, cannot be supposed to overwhelm his uncle with that feeling of awe which Nicholas, after his marriage with Frederick William III's eldest daughter,^b knew how to strike into the heart of the Hohenzollern dynasty. It is, moreover, very likely that his new family relations with England may exercise some influence on the bias of the Regent's foreign policy. Yet, in fact, the latter depends not on the personal inclinations of the Prince, but on the vital conditions of the State.

^a "England, Turkey and Russia", *The Times*, No. 21963, March 20, 1854.—*Ed.*

^b Charlotte Louise (Alexandra Fyodorovna).—*Ed.*

If Prussia was simply a German Power, the question could be very simply decided; but Prussia is not only the rival of Austria, who herself is the antagonist of Russia, but the vital principle of the Prussian monarchy is encroachment on Germany by the help of Russia. It was by the alliance of Frederick William I with Russia that Prussia succeeded in stripping Sweden of Pomerania. It was again by Frederick the Great's alliance with Catherine that he was able to keep Austrian Silesia and that he got part and parcel of Poland; the same maneuver being repeated with the same result by Frederick William II and Frederick William III. It was again by the patronage of Alexander I that Prussia got the Rhenish provinces and was allowed simultaneously to aggrandize herself at the cost of Saxony. It is on Russia that Prussia must again fall back in case of a French invasion. It is, therefore, more than doubtful whether the vital conditions of the Prussian State will ever allow its rulers to emancipate themselves from Russian supremacy, and whether public expectation will, therefore, not be disappointed on this point as well as on questions of internal policy.

Written on October 13, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5465, October 27, 1858;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1401, October 29, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Karl Marx

AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, Oct. 16, 1858

If the world in general knows nothing or little of the Prussian Constitution, it will, at all events, derive any desirable comfort from the great fact that the Prussian people itself gropes its way in the same dark ignorance. At this very moment, electioneering Committees in Berlin, Breslau, Königberg, Cologne and all the other great or small centers of liberalism, are busily engaged in turning over the dry leaves of the Prussian Charter, to make sure what legitimate arms of attack or defense, suitable to the purpose of the hour, may be snatched from that mysterious arsenal. These ten years over, while that Charter pretended to be a thing of intrinsic value, a final result, a definitive solution, the bulk of the Prussians showed it the cold shoulder, caring about as much for it as for the laws of Manu.⁶¹ The very moment that a general feeling did spring up of circumstances having turned this official lumber into a two-edged sword, everybody appears anxious to get acquainted with "the Great Unknown."^a In official regions, on the other hand, there prevails a most uneasy feeling, lest the fruit of knowledge, in this case, as in the antediluvian epoch, may prove the fruit of sin; and the Constitutional mania, which has all at once seized upon the Prussian people, is looked upon with gloomy, and I cannot but say well-founded suspicion. The Prince of Prussia, at this very moment, considers a *coup d'état* as a contingency he may be driven to before long. If the electioneering Committees should succeed in their scheme of recruiting the majority of the Elective Chamber from the liberal ranks of the National Assembly of 1848, from Waldeck, Jacoby, Rodbertus,

^a The name given to Walter Scott, because his first novels, beginning with *Waverley* up to 1827, were published anonymously.—*Ed.*

Unruh, Kirchmann, &c., the Prince would have to walk over again the same battle-ground Royalty seemed to have conquered in December, 1848. Even the mere breath and hum and clamor of reawakened popular life bewilder him. If he were to form—as advised by part of his own camarilla—a Cabinet Bismarck-Schönhausen, thus openly throwing the gauntlet into the face of revolution, and unceremoniously nipping the hopes ostensibly attached to his advent, the Elective Chamber, in harmony with Art. 56 of the Constitution and his own rescripts,^a might discuss the “necessity” of his regency. His regime would thus be initiated by stirring and ominous debates as to the legitimate or usurpatory character of his title. On the other hand, should he allow, for a while only, the movement to spread and quietly assume palpable forms, his difficulties would become enhanced by the old Royalist party turning round and assailing him for his having reopened the flood-gates of revolution, which, in their opinion, they with statesmanlike superiority knew how to lock up as long as allowed to steer under the colors of the old insane King. The history of monarchies shows that, in epochs of social revolution, there is nothing more dangerous for a resolute and straightforward, but vulgar and old-fashioned man, than to accept the inheritance of a vacillating, feeble and faithless character. James I., to whom Frederick William bears the closest resemblance, weathered the tempest which threw Charles I. upon the scaffold, and James II. expiated in an obscure exile those divine-right delusions which had even added to the strange popularity of Charles II. It was, perhaps, from an instinctive apprehension of such difficulties laid in store for him, that Prince William stubbornly resisted the proclamation of the Charter by the same King who, in 1847, on the opening of the United Diet of the provincial estates, had pompously declared:

“I feel urged to make the solemn declaration that no earthly power will ever succeed in deciding me to convert the natural and solid relation between King and people into a conventional, constitutional one, and that I will never allow, never, that there intrude between the Lord in heaven and this country, a written bit of paper, a second providence, so to say, pretending to rule by its paragraphs, and supplant by their means the old, sacred faith.”^b

^a Wilhelm, Prinz von Preussen, Regent, “Erlass Seiner Königlichen Hoheit des Prinzen von Preussen vom 9. Oktober 1858, die Uebernahme der Regentschaft und die Einberufung der beiden Häuser des Landtages der Monarchie betreffend.”—Ed.

^b Friedrich Wilhelm IV, *Der 11. April 1847. Thron-Rede ... zur Eröffnung des Vereinigten Landtages*, Berlin, 1847, S. 6.—Ed.

I have already related, in a former letter,^a how the sketch of a Constitution drawn up by the Camphausen Cabinet and elaborated by the Revolutionary Assembly of 1848, forms the groundwork of the present Constitution, but only after a *coup d'état* had swept away the original scheme, an octroyed Charter had reproduced it in a mangled form, two revision chambers had remodeled the octroyed Charter, and innumerable royal decrees had amended the revised Charter; all this tedious process being gone through in order to wipe out the last features recording the revolutionary offspring of the patchwork. Still this end was not absolutely obtained, since all ready-made charters must be molded more or less on the French pattern, and, do what you may, forsake all pretension at any striking originality. Thus, if one runs through Title II of the Constitution of January, 1850, treating of the "Rights of Prussians," the Prussian *droits de l'homme*,⁶² so to say, the paragraphs on first view read well enough,

"All Prussians are equals before the law. Personal liberty is guaranteed. The private domicile is inviolable. Nobody can be withdrawn from his legal judge. Punishments, save through the magistrate, in his legitimate function, are not to be held out by way of intimidation. Property is inviolable. Civil death and confiscation are banished from the law. The liberty of emigration is not to be encroached upon by the State, save with relation to military duty. The liberty of religious confession, of formation into religious societies, and private or public worship in common is granted. The enjoyment of civil and political rights is independent from religious confession. Marriages according to civil law only are to be allowed. Science and its doctrines are free. The education of the youth is to be sufficiently provided for by public schools. Everybody is free to teach and to found educational establishments. The direction of the economical relations of popular schools belongs to the communes. In public elementary schools instruction is given gratuitously. Every Prussian possesses the right of freely expressing his opinions by way of speech, writing and printing. Offenses, committed in this way, fall under the jurisdiction of the regular tribunals. All Prussians have the right to hold meetings if unarmed, and if gathering in closed rooms. They may form reunions and clubs for purposes not offending the laws. All Prussians enjoy the right of petition. The secrecy of letters is inviolable. All Prussians must fulfill their military duties. The armed force is only to interfere in exceptional cases legally circumscribed. Entails are by law proscribed, and the existing feudal property is to be transformed into freehold property. The free division of landed property is granted."

Now, if you turn from the "Rights of the Prussians," as they appeared on paper, to the sorry figure they cut in reality, you will, if you never did before, arrive at a full appreciation of the strange antagonism between idealism and realism, theory and practice. Every step of yours, simple locomotion even, is tampered with by the omnipotent action of bureaucracy, this second providence of

^a See this volume, pp. 67-69.—Ed.

genuine Prussian growth. You can neither live nor die, nor marry, nor write letters, nor think, nor print, nor take to business, nor teach, nor be taught, nor get up a meeting, nor build a manufactory, nor emigrate, nor do any thing without "*obrigkeitliche Erlaubniss*"—permission on the part of the authorities. As to the liberty of science and religion, or abolition of patrimonial jurisdiction,⁶³ or suppression of caste privileges, or the doing away with entails and primogeniture, it is all mere bosh. In all these respects Prussia was freer in 1847 than it is now. Whence this contradiction? All the liberties granted by the Prussian Charter are clogged with one great drawback. They are granted within "the limits of law."^a Now the existing law is exactly the absolutist law, which dates from Frederick II, instead of from the birthday of the Constitution. Thus there exists a deadly antagonism between the law of the Constitution and the constitution of the law, the latter reducing, in fact, the former to mere moonshine. On the other hand, the Charter in the most decisive points refers to organic laws, intended to elaborate its vague outlines. Now these organic laws have been elaborated under the high pressure of reaction. They have done away with guaranties even existing at the worst times of the absolute monarchy, with the independence, for instance, of the Judges of the executive Government. Not content with these combined dissolvents, the old and the new-fangled laws, the Charter preserves to the King the right of suspending it in all its political bearings, whenever he may think proper.

Yet, with all that and all that, there is there a double Prussia, the Prussia of the Charter and the Prussia of the House Hohenzollern. To work out that antagonism the electoral bodies are now busied with, despite the difficulties thrown in their way by the electoral laws.

Written on October 16, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5471, November 3, 1858;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1404, November 9, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

^a Circular of the Minister of the Interior von Westphalen of September 24, 1858, *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 231, October 3, 1858.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, Oct. 19, 1858

The Chambers are to assemble in united sitting on the 21st inst., when the Prince will call upon them "to acknowledge the necessity of the Regency," a demand which, I need not say, will be at once complied with, and most humbly too. It is, however, generally felt that if the formal existence of the Constitution dates from the 30th of January, 1850, its reality, as a working machine against the royal prerogative, is to be dated from 21st October, 1858. Meanwhile, to damp useless enthusiasm, newspaper confiscation is the order of the day—a true pity this, if one considers the happy-family character of the offenders. The most advanced of these papers are the *Volks-Zeitung* and the *National-Zeitung*—the latter being a paper which, by dint of respectable mediocrity, cowardly concession and unbounded display of Prussian local enthusiasm, contrived to weather the counter-revolutionary tempest, and convert into hard cash the scanty remnants of a movement whose dangerous eccentricities it was too wise in its generation to share. After the deluge, the organic beings peopling the earth were shaped in more decent and moderate size than their antediluvian predecessors. The same law prevails in the process of the formation of society. Still, we are involuntarily driven to the conclusion that the German Revolution itself must have been very dwarfish indeed, if the Lilliputians of the Berlin Press are to be considered as the legitimate representatives into whom it has finally settled down. However that may be, if these editors are no heroes, nor even common fighting men, they are shrewd calculators at all events. They feel that there is something stirring and that the regime which formed the background necessary for their own mock liberalism, and gave the value in

exchange to their ware, is rapidly breaking down. To convince, therefore, their customers that they are true watchmen, they venture upon low murmurs and plaintive moans. They do certainly not bite, nor even bark. Their audacity in this moment consists in lauding the Prince to the sky. They call upon him even, as the *National-Zeitung* recently did, to make free with the public exchequer; but, and this is the humor of the thing, all their compliments on his deeds yet unborn, turn into as many strictures on the past deeds of the Manteuffel Cabinet. They annoy the Prince by their prospective credulity and pique the ministry by their retrospective scepticism. But to appreciate them duly, one ought to read them in the vernacular. It is impossible to attempt in any other language, not even in Decembrist French, which smacks at least of its own specific *odeur de mauvais lieu*,^a the dull, insipid, interminable yarn they spin. One might suppose they were speaking by mere innuendoes, playing hide and seek with the police, but this would be a great mistake. They say, in fact, every thing they have to say, but combine the homeopathic and allopathic methods in a most skilful and profitable way; they administer an infinitesimal deal of drug in an ocean of indifferent fluid. The ministers, on the other hand, seem aware of the geological fact, that the continuous action of water will wash away the proudest rock and roll it into pebbles. They feel not so much irritated at the stammering of these cautious wiseacres as at the general state of public mind which they presuppose to exist. Consequently, in their shortsighted bureaucratic way they beat the donkey in order to hit the bag—I mean the bag of public opinion. The repeated newspaper confiscations, initiating the new *régime*, say the royalists, are the true answer to the noisy hopes that affect to cling to the Prince. No, say the official Liberals, the Prince's *régime* has not yet begun, and his great respect for constitutional law obliges him, until he has been acknowledged by the Chambers and sworn in as Regent, to allow the ministers, according to the Charter, to act on their own responsibility. Now, "ministerial responsibility" is a very mysterious thing in all our monarchic Constitutions, whether cut on the English or the French pattern. In England, where it may be supposed to exist in its most vital, palpable form, it means that on certain solemn occasions irresponsibility becomes transferred from a Whig to a Tory, or from a Tory to a Whig. Ministerial responsibility means there the transformation of place-hunting into the main business of

^a Bad odour.—*Ed.*

parliamentary parties. He who is in office is, for the time, irresponsible, because the representative of a legislative majority who, in order to help him in, abdicate into the hands of his whipper-in. In Prussia, the most ardent aspirations of middle-class ambition tend to render the ministerial posts prizes to be won in parliamentary tournaments. Till now, however, Prussian ministerial responsibility was a myth in every sense. Article 44 of the Charter runs thus:

"The ministers of the King are responsible; all the governmental acts of the King, to have legal force, require the countersignature of a minister upon whom, thereby, the responsibility devolves."

No law has, however, been made with respect to this responsibility. In the paragraph itself, it is not said to whom the ministers are responsible. In practice, on every occasion when the chambers went the length of threatening the ministers with a vote of non-confidence, the latter declared roundly that they were quite welcome to it, ministers being responsible, indeed, but to their royal master only. The question of ministerial responsibility possesses in Prussia, as it did in the France of Louis Philippe, an exceptional importance, because it means, in fact, the responsibility of bureaucracy. The ministers are the chiefs of that omnipotent, all-intermeddling parasite body, and to them alone, according to Article 106 of the Constitution, have the subaltern members of the administration to look, without taking upon themselves to inquire into the legality of their ordinances, or incurring any responsibility by executing them. Thus, the power of the bureaucracy, and by the bureaucracy, of the executive, has been maintained intact, while the constitutional "Rights of the Prussians" have been reduced to a dead letter.

The imminent elections are the lever which all parties intend now using, but it is principally with regard to electoral matters that the present octroyed Constitution has succeeded in rooting out all traces of its revolutionary origin. True, in order to eke out small bureaucratic salaries by adding to them a parliamentary source of income, the very plebian law prescribing that the representatives of the people should be paid has been maintained. So has the eligibility of every Prussian aged 25 years. The electoral rights, however, and the machinery of election, have been managed in such a way as to exclude not only the bulk of the people, but to subject the privileged remnant to the most unbridled bureaucratic interference. There are two degrees of election. There are first elected the electors of the electors, and then the latter elect the

representatives. From the primitive election itself are not only excluded all those who pay no direct tax, but the whole body of primitive electors itself is again divided into three portions, consisting of the highest-taxed, the middle-taxed, and the lowest-taxed; these three parties, like the tribes of King Servius Tullius,⁶⁴ electing each of them the same number of representatives. As if this complicated process of filtering was not sufficient, the bureaucracy has, moreover, the right to divide, combine, change, separate and recompose the electoral districts at pleasure. Thus, for instance, if there exists a town suspected of liberal sympathies, it may be swamped by reactionary country votes, the minister, by simple ordinance, blending the liberal town with the reactionary country into the same electoral district. Such are the fetters which shackle the electoral movement, and which, only in the great cities, can exceptionally be broken through.

Written on October 19, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5475, November 8, 1858

Frederick Engels

[RUSSIA'S SUCCESSES IN THE FAR EAST]⁶⁵

The return match which Russia owed to France and England for her military defeats before Sevastopol, has just come off. The hard-contested, long-continued battles on the Heracleatic peninsula, though they damped the national pride of Russia, and deprived her of a small slice of territory,⁶⁶ still left her with a clear balance of profit at the close of the war. The condition of the "sick man"⁶⁷ has been rendered materially worse; the Christian population of European Turkey, both Greek and Slavonic, are more eager than ever to shake off the Turkish yoke, and look up to Russia, more than ever, as to their only protector. Russian agents, no doubt, have their hands in all the insurrections and conspiracies now at work in Bosnia, Servia, Montenegro and Candia, but the utter prostration and weakness of Turkey, as laid bare by the war itself and as augmented by the obligations imposed upon that country by the peace, can alone satisfactorily explain this general agitation among the Christian subjects of the Sultan.^a Thus, for a momentary sacrifice of a narrow strip of land—for it must be obvious that she is sure to recover that at the very first opportunity—Russia has advanced a good deal toward the realization of her plans respecting Turkey. The increasing dilapidation of Turkey and the protectorate of her Christian subjects were the very objects sought after by Russia in beginning the war; and who can say that Russia does not now exercise such a protectorate more than ever?

Thus, Russia is the only gainer, even by this unsuccessful war. Still, she owed a return match, and she has chosen to play it on a

^a Abdul Mejid.—*Ed.*

ground where her success stands unrivaled—on that of diplomacy. While England and France undertook an expensive contest with China, Russia remained neutral, and only stepped in at the conclusion. The result is that England and France have been making war upon China for the sole benefit of Russia. The position of Russia, in this case, was indeed as favorable as it well could be. Here was another of those tottering Asiatic Empires, which are, one by one, falling a prey to the enterprise of the European race; so weak, so collapsed, that it had not even energy to pass through the crisis of popular revolution, but transformed even an acute insurrection into a chronic and apparently incurable complaint; an empire so rotten that nowhere scarcely was it capable either of controlling its own people or opposing resistance to foreign aggression. While the British squabbled with inferior Chinese officials at Canton, and discussed among themselves the important point whether Commissioner Yeh really did, or did not, act according to the will of the Emperor, the Russians took possession of the country north of the Amoor, and of the greater part of the coast of Mantchooria south of that point; there they fortified themselves, surveyed a line of railway, and laid out the plans of towns and harbors. When at last England resolved to carry the war to Pekin, and when France joined her in the hope of picking up something to her advantage, Russia, though at the very moment despoiling China of a country as large as France and Germany put together, and of a river as large as the Danube, managed to appear as the disinterested protector of the weak Chinese, and to act almost as mediator at the conclusion of the peace; and when we come to compare the different treaties, we must confess that the fact of the war having been carried on for the benefit, not of England or France, but of Russia, becomes evident to all.

The advantages secured to the belligerents, and in which Russia as well as the United States participates, are of a purely commercial character, and, as we have shown on former occasions,^a for the most part illusory. Under present circumstances, the Chinese trade, with the exception of opium and some East Indian cotton, must continue to consist principally in the export of Chinese goods, tea and silk; that export trade depending on foreign demand rather than the greater or less facilities afforded by the Chinese Government. The world managed to get tea and silk before the treaty of Nankin,⁶⁸ and after that treaty the effect

^a See this volume, pp. 46-50.—*Ed.*

of opening the five ports was the transfer of a portion of the trade of Canton to Shanghai. The other ports have scarcely any trade at all, and indeed the only one which has at least some importance, Swatow, does not belong to the five open ports. As to the opening of trade high up the Yang-tse-kiang, that has been wisely postponed till the time when his Imperial Majesty shall have recovered his full sway over the disturbed country in that neighborhood—a period coincident with the Greek Calends. But there have arisen other doubts as to the value of this new Convention. There are some people who affirm that the transit duties spoken of in Article XXVIII of the Anglo-Chinese treaty are imaginary. These duties have been supposed to exist solely because the Chinese wanted very little English merchandise, and English goods accordingly, did not penetrate inland at all, while a certain kind of Russian cloth, suited to the wants of the Chinese, and brought by way of Kiakhta or Thibet, actually found its way to the coast. It was forgotten that such tolls, if in existence, would affect Russian as well as English goods. So much is sure, that Mr. Wingrove Cooke, who was sent into the interior on purpose, was unable to trace out these pretended “transit duties,” and that when publicly interrogated on the subject, he confessed his “humiliating conviction that our ignorance of China is a darkness that may be felt.”^a On the other hand, Mr. J. W. Henley, the President of the British Board of Trade, answers in a letter that has been published, to the question, “Whether there is evidence that such internal duties exist?” very plainly: “I am unable to furnish you with the information you ask, as to the evidence of internal duties in China.” Thus, beside the rather uncomfortable conviction that Lord Elgin, in stipulating for an indemnity, fixed no time for its payment, and carried the war from Canton to the capital merely to make a treaty which should send the British forces back from the capital to fight at Canton, the dark suspicion has broken in upon John Bull’s mind, that he himself will have to pay out of his own pockets the indemnity stipulated for, since Article XXVIII will prove a strong inducement to the Chinese authorities to establish transit duties of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the British manufactures to be, on demand, converted into a $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent import duty. To divert John Bull from looking too deeply into his own treaty, the London *Times* found it necessary to affect great

^a G. W. Cooke, *China: being “The Times” Special Correspondence from China in the Years 1857-58*, London, 1858, p. 273.—Ed.

wrath at the American Ambassador,^a and fiercely denounced him as the spoiler of the mess, although, in fact, he had about as much to do with the failure of the second Anglo-Chinese war as the man in the moon.^b

So the peace, so far as English commerce is concerned, results in a new import duty, and in a series of stipulations which are either without any practical value, or cannot be kept by the Chinese, and may, at any moment, become the pretexts of a new war. England has not obtained any accession of territory—she could not claim that, without allowing France to do the same, and an English war resulting in the establishment of French possessions on the Chinese coast would have been altogether unprofitable. As to Russia, the case is quite different. Beside sharing in all the ostensible advantages, whatever they be, secured to England and France, Russia has secured the whole of the country on the Amoor, which she had so quietly taken possession of. Not satisfied with this, she has obtained the establishment of a Russo-Chinese Commission to fix the boundaries. Now, we all know what such a Commission is in the hands of Russia. We have seen them at work on the Asiatic frontiers of Turkey, where they kept slicing away piece after piece from that country, for more than twenty years, until they were interrupted during the late war, and the work has now to be done over again. Then there is the article regulating the postal service between Kiakhta and Pekin. What was formerly an irregular and merely tolerated line of communication, will now be regularly organized, and established as a right. There is to be a monthly mail between the two places, and the journey, about 1,000 miles, is to be performed in 15 days; while once every three months a caravan is to go over the same route. Now, it is evident that the Chinese will either neglect this service, or be unable to carry it out; and, as the communication is now secured to Russia as a right, the consequence will be that it will gradually fall into her hands. We have seen how the Russians have carried their lines of posts through the Kirghiz steppe^c; and we cannot doubt that in a very few years a similar line will be established across the desert of Gobi, and then adieu to all dreams of British supremacy in China; for then a Russian army may march on Pekin any day.

It is easy to imagine what will be the effect of the establishment of permanent Embassies at Pekin. Look to Constantinople or

^a William B. Reed.—*Ed.*

^b *The Times*, No. 23129, October 20, 1858 (leading article).—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, pp. 59-64.—*Ed.*

Teheran. Wherever Russian diplomacy meets English and French, it is uniformly successful. And that a Russian Ambassador, with the chance of having, a few years hence, an army strong enough for any purpose at Kiakhta, a month's march from Pekin, and a line of road prepared for its march all the way—that such a Russian Ambassador will be all powerful at Pekin, who can doubt?

The fact is that Russia is fast coming to be the first Asiatic Power, and putting England into the shade very rapidly on that continent. The conquest of Central Asia and the annexation of Mantchooria increase her dominions by an extent of country as large as all Europe exclusive of the Russian empire and bring her down from snowy Siberia to the temperate zone. In a short time, the valleys of the Central Asiatic rivers and of the Amoor will be peopled by Russian colonists. The strategic positions thus gained are as important for Asia as those in Poland are for Europe. The possession of Turan menaces India; that of Mantchooria menaces China. And China and India, with their 450,000,000 of inhabitants, are now the decisive countries of Asia.

Written about October 25, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5484, November 18, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1409, November 26, 1858

Karl Marx

[MR. JOHN BRIGHT]⁶⁹

Mr. John Bright is not only one of the most gifted orators that England has ever produced; but he is at this moment the leader of the Radical members of the House of Commons, and holds the balance of power between the traditional parties of the Whigs and Tories.⁷⁰ Rejected from Parliament for opposing Lord Palmerston's Chinese war, by the electors of Manchester,⁷¹ he was taken up, when prostrate under the combined influence of this political defeat and of grievous bodily illness, and elected by the constituency of Birmingham. As he left the House at one important historical epoch, so his return to it, after a long period of suffering and of silence, constituted another. That return was marked by the forced retirement of Lord Palmerston from the Government.⁷² Coming into the House, in which Palmerston had worn the authority of a dictator, Mr. Bright, with almost no personal following, overthrew that veteran tactician, and not only made a new Ministry but was able virtually to dictate the terms on which it should hold office. The magnitude of this position lent an unusual importance to Mr. Bright's first meeting with his constituents, which took place in the last week of October. This was the first time that the great orator had addressed a popular assemblage since his recovery from illness, and a dramatic interest accordingly attached to the event. At the same time the official parties of the country were anxiously awaiting a declaration of peace or war from the man, who, if excluded from himself framing a new reform bill, will at all events decide which of these parties is to frame it.

Mr. Bright twice addressed his constituents; once at a public meeting held to receive him, and again at a banquet given in his honor.^a Of these speeches we, on another page, present the leading points and most striking passages.⁷³ Considered in a merely rhetorical point of view, they are not equal to previous performances of their author. They contain admirable touches of eloquence, but in that respect are inferior to the famous speech on the Russian war, or to the speech of last Spring on the Indian rebellion.^b But that was a matter of necessity. The object in hand was to set forth a political programme fit to answer widely differing ends. On the one hand, it is designed to be immediately brought into Parliament as a legislative measure, and, on the other hand, to become the rallying cry of all sections of reformers, and, in fact, to create a compact Reform party. This problem, which Mr. Bright had to solve, did not allow of any extraordinary display of rhetorical power, but required plainness, common sense and perspicuity. It is praise enough, then, to say that Mr. Bright has anew proved himself a consummate orator by adapting his style to his subject. His programme may be described as a reduction of what has been called the People's Charter to a middle-class standard.⁷⁴ He fully adopts one point of the Charter—the Ballot.⁷⁵ He reduces another point, Universal Suffrage, while declaring that he personally believes in it, to the vote of rate-payers, so that the qualifications now required for being a parochial and municipal elector will suffice to make a man an imperial elector also. He lastly reduces a third point of the Charter, namely, the equalization of electoral districts, to a fairer distribution of representatives among the different constituencies. Such is his proposition. He would have it drawn up and introduced into Parliament as the Reformer's own bill, in opposition to the country gentlemen's measure, which the Derby Cabinet are likely to introduce, thinking that, as in the case of the Reform bill of 1830,⁷⁶ union will arise as soon as the scheme is brought before the House. The proposed reform being thus set on foot, petitions from the different towns should be sent in to support it. The House of Commons might give way before such a general demonstration, and if, as is

^a John Bright's speeches at a meeting of Birmingham constituents on October 27, 1858, *The Times*, No. 23136, October 28, 1858, and at a banquet in Birmingham, *The Times*, No. 23138, October 30, 1858.—*Ed.*

^b John Bright's speeches in the House of Commons on March 31, 1854, *The Times*, No. 21704, April 1, 1854, and on March 26, 1858, *The Times*, No. 22952, March 27, 1858.—*Ed.*

probable, the Government should resort to a new election, it would only afford a new opportunity for agitation. Lastly, Mr. Bright wishes the Reform party to reject every bill which concedes less than he demands.

The impression which this demonstration has produced in England is no doubt fairly reflected in the London journals. *The Times*,^a with ill humor but slightly concealed, compares the last and most important speech to the fabulous mouse which, according to the Roman poet, was the offspring of a mountain in travail.^b The contents of the speech, it says, are trivial. There is no novelty about them. Neither are they clothed in a new garb. Any stump orator spouting on Reform might have delivered the identical speech in the identical words. The only thing that appears new to *The Times*, because of its very obsoleteness, is the bad taste of Mr. Bright in excavating long-forgotten invectives against the House of Lords—as if the Lords had not just condescended to become popular lecturers on sociology, indoctrinating the lower orders how to bear cheerfully their predestinated inferiority!—as if the Birmingham of 1858 was the Birmingham of 1830, with its revolutionary Political Union⁷⁷! An underbred man alone could commit such unfashionable anachronisms. On the other hand, *The Times* is perplexed at the want of discernment displayed by Mr. Bright in speaking for the ballot, although he must be fully aware of the fact that all the heaven-born statesmen—Whig and Tory and Peelite and Palmerstonian—are unanimous against that political heresy. The Tory press, on the other hand, lament the aberrations of so “honest” a man as Mr. Bright. They say that he has allowed himself to be ensnared into traps treacherously laid for him by Whiggish Pharisees. This speech, it seems, they consider an open breach of the truce between the Radicals and the Conservatives. Lord Palmerston’s organ—*The Morning Post*—however, is not at all disappointed, since it knew all along that nothing good could come from this stubborn Roundhead.⁷⁸ *The Morning Chronicle*—which takes up a middling position between the Palmerstonian and Derbyite press—laments, in the interest of Mr. Bright himself, that he should have flung all moderation to the wind, and spoken not like a statesman, but like a demagogue. The Radical press, and especially the Radical penny papers, are, on the other hand,

^a *The Times*, No. 23137, October 29, 1858 (leading article).—Ed.

^b Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 139.—Ed.

unanimous in applause of both the doctrines of Mr. Bright and the manner in which he has now stated them.⁷⁹

Written on October 29, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5479, November 12, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1406, November 16, 1858

Frederick Engels

THE PROSECUTION OF MONTALEMBERT

Paris, Nov. 6, 1858

The very first man of any note in France to adhere to Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* was Count Montalembert. Under Louis Philippe, he had represented the Catholic party in the Chamber of Deputies; under the Republic, he belonged to that reactionary party in the National Assembly⁸⁰ which, composed of Orleanists and Legitimists, seemingly accepted the Republic, in order the better to undermine it, and which, in the hopes of working for either the one or the other branch of the Bourbons, in reality worked for that very same Louis Bonaparte who, one fine morning, had them all arrested and dispersed, and took hold of absolute power by the grace of a drunken soldiery. Involved in this forcible dispersion, and himself by his antecedents an Orleanist, Montalembert was the very first, and, with the "one base exception" of M. Dupin, still is the only, man of parliamentary notoriety in France, who has passed over into the Bonapartist camp. In the political syncope which at that time had overcome all France, this desertion of Montalembert was a fact of importance; it was a great fact for the new Government, still isolated from all France by the wall of soldiers which formed its protecting barrier. Montalembert had been bribed by the specifically Catholic turn which Louis Napoleon's Government took. Rumor adds that more substantial bribes, too, changed hands. For a while, Montalembert supported the Government as a member of the Legislative body; he fawned upon and flattered the man who had placed military dictatorship in the place of parliamentary debate; he was base enough to count it an honor to be one of those dummies whom the successful usurper deputed to vote laws and supplies at his dictation—to vote, and not to talk, or else to talk nothing but his

praise. But he got no reward for thus debasing himself; he had done his work; he was estranged forever from his former political friends; he was forever compromised; he could never again be a dangerous opponent; he was sucked out like an orange—why any longer treat him with ceremony? Montalembert, neglected, found out that the manner in which Louis Bonaparte had saved and continued to save France, by having it all his own way, was not the thing, after all. He could not help comparing his position in the Deputies' Chamber with the one he used to occupy in that same building, ten or twenty years ago; and he began gradually to oppose the Government. This he was allowed to do to a certain amount; the first two or three of his speeches^a were even permitted to be published. Since that time, he, the few Republican deputies who have taken the oath of allegiance, and a few discontented Bonapartists, form a sort of Opposition in this miserable Assembly—an Opposition quite as miserable as the body to which it belongs.

This opposition to further Imperial encroachments appears to have gained to M. Montalembert a slight and sickly kind of popularity among a certain portion of the middle classes; and he has apparently waited for an opportunity to follow up this advantage by some bold and sudden stroke. He was connected with *The Correspondent*, a periodical belonging almost exclusively to the Broglie family, and accordingly Orleanist in its politics. Profiting by their absence from Paris, he carried the insertion of an article of his: "A Debate on India in the British Parliament," which would not have been admitted in its present form, if the cautious and timid Broglies had been present to exercise their influence. In this article, Montalembert tries to make the *amende honorable*^b for having embraced the Bonapartist cause; by exalting to the skies the Parliamentary government of England, he most unmistakably condemns the present system of government in France.

"When my ears are dinned sometimes with the buzz of the antechamber chroniclers, sometimes with the clamorings of fanatics, who believe themselves to be our masters, or of hypocrites who fancy us their dupes; when I feel stifled with the weight of an atmosphere loaded with servile and corrupting effluvia, I hasten away to breathe a purer air and take a life-bath in the ocean of the liberties of England.... If among those who have opened these pages there be any under the

^a Charles Montalembert's speeches in the French Legislative Assembly on June 22, 1852, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 176, June 24, 1852, and on June 26, 1852, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 180, June 28, 1852.—*Ed.*

^b Due apology.—*Ed.*

dominion of that [the Bonapartist and absolutist] fashion, I say to them, without ceremony: cease reading, go no further; nothing that I am going to write can please or interest you; go and ruminate in peace among the fat pastures of your contented repose, and do not envy them who, unenvying you, enjoy *the right of remaining faithful to their antecedents*, to the anxieties of thought and to their aspirations after liberty.... I came first from this grand spectacle (the debate in the House of Commons) full of emotion, as might any man who looks to a government as something above a lacquey's waiting-room, and who seeks in a civilized nation something better than a flock of sheep only fit for the shears or to be led to nibble in silence under the shadow of an enervating security."^a

This sounds extremely well, and, indeed, is sonorous. John Bull, accustomed lately to get nothing but hard words and sneers from the French press, is of course exceedingly thankful for the wholesale flattery which Montalembert has poured out over him, so thankful that he has quite neglected to look into those "antecedents" to which Montalembert says he has remained faithful. It is a fact that it was by M. de Montalembert's own free will that he associated with those antechamber chroniclers, with those fanatics and hypocrites whose buzz and clamor now din his ears; he has but himself to blame if he dived down, determinedly and knowingly, into that atmosphere loaded with servile and corrupt effluvia, whose weight now stifles him. If it be "the fashion of the day in France to express repugnance for anything having the semblance of a remembrance or a regret for a past political life," M. de Montalembert was one of the first to get up that fashion when he passed over, drums beating and banners flying, into the very camp which proclaimed a new era, based upon the total and final destruction of "past political life." As to the men who are satisfied to ruminate in peace among the fat pastures of their contented repose, Montalembert cannot blame them. The *coup d'état* was made under the very pretext of putting down political passions and initiating this very peace and contented repose; and if Montalembert did not adhere to the *coup d'état* on this very ground, on what ground did he adhere at all? Surely, whatever may be said against Louis Napoleon, he cannot be accused of having disguised his policy or his intentions after the *coup d'état*. There could be no mistake—nor was there any—that he intended to turn the French people into a flock of sheep, only fit for the shears, or to be led to nibble in silence under the shade of an enervating security. Montalembert knew this as well as the rest of the world. If he then raises himself up to his full height, and

^a Ch. Montalembert, "Un débat sur l'Inde au parlement anglais", *Le Correspondant*, new series, Vol. IX, October 1858, pp. 205-06, 261.—*Ed.*

calls upon us to admire him as a man who, not envying his late Bonapartist friends, remains faithful to his antecedents, we have to ask him: Which antecedents do you mean, M. de Montalembert? Your antecedents of the monarchial chamber, where you used to speak and vote in the interest of reaction, repression and priestly fanaticism? Or your antecedents of the Republican assembly, when you plotted, with a lot of your old Parliamentary friends, to restore the monarchy, when you voted away, piece by piece, the liberties of the people, the freedom of the press, the right of meeting and of association and when you yourselves forged the arms for that same adventurer who, with those very arms, turned you and your associates out of doors? Or lastly, your antecedents of the Bonapartist Legislative body, where you ate humble pie before this same successful adventurer, and made yourself, willfully and deliberately, over to him as one of the lackeys in his waiting-room? Which of these three antecedents, M. de Montalembert, contain your aspirations for liberty? We are inclined to think it would take most people a great many "anxieties of thought" to find it out. In the mean time the Government of Louis Napoleon have retaliated upon their unfaithful adherent by a prosecution, and the trial is to come off some time this month. We shall have an opportunity to compare the virtuous indignation of M. de Montalembert, with the virtuous indignation of a Bonapartist *procureur*; and we may say, even now, that as far as sincerity is concerned, they will be both about on a par. The trial itself will create a deal of sensation in France, and, whatever its result may be, it will constitute an important fact in the history of the Second Empire. The very fact of Montalembert having considered it necessary to break thus conspicuously with the existing Government, and to provoke a prosecution, is a significant proof that political life is awakening among the middle classes of France. It was the total apathy—the politically used-up, *blasé* state of mind—of these classes which allowed Louis Napoleon to establish his power. Having against himself the Parliament only, unsupported by either the middle classes or the working classes, he had the passive assistance of the middle classes and the active support of the army for himself. The Parliamentarians were defeated in an instant, but the working classes not until after a month's struggle, carried on all over France.⁸¹ The middle classes for a long while have obeyed grumbly, but they have obeyed and looked upon Louis Napoleon as the savior of society, and therefore as an indispensable man. Now, it appears they have gradually changed their opinion. They are longing for the return of the time when

they, or at least a fraction of them, governed the country, and when the tribune and the press resounded with nothing but their own political and social concerns. They are evidently beginning again to feel confidence in themselves and their ability to govern the country, and if that be the case, they will find means to express it. Thus we may expect, in France, a middle-class movement corresponding to that which is now going on in Prussia, and which is as certain a forerunner of a new revolutionary movement as the Italian middle-class movement of 1846-47 was the herald of the revolutions of 1848. Louis Napoleon seems to be fully aware of this. He said at Cherbourg to a man whom he had not seen for many years:

"It is a pity that the educated classes of the country will not go with me; it is their own doing; but I have the army with me, and I do not care."

He will, however, very soon find out what becomes of the army, and an army officered and generaled like his, too—as soon as the mass of the middle classes are in open opposition. At all events, stirring times appear to be in store for the Continent of Europe.

Written about November 2, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5489, November 24, 1858

Karl Marx
THE NEW MINISTRY

Berlin, Nov. 6, 1858

After considerable vacillation a new Ministry has at last been formed, which may be best characterized as the Princess of Prussia's^a Ministry. It is more liberally tinged than the Berlin Philistines dared to hope, and as might be expected from a lady's choice, is composed with but slight regard to the congruity of its different elements, so that the principal end aimed at, of securing a momentary popularity, is but secured. In true lady-like style the Princess says a gracious word to everybody; to the Catholics, in installing a Catholic as Prime Minister,^b a thing unheard of in the annals of Prussia; to the fervent Protestants, in surrendering the Ministry of Public Instruction to an Evangelical Pietist^c; to anti-Russian tendencies, in confiding the War Ministry to a General^d formerly dismissed from the same post, on the express demand of the Czar Nicholas; to anti-Austrian jealousy, in intrusting with Foreign Affairs a man^e who had once resigned that place in order not to stoop to the dictation of the Prince of Schwarzenberg; to the bureaucratic mind, in nominating as Minister of the Interior—that Minister being in fact the head of the whole bureaucratic army, police as well as administration (*Regierung*)—a survivor^f of the good old times of Frederick William III; to the Liberals, in giving a seat in the Cabinet without office, something like the Presidency of the Council⁸² in an

^a Augusta Marie Luise Katharina.—*Ed.*

^b Prince von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.—*Ed.*

^c Von Bethmann-Hollweg.—*Ed.*

^d Von Bonin.—*Ed.*

^e Baron von Schleinitz.—*Ed.*

^f Von Flottwell.—*Ed.*

English Ministry, to the man^a who served as Prime Minister in the first Cabinet produced by the revolution of 1848; to the Free-Traders, in introducing Herr von Patow into the Ministry of Finance; and to the Protectionists, in retaining von der Heydt in the Ministry of Commerce; to the nobility, in placing a Prince of the royal house at the head of the Cabinet, and filling all its political posts with nobles; and to the middle-class, in leaving to simple or ennobled middle-class men the matter of fact Ministries of Justice, Commerce, Public Instruction and the Interior; to the enemies of the Camarilla, in forming the great majority of the new Cabinet of personal enemies of Gerlach and Company; and to the Conservatives, anxious lest any thing like Cabinet changes, in the Parliamentary sense of the word, should become the fashion in Prussia, in keeping in pay some Ministers who were the colleagues of Manteuffel, men of his own choosing, and men who countersigned the orders by which the *coup d'état* was proclaimed in December, 1848.^b

Thus eclecticism is the distinctive character of the new Cabinet—an eclecticism proceeding from popularity-hunting, tempered by the firm resolution to sacrifice no essentials to that same popularity. I shall but hint at one feature of the new Cabinet, a shade quite indifferent to the cool political observer, but most interesting for the Berlin gossip-monger. There is not one of the newly-appointed ministers whose name does not look like a trump played against the Queen of Prussia, like a personal epigram pointed at her by her spiteful sister-in law. The general impression produced by the nomination of the new Cabinet among the more thinking part of the Berliners, I shall describe in the words of one of my Berlin friends. The official announcement^c was only made in to-night's *Staats-Anzeiger*, that is to say at about 6 o'clock in the evening; but long before that time accurate lists of the men appointed were freely circulated among the groups gathered "*unter den Linden*".^d Meeting there the friend alluded to, an average Berlin pot-house politician, I asked him what his thoughts were of the new Cabinet, and what the thoughts were of the

^a Von Auerswald.—*Ed.*

^b Friedrich Wilhelm IV, "Verordnung, betreffend die Auflösung der zur Vereinbarung der Verfassung berufenen Versammlung. Vom 5. Dezember 1848".—*Ed.*

^c Wilhelm, Prince von Preussen, Regent, "Allerhöchster Erlass vom 6. November 1858 betreffend die Zusammensetzung des neu zu bildenden Ministeriums", *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 261, November 7, 1858.—*Ed.*

^d *Unter den Linden*—the main street in Berlin.—*Ed.*

"town" generally. Before giving his response, I must tell you what an average Berlin pot-house politician is. It is a man imbued with the notion that Berlin is the first town of the world; that there is to be found no "*Geist*" (an idea not to be translated, although ghost is etymologically the same word; the French *esprit*^a is quite another thing) save at Berlin; and that *Weissbier*,^b a disgusting beverage for every outside barbarian, is the identical drink quoted in the *Iliad* under the name of nectar, and in the *Edda* under the name of meth. Beside these harmless prejudices, your average Berlin luminary is an incorrigible wiseacre, indiscreet, fond of talk, indulging a certain low humor, known in Germany as *Berliner Witz*^c which plays more with words than with ideas, a curious compound of a little irony, a little skepticism and much vulgarity—altogether no very high specimen of mankind, nor a very amusing one, but still a typical character. Well, my Berlin friend answered my question by quoting, in the true Berlin tone of mockery, the following strophe from Schiller's "*Glocke*." I may remark, *en passant*, that your average Berliner praises nobody but Goethe, yet quotes nobody but Schiller:

"O zarte Sehnsucht, süßes Hoffen!
Der ersten Liebe goldne Zeit!
Das Auge sieht den Himmel offen,
Es schwelgt das Herz in Seligkeit;
O, dass sie ewig grünen bliebe,
Die schöne Zeit der jungen Liebe!"

(Oh, tender longings, sweet hopes, golden time of first love! The eye sees heaven open, the heart luxuriates in bliss. Oh, that it could bloom forever, that golden time of young love!)^d

Returning from the poetical Berlin pot-house politician to the new Prussian Cabinet, and minding the old French adage: "*à tout seigneur tout honneur*"^e the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the Prime Minister and intimate friend of the Princess of Prussia, claims attention first. He is the father of the Queen of Portugal,^f and firmly declined standing as father-in-law to the second French Empire.⁸³ Still, he is a near relative of Bonaparte. His mother was a sister of Murat, one of the kings extemporized by Napoleon, and his wife^g is the second daughter of the dowager Archduchess

^a Mind, wit.—*Ed.*

^b Pale ale.—*Ed.*

^c Berlin wit.—*Ed.*

^d Schiller, "Das Lied von der Glocke".—*Ed.*

^e "Honour to whom honour is due."—*Ed.*

^f Stephanie.—*Ed.*

^g Josephine Friederike Luise.—*Ed.*

Stéphanie of Baden, a Beauharnais by birth. Thus, this Prince forms a link of relationship between the Prussian dynasty, the Coburg dynasty, and the Bonaparte dynasty. He has been much slandered by the liberals of Southern Germany, because in the year 1849 he abdicated the sovereignty of his state of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and according to family treaties sold it to the branch of the Hohenzollerns⁸⁴ ruling in Prussia. At the time he made that bargain no German principality was worth a three years' purchase, and, of all men, the Prince could not be expected to oblige the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen demagogues by continuing the existence of a Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen nationality. The hoisting of the Prussian colors in Southern Germany was, besides, a thing which displeased Austria as much as the small demagogues of Baden and Württemberg. After the abdication the Prince entered the military service of Prussia as a General, pitching his tent at Düsseldorf, a town of painting, sculpture and barracks, where a side branch of the Prussian dynasty formerly used to keep a little court.^a To punish the Düsseldorfers for their participation in the revolution of 1848, which had reached its climax in a mob-demonstration against the King, on his passage through that town, Düsseldorf was deprived of the presence of Prince Frederick's Court, and degraded to the common rank of towns, which must contrive to live without having a court as their customer. Thus the Prince of Hohenzollern's appearance in Düsseldorf was quite an event. Without doing anything remarkable, he shone by his mere presence, like the great man of whom Goethe says that he pays by what he *is*, instead of by what he *does*. His popularity spread from Düsseldorf like wild-fire. His being simultaneously a member of the Dynasty and a member of the Catholic Church, did the rest. For the bigoted part of the population of Rhenish Prussia no further qualification is needed. You may be sure that the powerful and well-organized Catholic clergy throughout Rhenish Prussia, Westphalia, Silesia and Posen will strain every nerve in support of a Prussian Ministry, headed by a Roman Catholic, and it is, in fact, desirable that it should be so. Nothing did more harm to the revolution of 1848 than the opposition attitude taken by the Roman clergy. The latter body won immensely by the revolution, viz.: the right of freely communicating with the Pope, of erecting nunneries and cloisters, and not least, of acquiring real property. In reward for these

^a In the eighteenth century Düsseldorf was the capital of the Counts von Berg, side branch of the Sigmaringens.—Ed.

privileges won, the holy men, of course, fiercely turned upon the revolution when defeated. They acted as the most merciless tools of reaction, and it is a good thing that no opportunity should be afforded them for gliding again into the Opposition camp. Of the other Ministers I shall find another occasion of speaking.

Written on November 6, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5489, November 24, 1858

Karl Marx
THE NEW MINISTRY

Berlin, Nov. 9, 1858

"The whirligig of time brings in his revenges."^a Herr von Auerswald, the Vice-President of the new Cabinet, was, as I stated in a former letter,^b the nominal chief of the first regular Ministry of the revolutionary epoch. Then his appointment was considered a symptom of reaction, just as now, after a lapse of ten years, it is considered a symptom of progress. He was the successor of Camphausen, the corn merchant, whom the revolutionary tempest had thrown from his counting-house at Cologne to Berlin on the steps of the Prussian throne. Auerswald's Ministry lasted from the end of June to the 7th September, 1848. Quite apart from what he might do or leave undone, his mere name on the title-page of a Cabinet had a significant meaning in the month of June, 1848. Camphausen, his predecessor, was a native of Rhenish Prussia; Auerswald, a native of the province of East Prussia—the former a private merchant, the latter a public functionary; the former a *bourgeois*, the latter a noble; the former wealthy, the latter poor. Thus, it was evident that already at the end of June, 1848, one month only after the days of March, the oscillatory movement of the Prussian revolution had turned from the west to the east—from the neighborhood of France to the neighborhood of Russia; from simple mortals to Mandarins; from the middle class to the nobility; from the purse to the rank. Save this significance of his name, it cannot be said that Auerswald realized any great significance during the three months his Cabinet lasted. If you ask a Prussian as to the character of Auerswald's former Cabinet, he is

^a Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night; or What You Will*, Act V, Scene 1.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 96-97.—*Ed.*

likely to put his forefinger to his pate, rub it seriously, in true Hudibras⁸⁵ way, and at last, as if awaking from a trance, exclaim: "Ah, you mean Hansemann's Cabinet." Hansemann, indeed, the Minister of Finances who had passed from Camphausen's Cabinet to Auerswald's Cabinet, was the soul of the latter. So, to characterize the Premiership of Auerswald, we must speak of Hansemann.

The latter, an Aachen merchant, had resumed his political creed in his apostrophe, afterward become celebrated, addressed to Prussian royalty on the United Diet in 1847: "In monetary matters, there is an end of fine feeling." (In Geldsachen hört die Gemüthlichkeit auf.)^a This sentence, if it be allowed *parva componere magnis*,^b was, under the then circumstances, an equivalent of Sieyès's famous words: "*Le tiers-état c'est tout.*"^c Under Frederick William III, at a time when nobody, save the licensed followers of Prussian Universities, dared write on politics, Hansemann published a book comparing Prussia to France,^d strongly leaning to the latter power, but so cleverly moderate that it was impossible even for the Prussian censure to put down his insulting parallelism. At a time when a joint-stock company was still a *rara avis*^e in Germany, he had the ambition of becoming a German Hudson, and proved a perfect adept in that sort of jobbery which now flourishes in all civilized countries, and has been converted into a system, even, by the *Crédit Mobilier*.⁸⁶ At a time when bankruptcy was still considered by old-fashioned Germany a stain on the fair reputation of a man, Hansemann contrived to prove that an alternation of bankruptcies is almost as productive in the trading line, as an alternation of crops is in agriculture. The administration of this man, to which Auerswald lent his name, proceeded from the erroneous notion that the few weeks of revolution had sufficiently shaken the old State pillars, that dynasty and aristocracy and bureaucracy had been sufficiently humbled, that the political ascendancy of the middle class was conquered forever, and that there remained nothing to do but roll back the ever-surging waves of the revolution.

^a David Hansemann's speech in the first United Diet on June 8, 1847.—Ed.

^b To compare small things to great (Virgil, *Georgics*, IV, 176).—Ed.

^c Paraphrase of *Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?*—*C'est tout* (What is the Third Estate?—Everything) from Abbé Sieyès' book *Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?*, published in 1789.—Ed.

^d D. Hansemann, *Preussen und Frankreich*, Leipzig, 1833.—Ed.

^e A rare thing, rarity (Juvenal, *Satires*, VI, 165).—Ed.

So successful proved the Ministry in this work of breaking the breakers, that itself was broken three months after its installation, that they, the liberal sycophants, were most unceremoniously kicked out by the courtiers standing behind them, who had used them as mere cat's-paws. Auerswald and Hansemann cut the sorry figures of impostors imposed upon.^a Auerswald shared, besides, the by no means enviable position of being responsible for the Prussian foreign policy, since he had united in his person the Premiership and the *Portefeuille* of Foreign Affairs. Now, if the internal policy of the Ministry was dictated, at least, by the apparent interests of the middle class, which had taken fright at the progress of revolution, the foreign policy was exclusively directed by the Camarilla, and Auerswald a mere tool in their hands. In June 1850 he was appointed President of the province of Rhenish Prussia, to be shortly after removed from that post by Herr von Westphalen, who cleared the Prussian bureaucracy of liberals as coolly as a Scotch nobleman clears his estates of men. As a member of the Lower House (*Abgeordneten Haus*), Auerswald limited himself to opposition in such a diluted form as to be perceptible to the eyes of the political homeopathist only. Auerswald is one of the aristocratic representatives of the liberalism of the province of Eastern Prussia. The elements of which this liberalism consists are remembrances of the wars against Napoleon, and the hopes then embraced by the more intellectual patriots; some general ideas which Königsberg, as the center of Kant's philosophy, considers a local property almost; the unity of interests between the noble who grows the corn, and the inhabitants of the sea towns which export it; free-trade doctrinairism in various shapes, since the province of Prussia is no manufacturing country, but for the greater part depends on the sale to England of its agricultural produce.

Herr von Schleinitz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had once before, in 1849, been appointed Foreign Minister, and, during the short time of his administration, coalesced with the Gotha party,⁸⁷ who, if successful, would divide Germany into two parts—a Northern one, incorporated with Prussia, and a Southern one, incorporated with Austria. In fact, the absorption of Germany by the two great antagonist monarchies is the avowed purpose of the Gothaers. If successful in the formation of two Germanies, a deadly conflict would arise, a new thirty-years' war would be at hand, and the duel between the two antagonistic Germanies would

^a G. E. Lessing, *Nathan der Weise*, Act III, Scene 7.—*Ed.*

at last be stopped by Russia pocketing the one and France pocketing the other.

Herr von Bonin, the War Minister, I have already alluded to in my former letter.^a Here I shall only add that, during his commandership in the Schleswig-Holstein war,⁸⁸ he shone less by pursuit of the Danes than of the Democratic volunteers fighting under the German banner. That war, as is generally known, was one of the bloody farces of modern diplomacy. Herr von Patow, the Minister of Finance, was a member of the Camphausen Cabinet. In the Lower House, he was, a few years ago, denounced by the *Krautjunkers*,^b as a Revolutionist. Some personal insult was added, resulting in his duel with Graf Pfeil, which made him for some time the pet of the Berlin public. Patow might be enrolled as a member of the Financial Reform Association of Liverpool.⁸⁹

Of Count Pückler, the Minister of Agriculture, nothing is to be said but that he is the nephew of the *blasé* author of the "Memoirs of the Dead."^c Bethmann-Hollweg was formerly curator of the University of Bonn, these curators being, in fact, the great inquisitors the Prussian Government pesters the official centers of science with. Under Frederick William III they hunted demagogues⁹⁰—under Frederick William IV heretics. Bethmann was employed in the latter business. He belonged, in fact, before the revolution, to the King's camarilla, and separated only from them when they went "too far."

Simons, the Minister of Justice, and von der Heydt, the Minister of Commerce, are the only members of the Manteuffel cabinet that have outlived their chief. Both are natives of Rhenish Prussia, but of the Protestant part of it, lying on the right bank of the Rhine. Since it was intended to have some natives of Rhenish Prussia in the Cabinet, but to exclude, at the same time, the Rhenish Liberals, the two men were kept in. Simons may claim the merit of having degraded the law-tribunals to a lower depth than they had ever sunk to at the worst times of the Prussian monarchy. Von der Heydt, a rich merchant of Elberfeld, had in 1847 said of the King: "That fellow has belied us so often that we cannot trust him any longer." (Dieser Mensch hat uns so oft belogen, dass wir ihm nicht länger trauen können.) In December, 1848, he entered the *coup d'état* Ministry. At present he is the only Prussian Minister suspected of turning his official position to

^a See this volume, p. 96.—*Ed.*

^b Cabbage junkers.—*Ed.*

^c H. Pückler-Muskau, *Briefe eines Verstorbenen*, Stuttgart, 1831.—*Ed.*

private account. The rumor is very generally spread that he used to make state secrets subservient to the commercial jobs of the Elberfeld firm of Heydt & Co.

Written on November 9, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5492, November 27, 1858

Karl Marx

AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, Nov. 16, 1858

The eclectic and variegated character of the new Cabinet, which I dwelt upon in a former letter,^a has been laid hold of by the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, in the following sneering apostrophe:

"A change of system is to take place. What change of system, if we may take the liberty of asking? What is the system abandoned, and what are the principles of the new system to be adopted? Is it the Catholic Prince at the head of the Ministry, who represents its leading thought; or the Minister of Church and Educational Affairs, the man of the Evangelical alliance? And how is it that the Minister of Finance, the former deputy of the Democrats, is expected to harmonize with the above-mentioned persons? And can the veteran representative of old Prussian bureaucracy bring his opinions to the same level as that of Herr von Patow?"^b

On the 12th of November, the *Urwahlen* (primitive elections) took place throughout the whole of the monarchy. The *Wahlmänner*^c thus elected will in their turn elect the Deputies on the 23d of this month. Nobody likes moderate chastity in his wife, or moderate solvency on the part of his debtor; but moderate liberty was the watchword moderately dealt out among the *Urwähler*. The part of the Prussian population which as yet monopolizes the movement, and whose political creed may be characterized as *liberalismus vulgaris*, is anything but heroical. In 1848, they dared not move on until Naples and Paris and Vienna had broken loose. By a curious concatenation of circumstances, they find themselves, at this moment, in the position of giving the signal of the political

^a See this volume, pp. 96-97.—*Ed.*

^b "Der Ministerwechsel", *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 264, November 11, 1858.—*Ed.*

^c Electors.—*Ed.*

revival on the continent. With a great army at their own back, with a Decembrist France on one side, a newly centralized Austria⁹¹ on another, an eternally watchful Russia on the third, they offer too easy an object for a concentric attack not to feel rather uncomfortable. Then there is before their eyes and in their hearts the still fresh remembrance of the revolution; and, lastly, the Prince Regent must not be frightened out of his new constitutionalism. So one liberal hero admonishes the other, to do him the good service which the husband asked from his wife on her being insulted in the open street by a military officer. "Keep me back," cried the gallant fellow, "or I shall take revenge, and there will be bloodshed." In fact, no delusion is allowed on this point. A Prussian movement, in the local meaning of the word, is possible only within very narrow limits, which, once overstepped, it must roll back or resolve itself into a general continental movement. The fear of the latter is shared alike by the higher middle class and by the Prince Regent. A fact which you are not likely to find reported in any newspaper, but which I can vouch for, is, that the Prince, on his last visit to Breslau, in an audience granted to the notabilities of that city, declared in a most solemn tone that the revolutionary fire was still burning, that a new European eruption was threatened, and that it was, therefore, the duty as well as the interest of the middle classes to gather round the throne, and above all, by the observance of strict moderation in their political act, to stop any hole by which reckless demagogues (*gesinnungslose Demagogen*)^a might rush in. This is quite in consonance with what I was recently told by a highly intellectual Prussian nobleman: "Do you know," he said, "what it was that drove the King mad? The specter of the Red Republic, and his brother, though a sober, mediocre and dull martinet, is haunted by the same ghost."

On the whole, liberal *Wahlmänner* have carried the day in the greater towns, and decided reactionists in the country. The way in which the country elections were managed you may infer from the fact that the *Landräthe*, in their private capacities, sent round circulars, through their respective districts, calling upon the *Urwähler* (primitive electors) to return such and such persons. Now, the position of the *Landrath* is quite exceptional in Prussia. In all the provinces, with the single exception of Rhenish Prussia, he is a squire of extensive landed property, the latter being

^a The Prince of Prussia's declaration at the reception of the Breslau notabilities on September 13, 1858, *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 216, September 16, 1858.—Ed.

situated, like that of the English county magistrate, within the circle of his official domain. At the same time, he is a link of the Bureaucracy elected by the country, nominated by the crown, subject to the *Regierung* (a collegial body), residing in one of the centers of the greater administrative divisions, but in his district (or *Ressort*, as the Prussians call it) he is the highest Government representative. These *Landräthe* combine, therefore, in their persons the quality of the *Krautjunker* (fox-hunter) and the Bureaucrat. They do not, like the greater part of the State functionaries, exclusively depend on their public salaries; or they are, in the worst case, recruited from the younger sons of the landed aristocracy, to eke out by the State salary of \$1,200 a year, the allowance granted by the father, or the uncle, or the elder brother. Generally, therefore, their interests are more strictly bound up with the class and party interests of the landed aristocracy than with the caste interests of the Bureaucracy. These men were the principal pillars of the Cabinet just overthrown. They considered a central government the tool of their own social interests, rather than that they had been its tools. They are making at this moment a stand against the new Cabinet, which has not dared to remove them, partly because such a radical operation would smash up all revolutionary tendencies, and clash with the routine of Prussian administration; partly because the action of the *Landräthe* is, to some degree, depended upon for fettering the agricultural population, and thus forming a counterpoise to the liberalism of the towns. The only *Landrat* yet removed is Count von Krassow in Pomerania, who amused himself with insulting the Cabinet in his circular addressed to the *Urwähler*.^a

There has been no new census published since 1852; but the latter is quite sufficient to give you some idea of the proportion between the country population and the population of the towns. Of seventeen millions of inhabitants, twelve millions were scattered over the country, while five millions were gathered in towns, a great part of the latter being themselves country-towns only. Of the 984 towns of the monarchy, the 12 principal ones boasted of an aggregate population of 1,000,000, while more than 500 came not up to 2,500. The industrial population numbers 11 per cent in the Province of Prussia,^b 15 per cent in Pomerania, 18 per cent in

^a Count von Krassow's circular addressed to the primary electors on October 26, 1858, was published in the *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 267, November 14, 1858.—*Ed.*

^b This is what the North-Eastern province of the monarchy was called until 1878.—*Ed.*

Posen, 23 per cent in Silesia, 26 per cent in Westphalia, 28 per cent in Saxony, 25 per cent in Rhenish Prussia, 37 in Brandenburg. In the latter province, however, the whole industrial population is almost absorbed by Berlin. Of the whole population of the monarchy, 60 per cent belong to strictly agricultural life, and, on the average, there is one nobleman to 263 people.

Written on November 16, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5497, December 3, 1858

Karl Marx

[PROJECT FOR THE REGULATION OF THE PRICE
OF BREAD IN FRANCE]⁹²

The Emperor of the French has just undertaken the execution of a favorite project of his, namely, the regulation of the price of bread throughout his empire. This idea he definitely announced as long ago as 1854, in his speech to the Legislative Body on occasion of the declaration of war against Russia. His statement of the case at that time is worth quoting, and we give it as follows:

"Above all, I recommend to your attention the system now adopted by the City of Paris; for if it extend, as I trust it will, to the whole of France, it will for the future prevent those extreme variations in the price of corn which, in times of abundance, cause agriculture to languish because of the low price of wheat, and, in years of scarcity, the poorer classes to suffer so greatly because of its dearness. That system consists in the establishment in all great centers of population of a credit institution called Baker's Bank (*Caisse de la Boulangerie*), which, during years of dearth, can give bread at a price infinitely lower than the official market quotation, on the condition of its price ranging a little higher in years of plenty. The good harvests being in general more numerous than the bad ones, it is easy to understand that the compensation between both may be effected with ease. In addition, the immense advantage would be gained of finding credit-companies which, instead of gaining from a rise in the price of bread, would, like every one else, be interested in its cheapness; for, contrary to what has existed to the present time, such companies would make money in seasons of fertility, and lose money in seasons of dearth."^a

The principle here set forth is that bread should be sold "infinitely" below its market price in bad, and only "a little" above that same price in good seasons—the compensation to result from the hope that the good years will by far overbalance the scarce

^a Napoleon III's speech to the *Corps législatif* on March 2, 1854, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 62, March 3, 1854.—*Ed.*

ones. An Imperial decree having in December, 1853, established the Baker's Bank at Paris,^a the maximum price for the four-pound loaf was fixed at 40 centimes; the bakers being empowered to claim compensation for their loss from the Bank, which, in its turn, raised its funds by the issue of obligations guaranteed by the Municipality, which, on its part, raised the guaranty funds by contracting new debts, and enhancing the excise duties on articles of consumption at the gates of Paris. A certain sum was, besides, directly contributed by the Government from the public exchequer. At the end of 1854 the debts thus contracted by the Municipality of Paris, together with the Government money, had already reached the sum of eighty millions of francs. The Government was then forced to rescind its steps, and to successively raise the maximum price of the loaf to 45 and 50 centimes. Thus, the Paris people had partly to pay in the form of increased excises what they saved in the price of bread, and the rest of France had to pay a general pauper tax for the metropolis, in the form of the direct Government subvention accorded to the Municipality of Paris. However, the experiment proved a complete failure; the Paris price of bread rising above the official maximum during the bad seasons, from 1855 to 1857, and sinking below it during the rich harvests of 1857 and 1858.

Nothing daunted by the failure of this experiment on a relatively small scale, Louis Napoleon has now taken to organizing, by his own ukase, the bakers' trade and the commerce in grain throughout the Empire. Some weeks ago, one of his newspapers in Paris attempted to convince the public that "a reserve of grain"^b was a necessity in all considerable towns. The argument was, that in the worst years of scarcity the maximum deficit of grain had been equal to 28 days' consumption of the whole population, and that the average number of consecutive bad years was three. From these premises it was calculated that "an effective reserve for three months will be all that can be enacted from human foresight." If extended only to towns with a minimum population of 10,000 inhabitants, the aggregate population of such towns in France (Paris excluded) amounting to 3,776,000 souls, each average soul consuming 45 kilogrammes of wheat for three months, and the present price of wheat being about 14f. the hectolitre—such a reserve, according to this view of the case, would cost between

^a Décret impérial qui institue une caisse de service pour la boulangerie de Paris, le 27 décembre, 1853.—*Ed.*

^b L. Burat's article on the consumption of grain in France, *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 315, November 11, 1858.—*Ed.*

31,000,000 and 32,000,000f.! Now, on the 18th of Nov. the *Moniteur* published a decree in the following terms:

"Art. 1. The reserve of the bakers in all the towns in which the baking trade is regulated by decrees and ordinances is fixed at the quantity of grain or flour necessary for supplying the daily make of each baking establishment during three months.

"Art. 2. Within a month from this date, the Prefects of Departments, after having consulted the municipalities, shall decide whether the reserves shall be established in grain or flour, and shall fix the period within which they shall be provided; also, the portion of them which may be deposited in public store-houses."^a

Annexed to this decree is a list of the towns "in which the baking trade is regulated," and which, consequently, have to lay in reserves. The list comprises all the towns and cities of France of a certain degree of importance, except Paris and Lyons, in which reserves already exist, and which consequently do not fall within the operation of the decree. In all, there are not fewer than 161 towns or cities, and among them are Marseilles, St. Quentin, Mouline, Caen, Angoulême, Dijon, Bourges, Besançon, Evreux, Chartres, Brest, Nîmes, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Montpellier, Rennes, Tours, Grenoble, St. Etienne, Nantes, Orléans, Angers, Rheims, Chalôns, Metz, Lille, Douai, Valenciennes, Beauvais, Arras, St. Omer, Calais, Boulogne-sur-Mer, Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Rouen, Havre, Mâcon, Le Mans, Amiens, Abbeville, and Toulon. According to the last census, the populations of the 161 towns and cities may now be set down at about 8,000,000! This gives us then 5,500,000 hectolitres, at a cost of between 70,000,000 and 80,000,000 francs for the reserves. In transmitting by circular the decree to the Prefects of Departments, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce tells them that, though they "must not constrain the bakers to fulfill precipitately the obligations imposed on them by the decree," they must "fix within reasonable limits the period allowed for so doing." He leaves the Prefects to decide, from local considerations, whether the reserves shall be laid in in grain or flour. He then tells them that the present measure, vast as it is, may be considered capable of extension.^b

^a Napoleon III's decree on grain reserves of November 16, 1858 and "Tableau des villes dans lesquelles la boulangerie est réglementée par des décrets ou ordonnances, et dans lesquelles l'approvisionnement de réserve des boulangers sera porté à trois mois de leur vente journalière", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—*Ed.*

^b Here and in what follows the quotations are from a circular by Eugène Rouher, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, "Extension des réserves de la boulangerie", published in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—*Ed.*

"The Government does not exaggerate, Monsieur le Prefect, the importance of the measure I have described. It is aware that the decree only concerns a small part of the population, and accordingly it has occupied itself with the possibility of extending its means of action. The inhabitants of hamlets and of villages bake their own bread, and take from their crops the quantity of wheat necessary for their families during the year. The intervention of the Government with regard to them would be useless and impossible. But in a certain number of chief towns of departments, and in a greater number of the chief places of arrondissements and of cantons, and even in populous villages, bakers make an important part of the bread consumed, and yet they are not the object of any regulations, and are not obliged to make any reserves. Is it not possible to place the bakers of such places as these under the same *régime*, and to impose on them the same salutary law of prudence? The Government is disposed to think that its prescriptions in this respect would not meet with any serious objections."

Before, however, subjecting to the above decree all the rest of France, except the small villages, the Minister directs the Prefects to consult the Municipalities of the places which do not now fall within its operation. He then tells the Prefects how the reserves are to be stored up:

"Bakers must, as far as possible, utilise the dependencies of their shops, as the *surveillance* of them will be easy. But you must invite the Municipalities to organize, and to place at the disposal of bakers, public store-houses calculated to receive, on payment of a rent to be fixed by tariff, the reserve they cannot receive themselves. I do not doubt that the enlightened cooperation of the municipal authorities will render these operations easy."

The Minister next arrives at the vital point—where to get the money for carrying out the decree:

"As to the realization of the capital necessary, I am convinced that bakers will employ the most serious efforts to procure the sums they will need. Such an employment of capital presents commercial advantages so great, and promises to realize such legitimate profits that they can hardly fail to obtain credit, especially at a moment at which the interest on money is so low. Is it presuming too much on the good will of the capitalists in each commune to hope for their cooperation in favor of the bakers? Would they not find in the reserves constituted a safe pledge of their advances—and a pledge which is rather destined to increase in value than to decline? I shall be happy if the efforts you may make in this matter may be crowned with success. *I ask myself, if the Municipalities could not, if necessary, in imitation of the Caisse de Paris, create resources and employ them in advances to bakers.* In order to encourage and facilitate such advances, and to multiply them by circulation, the granaries destined to receive the reserves might have the character of bonded warehouses (*magasins généraux*), conferred on them, and might deliver warrants which would safely be accepted with favor by our financial establishment, and especially by the Bank of France."

The Minister concludes his circular by directing that within twenty days the Prefects shall inform him what they propose in regard to the execution of the second article of the decree, and

within a month shall report on what the Municipalities of the towns and villages not included in the decree recommend.

Now, we do not purpose to enter at this moment into the question of public granaries, but the immense importance of this economical *coup d'état* needs no long commentary. It is well known that the present price of grain is ruinously low in France, and that, consequently, signs of dissatisfaction are perceptible among the peasantry. By the artificial demand to be created through the means of three months' reserve, Napoleon tries to enhance prices artificially, and thus stop the mouth to agricultural France. On the other hand, he proclaims himself a sort of socialist providence to the proletarians of the towns, although in a rather awkward way, since the first palpable effect of his decree must be to make them pay more for their loaf than before. The "savior of property"^a shows the middle class that not even the formal intervention of his own mock Legislatures, but a simple personal ukase on his part, is all that is wanted to make free with their purses, dispose of municipal property, trouble the course of trade, and subject their monetary dealings to his private crochets. Lastly, the question is still to be considered from the pure Bonapartist point of view. Immense buildings for public granaries will become necessary over the whole of France; and what a fresh field they will open for jobs and plunder. An unexpected turn is also given to the trade in breadstuffs. What profits to be pocketed by the Crédit Mobilier⁹³ and the other gambling companions of his Imperial Majesty! At all events, we may be sure that the Imperial Socialist will prove more successful in raising the price of bread than he has been in attempts to reduce it.

Written about November 19, 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5507, December 15, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1418, December 28, 1858

^a From the Address of the Commerce Municipal Council to Napoleon III published in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 196, July 15, 1849.—Ed.

Karl Marx
AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, Nov. 23, 1858

To-day was election day, the electors of the second degree, a body by no means numerous, meeting quietly to act as the proxies of the turbulent multitude. Liberalism, in its most moderate form, middle-class liberalism, clothed in bureaucratic garb—self-denying liberalism, has sprung out of the urn one moment suspected of turning out a Pandora box. The very titles of the nominees in this town prove that they can mean no harm. There is a General-Steuer-Director (chief controller of the taxes), an Oberbürgermeister (Lord Mayor), a Minister, an ex-Minister, a Gerichts President (chief justice), a Geheimer Archiv Rath (keeper of the royal archives), a Geheimer Rath (secret counsellor); all these official and secret people being backed by two *bourgeois*—the one Mr. Reimer, a Conservative and publisher to his Majesty, the other Dr. Veit, also a publisher, chosen by the money market, which here, as everywhere, is strongly imbued with Semitic blood, because of his Jewish persuasion. Now, there can be no mistake about the fact, that the middle-class radicals of 1848, Jacoby, Unruh, Waldeck, Rodbertus, Stein, Elsner, and so forth, in one word, the men whom I wrote you a month ago^a were likely to be chosen by the great towns, played, indeed, a leading part in the meetings of the primitive electors, drew up many of the electioneering programmes, and at Breslau, Königsberg, Magdeburg, Elbing had seats in the Landtag offered to them. Whence this sudden *changement de décoration*? They have humbly declined accepting the honor kept in store for them. Some acted not quite as free agents, but resolved only upon self-abnegation after an

^a See this volume, pp. 74-75.—Ed.

uncomfortable and by no means spontaneous interview with the Polizei Director. The others yielded to the pressure of the anxious part of the *bourgeoisie*, which lords it supreme at this moment. All, however, Polizei Directors, candidates and constituents, acted under the strong impulse of suddenly changed circumstances, or, I should rather say, circumstances had not changed, but the mist of delusions that hung about them became dissolved by a thunder-storm. *La situation*, as the French call it, *s'était dessinée*.^a The Government had taken fright, and, out of mere timidity, grew bold. Herr Flottwell, the Minister of the Interior, published a circular^b such as never before has been published in any language, teeming with grammatical blunders, perplexed in its wording, nonsensical in its arguments, but still full of angry meaning. You know what in France is understood by an official warning to a newspaper. Well, Flottwell's circular was a general warning to the electors, backed by private instructions to the police force. It directly pointed at the electioneering speeches, the electioneering programmes, and the electioneering prospects of the radical ex-members of the National Assembly of 1848. So, as the higher middle-class is willed to take the fortress by moderation, and as the more democratic majority of the people understand that for the moment the political initiative belongs to the higher middle-class, the Ministerial hint was at once acted upon, the *grands airs* of the revival were dropped, and the elections cut down to the Government pattern. Still, to be roughly shaken out of a delicious dream is by no means a pleasant sensation. The men and the speeches and the programmes interfered with, had, in their boldest soars, kept themselves so strictly "within the limits of practical reason," that even the anxious part of the middle-class felt offended at the anxiety of the Government. Its method of ushering in the new regime of liberty seemed rather unceremonious; consequently, there was a low rumbling of disappointment through the general public, while the organs of the old Camarilla were overflowing with ironical congratulations upon the "*Selbstbesinnung*"^c of the new Cabinet. Upon this poor Flottwell had another circular of his published,^d which he had some weeks ago

^a The situation had taken shape.—*Ed.*

^b Von Flottwell's circular of November 17, 1858 was published in the *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 271, November 19, 1858.—*Ed.*

^c Prudénce.—*Ed.*

^d Von Flottwell, "Circular an die Herren Regierungs-Präsidenten und den Herrn Polizei-Präsidenten von Berlin. 10. November 1858", *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 273, November 21, 1858.—*Ed.*

secretly addressed to the *Landräthe*, and in which they were warned against supporting candidates of extreme opinions on either side. To give some weight to this anachronism, the by-gone edict was made the pretext of the following commentary in the *Preussische Zeitung*, the Ministerial organ:

"One highly auspicious fact characterizing the present elections is, that all parties concur to meet on the monarchical and constitutional basis, and thus lessen in a degree the points of difference separating their various creeds. The progressive but firm and moderate course of politics assumed by Government, will aim especially at promoting this union. Government will not suffer itself to be driven from its liberal but temperate principles by extravagant hopes or demands. Government, on the other hand, cannot allow that party to appropriate to themselves the exclusive title of Royalists, who, far from unreservedly accepting the basis of the Constitution, only admit the legality of the Charter in the same proportion as it corresponds with their own interests. Government denies the assertion that the majority of the landed proprietors belong to this party," etc.

In point of fact, the Ministry went in all this for nothing. The Prince had not established himself with a reactionary speech in the *Staatsrath*,^a on the introduction of his son, with another reactionary speech in the Freemasons' meeting, and with a reactionary address to the *Treibund*^b (a sort of Prussian Orangemen organization),⁹⁴ but he had frightened the Cabinet by violent explosions of anger at the turn things were taking under their direction. Flottwell's first circular was a well-meant warning to the middle-class not to put the Regent's new-fangled constitutionalism upon anything like a trial. When, consequent upon this step, the Ministers became aware of their own precarious position, they telegraphed to the Princess of Prussia, who at once hastened from Coblenz to Berlin and gave a *coup de baguette*^c in the opposite direction. The Princess during the last year alternately dwelt at Weimar, Carlsruhe and Coblenz. She had only repaired to Berlin at the moment of the settlement of the Regency question. Then all the physicians consulted, declining to declare whether the King's malady was or was not to be cured, the Queen, through Herr von Kleist-Retzow, singled out an army surgeon, one Boeger, who countersigned a paper to the effect that the King could be restored to health. The Princess of Prussia feigned to fall sick. Cited that same surgeon to her side, had herself treated by him, coaxed him by flattery and

^a The Prince's speech in the State Council on November 8, 1858 was published in the *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 276, November 25, 1858.—*Ed.*

^b This address was delivered on November 11, 1858. See *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 270, November 18, 1858.—*Ed.*

^c Stroke of the wand.—*Ed.*

gracious condescension, and, when he seemed ripe for her purpose, put the pertinent question, whether he, such an exceedingly learned and conscientious man, could in fact believe in his own declaration as to the King's state of health? Silly Boeger avowed that the tears of the Queen had alone determined his course of action. Upon this, the Princess rang the bell, two chamberlains rushed in, and the army surgeon, required to obey his natural superiors, had to repeat, not by word of mouth, but in his own handwriting, the confession just extorted. Having thus gained her end, the Princess was banished from Berlin. After her husband's installation as Regent, she voluntarily prolonged her sojourn at Coblenz. Prince William, like other mediocre men, suffers from the mental superiority of his better half, and, though kept in leading strings, dislikes to see the hands that pull them. His wife's influence must be brought to bear upon him in a roundabout way. The relations between these two personages are, besides, of an icy and ceremonious character. Prince William, in his youth, was passionately in love with Fräulein von Brockhaus, and wanted to marry her. His father interfered, and the Fräulein died of a broken heart at Paris. The marriage with the Princess of Weimar was forced upon the restive scion of the house of Hohenzollern; and to revenge himself, he exhibited, during the first years of marriage, an unbounded passion for Fräulein V—k. So the relations between the Prince and his wife are anything but homelike, and the best method for installing her Ministry at Berlin was to hide herself at Coblenz.

Meanwhile, the Queen played one of those tricks familiar to the readers of the *oeil de boeuf*'s⁹⁵ chronicles. You have, perhaps, read in the newspapers that, on the departure from Berlin of the King and the Queen, the latter's *portefeuille* was stolen at Leipsic, and that, despite all the exertions of the Argus-eyed and Briareus-handed German police, the thief was not to be caught. By some accident or other, this *portefeuille* found its way to the Regent's writing-desk, and in the *portefeuille* there was found a voluminous correspondence, carried on by the Princess, his wife, with all sorts of political characters.

There were letters addressed to Wenzel, Gerichts President at Ratibor, one of the deputies just elected at Berlin, and an Opposition member in the Manteuffel House of Commons, and letters to Reichensperger, the chief of the Prussian Catholic opposition, and other letters—all teeming with affected liberalism, and all longing for a united Germany. In this way, the Prince, known to be haunted by the bugbear of the Red Republic, was still

more frightened by the apparent discovery of his own wife being made a wife of the Revolutionists. Other intrigues were resorted to. I chronicle this *chronique scandaleuse*, the correctness of which I can vouch for, because revolutions, before taking the shape of popular commotion, announce themselves in monarchic States first by the decay of dynasties.

Written on November 23, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5505, December 13, 1858

Frederick Engels

EUROPE IN 1858⁹⁶

The second half of the year 1858 has witnessed, in Europe, a peculiar revival of political activity. From the 2d of December, 1851, till the middle of the present year, the continent of Europe was, politically speaking, covered as with a shroud. The powers which, by the grace of the armies, had issued victorious out of the great revolutionary contest, had been allowed to govern as they liked, to make and unmake, to keep or to break the laws just as they pleased. Representative institutions had everywhere been degraded to a mere sham; there was scarcely any Parliamentary opposition anywhere; the press was gagged; and had it not been, now and then, for some sudden explosion, an outbreak at Milan, a landing at Salerno, a riot at Châlon, an attempt on the life of Louis Napoleon⁹⁷; had it not been for some political trials at Angers and elsewhere, during which the old revolutionary spirit revelled, for a short hour, and no matter at what cost, in a loud and startling self-assertion—one might have thought that the European Continent had given up all ideas of political life after the experiment of 1848, and that military despotism, the rule of the Caesars was generally acquiesced in as the only practicable form of government. Even in England, the spirit of political reform had been constantly on the decline. Judicial, commercial, and administrative legislation, the latter with an undoubted tendency toward centralization, occupied the attention of Parliament. The attempts at keeping alive a popular political movement failed most signally, the Middle-Class Reform party going quietly to sleep and suffering an immense defeat in Lord Palmerston's general election of 1857,⁹⁸ while Chartism had fallen completely to pieces.

Of all the European nations, Russia was the first to awake from this political lethargy. The Crimean war, though concluded without any very substantial loss of territory, and, so far as the East is concerned, even of prestige, had still humiliated her pride. For the first time, she had been compelled to abandon the principle, that whatever lands she annexes she never again gives up. Her whole system of administration, in its most perfect branch—the military—had broken down completely, and had to be admitted a failure. The work in which Nicholas had labored, day and night, for twenty-five years, had crumbled into ruins with the ramparts and forts of Sebastopol. Still, with the existing political state of the country, no other system of administration was possible than the exclusive and exaggerated bureaucratic system which existed. To lay a foundation for a better system, Alexander II had to recur to the idea of emancipating the serfs. He had two formidable opponents to contend with, the nobility and that very bureaucracy which he intended to reform against its own will, and which at the same time was to serve as the instrument of his designs. To support him, he had nothing but the traditional passive obedience of that inert mass of Russian serfs and merchants which had hitherto been excluded from the right even of thinking about their political condition. To make their support available, he was compelled to create a kind of public opinion, and at least the shadow of a press. Accordingly, the censorship was relaxed, and civil, well-intentioned and well-behaved discussion was invited; even slight and polite criticisms of the acts of public officers were permitted. The degree of liberty of debate now existing in Russia would seem ridiculously small in any country of Europe except France; but still, to people who knew the Russia of Nicholas, the step in advance appears enormous, and, combined with the difficulties necessarily arising from the emancipation of the serfs, this awakening to political life of the more educated classes of Russia is full of good omens.

The next political revival took place in Prussia. When the King had temporarily retired from active government, it soon became known that his mental derangement was incurable, and that sooner or later his brother would have to be appointed Regent, with full powers. This intermediate period gave rise to some agitation, which, under the pretext of clamor for a definitive Regency, was, in fact, directed against the existence of an unpopular Ministry. When, two months ago, the Regency was finally established, the Ministry changed, and a new House of Representatives elected, the political movement, so long dammed

up, at once cleared a road for itself, and turned the former majority out of the Legislature, almost to a man. What all the present manifestation in Prussia will ultimately lead to, has been analyzed in these columns on former occasions^a; here we have merely to register the fact that the political revival has taken place.

The existence of such a movement could not remain unnoticed in the remainder of Germany. In fact, it is already making itself felt in the smaller States; and changes of Ministry, shiftings of majorities and vacillations of policy, are sure to develop themselves as the movement in Prussia takes a more definite shape. And, not only in the small fry of German monarchies, but in Austria as well, is this movement beginning to be seriously felt. The Constitutional party in Austria have, at present, no chance of inducing the Government to make a second trial of Representative institutions; so, the only means they have of keeping the question before the public is to praise the "return to sound Constitutional Government" in Prussia; and, indeed, it is wonderful how popular Prussia has at once become in Austria and South Germany. But no matter what be its expression, the movement is in existence even in Austria.

Another focus of agitation is Italy. Comparatively quiet since the peace with Russia, the political infection, aided by Bonapartist intrigues, was sure to spread to this inflammable nation. The old anti-smoking movement has begun again in Lombardy; the Duchess of Parma^b finds it convenient to allow Ristori to declaim against the Austrians under the cloak of Judith preaching a holy war against the Assyrians,⁹⁹ and that within hearing of the Austrian garrison of Piacenza. The position of the French army of occupation at Rome, and of the Papal Government there, are becoming equally difficult. Naples is even ready to rise, and, to crown all, Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia calls upon his generals to be prepared, for they may possibly have to smell powder again in the Spring.^c

Even France has been seized by this new spirit. Montalembert's paper against Bonapartism^d was a striking proof of a reawakening life among the French middle classes. It now appears that not only had Montalembert prepared another essay, but M. Falloux, the

^a See this volume, pp. 65-81, 96-109, 115-19.—*Ed.*

^b Louise de Bourbon.—*Ed.*

^c Victor Emmanuel's address to Colonel Rolland after the review of the Savoy brigade, November 1858, *The Times*, No. 23168, December 4, 1858.—*Ed.*

^d Ch. Montalembert, "Un débat sur l'Inde au parlement anglais", *Le Correspondant*, new series, Vol. IX, October 1858. See also this volume, p. 93.—*Ed.*

ex-Minister of Louis Napoleon, is also coming out with a strong article against the existing state of things. The trial of Montalembert^a resolves itself into a solemn protest of the parliamentary celebrities of France against the present system, and a declaration that they still aspire to the restoration of parliamentary government. De Broglie, Odilon Barrot, Villemain and many other men of that class were there, and Berryer spoke for them all when, under the shelter of that inviolability which to a certain degree adheres to the forensic speeches of an advocate, he exclaimed:

"No, we shall never and on no account be renegades to our past. You hold this country too cheap. You admit, yourselves, that it is changeful and inconstant. What guaranty, then, have you that it will not one day return to those institutions which it has loved, and under which it has lived for half a century? Ah, our strength is greatly exhausted by our protracted struggles, by our painful trials, by the bitterness of our disappointments—*no matter when our country wants us, it will ever find us at our posts.* We will devote ourselves to it with the same ardor, the same perseverance and the same disinterestedness as in bygone days, and the last cry of our expiring voice shall be—'Liberty and France!'"

Surely, such an open declaration of war against the whole of the existing institutions of France would never be ventured upon unless there was a strong party out of doors giving the speaker their moral support. Finally, we find even in England a resuscitated reform agitation, and an all but certainty that this question must now be kept before Parliament, in some definite shape or other, until a measure is passed which will alter materially the balance of parties, and thereby attack the foundations of the venerable but rickety British Constitution.

Now, what is at the bottom of this uniform and, so far, uncommonly harmonious movement in almost all the countries of Europe? When the volcanic upheavings of 1848 suddenly threw before the eyes of the astonished liberal middle classes of Europe the giant specter of an armed working class, struggling for political and social emancipation, the middle classes, to whom the safe possession of their capital was of immensely higher importance than direct political power, sacrificed this power, and all the liberties for which they had fought, to secure the suppression of the proletarian revolution. The middle class declared itself politically a minor, unfit to manage the affairs of the nation, and acquiesced in military and bureaucratic despotism. Then arose that spasmodic extension of manufactures, mines, railways, and steam navigation, that epoch of *Crédits Mobiliers*, joint-stock bubbles, of

^a On November 24, 1858.—*Ed.*

swindling and jobbing, in which the European middle class sought to make up for their political defeats by industrial victories, for their collective impotence by individual wealth. But with their wealth rose their social power, and in the same proportion their interests expanded; they again began to feel the political fetters imposed upon them. The present movement in Europe is the natural consequence and expression of this feeling, combined with that return of confidence in their own power over their workmen which ten years of quiet industrial activity have brought about. The year 1858 bears a close resemblance to the year 1846, which also initiated a political revival in most parts of Europe, and was also distinguished by a number of reforming princes, who, two years afterward, were carried away helplessly by the rush of the revolutionary torrent which they had let loose.

Written late in November 1858

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5514, December 23, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1417, December 24, 1858 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 902, December 25, 1858

Karl Marx

[AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA]

Berlin, Dec. 4, 1858

In a former letter^a I told you how sudden a turn was given to the general elections by Mr. Flottwell's confidential warning^b to the middle class not to overdo the "revival" scene. Accordingly a full sweep was made of the middle-class radicals. On the other hand, the inferior classes stood in no need of warnings, since they abstained voluntarily and rather contemptuously from using the farcical right of casting a vote which, by virtue of the electoral law, counts for nothing whenever, as in the present case, first-rate and second-rate wealth have decided upon a common course. The few places where, as in this town for instance, you find the votes of the minority of the ratable working classes recorded, you may be sure that they acted under compulsion on a *mot d'ordre*^c intimated by their employers. Even "the London *Times*' Own Correspondent" (who sees everything *couleur de rose*) cannot but avow, in the columns of the British Leviathan, that the passive attitude taken by the masses inspired his stout heart with dark misgivings.^d So, then, the elections are altogether liberal in the ministerial sense. The *Kreuz-Zeitung*'s party¹⁰⁰ has disappeared as by the move of a magical wand. Two of its magnates even have found their way back to the chambers where they used to dictate, and some owe their return solely to the magnanimity of their rivals. The havoc

^a See this volume, pp. 116-17.—*Ed.*

^b See von Flottwell's circular of November 17, 1858, *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 271, November 19, 1858.—*Ed.*

^c Order.—*Ed.*

^d See the report from Berlin of November 30, *The Times*, No. 23167, December 3, 1858 ("Prussia").—*Ed.*

made among them may be inferred from the single fact that out of 77 *Landräthe* but 27 have been reelected. Altogether they will reappear in the shape of a by no means respectable minority.

But such is the frail nature of Prussian constitutionalism that it has taken fright at the magnitude of its own victory. The elections having resulted in Chambers representing the liberalism of the Ministry, it is evident that the Ministry represents the liberalism of the elected Chambers, and by this simple process becomes actually converted into a party Ministry, a parliamentary Ministry, just the abomination that ought not to be. Consequently, the Ministers had to protest at once in the *Staats-Anzeiger* against the new situation created for them. They, the elected Councillors of the Prince, appeared all at once, transformed into the chosen Executive of the country, and their power to emanate from popular delegation. In their protest—the only name one can give to their profession of faith inserted in the *Staats-Anzeiger*—they asseverate in highflown sentences that Parliamentary Ministry or party Government is in Prussia quite out of the question; that the King, by the grace of God, must remain the exclusive source of power; that the Ministers cannot serve two masters; that it is all right on the part of the country to have carried the elections in its senses, but that, instead of the country now expecting them to follow the initiative of the Chambers, the Ministry expects the Chambers to walk obsequiously in the footsteps of the Government.

You see where we are. They are a Parliamentary Government and they are no Parliamentary Government. They have, through the elections, ousted the party of the Queen, but already they show themselves anxious to break the ladder by which they entered the premises of power. With the King still living, with the Queen still intriguing, with powerful and organized interests still hiding themselves under their banner, the Prince could not secure his place but by choosing a liberal Ministry, and that Ministry could not hold its post but by appealing to the general elections. The electors sending back from below the tune played from above, the Ministers became a party Ministry and the Prince became a middle-class Dictator. But then, all at once, he, the expectant heir, by the grace of God, to the throne of Prussia, recognizes the false position in which events have placed him, and in his angry weakness, imagines that by words he can blot out facts; that by phrases half didactic, half menacing, he can change the real conditions of his tenure of power, and that the electoral manoeuvre once got through with, he will be able to reassume the traditional airs of a Prussian King. He and his men, while fancying

that they can impose upon the country, betray only their own bad faith and exhibit the grotesque spectacle of the *malade malgré lui*.^a In their anxiety to hush up the political revival, they are only emancipating it from their control. As an appendage of the ministerial protest must be considered the speech^b in the State Council of the Prince, a speech published at full length because the Queen's camarilla harped upon some isolated sentences of the harangue.

Now, the Prince, like the Ministers, turns in most lusty self-contradiction. He has chosen a new Cabinet, because he considered the dismissal of the old one no real change. He wants something new, but the new thing must be a new edition of the old one. He condemns the Constitution of the Municipalities, forced upon the country by the late Government, because it extinguished the last spark of municipal self-government; but he will not have it altered, because such an alteration might work dangerously in the present fermentation of the public mind. He proposes to extend the influence of Prussia by pacific means only, and, consequently, dwells upon the necessary augmentation of the army, already a ruinously huge excrescence. He confesses that for the latter purpose money is wanted, and that, despite the creation of a State debt since the revolution, the Exchequer turns a deaf ear to the demands pressing upon it. He announces the creation of new taxes, and, at the same time, inveighs against the immense strides credit has made in Prussia during the last decennial epoch. As his Ministers want electors in their sense, while not admitted to be Ministers in the sense of their electors, he, the Regent, wants money for his army, but wants no moneyed men. The only passage in his speech which smacks of decided opposition to the late regime, is his invective against religious hypocrisy. This was a pique he owed to the Queen, but lest the public should take the same liberty, he, a Protestant Prince, had simultaneously a Berlin congregation of free Catholics¹⁰¹ dispersed by the Police force.

Now, you will admit that such a nondescript, self-contradictory, suicidal policy would, even under ordinary circumstances, prove provoking and dangerous enough, but the circumstances are no ordinary ones. There is the revolution threatening from France, to show front against which the Prussian Government must feel

^a A play of words on the titles of two comedies by Molière, *Le médecin malgré lui* and *Le malade imaginaire*.—Ed.

^b Delivered on November 8, 1858 and published in the *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 276, November 25, 1858.—Ed.

comfortable at home. The only prospect of delaying the revolution in France is a European war. In such a war Russia, France and Sardinia would club together against Austria. Not to become the common scapegoat, Prussia must then be ready to carry on an insurrectionary war, a war of German independence; for if it should wage war against its own subjects, it would, as in 1806, be felled by a single stroke.¹⁰² The Prussian Government is fully conscious of the predicament it would be put in by either a French revolution or a European war. And it knows that on the horns of this dilemma Europe is tossed at this moment. But, on the other hand, it knows that in giving full swing to the popular movement, the same danger would start from within, which would thus be shunned from without. To make popular concessions in appearance and baffle them in fact, is a game perhaps dangerous to play with the German people, but the poor Prussian Government lacks the nerve to even attempt the game. Why, for instance, not allow the higher middle classes to indulge the comfort that a Cabinet nominated by the Regent was afterward elected by them? Because even the appearance of popular concession offends the dynastic pride. As with the internal policy, so with foreign policy. No State feels more horror-struck at the aspect of a European war, than Prussia. Yet a little private war, say a fight with Denmark as to Schleswig-Holstein, or internecine bullets exchanged with Austria as to the German Hegemonie, might prove an extremely clever diversion, and create popularity at the cheap price of bleeding the mob. But, there again the thing desirable is not the thing that can be done. Behind the Danish question lurks Russia, while Austria represents in her proper person nothing less than the European *status quo*. Thus, as Constitutional concessions would pave the way to the revolution, so a little fighting would lead to a European war. Hence you may be sure that the grand warlike tones of Prussia against Denmark will evaporate in a wordy protest inserted in the *Staats-Anzeiger*.

Written on December 4, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5517, December 27, 1858

Karl Marx

QUESTION OF THE IONIAN ISLANDS

London, Dec. 17, 1858

The case of Mr. William Hudson Guernsey, alias Wellington^a Guernsey, criminally prosecuted for stealing from the library of the British Colonial Office two secret dispatches addressed—the one on June 10, 1857, the other on July 18, 1858^b—to the late Government of Lord Palmerston by Sir John Young, Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, has just been tried before Baron Martin of the Central Criminal Court, and ended in the acquittal of the accused. The trial was interesting, both in a political and a judicial point of view. It will be remembered that the Homeric Mr. Gladstone had hardly left London, on his extraordinary mission to pacify the Ionian Islands,¹⁰³ when, like a Scythian arrow, darted from an unseen hand, Sir John Young's dispatch, which proposes to abandon the protectorate of the islands and surrender them to Greece, but only after having cut off the finest morsel by merging Corfu in the colonial domains of Great Britain, made its appearance in the columns of *The Daily News*. Great and general was the astonishment. The portion of the London press opposed to secret diplomacy congratulated Lord Derby's Cabinet on the bold step of initiating the public into the mystery of diplomatic whisperings; and *The Morning Star*, in its naive enthusiasm, proclaimed that a new epoch of international policy had dawned upon the United Kingdom. The sweet voice of praise became, however, in no time, overwhelmed by the shrill and

^a The *New-York Daily Tribune* has "Washington" here.—*Ed.*

^b The last date should be July 14, 1858. See "Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Young to Mr. Secretary Labouchere, Corfu, June 10, 1857" and "Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Young to the Right Hon. Sir E. L. Bulwer Lytton, Corfu, July 14, 1858", *The Times*, No. 23150, November 13, 1858.—*Ed.*

angry tones of criticism. The anti-ministerial press eagerly seized upon the “premeditated blunder,” as they called it, which, they said, was aimed at nothing else than the destruction, in the first instance, of Mr. Gladstone’s political independence and at his temporary removal from the Parliamentary arena; while, at the same time, by an unscrupulous stroke of Machiavellian perfidy, his mission was to be baffled on the part of his own employers by the publication of a document which put him at once in a false position toward the party he had to negotiate with, toward public opinion in England, and toward the public law of Europe. To ruin a too confiding rival, said *The Times*,^a *The Globe*, *The Observer*, and the smaller anti-ministerial fry, the Derby Cabinet had not hesitated to commit an indiscretion which, under existing circumstances, amounted to nothing less than treason. How could Mr. Gladstone negotiate when the Ionians were not only informed that a foregone conclusion was arrived at on the part of Britain, but when the leading Ionian patriots were compromised by the betrayal of their acceptance of a plan resulting in the dismemberment of the seven islands? How could he negotiate in face of the European remonstrances, which were sure to result from such an infringement of the treaty of Vienna,^b that treaty constituting England not the owner of Corfu, but the protector only of the seven islands, and settling the territorial divisions of the European map forever? These newspaper articles were, in fact, followed by actual remonstrances on the part of Russia and France.

Let me remark, *en passant*, that the treaty of Vienna, the only acknowledged code of international law in Europe, forms one of the most monstrous *fictiones juris publici* ever heard of in the annals of mankind. What is the first article of that treaty?^c The eternal exclusion of the Bonaparte family from the French throne; yet there sits Louis Napoleon, the founder of the second empire, acknowledged and fraternized with, and cajoled and bowed to by all the crowned heads of Europe. Another article^d runs to the effect that Belgium is forever granted to Holland; while, on the other hand, for eighteen years past, the separation of Belgium

^a No. 23152, November 16, 1858 (leading article).—*Ed.*

^b “Convention entre les cours de Vienne, de St. Pétersbourg, de Londres et de Berlin, pour fixer le sort des sept îles Ioniennes; signée à Paris le 5 novembre 1815”.—*Ed.*

^c “Traité d’alliance de Vienne entre la Grande-Bretagne, l’Autriche, la Prusse et la Russie conclu le 25 mars 1815.”—*Ed.*

^d “Traité entre le roi du Pays-Bas et les quatre Puissances alliées, signé à Vienne, le 13 mai 1815.”—*Ed.*

from Holland is not only a *fait accompli*, but a legal fact. Then the treaty of Vienna prescribes that Cracow, incorporated with Austria since 1846, shall forever remain an independent republic^a; and last, not least, that Poland, merged by Nicholas into the Russian Empire, shall be an independent constitutional kingdom, linked with Russia by the personal bond of the Romanoff dynasty only.^b Thus, leaf after leaf has been torn out of this holy book of the European *jus publicum*, and it is only appealed to when it suits the interests of one party and the weakness of the other.

The Derby Cabinet was evidently wavering, whether to pocket the unmerited praises of one part of the press, or meet the unmerited slanders of the other. Yet, after eight days' vacillation, it decided on the latter step, declared by a public advertisement that it had no hand in the publication of Sir John Young's dispatches, and that an investigation was actually going on as to the performer of the criminal trick.^c Finally, Mr. William Hudson Guernsey was traced out as the guilty man, tried before the Central Criminal Court, and convicted of having purloined the dispatches. The Derby Cabinet, consequently, comes out victorious in the contest; and here the political interest of the trial ends. Still, in consequence of this lawsuit, the attention of the world has been again directed to the relations between Great Britain and the Ionian Islands. That the plan of Sir John Young was no private crotchet, is conclusively proved by the following extract from a public address of his predecessor, Sir Henry Ward, to the Ionian Assembly, on the 13th of April, 1850:

"It is not for me to speak, in the name of the British crown, of that distant future which the address shadows forth, when the scattered members of the Greek race may be reunited in one mighty empire, with the consent of the European powers. But I have no difficulty in expressing my own opinion [he spoke in the name of the British crown] that, if such an event be within the scope of human contingencies, the Sovereign and the Parliament of England would be equally willing to see the Ionians resume their place as members of the new power that would then take its place in the policy of the world."^d

Meanwhile, the philanthropic feelings of Great Britain for the islands, gave themselves vent in the truly Austrian ferocity with

^a "Traité additionnel entre la Russie, la Prusse, et l'Autriche, relatif à Cracovie, signé à Vienne, le 3 mai 1815."—*Ed.*

^b "Acte final du Congrès de Vienne, 9 juin 1815."—*Ed.*

^c H. Drummond Wolff, "To the Editor of *The Times*", *The Times*, No. 23153, November 17, 1858. The statement to the *Times* editor was made on behalf of the British Colonial Office.—*Ed.*

^d This and the following quotations are to be found in the article "The Ionian Islands", *The Free Press*, No. 23, November 24, 1858.—*Ed.*

which Sir Henry Ward crushed the then rebellion in the islands. Out of a population of 200,000 souls, 8,000 were punished by hanging, scourging, imprisonment and exile; women and children being whipped until blood flowed. In order not to be suspected of exaggeration, I will quote a British paper, *The Morning Chronicle*, of April 25, 1850:

"We shudder at the awful measure of retribution which was inflicted by the Court-Martials, under the direction of the Lord High Commissioner. Death, transportation and corporal punishments were awarded to the wretched criminals in some cases *without trial*, in another by the rapid *process of martial law*. Of capital executions there were 21, and of other punishments a large number."

But, then, the Britishers boast of having blessed the Ionians with a free Constitution and developed their material resources to a pitch forming a bright contrast with the wretched economical state of Greece proper. Now, as to the Constitution, Lord Grey, at the moment when he was given to constitution-mongering for the whole Colonial Empire of Great Britain, could with no good grace pass over the Ionian Islands; but he only gave them back what England for long years had fraudulently wrested from them.

By a treaty drawn up by Count Capo d'Istria, and signed with Russia at Paris in 1815, the protection of the Ionian Islands was made over to Great Britain, on the express condition of her abiding by the Russian Constitution granted to them in 1803. The first British Lord High Commissioner, Sir Thomas Maitland, abrogated that Constitution, and replaced it by one investing him with absolute power.¹⁰⁴ In 1839, the Chevalier Mustoxidis, an Ionian, states in his "*Pro Memoria*," printed by the House of Commons, June 22, 1840:

"The Ionians [...] do not enjoy the privilege which the communities of Greece used to possess even in the days of Turkish tyranny, that of electing their own magistrates, and managing their own affairs, but are under officers imposed upon them by the police. The slight latitude which had been allowed to the municipal bodies of each island of administering their own revenues has been snatched from them, and in order to render them more dependent, these revenues have been thrown into the public exchequer."

As to the development of the material resources, it will suffice to say that England, Free-trade England, is not ashamed to pester the Ionians with export duties, a barbarous expedient which seemed relegated to the financial code of Turkey. Currants, for instance, the staple product of the islands, are charged with an export duty of $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

"The intervening seas," says an Ionian, "which form, as it were, the highway of the islands, are stopped, after the method of a turnpike gate, at each harbor, by transit duties, which tax the commodities of every name and description interchanged between island and island."

Nor is this all. During the first twenty-three years of British administration, the taxation was increased threefold and the expenditure fivefold. Some reduction took place afterward, but then in 1850 there was a deficiency equal to one half of what was previously the total taxation, as is shown by the following table:

	Annual Taxation.	Expenditure.
1815.....	£68,459	£48,500
1817*	108,997	87,420
1850.....	147,482	170,000

* First year of the British Protectorate.

Thus, export duties on their own produce, transit duties between the different islands, increase of taxation and waste of expenditure are the economical blessings conferred on the Ionians by John Bull. According to his oracle in Printing-House Square,^a he grasps after colonies only in order to educate them in the principles of public liberty; but, if we adhere to facts, the Ionian Islands, like India and Ireland, prove only that to be free at home, John Bull must enslave abroad. Thus, at this very moment, while giving vent to his virtuous indignation against Bonaparte's spy system at Paris, he is himself introducing it at Dublin.

The judicial interest of the trial in question hangs upon one point: Guernsey's advocate confessed to the purloining of ten copies of the dispatches, but pleaded not guilty, because they had not been intended to be used for a private purpose. If the crime of larceny depends on the intention only with which foreign property is unlawfully appropriated, the criminal law is brought to a dead stop in that respect. The solid citizens of the jury-box scarcely intended to effect such a revolution in the conditions of property, but only meant to assert, by their verdict, that public documents are the property—not of the Government, but of the public.^b

Written on December 17, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5526, January 6, 1859

^a The square in London where *The Times* had its main offices.—*Ed.*

^b "Trial of Mr. Guernsey for Stealing the Ionian Despatches", *The Times*, No. 23178, December 16, 1858.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

THE EXCITEMENT IN IRELAND

London, Dec. 24, 1858

A Government, representing, like the present British Ministry, a party in decay, will always better succeed in getting rid of its old principles, than of its old connections. When installing himself at Downing street,^a Lord Derby, doubtless, made up his mind to atone for the blunders which in times past had converted his name into a byword in Ireland; and his versatile Attorney-General for Ireland, Mr. Whiteside, would not one moment hesitate flinging to the wind the oaths that bound him to the Orange Lodges.¹⁰⁵ But, then, Lord Derby's advent to power gave, simultaneously, the signal for one coterie of the governing class to rush in and fill the posts just vacated by the forcible ejection of the other coterie. The formation of the Derby Cabinet involved the consequence that all Government places should be divided among a motley crew still united by a party name which has become meaningless, and still marching under a banner torn to tatters, but in fact having nothing in common save reminiscences of the past, club intrigues, and, above all, the firm resolution to share together the loaves and fishes of office. Thus, Lord Eglinton, the Don Quixote who wanted to resuscitate the tournaments of chivalry in money-mongering England, was to be enthroned Lord Lieutenant at Dublin Castle, and Lord Naas, notorious as a reckless partisan of Irish landlordism, was to be made his First Minister. The worthy couple, *arcades ambo*,^b on leaving London, were, of course,

^a 10 Downing Street is the British Prime Minister's residence.—*Ed.*

^b Arcadians both: two of the same stamp, blackguards both (Virgil, *Bucolics*, *Elegies*, VII, 4).—*Ed.*

seriously enjoined by their superiors to have done with their crotchetts, to behave properly, and by no capricious pranks to upset their own employers. Lord Eglinton's path across the channel was, we do not doubt, paved with good intentions, the vista of the Viceregal baubles dancing before his childish mind; while Lord Naas, on his arrival at Dublin Castle, was determined to satisfy himself that the wholesale clearance of estates,¹⁰⁶ the burning down of cottages, and the merciless unhousing of their poor inmates were proceeding at the proper ratio. Yet as party necessities had forced Lord Derby to instal wrong men in the wrong place, party necessities falsified at once the position of those men, whatever their individual intentions might be. Orangeism had been officially snubbed for its intruding loyalty, the Government itself had been compelled to denounce its organization as illegal, and very unceremoniously it was told that it was no longer good for any earthly purpose, and that it must vanish. The mere advent of a Tory Government, the mere occupancy of Dublin Castle by an Eglinton and a Naas revived the hopes of the chopfallen Orangemen. The sun shone again on the "true blues"; they would again lord it over the land as in the days of Castlereagh,¹⁰⁷ and the day for taking their revenge had visibly dawned. Step by step, they led the bungling, weak, and, therefore, temerarious representatives of Downing street from one false position to the other, until one fine morning at last, the world was startled by a proclamation of the Lord Lieutenant,^a placing Ireland (so to say) in a state of siege, and turning, through the means of £100 and £50 rewards, the trade of the spy, the informer, the perjuror, and the *agent provocateur* into the most profitable trade in Green Erin. The placards announcing rewards for the detection of secret societies were hardly posted, when an infamous fellow, named O'Sullivan, an apothecary's apprentice at Killarney, denounced his own father and some boys of Killarney, Kenmare, Bantry, Skibbereen, as members of a formidable conspiracy which, in secret understanding with filibusters from the other side of the Atlantic, intended not only, like Mr. Bright, to "Americanize English institutions,"^b but to annex Ireland to the model Republic. Consequently, detectives busied themselves in the Counties of Kerry and Cork, nocturnal arrests took place, mysterious informa-

^a R. S. Naas, "By the Lord Lieutenant-General and General Governor of Ireland. Proclamation. Eglintoun and Winton", *The Times*, No. 23168, December 4, 1858 ("The Irish Government and the Riband Conspiracy").—*Ed.*

^b *The Times*, No. 23176, December 14, 1858 (leading article).—*Ed.*

tions went on; from the south-west the conspiracy hunting spread to the north-east, farcical scenes occurred in the County of Monaghan, and alarmed Belfast saw some dozen of schoolmasters, attorneys' clerks and merchants' clerks paraded through the streets and locked up in the jails. What rendered the thing worse was the veil of mystery thrown over the judicial proceedings. Bail was declined in all cases, midnight surprises became the order of the day, all the inquisitions were kept secret, copies of the informations on which the arbitrary arrests had been made were regularly refused, the stipendiary magistrates were whirling up and down from their judicial seats to the antechambers of Dublin Castle, and of all Ireland might be said, what Mr. Rea, the counsel for the defendants at Belfast, remarked with respect to that place, "I believe the British Constitution has left Belfast this last week."^a

Now, through all this hubbub and all this mystery, there transpires more and more the anxiety of the Government, that had given way to the pressure of its credulous Irish agents, who, in their turn, were mere playthings in the hands of the Orangemen, how to get out of the awkward fix without losing at once their reputation and their places. At first, it was pretended^b that the dangerous conspiracy, extending its ramifications from the south-west to the north-east over the whole surface of Ireland, issued from the Americanizing Phoenix Club.¹⁰⁸ Then it was a revival of Ribbonism¹⁰⁹; but now it is something quite new, quite unknown, and the more awful for all that. The shifts Government is driven to may be judged from the maneuvers of the Dublin *Daily Express*, the Government organ, which day by day treats its readers to false rumors of murders committed, armed men marauding, and midnight meetings taking place. To its intense disgust, the men killed return from their graves, and protest in its own columns against being so disposed of by the editor.

There may exist such a thing as a Phoenix Club, but at all events, it is a very small affair, since the Government itself has thought fit to stifle this Phoenix in its own ashes. As to Ribbonism, its existence never depended upon secret conspirators. When, at the end of the Eighteenth century, the Protestant Peep-o'-Day boys combined to wage war against the Catholics in the north of Ireland, the opposing society of the Defenders sprang up.¹¹⁰ When, in 1791, the Peep-o'-Day boys merged into Orangeism, the

^a "Ireland. The Arrests", *The Times*, No. 23183, December 22, 1858.—Ed.

^b "Ireland. Illegal Societies", *The Times*, No. 23174, December 11, 1858.—Ed.

Defenders transformed themselves into Ribbonmen. When, at last, in our own days, the British Government disavowed Orangeism, the Ribbon Society, having lost its condition of life, dissolved itself voluntarily. The extraordinary steps taken by Lord Eglinton may, in fact, revive Ribbonism, as may the present attempts of the Dublin Orangemen to place English officers at the head of the Irish Constabulary, and fill its inferior ranks with their own partisans. At present there exist no secret societies in Ireland except Agrarian societies. To accuse Ireland of producing such societies would be as judicious as to accuse woodland of producing mushrooms. The landlords of Ireland are confederated for a fiendish war of extermination against the cotters; or, as they call it, they combine for the economical experiment of clearing the land of useless mouths. The small native tenants are to be disposed of with no more ado than vermin is by the housemaid. The despairing wretches, on their part, attempt a feeble resistance by the formation of secret societies, scattered over the land, and powerless for effecting anything beyond demonstrations of individual vengeance.

But if the conspiracy hunted after in Ireland is a mere invention of Orangeism, the premiums held out by the Government may succeed in giving shape and body to the airy nothing.^a The recruiting sergeant is no more sure to press with his shilling and his gin some of the Queen's mob into the Queen's service, than a reward for the detection of Irish secret societies is sure to create the societies to be detected. From the entrails of every county there rise immediately blacklegs who, transforming themselves into revolutionary delegates, travel through the rural districts, enrol members, administer oaths, denounce the victims, swear them to the gallows, and pocket the blood-money. To characterize this race of Irish informers and the effect on them of Government rewards, it will suffice to quote one passage from a speech delivered by Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons:

"When I was Chief Secretary of Ireland, a murder was committed between Carrick-on-Suir and Clonmel. A Mr. — had a deadly revenge toward a Mr. —, and he employed four men at two guineas each to murder him. There was a road on each side of the River Suir, from Carrick to Clonmel; and placing two men on each road, the escape of his victim was impossible. He was, therefore, foully murdered, and the country was so shocked by this heinous crime, that the Government offered a reward of £500 for the discovery of each of the murderers.

^a Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Scene 1.—*Ed.*

And can it be believed, the miscreant who bribed the four murderers was the very man who came and gave the information which led to their execution, and with these hands I paid in my office in Dublin Castle the sum of £2,000 to that monster in human shape."

Written on December 29, 1858

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5530, January 11, 1859

Karl Marx

THE EMANCIPATION QUESTION

I

Berlin, Dec. 29, 1858

The great "initiator" (to use a Mazzinian term) of the Russian Revolution, the Emperor Alexander II, has taken a new step in advance. On Nov. 13, last, the Imperial Central Committee for the abolition of servitude¹¹¹ finally signed its report to the Emperor, in which the bases are laid down on which the emancipation of the serfs is proposed to be carried out.^a The fundamental principles are the following:

I. The peasants cease at once to be serfs, and enter into a state of "provisional obligation" toward their landlords. This state is to last for twelve years, during which they enjoy all the rights, personal and proprietary, of all other taxable subjects of the Empire. Serfdom and all its attributes, are abolished forever, without any consideration being paid to their former proprietors; for, says the report, serfdom was arbitrarily introduced by Czar Boris Godunov,* grew by an abuse of power into part and parcel

* This is anything but correct. Boris Godunov (ukase of Nov. 2, 1601) put an end to the right of the peasantry to travel about the Empire, and tied them to the estate to which they belonged by birth or residence. Under his successors the power of the nobility over the peasantry increased rapidly, and a state of serfdom became gradually the general condition of the latter. But this remained an illegal usurpation on the part of the boyars, until Peter the Great in 1723 legalized it. The peasants, without being freed from the bonds which fettered them to the estates, now were also made the personal property of the noble owner of that estate; he obtained the right to sell them, singly or in lots, with or without the land, and, in consideration of this, was made personally responsible for them and their taxes to the government. Subsequently [in 1783], Catherine II, by one stroke of the pen, turned four or five millions of comparatively free peasants in the newly-acquired western and southern provinces into serfs. But it would not do in Russian official documents to mention such facts respecting Peter I and Catherine II; and poor Boris Godunov is made to bear the responsibility of the sins of all his successors.

^a See *Le Nord*, No. 354, December 20, 1858 ("Russie").—Ed.

of the common law, and thus, having been created by the will of the sovereign, may also be abolished by the will of the sovereign. As to a pecuniary consideration for its abolition, such a money payment in return for rights which belong to the peasantry by nature, and should never have been taken away from them, would form, says the report, a disgraceful page, indeed, in Russian history.

II. During the twelve years of provisional obligation, the peasant remains attached to the estate; but in case the landlord cannot find him at least five dessiatines^a of land to cultivate for himself, he is at liberty to leave the estate. The same liberty is allowed him if he finds somebody else to cultivate his allotment, so long as he pays his taxes to the Crown.

III and IV. Every village community retains the possession of the dwelling-houses of its members, with their inclosures, farm-yards, gardens, &c., for which a rent of 3 per cent per annum on the appraised value is paid to the landlord. The community has the right to compel the landlord to have this value appraised by a mixed commission of two landlords and two peasants. Whenever the community please, they can buy their homesteads out and out by paying down the appraised value.

V. The land allotments to be given by the landlords to the peasants are thus regulated: Where there are on an estate more than six dessiatines to each serf inscribed on it, every adult male peasant receives an allotment of arable land of nine dessiatines; where there is less land, two-thirds of the whole arable land are delivered up to the peasants; and where there are so many peasants on an estate that out of these two-thirds there cannot be found five dessiatines, at least, for every adult male, the land is divided into allotments of five dessiatines, and those who, by lot, are excluded from receiving any, receive passports from the village authorities, and are at liberty to go where they like. As to firewood, the landlord is bound to find it for the peasants in his forests, at a price to be fixed beforehand.

VI. In return for these advantages, the peasant has the following *corvées* to furnish to the landlord: For every dessiatine allotted, ten work days with a horse and ten work days without (in case of nine dessiatines, 180 work days per annum). The value of his *corvée* is to be fixed, in money, in every government (province) after this rate, that one day of *corvée* is considered worth one-third only of one day of free labor. After the first seven years,

^a A dessiatine is equal to 2.7 acres.—Ed.

one-seventh of these *corvées*, and in every following year another seventh, may be commuted into a corn-rent.

VII. The personal serfs, such as are not attached to a particular estate, but to the family mansion or the person of their lord, will have to serve their lords for ten years, but will receive wages. They may, however, buy their liberty any time, at 300 roubles for a man and 120 roubles for a woman.

IX. The landlord remains the chief of the village community, and has the right of veto against their resolutions; but in such a case an appeal lies to a mixed commission of nobles and peasants.

Such are the contents of this important document, which expresses, in an indirect manner, the ideas of Alexander II on the great social question of Russia. I have omitted chapters VIII, which treats of the organization of the village communities, and X which merely gives the legal forms in which the official documents relating to this change are to be made out. A very superficial comparison shows that this report is a mere continuation, and, indeed, a filling up, of the programme issued by the Central Committee last Spring, to the various corporations of nobles throughout the Empire.^a This programme, the ten heads of which correspond exactly to the ten chapters of the report, was, in fact, a mere form made out, to show the nobles in what direction they were to act, and which they were expected to fill up. But, the more they entered upon the question the greater was their repugnance; and it is very significant that after eight months, the Government have found themselves obliged to fill up this form themselves, and to draw up that plan which was to be supposed to be a spontaneous act of the nobles.

So much for the history of the above document; now for its contents.

If the Russian nobility do not think that the "4th of August" (1789) has yet arrived, and that so far there is no necessity of sacrificing their privileges on the altar of their country, the Russian Government is going a great deal faster; it has already arrived at the "declaration of the rights of man."¹¹² What, indeed, do you think of Alexander II, proclaiming "rights which belong to the peasantry by nature, and of which they ought never to have been deprived"? Verily, these are strange times! In 1846, a Pope^b initiating a liberal movement¹¹³; in 1858, a Russian Autocrat, a true *samoderjetz userossiiski*,^c proclaiming the rights of man! And we

^a See *Le Nord*, No. 354, December 20, 1858 ("Russie").—Ed.

^b Pius IX.—Ed.

^c Autocrat of all Russias.—Ed.

shall see that the Czar's proclamation will have as world-wide an echo, and an ultimate effect of far greater magnitude than the Pope's liberalism.

The first of the parties dealt with in this report is the nobility. If they refuse to celebrate a 4th of August, the Government tells them plainly enough that they will be compelled to do so. Every chapter of the report includes a pungent material loss to the aristocracy. One of the modes in which the nobles have turned their human capital was to hire them out, or to allow them, on payment of an annual sum (*obrok*), to travel about and gain a living as they pleased. This custom suited admirably both the purses of the nobles and the roving character of the Russian serf. It was one of the chief sources of income to the former. By chapter I this is proposed to be done away with, without any payment in return. Not only this: By chapter II every serf to whom the lord cannot allot 5 dessiatines of arable land is free in his own right, and can go where he pleases. By chap. III-V, the lord is deprived of the free disposal of something like two-thirds of his land, and compelled to assign it to the peasants. It is true, they occupy it now, but under his control, and in consideration of services which were fixed entirely by him. Now, the land is to belong, in reality, to the peasants, who are made tenants in perpetuity, who obtain the right to buy, out and out, their homesteads, and whose services, though fixed at a very high rate, are yet to be immutably fixed by a legal enactment, and, worse still, may be commuted at a (to them) pretty advantageous tariff. Even the *dvorovye*, the domestic servants of the hall, are to be paid wages, and, if inclined, may buy their liberty. And what is worse, the serfs are to receive the rights of all other citizens, which means to say that they will have the right, hitherto unknown to them, to bring actions against their lords, and to bear witness against them in Courts of law; and though the lords remain the chiefs of the peasants on their estates, and retain a certain jurisdiction over them, still the extortions by which a large portion of the Russian nobility have scraped together the means to keep fashionable *lorettes* in Paris and to gamble at German watering places, will undergo a vast limitation in future. But, in order to judge of the effect such a reduction of income would have upon the Russian nobles, let us cast a glance at their financial position. The whole territorial nobility of Russia is indebted to the Credit Banks (instituted by the Crown) in the sum of 400,000,000 silver roubles, for which sum about 13,000,000 of serfs are pledged to these banks. The whole of the serf population of Russia (excluding the Crown peasants)

amounts to 23,750,000 (census of 1857). Now it is evident that of the owners of serfs the smaller ones are the principal contractors of this debt, while the larger ones are comparatively free from debt. From the census of 1857 it appears that about 13,000,000 of serfs belong to landlords owning less than 1,000 serfs each, while the remaining 10,750,000 belong to proprietors holding more than 1,000 serfs each. It stands to reason that the latter will nearly represent the unencumbered, and the former the encumbered nobles of Russia. This may not be quite exact, but it comes near enough to be generally correct.

The number of landed proprietors owning from one to 500^a "souls," according to the census of 1857, is 105,540, while that of nobles owning 1,000 souls and above is not more than 4,015. Thus, it would appear that, at the lowest estimate, nine-tenths of the whole Russian aristocracy are deeply indebted to the credit banks, or, what is tantamount, to the Crown. But it is notorious that the Russian nobility are, moreover, indebted, to a large extent, to private individuals, bankers, tradesmen, Jews and usurers, and that the great majority are so heavily incumbered as to leave them but a nominal interest in their possessions. Those that were still struggling with ruin were completely broken down by the heavy sacrifices of the late war, when, with heavy taxes, both in men, money and *corvées*, they found the egress for their produce shut up, and had to contract loans on extremely onerous conditions. And now they are called upon entirely to resign, without any return, a great portion of their revenue, and to regulate the remainder of their income in a manner which will not only reduce it, but also maintain it at the reduced limit.

With a nobility like the Russian, the consequences are easily foreseen. Unless they agree to see the great majority of their order ruined, or brought at once to bankruptcy, in order to be merged in that class of bureaucratic nobles whose rank and position depends entirely upon the Government, they must resist this attempt at enfranchising the peasantry. They do resist it; and if, as is evident, their present legal resistance will be of no avail against the sovereign will, they will be compelled to resort to other more telling means.

^a The *New-York Daily Tribune* has "999".—Ed.

II

Berlin, Dec. 31, 1858

The resistance of the Russian nobles against the Czar's schemes of emancipation, has already begun to manifest itself in a double way—the one passive, the other active. The personal harangues which Alexander II, on his journey through several provinces, condescended to address to his nobles, harangues now mildly clothed in the garb of philanthropic appeals, now assuming the persuasive form of didactic exposition, now rising to the shrill tones of command and menace—what have all these speeches^a resulted in? The nobles listened to them in servile attitude with diminished heads, but in their hearts they felt that the Emperor, who came to harangue, coax, persuade, inform, and menace them, had ceased to be that almighty Czar whose will was to stand in the place of reason itself. Consequently, they dared to give a negative answer by giving no answer at all, by not reechoing the Czar's sentiments, and by adopting the simple process of procrastination in their different committees. They left the Emperor no chance but that of the Roman Church: *Compelle intrare.*^b However, the dull monotony of that restive silence was boldly broken through by the St. Petersburg Nobility Committee, which indorsed a paper drawn up by Mr. Platonoff, one of its members, and forming, in fact, a "petition of rights."¹¹⁴ What was asked for was nothing less than a parliament of nobles to decide jointly with the Government not only the great question of the hour, but all political questions.

^a The reference is to Alexander II's speeches to the Tver nobility on August 11 and to the Kostroma nobility on August 16, 1858. See *Le Nord*, No. 277, October 4, 1858 ("Russie").—*Ed.*

^b "Compel *them* to come in" (*Luke 14:23*).—*Ed.*

It was in vain that Mr. Lanskoi, the Minister of the Interior, declined accepting this paper, and sent it back to the nobility with the angry remark, that it was not their business to club together for the purpose of presenting petitions, but simply to deliberate upon the questions put to them by the Government. In the name of the Committee, Gen. Shuwaloff returned to the assault, and, by the menace of himself carrying the paper to the Emperor, compelled Mr. Lanskoi to receive it. Thus, the Russian nobility in 1858, as the French nobility in 1788, has given out the watchword of the *Assemblée des Etats généraux*,¹¹⁵ or, in the Muscovite vernacular, of *Semski Sobor* or *Semskaja Duma*. Thus, in their interested attempts at maintaining the antiquated social basis of the pyramid intact, the nobles themselves attack its political point of gravitation. Besides, the *esprit de vertige*, as the old French emigrants styled the spirit of the age, has seized on them so violently, that the majority of the nobles go head over heels into the middle-class-joint-stock-company mania, while in the more western provinces the minority affects to lead and protect the new-fangled literary agitation. To give some notion of those bold movements, it will suffice to say, that in 1858 the number of existing journals had already swelled to 180, while 109 fresh ones were announced for 1859. On the other hand there were founded in 1857, sixteen companies, with a capital of 303,900,000 roubles, while, from January to August, 1858, 21 fresh new companies with a capital of 36,175,000 roubles were added.

Let us now consider the other party to the changes intended by Alexander II. It is not to be forgotten how often the Russian Government has, before the eyes of the peasantry, conjured up the *fata morgana* of freedom. In the beginning of his reign, Alexander I called upon the nobility to emancipate the peasants, but without success. In 1812, when the peasantry were called on to enrol themselves in the *opolchenie* (militia), emancipation from serfdom, if not officially still with the tacit consent of the Emperor, was held out as the reward for patriotism; the men who had defended Holy Russia could no longer be treated as slaves. Under Nicholas even, a series of ukases restricted the power of the nobles over their serfs, authorized the latter (ukase of 1842) to conclude contracts with their owners as to the services to be rendered (by which indirectly they were admitted to plead in courts of law against their lords); undertook (1844) to guarantee, on the part of the Government, the fulfillment of the engagements made by the peasants under such contracts; enabled the serfs (1846) to buy their liberty, if the estate to which they were

attached had to be sold by public auction; and enabled (1847) the corporation of serfs attached to such an estate, when first up for sale, to buy the whole estate. To the great astonishment of both government and nobles, it all at once appeared that the serfs were quite prepared for this, and actually did buy up one estate after the other; nay, that, in a great many cases, the landlord was but the nominal owner, having been liberated from his debts by the money of his own serfs who, of course, had taken such precautions as to secure to themselves virtually their own liberty and the property in the estate. When this came out, the Government, frightened at such symptoms of intelligence and energy among the serfs, and at the same time by the outbreaks of 1848 in Western Europe, had to look out for a remedy against an enactment which threatened to gradually turn the nobility out of their estates. But it was too late to repeal the ukase; and thus another ukase (March 15, 1848) extended the right of purchase, which so far had belonged to the commercial corporations of serfs only, to every individual serf. This measure not only tended to break up the associations, by villages and between the villages of a district, which hitherto had enabled the serfs to concentrate the capital for such purchase; it was, besides, seasoned with a few qualifications. The land could be bought by the serfs, but not the people attached to it; in other words, by buying the estate to which they belonged, the serfs did not buy their own freedom. On the contrary, they remained serfs, and the whole purchase-transaction was, moreover, made subject to the assent of the old landlord! To crown the whole, the numerous nobles who held their property, so to say, in trust for their serfs, were by the same ukase enabled and encouraged to break this trust and to recover full possession of their estates; all pleas on the part of the serfs being expressly excluded from the courts of law. Since then, all but the primary schools were closed to the serfs; and all hopes of emancipation appeared cut off, when the late war again compelled Nicholas to appeal to a general armament of the serfs, and to support this appeal, as usual, by promises of liberation from bondage, which the inferior servants of the Government were ordered to spread among the peasantry.

That after such antecedents, Alexander II should feel himself compelled to proceed seriously to an emancipation of the peasants, is quite natural. The result of his efforts, and the outlines of his plans, so far as they have been matured, are before us. What will the peasantry say to a twelve years probation, accompanied by heavy *corvées*, at the end of which they are to pass into a state

which the Government does not venture to describe in any particular? What will they say to an organization of communal government, jurisdiction and police, which takes away all the powers of democratic self-government, hitherto belonging to every Russian village community, in order to create a system of patrimonial government, vested in the hands of the landlord, and modeled upon the Prussian rural legislation of 1808 and 1809?¹¹⁶—a system utterly repugnant to the Russian peasant, whose whole life is governed by the village association, who has no idea of individual landed property, but considers the association to be the proprietors of the soil on which he lives.

If we recollect that since 1842 the insurrections of serfs against their landlords and stewards have become epidemic; that something like sixty nobles—according, even, to the official statistics of the Ministry of the Interior—have been annually murdered by the peasants; that during the late war the insurrections increased enormously, and in the western provinces were directed chiefly against the Government (a conspiracy was formed for an insurrection to break out the moment the Anglo-French army—the foreign enemy.—approached!)—there can be little doubt that, even if the nobility does not resist the emancipation, the attempt to realize the committee's proposals must be the signal for a tremendous conflagration among the rural population of Russia. But the nobility are sure to resist; the Emperor, tossed about between state necessity and expediency, between fear of the nobles and fear of the enraged peasants, is sure to vacillate; and the serfs, with expectations worked up to the highest pitch, and with the idea that the Czar is for them, but held down by the nobles, are surer than ever to rise. And if they do, the Russian 1793 will be at hand; the reign of terror of these half-Asiatic serfs will be something unequaled in history; but it will be the second turning point in Russian history, and finally place real and general civilization in the place of that sham and show introduced by Peter the Great.

Written on December 29 and 31, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5535, January 17, 1859;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1425, January 21, 1859 and
the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 906,
January 22, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Karl Marx

[ON ITALIAN UNITY]¹¹⁷

Like the boy and his wolf alarm,¹¹⁸ the Italians have so repeatedly affirmed that "Italy is rife with agitation, and on the eve of a revolution," the crowned heads of Europe have so often prated about a "settlement of the Italian Question," that it will not be surprising if the actual appearance of the wolf should be unheeded, and if a real revolution and a general European war should break out and take us unawares! The European aspect of 1859 is decidedly warlike, and, should the hostile bearing, the apparent preparations of France and Piedmont for war with Austria, end in smoke, it is not improbable that the burning hate of the Italians toward their oppressors, combined with their ever-increasing suffering, will find vent in a general revolution. We limit ourselves to a *not improbable*—for, if hope deferred maketh the heart sick, fulfillment of prophecy deferred maketh the mind skeptical. Still, if we are to credit the reports of English, Italian and French journals, the moral condition of Naples is a *fac simile* of her physical structure, and a torrent of revolutionary lava would occasion no more surprise than would a fresh eruption of old Vesuvius. Writers from the Papal States^a dwell in detail on the increasing abuses of clerical government, and the deep-rooted belief of the Roman population that reform or amelioration is impossible—that a total overthrow of said government is the sole remedy—that this remedy would have been administered long since, but for the presence of Swiss, French and Austrian troops¹¹⁹—and that, in spite of these material obstacles, such an attempt may be made at any day or at any hour.

^a The Papal States existed until 1860; they consisted of legations governed by legates.—*Ed.*

From Venice and Lombardy, the tidings are more definite—and remind us forcibly of the symptoms that marked the close of 1847 and the commencement of 1848 in these provinces.¹²⁰ Abstinence from the use of Austrian tobacco and manufactures is universal, also proclamations to the populace to refrain from places of public amusement—studied proofs of hate offered to the Archduke^a and to all Austrian officials—are carried to such a point that Prince Alfonso Parcia, an Italian nobleman devoted to the House of Hapsburg, dared not, in the public streets, remove his hat as the Archduchess^b passed, the punishment for which misdemeanor, administered in the form of an order from the Archduke for the Prince's immediate departure from Milan, acts as an incentive to his class to join the popular cry of *fuori i Tedeschi*.^c If we add to these mute demonstrations of popular feeling the daily quarrels between the people and the soldiery, invariably provoked by the former, the revolt of the students of Pavia, and the consequent closing of the Universities, we have before our eyes a reenactment of the prologue to the five days of Milan in 1848.¹²¹

But while we believe that Italy cannot remain forever in her present condition, since the longest lane must have a turning—while we know that active organization is going on throughout the peninsula, we are not prepared to say whether these manifestations are entirely the spontaneous ebullitions of the popular will, or whether they are stimulated by the agents of Louis Napoleon and of his ally, Count Cavour. Judging from appearances, Piedmont, backed by France, and perhaps by Russia, meditates an attack on Austria in the Spring. From the Emperor's reception of the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, it would seem that he harbors no friendly designs toward the Government represented by M. Hübner¹²²; from the concentration of so powerful a force at Algiers, it is not unnatural to suppose that hostilities to Austria would commence with an attack on her Italian provinces; the warlike preparations of Piedmont, the all but declarations of war to Austria that emanate daily from the official and semi-official portion of the Piedmontese press, give color to the surmise that the King will avail himself of the first pretext to cross the Ticino.^d Moreover, the report that Garibaldi, the hero of Montevideo and of Rome,¹²³ has been summoned to Turin, is confirmed from

^a Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph.—*Ed.*

^b Charlotte.—*Ed.*

^c Out with the Germans.—*Ed.*

^d The Ticino was the border line between Piedmont and Lombardy, which was occupied by the Austrians.—*Ed.*

private and reliable sources. Cavour has had an interview with Garibaldi, informed him of the prospects of a speedy war, and has suggested to him the wisdom of collecting and organizing volunteers. Austria, one of the chief parties concerned, gives evident proof that she lends credence to the rumors. In addition to her 120,000 men, concentrated in her Italian provinces, she is augmenting her forces by every conceivable means; and has just pushed forward a reinforcement of 30,000. The defenses of Venice, Trieste, &c., are being increased and strengthened; and in all her other provinces land-owners and trainers are called on to bring forward their studs, as saddle-horses are required for the cavalry and pioneers. And while, on the one hand, she omits no preparations for resistance in a "prudent Austrian way," she is also providing for a possible defeat. From Prussia, the Piedmont of Germany, whose interests are diametrically opposed to her own, she can, at best, hope but for neutrality. The mission of her Ambassador, Baron Seebach, to St. Petersburg, seems to have failed utterly to win a prospect of success in the case of attack. The schemes of the Czar,^a in more ways than one, and not the least on the question of the Mediterranean, where he, too, has cast anchor,¹²⁴ coincide too nearly with those of his ex-opponent, now fast ally, in Paris, to permit him to defend "the grateful" Austria.¹²⁵ The well-known sympathy of the English *people* with the Italians in their hatred of the *giogo tedesco*^b renders it very doubtful whether any British Ministry would dare to support Austria, anxious as one and all would be to do so. Moreover, Austria, in common with many others, has shrewd suspicions that the would-be "avenger of Waterloo"^c has by no means lost sight of his anxiety for the humiliation of "perfidious Albion"¹²⁶—that, not choosing to beard the lion in his den, he will not shrink from hurling defiance at him in the East, attacking, in conjunction with Russia, the Turkish Empire (despite his oaths to maintain that empire inviolate), thus bringing half the British forces into action on the Eastern battle-field, while from Cherbourg he keeps the other half in forced inaction, guarding the British coasts. Therefore, in the case of actual war, Austria has the uncomfortable feeling that she must rely on herself alone; and one of her many expedients for suffering the least possible loss, in case of defeat, is worthy of notice for its impudent sagacity. The barracks,

^a Alexander II.—*Ed.*

^b German yoke.—*Ed.*

^c Napoleon III.—*Ed.*

palaces, arsenals and other official buildings throughout Venetian Lombardy, the erection and maintenance of which have taxed the Italians exorbitantly, are, nevertheless, considered the property of the Empire. At this moment the Government is compelling the different municipalities to purchase all these buildings at a fabulous price, alleging as its motive that it intends to *rent* instead of owning them for the future. Whether the municipalities will ever see a farthing of the *rent*, even if Austria retains her sway, is doubtful at best; but, should she be driven from all, or from any part of her Italian territory, she will congratulate herself on her cunning scheme for converting a large portion of her forfeited treasure into portable cash. It is asserted, moreover, that she is using her utmost efforts to inspire the Pope, the King of Naples, the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma and Modena, with her own resolution to resist to the uttermost all attempts on the part of the people or the crowned heads to change the existing order of things in Italy. But none knows better than Austria herself how bad would be the best efforts of these poor tools to make head against the tide of popular insurrection or foreign interference. And, while war on Austria is the fervent aspiration of every true Italian heart, we cannot doubt that a large majority of Italians look upon the prospects of a war, begun by France and Piedmont, as doubtful, to say the least, in its results. While none conscientiously believe that the murderer of Rome¹²⁷ can by any human process be transformed into the Savior of Lombardy, a small faction favor Louis Napoleon's designs of placing Murat on the throne of Naples, profess to believe in his intention to remove the Pope from Italy or to confine him to the City and Campagna of Rome, and of assisting Piedmont to add the whole of Northern Italy to her dominions. Then there is a party, small but honest, who imagine that the idea of an Italian crown dazzles Victor Emmanuel, as it was supposed to dazzle his father^a; who believe that he anxiously awaits the first opportunity to unsheathe his sword for its attainment, and that it is with this sole end in view that the King will avail himself of help from France, or any other help, to achieve this coveted treasure. A much larger class, numbering adherents throughout the oppressed provinces of Italy, especially in Lombardy and among the Lombard emigration, having no particular faith in the Piedmontese King or Piedmontese monarchy, yet say: "Be their aims what they may, Piedmont has an army of 100,000 men, a navy, arsenals, and treasure; let

^a Charles Albert.—*Ed.*

her throw down the gauntlet to Austria; we will follow her to the battle-field: if she is faithful, she shall have her reward; if she falls short of her mission, the nation will be strong enough to continue the battle once begun and follow it up to victory."

The Italian National party,¹²⁸ on the contrary, denounce as a national calamity the inauguration of an Italian War of Independence under the auspices of France and Piedmont. The point at issue with them is not, as is often erroneously supposed, whether Italy, once free from the foreigners, shall be united under a republican or monarchical form of government, but that the means proposed must fail to win Italy for the Italians, and can at best only exchange one foreign yoke for another equally oppressive. They believe that the man of the 2d of December will never make war at all, unless compelled by the growing impatience of his army, or by the threatening aspect of the French people; that, thus compelled, his choice of Italy as the theater of war would have for its object the fulfillment of his uncle's^a scheme—the making of the Mediterranean a "French lake"—which end would be accomplished by seating Murat on the throne of Naples; that, in dictating terms to Austria, he seeks the completion of his revenge, commenced in the Crimea, for the treaties of 1815, when Austria was one of the parties who dictated to France terms humiliating in the extreme for the Bonaparte family. They look upon Piedmont as the mere cat's-paw of France—convinced that, his own ends achieved, not daring to assist Italy to attain that liberty which he denies to France, Napoleon III will conclude a peace with Austria and stifle all efforts of the Italians to carry on the war. If Austria shall have at all maintained her ground, Piedmont must content herself with the addition of the Duchies of Parma and Modena to her present territory; but, should Austria be worsted in the fight, that peace will be concluded on the Adige, which will leave the whole of Venice and part of Lombardy in the hands of the hated Austrians. This *peace upon the Adige*, they affirm, is already tacitly agreed on between Piedmont and France. Confident as this party feels of the triumph of the nation in the event of a national war against Austria, they maintain that, should that war be commenced with Napoleon for *Inspirer*, and the King of Sardinia for *Dictator*, the Italians will have put it out of their own power to move a step in opposition to their accepted heads, to impede in any manner the wiles of diplomacy, the capitulations, treaties and the riveting of their chains which must result

^a Napoleon I.—Ed.

therefrom; and they point to the conduct of Piedmont toward Venice and Milan in 1848, and at Novara in 1849,¹²⁹ and urge their countrymen to profit by that bitter experience of their fatal trust in princes. All their efforts are directed to complete the organization of the peninsula, to induce the people to unite in one supreme effort, and not to commence the struggle until they feel themselves capable of initiating the great national insurrection which, while deposing the Pope, Bomba^a & Co., would render the armies, navies and war material of the respective provinces available for the extermination of the foreign foe. Regarding the Piedmontese army and people as ardent champions of Italian liberty, they feel that the King of Piedmont will thus have ample scope for aiding the freedom and independence of Italy, if he chooses; should he prove reactionary, they know that the army and people will side with the nation. Should he justify the faith reposed in him by his partisans, the Italians will not be backward in testifying their gratitude in a tangible form. In any case, the nation will be in a situation to decide on its own destinies, and feeling, as they do, that a successful revolution in Italy will be the signal for a general struggle on the part of all the oppressed nationalities to rid themselves of their oppressors, they have no fear of interference on the part of France, since Napoleon III will have too much home business on his hands to meddle with the affairs of other nations, even for the furtherance of his own ambitious aims. *A chi tocca-tocca?*^b as the Italians say. We will not venture to predict whether the revolutionists or the regular armies will appear first on the field. What seems pretty certain is, that a war begun in any part of Europe will not end where it commences; and if, indeed, that war is inevitable, our sincere and heartfelt desire is, that it may bring about a true and just settlement of the Italian question and of various other questions, which, until settled, will continue from time to time to disturb the peace of Europe, and consequently impede the progress and prosperity of the whole civilised world.

Written about January 5, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5541, January 24, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1427, January 28, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

^a Pius IX and Ferdinand II.—*Ed.*

^b Who is to begin?—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

THE WAR PROSPECT IN EUROPE

Paris, Jan. 11, 1859

The Emperor of Austria's reply to the strange Happy New-Year sent over to him from Paris on the part of the "Dutch cousin to the battle of Austerlitz," and the virtuous Emmanuel's opening speech addressed to the Sardinian Chambers,¹³⁰ have by no means contributed to allay the war alarm pervading Europe. On all the centers of the money market the barometer points to "stormy." The King of Naples has all of a sudden grown magnanimous and anti-Russian, setting free batches of political prisoners, exiling Poèrio with his associates, and refusing to Russia a coaling depot in the Adriatic; quarrels with the Tedeschi, and the crusade against the smokers of Government cigars continued at Milan, Lodi, Cremona, Brescia, Bergamo, Parma and Modena, while at Pavia the course of University studies has been suspended by Government order; Garibaldi, summoned to Turin, has been intrusted with the duty of reorganizing the National Guard; a new corps of about 15,000 chasseurs, is forming at Turin, and the fortifications of Casale are pushed forward with the utmost activity. An Austrian army of about 30,000 men, a complete *corps d'armée* (the 3d), will by this time have marched into the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, and Count Gyulay, a general of the Radetzky school, and a man of Haynau instincts, has already reached Milan to take the reins of power from the hands of the gentle, benevolent, but weak Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian. In France, military movements and counter-movements are the standing order, while the Emperor affects an immense zeal in trying experiments with the new cannon at Vincennes. The Prussian Government, finally, has initiated its new system of

liberty by asking the Chambers for money to augment the standing army and the conversion of the Landwehr into an appendage of the line.¹³¹ With such clouds visible on the horizon of Europe, one may feel astonished at the comparatively inconsiderable decline in the quotations of the London Stock Exchange, which generally indicates the pulsations of European society more exactly than the monetary observatories of Paris and the rest of the Continent.

In the first instance, the shrewd observers of the London Stock Exchange were not quite averse to considering Napoleon's New-Year's freak a mere stock-jobbing maneuver on the part of their august ally. In fact, the French securities once sent down, people rushed headlong into Baal's temple to get rid of the public debt, Crédit Mobilier,¹³² and railway shares for whatever they would fetch. Then part of the speculators for a rise being done for, there followed all at once, on the 6th of January, a slight rally on the Paris Bourse, in consequence of the rumor set afloat to the effect that a Government note in the *Moniteur* was to take out the sting of "his Majesty's" apostrophe to the Austrian Minister. Such a note, indeed, made its appearance on Friday, Jan. 7; then the funds went up, and a lot of fellows, known to be familiars of the Tuileries, realised on that very Friday extraordinary profits. Thus these gentlemen reimbursed themselves for the expenses of their New-Year's presents, in the cheapest way possible. Now, it seems that a similar conspiracy brewing at London, was baffled not by any uncommon shrewdness on the part of the British monetary mind, but by its secret sway over some of the financial managers of the Elysian *menus plaisirs*.^a However, the comparative steadiness of the British securities is principally due to another circumstance less flattering to Louis Napoleon, but more characteristic of the state of Europe. No confessor knows more exactly the vulnerable parts of a fair penitent's heart than do the hard-cash men of Chapel street, Lombard street and Threadneedle street know where the shoe pinches the European potentates. They know that Russia wants a loan of about ten millions sterling; that France, despite the prospective surplus of a budget, always conjugated in the future tense, is badly in want of money; that Austria is looking out for an instalment of at least six or eight millions sterling; that little Sardinia is eager for a loan, not only to undertake a new Italian crusade, but to pay the old debts contracted through the Crimean war; and that altogether bills to the amount of thirty

^a Small pleasures, also pocket money.—Ed.

millions sterling must be drawn by the crown-bearers and sword-bearers, upon the English purse, before armies can move, blood be let, and the boisterous voice of cannon roar. Now, to run through all these monetary transactions, two months' respite at least is required; so that, quite apart from military considerations, if there is to be war, it must be delayed until Spring.

Yet it would be a great mistake to rush to the conclusion that by their dependence on the good pleasure of peace-loving capitalists, the war-hounds will certainly be prevented from breaking loose. With the rate of interest ranging hardly at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, with more than forty millions of gold stagnating in the vaults of the Banks of England and France, and with a general distrust in commercial speculation, Satan himself, if he were to open a loan for a new campaign, would, after some prudish delays and a few sanctimonious conferences, succeed in selling his scrip at a premium.

The circumstances which may put off the European war are the very same circumstances which push on to such an issue. After her splendid diplomatic successes in Asia, Russia is anxious to recover her predominance in Europe. In fact, as little Sardinia's throne-speech was revised at Paris, so Bonaparte's (the Little)¹³³ New-Year's *boutade*^a was only the echo of a watchword indicated at St. Petersburg. With France and Sardinia in the leading strings of St. Petersburg, Austria threatened, England insulated and Prussia vacillating, Russian influence would lord it supreme in the case of war, for some time at least. She might keep aloof; weaken France and Austria by internecine contest, and in the end "improve" the difficulties of the latter power, that now stops her way to the South and opposes her Slavonian propaganda. Sooner or later, the Russian Government would have to interfere; its internal troubles might be diverted by a foreign war, and the Imperial power, by success abroad, become enabled to break down the nobiliary opposition at home. But, on the other hand, the financial pressure engendered by the Crimean campaign would be trebled; the nobility, appealed to in such an emergency, would gather new arms of attack and defense; while the peasantry, with promises not yet fulfilled before their eyes, exasperated by new delays, new conscriptions and new taxes, might be driven to violent commotions. As to Austria, she is afraid of war; but, of course, may be forced into it. Bonaparte, in his turn, has very probably arrived at the just conclusion, that now is an occasion for playing his trump

^a Sally.—*Ed.*

card. *Aut Caesar aut nihil*^a The mock glories of the Second Empire are vanishing fast away, and blood is wanted to cement that monster imposture anew. And in what better character than that of an Italian liberator, and under what more favorable circumstances than those of England's forced neutrality, Russia's secret support, and Piedmont's confessed vassalage, could he hope ever to succeed? But on the other hand, the Ecclesiastical party in France is violently opposed to the unholy crusade; the middle class reminds him of *L'Empire c'est la paix*¹³⁴; the very circumstance of England and Prussia being for the present bound to neutral attitudes would transform them into arbiters during the progress of the war; and any defeat on the plains of Lombardy would ring the funeral knell of the Brummagem Empire.

Written on January 11, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5547, January 31, 1859;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1428, February 1, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

^a Either Caesar or nothing—a motto of Cesare Borgia, copied from Caligula's words in Suetonius' *The Twelve Caesars*.—Ed.

Karl Marx

AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA

Berlin; 11th January, 1859

You know the German proverb: "Where there is nothing, the Emperor loses his right" (*Wo nichts ist, hat der Kaiser sein Recht verloren*), and this law of nothingness, lording it over so mighty a personage as an Emperor, is, of course, not to be set at naught by your own correspondent. Where there are no events, there is no reporting. Such is the very conclusive reason which has induced me for some weeks to lay an embargo on my missives from the "capital of intelligence," the central residence, if not of worldly power, at least of the "*Weltgeist*."^a The first phase of the Prussian movement ended in the general elections, while the second begins to-morrow with the opening of the Diet. Meanwhile, the views of the state of affairs in this country developed in my former letters,^b and, as I see from a batch of German American papers sent over to me, annexed by many American sons of Teut¹³⁵ without a due acknowledgment of the source from which they derived their wisdom, have been fully borne out by the slovenly, bit-by-bit, I cannot say march of things; but as Dr. Johnson, of pedantic memory, might have called it—their movement with the belly to the ground, without legs, like a worm. The German miles are longer than those of any other nation, but the steps by which they measure the ground are the shorter, with a vengeance. It is for this exact reason that in their fairy tales they are always dreaming of magical boots, enabling their happy possessor to walk over a league^c at every lifting of the foot.

^a "World spirit."—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 74-81 and 106-09.—*Ed.*

^c The German mile (*Meile*) was a linear measure of different length in different German states. The Prussian mile was equal to 7,533 metres. The English (statute) mile is equal to 1,609 metres. One land league is equal to about three miles.—*Ed.*

The history of the past ten years in this country has been so one-sidedly (to use a pet word of the Germans, who, like Buridan's scholastic animal, are so many-sided that they stick every moment in a deadlock)¹³⁶ judged, that some general considerations may not appear out of place. When the King with the brainless head ascended the throne, he was full of the visions of the romantic school.¹³⁷ He wanted to be a king by divine right, and to be at the same time a popular king; to be surrounded by an independent aristocracy in the midst of an omnipotent bureaucratic administration; to be a man of peace at the head of barracks; to promote popular franchises in the mediaeval sense while opposing all longings of modern liberalism; to be a restorer of ecclesiastic faith while boasting of the intellectual preeminence of his subjects; to play, in one word, the mediaeval king while acting as the king of Prussia—that abortion of the Eighteenth Century.¹³⁸ But, from 1840 to 1848, everything went the wrong way. The *Landjunkers*, who had hoped that the crowned collaborator of the *Politisches Wochenblatt*,^a which day by day had preached the necessity of engraving the poetical rule of aristocracy upon the Prussian prosaic rule by the schoolmaster, the drill-sergeant, the policeman, the tax-gatherer and the learned mandarin, were forced to accept the King's secret sympathies in lieu of real concessions. The middle class still too weak to venture upon active movements, felt themselves compelled to march in the rear of the theoretical army led by Hegel's disciples against the religion, the ideas and the politics of the old world. In no former period was philosophical criticism so bold, so powerful and so popular as in the first eight years of the rule of Frederick William IV, who desired to supplant the "shallow" rationalism, introduced into Prussia by Frederick II, by mediaeval mysticism. The power of philosophy during that period was entirely owing to the practical weakness of the *bourgeoisie*; as they could not assault the antiquated institutions in fact, they must yield precedence to the bold idealists who assaulted them in the region of thought. Finally, the romantic King himself, was, after all, like all his predecessors, but the visible hand of a common-place bureaucratic Government which he tried in vain to embellish with the fine sentiments of by-gone ages.

The revolution, or rather the counter-revolution to which it gave birth, altogether changed the face of things. The *Landjunkers* turned the private crotchetts of the King to practical account, and succeeded in driving the Government back, not behind 1848, not

^a Frederick William IV.—Ed

behind 1815, but even behind 1807. There was an end of coy, romantic aspirations; but in their place there sprang up a Prussian House of Lords; mortmain¹³⁹ was restored, the private jurisdiction of the manor flourished more than ever, exemption from taxation became again a sign of nobility, the policemen and the Government men had to stoop to the noblemen, all places of power were surrendered to the scions of the landed aristocracy and gentry, the enlightened bureaucrats of the old school were swept away, to be supplanted by the servile sycophants of rent-rolls and landlords, and all the liberties won by the revolution—liberty of the press, liberty of meeting, liberty of speech, constitutional representation—all these liberties were not broken up, but maintained as the privileges of the aristocratic class. On the other hand, if the *bourgeoisie*, in the by-gone period, had fostered the philosophical movement, the aristocracy now rooted it out and put pietism in its place. Every enlightened professor was driven away from the University and the *viri obscuri*,^a the Hengstenbergs, the Stahls and *tutti quanti* seized upon all the educational institutions of Prussia, from the village school to the great seminary of Berlin. The police and administrative machinery were not destroyed, but converted into the mere tools of the ruling class. Even industrial liberty was struck at, and as the license system was turned into a mighty engine of patronage, intimidation and corruption, so the artizans in the great towns were again pressed into corporations, guilds, and all the other extinct forms of a departed epoch. Thus, then, the boldest dreams of the King, which had remained dreams during the eight years of his absolute regime, had all become fulfilled by the Revolution, and shone as palpable realities in the light of day during the eight years from 1850 to 1857.

But there is another side to the medal. The revolution had dispelled the ideological delusions of the *bourgeoisie*, and the counter-revolution had done away with their political pretensions. Thus they were thrown back upon their real resources—trade and industry—and I do not think that any other people have relatively made so immense a start in this direction during the last decennial epoch as the Germans, and especially the Prussians. If you saw Berlin ten years ago, you would not recognize it now. From a stiff place of parade it has been transformed into the bustling center of German machine-building. If you travel through Rhenish Prussia and the Duchy of Westphalia, Lancashire and Yorkshire will be recalled to your memory. If Prussia cannot boast one Isaac

^a Obscure people (Ulrich von Hutten, *Epistolae obscurorum virorum*).—Ed.

Péreire, she possesses hundreds of Mevissens, at the head of more Crédits Mobiliers than the German Diet numbers princes.

The rage of getting rich, of going ahead, of opening new mines, of building new factories, of constructing new railways, and above all of investing in and gambling with joint-stock company shares, became the passion of the day, and infected all classes from the peasant even to the coroneted prince, who had once been a *reichsunmittelbarer Fürst*.¹⁴⁰ So you see the days when the Bourgeoisie wept in Babylonian captivity^a and drooped their diminished heads, were the very days when they became the effective power of the land, while even the inner man of the overbearing aristocrat became converted into a profit-loving, money-mongering stock-jobber. If you want an example of speculative philosophy converted into commercial speculation, look at Hamburg in 1857.¹⁴¹ Did not these speculative Germans then prove masters in the swindling line? Still this upward movement of the Prussian middle class, strengthened by the general rise in the prices of commodities, and, consequently, the general fall of the fixed incomes of their bureaucratic rulers, was, of course, accompanied by the ruin of the small middle class and the concentration of the working class. The ruin of the small middle class during the last eight years is a general fact to be observed all over Europe, but nowhere so strikingly as in Germany. Does this phenomenon need any explanation? I answer in one word: Look at the millionaires of to-day who were the poor devils of yesterday. For one man of nothing to become a millionaire overnight, a thousand \$1,000-men must have been turned into beggars during the day. The magic of the Stock Exchange will do this sort of thing in the twinkling of an eye, quite apart from the slower methods by which modern industry centralizes fortunes. A discontented small middle class and a concentrated working class have, therefore, during the last ten years, grown up in Prussia simultaneously with the bourgeoisie.

It is time to post this letter, although I have not yet done with my *Rundschau*, as the *New Prussian Gazette* calls this sort of retrospective review.

Written on January 11, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5548, February 1, 1859;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1429, February 4, 1859

^a Psalms 137.—Ed.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

THE MONEY PANIC IN EUROPE¹⁴²

Paris, Jan. 13, 1859

The panic on the European Exchanges has not yet subsided, and according to a very moderate calculation public securities have been depressed in value, some \$300,000,000. While French, Sardinian and Austrian Government stocks have declined 5 per cent, the railway shares in the same countries have sustained a fall of between 15 and 35 per cent, while the Lombardo-Venetian show a decline of nearly 50 per cent. Save London, every European stock exchange now believes in war. I have no reason to alter my views on this topic, as before expressed.^a I am convinced that Louis Napoleon does not really mean war; that his intentions do not exceed a diplomatic victory over Austria, connected with a good haul for himself and his tail of adventurers on the Paris Bourse. The noisy tone of the Bonapartist press and of that venal deposit of gossip, the *Indépendance belge*, the ostentation with which military preparations are heralded forth, are sufficient to show that not fighting but frightening is the object in hand. It is now admitted even by the London *Times*^b correspondent that the debt-ridden flunkeys about the Court have again been allowed, and to a more formidable extent than ever, to fleece the "respectable" speculators and the small holders of stock all over the country by bearing the market in an unprecedented degree. Count de Morny alone is said to have won at this game, up to the 5th January, not less than 2,000,000 of francs, and the total amount of money transplanted from the pockets of the *Bourgeoisie* to those of the Bonapartist adventurers must be many times this sum.

^a See this volume, pp. 154-56.—*Ed.*

^b *The Times*, No. 23194, January 4, 1859 ("France").—*Ed.*

There are three agencies which impel Louis Napoleon to court Italian sympathies and to affect a menacing attitude toward Austria. There is, first, Russia, which has used him like a manakin ever since the peace of Paris.¹⁴³ The second agency is little known, as he and his court do their best to hide it from the public eye, although its existence is an established fact. Since the attempt of Orsini, both before and after his execution, the French Emperor has continually received missives from the supreme Venta of the Italian Carbonari, of which secret society he was a member in 1831.¹⁴⁴ He has been reminded what his oaths were on entering that association, how he broke them, and how the laws of the society punish a traitor like him. While Orsini was in prison, he was warned that if he had him executed these attempts on his own life would be repeated until successful; after the execution, a formal sentence of death, passed upon Louis Napoleon by the Venta, was forwarded to him. The superstitious mind of the successful adventurer was terribly affected by this judgment of a secret tribunal. The nerves that had become, not iron, but tough and impermeable as leather, by twenty years' nightly training at the gambling table, were not proof against this constant vision of the sword of Damocles. This mysterious intervention of a power, invisible indeed, but known to him by his experience of former years, as well as latterly by the pistol of Pianori and the shells of Orsini, was the very thing to disturb the brains of a man who, beyond the common everyday policy of expediency, knew no causality in history but a mysterious action of some fatalistic influence, baffling rational inquiry, and often elevating perfect humbug to supreme power. This constant fear of assassination has contributed infinitely to the series of palpable blunders which mark the last twelve months of his reign.

The fact is that, to escape from his fate—for he believes in the omnipotence of the Italians for assassination as firmly as in the words of the Gipsy women at the Epsom races—a few pledges had to be given to the invisible power; and so the letters of Orsini, garbled as they were, were printed, and were made to bequeath to Louis Napoleon, as a sacred legacy, the realization of the hopes of the Italians.¹⁴⁵ But the Carbonari were not so easily satisfied; they have again and again reminded the culprit that he is still under sentence of death, and that to be pardoned he must act. Now the domestic difficulties of his situation in France have been growing very much of late. The great question as to where the money is to come from stares him in the face more threateningly every day. There is no chance of a loan, and the national debt has been so

rapidly increased that such a thing is out of the question. The Crédit Mobilier and Crédit Foncier,¹⁴⁶ the raising of millions under pretext of drainage and irrigation, rewooding, and the construction of dykes, all these have had their day, and cannot be played over again. But the necessities of the situation demand more money; his own prodigalities, and above all, the daily increasing exigencies of the ravenous band of soldiers, officials and adventurers, whose fidelity he has to buy from day to day, render the money question a question of life and death to him, and from a merely pecuniary point of view, a war with the prospect of forced loans, of plunder and war contributions from conquered provinces, would, at a certain extremity, appear the only outlet left to him. But it is not merely the financial question; it is the general insecurity of his position in France; it is the consciousness that, though Emperor by the grace of the army, he cannot overstep certain limits in struggling against public opinion, either of the middle or working class; that, because Emperor by the grace of the army, he must obey its will. It is all this which long since has made it as evident to himself as to the rest of the world that his last trump, in an extreme danger, is a war, and a war for the reconquest of the left bank of the Rhine. It is not exactly necessary that such a war should be commenced on the Rhine itself. On the contrary, the territory in question may be conquered, or its conquest begun, in Italy, just as the first conquest of these provinces was completed by Gen. Bonaparte's victories in Lombardy.

Such a war is necessarily Louis Napoleon's last card. He stakes his all upon it, and as an experienced gambler, he knows full well how fearful the odds are against him. He knows that silent and mysterious as he affects to be, the whole world knows, and knew from the first day of his power, what that last card is. He knows that none of his sphinx-like airs can deceive anybody on this point. He knows that no European power would tolerate such an extension of French territory, and that the friendship of Russia is almost as reliable as his own oath. To a man like him, who has given such a development to Louis XV's "*Après moi le déluge,*" and who knows what that deluge will be, every hour is a positive and invaluable gain, by which he can delay, temporize, bamboozle the players who surround him.

But at the same time the game is not in his hands; its necessities may compel him to play his grand trump long before he wishes. For the last three months at least armaments have been going on in France on a colossal scale. After dismissing on furlough a

considerable number of old soldiers, the whole of the recruits of 1858, 100,000 in number, have been called out, instead of the 60,000 of other years of peace. The activity developed in all the arsenals and military workshops has been such as to persuade all general officers, as much as three months ago, that a serious campaign was in preparation. We now learn that 75 batteries or 450 guns of Louis Napoleon's new construction (light 12-pounders), have been ordered in the public foundries; that new improvements in rifle projectiles (invented by Mr. Nessler, the official successor of Minié), have been introduced; that the battalions of chasseurs are increased from 400 to 700, and the regiments of the line from 900 or 1,000 to 1,300 men, by a draft on the depots (where the recruits have been forming), of some 60,000 men; that the materials of a campaign are being heaped up at Toulon, and that two camps, the sites of which are not yet known, have been fixed upon. The sites of these two camps may easily be guessed; the one will be about Lyons, or in the south, near Toulon, and the other at Metz, as an army of observation against Prussia and the German Confederation.¹⁴⁷ All this has of necessity excited the warlike spirit of the army to the highest pitch, and a war is so certainly reckoned upon that the officers will not order any more civilian's clothes, convinced as they are that they will have to wear the uniform alone for some time to come.

While this is going on in France, in Piedmont we have a King who, before Christmas, announced to his generals the intimation to keep themselves ready, for they might be called upon to smell powder before Spring,^a and who now opens his Chambers with a speech^b so full of general run of Italian patriotic bombast, and of allusions to Austria's misrule, that he must be either determined upon war or be content to be declared by all the world a perfect fool. In Lombardy, in Rome, in the Duchies, we have an excitement equaled only by that preceding the outbreak of 1848; the population seem to put the foreign troops at defiance, to be intent upon nothing but to show their utter contempt of established authority, and their certain conviction that the Austrians will in a few months have to leave Italy. To all this Austria answers by very quietly strengthening her army in Lombardy. It has consisted of three army corps—the 5th, 7th and

^a Victor Emmanuel II's address to Colonel Rolland after the review of the Savoy brigade, November 1858, *The Times*, No. 23168, December 4, 1858 ("Piedmont").—*Ed.*

^b See also this volume, p. 154.—*Ed.*

8th, together about 100,000 men. Now, as I stated in my last,^a the 3d is on the march to join it. Six infantry regiments (30 battalions), four battalions of Tyrolean chasseurs, two cavalry regiments, six batteries and the whole staff and engineering train of the Third Army corps are reported to be on the road, or to have already arrived in Lombardy. This raises the force to 130,000 or 140,000 men, who, in the position between the Adige and Mincio, will be able to resist, at least, double their number.

Thus, on every hand, the elements of strife are accumulating. Is Louis Napoleon the man to control them all? Not he; most of them are perfectly out of his reach. Let there be an outbreak in Lombardy, in Rome, or in one of the Duchies—let Gen. Garibaldi make an irruption into the very next portion of neighboring territory and insurge the population—will Piedmont, will Louis Napoleon be able to hold back? After the French army have been all but promised the conquest of Italy, where they are to be received as liberators, are they to be told that they must stand at ease, with arms grounded, while Austrian troops trample out the embers of Italian insurrection? There is the point. The turn of events in Italy has already escaped from Louis Napoleon's control; the turn of events in France may escape from it any day.

Written on January 13, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5548, February 1, 1859;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1429, February 4, 1859

^a See this volume, p. 154.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

LOUIS NAPOLEON'S POSITION

Paris, Jan. 26, 1859

You will certainly have been already informed of the secret connection between Louis Bonaparte's recent Italian policy and his inveterate dread of Italian assassins. Some days ago you might have read in the *France Centrale*, a provincial paper that unfortunately never crosses the Atlantic, the following tale:

"We alluded to the ball of last Monday at the Tuileries. Letters from Paris inform us of an incident that caused no small disturbance at that fête. The crowd was great; a lady fainted, we believe, or from some cause of a similar nature, confusion ensued, and the 3,000 or 4,000 guests present fancied an accident had happened. A tumult was occasioned, several persons hurried toward the throne, and the Emperor, in order to calm the agitation, walked through the *salons*."

Now, there were, on the occasion alluded to, about 200 or 300 persons present in the *Salle du Trône* witnessing a scene very different from what the *France Centrale* has been allowed to describe. By some accident or other, there had, in fact, taken place a sudden rush of the guests throughout the different *salons*, and the throng was pressing against the *Salle du Trône*, when Louis Bonaparte and Eugénie fled at once from the throne, and cut their way as precipitately as possible across the *salon*, the Empress gathering up her petticoats with her hands as best she might, and looking so pale that her best friends said "it was death-like to look at."

These cruel tribulations, which the usurper and his friends have been tormented by ever since Orsini's attempt, almost remind one of the celebrated passage in Plato's *Republic*^a:

^a Plato, *Republic*, Book VIII.—*Ed.*

"Not even his end of being a ruler is attained by the tyrant. Whatever he may appear to be, the tyrant is a slave. His heart will be always filled with fears, always tortured by terror and pangs. From day to day he will become more and more what he was from the beginning, envied and detested, suspicious, friendless, unjust, an enemy to everything divine, and a protector and fosterer of all that is infamous. Thus he is himself the most unfortunate of men."

Bonaparte's hostile attitude against Austria, while it certainly intended holding out to the grumbling army some prospect of active employment other than its present police service, is still mainly aimed at disarming the Italian dagger, and giving the Italian patriots an earnest of the Emperor's adherence to his old Carbonari oath. The marriage of Prince Napoleon—or Gen. Plon-Plon, as the Parisians call him—with Princess Clotilde of Sardinia was to irretrievably identify, in the eyes of the world, France with Italy, thus paying the first installment, as the Tuileries people affect to think, of the debts due by the Bonapartes to the Italians. But you know the hero of Satory.¹⁴⁸ Obstinate as he has always shown himself in the pursuit of a purpose once settled, his ways are tortuous, his advances are made by continuous retreats, and supreme perplexities seem to paralyze him whenever he has crawled up to the crisis.

In such moments, as at Boulogne, at Strasbourg,¹⁴⁹ and during the night of the 1st of December, 1851, it is always by some bold, sanguine, impetuous desperadoes, standing behind him, that he is no longer allowed to put off the execution of his long-hatched plans and is forcibly plunged into the Rubicon. Having once passed it safely, he again begins to wind his way in his own plotting, designing, conspiring, irresolute and lymphatic manner. The very falsehood of his mind tempts him to play a double game with his own plans. This Sardinian marriage, for instance, was designed eight months ago, on the pretext of an Italian crusade, to be led by France. After so many baffled attempts at intruding into the royal families, would it not be a fine stroke of policy to ensnare, on false pretenses, the daughter of the oldest European dynasty into the Bonapartist net?

But Louis Bonaparte had more urgent reasons to resort to a *reculade*,^a and try the soothing system after he had blown the war trumpet. Never during his whole reign had the middle classes shown so unmistakable signs of ill humor, while their alarm at the mere rumor of war exploded in tremendous commotions at the Bourse, on the produce markets and in the centers of industry. The financial magnates remonstrated. The Count de Germinal,

^a Retreat.—Ed.

Governor of the Bank of France, personally informed the Emperor of the widespread commercial disasters which persistence in the dangerous line of policy pursued was sure to bring about.

The prefects of Marseilles, Bordeaux and other great commercial towns, while reporting on the unprecedented panic prevalent among the mercantile classes, gave strange hints as to the marks of disaffection on the part of those "friends of property and order." Mr. Thiers thought the opportunity fit for breaking his long silence and openly attacking in salons, interspersed with Government spies, the "insane policy" of the Tuilleries. Entering into an elaborate political and strategical review of the chances of war, he showed how impossible it would be for France to escape defeat unless she could begin the contest with 400,000 soldiers, beside those she must keep in Algeria and those she must retain at home. The Governmental *Constitutionnel* itself, though in affected tones of indignation, could not but avow that the spirit of France was gone, and that, like a coward, she stood aghast at the mere notion of a serious war.^a

On the other hand, the spies of inferior rank unanimously reported the sneers current among the populace, at the mere idea of the despot of France playing the liberator of Italy, along with most irreverent couplets sung in honor of the Sardinian marriage. One of those couplets begins with the words:

"So this time, it is Plon-Plon who is to be the husband of Marie Louise."¹⁵⁰

Despite the soothing instructions sent to all the prefects, and the strictly official denials of any danger threatening the *status quo*, the general panic is far from having yet subsided. In the first instance, it is known here that the demi-god of the Tuilleries has been pushed farther than he intended going. It is rumored that the Princess Clotilde, who, despite her young years, is very strong-minded, accepted Plon-Plon's offer with the words: "I marry you in order to insure the support of France to papa. If it were not quite certain of securing that, I would not marry you." She refused to agree to the betrothal until "positive guaranties" were given her father of the active assistance of France. Thus, Louis Bonaparte had to sign a defensive and offensive alliance¹⁵¹ with Victor Emmanuel, a fact which the agents of Plon-Plon took good care to have immediately communicated to all Europe, through the columns of the *Indépendance belge*.^b This Plon-Plon, in fact, and

^a E. Dréolle, "On se préoccupe beaucoup de la guerre...", *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 25, January 25, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b No. 22, January 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

his suite, pretend to play the same part at this moment which Persigny had to act during the expedition of Boulogne, Morny, Fleury and St. Arnaud during the night of the 1st of December, viz.: that of plunging Louis Bonaparte into the Rubicon. Plon-Plon, you know, is not renowned for his military prowess. He cut a very sorry figure during the Crimean campaign, and, lacking even the pluck necessary for a common rider, knows not how to preserve the proper balance on horseback. Yet he is now the very Mars of the Bonaparte dynasty. To become Viceroy of Lombardy he considers the next step leading him to the throne of France. So indiscreet have grown his friends, that their chief, M. Émile de Girardin, dared to utter before some twenty people, discussing the Emperor's intentions: "Which Emperor do you mean?" "The one at the Palais Royal¹⁵² is the only real Emperor." While the Government papers affect to preach peace, Plon-Plon's *Moniteur*, the *Presse*, in the coolest way announces day by day the preparations for war. While Louis Bonaparte ostensibly admonishes Victor Emmanuel to moderate the Mazzinians, Plon-Plon is pushing the King "to excite them." While Bonaparte has composed the suite following his cousin to Turin of the most conservative men, such as Gen. Niel, Plon-Plon refused to start, save on the condition that Mr. Bixio, the ex-Minister of the French Republic of 1848, was to accompany him, in order to imbue his *entourage* with a revolutionary perfume. Now, what people say is this: "Unless Louis Napoleon is prepared to go all lengths, nothing can be more dangerous than the airs assumed by Plon-Plon, and the articles published by his friends." Hence the apprehensions still prevailing. On the other hand, it is generally understood that Louis Napoleon would commit suicide if, intimidated by the cry of the French middle class, and the frowns of the European dynasties, he should now draw back, after Victor Emmanuel has been compromised, and the hopes of the French army have been raised to the highest pitch. To give the latter a *quid pro quo*, he intends, as rumor says, to dispatch them on some transmarine expedition against Morocco, Madagascar, or some other out-of-the-way place, not known to the Treaty of Vienna.¹⁵³ Still, any unforeseen event may bring about a war with Austria, despite the Imperial blackleg.

Written on January 28, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5563, February 18, 1859

Frederick Engels

THE FRENCH ARMY

The Paris *Constitutionnel* has lately put forth a statement intended to prove that, in case of war, France could send across her frontiers a force of 500,000 men.^a According to M. Gaillardet in his letter from Paris published in the *Courrier des États-Unis* of yesterday, this statement, and the figures by which it is supported, were furnished to our Parisian cotemporary directly from the Emperor himself, without the knowledge of any of his Ministers. The first point of the statement is that, if all the men on furlough are called in, and no more furloughs given, the French army will consist, on the 1st of April next, of 568,000 men; if the whole of the recruits of 1858 are called in, this strength will be increased by 64,000 men; and if war be declared, the Government may, with absolute certainty, count upon 50,000 voluntary enlistments at least, either of old soldiers whose time has expired, or of young volunteers. This would give a grand total of 682,000 men, divided, according to the Imperial statistician, as follows:

Infantry	390,978	Train	10,120
Cavalry	83,000 ^b	Guards	29,942
Artillery	46,450	Miscellaneous corps	49,000
Engineers	12,110		
Total			621,600

There is evidently some flaw in this sum total. There are 60,000 men wanting, which the Imperial pen, in the hurry of the

^a Louis Boniface's article dated Paris, January 29, *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 30, January 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b Boniface has the figure 83,800.—*Ed.*

moment, has forgotten to distribute. But never mind that. Suppose the 682,000 men are all right. In case of war, there would remain in the depots, which form at the same time the garrisons of the interior, 100,000 men. They would be supported by the 25,000 gensd'armes, while 50,000 men would be sufficient for Algeria. These 175,000 men, deducted from the above grand total, would leave 507,000 men. But his Majesty has again managed to lose 10,000 men, and deducts from 672,000 instead of from 682,000 men, thus reducing the net available field force to 497,000 men. An army of 500,000 men can, therefore, according to our authority, be made available for foreign war by the 1st of June, 1859, without in any way altering the existing military organization of France.

Now let us see what the French army is made of in reality. The existing organization of an army forms a certain limit to its extension; battalions, squadrons, batteries, cannot comprise more than a certain number of men, horses and guns, in any particular service, without destroying the system and the tactical specialities of that service. The French battalions of eight companies each, for instance, could not increase their companies to anything like twice their normal number of 118 combatants, without necessitating an entire revolution in the rudimentary and battalion drill; nor could the French batteries increase the number of their guns from six to eight or twelve, without a similar effect; and, in either case, the companies and batteries would become extremely clumsy, unless they were subdivided. Thus the organization of any army places certain limits to the numbers it can accommodate; and if those limits be exceeded, new formations become necessary. As these, however, cannot escape public notice, so soon as they are established to any extent, and as, so far, the *Constitutionnel* says that there need be no new formations, we may take the frame-work of the army, as it existed at the conclusion of the Russian war, as the limit of the number of men it can at present absorb.

The infantry battalion of the French line, with its complex organization of six companies of the line and two of élite, cannot well exceed the strength of 1,000 men. For 100 regiments of the line, this would give, at three battalions each, 300,000 men. We purposely include the third battalion, for, although up to the Russian war it merely figured as a depot battalion, it was then mobilized, and three extra depot companies per regiment created, which no doubt are still in existence. These 300 depot companies will form a total of about 36,000 men. The 20 battalions of

chasseurs à pied,^a destined to fight in detailed companies rather than in closed battalions, admit of a larger number of men; they number nearly 1,300 men each, and would therefore give a total strength of 26,000 men, with scarcely any depots, as they receive many men from other regiments. The guard consists of two divisions of infantry, and its regiments, up to the peace with Russia, had only two battalions each, which agrees with the *Constitutionnel*, according to which its infantry will consist of 18 battalions or 18,000 men. This constitutes the whole of the French infantry, with the exception of the troops designed for African service. These are 9 battalions of Zouaves, equal to 9,000 men, beside about 500 in depot; 3 penal battalions (*Zéphirs*),¹⁵⁴ or 3,000 men, and 9 battalions of Algerian (native) Tirailleurs, which, if fully up to their complement, will number 9,000 men. Thus, the total strength of the French infantry may be summed up as follows:

Line, including depots, 336,000 men in 300 battalions and 300 depot companies.

Chasseurs, 26,000 men in 20 battalions.

Guard, 18,000 men in 18 battalions.

Zouaves, 9,500 men in 9 battalions.

Zéphirs, 3,000 men in 3 battalions.

Native Algerians, 9,000 men in 9 battalions.

Total, 401,500 men in 359 battalions and 300 depot companies.

Of which 36,500 belong to the depots, leaving 365,000 for active service at home and abroad.

The French cavalry was supposed, in 1856, to consist of

12 heavy regiments—72 squadrons and 12 depots—14,400 active and 1,800 depot men.

20 line regiments—120 squadrons and 20 depots—24,600 active and 3,820 depot men.

21 light regiments—126 squadrons and 21 depots—27,100 active and 4,230 depot men.

4 African regiments—16 squadrons and 4 depots—3,000 active and 450 depot men.

3 native regiments—12 squadrons—3,600 active men.

Total, 346 active and 57 depot squadrons—72,700 active and 10,300 depot men.

To which add the Guards—30 active squadrons—6,000 active.

Grand total, 376 active, 57 depot squadrons—78,700 active and 10,300 depot men.

^a Foot soldiers.—*Ed.*

But it is not to be forgotten that, although since 1840 great strides have been made in the improvement of the breed of horses in France, still the native horses of that country are, to an extraordinary extent, unfit for cavalry service. Only with the greatest trouble and expense has it been possible to mount the cavalry, of late years, and that not in very good style, mainly with French horses. This refers, however, to the peace establishment only, which would scarcely exceed 50,000 horses; and in spite of the resources offered by Algeria, many foreign horses have had to be bought, among which not a few had been previously sold by other cavalries as unserviceable. Horses are, at this moment, being bought for the French cavalry in Germany, and the Austrian Government has just prohibited the exportation of horses on its south-western frontier. With all these difficulties, we need not apprehend that the French cavalry will ever exceed the number stated above, or that, with the exception of the small portion mounted on Algerian horses, it will ever excel in the field, unless it obtain, by conquest, a larger proportion of good horses than it now has.

The artillery, including the guards, may number about 50,000 men, with 207 field batteries, or 1,242 guns. Of this number of men, at least 5,000 belong to the depots. The engineers will not exceed 9,000, or 10,000 men, but we will say 12,000, with the *Constitutionnel*. The train, working companies, sanitary officers, &c., all non-combatants, number about 11,000 men on the war footing. Thus the utmost number of men for which the French army, in its present organization, is adapted would be as follows:

	Active men.	Depot men.	Total.
Infantry	365,000	36,500	401,500
Cavalry	78,700	10,300	89,000
Artillery	45,000	5,000	50,000
Engineers	12,000	—	12,000
Non-combatants	—	11,000	11,000
 Total	500,700	62,800	563,500

This result agrees very well with the general arrangements of the French army for recruits. Every year 100,000 young men are called upon to join the ranks, but formerly in time of peace 60,000 only were actually sent to their regiments, and as they were liable to serve seven years, the army would not exceed 400,000 to 420,000 men. But under Louis Philippe the actual time of service

seldom exceeded from four to five years, so that at that period the actual strength would not exceed 300,000 men, the remainder being on furlough. Since then, however, an extra battalion to each infantry regiment, an extra squadron to each cavalry regiment, and the whole corps of guards having been added,¹⁵⁵ the frame-work of the army has been so far extended that it can accommodate about 600,000 men; and it is not likely that France, except in a war of national self-defense, will ever have more drilled soldiers at any one time.

If, therefore, we take the numbers which we have given above, and add to them the 49,000 gensd'armes, municipal guards, and nobody knows what other "miscellaneous corps" the *Constitutionnel* includes to make up that sum, the grand total will very nearly coincide with what that journal makes the strength to be on the 1st of April, 1859. But now the difference begins. In our grand total there are depots organized in 300 companies and 57 squadrons, which are barely sufficient for the preliminary drill and organization of the 46,800 infantry and cavalry soldiers which are now in them. Supposing these to be suddenly withdrawn to make room for new recruits, and to fill up in the regiments the places of men whose time has elapsed, what number of recruits would these depots have to drill? The 100,000 men of the levy of 1859, and at least 20,000 raw volunteers, in all 120,000 men, or 70,000 more than the depots can accommodate. There is no doubt, then, that between the 1st of April and the 1st of June, the three depot companies of each infantry regiment must be increased to a full battalion, and thus for every cavalry regiment, two instead of one depot squadron must be established. For while now, with the whole army on mere garrison duty, the depots are mere stations of passage for the recruit, from which as soon as possible, undrilled or half-drilled, he is sent to his regiment, there to receive his education, it is not to be forgotten that in war, the army being on active duty, the depot has to equip and drill the soldier thoroughly so that he may join his regiment fit for army duty. Thus, if the *Constitutionnel* maintains the French can increase their strength to 700,000 men, without new formations, it deviates very considerably from the truth. And the formation of 100 depot battalions out of 300 companies, and of 57 extra depot squadrons, will necessitate the withdrawal from the ranks of the active army, at the very moment when their services are most required, of at the very least 2,000 commissioned and 10,000 non-commissioned officers.

But, supposing the 700,000 men collected—and we are far from

maintaining that France, at the onset of a war, could not collect this number of young men—how many soldiers fit for duty will there be of the 700,000? Not more than 580,000, and of these, according to the *Constitutionnel*, 50,000 have to defend Algeria. The gensd'armes and miscellaneous corps for duty in the interior we must not take at 25,000, but stick to the original estimate of the *Constitutionnel*, viz., 49,000. This leaves a residuum of 481,000 men. But our Imperial cotemporary must have a very strong faith indeed in the stability of his dynasty if he thinks that 120,000 raw recruits and 49,000 gensd'armes and other military police can be intrusted with its exclusive defense. The depots will hardly be sufficient to garrison the more important fortresses, except Paris and Lyons. These two towns Louis Napoleon would never trust in the hands of raw recruits; and although the *Constitutionnel* thinks 40,000 troops quite sufficient to keep them in check, it is certain that 100,000 men will not be too many for the purpose. But suppose we deduct 100,000 men for the requirements of the large towns of the interior, and for the Royalist south of France, the whole force disposable to be employed abroad is reduced to 381,000 men. Of these, 181,000 men, at least, would have to form an army of observation on the Belgian, German and Swiss frontier, and but 200,000 men would remain available for an attack upon Italy. Now, we maintain, that 150,000 Austrians, in their strong position on the Mincio and Adige, are equal to at least 300,000 French and Sardinians, and if there should be a war, they may one of these days prove it.

Written on January 31, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5568, February 24, 1859 as a leading article

Frederick Engels

GERMAN RESOURCES FOR WAR

The recent boasting of Louis Napoleon as to the strength of the forces which he is able to bring against Austria, has called forth from the journals of Germany similar statements concerning the military resources likely to be combined against him in the event of a war. These statements, however, have generally but slender pretensions to accuracy or thoroughness of detail; and we have accordingly been obliged to resort to original and official documents for the facts and figures which we now proceed to lay before our readers.

The army of Austria is, of course, by far the strongest of all those that would be enlisted against France in such a war. Its infantry consists of 62 regiments of the line (each composed of 1 grenadier, 4 line, and 1 depot battalion), equal to 310 active and 62 depot battalions; 14 frontier regiments,¹⁵⁶ of 2 field and 1 reserve battalion; in all 28 active, 14 reserve battalions (beside one unattached battalion); and 32 battalions of rifles. The Austrian battalions are of unequal strength, varying from four to six companies. With full ranks, the strength of the whole will be:

Line	370,000 men.
Frontier regiments	55,000 men.
Rifles	32,000 men.
<hr/>	
Total, inclusive of depots	457,000 men.

The line and frontier regiments are armed with smooth-bore percussion muskets, the locks being of a peculiar, not very admirable construction, but still very fair muskets. In the frontier

regiments, every company has 20 rifles. The 32 battalions of riflemen all carry rifles, but these are much inferior in range to the French Minié or English Enfield rifle. The infantry is, throughout, first-rate, and the men are equal to any in Europe, though as against English or Prussian infantry, every man of which carries a rifled musket of long range, the inferior armament must tell disadvantageously. Against French or Russian troops this disadvantage would not exist, if we except the 20 battalions of French Chasseurs, and unless the armament of the French line infantry should be changed.

The Austrian cavalry numbers 16 heavy and 24 light regiments—the first of 6, the second of 8 squadrons, beside a depot squadron per regiment. The heavy squadron has 194, the light 227 men. With such a force, an Austrian cavalry regiment is stronger than a French brigade of horse. The whole body is 67,000 men strong, exceedingly well mounted, and the greater part of the light cavalry recruited among two nations of horsemen, the Hungarians and Poles. There is no doubt that these 67,000 men would be more than a match for the 81,000 French cavalry which Louis Napoleon proposes to bring forward. The Austrian cavalry is, undoubtedly, at present without a rival.

The artillery consists of 12 field regiments, of 13 batteries of 8 guns each, 1 coast regiment, and 1 rocket regiment of 20 batteries—in all, 1,248 guns, 240 rocket-carriages, and 50,000 men. The pioneers, hospital troops, &c., amount to some 20,000 men in addition.

The whole force, on the peace footing, including train, &c., would be from 580,000 to 600,000 men. Of these, nearly 200,000 are generally, and up to this moment, on furlough, leaving 400,000 present with the colors. Not only these, however, but 120,000 men of the reserve (dismissed after eight years' service, and liable to be called out for two years longer) can be called together in case of war; and, if we are to believe the assertions of Austrian writers, the whole may be under arms in 14 days. Still, the resources of the empire are not exhausted with this. The frontier district is exempt from the reserve duty, but there every man is a soldier up to his 60th year, and ready at all times to be called to his regiment. This district, in 1848, furnished the troops that saved Radetzky in Italy, and with him the Austrian monarchy. It is not yet forgotten how battalion after battalion of these hardy Slavonians was formed, and dispatched into Italy; while, at the same time, the army which took Vienna from the insurgents was collected from the same material.¹⁵⁷ This district, whose contingent

for ordinary purposes is limited to 55,000 men, can, in case of need, send 200,000 soldiers into the field. Thus the Austrian army, with the reserves, and but 80,000 extra men from the frontier district, would count fully 800,000 men, to which above 100,000 frontier soldiers more can be added as fast as the battalions can be organized. Thus Austria, alone, supposing her to have the necessary money, would be fully sufficient for the defense of her Italian possessions against France and Piedmont combined.

Next comes Prussia. The infantry of this kingdom consists of 36 regiments of the line and guards, containing 108 battalions; 9 reserve regiments, containing 18 battalions; with 8 reserve battalions, and 10 battalions of rifles, in all 144 battalions, equal, on the war footing, to about 150,000 men. To this add the Landwehr of the first levy, 116 battalions, equal to about 120,000 men—in all 270,000 men. In time of war the 8 reserve battalions are formed into 36 depot battalions for the 36 line regiments, and the 9 reserve regiments, with their corresponding 9 Landwehr battalions, are destined for garrison duty, so that there remains an active field force of 228 battalions, including about 230,000 men.

The cavalry consists of 38 regiments of the line, 4 squadrons each; 152 squadrons and 34 regiments; 136 squadrons of the first levy of the Landwehr, equal to about 49,000 men.

Artillery: 9 regiments, each of 11 batteries of 8 guns, and 4 companies for duty in fortresses—in all 792 field guns and 20,000 men.

The engineers, train, &c., form a total of 40,000 men.

Thus, in all, Prussia has an available army of 380,000 men of the line and first levy of the Landwehr, of which 340,000 at least are able to take the field. The second levy of the Landwehr is not organized, and in fact merely destined to do duty in fortresses. In case of a war, however, it might be brought to a tolerable state of efficiency in about four months, as far as the infantry and artillery are concerned; the cavalry will scarcely ever be fit for much active duty. At all events, 100,000 or 120,000 men from this source may safely be reckoned upon, setting so many men of the line free from garrison duty. Thus the Prussian army can muster 500,000 men, with plenty of drilled men in addition who would not find a place in the frame-work of the first levy of the Landwehr, and who could be used for new formations.

The Prussian army, from the short time of service (three years), and from the fact that the whole of the first levy of the Landwehr

has been on an average from four to five years absent from the army (with few and short interruptions), is not equal, in the outbreak of a war, as far as the men go, to the Austrian. The nation is, however, of an essentially military cast, and a few weeks of active campaigning will always make good soldiers of them. It is the first month or two of a war that Prussia has to fear. Above one half of the army, consisting of a militia; it is ill adapted for an offensive war, but will act so much the better in a defensive one; for nowhere except in Switzerland¹⁵⁸ is the army so really a national body as in Prussia. As to the armament, the whole of the guards and one battalion of every line regiment are armed with the new needle guns, which have a range of 1,000 yards, and, with the English Enfield rifle, carry farther than any other muskets at present in use. The remainder of the line are armed with the common musket, which, however, by a very simple process has been rifled on Minié's principle, and is little inferior in range or precision to the real Minié rifle. The first levy of the Landwehr will also receive the needle gun when called out. Thus, with the exception of the British, the Prussian infantry have the best armament of any in Europe.

Of the German Federal army,¹⁵⁹ Austria forms the first, second and third, and Prussia the fourth, fifth and sixth army corps. The seventh is furnished by Bavaria. She is bound to find a simple contingent of 36,500 men, and 17,800 men reserve; in all, 54,300 men. But the Bavarian army counts a good deal more, viz.: 54 battalions—54,000 men, infantry; 56 squadrons, 9,000 men, cavalry; 224 guns, and 5,600 men, artillery, besides engineers, &c.; in all, more than 72,000 men; besides the reserve, formed by all dismissed soldiers from the 27th to the 40th year, and who may be used for new formations.

The eighth corps counts, in contingents and reserve:

	Men.		Men.
Württemberg	21,000	Actual army	19,000
Baden	15,000	Actual army	15,000
Hesse-Darmstadt	9,300	Actual army	10,500
Strength required	45,300	Actual strength	44,500

The ninth corps, in contingents and reserve, should count 36,000 men; the armies composing it number actually 44,000 men.

The tenth corps is to number 42,000 men, and, we suppose, its component armies will make up about that strength.

The reserve division (contingents of the petty States) is about 17,000 strong. Thus, in a general summary, we have:

	Men.		Men.
Austria	800,000	Ninth Corps	44,000
Prussia	400,000	Tenth Corps	42,000
Bavaria	70,000	Reserve Division	17,000
Eighth Corps	45,000		
Total	1,418,000		

Of this colossal force, the last five items, amounting to 218,000 men, are always ready, and form but the *regular peace establishment* of the respective States, after calling in all the men on furlough. These States could therefore easily furnish 100,000 to 150,000 men more, but as no organization exists for them, we have not counted them at all, any more than the Prussian second levy of the Landwehr. Austria can certainly have 700,000 men under arms at a fortnight's notice. In Prussia, the calling in of the reserve of war (men on furlough) would take even less time, and would swell the line to its full complement of 225,000 men. Thus, within a fortnight, Germany can bring some 1,150,000 men into the field; a month afterward, some 270,000 more, and then all the Prussian second levy, all the Bavarian reserve, and some 100,000 Austrian frontier soldiers, are still available. And when this is exhausted, then, and then only, will extraordinary efforts be necessary.

Thus, the forces at the disposal of Germany are so immense, that if they are directed with unity and firmness, she need not fear an attack made simultaneously by France, Italy and Russia. Whether they will be so used, is, of course, doubtful; but, if in a general war, petty jealousies, indecision and routine should hamper the acts of these armies, and insure defeat, then the present Governments of Germany may pack their trunks; they will soon have to decamp. The Germany of 1859 is as different from the Germany of the peace of Basel, of Jena, Austerlitz and Wagram,¹⁶⁰ as the France of to-day is from the revolutionary France of 1793; and if 1848 has done nothing else, it has created a German national feeling in every part of the country, even among those that were formerly accused of French sympathies. Louis Napoleon may attempt to play the liberator in Italy, but he dare not try that game on the Rhine; and even if he were partly

successful in war, he would only provoke a revolution in Germany which would insure his ultimate defeat, and endanger, by its example, his own already tottering throne.

Written on February 10, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5582, March 12, 1859;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1440, March 15, 1859

Frederick Engels

THE AUSTRIAN HOLD ON ITALY

When General Bonaparte, in 1796, descended from the Maritime Alps, the great week of Dego, Millesimo, Montenotte and Mondovi, sufficed to conquer the whole of Piedmont and Lombardy.¹⁶¹ His columns advanced without resistance until they reached the Mincio. But there the tables turned. The walls of Mantua arrested them, and it took the greatest general of his age nine months to conquer this obstacle. The whole second part of the first campaign of Italy turns upon the conquest of Mantua. Rivoli, Castiglione, Arcole, and the march through the Brenta valley, are all subordinate to that grand object.¹⁶² Twice was Napoleon arrested by a fortress; the first instance was Mantua, Danzig being the second.¹⁶³ Napoleon knew very well that Mantua was the key of Italy. After he once got hold of it, he never parted with it until he parted with his crown, and his sway over Italy was never seriously endangered till then.

From the geographical configuration of Italy, it is clear that whichever power can hold the Northern portion, the Gallia Cisalpina of the Romans, that power rules in all Italy. The basin of the Po has ever been the battle-field in which the fates of the peninsula were decided. From Marignano and Pavia, through Turin, Arcole, Rivoli, Novi and Marengo, down to Custoza and Novara, all the decisive struggles for mastery in Italy have been fought there.¹⁶⁴ It is quite natural. French or German, whoever drives his opponent from the valley of the Po, isolates him from the long-stretched peninsula, and isolates that peninsula from its allies. Reduced to its own resources, this peninsula, the least populated and least civilized portion of Italy, is soon subdued. Now, in this basin of the Po, Mantua is the most central position.

It is equidistant from both Adriatic and Mediterranean, about 70 miles from either; it thus effectually shuts up, if defended by an army in the field, all access to the peninsula. Add to this the immense tactical advantages of its position, in the middle of a lake, with three bridge-heads to debouch from, surrounded on all sides by ground intersected by rivers, and tending to isolate from each other the various portions of a besieging army—and no wonder that it should be a traditional saying that who holds Mantua is master of Italy.

These few considerations will suffice to show that it would not be so very easy to drive the Austrians out of Italy, even if they held nothing but Mantua. What it took the first captain of the age nine months to do, a late captain of the Swiss artillery¹⁶⁵ will not do under the same time. But the military aspect of Lombardy has changed immensely since 1796, nay, even since 1848. The campaign of 1848 is in a manner the reverse of that of 1796. If 1796 showed what Mantua could do when on the defensive, 1848 showed what Mantua, Peschiera, Legnago and Verona together can do in offensive warfare; and since then, this splendid position, about the finest in Europe, has been worked out and prepared in every possible way, and with a predilection, a study, and an *ensemble* which do the highest credit to the Austrian staff and engineers.

Look at the map. From the Lago di Garda to the Po runs the Mincio, a not very considerable river, fordable in Summer in many places, but, on the whole, not unfit for a defensive position. The length of the line, which must be measured from Peschiera to Borgoforte, though this is beyond the river, is about thirty miles, so that an army, placed in the middle of it, can reach either extremity in one day's march. Flanked on the right (north) by the lake and the Tyrolese Alps, and on the left by the Po, this short line of thirty miles is the first defensible line which an Austrian army can find against an enemy from the west. But this is not its only merit. Nearly parallel with the lake, the Mincio and the Po, at a distance of from ten to thirty miles to the rear, runs the Adige, forming a second and far stronger line of defense, and offering at all times an obstacle which must be overcome by bridges. This double line, as a glance on the map will show, naturally rounds off the Tyrol and the adjoining Austrian Provinces into a compact whole; it is, militarily speaking, their necessary complement; and upon this is founded the Austrian political maxim that the line of the Mincio is necessary to the defense of Germany, and that the Rhine must be defended on the Po.

This position, naturally strong, has been rendered stronger still by art. The line of the Mincio is cut in two by Mantua. This fortress is so near to the mouth of that river, that the portion below it may be left entirely out of the calculation. Thus the line is shortened by some seven or eight miles more; and its southern extremity strengthened by a fortress of the first rank, forming bridge-heads on either side of the river. The other extremity, where the river leaves the lake, is defended by a small fortress, Peschiera. This place is certainly not very strong, and was taken by the Piedmontese in 1848; but it is sufficient to resist an irregular attack, and can therefore be held while the Austrians hold the field; while it allows them to debouch on the western side of the Mincio.

The line of the Adige, up to 1815, had been neglected. From 1797 to 1809, it formed the boundary of Austria and Italy; but since 1815, Austria became possessed of both banks of the river. Behind Mantua, about 25 miles distant, lay the small fortress of Legnago, on the Adige; but behind Peschiera, the nearest town, Verona, was not fortified. The Austrians, however, were not slow to find out that, to make the position really what it ought to be, Verona must be fortified. And so it was. Only, with the usual sloth of antediluvian Austria, the execution was so neglected that in 1848, when the revolution broke out, the portion on the left or eastern bank of the river, that which might be turned against Austria, was tolerably fortified, while the side toward the enemy was comparatively defenseless.

Radetzky and his chiefs of the staff, Hess and Schönhals, at once set to work, when the revolution had driven them from Milan, to remedy this defect. The heights surrounding Verona to the west were crowned with entrenchments, and by these the ramparts of the town were covered from a commanding fire. And well for Austria they did so. The line of the Mincio had to be abandoned. Peschiera was besieged by the Piedmontese, and they advanced to the very ramparts of these redoubts. But here they were brought to a standstill. The day of Santa Lucia (May 6, 1848) showed them that every further attempt on the defenses of Verona was quite useless.

Still, the whole of Upper Italy was in the hands of the revolutionary army. Radetzky held nothing but his four fortresses, using Verona as an entrenched camp for his army. His front, flanks and almost his rear were in the power of the enemy; for even the communication with the Tyrol was menaced and sometimes interrupted. Still, a division under Gen. Nugent

succeeded in making its way through the insurged Venetian country, and joined him toward the end of May. Then it was that Radetzky showed what could be done with that splendid position he had just been organizing for himself. Unable to live any longer in the exhausted neighborhood of Verona, too weak to take the field in a decisive battle, he removed his army, by a bold and skillful flank-march, by Legnago to Mantua; and, before the enemy had any certain knowledge of what was going on, Radetzky advanced from Mantua to attack them on the western bank of the Mincio; he drove in their line of blockade, and compelled the main army of the Piedmontese to retreat from before Verona. Still, he could not prevent the fall of Peschiera, and, having attained all the results from his march to Mantua he could possibly expect, he again collected his troops, marched by Legnago to Vicenza, and took it from the Italians, thereby subduing the whole of the Venetian territory on the continent, recovering his communications, and securing the resources of a large and rich district in his rear, after which he again retired to his stronghold of Verona, from which the Piedmontese were so much at a loss how to drive him, that they lost a whole month in doing nothing. In the mean time, however, three strong Austrian brigades had arrived, and then the tables were turned. In three days, Radetzky swept the Piedmontese from the heights between the Adige and the Mincio, turning, at the same time, their right flank by Mantua, and gave them such a lesson that they never showed fight again until they were behind the Ticino.

This campaign of Radetzky's shows what a general can do with an inferior army if supported by a well-defended system of river-lines. No matter where the Piedmontese stood, or which way they tried to make front, they could not attack the Austrians; and the groping in the dark to which all their military operations were confined for the last five weeks before their ultimate defeat, shows clearly how helplessly fast they were. Now, in what consisted the strength of Radetzky's position? Merely in this, that the fortresses not only sheltered him from an attack, but that they compelled the enemy to divide his forces, while Radetzky, under their shelter, could operate with the whole of his forces at any given point against that portion of the enemy he might happen to find against him. Peschiera neutralized a good many troops; while Radetzky was in Verona, Mantua neutralized another portion, and no sooner did he go to Mantua, than Verona compelled the Piedmontese to leave a corps of observation there. But more than this: the Italians had to operate with separate corps on either side

of the rivers, none of which could rapidly support the other, while Radetzky, by his fortresses and bridge-heads, could at pleasure remove the whole of his forces from one bank to the other. Vicenza and the Venetian Main would never have fallen had it been in the power of the Piedmontese to support them. As it was, Radetzky took both, while the Piedmontese were kept in check by the garrisons of Verona and Mantua.

When the French, in Algeria, have to march a column through a hostile district,¹⁶⁶ they form four squares of infantry and place them on the four corners of a rhomboid; the cavalry and artillery is placed in the center. If the Arabs attack, the steady fire of the infantry repels them, and, so soon as they are broken, the cavalry dash among them, and the artillery unlimber to send them their balls. If repulsed, the cavalry finds safe shelter behind the squares of the infantry. What the solid infantry is against such irregular hordes, such is a system of fortresses for an inferior army in the field; especially if these fortresses are situated on a network of rivers. Verona, Mantua, Peschiera, Legnago, form the four corners of a square, and so long as not three, at least, of them are taken, an inferior army cannot be compelled to leave the position. But how are they to be taken? Peschiera, indeed, will always fall easily, if the Austrians cannot hold the field; but Mantua, in 1848, was not even attempted to be blockaded on all sides, much less to be besieged. To blockade Mantua, three armies are required; one on the western, one on the eastern bank of the Mincio for the siege, and one to cover the siege against the Austrians at Verona. By skillful maneuvering among the rivers and fortresses, *each* of these three armies can be attacked, *ad libitum*, by the *whole* of the Austrian forces. How is a siege to be kept going, under such circumstances? If Mantua, alone, took General Bonaparte nine months to starve out, how strong will it be if supported by an army resting upon Verona, Legnago and Peschiera, capable of maneuvering with united forces, on either bank of the Mincio or Adige, and to which the retreat can never be cut off, as it has two lines of communication, one through the Tyrol, and the other through the Venetian Main? We have no hesitation in saying that this position is one of the strongest in Europe, and as it is not only fully prepared, but also fully understood by the Austrians, we believe that 150,000 Austrians, in it, need not fear double their number of opponents.

But suppose they get beaten out of it. Suppose they lose Mantua and Peschiera and Legnago. So long as they hold Verona, and are not totally driven from the field, they can render very risky the

march of any French army toward Trieste and Vienna. Keeping Verona as an outpost, they can retire into the Tyrol, recruit their strength, and again compel the enemy to divide his forces. One portion must besiege Verona, another defend the valley of the Adige; will there remain enough to march toward Vienna? If so, the Tyrolese army can fall upon them by that valley of the Brenta, the strategetic importance of which Gen. Bonaparte taught the Austrians in 1796 by such a severe lesson. Such an experiment, however, would be a decided fault, unless there was another army for the defense of the direct road to Germany; for if the main body of the Austrians was to be thrown into the Tyrolese Alps, the enemy might still march past, and arrive in Vienna before the Austrians could extricate themselves from the hills. But suppose Vienna fortified (which, we believe, is now being done), this consideration ceases. The army would still arrive in time to relieve it, and might confine the defense of the Carinthian frontier to a constant hovering in the Alps, on the left flank of the invader, threatening to fall upon him either by Bassano or Cornegliano, and seizing his communications so soon as he marched past.

This indirect defense of the South-German frontier is, by the bye, the best answer to the Austrian defense of their occupation of Italy—that the line of the Mincio is the natural frontier of Germany in the south. Were it so, the Rhine would be the natural frontier of France. Every argument that holds good in one case, is fully applicable to the other. But, fortunately, France does neither require the Rhine, nor Germany the Po and Mincio. Who turns, is turned. If the Venetian Main turns the Tyrol, the Tyrol turns all Italy. The Pass of Bormio leads straight to Milan, and may be made the means of preparing a Marengo to an enemy attacking Trieste and Gradisca, as much as the Great Saint Bernard was to Melas attacking the line of the Var.¹⁶⁷ In war, after all, he who holds the field longest and best is sure to win. Let Germany hold the Tyrol with a strong hand, and she can very well afford to let the Italians of the plain have it all their own way. So long as her armies can hold the field, it matters little to her whether the Venetian Main belongs politically to her. Militarily speaking, it is *commanded* by her Alpine frontier, and that should be enough.

This, of course, is a question between Italy and Germany alone. So soon as France steps in, things are different; and if France throws all her weight into the scale, it is but natural that each of the two combatants should secure its position as much as possible. Germany can afford to part with the line of the Mincio, and of the

Adige, too; but part with them to Italy only, and not to any other nation.

So far, we have considered the chances of a defensive war only on the part of the Austrians. But if it should come to war, their position is such that an offensive plan of campaign is imperatively imposed upon them—and of this, more hereafter.

Written in mid-February 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5575, March 4, 1859

Karl Marx

THE STATE OF BRITISH MANUFACTURES

London, Feb. 25, 1859

The factory inspectors of England, Scotland and Ireland, having issued their regular half-yearly reports, ending October 31, 1858, on their different districts, I send you my usual abstract of those most important industrial bulletins.^a The joint report is this time condensed into a few lines, and states only that, with the single exception of Scotland, the encroachments of the manufacturers upon the legal time for the employment of young persons and women,¹⁶⁸ and especially upon the time reserved for their meals, are rapidly increasing. They consequently feel it incumbent upon themselves to urge that these evasions of the law should be prevented by an amending act.

"The imperfections," they say, "in the Factory acts, which make it extremely difficult for the inspectors and sub-inspectors to detect and convict the offenders, and to fulfill the evident intentions of the Legislature in regard to the all-important subjects of limitation to the hours of work, and the securing of sufficient opportunities of rest and refreshment to the workers in the course of the day, render some alterations in the law necessary. If Parliament had imagined that such evasions could be resorted to, they would doubtless have been guarded against by adequate provisions."

Now, since I have conscientiously studied the stormy parliamentary debates from which the present factory laws emerged, the factory inspectors must allow me to dissent from their concluding passage, and to stick to the opinion that the factory laws were formed with the express purpose of allowing every possible facility for evasion and circumvention. The bitter antagonism between

^a *Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department for the Half Year ending 31st October 1858.—Ed.*

landlords and mill lords which gave birth to them, was still mitigated by the common spite the two ruling classes entertain for what they call "vulgar interests." At the same time, I willingly embrace the opportunity of paying my respects to those British factory inspectors, who, in the teeth of all-powerful class-interests, have taken up the protection of the down-trodden multitude with a moral courage, a steadfast energy, and an intellectual superiority of which there are not to be found many parallels in these times of mammon-worship.^a

The first report proceeds from Mr. Leonard Horner,^b whose district comprises the industrial center of England, the whole of Lancashire, parts of Cheshire, Derbyshire, the West Riding of Yorkshire, the North Riding and the four northern counties of England. The factory laws being still the object of unmitigated opposition on the part of the manufacturers, and almost every year witnessing a parliamentary campaign in favor of their repeal, Mr. Horner starts with an apology for the legislation which exempted children and women from the absolute sway of the inexorable laws of Free Trade. The official economists pronounced the factory legislation to be contrary to all sound "principles," and certain to prove most injurious in its consequences to trade. In reply to the first objection, Mr. Horner states.

"As in all factories, there is a very large amount of fixed capital in buildings and machinery, the greater number of hours that machinery can be kept at work the greater will be the return; and, most assuredly, if that working could have been carried on without injury to human beings, there would have been no legislation to interfere with it. But when it was shown that, in order to derive a greater return upon the capital, children, young persons of both sexes, and women, were employed daily, and often in the night, for a length of time wholly inconsistent with their health, morals, education of the young, domestic comfort, and with any reasonable enjoyment of life, the clearest dictates of *moral* principles called upon the Legislature to put an end to so enormous an evil."

In other words, Mr. Horner propounds that, in the present state of society, a principle may appear "sound" on the part of the economist and the classes of which he is the theoretical mouth-piece, and may, nevertheless, not only prove contrary to all the laws of human conscience, but, like a cancer, eat into the very vitals of a whole generation. As to the alleged interference of the factory laws with the progress of industry, Mr. Horner opposes facts to declamation. In the return ordered by the House of

^a Th. Carlyle, *Past and Present*, Book III, Chapter 2.—*Ed.*

^b "Report of Leonard Horner, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ended the 31st October 1858."—*Ed.*

Commons on the 19th of March, 1835, the numbers of mills, and the numbers of persons employed therein, were, in his present district, as follows:

	Factories.	Persons emp'd.
Cotton	775	132,898
Woolen and Worsted	220	8,738
Flax	60	5,546
Silk	23	5,445
Total	1,078	152,627

In the return made to the House of Commons in February, 1857, the account stands thus:

	Factories.	Persons emp'd.
Cotton	1,535	271,423
Woolen and Worsted	181	18,909
Flax	49	6,738
Silk	46	10,583
Total	1,811	307,653

From this tabular statement it appears, that in twenty-two years the number of cotton mills has nearly doubled, while the number of persons employed therein has more than doubled. In the woolen and worsted manufactories the considerable decrease of the number of mills simultaneous with an increase of more than two-fold in the persons employed therein, shows the concentration of capital and the extinction, to a great degree, of the smaller mills by the larger ones. The same process, although on a smaller scale, may be observed with regard to the flax mills. As to the silk mills, their number has been doubled, and the number of persons employed in them nearly so.

"But," as Mr. Horner remarks, "the increase in the actual number of mills is not the only measure of progression; for the great improvements that have been made in machinery of all kinds, have vastly increased their productive powers."

The important point is, that a stimulus to these improvements, especially as regards the greater speed of machines in a given time, was evidently given by the legal restrictions of the hours of work.

"These improvements," says Mr. Horner, "and the closer application which the operatives are enabled to give, have had the effect, as I have been again and again assured, of as much work being turned off in the shortened time as used to be in the longer hours."

It is principally in Mr. Horner's district that willful and deliberate violations of the enactments that restrict the hours of work, as well as those respecting the age of the workers and the attendance to school of children from eight to thirteen years, who by law are to work half-time only, have been on the increase since the recent improved state of trade. I quote from the report:

"The temptation of increased profits is yielded to by those mill-owners in whose code of morality disobedience to an act of Parliament is no crime, and who calculate that the amount of any fine they will have to pay, if found out, will form a very small proportion of the profit they make by disregarding the restrictions of the law."

To understand this trite complaint which we meet in all the successive reports, it must be first considered that, for the greater part, the magistrates consist of manufacturers or their relations, that secondly the fines imposed by law are very small, and lastly, that young persons and women are only held to be employed "*unless the contrary shall be proved.*" Now, as Mr. Horner states:

"Nothing is more easy for a fraudulent mill-owner than to preserve the *contrary*. He has only to stop his steam engine so soon as the Inspector appears, and then all work ceases, and in every information the Inspector must prove that the individual named in the complaint was found actually at work. So soon as the illegal working begins, and it takes place at six different periods of the day, the gross daily amount being made up of small installments, a watch is set to give notice of the approach of an Inspector, and immediately on his being seen, a signal is given to stop the engine and to turn the people out of the mill."

Convictions can, in fact, be obtained only by the Sub-Inspectors overcoming the repugnance natural to gentlemen to resort to measures akin to those of a detective police officer. The persons of the Inspector and his Sub-Inspectors becoming soon well known in their respective districts, they thereby cease to be able to detect those most skillful in breaking the law, and the only resource left to them is to call in their colleagues from neighboring districts who, being mistaken for foreign merchants coming to buy, may escape the notice of the scouts posted by the mill-owners on the different railway stations.

The following bulletin of the wounded and dead of the half-yearly industrial campaign in Mr. Horner's district, is sure to afford a curious theme to the students of military science who will see that the regular tributes of human limbs, hands, arms, bones, feet, heads and faces offered to modern industry exceed in dimension many battles thought most murderous.

ACCIDENTS ARISING FROM MACHINERY.

Nature of Injury.	Adults.		Young Persons.		Children.		Total.	
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
Causing death	4	—	3	1	2	—	9	1
Amputation of right hand or arm.....	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—
Amputation of left hand or arm.....	2	—	1	1	1	—	4	1
Amputation of part of right hand.....	8	19	14	14	6	4	28	37
Amputation of part of left hand	14	14	8	12	5	3	27	29
Fracture of limbs and bones of trunk.....	18	4	10	4	3	3	31	11
Fracture of hand or foot	26	27	23	19	8	9	57	55
Injuries to head and face	11	16	12	13	7	1	30	30
Lacerations, contusions and other injuries not enumerated above.....	146	97	122	138	33	35	301	270
Total	231	177	194	202	65	55	490	434

ACCIDENTS NOT ARISING FROM MACHINERY.

Nature of Injury.	Adults.		Young Persons.		Children.		Total.	
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
Causing death	3	1	—	—	—	—	3	1
Injuries to head and face	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—
Lacerations, contusions and other injuries not enumerated above.....	3	2	4	2	—	1	7	5
Total	8	3	5	2	—	1	13	6

The second report, drawn up by Sir John Kincaid,^a extends over the whole of Scotland where, as he states, the laws which regulate the employment of women, young persons, and children, in factories, continue to be strictly observed. The same is not true in

^a "Report of Sir John Kincaid, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ending the 31st October 1858."—Ed.

respect of the educational enactments, since it seems with Scotch manufacturers a pet device to obtain for their juvenile workers school certificates from shops put up for that purpose, but where the children do not attend at all, or if they attend, are unfit to gather any instruction. It may suffice to quote two cases. In 1858, Sir John Kincaid, accompanied by Mr. Campbell, the Sub-Inspector, attended two schools, from which children employed in some of the Glasgow Print Works are used to receive their certificates. I quote from the report:

"The first school was that of Mrs. Ann Killin, in Smith's Court, Bridgeton; there were no children in the school room when we called, and on asking Mrs. Killin to spell her name, she blundered by commencing with the letter C, but presently corrected herself and said it began with K. However, on looking at her signature in the children's school certificate books, I noticed that she did not always spell her name the same, while the character of the writing showed that she was quite incapable of teaching, and she admitted that she was incapable of keeping the register. The second school visited was that of William Logue, of Londressey street, Calton, whose certificates I also felt it my duty to annul. The school apartment was about fifteen feet long and ten feet wide, and within that space we counted seventy-five children, screaming something unintelligible at the top of their voices. I requested the schoolmaster to point some of the children out to me, and from the manner in which he surveyed the crowd, I saw that he had no knowledge whether or not any of them were present."

In fact, the educational clauses of the Factory acts, while they require children to have certificates of school attendance, do not require that they shall have learned anything.

In Scotland the accidents arising from machinery were 237, of which 58 happened to men, and 179 to females; while there were only 10 accidents not arising from machinery. There is an increase in the numbers who have suffered amputations, as well as those who have met with minor accidents; but the difference is accounted for by the greater number of hands employed during the last half year of 1858. There is only one fatal accident. According to the reports of the Sub-Inspectors of the Western Districts of Scotland, some cotton mills which stopped in 1857 have not yet resumed work, while the fancy printing trade has been dull throughout the year. The latest reports received by Sir John Kincaid of the Eastern Division state that at Dundee and Arbroath several mills are standing, owing to recent bankruptcies and other causes; and that in some others, which are professedly working full time, a good deal of the machinery is unemployed; that this state of matters is very much to be attributed to over-production, to the deficiency in the usual supplies of flax from the Baltic, and to the consequent high prices of the raw

material. The number of persons usually employed in the mills was on the decrease, and, in fact, there was a movement among the flax spinners to reduce the working to forty-two hours per week while the depression continues. In the woollen districts, on the other hand, particularly in the manufacture of tweeds, a branch of trade which is every day increasing, there had been great activity at Hawick, Galashiels, Selkirk, &c.—every department being in full operation, except that of hand-loom weaving, which, from the increase in the number of power-looms, is gradually on the decline, and will soon altogether cease.

Sir John Kincaid gives the following tabular statement respecting the changes which have taken place in the chief branches of Scotch manufactures in the course of 20 years, between 1835 and 1857:

		MILLS.		
		NUMBER OF HANDS.		
	Cotton in all its branches.	Males.	Females.	Total.
1835.....	159	10,529	22,051	32,580
1857.....	152	7,609	27,089	34,698
	Woolen.			
1835.....	90	1,712	1,793	3,505
1857.....	196	4,942	4,338	9,280
	Flax.			
1835.....	170	3,392	10,017	13,409
1857.....	168	8,331	23,391	31,722

A notice of the two other reports I delay for another letter especially as the report of Mr. Robert Baker contains matters of interest to industrialists everywhere.

Written on February 25, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5584, March 15, 1859;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1441, March 18, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Frederick Engels

CHANCES OF THE IMPENDING WAR¹⁶⁹

The most zealous friends of peace in Europe are beginning to abandon the last faint hope that peace will be maintained, and in place of discussing the possibility of a pacific settlement, they now debate the chances of success for the future belligerents. We may, then, be allowed to continue our observations on the military character of the valley of the Po, and on the chances it may offer to the maneuvers of a French and Sardinian and an Austrian army opposed to each other.

We have already described the strong position of the Austrians on the Mincio and Adige.^a Let us now turn to the other side. The Po, in its general course west to east, makes one considerable bend, flowing for about sixteen miles from north-west to south-east, after which it resumes its eastward direction. This bend is on Sardinian territory, about 25 miles from the Austrian frontier. At its northern angle the Sesia, running southward from the Alps, at its southern angle the Bormida, running northward from the Apennines, join the Po. Numerous smaller streams join either of these rivers near their junction with the main stream, so that the country west of them offers, on the map, the spectacle of a vast system of water courses, all tending from the amphitheater of mountains surrounding Piedmont on three sides, to one common center, similar to the radii drawn from the periphery of a circle to its central point. This is the strong defensive position of Piedmont, and it was well recognized as such by Napoleon; but, neglected by him as well as by the Sardinian Government which succeeded the French dominion, it was never organized for defense until after

^a See this volume, pp. 183-89.—*Ed.*

the disasters of 1849. Even then the defensive works were so slowly and sparingly erected that at the present moment they are incomplete, and works which ought to have a masonry scarp and counterscarp, are at this moment being constructed as simple field works, in order to be ready for defense in the Spring.

On the Po, about four miles above the junction of the Sesia, is situated Casale, which has been and is now being fortified so as to form the support of the northern or left wing of the position. At the junction of the Tanaro and the Bormida, eight miles above the junction of the latter with the Po, is Alessandria, the strongest fortress in Piedmont, and now being made the central point of a large intrenched camp, covering the southern or right wing of the position. The distance between the two towns is sixteen miles, and the Po runs in front of the road joining them, at a distance of about five or six miles. The left wing of an army camping in this position is covered first by the Sesia, and secondly by Casale and the Po; the right wing is covered by Alessandria and by the rivers Orba, Bormida, Belbo, and Tanaro, all of which form a junction close to Alessandria. The front is covered by the bend of the Po.

If Sardinia concentrates her army of 80,000 to 90,000 men in this position, she will have some 50,000 men disposable for active operations, and ready to fall on the flanks of any army attempting to turn the position by Novi and Acqui on the south, or by Vercelli on the north. Turin may, therefore, be considered as well covered by this position, especially as this capital has a citadel requiring regular siege before it can be taken, and no army turning such a position could conduct a siege without having first dislodged the Piedmontese army from its intrenched camp. But the position of Casale and Alessandria has one weak point; it has no depth, and its rear is completely uncovered. The Austrians, between the Mincio and Adige, have a square covered by four fortresses, one at each corner; the Piedmontese, on the Po and Bormida, have a line with two fortresses at each flank, and a well-defended front, but their rear is completely open. Now, to turn Alessandria by the south would be hazardous, and comparatively useless; but Casale can be turned on the north, if not by Vercelli, at least by Sesto Calende, Novara, Biella, Santhia and Crescentino; and, if a superior army pass the Po, above Casale, and attack the rear of the Piedmontese, they are at once compelled to give up the advantages of a strongly intrenched position, and to fight in the open field. It would be the counterpart of Marengo, though on the opposite side of the Bormida.

Having thus described the two bases of operation in the basin of the Po, that of the Austrians in a former article, that of the Franco-Piedmontese in the above remarks, let us next consider to what use they may be turned. A glance at the map shows that the whole north-eastern part of the Alpine chain belonging to Switzerland, from Geneva to within a mile of the Stelvio Pass, is neutral territory to begin with, until one or the other of the belligerents thinks proper to violate it. As the Swiss now-a-days muster a pretty strong force for defensive purposes, it is not likely that such a thing would be done at the very beginning of the war. We shall, therefore, for the present, consider Switzerland as really neutral and inaccessible to either party. In that case, the French have but four ways of getting into Piedmont. The army of Lyons will have to pass by Savoy and the Mont Cenis. A smaller corps may pass by Briançon and the Mont Genève; both will emerge from the mountains, and unite at Turin. The army concentrated in Provence may, in part, march from Toulon by Nice and the Col di Tenda; in part it may embark at Toulon and be steamed to Genoa in far shorter time. Both these bodies have their point of concentration at Alessandria. There are a few more roads, but they are either unfit for the passage of large bodies of troops, or subordinate to those named, leading to the same points of concentration.

The disposition of the French army of Italy, for we may now venture to call it by this name, has already been made, in accordance with this state of things. The two main points of concentration are Lyons and Toulon, with a smaller corps in the valley of the Rhône between the two, ready to advance by Briançon. In order rapidly to concentrate a strong French army in the valley of the Po, behind Alessandria and Casale, it is in fact necessary that all the above routes should be used; the strongest corps coming by Lyons and Mont Cenis, the weakest by Briançon and Mont Genève, and as large a portion as possible of the army of Provence being forwarded to Genoa by water; for while a corps marching from the Var by the Col di Tenda will require above ten days to march to Alessandria, it may go by water from Toulon to Genoa in twenty-four hours, and thence reach Alessandria in three forced or four easy marches.

Now, supposing, as we are bound to do, that Austria will declare war as soon as a French battalion passes into Piedmont, what course can her army of Italy pursue? It may remain in Lombardy, await, with arms grounded, the concentration of 200,000 Frenchmen and 50,000 Piedmontese, and then retire before them to its

base of operations on the Mincio, abandoning all Lombardy. This course would dishearten the Austrian troops, and flush their opponents with success bought unexpectedly cheap. Or it may await the attack of the French and Piedmontese in the open plains of Lombardy; in that case it would be beaten by superior numbers, having but 120,000 men to oppose to twice that strength, and, besides, be hampered by the Italian insurrection which would break out all over the country. It might, indeed, reach its fortresses, but that splendid base of operations would be reduced to a barren defensive, the offensive strength of the field army being gone. The great purpose for which that system of fortresses was created, to serve as a base to a weaker army for successful and sheltered attack upon a stronger one, would be completely destroyed, until support could arrive from the interior of Austria; and during that time Peschiera might fall, Legnago might fall, and the communications through the Venetian territory would certainly be lost. Either of the courses considered would be disadvantageous, and indeed inadmissible, unless dictated by stern necessity. But there remains another course.

The Austrians can bring into the field at least 120,000 men. If they choose their moment well, they have nothing to oppose them but the 90,000 Piedmontese, 50,000 of whom alone can take the field. The French arrive by four routes, all verging toward Alessandria. The angles comprised between these four routes, between a line drawn from Mont Cenis to Alessandria, and from Genoa to Alessandria, amount together to about 140 degrees; thus a mutual cooperation of the different French corps, while yet unconcentrated, is completely out of the question. Now, if the Austrians choose their time well—and we have seen in 1848 and '49 that they can do so—and march upon the Piedmontese base of operations, attacking it either in front or turning it by the north, we venture to say, with all respect for the bravery of the Piedmontese army, that the Sardinians would stand but a poor chance against superior numbers of Austrians; and, once the Piedmontese were driven from the field and reduced to a passive defense of their fortresses, the Austrians might attack with superior forces every French corps singly as it debouched from the Alps or the Apennines; and even if compelled to retreat, their retreat would be secure, so long as Switzerland's neutrality covered their northern flank, and the army, on arriving at Mantua, would still be fit for an active, offensive defense of its base of operations.

Another chance for the Austrians would be to take position about Tortona and await the arrival of the French column from

Genoa on its march to Alessandria, when it must offer its flank to the Austrians. But this would be but a lame kind of offensive, for the French might remain quiet at Genoa till the other columns were concentrated at Alessandria, in which case the Austrians would not only be completely outdone, but even liable to be cut off from the Mincio and Adige.

Supposing the Austrians were beaten, and had to retreat toward their base of operations; the French, as soon as they advance beyond Milan, are liable to be turned. The Stelvio road leads from the Tyrol straight to Milan, by the valley of the Adda; the Tonale road by the valley of the Oglio, and the Giudicaria road by that of the Chiese. Both lead into the heart of Lombardy, and to the rear of any army attacking the Mincio from the west. By the Tyrol, Austria turns all Lombardo-Venetia, and, if the requisite preparations are made, may prepare for her enemies any day a Marengo in the Lombard plains. So long as Switzerland remains neutral, no such stratagem can be played upon her while she attacks Piedmont.

Thus the offensive is what, in the present state of matters in Italy, will suit Austria best. To march right into the midst of an army while in the act of concentration, is one of the most splendid of those grand maneuvers of modern warfare which Napoleon knew so well how to execute. Upon none did he execute it with greater success than upon the Austrians; witness Montenotte, Millesimo, Mondovi and Dego, witness Abensberg and Eckmühl.¹⁷⁰ That they have learned it from him, they have brilliantly proved at Sommacampagna,¹⁷¹ and Custoza, and above all, at Novara. The same maneuver would, therefore, seem to be most congenial to Austrian warfare now; and, although it will require great vigilance and nice timing, yet the Austrians will let immense chances of success escape out of their hands, if they confine themselves to a mere defense of their territories.

Written late in February 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5586, March 17, 1859 as a leading article

Karl Marx

THE NEW BRITISH REFORM BILL¹⁷²

London, March 1, 1859

On the night of Feb. 28, Mr. Disraeli initiated the House of Commons into the mysteries of the Government Reform Bill.^a That bill may be shortly described as Mr. Locke King's bill, for the reduction from £50 to £10 of the county franchise,¹⁷³ mitigated by the disfranchisement of the forty shilling freeholders¹⁷⁴ residing in boroughs, so far as their county votes are concerned, and embellished by a complex medley of fancy franchises, which, on one hand, are altogether nugatory, and on the other hand, would only strengthen the existing class-monopolies. The broad questions of admitting the majority of the people into the electoral precincts, of equalizing the electoral districts, and of protecting the vote by the ballot, are not even touched upon. The exactness of my description of the bill, may be ascertained from the following summary of its principal details: The occupation franchise is to be reduced to one uniform standard, both for the counties and boroughs; or, in other words, the Chandos clause of the Reform Act of 1832,¹⁷⁵ which established the £50 tenancy franchise in the counties, is to be repealed. The occupation franchise is extended to all descriptions of real property, whether a building is or is not included in the occupation. The introduction of the £10 county franchise, would, according to Mr. Newmarch's calculation, increase the number of county voters by 103,000, while Mr. Disraeli estimates the addition to the county constituencies at 200,000 votes. On the other hand, the forty shilling freehold would

^a The speeches of Disraeli, Bright, Russell and Roebuck made in the House of Commons on February 28, 1859 were published in *The Times*, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—*Ed.*

nominally remain on its old basis, but the forty shilling freeholders dwelling in towns, who have heretofore exercised their suffrage in the counties on behalf of their freeholds, would lose this privilege, being obliged to vote in the boroughs in which they reside. By this process, about 100,000 votes would be transferred from the counties to the boroughs, while about 40,000, if not more, non-resident voters would be disfranchised altogether. This is the pith of the new scheme. With the one hand it would extract from the county franchise what it adds with the other, taking good care to break down whatever influence the towns, since the Reform Act of 1832, have wielded on county elections by the purchase of forty shilling freehold. Mr. Disraeli in his long speech in bringing in the bill, worked hard to show that during the last fifteen years the manufacture of forty shilling freeholds on the part of the boroughs, had proceeded at such a rate,

"that the number of county voters who do not dwell in the county, now exceeds the number who vote under the occupation clause"; so that on the election day "some large towns would pour out their legions by railway, and overpower, by some Club in the town, the persons who resided in the county."

To this county gentleman's plea, Mr. Bright made the following victorious reply:

"Your object is to make the counties more exclusive. There is nothing of which you seem to be more afraid than to have a good constituency, especially in the counties. It is a very remarkable fact that in a large portion of England, the county constituencies, for a considerable time past, have not been extended, but many of them have been diminished. Mr. Newmarch has shown that there are eleven counties in which, in the space of fifteen years, from 1837 to 1852, the whole constituency diminished by not less than 2,000 voters; whereas the whole county franchise of England and Wales only increased in these fifteen years by 36,000—more than 17,000 of that increase^a took place in Lancashire, Cheshire, and the West Riding of Yorkshire. In the rest of England, such are the difficulties in the purchase of freeholds, such the mode in which farms have been increased in size, that the whole constituency of almost all the counties is stationary, or has absolutely been diminishing."

Passing now from the counties to the boroughs, we arrive at the new fancy franchises that are partly derived from Lord John Russell's abortive schemes of 1852 and 1854,¹⁷⁶ and are partly due to the genius which hatched the convoluted perplexities of Lord Ellenborough's unhappy India bill.¹⁷⁷ There are, first, some so-called educational qualifications, which, as Mr. Disraeli ironically remarked, independent as they are of scientific acquirements, betoken the education of the classes they concern, "to have

^a *The Times* has: "...by 30,000 votes, and of that increase more than half...."—*Ed.*

involved some considerable investment," and may, therefore, be considered to belong to the general category of property qualifications. The right of vote is consequently to be conferred upon graduates, the clergy of the Church of England, ministers of all other denominations, barristers, pleaders and conveyancers, solicitors and proctors, medical men, certified schoolmasters; in a word, on the members of the different liberal professions, or, as the French used to call it in Mr. Guizot's time, on the "capacities." Since the greater portion of these "capacities" already share in the franchise as £10 leaseholders,¹⁷⁸ this is not likely to augment the number of voters in any perceptible degree, although it may contribute to an increase of clerical influence. The other new franchises are created in favor of—1. Lodgers or occupiers of any house, whether furnished or unfurnished, at the rate of 8 shillings per week, or £20 per annum; 2. Persons in the receipt of an income from personal property invested in government funds or annuities, East India stock, or bank stock of £10 per annum; or in receipt of a pension or superannuation allowance for services rendered in any department of the army, navy, or civil service, and not on active duty, of £20 per annum; 3. Depositors in a savings bank to the extent of £50.

On first view it will be understood that all these new franchises, while admitting some new middle-class sections, are framed with the express purpose of excluding the working classes, and chaining them to their present station of political "pariahs," as Mr. Disraeli had the indiscretion to call the non-voters. Now, it may be considered a new feature of the opposition raised within the walls of the House of Commons that all the adversaries of the Ministry, from Mr. John Bright, down to Lord John Russell, dwelt upon this point as the most objectionable feature of the new Reform bill. Mr. Disraeli himself stated,

"when the Reform bill was introduced in 1831, it was generally avowed that the object was to give a legitimate opposition in the Legislature to the middle classes of England."

"Well, Sir," said Lord John Russell, "since the time when I departed from the position of finality, I have done so on the ground, which appeared to me the only ground for disturbing a settlement, so vast and complicated as that was, namely, that there was a great body of persons, and those persons belonging to the working classes of this country, who are very competent to exercise the franchise, excluded."

"The bill of 1832," said Mr. Roebuck, "was to give power to the middle class. Without the working classes on that occasion there would have been no Reform bill. They behaved in a way that I shall never forget, and the middle classes of England ought not to forget. And I now appeal in the name of the working classes of this country to the middle classes."

"I," said Mr. Bright, "I should have the utmost contempt, and I would not say contempt, but should be utterly hopeless with regard to working classes of the country, if I thought they would remain content under an exclusion like that."

The exclusion of the working classes, coupled with the disfranchisement of the freeholders of the towns, will be the war cry under which the present Reform bill, together with its authors, will be attacked, at the same time that discussions in the ministerial camp, already marked by the secession from the Cabinet of Mr. Walpole and Mr. Henley, and originating in the repeal of the Chandos clause, will by no means contribute to strengthen their means of defense.

As to the other clauses of the bill, they are relatively unimportant. No nomination borough is to be disfranchised, but 15 new seats are to be created, of which the West Riding of Yorkshire will receive 4; South Lancashire, 2; and Middlesex, 2; while 7 new members will be given to boroughs of recent growth, viz.: Hartlepool, Birkenhead, West Bromwich and Wednesbury united, Bromley, Staleybridge, Croydon and Gravesend. To gain room for these additional Members of Parliament, a reduction from two to one is to be effected in the numbers of representatives returned by fifteen boroughs whose population is under 6,000. Such are the proportions in which the "equalization" of electoral districts is to be carried out.

Polling places are to be provided for in every parish, or group of parishes, containing not less than 200 electors; the additional polling places to be supplied at the expense of the county. As a sort of compromise with the partisans of the ballot, the elector, anxious not to give his vote on the hustings, may have recourse to the voting paper, sent to the voter, returned by him to the returning officer by a registered letter, signed in the presence of two witnesses, one of them a householder, and to be opened on the day of polling by a special deputy. There are finally some improvements to be introduced into the registration of county voters. There is not a single London paper, except *The Times* and the Government organ,^a that holds out any prospect of success for this bill.¹⁷⁹

Written on March 1, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5586, March 17, 1859;
reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1441, March 18, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

^a *The London Gazette*.—Ed.

Karl Marx

THE STATE OF BRITISH MANUFACTURES

London, March 4, 1859

I propose now giving a notice of the two Factory Reports alluded to in a former letter.^a The first is written by Mr. A. Redgrave,^b whose factory district comprises Middlesex (in and about London), Surrey, Essex, parts of Cheshire, Derbyshire and Lancashire, and the East Riding (Yorkshire). There were caused during the half year terminated on Oct. 31, 1858, 331 accidents by machinery, of which 12 proved fatal. Mr. Redgrave's report turns almost exclusively on one point, viz.: the educational enactments for factories and print-works. Previous to the permanent employment of a child or young person in a factory or print-work, the mill occupier is required to obtain a certificate from the certifying surgeon, who, by virtue of 7 Vict., c. 15, sch. A,¹⁸⁰ is bound to refuse that certificate if the person presented has

"not the ordinary strength and appearance of a child of at least eight years of age, or of a young person of at least thirteen years of age, or if it be incapacitated by disease and bodily infirmity from working daily in the factory for the time allowed by law."

Children between the ages of eight and thirteen years, are legally disqualified for full-time employment, and have part of their time to give to school attendance, the surgeon being authorized to tender them half-time certificates only. Now, it appears from Mr. Redgrave's report that, on the one hand, the parents, if they can obtain full-time wages for their children, are anxious to withdraw them from school and half wages, while the

^a See this volume, pp. 190-96.—*Ed.*

^b "Report of Alexander Redgrave, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ended the 30th of October 1858."—*Ed.*

only thing the mill-owner looks for in the juvenile hands is strength to enable them to perform their respective work. While the parent seeks full-time wages, the manufacturer seeks the full-time worker. The following advertisement, which appeared in the local newspaper of an important manufacturing town in Mr. Redgrave's district, and which smacks strangely of the slave-trade, will show how the mill-owners conform to the provisions of the law, literally:

WANTED—From 12 to 20 BOYS, not younger than *what will pass* for 13 years of age.... Wages 4s. per week.

In point of fact, the employer is legally not bound to procure a certificate of the children's age from an authentic source, but an *opinion*, relying upon appearance. The half-time system founded upon the principle that child labor should not be permitted unless, concurrently with such employment, the child attend some school daily, is objected to by the manufacturers, on two grounds. They object to their responsibility of enforcing the school attendance of the half-times (children under 13 years of age), and they find it cheaper and less troublesome to employ one set of children instead of two sets, working alternately 6 hours. The first result, therefore, of the introduction of the half-time system was the nominal diminution to nearly one half of the children under 13 years employed in factories. From 56,455, to which their number amounted in 1835, it had sunk to 29,283 in 1838. This diminution, however, was to a great extent nominal only, since the complaisance of the certifying surgeons worked a sudden revolution in the respective ages of the juvenile hands of the United Kingdom. At the same ratio, therefore, that the certifying surgeons were more strictly watched by factory inspectors and sub-inspectors, and that the facility of ascertaining the real age of the children from the Registrars of Births increased, a movement opposite to that of 1838 set in. From 29,283, to which the number of children under 13 years of age employed in factories had fallen in 1838, it rose again to 35,122 in 1850, and to 46,071 in 1856, the latter legal return being still far from exhibiting the real proportion of such employment. On the one hand, many of the certifying surgeons know still how to baffle the surveillance of the inspectors, and on the other, many thousand children were withdrawn from school and the half-time system at 11 years of age, by the alteration of the law with respect to silk mills;¹⁸¹

"a sacrifice which," as one of the factory inspectors says, "may have been accommodating to the mill occupiers, but which has proved injurious to the social interests of the silk districts."

Although we may consequently infer that the number of children between 8 and 13 years now employed in the factories and print-works of the United Kingdom exceeds the number similarly employed in 1835, there can exist no doubt that the half-time system had a great share in stimulating inventions for the suppression of child labor. Thus, Mr. Redgrave states:

"In fact, one class of manufacturers—the spinners of woolen yarn—now rarely employ children under 13 years of age (i.e., half-times). They have introduced improved and new machinery of various kinds, which altogether supersedes the necessity for the employment of children. For instance, I will mention one process, as an illustration of this diminution in the number of children, wherein, by the addition of an apparatus called a piecing machine to existing machines, the work of six or four half-times, according to the peculiarity of each machine, can be performed by one young person."^a

How modern industry, in old-settled countries at least, tends to press children into money-making employment, has been again illustrated by recent instances in Prussia. The factory law of Prussia of 1853 enacted that after the 1st of July, 1855, no child should be employed in a factory until it had completed its twelfth year, and that children between 12 and 14 years of age should not be employed for more than 6 hours per day, and attend school at least 3 hours per day. This law met with such opposition from the manufacturers, that the Government had to give way, and enforce it, not throughout Prussia, but by way of experiment in Elberfeld and Barmen only, two continuous manufacturing towns, containing a large manufacturing population, engaged in spinning, calico-printing, &c. In the Annual Report of the Chamber of Commerce for Elberfeld and Barmen, for 1856, the following representations on this subject are made to the Prussian Government:

"The increase of the rate of labor, as also the increased price of coals and all materials necessary for those branches of manufacture, such as leather, oil, metal, &c., has proved highly disadvantageous to the trade. In addition to this, the strict enforcement of the law of May 1, 1853, concerning the employment of children in the manufactories, has worked very prejudicially. Not only has it caused the withdrawal of a number of children, but it has been rendered impossible to give them that early instruction calculated to render them skillful workmen. In consequence of the lack of these youthful hands, the machines in several establishments were brought to a stand-still, as the handling of them could not be performed by grown-up persons. A modification of this law is recommended, so as to shorten the forced attendance at school of children who have reached a certain standard of knowledge, as being a measure advantageous to numerous families and to the owners of manufactories."

^a "Report of Alexander Redgrave"..., p. 43.—*Ed.*

The last of the factory reports, that of Mr. Baker, Inspector for Ireland,^a is distinguished by an analysis of the causes leading to accidents, and by a summary of the state of trade. In regard to the first point, Mr. Baker states that there happened one accident to every 340 persons, this being an increase of 21 per cent over the half year ending in April last, and that of the accidents that happened by machinery—only 10 per cent of the whole number of accidents being not connected with machinery—about 40 per cent were avoidable and might have been prevented by a nominal outlay, but which,

“by the recent change in the law, it is now very difficult to effect when entreaties fail.”

The state of trade Mr. Baker asserts to be better, but, according to his opinion,

“in many instances the maximum has again been reached, beyond which manufactures become gradually less and less profitable, till they cease to be so altogether.”

The changes in the relation between the price of the raw materials and the manufactured articles he justly points out as one of the principal causes upon which, concurrently with the increase of machinery, the cycle of good and bad times revolves. Mr. Baker takes as an instance the changes in the worsted trade:

“During the lucrative years in the worsted trade of 1849 and 1850 the price of English combing wool stood at 1s. 1d., and of Australian at between 1s. 2d. and 1s. 5d. per lb., and on the average of the 10 years from 1841 to 1850, both inclusive, the average price of English wool never exceeded 1s. 2d., and of Australian wool 1s. 5d. per lb. In the commencement of the disastrous year of 1857, the price of Australian wool began with 1s. 11d., falling to 1s. 6d. in December, when the panic was at its hight, but has gradually risen again to 1s. 9d. through 1858; while that of English wool, commencing with 1s. 8d. and rising in April and September, 1857, to 1s. 9d., falling in January, 1858, to 1s. 2d., has since risen to 1s. 5d., which is 3d. per lb. higher than the average of the 10 years above referred to. This shows either that the bankruptcies which similar prices occasioned in 1857 are forgotten, or that there is barely the wool grown which the existing spindles are capable of consuming.”

On the whole, Mr. Baker’s opinion seems to be that spindles and looms multiply, both in number and speed, at a ratio not warranted by the production of wool. In England there exist no reliable statistics in this respect; but the agricultural statistics of Ireland, obtained by the constabulary, and those of Scotland,

^a “Report of Robert Baker, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ended 31st October 1858.”—*Ed.*

obtained by Mr. Hall Maxwell, suffice for all practical purposes. They show that while in 1857 some of the cereal, and generally the animal growths in both countries materially increased, sheep were an exception, the number in Ireland being less in 1858 than it was in 1855 by 114,557; and though there was an increase in 1858 over 1857 by 35,533, the gross number was less even than the average of the three preceding years by 95,177, principally in ewes. And so, also, in Scotland, there were:

	Sheep of all ages for breeding.	Sheep of all ages for feeding.	Lambs.
In 1856	2,714,301	1,146,427	1,955,832
In 1857	2,632,283	1,181,782	1,869,103
Decrease	82,018	35,355	Dec. 86,729

Showing not only a general decrease in sheep of 133,392, but that more sheep had been put up for feeding purposes than heretofore. Hence we know that, estimating the fleece to weigh 7 lbs., while in 1855 Ireland was capable of affording 16,810,934 lbs. of wool, without reckoning lambs, in 1858 that country was only able to afford 16,276,330 lbs.; and that the diminution of wool in Scotland, also without reckoning lambs, amounted in 1857 to 326,641 lbs.; the total deficient product in both countries being 861,245 lbs., or as nearly as possible, one-ninety-fifth part of all the home-grown wool estimated to be annually required for consumption in the worsted trade.

Written on March 4, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5592, March 24, 1859

Frederick Engels

PO AND RHINE¹⁸²

**Written in late February and early March
1859**

**First published, as a pamphlet, in Berlin in
April 1859**

Printed according to the pamphlet

**Published in English for the first
time**

Po und Rhein.



Das Recht der Uebersetzung wird vorbehalten.

Berlin.

Verlag von Franz Duncker.
(W. Besser's Verlagsbuchhandlung).

1859.

Title-page of Frederick Engels' pamphlet
Po and Rhine

I

Since the beginning of this year it has become the slogan of a large part of the German press that *the Rhine must be defended on the Po.*

This slogan was fully justified in the face of Bonaparte's war preparations and threats. It was sensed in Germany, with correct instinct, that although the Po was Louis Napoleon's pretext, in any circumstances the Rhine could not but be his ultimate goal. Nothing except a war for the Rhine border could provide a lightning-conductor against the two factors inside France that threatened Bonapartism: the "superabundant patriotism"^a of the revolutionary masses and the seething discontent of the "bourgeoisie". It would engage the former in a national undertaking and give the latter the prospect of a new market. That is why the talk about liberating Italy could not be misunderstood in Germany. It was a case of the old proverb: He beats the sack and means the donkey. If Italy was to play the part of the sack, Germany had no desire in this case to act as the donkey.

In the present case, the maintenance of the Po therefore meant merely that Germany, threatened by an attack involving, in the last instance, the possession of some of its best provinces, could not by any means dream of giving up one of its strongest, in fact its strongest military position without striking a blow. In this sense the whole of Germany was indeed interested in the defence of the Po. On the eve of a war, as in war itself, one occupies every position that can be used to threaten the enemy and do him damage, without engaging in any moral speculations as to whether it is consonant with eternal righteousness and the principle of nationality. One simply fights for one's life.

^a Heinrich Heine, "Bei des Nachtwächters Ankunft zu Paris".—Ed.

However, this way of defending the Rhine on the Po should be clearly distinguished from the tendency on the part of very many German military men and politicians to regard the Po, that is, Lombardy and Venice, as an indispensable strategic complement and, so to speak, an integral part of Germany. This view has been put forward and defended theoretically particularly since the campaigns in Italy in 1848 and 1849, for example, by General *von Radowitz* in St. Paul's Church^a and by General *von Willisen* in his *Italienischer Feldzug des Jahres 1848*. In non-Austrian South Germany the theme has been treated particularly by Bavarian General *von Hailbronner*, with a predilection bordering on enthusiasm. The main argument is always a political one: Italy is totally incapable of staying independent; either Germany or France must rule in Italy; if the Austrians were to pull out of Italy today, the French would be in the Adige valley and at the gates of Trieste tomorrow and the entire southern border of Germany would be exposed to the "hereditary enemy". Therefore, Austria holds Lombardy in the name and the interests of Germany.

As we see, the military authorities for this opinion are among the foremost in Germany. Nonetheless, we must decidedly oppose it.

Yet this opinion has become an article of faith defended with true fanaticism in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, which has set itself up as the monitor of German interests in Italy. This Christian-Teutonic paper, for all its hatred of Jews and Turks, would rather see itself circumcised than the "German" region of Italy. What is after all only defended by politicking generals as a splendid military position in Germany's hands is in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* an essential component of a political theory. We mean the "Central European great power theory", which would make Austria, Prussia and the rest of Germany into a federal state under the predominant influence of Austria, Germanise Hungary and the Slavic-Romanian Danubian countries by means of colonisation, schools and gentle violence, thus shift the centre of gravity of this complex of countries more and more to the southeast, towards Vienna, and incidentally reconquer Alsace and Lorraine as well. The "Central European great power" is intended to be a kind of rebirth of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and seems, among other things, to aim at incorporating the once Austrian Netherlands¹⁸³ and also Holland as vassal states. The German's Fatherland would extend about twice as far as the

^a J. M. von Radowitz's speech of August 12, 1848 in the Frankfurt National Assembly in St. Paul's Church.—Ed.

German tongue is now heard^a; and when all this had come to pass, Germany would be the arbiter and master of Europe. Moreover, the conditions for all this coming to pass have already been assured. The Romanic peoples are in an acute state of decadence: the Spanish and Italians are already totally ruined, and the French are now also experiencing their disintegration. On the other hand, the Slavs are incapable of forming a genuine modern state and have the world-historical vocation of being Germanised, in which case a rejuvenated Austria is once again the principal instrument of Providence. The Teutons are therefore the only race that still has moral strength and historical capacity, and among them the English are sunk so deep in insular egoism and materialism that their influence, trade and industry have to be kept off the mainland of Europe by powerful protective tariffs, by a kind of rational continental system. In this way German moral earnestness and the youthful Central European great power can hardly fail to attain world supremacy on land and sea in a short time and inaugurate a new era in history, in which Germany would at long last play first fiddle again and the other nations would dance to its music.

The land belongs to the Russians and French,
 The English own the sea.
 But we in the airy realm of dreams
 Hold sovereign mastery.^b

We would not dream of going into the political aspect of these patriotic fantasies^c here. We have only outlined them in context in order that all these wonderful things might not, at some later time, be brought up against us as new proofs of the necessity of "German" rule in Italy. The only thing that concerns us here is the military question: Does Germany require for its defence permanent rule over Italy and in particular total military possession of Lombardy and Venice?

Reduced to its most essential military expression the question is: In order to defend its southern border, does Germany require possession of the Adige, the Mincio and the Lower Po, with the bridgeheads of Peschiera and Mantua?

Before we undertake to answer this question, we state expressly that when we speak of Germany here we mean by that a single power whose military forces and actions are directed from a single centre—Germany as a real, not an ideal, political body. On any other presuppositions there can be no question of the political and military requirements of Germany.

^a Cf. E. M. Arndt, "Des Deutschen Vaterland".—Ed.

^b Heinrich Heine, *Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen*, Caput VII.—Ed.

^c An allusion to Justus Möser's *Patriotische Phantasien*.—Ed.

II

For hundreds of years Upper Italy has been, even more than Belgium, the battle-field on which the Germans and the French have fought out their wars. For the aggressor, possession of Belgium and the Po valley is a necessary condition for either a German invasion of France or a French invasion of Germany; it is only by virtue of such possession that the flanks and rear of the invasion are fully secure. The only exception could be a completely reliable neutrality of these two regions, and that case has never yet arisen.

If the fate of France and Germany has been decided indirectly on the battlefields of the Po valley ever since the day of Pavia,¹⁸⁴ the fate of Italy has been simultaneously decided there directly. With the huge standing armies of modern times, with the growing power of France and Germany, and with the political disintegration of Italy, old Italy proper, the region south of the Rubicon, lost all military importance, and possession of the old Cisalpine Gaul inevitably brought with it mastery of the long narrow peninsula. In the basins of the Po and Adige, on the Genoese, Romagnese and Venetian coasts, was the densest population, and there was concentrated Italy's most flourishing agriculture, most active industry and liveliest trade. The peninsula, Naples and the Papal States, remained relatively stationary in their social development; their military power had not counted for centuries. Whoever held the Po valley cut off the peninsula's land communications with the rest of the Continent and could easily subdue it if the occasion arose, as the French did twice during the revolutionary war and the Austrians did twice in this century. Accordingly, only the basins of the Po and the Adige are of military importance.

Enclosed on three sides by the unbroken chain of the Alps and Apennines and on the fourth, from Aquileia to Rimini, by the Adriatic Sea, this basin forms a region very clearly demarcated by nature, with the Po flowing through it from west to east. The southern, or Apennine, boundary does not interest us here; the northern, or Alpine, boundary interests us all the more. Its snow-clad ridge has only a few passes with paved roads; even the number of wagon-tracks, bridle-paths and footpaths is limited; long narrow gorges lead to the passes over the high peaks.

The German frontier bounds North Italy from the mouth of the Isonzo to the Stelvio Pass; from there to Geneva the border is with Switzerland; from Geneva to the mouth of the Var it is with France. Going west from the Adriatic to the Stelvio Pass, each pass leads deeper into the heart of the Po basin than the previous one and hence outflanks any positions of an Italian or French army lying further to the east. The border-line of the Isonzo is immediately outflanked by the first pass from Caporetto to Cividale; the Pontebba Pass goes round the position on the Tagliamento, which is also outflanked by two unpaved passes from Carinthia and Cadore. The Brenner Pass outflanks the line of the Piave by the Peutelstein Pass from Bruneck to Cortina d'Ampezzo and Belluno, the line of the Brenta by the Val Sugana to Bassano, the line of the Adige by the Adige valley, the Chiese by the Giudicaria, the Oglio by unpaved roads over Tonale, and finally all the territory east of the Adda by the Stelvio Pass and the Valtellina.

One could say that with such a favourable strategic position, actual possession of the plains down to the Po would not matter too much to us Germans. Given forces of equal strength, where could the enemy army take a stand east of the Adda or north of the Po? All its positions would be outflanked; even if it crossed the Po or the Adda, its flank would be threatened; if it moved south of the Po, its communications with Milan and Piedmont would be threatened; if it went beyond the Ticino, it would endanger its connections with the entire peninsula. If it were reckless enough to advance in an offensive in the direction of Vienna, it could be cut off any day and forced to give battle with its rear towards enemy country and its front facing Italy. If it were beaten, it would be a second Marengo with the roles reversed; if it beat the Germans, the latter would have to behave very stupidly to be deprived of their retreat to the Tyrol.

The construction of the road over the Stelvio Pass is proof that the Austrians learned their lesson from their defeat at Marengo.

Napoleon built the Simplon road in order to have a protected route into the heart of Italy; the Austrians supplemented their system of offensive defence in Lombardy by the road from Stelvio to Bormio. It may be said that this pass is too high to be practicable in winter; that the entire route is too difficult since it goes without relief through inhospitable high mountain country for a distance of at least fifty German miles^a (from Füssen in Bavaria to Lecco on Lake Como), including three mountain passes; finally, that it can easily be blocked in the long defile along Lake Como and in the mountains themselves. Let us look into this.

To be sure, the pass is the highest practicable one in the entire chain of the Alps, 8,600 feet, and may be heavily snowed up in winter. But if we recall Macdonald's winter campaign of 1800-01 in the Splügen and Tonale, we will not give too much weight to such obstacles. All the Alpine passes are snowed up in winter and are passable nonetheless. Armstrong's production of efficient breech-loading rifled cannon has made reorganisation of all artillery something that can hardly be put off; it will introduce lighter guns into field artillery as well, increasing their mobility. A more serious obstacle is the long march in the high mountains and getting over one range after another. The Stelvio Pass does not cross the divide between the northern and southern Alpine rivers, but between the Adige and the Adda, two rivers that flow into the Adriatic, and therefore presupposes that the main range of the Alps is crossed by the Brenner or the Finstermünz Pass in order to get from the Inn valley into that of the Adige. Since in the Tyrol the Inn flows pretty much from west to east between two mountain ridges, troops from Lake Constance and Bavaria must also cross the more northerly of these ridges, so that there will be a total of two or three mountain passes on this route alone. Laborious though this may be, it is not a decisive obstacle to leading an army into Italy by this route. This difficulty will soon be reduced to a minimum by a railway in the Inn valley, which is already partly completed, and a projected line in the valley of the Adige. Napoleon's route over the St. Bernard Pass from Lausanne to Ivrea involved no more than about 30 miles through high mountains; but the route from Udine to Vienna, along which Napoleon advanced in 1797 and along which Eugène and Macdonald joined him at Vienna in 1809, goes through high mountains for over 60 miles, and likewise over three Alpine passes. The way from Pont-de-Beauvoisin over the Little St.

^a The German mile is equal to 7,420 metres.—*Ed.*

Bernard to Ivrea, the route that goes directly from France furthest into Italy, without touching Switzerland, and is therefore the best for outflanking, also leads for more than 40 miles over high mountains, as does the Simplon route from Lausanne to Sesto Calende.

Finally, as for blocking the road in the pass itself or on Lake Como, one is no longer so inclined, after the campaigns of the French in the Alps, to rely on the efficacy of roadblocks. Commanding heights and the possibility of outflanking make them rather futile; the French stormed many of them and were never seriously held up by the fortifications in the passes. Any fortifications of the passes on the Italian side can be flanked via Cevedale, Monte Corno and Gavia, and the Tonale and Aprica. From the Valtellina there are many bridle-paths to the Bergamo region, and roadblocks on the long defile by Lake Como can be outflanked along those paths or from Dervio or from Bellano through Val Sassina. In mountain warfare, advancing in several columns is advisable in any case, and if one of them gets through, the purpose is usually attained.

How practicable even the most difficult passes are at virtually any time of year, provided good troops and resolute generals are employed; how even minor auxiliary passes not negotiable by vehicles can be used as good operational lines, especially for flanking purposes; and how little roadblocks can do to block the advance—all this is best shown by the campaigns in the Alps from 1796 to 1801. At that time not a single Alpine pass had been paved, and nonetheless armies crossed the mountains in every direction. In 1799, as early as the beginning of March, Loison with a French brigade crossed the divide between the Reuss and the Rhine by footpaths, while Lecourbe went over the Bernardino and the Viamala, then crossed the Albula and Julier Passes (7,100 feet high) and by March 24 took the Martinsbruck defile by a flanking movement, sending Dessolle through the Münster valley over Pisoc and the Worms Pass (a footpath 7,850 feet high) to the Upper Adige valley and thence to the Reschen-Scheideck. At the beginning of May Lecourbe pulled back over the Albula again.

Suvorov's campaign followed in September of the same year; during it, as the old soldier expressed it in his vigorous figurative language, the Russian bayonet forced its way through the Alps (*Ruskij štyk prognal črez Alpow*). He sent most of his artillery over the Splügen, had a flanking column go through Val Blegno over the Lukmanier (footpath, 5,948 feet) and thence over the Sixmadun (about 6,500 feet) into the Upper Reuss valley, while he himself

went through the St. Gotthard, which at that time was hardly passable for vehicles (6,594 feet). He took the roadblock of Teufelsbrücke by storm on September 24-26; but when he got to Altdorf, with the lake in front of him and the French on every other side, there was nothing left for him to do but to go up the Schächen valley over the Kinzig-Kulm into the valley of the Muota. Arriving there, after leaving all his artillery and baggage in the Reuss valley, he found the French in superior force before him again, while Lecourbe was on his heels. Suvorov went over the Pragel Pass into the valley of the Klön in order to reach the Rhine plain by that route. He met with insurmountable resistance in the Näfels defile and the only thing left him was to take the footpath through the Panix Pass, 8,000 feet high, to reach the upper valley of the Rhine and the link with the Splügen. The passage began on October 6 and on October 10 the headquarters were in Ilanz. This passage was the most impressive of all Alpine crossings in modern times.

We shall not say much about Napoleon's crossing of the Great St. Bernard. It does not come up to other similar operations of that period. The season was favourable and the only noteworthy thing was the skilful way in which the strong point of Fort Bard was outflanked.

On the other hand, Macdonald's operations in the winter of 1800-01 were remarkable. With the assignment of taking 15,000 men as the left wing of the French army of Italy to outflank the Austrian right wing on the Mincio and the Adige, he crossed the Splügen (6,510 feet) *in the depth of winter with all kinds of arms*. With the greatest of difficulty, often halted by avalanches and snowstorms, he led his army over the pass between December 1 and 7 and marched up along the Adda through the Valtellina to the Aprica. Nor were the Austrians frightened off by winter in the high mountains. They held the Albula, the Julier and the Brailio (Worms Pass), and at the last named even made a surprise attack in which they captured a detachment of dismounted French hussars. After Macdonald had surmounted the Aprica Pass from the Adda valley into the valley of the Oglio, he climbed the very high Tonale Pass by footpaths, and on December 22 attacked the Austrians, who had obstructed the defile in the pass with blocks of ice. Thrown back on that day as well as in the second attack (December 31—thus he remained in the high mountains for nine days!), he went down the Val Camonica to the Lago d'Iseo, sent his cavalry and artillery through the plain and with the infantry climbed the three ranges leading to Val Trompia, Val Sabbia and

the Giudicaria, where he reached Storo as early as January 6. Meanwhile Baraguay d'Hilliers had gone over the Reschen-Scheideck (Finstermünz Pass) from the valley of the Inn into the Upper Adige valley.—If such manoeuvres were possible sixty years ago, what can we not do today, when we have excellent paved roads in most of the passes!

Even from these sketches we can see that the only roadblocks that had any sort of ability to hold out were those that were not outflanked, whether from lack of skill or lack of time. For example, the Tonale was untenable once Baraguay d'Hilliers appeared in the Upper Adige valley. The other campaigns show that they were taken either by a flanking operation or, frequently, by storm. Luziensteig was stormed two or three times, and likewise Malborghetto in the Pontebba Pass in 1797 and 1809. The Tyrolean strong points did not stop Joubert in 1797 or Ney in 1805. It is known, as Napoleon stated, that outflanking can be accomplished on paths that a goat can negotiate. And ever since people have waged war on this basis, any and all strong points can be bypassed.

Consequently, we cannot see how, given equality of forces, a hostile army can defend Lombardy east of the Adda in the open field against a German army advancing over the Alps. Its only chance would be to take up a position between existing or newly erected fortifications and to manoeuvre between them. This possibility will be examined later.

What passes are now open to France for penetrating into Italy? Whereas Germany surrounds a full half of Italy's northern border, the French frontier runs in almost a straight line from north to south, surrounds nothing and outflanks nothing. It is only after taking Savoy and a part of the Genoese coast that flanking movements can be prepared via the Little St. Bernard and some passes in the Maritime Alps, and even then the effect will extend only to the Sesia and the Bormida and will not reach Lombardy and the duchies, let alone the peninsula. Only a landing in Genoa, which would have its difficulties for a large army, could bring about a flanking of all of Piedmont; a landing further east, e.g., at La Spezia, could no longer be based on Piedmont and France, but only on the peninsula, and would therefore be outflanked as much as itself doing the outflanking.

Thus far we have assumed that Switzerland would be neutral. In the event that it was drawn into the war, France would have one more pass available, the Simplon (the Great St. Bernard, which leads to Aosta as the Little St. Bernard does, would yield no new

advantages beyond the shorter line). The Simplon leads to the Ticino and therefore covers Piedmont for the French. In the same way, the Germans would obtain the relatively minor Splügen, which meets the Stelvio road on Lake Como, and the Bernardino, whose effect extends as far as the Ticino. The St. Gotthard could serve either side, depending on the circumstances, but would not give them many new opportunities for flanking operations. Thus we see that the effect of a French flanking manoeuvre over the Alps, on the one hand, and of a German flanking manoeuvre, on the other, extends to the present border between Lombardy and Piedmont, the Ticino. But if the Germans are on the Ticino, even if they are only at Piacenza and Cremona, they bar the French from the land route into the Italian peninsula. In other words, if France dominates Piedmont, Germany dominates all the rest of Italy.

The Germans have moreover a tactical advantage. Along the entire German frontier, the watershed is on the German side for all the important passes, with the exception of the Stelvio. The Fella in the Pontebba Pass rises in Carinthia, and the Boite in the Peutelstein Pass in the Tyrol. In the Tyrol this advantage is decisive. The Upper Brenta valley (Val Sugana), the Upper Chiese valley (Giudicaria) and more than half of the course of the Adige belong to the Tyrol. Although in any particular case it cannot be known, without a close study of the locality, whether possession of the watershed in mountain passes gives actual tactical advantage, this much is certain, that as a rule the party occupying the ridge and some of the slope towards the enemy will have the better chance of outflanking the other side and dominating the enemy from above. Furthermore, that party will be in a position to make the most difficult stretches of the auxiliary passes negotiable for all arms, even before war breaks out; this can be of decisive importance for communications in the Tyrol. If this projection of our territory on the enemy side has the extent that the zone of the German Confederation has in the South Tyrol; if, as here, the two main passes, the Brenner and the Finstermünz, are far removed from the enemy frontier; if, in addition, decisive auxiliary passes, such as those through the Giudicaria and the Val Sugana, are entirely within German territory, the tactical conditions for an invasion of Upper Italy are facilitated so enormously that in the event of war they need only be judiciously employed to ensure victory.

So long as Switzerland remains neutral, the Tyrol is the most direct route for a German army operating against Italy; if Switzerland is no longer neutral, the Tyrol and the Grisons (the

Inn and the Rhine valleys) are the most direct. It was along this line that the Hohenstaufens moved against Italy; there is no other route by which a Germany acting militarily as a *single* state can operate decisively with rapid blows in Italy. For this line, however, not Inner Austria, but Upper Swabia and Bavaria, from Lake Constance to Salzburg, is the operational base. This was true throughout the Middle Ages. Only when Austria had consolidated on the Middle Danube, when Vienna became the central point of the monarchy, when the German Empire fell apart and merely Austrian wars, not German wars, were waged in Italy, was the old, short, straight line from Innsbruck to Verona and from Lindau to Milan abandoned; only then was it replaced by the long, crooked, bad line from Vienna through Klagenfurt and Treviso to Vicenza, a line that a German army would formerly have relied on only in the extreme emergency of a threatened retreat, but never for an offensive.

So long as the German Empire existed as a real military power and hence based its attacks against Italy on Upper Swabia and Bavaria, it could strive to conquer Upper Italy on political, never purely military grounds. In the long struggles for Italy, Lombardy was at various times German, independent, Spanish or Austrian; but it should not be forgotten that Lombardy was separate from Venice and Venice was independent. And although Lombardy held Mantua, it did not include the Mincio line and the region between the Mincio and the Isonzo, without possession of which, we are now told, Germany cannot sleep in peace. Germany (through the intermediary of Austria) has had full possession of the Mincio line only since 1814. And although Germany, as a political body, did not play the most brilliant of roles in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this was not due to its not possessing the Mincio line.

In any case, the strategic rounding-out of states and their provision with defendable frontiers has come more to the forefront since the French Revolution and Napoleon created armies with greater mobility and traversed Europe with those armies in every direction. While during the Seven Years' War¹⁸⁵ the field of operations of an army was confined to a single province, and manoeuvres would go on for months around individual fortresses, positions or operational bases, in any war today the configuration of the terrain of entire countries is involved, and the importance previously attached to individual tactical positions is now given only to large groups of fortresses, long river lines or high, prominent mountain chains. In this

connection, such lines as the Mincio and the Adige are certainly much more important than in the past.

Let us therefore examine these lines.

All the rivers east of the Simplon that flow from the Alps into the Po in the Upper Italian plain or directly into the Adriatic make a concave arc with the Po or by themselves to the east. They are therefore more favourable for defence by an army to the east of them than by one to the west. If we look at the Ticino, the Adda, the Oglio, the Chiese, the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Piave or the Tagliamento, each of these rivers, alone or with the adjacent portion of the Po, forms an arc whose centre is to the east. This enables an army on the left (east) bank to take up a central position from which it can reach any seriously threatened point on the river in a relatively short time; it holds Jomini's "internal line",^a and marches on the radius or the chord, whilst the enemy has to manoeuvre on the periphery, which is longer. If the army on the right bank is on the defensive, on the other hand, this situation is unfavourable to it; the enemy is supported in his feinting attacks by the terrain, and the shorter distances from the various points on the periphery that favour him in defence add decisive weight to his attack. Accordingly, the lines of the Lombard and Venetian rivers are favourable in every way to a German army, whether for defence or offence, and unfavourable for an Italian or Italian-French army; and if we add the circumstance discussed above, that the Tyrolean passes outflank all these lines, there is really no reason to be concerned for the security of Germany, even if there were not a single Austrian soldier on Italian soil; for the soil of Lombardy is ours whenever we want it.

Furthermore, these Lombard river lines are for the most part quite insignificant and unsuited to serious defence. Apart from the Po itself, which will be discussed below, there are only two positions in the entire basin that are really important for France or Germany; the relevant general staffs have realised the strength of these zones and fortified them, and they will undoubtedly play a decisive role in the next war. In Piedmont, a mile below Casale, the Po, which has an easterly course up to that point, turns southward, runs south-southeast for a good three miles and then bends eastward again. At the northern bend the Sesia flows in from the north; at the southern bend the Po is joined by the

^a H. Jomini, *Précis de l'art de la guerre, ou Nouveau tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la stratégie, de la grande tactique et de la politique militaire*.—Ed.

Tanaro, coming in from the southwest. The Tanaro is joined, just before its confluence, near Alessandria, by the Bormida, the Orba and the Belbo, forming a system of radial river lines converging at a central point; this important junction is covered by the fortified camp of Alessandria. From Alessandria as a base, an army can take either bank of the smaller rivers, can defend the line of the Po in front of it, or can cross the Po at Casale (likewise a fortress) or operate downstream along the right bank of the Po. This position, which is strengthened by sufficient fortifications, is the only one that covers Piedmont or can serve as the base for offensive operations against Lombardy and the duchies. It has the drawback that it lacks depth, a highly unfavourable circumstance since it can be either outflanked or broken through frontally; a strong and skilful attack would soon reduce it to the as yet uncompleted fortified camp of Alessandria, and we have no basis for judging to what extent that camp could protect the defenders from having to give battle under unfavourable conditions, since neither the nature of the latest fortifications there nor the extent to which they have been completed is known. Napoleon already realised the importance of this position for the defence of Piedmont against attack from the east, and had Alessandria refortified. In 1814 the position did not maintain its protective power; how far it can do so today may be apparent to us soon.

The second position, which protects the Venetian region against attack from the west as much as or more than Alessandria does Piedmont, is that of the Mincio and the Adige. The Mincio, after leaving Lake Garda, flows south for four miles to Mantua. There it becomes a sort of lagoon bordered by swamps and then flows southeast to the Po. The stretch of river below the Mantua swamps to the confluence is too short to be used as a crossing by an army, since the enemy could take them from the rear by a sortie from Mantua and compel them to give battle under the most unfavourable conditions. A flanking movement from the south would have to go further, and cross the Po at Revere or Ferrara. On the north the position on the Mincio is broadly protected by Lake Garda from being outflanked, so that the actual length of the Mincio line that has to be defended, from Peschiera to Mantua, is only four miles long, with a fortress at either end ensuring a débouché onto the right bank of the river. The Mincio itself is no great obstacle, and one bank or the other is higher, depending on the locality. That discredited the line more or less before 1848 and it would hardly ever have become very famous were it not significantly strengthened by a special circumstance.

This circumstance is that four miles further back the Adige, the second largest river of Upper Italy, flows in an arc roughly parallel to the courses of the Mincio and the Lower Po and thereby forms a second, stronger position, which is reinforced by the two Adige fortresses of Verona and Legnago. The two river lines, with their four fortresses, constitute such a strong defensive position for a German or Austrian army attacked by Italy or France that no other complex in Europe can be compared with it; an army that can still take the field after leaving garrisons in the strong points will easily be able to stand up to a force twice as strong, if based on this position. Radetzky showed in 1848 what could be got out of the position. After the March revolution in Milan,¹⁸⁶ the desertion of the Italian regiments and the crossing of the Ticino by the Piedmontese, he withdrew to Verona with the rest of his troops, about 45,000 men. After leaving garrisons of 15,000 men he had somewhat more than 30,000 men available. Against him, between the Mincio and the Adige, were about 60,000 Piedmontese, Tuscans, Modenese and Parmesans. In his rear appeared the army of Durando, about 45,000 Papal and Neapolitan troops and volunteers.¹⁸⁷ The only line of communication he had left was through the Tyrol, and even that was threatened, although only lightly, by Lombard irregulars in the mountains. Nevertheless Radetzky held on. Keeping Peschiera and Mantua in check drew off so many troops from the Piedmontese that when they attacked the Verona position (battle of Santa Lucia) on May 6 they could put only four divisions, 40,000 to 45,000 men, in the field. Radetzky could utilise 36,000 men, including the garrison at Verona. Considering the tactically strong defensive position of the Austrians, equilibrium was already reestablished on the battlefield, and the Piedmontese were beaten. The counter-revolution in Naples on May 15 freed Radetzky from the presence of 15,000 Neapolitans¹⁸⁸ and cut down the army of the Venetian mainland to about 30,000; of these only 5,000 Papal Swiss and about the same number of Papal Italian troops of the line could be used in the open field, the rest being irregulars. Nugent's reserve army, which had been formed in April on the Isonzo, easily broke through these troops and joined Radetzky near Verona on May 25, almost 20,000 strong. Now at last the old field marshal could go beyond passive defence. In order to relieve Peschiera, which the Piedmontese were besieging, and to give himself more freedom of action, he made the celebrated flanking march to Mantua with his entire army (May 27), then from here debouched on the right bank of the Mincio on the 29th, stormed

the enemy line on the Curtatone and pressed on towards Goito on the 30th, in the rear and on the flank of the Italians. But Peschiera fell on the same day; the weather turned unfavourable and Radetzky did not yet feel himself strong enough for a decisive battle. So on June 4 he marched back through Mantua again to the Adige, sent the reserve corps to Verona and with the rest of his troops moved via Legnago against Vicenza, which Durando had fortified and occupied with 17,000 men. On the 10th he attacked Vicenza with 30,000 men; on the 11th Durando capitulated, after a stout resistance. The Second Army Corps (d'Aspre) conquered Padua, the Upper Brenta valley and the Venetian mainland in general and then followed the First Corps to Verona; a second reserve army under Welden came up from the Isonzo. During this time and until the end of the campaign the Piedmontese, with superstitious obstinacy, concentrated all their attention on the Rivoli plateau which, since Napoleon's victory, they seem to have regarded as the key to Italy but which had lost its importance by 1848 since the Austrians had restored safe communication with the Tyrol through the Vallarsa and in particular had reestablished direct connection with Vienna across the Isonzo. At the same time something had to be done against Mantua, and so a block was set up on the right bank of the Mincio—an operation that could not have had any other purpose than to document the perplexity prevailing in the Piedmontese camp, to disperse the army all along the eight-mile stretch from Rivoli to Borgoforte and into the bargain to split it into two halves by the Mincio, halves which could not support each other.

When the attempt was now made to blockade Mantua on the left bank as well, Radetzky, who had got 12,000 of Welden's troops in the interim, decided to break through the Piedmontese in their weakened centre and then defeat the assembling forces separately. On July 22 he ordered Rivoli to be attacked, and the Piedmontese evacuated it on the 23rd; on the 23rd he himself started from Verona with 40,000 men against the position of Sona and Sommacampagna, which was defended by only 14,000 Piedmontese, took it, and thereby broke the entire enemy front. The Piedmontese left wing was completely driven back over the Mincio on the 24th, and the right wing, which had reformed in the meantime and was advancing on the Austrians, was defeated at Custoza on the 25th; on the 26th the entire Austrian army crossed the Mincio and defeated the Piedmontese once again at Volta. This ended the campaign; the Piedmontese withdrew behind the Ticino almost without any resistance.

This brief account of the 1848 campaign is better proof than any theoretical reasoning could give of the strength of the position on the Mincio and the Adige. Once the Piedmontese had entered the quadrilateral between the four fortresses, they had to detach so many troops that their offensive power was thereby broken, as the battle of Santa Lucia shows, while Radetzky, as soon as his first reinforcements arrived, could move between the fortresses with complete freedom, base himself now on Mantua and then on Verona, threaten the rear of the enemy on the right bank of the Mincio today and a few days later capture Vicenza and constantly hold the initiative in the campaign. The Piedmontese committed error after error, it is true; but it is precisely the strength of a position that puts the enemy in a quandary and almost compels him to make errors. Holding the individual fortresses in check, let alone besieging them, forces him to divide his forces and weaken his available offensive strength; the rivers compel him to repeat the division and make it more or less impossible for his various corps to come to each other's assistance. What forces would be needed to besiege Mantua so long as an army ready for action in the field could break out of the detached forts of Verona at any instant?

Mantua alone was able to hold up General Bonaparte's victorious army in 1797. Only twice did a fortress impede him: Mantua and, ten years later, Danzig. In the entire second part of the campaign of [1796 and] 1797: Castiglione, Medole, Calliano, Bassano, Arcole, Rivoli¹⁸⁹—everything revolves around Mantua, and only after this fortress had fallen did the victor venture to advance eastward and over the Isonzo. At that time Verona was not fortified; in 1848 only the circle of walls was completed on the right bank of the Adige at Verona, and the battle of Santa Lucia was fought on terrain where Austrian redoubts were put up immediately thereafter, and permanent detached forts subsequently; only as a result of this did the fortified camp of Verona become the core, the citadel of the entire position, which thus gained enormously in strength.

It will be seen that we have no intention of impugning the importance of the Mincio line. But let us not forget: This line only became important when Austria began waging war in Italy on its own account and the line of communication Bolzano-Innsbruck-Munich was pushed into the background by the Treviso-Klagenfurt-Vienna line. And for Austria, as presently constituted, possession of the Mincio line is indeed a matter of life and death. Austria as an independent state, which wishes to operate as a European great power independent also of Germany, must either

control the Mincio and the Lower Po or abandon defence of the Tyrol; otherwise the Tyrol would be outflanked on both sides and linked to the rest of the Empire only by the Toblach Pass (the road from Salzburg to Innsbruck goes through Bavaria). Now the opinion is held by elderly military men that the Tyrol has great defensive capacities and controls both the Danube and the Po basins. But this opinion is based entirely on fantasy and has never been confirmed by experience, for an insurrectional war, as in 1809,¹⁹⁰ proves nothing for the operations of a regular army.

The source of this opinion is Bülow; he expresses it, among other places, in his history of the Hohenlinden¹⁹¹ and Marengo campaigns. A copy of the French translation of this book, belonging to Emmett, an English engineer officer assigned to St. Helena while Napoleon was a prisoner there, came into the hands of the exiled general in 1819. He made copious marginal notes in it and Emmett had the book reprinted in 1831 with Napoleon's notes.^a

Napoleon obviously started reading the book in a favourable frame of mind. At Bülow's proposal to break all the infantry up into skirmishers, he remarks benevolently: "De l'ordre, toujours de l'ordre—les tirailleurs doivent toujours être soutenus par les lignes."^b Then we have a few times: "Bien—c'est bien"^c and again: "Bien." But from the twentieth page on it gets to be too much for Napoleon when he sees the unfortunate Bülow working his head off, with rare futility and clumsiness, to explain all the vicissitudes of warfare by his theory of eccentric withdrawals and concentric attacks, and rob the most masterful moves of their meaning by schoolboyish interpretation. First a few: "Mauvais—cela est mauvais—mauvais principe",^d and then: "Cela n'est pas vrai—absurde—mauvais plan bien dangereux—restez unis si vous voulez vaincre—il ne faut jamais séparer son armée par un fleuve—tout cet échafaudage est absurde",^e etc. And when Napoleon finds that Bülow keeps on praising bad operations and condemning good ones, that he attributes the silliest motives to

^a A. H. D. Bülow, *Der Feldzug von 1800, militärisch-politisch betrachtet von dem Verfasser des Geistes des neuern Kriegssystems*, Berlin, 1801; *Histoire de la campagne de 1800, en Allemagne et en Italie*, Paris, s. a., and *Histoire des Campagnes de Hohenlinden et de Marengo. Contenant les notes que Napoléon fit sur cet ouvrage en 1819, à St. Hélène. Le tout mis en ordre et publié par Brevet Major Emmett*, Londres, 1831.—*Ed.*

^b "Order, always order—skirmishers should always be supported by troops of the line."—*Ed.*

^c "Good—this is good."—*Ed.*

^d "Bad—this is bad—bad principle."—*Ed.*

^e "This is not true—absurd—bad plan, very dangerous—stay united if you want to win—one should never separate one's army by a river—all this scaffolding is absurd."—*Ed.*

generals and gives them the most comical advice, and finally that he wants to do away with the bayonet and arm the second line of the infantry with lances, he cries out: "Bavardage inintelligible, quel absurde bavardage, quelle absurdité, quel misérable bavardage, quelle ignorance de la guerre."^a

Bülow here reproaches the Austrian Danube army under Kray for going to Ulm instead of to the Tyrol. The Tyrol, he said, that impregnable bastion of rocks and mountains, dominates both Bavaria and a part of Lombardy if it is occupied by enough troops (Napoleon: "On n'attaque pas les montagnes, pas plus le Tirol que la Suisse, on les observe et on les tourne par les plaines"^b). Then Bülow reproaches Moreau for letting himself be held up by Kray at Ulm, instead of leaving him there and conquering the Tyrol, which was weakly held: Conquest of the Tyrol would have overthrown the Austrian monarchy (Napoleon: "Absurde, quand même le Tirol eût été ouvert, il ne fallait pas y entrer"^c).

After finishing reading the book, Napoleon characterised the system of eccentric withdrawals and concentric attacks and the control of the plains by the mountains in the following words: "Si vous voulez apprendre la manière de faire battre une armée supérieure par une armée inférieure, étudiez les maximes de cet écrivain; vous aurez des idées sur la science de la guerre, il vous prescrit le contre-pied de ce qu'il faut enseigner."^d

Napoleon repeated, three or four times, the warning: "Il ne faut jamais attaquer les pays des montagnes."^e This fear of the mountains obviously dates from his later years, when his armies had reached such colossal size and were tied down to the plains by reasons of supply and tactical development. Spain¹⁹² and the Tyrol may also have contributed to this. Formerly he had not been so afraid of mountains. The first half of his campaign of 1796 was all fought in the mountains, and in the following years Masséna and Macdonald proved adequately that even in mountain warfare—and precisely there more than anywhere else—great things can be accomplished with small forces. But in general it is clear that our

^a "Unintelligible chatter, what absurd chatter, what an absurdity, what miserable chatter, what ignorance of war."—*Ed.*

^b "One does not attack mountains, neither the Tyrol nor Switzerland, one keeps them under observation and goes around them by the plains."—*Ed.*

^c "Absurd, even if the Tyrol had been open, it should not have been entered."—*Ed.*

^d "If you want to learn how to have a stronger army defeated by a weaker army, study this writer's maxims; you will have ideas on the science of war, he prescribes the opposite of what should be taught."—*Ed.*

^e "Mountain countries should never be attacked."—*Ed.*

modern armies can develop their power best in the mixed terrain of plains and foothills, and that a theory is false that prescribes throwing a large army into high mountain regions—not in transit but to take up permanent positions there—so long as there are free-lying plains like those of Bavaria and Lombardy on either side, in which the war can be decided. How long can an army of 150,000 men be fed in the Tyrol? How soon would hunger drive them down into the plain, where in the meantime the enemy would have been given time to dig in and where they could be forced to fight under the most unfavourable circumstances? And where in the narrow valleys could they find a position in which they could develop their entire strength?

Once Austria no longer controlled the Mincio and the Adige, the Tyrol would be a lost position, which it would have to give up as soon as it was attacked either from the north or the south. For Germany, the Tyrol flanks Lombardy up to the Adda by means of its passes; for an Austria acting separately, Lombardy and Venetia up to the Brenta outflank the Tyrol. The Tyrol is only tenable for Austria when it is shielded by Bavaria in the north and possession of the Mincio line in the south. The establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine¹⁹³ made it impossible for Austria by itself to make a serious defence of both the Tyrol and Venetia, and thus it was quite consistent for Napoleon to detach both provinces from Austria in the Treaty of Pressburg.¹⁹⁴

For Austria, therefore, possession of the Mincio line with Peschiera and Mantua is an absolute necessity. For Germany as a whole, possession of it is not at all necessary, although still a great military advantage. What this advantage is, is obvious: simply that it ensures us, in advance, a strong position in the plain of Lombardy, one that we do not have first to conquer, and that it rounds out our defensive position comfortably while significantly supporting our offensive power.

But what if Germany does not hold the Mincio line?

Let us assume that all of Italy is independent, unified and allied with France for an offensive war against Germany. It follows from everything we have said so far that in that event the operational and withdrawal line of the Germans would be not Vienna-Klagenfurt-Treviso but Munich-Innsbruck-Bolzano and Munich-Füssen-Finstermünz-Glorenza, and that their débouchés on the plain of Lombardy lie between the Val Sugana and the Swiss border. Where then is the decisive point of attack? Obviously, that part of Upper Italy that affords communication of the peninsula with Piedmont and France, the Middle Po from Alessandria to Cremona. But the

passes between Lake Garda and Lake Como are quite sufficient to provide the Germans with access to that region and keep open a way of retreat on the same route or, if the worst comes to the worst, over the Stelvio Pass. In that case fortresses on the Mincio and the Adige, which we have assumed to be in the hands of the Italians, would lie far off from the decisive field of battle. Occupation of the entrenched camp of Verona with suitable forces sufficient for an offensive would only be a useless dispersion of the enemy troops. Or is it expected that the Italians massed on the beloved Rivoli plateau would deny the Adige valley to the Germans? Since the Stelvio road (over the Stelvio Pass) has been built, the outlet from the Adige valley has lost much of its importance. But assuming that Rivoli should once more be the key to Italy and that the Germans should be drawn strongly enough by the power of attraction of the Italian army stationed there to make the attack—what purpose would Verona serve in that case? It does not blockade the Adige valley, or else the march of the Italians to Rivoli would be pointless. Peschiera is sufficient to cover a withdrawal in the event of defeat; it provides a safe crossing over the Mincio and so ensures a further advance to Mantua or Cremona. Massing the entire Italian striking force between the four fortresses, perhaps to wait for the French to arrive there, and refusing to be provoked into fighting, would split the forces opposed to us at the very outset of the campaign and would enable us first to move concentrated forces against the French along the line of their join-up and after defeating them to undertake the somewhat tedious process of dislodging the Italians from their fortifications. A country like Italy, whose national army is confronted at any successful attack from the north and east with the dilemma of choosing between Piedmont and the peninsula as its base of operations, must obviously have its major defensive facilities in the region where its army may encounter this dilemma. Here the confluences of the Ticino and the Adda with the Po constitute points of support. General von Willisen (*Italienischer Feldzug des Jahres 1848*) wanted both points to be fortified by the Austrians. Apart from the fact that this will not work, if only for the reason that the land needed does not belong to them (at Cremona the right bank of the Po is Parmesan and at Piacenza they have only garrison rights), both points are too far forward for a major defensive position in a country in which the Austrians would be surrounded by insurrections in any war; furthermore, Willisen, who can never see two rivers join without straightaway making plans for a great entrenched camp, forgets that neither the Ticino nor the Adda are defensible lines and so, even according to his own views, do

not cover the region behind them. But what would be useless expenditure for the Austrians is undoubtedly a good position for the Italians. For them, the Po is the principal line of defence; the Pizzighettone-Cremona-Piacenza triangle, with Alessandria to the left and Mantua to the right, would provide effective defence of this line and enable the army either to wait in security for the arrival of distant allies or if need be to advance offensively in the decisive plain between the Sesia and the Adige.

General von Radowitz said in the Frankfurt National Assembly: If Germany no longer held the Mincio line, it would be placed in the same position in which it would be today after an entire unsuccessful campaign. The war would then be fought immediately on German soil; it would begin on the Isonzo and in the Italian Tyrol and all of South Germany up to Bavaria would be outflanked, so that the war even in Germany would have to be fought on the Isar rather than on the Upper Rhine.

General von Radowitz seems to have evaluated the military knowledge of his public accurately enough. It is true that if Germany gives up the Mincio line, it gives up as much, in terrain and positions, as an entire successful campaign might bring the French and Italians. But that does not signify that Germany would thereby be put in the position in which an unsuccessful campaign would put it. Or is a strong, intact German army which assembles at the Bavarian foot of the Alps and marches over the Tyrolean passes to invade Lombardy in the same situation as an army ruined and demoralised by an unsuccessful campaign and fleeing towards the Brenner, pursued by the enemy? Are the chances of a successful offensive from a position that in many respects dominates the point of juncture of the French and Italians equal to the chances that a defeated army has to get its artillery over the Alps? We conquered Italy much more often before we had the Mincio line than since we have had it; who can doubt that we can perform the trick again if need be?

As for the point that without the Mincio line the war would at once be shifted to Bavaria and Carinthia, that too is incorrect. The upshot of our entire exposition is that without the Mincio line, defence of the southern border of Germany can *only* be conducted *offensively*. One reason for that is the mountainous nature of the border provinces of Germany, which cannot serve as a decisive battlefield; another is the favourable position of the Alpine passes. The battlefield lies in the plains in front of them. There is where we have to descend, and no power on earth can prevent us from doing so. It is hard to conceive of any more favourable prelude to

an offensive than that available to us here in the most unfavourable case of a Franco-Italian alliance. It can be strengthened by improving the Alpine roads and fortifying the road junctions in the Tyrol enough, if not to hold up the enemy entirely in the event of a retreat, at least to compel him to detach strong contingents to guard his communications. So far as the roads through the Alps are concerned, all the wars in the Alps prove that most of the unpaved main roads and many bridle-paths are practicable for all classes of arms without excessive difficulty. Under these circumstances it should be possible to organise a German offensive into Lombardy in such a way as to have every prospect of success. We could still be beaten, to be sure; and then we should have the case that Radowitz speaks of. In that case, what about the exposure of Vienna and the outflanking of Bavaria through the Tyrol?

In the first place, it is clear that no enemy battalion would dare to cross the Isonzo until the German army of the Tyrol has been completely and irrevocably thrown back over the Brenner. Once Bavaria is the German operational base against Italy, from that moment on a Franco-Italian offensive in the direction of Vienna is purposeless; it would be a futile dispersion of forces. Even if Vienna were such a vital centre that it would be worth devoting the main power of the enemy army to conquer it, that proves only that Vienna must be fortified. Napoleon's 1797 campaign and the invasions of Italy and Germany in 1805 and 1809 could have turned out very badly for the French if Vienna had been fortified. An offensive that has been carried forward to such distances always runs the risk of seeing its last forces smashed before a fortified capital city. And even assuming that the enemy had thrown the German army back over the Brenner, what a degree of superiority would be required to make it possible to draw off an effective force against Inner Austria!

But what about the outflanking of all South Germany through Italy? In point of fact, if Lombardy flanks Germany as far as Munich, how far does Germany outflank Italy? At least as far as Milan and Pavia. So far, then, the chances are equal. But because of the much greater width of Germany, an army on the Upper Rhine which is "outflanked" from Italy towards Munich does not for that reason need to withdraw at once. An entrenched camp in Upper Bavaria or a temporarily fortified Munich could receive the defeated army of the Tyrol and soon bring the offensive of the pursuing enemy to a halt, while the army of the Upper Rhine would have the choice of basing itself on Ulm and Ingolstadt or

on the Main, that is, at worst it would have to change its base of operations. In Italy, on the other hand, it is entirely different. If an Italian army is outflanked via the Tyrolean passes in the west, it need only be driven from its fortresses and all Italy is won. In a war against France and Italy together, Germany always has several armies, at least three, and victory or defeat will depend on the aggregate result of all three campaigns. Italy has space for only one army; any division would be a mistake; and if this one army is wiped out, Italy has been conquered. For a French army in Italy, communication with France is vital under any and all conditions; and so long as this line of communication is not limited to the Col di Tenda and Genoa, its flank is exposed to the Germans in the Tyrol—and all the more so, the further the French advance into Italy. The possibility of a penetration of Bavaria through the Tyrol by the French and Italians must, to be sure, be guarded against once *German* wars are waged again in Italy and the base of operations is shifted from Austria to Bavaria. But with suitable fortifications in the modern sense, with the fortresses being there for the sake of the armies, not the armies for the sake of the fortresses, the spearhead of this invasion can be broken much more easily than that of a German invasion of Italy. And therefore we need not have any nightmares about this so-called "outflanking" of all South Germany. An enemy that outflanked a German army on the Upper Rhine through Italy and the Tyrol would have to advance to the Baltic before he could gather the fruits of this outflanking. Napoleon's march from Jena to Stettin¹⁹⁵ would be hard to repeat in the direction from Munich to Danzig.

We have no intention of denying that Germany yields a very strong defensive position if it gives up the line of the Adige and the Mincio. But we completely deny that this position is *necessary* for the security of the German southern frontier. If we proceed from the assumption, as the advocates of the opposite view seem to do, that a German army will always be defeated, wherever it makes its appearance, then it may be possible to imagine that the Adige, the Mincio and the Po are absolutely necessary for us. But in that case nothing would be of any use, really; neither fortresses nor armies would avail, and the best thing we could do would be to go at once under the Caudine Forks.¹⁹⁶ We have a different opinion of Germany's military power, and that makes us quite content to see our southern frontier secured by the advantages for an offensive on Lombard soil that that frontier affords.

Here, however, political considerations come into play which we cannot ignore. Since 1820¹⁹⁷ the national movement in Italy has

emerged from every defeat rejuvenated and more powerful. There are few countries whose so-called natural frontiers coincide so closely with the frontiers of nationality, and are at the same time so clearly marked. Once the national movement has become strong in such a country, which moreover has twenty-five million inhabitants, it can no longer rest so long as one of the best, and politically and militarily most important, parts of the country, with almost a quarter of the population, is under anti-national foreign domination. Ever since 1820 Austria has ruled in Italy by force alone, by suppressing repeated insurrections, by the terrorism of the state of siege. In order to maintain its domination in Italy, Austria is compelled to treat its political opponents, that is, every Italian who regards himself as an Italian, worse than common criminals. The manner in which Italian political prisoners have been treated by Austria, and to some extent still are being treated, is something unheard of in civilised countries. The Austrians have taken particular delight in trying to degrade political offenders in Italy by flogging them, either to extort confessions or under the pretext of punishment. Streams of moral indignation have been poured out over the Italian stiletto, over political assassination, but it seems to have been entirely forgotten that it was Austrian floggings that provoked it. The means that Austria has to use to maintain its rule in Italy are the best possible proof that this rule cannot endure; and Germany, which despite Radowitz, Willisen and Hailbronner does not have the same interest in it that Austria has—Germany must ask itself whether that interest is important enough to outweigh the many disadvantages it entails.

Upper Italy is an appendage that, under any conditions, can be of use to Germany only in war, but in peace can only harm it. The armies required to hold it down have kept growing larger since 1820, and since 1848, in a time of deepest peace, exceed 70,000 men, who are always as if in enemy country, expecting an attack at any moment. The war of 1848 and 1849 and the occupation of Italy down to the present time—despite the Piedmontese war indemnity, despite the repeated Lombard indemnities, forced loans and special taxes—have obviously cost Austria much more than Italy has brought in since 1848. And this despite the fact that from 1848 to 1854 the country has systematically been treated as a mere temporary possession to be drained of everything that can be got out of it before leaving. Since the Oriental war Lombardy has been in a less abnormal status for a few years; and how long will that last with today's complications and with Italian national feeling pulsating so strongly again?

Much more important, however: Does possession of Lombardy outweigh all the hatred, all the fanatical hostility, that it has brought us throughout Italy? Does it outweigh the complicity in the procedures by which Austria—in the name and on behalf of Germany, as we are assured—maintains its rule there? Does it outweigh the continual meddling in the internal affairs of the rest of Italy, without which, according to previous practice and Austrian assurances, Lombardy cannot be held, and which makes the Italians' hatred of us Germans even fiercer? In all our military discussions above, we have always assumed the worst possible case, an alliance between France and Italy. As long as we hold Lombardy, Italy will certainly be France's ally in any French war against Germany. As soon as we leave it, that will no longer be true. Is it really in our interest to hold four fortresses and thereby ensure that 25 million Italians will hate us fanatically and ally themselves with the French?

The disingenuous chatter about the political incompetence of the Italians and their calling to be under German or French domination, and the various speculations as to the possibility or impossibility of a unified Italy, sound a bit strange to us on the lips of Germans. How long is it since *we*, the great German nation, with twice as many people as the Italians, have escaped the "calling" to be either under French or Russian domination? And have today's realities solved the question of the unity or disunity of Germany? Are we not today in all likelihood on the eve of events that will mature the question of deciding our future in both directions? Have we completely forgotten Napoleon in Erfurt or the Austrian appeal to Russia at the Warsaw conferences or the battle of Bronzell?¹⁹⁸

We will grant for the moment that Italy must be under either German or French influence. In that case, the decisive factor is, in addition to particular sympathies, the military-geographical position of the two influencing countries. We will assume that the military forces of France and Germany are of equal strength, although obviously Germany could be far stronger. But now we believe we have proved that even in the most favourable case, that is, if the Valais and the Simplon Pass were open to the French, their immediate military influence would extend only to Piedmont and they would have to win a battle before extending that influence to further areas, whereas our influence extends to all of Lombardy and the point of junction between Piedmont and the peninsula and we would first have to be defeated to deprive us of that influence. But where such a geographical basis for domina-

tion exists, the influence of Germany has nothing to fear from French competition.

Recently, General Hailbronner said in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* something like the following: Germany is called to other things than to act as a lightning-conductor for the thunderbolts that are collecting over the head of the Bonaparte dynasty.^a The Italians could say with equal justification: Italy is called to other things than to serve as a buffer for Germany against French blows, and to get flogged by the Austrians in lieu of thanks. But if Germany has an interest in having such a buffer there, it would in any case be served much better by being on good terms with Italy, doing justice to the national movement, and leaving Italian affairs to the Italians so long as they do not interfere in German affairs. Radowitz's assertion that France would necessarily rule in Upper Italy tomorrow if Austria departed today was just as baseless at the time as it was three months ago; as things stand today, this assertion seems to be wanting to become true, but in a sense opposite to that of Radowitz. If the twenty-five million Italians cannot assert their independence, the two million Danes, the four million Belgians, the three million Dutch can do so even less. Nevertheless, we do not hear the defenders of German domination in Italy bemoan French or Swedish domination in those other countries or demand that it be replaced by German rule.

So far as the question of unity is concerned, our opinion is: Either Italy can be unified, and then it has a policy of its own, which of necessity will be neither German nor French and hence cannot be more harmful to us than to the French; or it remains divided, and then the division will assure us allies in Italy in any war with France.

In any event, this much is sure: Whether we have Lombardy or not, we shall always have considerable influence in Italy *so long as we are strong at home*. If we leave it to Italy to manage its own affairs, the Italians' hatred of us will come to an end automatically, and our natural influence on Italy will be much greater in any case and, eventually, rise to actual hegemony. Instead of seeking our strength in the possession of foreign soil and the oppression of a foreign nationality, whose future only prejudice can deny, we should do better to see to it that we *are united and strong in our own house*.

^a "Zur innern Politik des französischen Kaiserreichs. I. (Beschluss)", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 53 (supplement), February 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

III

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If we demand the Po and the Mincio for protection not so much against the Italians as against the French, we should not be surprised if the French likewise claim river lines for protection against us.

France's centre of gravity does not lie on the Loire at Orléans but in the north, on the Seine, in Paris; and experience has twice proved that if Paris falls, all France falls.¹⁹⁹ Accordingly, the military significance of the configuration of France's frontiers is determined primarily by the protection they afford Paris.

Straight lines from Paris to Lyons, Basle, Strasbourg and Lauterbourg are about the same length, some fifty-five miles; but any invasion of France from Italy aimed at Paris must advance between the Rhône and Loire in the Lyons area, or further north, if its communications are not to be endangered. Consequently, France's Alpine frontier, south of Grenoble, is out of the question in connection with an advance on Paris; on this side Paris is fully covered.

At Lauterbourg the French frontier leaves the Rhine at a right angle and runs northwest; from Lauterbourg to Dunkirk it forms almost a straight line. The arc that we drew using Paris-Lyons as radius and passing through Basle and Strasbourg to Lauterbourg is broken at this point; the northern frontier of France is more like the chord to this arc, and the segment of the circle lying outside this chord does not belong to France. The shortest line from Paris to the northern border, Paris-Mons, is only half as long as the Paris-Lyons or Paris-Strasbourg radius.

These simple geometrical relationships explain why Belgium must be the battlefield of every war fought in the north between

Germany and France. Belgium outflanks all Eastern France from Verdun and the Upper Marne to the Rhine. That is to say: An army invading from Belgium can reach Paris sooner than a French army stationed between Verdun or Chaumont and the Rhine; the army advancing from Belgium can therefore, if its offensive is successful, always drive a wedge between Paris and the French army of the Moselle or the Rhine; and all the more so since the way from the Belgian border to the points on the Marne that are decisive for the flanking action (Meaux, Château-Thierry, Epernay) is even shorter than the road to Paris itself.

Not only that. Along the entire line from the Meuse to the sea the terrain does not offer an enemy the slightest obstacle on the way to Paris until he comes to the Aisne and the Lower Oise, the courses of which, however, are rather unfavourable to the defence of Paris against attack from the north. They did not present any serious difficulties to the offensive either in 1814 or 1815. But even conceding that they can be integrated into the defensive system of the Seine and its tributaries and were in part so integrated in 1814, that in itself is a confirmation of the fact that the real defence of Northern France only begins at Compiègne and Soissons and that the first defensive position protecting Paris from the north is only twelve miles from Paris.

It is hard to imagine a weaker state frontier than the French frontier with Belgium. We know how Vauban laboured to make good the lack of natural means of defence by artificial ones; we also know how in 1814 and 1815 the attack went through the triple ring of fortresses almost without noticing it. We know how in 1815 fortress after fortress fell to the attacks of a single Prussian corps after incredibly brief siege and bombardment. Avesnes surrendered on June 22, 1815 after being shelled by ten field howitzers for half a day. Guise surrendered to ten field guns without firing a shot. Maubeuge capitulated on July 13 after 14 days of open approach trenches. Landrecies opened its gates on July 21 after 36 hours of open approach trenches and two hours of shelling, after only 126 bombs and 52 round shot had been fired by the besiegers. Mariembourg required, only *pro forma*, the honours of an open approach trench and a single twenty-four-pound ball and capitulated on July 28. Philippeville held out for two days of open approach trenches and a few hours of shelling. Rocroi 26 hours of open trenches and two hours of bombardment. Only Mézières held out for 18 days after the trenches were opened. There was a rage to capitulate among the commanders,

not much weaker than in Prussia after the battle of Jena; and if it is argued that these places were out of repair in 1815, weakly garrisoned and badly equipped, it should not be forgotten that with some exceptions these fortresses must *always* be neglected. Vauban's triple ring has no value today; it is a positive hindrance to France. None of the fortresses west of the Meuse protects any sector of the terrain by itself, and nowhere can four or five be found which form a group within which an army is protected and at the same time retains its ability to manoeuvre. The reason is that none of the fortresses is located on a large river. The Lys, the Scheldt and the Sambre only become important militarily on Belgian soil, and hence the action of these fortresses scattered in the open field does not extend beyond the range of their artillery. Except for a few large supply depots at the border which could serve as bases for an offensive into Belgium, and some points of strategic importance on the Meuse and Moselle, all the other strong points and forts on France's northern frontier have no effect beyond a quite useless scattering of forces. Any government that razed them would do France a service; but what would French traditional superstition say to that?

Thus, France's northern frontier is highly unfavourable for defence; in fact it is indefensible, and Vauban's ring of fortresses, instead of reinforcing it, is today only a confession of and monument to its weakness.

Like the Central European great-power theoreticians in Italy, the French too look beyond their northern frontier for a river line that could provide them with a good defensive position. What could it be?

The first line at hand would be that of the Lower Scheldt and the Dyle, continued to where the Sambre joins the Meuse. This line would give the better part of Belgium to France. It would comprise within itself almost all the famous Belgian battlefields on which Frenchmen and Germans have fought each other: Oudenarde, Jemappes, Fleurus, Ligny, Waterloo.²⁰⁰ But it still would not make a line of defence; it would leave a great gap between the Scheldt and the Meuse, through which the enemy could pass without hindrance.

The second line would be the Meuse itself. If France held the left bank of the Meuse, its position would not be even as favourable as that of Germany in Italy if we had only the line of the Adige. The Adige line is fairly well rounded out, that of the Meuse very incompletely. If it flowed from Namur to Antwerp, it would make a much better frontier. Instead, it runs northeast

from Namur and only after passing Venlo flows to the North Sea in a great arc.

In wartime the entire region north of Namur between the Meuse and the sea would only be covered by its fortresses; for an enemy crossing of the Meuse would always find the French army in the South Brabant plain, and a French offensive on the German left bank of the Rhine would immediately come up against the strong Rhine line, and quite directly against the entrenched camp of Cologne. The receding angle of the Meuse between Sedan and Liège contributes to making the line weaker, even though the angle is filled by the Ardennes. Thus, the line of the Meuse gives the French too much for good defence of the frontier at one point, and too little at the others. Let us continue.

If we put one point of our compasses on Paris on the map and, with Paris-Lyons as our radius, describe an arc from Basle to the North Sea, we find that the course of the Rhine *from Basle to its mouth* follows *this arc* remarkably accurately. Within a few miles, all the important points on the Rhine are equally distant from Paris. *This is the actual, real reason for the French desire for the Rhine boundary.*

If France has the Rhine, then Paris will, with respect to Germany, really be the centre of France. All the radii from Paris to the attackable frontiers, whether on the Rhine or in the Jura, have the same length. At every point the enemy is faced by the convex periphery of the circle and must manoeuvre on detours behind it, while the French armies move on the shorter chord and can forestall the enemy. The equal lengths of the operational and withdrawal lines of the several armies make concentric withdrawal much easier, rendering it possible to combine two of these armies at a given point for a massive blow at the still divided enemy.

Possession of the Rhine frontier would make France's defensive system, so far as the *natural* preconditions are concerned, one of those that General Willisen calls "ideal", one that leaves nothing to be desired. The strong inner defensive system of the Seine basin, which is formed by the Yonne, Aube, Marne, Aisne and Oise rivers flowing like a fan into the Seine, and on which Napoleon gave the Allies such harsh lessons in strategy in 1814,²⁰¹ is thus first given uniform protection in every direction; the enemy will reach it at much the same time from any side and can be held at the rivers until the French armies are in a position to attack each isolated enemy column with united forces; whereas without the Rhine line, the defence can only make a stand at the most decisive point, at Compiègne and Soissons, only twelve miles from Paris.

There is no other region in Europe in which defence would be supported by railways in rapidly concentrating large forces so much as in the country between the Seine and the Rhine. Railways radiate from Paris as a centre to Boulogne, Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, Maastricht, Liège and Cologne, to Mannheim and Mainz via Metz, to Strasbourg, to Basle, to Dijon and Lyons. At whatever point the enemy can be present in greatest strength, the entire strength of the reserve army can be thrown against him by railway from Paris. In particular, the inner defence of the Seine basin is reinforced even more by the fact that all the railway radii within it run through the river valleys (the Oise, the Marne, the Seine, the Aube, in part the Yonne). But that is not all. Three concentric arcs of railways run at roughly equal distances from Paris for a quadrant or more in length: the first is the set of lines on the left bank of the Rhine, which now run almost without a break from Neuss to Basle; the second goes from Ostend and Antwerp through Namur, Arlon, Thionville, Metz and Nancy to Epinal, and is also as good as complete; lastly the third extends from Calais via Lille, Douai, St. Quentin, Rheims, Châlons-sur-Marne and St. Dizier to Chaumont. Here everywhere the means are available to concentrate masses of troops at any given point in the shortest time, and nature and skill, without any fortifications, would make the defence so strong by reason of manoeuvrability that an invasion of France would come up against a much different resistance than in 1814 and 1815.

The Rhine would have only one defect as a frontier river. As long as one bank is all German and the other all French, the river is not dominated by either of the two countries. A stronger army, of whichever nation, could nowhere be denied crossing; we have seen that a hundred times, and strategy explains why it must be so. In the face of a German offensive with superior forces the French defence could only call a halt further back: the army of the north on the Meuse between Venlo and Namur; the army of the Moselle on the Moselle, perhaps at the confluence with the Saar; the army of the Upper Rhine on the Upper Moselle and the Upper Meuse. In order to dominate the Rhine fully and be able to oppose an enemy crossing energetically, the French would therefore have to have bridgeheads on the right bank. It was therefore very logical on Napoleon's part that he summarily incorporated Wesel, Kastel and Kehl into the French Empire. As things stand today, his nephew would ask, as a complement to the fine fortresses the Germans have built for him on the left bank of the Rhine, for Ehrenbreitstein, Deutz and if need be the

Germersheim bridgehead as well. In that case France's military-geographical system would be complete for the offensive or the defensive, and any new annexation would only damage it. And how natural the system seems, how readily understandable, was strikingly shown by the Allies in 1813. France had set up the system only 17 years earlier, and yet it was so much taken for granted that the high Allies, despite their preponderance of strength and the defencelessness of France, shuddered at the thought of touching it, as if it were a sacrilege; and if they had not been carried along by the German nationalist elements of the movement, the Rhine would still be a French river today.

But if we should cede to the French not only the Rhine but also the bridgeheads on the right bank, the French would have fulfilled the duty to themselves that we are fulfilling to ourselves, as Radowitz, Willisen and Hailbronner see it, by holding the Adige and the Mincio with the Peschiera and Mantua bridgeheads. But therewith we would have made Germany as totally helpless *vis-à-vis* France as Italy is now *vis-à-vis* Germany. And then Russia, as in 1813, would be the natural "liberator" of Germany (as France or rather the French Government presents itself as the "liberator" of Italy now) and would only ask, in payment for its unselfish exertions, some small districts to round out Poland—say Galicia and Prussia; for Poland too is "outflanked" by them!

What the Adige and the Mincio are for us, the Rhine is for France, and much more vital. If Venetia in the hands of Italy, and possibly of France, flanks Bavaria and the Upper Rhine and uncovers the road to Vienna, so Belgium and Germany, via Belgium, flank all of Eastern France and uncover the road to Paris much more effectively. From the Isonzo to Vienna there are still sixty miles to go, in a terrain where the defence can still make a stand somehow; from the Sambre to Paris is thirty miles, and it is only twelve miles from Paris, at Soissons or Compiègne, that the defence has any sort of a protective river line. If, as Radowitz says, giving up the Mincio and the Adige would put Germany from the outset in a position it would otherwise reach after losing an entire campaign, France with its present frontiers is situated as though it had possessed the Rhine line and lost two campaigns, one around the Rhine and Meuse fortifications and the other in the field, on the Belgian plain. Even the strong position of the fortresses of Upper Italy is in a way repeated on the Lower Rhine and the Meuse; would it not be possible to make Maastricht, Cologne, Jülich, Wesel and Venlo, with a little assistance and a couple of intermediate points, into an equally strong system completely covering Belgium and

North Brabant that would enable a French army not strong enough for the open field to manoeuvre so as to hold a much stronger enemy army at the rivers and finally to use the railways to withdraw to the Belgian plain or to Douai without hindrance?

Throughout this study we have assumed that Belgium was completely open to the Germans for attacking France and was an ally of Germany. Since we had to argue from the French standpoint, we had the same right to that assumption as our opponents on the Mincio, when they assumed that Italy, even a free and united Italy, would always be hostile to the Germans. In all such matters it is quite correct to look into the worst case first and get prepared for it as a start; and that is how the French must go about it when considering the defensibility and strategic configuration of their northern frontier today. That Belgium is a neutral country according to European treaties, just like Switzerland, is something we may ignore here. In the first place, it remains to be proved by the actual course of history that in a European war this neutrality amounts to anything more than a sheet of paper, and secondly, France cannot by any means count on it so firmly that it could, militarily, treat the entire frontier with Belgium as if the country formed a protective arm of the sea between France and Germany. Ultimately, the weakness of the frontier remains the same whether it is really actively defended or whether troops are only dispatched there to occupy it against possible attacks.

We have drawn the parallel between the Po and the Rhine pretty closely. Apart from the larger dimensions at the Rhine, which however would only strengthen the French claim, the analogy is as complete as one could desire. It is to be hoped that in the event of war the German soldiers will defend the Rhine on the Po practically with greater success than the Central European great-power politicians do theoretically. They defend the Rhine on the Po, to be sure, but—*only for the French*.

As for the rest, in case the Germans should at some time be so unfortunate as to lose their “natural frontier”, the Po and the Mincio, we shall carry the analogy still further. The French possessed their “natural frontier” only seventeen years and by now have had to get along without it for almost forty-five years. During this time their best military men have come to realise, theoretically too, that the uselessness of the Vauban ring of fortresses against invasion is based on the laws of modern warfare, and hence that it was neither accident nor the *trahison*^a they like to

^a Betrayal.—Ed.

invoke that allowed the Allies in 1814 and 1815 to march through between the fortresses undisturbed. Hereafter it was even clearer that something had to be done to protect the exposed northern frontier. Obviously, though, there was no prospect of obtaining the Rhine frontier in the near future. What was to be done?

The French managed in a way that honours a great people: They fortified Paris; for the first time in modern history, they performed the experiment of converting their capital into an entrenched camp on a colossal scale. The military experts of the old school shook their heads over this unwise undertaking. Money thrown away for nothing but French swagger! Nothing behind it, pure humbug; who ever heard of a fortress nine miles in circumference and with a million inhabitants! How is it to be defended, unless half the army is thrown into it as garrison? How are all those people to get their provisions? Madness, French vanity, godless frivolity, a repetition of the Tower of Babel! That is how the military pedants judged the new undertaking, the same pedants who study siege warfare from a Vauban hexagon and whose passive method of defence knows no greater offensive counterblow than the sortie of a column of infantry from the covered way to the foot of the glacis! But the French kept on calmly building and have had the satisfaction that, even though Paris has not yet undergone the test of fire, the unpedianic military men of all Europe agree with them, that Wellington drew up plans for the fortification of London, that, if we are not mistaken, construction of detached forts around Vienna has already begun and the fortification of Berlin is at least under discussion. They themselves must have learned from the example of Sevastopol how tremendously strong a colossal entrenched camp is if it is occupied by an entire army and the defence is conducted offensively on a large scale. And Sevastopol had only a rampart, no detached forts, only field works, no walled escarpments!

Ever since Paris has been fortified, France can do without the Rhine frontier. Like Germany in Italy, it will have to conduct its defence on the northern border offensively at first. The arrangement of the railway network shows that this has been understood. If this offensive is repulsed, the army makes its stand, a definitive one, on the Oise and the Aisne; for further advance by the enemy would no longer serve any purpose, since the army of invasion from Belgium would be too weak by itself to act against Paris. Behind the Aisne, in solid communication with Paris, at worst behind the Marne, with its left wing supported on Paris, in an

offensive flanking position, the French northern army could await the arrival of the other armies. The enemy would have no alternative but to move on Château-Thierry and operate against the communications of the French Moselle and Rhine armies. But the action would be far from having the decisive importance it would have had before the Paris was fortified. At the worst, the withdrawal of the other French armies behind the Loire cannot be cut off; concentrated there, they will still be strong enough to be dangerous to an invasion army weakened and split by the investment of Paris, or to break through to Paris. In a word: The fortification of Paris has blunted the point of a flanking movement through Belgium; it is no longer decisive; and it is easy to calculate the disadvantages it entails and the means to be employed against it.

We should do well to follow the example of the French. Instead of letting ourselves be deafened by the outcry about the indispensability of a possession outside Germany, which becomes more and more untenable for Germany every day, we should do better to prepare ourselves for the inevitable moment when we give up Italy. The earlier we set up the fortifications that will then be needed, the better. To say more about where and how they are to be set up than the ideas previously suggested, is not our function. Only let us not put up illusory strong points and, relying on them, neglect the only fortifications that can enable a retreating army to make a stand: entrenched camps and groups of fortresses on rivers.

IV

By now we have seen where the theory of natural frontiers advanced by the Central European great-power politicians leads us. France has the same right to the Rhine that Germany has to the Po. If France should not annex nine million Walloons, Netherlanders and Germans in order to obtain a good military position, then neither have we the right to subject six million Italians for the sake of a military position. And this natural frontier, the Po, is after all only a military position and that is the only reason, we are told, why Germany should maintain it.

The theory of natural frontiers puts an end to the Schleswig-Holstein question with a single slogan: *Danmark til Eideren!* Denmark up to the Eider!²⁰² After all, what are the Danes asking but their *Po* and their *Mincio*, whose name is Eider, their Mantua, Friedrichstadt by name?

By the same right that Germany claims the Po, the theory of natural frontiers requires for Russia Galicia and Bukovina and a rounding out to the Baltic Sea, which includes at least the entire Prussian right bank of the Vistula. In a few years it could with equal right demand that the Oder be the natural frontier of Russian Poland.

The theory of natural frontiers, applied to Portugal, must extend that country to the Pyrenees and include all of Spain in Portugal.

The natural frontier of Reuss-Greiz-Schleiz-Lobenstein²⁰³ will likewise have to be extended at least to the border of the German Confederation and beyond that to the Po and perhaps to the Vistula, if the laws of eternal righteousness are to be carried out, and Reuss-Greiz-Schleiz-Lobenstein has as much claim to its rights as Austria has.

If the theory of natural frontiers, that is, frontiers based exclusively on military considerations, is correct, what shall we call the German diplomats who at the Congress of Vienna brought us to the brink of a war of Germans against Germans, lost us the Meuse line, exposed Germany's eastern frontier and left it to foreigners to set the borders of Germany and divide it? Truly, no country has so much reason to complain of the Congress of Vienna as Germany has; but if we apply the rule of natural frontiers, what does the reputation of the German statesmen of that time look like? And it is precisely the same people who defend the theory of natural frontiers on the Po that live on the legacy of the diplomats of 1815 and continue the tradition of the Congress of Vienna.

Would you like an instance?

When Belgium broke away from Holland in 1830,²⁰⁴ the same people who are now making the Mincio a question of life and death raised their voices. They raised a hue and cry over the dismemberment of the strong Dutch border power that was to have been a bulwark against France and in fact—what superstition remains after all the experiences of twenty years!—had to undertake to erect a thin band of fortresses to surround Vauban's ring of fortresses, which at least is an imposing example of its kind. As if the great powers feared that one fine day Arras and Lille and Douai and Valenciennes would march into Belgium, with all their bastions, demilunes and lunettes, and make themselves at home there! At that time the spokesmen for the same narrow-minded trend we are opposing moaned that Germany was in danger, since Belgium was nothing more than a helpless appendage of France, an inevitable enemy of Germany, and that the valuable fortresses built with German money (i.e., money taken from the French) to be a protection against the French are now open to the French against us. The French border had been advanced to the Meuse and the Scheldt, and beyond; how long would it take until it was pushed forward to the Rhine? Most of us still remember these lamentations very clearly. And what happened? Since 1848, and particularly since the Bonapartist restoration, Belgium has turned more and more resolutely away from France and towards Germany. By now it might even count as a foreign member of the German Confederation. And what did the Belgians do as soon as they got into a kind of opposition to France? They razed all the fortresses which the wisdom of the Congress of Vienna had imposed on the country, as being *completely useless against France*, and erected around Antwerp an

entrenched camp large enough to take in the entire army and enable it, in the event of a French invasion, to wait there for English or German help. And they were right.

The same wise policy that in 1830 wanted to keep Catholic, mainly French-speaking Belgium chained by force to Protestant, Dutch-speaking Holland, that same wise policy has sought since 1848 to keep Italy by force under Austrian oppression and make us Germans responsible for Austria's actions in Italy. And all this only through fear of the French. All the patriotism of these gentlemen seems to consist in falling into a state of feverish agitation as soon as France is mentioned. They seem never to have recovered from the blows the old Napoleon dealt them fifty and sixty years ago. We are certainly not among those who underestimate the military power of France. We know very well, for example, that so far as light infantry is concerned and experience and skill in waging a small war, and certain aspects of artillery, no army in Germany can compare with the French. But when people start throwing phrases around about Germany's twelve hundred thousand soldiers, as though those soldiers were standing there all ready and prepared like chessmen with which Doctor Kolb can play a game with France over Alsace and Lorraine²⁰⁵—and when these same people then tremble in their boots at anything that happens, as if it went without saying that those twelve hundred thousand men could not help being cut to pieces by half the number of Frenchmen, unless the said twelve hundred thousand slunk into impregnable positions—then it is really high time to lose patience. It is high time to remember, as against this policy of passive defence, that even if Germany may by and large depend on a defence with offensive counterblows, still no defence is more effective than an active, offensively conducted one. It is time to remember that we have often enough shown ourselves better in attack than the French and other nations.

"Moreover, it is the inherent nature of our soldiers to attack; and that is quite right,"

said Frederick the Great of his infantry^a; Rossbach, Zorndorf and Hohenfriedberg can testify as to how his cavalry could attack.²⁰⁶ How accustomed the German infantry of 1813 and 1814 was to being aggressive can be best seen from Blücher's well-known instructions for the beginning of the 1815 campaign:

^a Friedrich II, "Aus der Instruction für die Generalmajors von der Cavallerie (14. August 1748)." — Ed.

"Since experience has shown that the French army cannot stand up to the bayonet attacks of our massed battalions, the rule is always to make such attacks when the object is to overrun the enemy or take a position."

Our finest battles have been offensive battles, and if there is one definite quality of the French soldier that the German soldier is lacking, it is demonstrably the art of holding up defensively in villages and houses; in the attack the German compares well with the French soldier, and has shown that often enough.

As for the policy itself, apart from the motives underlying it, it consists of the following: First, under the pretext of defending alleged or absurdly exaggerated German interest, to make us hated by all the smaller countries on our borders, and then to be indignant that they tend more to attach themselves to France. It took five years of Bonapartist restoration to divorce Belgium from the French alliance into which the policy of 1815, continued in 1830, the policy of the Holy Alliance,²⁰⁷ had forced it; and in Italy we have created a position for the French that certainly outweighs the line of the Mincio. And yet the French policy towards Italy has always been narrow, selfish, exploitative, so that with any kind of honourable treatment on our part the Italians would unquestionably have been more on our side than on France's. It is well known how from 1796 to 1814 Napoleon and his governors and generals drained them of money, produce, art treasures and men. In 1814 the Austrians came as "liberators" and were greeted as liberators. (Just how they freed Italy is shown by the hatred that every Italian has for the *Tedeschi*^a today.) So much for the actual practice of French policy in Italy; as for the theory, we need only say that it has a *single* basic principle: *France can never tolerate a unified and independent Italy*. This principle has held good down to Louis Napoleon, and to make sure there is no misunderstanding, La Guéronnière has to proclaim it now once again as an eternal verity.^b And in the face of such a narrow-minded philistine policy on the part of France, a policy that claims the right to intervene at will in the internal affairs of Italy, in the face of such a policy do we Germans need to fear that an Italy no longer under direct German domination will always be an obedient servant of France against us? It is really laughable. It is the old hue and cry of 1830 over Belgium. For all that, Belgium came over to us, came unasked, and Italy would have to come to us in the same way.

It must also be kept definitely in mind that the question of the

^a Germans.—*Ed.*

^b [A. La Guéronnière,] *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie*, Paris, 1859.—*Ed.*

possession of Lombardy is a question between Italy and Germany, but not between Louis Napoleon and Austria. *Vis-à-vis* a third party like Louis Napoleon, a third party intervening in his own interest, which in other respects is anti-German, what it comes to is simply holding a province that will only be given up under compulsion, a military position that will only be abandoned if it can no longer be held. In this case the political question retreats immediately behind the military question; if we are attacked, we defend ourselves.

If Louis Napoleon wants to appear as Paladin of Italian independence, he can get along without a war against Austria. *Charité bien ordonnée commence chez soi-même.*^a The "department" of Corsica is an Italian island, Italian despite the fact that it is the fatherland of Bonapartism. If Louis Napoleon were first to cede Corsica to his uncle Victor Emmanuel, we might then be ready to talk. Until he has done that, he would be well advised to keep his enthusiasm for Italy to himself.

There is no power of any importance in Europe that has not incorporated parts of other nations into its territory. France has Flemish, German and Italian provinces. England, the only country that has really natural frontiers, has gone out beyond them in every direction, has made conquests in every country and is now in conflict with one of its dependencies, the Ionian Islands, just after putting down a colossal rebellion in India with authentically Austrian methods.²⁰⁸ Germany has half-Slavic provinces and Slavic, Magyar, Wallachian and Italian annexes. And over how many languages is the White Tsar in Petersburg master!

Nobody will venture to say that the map of Europe is definitively established. But any changes, if they are to endure, must increasingly tend by and large to give the big and viable European nations their *real* natural frontiers to be determined by language and fellow-feeling, while at the same time the remnants of peoples that can still be found here and there and that are no longer capable of national existence, remain incorporated into the larger nations and either merge into them or are conserved as merely ethnographic relics with no political significance.²⁰⁹ Military considerations can apply only secondarily.

But if the map of Europe is to be revised, we Germans have the right to demand that it be done thoroughly and impartially, and that Germany should not be asked, as has been the custom, to make all the sacrifices alone, while all the other nations benefit

^a Charity begins at home.—*Ed.*

without giving up anything whatever. We can do without a good deal that lies at our borders and involves us in matters in which we should do better not to meddle directly. But the same applies to others, in exactly the same way; let them show us the example of unselfishness, or be silent. But the sum and substance of this entire study is that we Germans would make a very good deal if we could trade the Po, the Mincio, the Adige and all the Italian rubbish for *unity*, which would protect us from a repetition of Warsaw and Bronzell, and which alone can make us strong internally and externally. If we have this unity, the defensive can come to an end. We shall no longer need any Mincio; "our inherent nature" will once more be "to attack"; and there are still some sore points where this will be necessary enough.

Karl Marx

PEACE OR WAR²¹⁰

We print elsewhere the recent article of the *Moniteur*,^a oracularly disclaiming on the part of its master and inspirer, Louis Napoleon, any purpose of plunging Europe into war,—an article which would seem to have inflated the Exchanges, and half dispelled the apprehensions of the Old World. Yet whoever reads carefully that article will find in it little warrant for the hopes which it has excited. Beyond the single assertion that the Emperor's engagements to the King of Sardinia extend no further than assurances of defense against Austrian aggression—assurances which Victor Emmanuel cannot have needed, at all events, since his troops were dispatched to reenforce those of France and England before Sevastopol—we see nothing more in this manifesto than a fresh insult to the public understanding. It virtually asks the world to forget, in the interest of the French usurper, that it was he, and not the newspapers, that alarmed and convulsed Europe by a gratuitous and ostentatious menace, addressed to Austria through her Ambassador,^b on the first day of the present year²¹¹—that his presses, his pamphleteers, his cousin,^c his armaments and purchases of *materiel*, have stimulated and diffused the war panic which his own premeditated language excited—and that this very article contains no line, no phrase, that savors of abatement of his pretensions or his intrigues in Italy or Moldo-Wallachia.²¹² He may have concluded to recoil before the public opinion of Europe (Italy excepted, France *not* excepted); but he may also have

^a *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b Alexander Hübner.—*Ed.*

^c Joseph Charles Paul Bonaparte.—*Ed.*

concluded to simulate the language of peace and moderation to cover gigantic stock speculations or to lure those on whom he is about to spring into a false and fatal security. From first to last, his new manifesto does not even intimate that any lowering of the crest of Austria, any clearing of the sky of Diplomacy, has impelled and justified this change of tone rather than of attitude. And, as to the improbability that one about to launch his thunderbolts would parade such pacific professions, we must remember that this is the same Louis Napoleon who, on the very eve of his treacherous assassination of the French Republic, complained to a Republican of the cynicism which could suppose him capable of meditating such baseness. We hold, therefore, this Napoleonic manifesto "a conclusion by which nothing is concluded." It is only a white heap, which may turn out innocent meal or only mealy cat, but which of them time only can determine.

The comments of the London *Times* are even more significant in what they suggest by a constrained forbearance than in what they openly affirm.^a Louis Napoleon can never more be the demigod of the Bourse and the Bourgeois. He rules henceforth by the sword alone.

Written about March 8, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5593 (as a leading article) and in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1443, March 25, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

^a *The Times*, No. 23247, March 7, 1859 (leading article).—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

A SIGH FROM THE TUILERIES

The Emperor Napoleon must be in a very dismal condition indeed, for he has not only written a most lachrymose letter, but he has written it to Sir F. Head, who is not the liveliest of small statesmen, who has printed it in the London *Times*,^a which is not the most jocund of British journals—making the whole affair about the most solemn ever originating in the gay land of Gaul, and quite funereal in foggy England itself. “My dear Sir Francis” is the affectionate address of the Emperor to the Baronet of the Bubbles,^b and “My dear Sir Francis” is in the subscription. Sir Francis has, as it seems, heretofore written certain letters to the London *Times*^c in defense of the Emperor—letters no doubt excellent, as volunteer communications to the press often are, but which we do not remember to have read, or to have even cursorily noticed, and about which we are certain there has been little or no debate in the Imperial Parliament. The Sire Napoleon has received these productions from the author, and as great folks are often grateful for donations of razor-strops or large cheeses, so the Sire Napoleon is dismally grateful for Sir Francis Head’s articles. The Emperor is very glad to find that he is not forgotten in England, and touchingly refers to the days when he was trusted by the tradesmen of that land, as no vagabond Prince was ever trusted before.²¹³

^a Napoleon III’s letter to Francis Head of March 1, 1859 was published in *The Times*, No. 23246, March 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b An allusion to Head’s book *Bubbles from the Brunnens of Nassau*, after the publication of which in 1834 he received the title of Baronet.—*Ed.*

^c F. Head, “To the Editor of *The Times*, January 24, 1852”, *The Times*, No. 21022, January 27, 1852.—*Ed.*

"To-day," he says, "I see clearly the cares of power, and one of the greatest of them around me is, to find oneself misunderstood and misjudged by those whom one values the most, and with whom one desires to live upon good terms."

Now, too, he openly declares Liberty to be a humbug.

"I deeply regret," he says, "that Liberty, like all good things, should have its excesses! Why is it that, instead of making truth known, it uses every effort to obscure it? Why is it that, instead of encouraging and developing generous sentiments, it propagates mistrust and hatred?"

And thus attacked in his sacred person by Liberty, the Emperor returns thanks that dear Sir Francis has not hesitated energetically to oppose such errors with loyal and disinterested voice.

Now, without entering at all into his present griefs in their political detail, we do not see why the Sire Napoleon III should expect to be rosily and unremittingly jovial. Had the experiences of the family of which he is a putative member been of that gay and sunny character, that when he sought the throne of France—when he risked his life, his liberty, and such money as he could borrow, in little invasions²¹⁴—he supposed that he was in pursuit of a rosy chaplet of Sybaritic pleasures, of the good will of man, of private enjoyment, of the blessings of John Bull and the extorted deference of Europe! Had he never heard the remark of the "divine William," to the effect that uneasy lies the head that wears a crown?^a Did he suppose that he of all men was called by Destiny and Duty to have a headache in the Tuilleries for the benefit of the race? Why should he throw himself upon the broad bosom of the distinguished Sir F. Head, and cry because his much-coveted crown pinches his brows? And if he thinks it necessary to write to *The Times*, why does he not do it himself, instead of writing through a dilapidated Baronet? He has kicked poor etiquette out of doors more than once. Might he not have done so once more?

The dolorous dodge, if we may use so undignified an expression concerning dignitaries, was a favorite one with the Uncle, and seems to be fairly copied by the Nephew. The Founder of the Family was wont to expatiate at great length, with many tears, and with almost maudlin emotion, upon his sufferings, torments, trials, dangers, and especially upon the ill treatment which he received from perfidious Albion. But he never succeeded, we believe, in getting a letter to an Englishman into the London *Times*. He did succeed in being heartily laughed at in

^a Shakespeare, *King Henry IV*, The Second Part, Act III, Scene 1.—Ed.

England, in being as heartily mourned within France, and in sometimes making his giggling neighbors laugh on the wrong side of their mouths. But if he had never done anything better than write letters to the Sir Francis Heads of his time, he would probably have been relieved from his distressing duties at the Tuilleries at a much earlier period than the actual one which led him to the peaceful haunts of St. Helena.

Written about March 8, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5594, March 26, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1444, March 29, 1859

Karl Marx

THE WAR PROSPECT IN FRANCE

Paris, March 9, 1859

At the time when the war alarm had seized upon all the Bourses of Europe, I wrote that Bonaparte was far from having definitively decided upon war; but that whatever his real intentions might be, the control of circumstances was likely to slip from his hands.^a At the present moment, when the greater part of the European press seems inclined to believe in peace, I feel sure that there will be war, unless some happy combination lead to a sudden overthrow of the usurper and his dynasty. This much the most superficial observer must admit, that the prospects of peace being circumscribed within the limits of talk, the prospects of war, on the contrary, are based upon material facts. War preparations are being carried on, both in France and Austria, on a scale unprecedented; and if one considers the desperate state of the two Imperial treasuries, no long chain of arguments is wanted to lead to the conclusion that fighting is meant, and at no distant period, too. Let me remark that Austria is pursued by a merciless fate, whose threads you might perhaps trace to St. Petersburg, which, whenever her finances seem on the point of recovering, flings her back into an abyss of financial distress as certainly as the malignant marble painfully rolled up the mountain by Sisyphus was darted down by unseen hands, whenever the doomed martyr approached the summit. Thus Austria, after years of incessant efforts, had in 1845 succeeded in approaching the point where income and expense meet each other; when the Cracovian revolution²¹⁵ broke out, and necessitated an extra expenditure on her part, which led to the catastrophe of 1848.²¹⁶ Again, in 1858, she was announcing

^a See this volume, pp. 162-66.—*Ed.*

to the world the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of Vienna, when all at once the New-Year's congratulation²¹⁷ sent over from Paris roughly cut short all plans of economy, and doomed her to a waste of treasure and an exhaustion of resources which, even in the eyes of the most sober Austrian statesmen, makes war appear the last chance of salvation.

Of all journals which boast a more than local influence, the *Tribune* is, perhaps, the only one that has never condescended to share in the common slang—I will not say of praising Louis Bonaparte's character, because that would have been too bad—but of crediting him with genius and superior force of will. You analyzed his political, military and financial exploits, and, in my opinion, proved incontrovertibly that his success, so overwhelming in the estimation of the vulgar, was due to a concatenation of circumstances which he had not created, and in using which he never rose beyond the mediocrity of the professional gambler, gifted with a keen eye for expedients, for surprises and *coups de main*, but always remaining the humble servant of hazard, and anxiously concealing beneath a mask of iron a soul of gutta-percha. Now, this is exactly the view which from the first all the great powers of Europe have silently consented to take of the *grand saltimbanque*,^a as Russian diplomatists called him. Understanding that he was dangerous because he had placed himself in a dangerous position, they agreed to allow him to play the successor of Napoleon, on the express, although tacit condition, that he should always content himself with the mere appearance of influence, and never overstep the boundaries which separate the actor from the hero he personates. This game went on successfully for some time, but the diplomatists, as is their habit, had, in their wise calculations, overlooked one important item, the people. When Orsini's grenades exploded, the hero of Satory feigned to assume an attitude of dictation against England, and the British Government proved quite willing to allow him to do so; but popular clamor exercised so violent a pressure on Parliament, that Palmerston was not only thrown out,²¹⁸ but an anti-Bonapartist policy became a vital condition for the tenancy of Downing street. Bonaparte gave way, and from that moment his foreign policy has proved one uninterrupted chain of blunders, humiliations and failures. I need only allude to his Free-Negro Immigration scheme and his Portuguese adventures.²¹⁹ Meanwhile, Orsini's attempt had created a recrudescence of despotism in the interior of France,

^a Great charlatan.—*Ed.*

while the commercial crisis, converted by empirical quackery from an acute fever into a chronic malady, withdrew from beneath the *parvenu* throne the only real basis upon which it rested, material prosperity. Signs of disaffection showed themselves in the ranks of the army; signals of mutiny became audible in the camp of the *bourgeoisie*; menaces of personal vengeance on the part of Orsini's countrymen poisoned the sleep of the usurper; when all of a sudden he tried to create for himself a new position, by repeating, *mutatis mutandis*, Napoleon's rough apostrophe, after the peace of Lunéville,²²⁰ to the English Ambassador,^a and by throwing, in the name of Italy, the gauntlet into the face of Austria. It was not from his free will, but from the force of circumstances, that he, the representative of reserve, the field marshal of expedients, the hero of nocturnal surprises, undertook such a desperately bold step.

There is no doubt that he was pushed on by false friends. Palmerston, who, at Compiègne, had flattered him with the sympathies of the English Liberals, ostensibly turned against him^b on the opening of Parliament.²²¹ Russia, which had urged him on by secret notes and public newspaper articles, entered seemingly into diplomatic *pourparlers*^c with her Austrian neighbor. But the die was cast—the war trumpet had sounded; and Europe was, so to say, forced to reconsider the past, the present and the future, of the successful blackleg who had at last arrived at the Italian campaign with which his uncle had begun his career. By the days of December, he had restored Napoleonism in France; but by an Italian campaign he seemed determined upon restoring it all over Europe. What he meant was not an Italian war, but an Austrian humiliation without a war. Successes which his namesake had bought at the mouth of the cannon, he was to wring from the fear of revolution. That he meant no war, but only a *succès d'estime*,^d is evident. Otherwise, he would have commenced with diplomatic negotiations and ended with war, instead of following the opposite course. He would have prepared for war before talking war. He would, in one word, not have put the carriage before the horses.

But he had sadly mistaken the power with which he picked a quarrel. England, Russia, and the United States may go a great length in the way of apparent concession without losing one single

^a Charles Whitworth.—*Ed.*

^b Lord Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons on February 3, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23221, February 4, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c Negotiations.—*Ed.*

^d Limited success.—*Ed.*

atom of their real influence; but Austria—above all, with respect to Italy—cannot swerve from her path without endangering her empire itself. Accordingly, the only answers Bonaparte received from Austria, were preparations of war which compelled him to embark in the same waters. Quite independent of his will, and quite contrary to his expectation, the mock quarrel assumed, by and by, the dimensions of a deadly conflict. Moreover, everything went the wrong way. In France, he met with a passive but stubborn resistance, and the anxiety of his most interested friends to keep him back from mischief, left no doubt of their distrust in his Napoleonic faculties. In England, the liberal party turned on him the cold shoulder, and railed at his pretensions of treating liberty as a French article of export. In Germany, a unanimous shout of defiance proved to him that, whatever the stupid French peasantry might fancy in 1848, there existed on the other side of the Rhine a settled conviction that *he* was a spurious Napoleon only, and that the respect shown to him by their rulers was a mere conventionality; that, in one word, he was as much a Napoleon “by courtesy,” as the younger sons of English dukes are “lords by courtesy.”²²²

Now, do you think in earnest, that the necessity which in January, 1859, led the man into the Austrian complication, will be overcome by a ridiculous and shameful *reculade*,^a or that the hero of Satory himself thinks he has improved his desperate position by the greatest and most unmistakable defeat he ever underwent? He knows that the French officers do not even affect to conceal their desperate anger at his ridiculous lies told in the *Moniteur*,^b about the present war preparations; he knows that the Paris shop-keeper is already beginning to draw parallels between Louis Philippe’s retreat before an European coalition in 1840,²²³ and Louis Bonaparte’s *grande retirade*^c in 1859; that the bourgeoisie are pervaded by an evident, although smothered rage at their subjection under an adventurer who turns out to be cowardly; that in Germany undisguised contempt for him rules supreme, and that a few more steps in the same direction will make him the laughing-stock of the world. *N'est pas monstre qui veut*,^d said Victor Hugo; but the Dutch adventurer cannot do without the reputation of being not only a Quasimodo, but a terrible one. The chances

^a Retreat.—*Ed.*

^b *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 64, March 5, 1859. See also this volume, p. 256.—*Ed.*

^c Grand retreat.—*Ed.*

^d “Not everybody can be a monster” (Victor Hugo, *Napoléon le petit*. Conclusion. Première partie).—*Ed.*

which he now reckons upon for beginning the war in earnest, and he knows that he must begin it, are these: Austria will not make the least concession during the diplomatic transactions pending, and will thus give him some respectable pretext for appealing to the sword. Prussia has shown herself very lukewarm in her answer^a to the Austrian note of Feb. 22,²²⁴ and the antagonism between these two German powers may be widened. England's foreign policy will, on the downbreak of the Derby Cabinet, fall into the hands of Lord Palmerston. Russia will take her revenge upon Austria without herself risking a man or a rouble, and above all she will create European complications allowing her to take advantage of the meshes she has laid for the Sublime Porte in the Danubian Principalities, in Servia and Montenegro. Italy, at last, will commence burning while the diplomatic smoke envelopes the Conferences at Paris, and the people of Europe will yield to rising Italy what they refused to its self-constituted champion. Such are the chances which Louis Bonaparte hopes will once more launch his fortune on the high sea. The pangs of anxiety that he labors under now you may infer from the one fact that, at a recent Ministerial Council, he was overcome by a severe fit of vomiting. The horror of Italian vengeance is not the least powerful motive in urging him on to war at any price. That the judges of the Peninsular *Feme*²²⁵ are watching over him, he again ascertained three weeks ago. A man was seized in the garden of the Tuilleries, searched, and found to be the bearer of a revolver and of two or three hand grenades, with nipples like Orsini's. He was, of course, arrested and carried to prison. He gave an Italian name, and had an Italian accent. He said he could give the police a great deal of information, for he was connected with a secret society. For two or three days, however, he was very silent, and at last he petitioned for a companion, saying he could not, and would not, tell anything so long as he should be kept in solitary confinement. A companion was given him in the shape of one of the prison functionaries, a sort of archivist or librarian. The Italian then revealed, or appeared to reveal, many things. But, at the end of another day or two, his questioners returned and informed him that, on inquiry, all he had uttered was found to be unsupported by facts, and that he must make up his mind to act frankly. He said he would the next day. He was left to himself for the night. About 4 o'clock, however, in the morning he rose, borrowed his companion's razor

^a Circular dispatch to the Prussian Ambassadors at the German Courts, early March 1859, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 56, March 8, 1859.—Ed.

and cut his throat. The doctor called in gave as his opinion that the cut was so energetically made that life must have been extinguished on the instant.

Written about March 11, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5598, March 31, 1859

Karl Marx

THE WAR PROSPECT IN PRUSSIA

Berlin, March 15, 1859

War is considered at this place inevitable, but the part that Prussia ought to play in the impending contest between France and Austria is a matter of general dispute, neither the government nor the public seeming to have arrived at any settled opinion. One fact must have struck you, viz.: that the only warlike petitions sent up to Berlin came not from Prussia proper, but from Cologne, the capital of Rhenish Prussia. Too much stress, however, ought not to be laid upon those petitions, since they are evidently the work of the Catholic party, which, in Germany, as well as in France and Belgium, naturally identifies itself with Austria. In one respect, an exceptional unanimity of feeling may be said to pervade the whole of Germany. Nobody raises his voice in favor of Louis Napoleon—nobody affects any sympathy for the “liberator,” but, on the contrary, a real deluge of hatred and contempt is day by day poured out against him. The Catholic party considers him a rebel against the Pope, and curses, of course, the sacrilegious sword about to be drawn against a power that, by its concordat with Rome, has anew subjected a great part of Europe to the Holy See²²⁶; the feudal party, while it affects to detest the French usurper, detests, in fact, the French nation, and flatters itself that, by a sound war against it all, the horrid innovations imported from the country of Voltaire and Jean Jacques Rousseau, may be swept away; the commercial and industrial middle class, who used to glorify Louis Bonaparte as the great “savior of order, property, religion and family,” now abound in denunciations of the reckless peace-breaker who, instead of contenting himself with keeping down the exuberant forces of France and quenching the socialist desperadoes by wholesome exercise at Lambessa and Cayenne,²²⁷

has taken into his head the extravagant idea of sending down the funds, disturbing the even course of business, and awaking anew the revolutionary passions; the great mass of the people, at least, are exceedingly glad, after years of compulsory silence, to be allowed to give vent to their hatred against the man whom they consider the principal cause of the revolutionary failures of 1848-49. Angry recollections of the Napoleonic wars and the lurking suspicion of a war against Austria meaning a simulated move upon Germany, are quite sufficient to impregnate the philippics against Bonaparte, due to so many different motives, with the appearance of one common national feeling. The silly lies in the *Moniteur*, the frivolous pamphlets indited by the literary *condottieri* of the Emperor, and the evident signs of vacillation, distress, and even fear, on the part of the fox who is forced to play the lion,^a have done the rest, and turned general hatred to general contempt.

Still, it would be the greatest mistake possible to infer that united Germany sides with Austria, because the whole of Germany is aroused against Bonaparte. In the first instance, I need not remind you of the inveterate and necessary antagonism between the Austrian and the Prussian Governments—an antagonism which certainly is not likely to be soothed by the recollections of the Congress of Warsaw, the bloodless battle of Bronzell, the Austrian armed promenade to Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, or even the Russo-Turkish war.²²⁸ You are aware of the cautious lukewarmness pervading the last manifestoes of the Prussian Government.^b As a European power, they say, in fact, Prussia sees no reason why she should decide for one party or the other, and as a German power she reserves to herself to inquire how far the Austrian pretensions in Italy are in unison with truly German interests. Prussia has even gone further. She has declared that Austria's separate treaties with Parma, Modena, Tuscany and Naples,²²⁹ and consequently the mooted abrogation of those treaties, ought to be considered from a European point of view, but did not at all lie within the horizon of the German Confederation. She has openly sided against Austria in the Danubian question; she has recalled from the German Diet at Frankfort a plenipotentiary,^c apparently too decided a partisan of

^a Aesop, "The Fox and the Lion".—*Ed.*

^b A. Schleinitz, "Rundschreiben der preussischen Regierung vom 12. Februar 1859", *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 53, March 4, 1859; speech in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, March 9, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c Otto Bismarck.—*Ed.*

Austrian interests²³⁰; she has, finally, in order to meet the suspicion of acting unpatriotically, followed in the track of the minor German States, and forbidden the export of horses^a; but to extract the anti-French sting from this prohibition, she has extended the latter to the whole of the Zollverein,²³¹ so that the prohibition is directed against Austria as well as against France. Prussia is still the very same power which concluded the separate treaty of Basle,²³² and, in 1805, sent Haugwitz into the camp of Napoleon with double dispatches, the one set to be presented in case the battle of Austerlitz should go the wrong way, the other containing servile felicitations to the foreign invader. Apart from the traditional family-policy, persisted in by the house of Hohenzollern, it is intimidated by Russia, who, she knows, entertains a secret understanding with Bonaparte, and even pushed him on to his fatal declaration of New-Year's day.²³³ If one sees such a paper as the *New Prussian Gazette*^b taking up the cudgels for the King of Piedmont against Francis Joseph, no great power of divination is required to guess from which side the wind blows. To leave no doubt, Herr von Manteuffel has published an anonymous pamphlet, recommending a Russo-French alliance against an Austro-English one.^c

But the real question does not so much concern the intentions of the Government as the sympathies of the people. Now, I must tell you that, save the Catholic party, the feudal party, and some stupid relics of the Teutonic brawlers of 1813-15, the German people generally, and the population of Northern Germany in particular, feel themselves planted on the horns of a dilemma. While decidedly taking part for Italy against Austria, they cannot but take part for Austria against Bonaparte. Of course, if one were to receive his cue from the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, the conviction would grow upon one's mind that Austria was the idol of every German heart. Let me expose, in a few words, the theory started by that paper. Every race in Europe, except the German, is breaking down. France is decaying; Italy must feel exceedingly blessed at being converted into a German barrack; the Slavic races lack the ethical qualities necessary to govern themselves; and England is corrupted by commerce. So there remains only solid

^a "Bekanntmachung vom 7. März 1859—betreffend das Verbot der Ausfuhr von Pferden über die äussere Zollgrenze (gegen das Zollvereins-Ausland)", *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 60, March 10, 1859.—Ed.

^b *Neue Preussische Zeitung*.—Ed.

^c *Preussen und die italienische Frage*. The pamphlet is supposed to be written by Constantin Rössler.—Ed.

Germany—and Austria is the European representative of Germany. With one hand it keeps Italy, with the other the Slavonians and Magyars under the ennobling influence of German *Sittlichkeit* (it is impossible to translate the word^a). While securing the Fatherland from Russian invasion by its hold upon Galicia, Hungary, the Dalmatian coast, Moravia, and the prospective occupation of the Danubian Principalities, Austria defends Germany, that heart of human civilization, from the sullying contagion of French demoralization, frivolity and ambition, by its hold of Italy. Now, I need not tell you that this theory has, without the frontiers of Austria, never been embraced by anybody, save some Bavarian *Krautjunkers*,^b whose claim to represent German civilization is about as well grounded as that of the ancient Boeotians²³⁴ to represent Greek genius. But there has been, and there is at this very moment, another more prosaic view of the case, started from the same quarter. It is said that the Rhine must be defended on the Po, and that the Austrian positions on the Po, the Adige and the Mincio, form the natural military frontiers of Germany against French invasion. Propounded in 1848 in the German National Assembly at Frankfort by Gen. Radowitz, this doctrine carried the day and led the Assembly to side with Austria against Italy,^c but the judgment of that so-called revolutionary parliament, which could go the length of investing an Austrian Archduke with the powers of the executive,²³⁵ has long since been judged. The Germans begin to understand that they have been led astray by *quid pro quo*, that military positions needed for the defense of Austria are not at all wanted for the defense of Germany, and that the French can, with the same, and even a better right, claim the Rhine as their natural military frontier, than the Germans can claim the Po, the Mincio and the Adige.

Written on March 15, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5598, March 31, 1859

^a It may mean "respectability" or "morality".—*Ed.*

^b Cabbage junkers.—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, p. 216.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

A HISTORIC PARALLEL

When Louis Napoleon, emulating the less lucky Marino Faliero of Venice, vaulted to a throne by perjury and treason, by midnight conspiracy and the seizure of the incorruptible members of the Assembly in their beds, backed by an overwhelming display of military force in the streets of Paris, the sovereign princes and aristocracies of Europe, the great landowners, manufacturers, *rentiers* and stockjobbers, almost to a man, exulted in his success as their own. "The crimes are his," was their general chuckle, "but their fruits are ours. Louis Napoleon reigns in the Tuileries; while we reign even more securely and despotically on our domains, in our factories, on the Bourse, and in our counting-houses. Down with all Socialism! *Vive l'Empereur!*"

And next to the Military, the fortunate usurper plied all his arts to attach the rich and powerful, the thrifty and speculating, to his standard. "The Empire is peace,"²³⁶ he exclaimed, and the millionaires almost deified him. "Our very dear son in Jesus Christ," the Pope affectionately termed him; and the Roman Catholic priesthood saluted him (*pro tem.*) with every expression of confidence and devotion. Stocks rose; Banks of Crédit Mobilier sprang up and flourished; millions were made at a dash of the pen in new railroads, a new slave-trade, and new speculations of every sort. The British Aristocracy, turning their back on the past, doffed their caps and pulled their forelocks to the new Bonaparte; he paid a family visit to Queen Victoria²³⁷ and was feasted by the City of London; the Exchange touched glasses with the Bourse; there was general congratulation and hand-shaking among the apostles of stockjobbing, and a conviction that the golden calf had

finally been fully deified, and that his Aaron was the new French autocrat.^a

Seven years have rolled away, and all is changed. Napoleon III has spoken the word that may never be unsaid nor forgotten. No matter whether he rushes on his destiny as recklessly as his forerunner did in Spain and Russia, or is forced by the indignant, universal murmur of the royalties and bourgeoisies of Europe into a position of temporary submission to their will, the spell is forever broken. They knew him long since as a villain; but they deemed him a serviceable, pliant, obedient, grateful villain; and they now see and rue their mistake. He has been using *them* all the time that they supposed they were using him. He loves them exactly as he loves his dinner or his wine. They have served him so far in a certain way; they must now serve him in another way or brave his vengeance. If "the Empire is peace" henceforth, it is peace on the Mincio or the Danube—peace with his eagles flaunting in triumph on the Po and the Adige, if not on the Rhine and Elbe as well—it is Peace with the Iron Crown on his brow²³⁸; Italy a French satrapy, and with Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, merely satellites revolving around and lighted by the central orb France, the Empire of Charlemagne.

Of course, there is gnashing of teeth in royal palaces, but not less in the halls of bankers and merchant princes. For the year, 1859, was opening under auspices that promised a restoration of the golden days of '36 and '56.²³⁹ The long protracted stagnation of manufacturing had exhausted stocks of metals, wares and fabrics. The manifold bankruptcies had measurably purified the atmosphere of Commerce. Ships began again to have a market value; warehouses were about once more to be built and filled. Stocks were buoyant and millionaires decidedly jolly; in short, there was never a brighter commercial prospect, a more serene, auspicious sky.

A word changes all this; and that word is uttered by the hero of the *Coup d'État*—the Elect of December—the Savior of Society. It is spoken wantonly, coolly, with evident premeditation, to M. Hübner, the Austrian Envoy, and clearly indicates a settled purpose to pick a quarrel with Francis Joseph or bully him into a humiliation more fatal than three lost battles. Though evidently calculated for instant effect on the Bourse, in aid of gambling stock sales to deliver, it betrayed a fixed purpose to recast the map of Europe. Austria must recede from all those nominally

^a Cf. Exodus 7:20.—*Ed.*

independent Italian States which she now practically occupies by virtue of treaties with their willing rulers, or France and Sardinia will occupy Milan and menace Mantua with such an army as Gen. Bonaparte never commanded in Italy. The Pope must reform the abuses of clerical rule in his States—abuses so long upheld by French arms—or follow the petty despots of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, &c., in their headlong race to find safety at Vienna.²⁴⁰ The Rothschilds groan over their Eleven Millions of Dollars lost by the depreciation of stocks consequent on the menace to Hübner, and utterly refuse to be comforted. The manufacturers and traders mournfully realize that their anticipated harvest of 1859 is likely to give place to a "harvest of death." Everywhere apprehension, discontent and indignation convulse the breasts on which the throne of the Man of December reposed so securely a few months ago.

And the cast-down, broken idol can never be set on its pedestal again. He may recoil before the storm he has raised, and again receive the benedictions of the Pope and the caresses of the British Queen; but neither will be more than lip-service. They know him now, what the peoples knew him long since—a reckless gambler, a desperate adventurer, who would as soon dice with royal bones as any other if the game promised to leave him a winner. They know him one who, having, like Macbeth, waded to a crown through human gore, finds it easier to go forward than to return to peace and innocence. From the hour of his demonstration against Austria, Louis Napoleon stood and stands alone among potentates. The young Emperor of Russia^a may, for his own purposes, seem to be still his friend; but that seeming is an empty one. Napoleon I in 1813 was the prototype of Napoleon III in 1859. And the latter will probably rush on his fate as substantially as the former did.

Written about March 18, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5598, March 31, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1445, April 1, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 917, April 9, 1859

^a Alexander II.—Ed.

Frederick Engels

THE PROPOSED PEACE CONGRESS

The readiness with which Louis Napoleon assented to the proposal of a Congress for the discussion of the Italian question,²⁴¹ was rather ominous than otherwise for the peace of Europe.^a If a monarch, whose every act for the last six months has unmistakably pointed toward war, all at once turns around, and jumps at a proposal seemingly calculated to preserve the peace; then our first conclusion is that there are things behind the scenes which, if they were known, would take away the semblance of inconsistency from his course of action. This has been the case with regard to the European Congress. What at the first glance seemed to look like an attempt to preserve the peace, now turns out to be a new pretext for gaining time to complete the preparations for war. It is but recently that the Congress was proposed, and while nothing is decided as to the place where and the conditions on which it is to meet, while its meeting, if it should ever occur, is postponed to the end of April at the earliest, the French army is ordered to form a fourth battalion to each regiment, and six French divisions are to be placed on the war footing. These are facts worthy of consideration.

The French infantry, beside Chasseurs, Zouaves, Foreign Legion, native Algerian troops and other special corps, consists of eight regiments of the Guard and a hundred regiments of the line. These hundred regiments of the line are formed, on the peace footing, of three battalions each, two for active service and one for a *dépôt*; the regiment thus numbers from 1,500 to 1,800 men present under arms. But beside these, it includes the same, or

^a *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 81, March 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

even a larger number of men, on furlough, who, when the regiment is placed on the war footing, are at once required to join their colors. In this case, the three battalions become, together, from 3,600 to 4,000 men strong; and leaving from 500 to 600 for the depot battalion, the two active battalions would count from 1,500 to 1,700 men each, a strength which is quite unwieldy. To make this force of trained men really available, it thus becomes necessary to form at once a new active battalion in every regiment, by which the strength of the battalion, the tactical unity, becomes reduced to about 1,000 men, which is the average figure now adopted in most European armies. The formation of the fourth battalions is therefore necessarily a preliminary step to placing the French army on the war footing, and is alone capable of furnishing the organizations requisite to receive the available number of trained men. This circumstance gives a peculiar significance to the formation of these fourth battalions; they mean readiness for war. The mode in which they are created is very simple: the 5th and 6th companies of the three existing battalions (each having six companies) are combined into a fourth battalion, while from the remaining four companies the necessary officers and men are drafted to form two new companies for each battalion. The new battalion goes into depot while the third battalion is transformed into an active one. Together with guards, chasseurs, and other special corps, the number of battalions in the French army will then be about 480, a number sufficient to absorb about 500,000 men; and if this should not suffice, the fourth battalions may be formed into active ones, and be replaced in the depots by newly-formed fifth battalions. This process was actually in course of execution at the close of the Russian war, when the army counted 545 battalions.

That the step taken by the French Government has indeed no signification, except immediate readiness for war, is proved by another measure which has closely followed it. Six divisions have received orders to place themselves on the war footing—that is to say, to call in their men on furlough. A French division of infantry consists of four regiments or two brigades of the line, and one battalion of foot chasseurs, or thirteen battalions in all—making about 14,000 men. Although the six divisions are not designated, it is not difficult to guess to which of them the order applies. There are, in the first instance, the four divisions now already on the Rhône, among which is the division of Gen. Renault, just returned from Algeria; then the Bourbaki division, now under orders of embarkation in Algeria; and finally a division of the

army of Paris, which, it is reported, has received orders to hold itself in readiness to march at a moment's notice. These six divisions include about 85,000 infantry, which, with the requisite artillery, cavalry and train, would form an army of rather more than 100,000 men, and may be considered as the main body of what is to be in the approaching campaign the army of Italy.

Now, considering the universal clamor for peace in France, the violent national and anti-French agitation in Germany, and the attitude of England, Louis Napoleon seems to have hesitated to take such a step as the mobilization of his army, without, at the same time, doing something to make people believe that he had not irrevocably resolved on war, but would be content with any improvement in the situation of Italy which could be obtained by means of a Congress. A glance at the history of the military preparations will confirm this view, and develop new reasons why such a sham was an element in his plans.

No sooner had the reception of New-Year's Day at the Tuileries shown that his intentions were to provoke difficulties with Austria, than what we might call a race of armaments began between France and Sardinia on one side, and Austria on the other. This latter power, however, at once proved that she had the best of it. With astonishing rapidity a whole army corps was in a few days thrown into Italy, and when the reports of French and Sardinian concentrations of troops took a still more menacing character, the men on leave belonging to the army of Italy were in three weeks collected and reincorporated with their regiments, while the men on furlough and the recruits belonging to the Italian Provinces were also called in and sent to the garrisons of their respective corps in the interior. The quietness and rapidity with which all this was done, afford the best possible proof of the perfection of the Austrian military system, and of the thorough efficiency of the Austrian army. The old reputation of the Austrians for slowness, pedantry and unwieldiness had certainly been very effectively reversed by the way the troops were handled by Radetzky in 1848-49, but such smooth working of the mechanism and such readiness at the shortest notice could scarcely have been expected. Here no new formations were required; the active battalions in Italy had but to receive their complement of men, to be raised to their full strength, while the transformation of depot battalions into active battalions, and the organization of fresh depots are going on far away in the interior of the monarchy, and without in any way delaying the completion of the active army.

It is also true that Sardinia did not require any new formations;

her organization was sufficient. But with the French it was different. The process of mobilization required a good deal of time. The creation of the fourth battalions had to precede the calling in of the men on furlough. Then Louis Napoleon had to keep in view the probability of a war with the German Confederation, in case of an attack upon Austria. While Austria, therefore, open to attack on her Italian or southern frontier only, and covered by Germany toward the west, could throw a very large portion of her forces into Italy, and enter upon war at once, if required, the French Government had to concentrate all its strength before it could venture on offensive operations; therefore, the new levy of recruits of 1859 and the 50,000 volunteers, on which France generally counts in case of war, had to be got together first. All this would require a considerable time; and a hurried embarking in a campaign, was, therefore, not at all in the interest of Louis Napoleon. Indeed, if we refer to the celebrated article of the *Constitutionnel* on the French army, which, it will be remembered, came direct from Louis Napoleon himself,^a we shall find that he there fixed the epoch when the French forces will amount to some 700,000 men, at the end of May. Up to that period, then, Austria would have a relative advantage over France; and as matters were in a fair way of precipitating themselves toward an open rupture, this Congress became a capital means of gaining time.

There is another point to be considered. The fact that Russia has a finger in this pie cannot now be doubted. That she desires to humiliate Austria is certain; that an imbroglio in Western Europe gives her freedom of action on the Danube in order to recover whatever she lost by the Peace of Paris, is evident; that she has views of her own with regard to the Rouman Principalities, and Servia, and the Slavonic populations of Turkey, is proved by her recent policy in those countries.²⁴² There can be for her no better means of taking revenge on Austria, than to revive, while Austria is at war, the Panslavic agitation among the millions of Austrian Slavonians. To do all this, and more, if opportunity offers, she, too, must concentrate her troops and prepare the ground; and for this she requires time. And, moreover, to assume a passively hostile attitude toward Austria, a pretext is wanted, and an opportunity for picking a slight quarrel can nowhere be found so well as in such a Congress. This Congress, therefore, should it ever take place, instead of being a serious, or at least honest

^a See this volume, pp. 171-76.—*Ed.*

attempt at maintaining peace, will prove nothing but "a delusion, a mockery and a snare"^a; and it can scarcely be doubted that all the great powers are perfectly convinced by this time that the whole affair will be a mere formality, gone through to blind the public and to cloak ulterior projects which are not yet ripe for the daylight.

Written early in April 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5618, April 23, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1452, April 26, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

^a Quoted from the speech by the Lord Chief Justice Th. Denman at a trial in September 1844.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

GREAT TROUBLE IN INDIAN FINANCES

I

London, April 8, 1859

The Indian financial crisis, which at this moment shares with the war rumors and the electioneering agitation in the privilege of absorbing public interest in England, must be considered in a double point of view. It involves both a temporary necessity and a permanent difficulty.

On the 14th of February Lord Stanley brought in a bill in the House of Commons^a authorizing the Government to raise a loan of £7,000,000 in England, in order to adjust the extra expenditure of the Indian administration for the current year. About six weeks later, John Bull's self-congratulations as to the small cost of the Indian rebellion²⁴³ were roughly interrupted by the arrival of the Overland Mail, conveying a cry of financial distress from the Government at Calcutta. On March 25, Lord Derby rose in the House of Lords to state^b that a further loan for India of £5,000,000, in addition to the £7,000,000 loan now before Parliament, would be required to meet the demands of the present year, and that even then, certain claims for compensation and prize money,²⁴⁴ amounting to £2,000,000 at least, would remain to be paid from some source not yet apparent. To make things pleasant, Lord Stanley had, in his first statement, only provided for the wants of the Indian Treasury at London, leaving the British Government in India to its own resources, which, from the dispatches received, he could not but know to be far from sufficient. Quite apart from the expenses of the Home Government, or the Indian administration at London, Lord Canning

^a *The Times*, No. 23230, February 15, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b *The Times*, No. 23264, March 26, 1859.—*Ed.*

estimated the deficit of the Government at Calcutta for the current year of 1859-60 at £12,000,000, after allowing an increase in the ordinary revenue of £800,000, and a decrease on military charges of £2,000,000.^a Such was his penury that he had stopped paying part of his civil service; such was his credit that the Government 5 per cents were quoted at 12 per cent discount; and such was his distress that he could only be saved from bankruptcy by the shipment from England to India of £3,000,000 of silver within a few months. Three points thus become evident. First: Lord Stanley's original statement was a "dodge," and, so far from embracing all the Indian liabilities, did not even touch the immediate wants of the Indian Government in India. Secondly: During the whole period of the insurrection, if we except the sending from London in 1857 of £1,000,000 of silver to India, the Calcutta Government was left to shift for itself, to provide out of its own resources for the main part of the extraordinary war charges which, of course, had to be disbursed in India, for the barrack accommodation of some 60,000 additional Europeans, for the restoration of the treasures plundered, and for the replacing of all the revenues of the local Administrations which had been swept away. Thirdly: There is, apart from the wants of the Home Government, a deficit of £12,000,000, to be met in the present year. By operations, the questionable nature of which we forbear to dwell upon, this sum is to be reduced to £9,000,000, of which sum £5,000,000 are to be borrowed in India and £4,000,000 in England. Of the latter, £1,000,000 in silver bullion has already been shipped to Calcutta from London, and £2,000,000 more is to be dispatched in the shortest possible period.

It will be seen from this succinct statement that the Indian Government was very unfairly dealt with by its English masters, who left it in the lurch, in order to throw dust in the eyes of John Bull; but it must, on the other hand, be admitted that the financial operations of Lord Canning surpass in awkwardness even his military and political exploits. Up to the end of January, 1859, he had contrived to raise the necessary means by loans in India, issued partly in Government stocks, partly in Treasury bills; but, strange to say, while his efforts had answered during the epoch of the revolution, they failed entirely from the moment English authority was restored by the force of arms. And not only did they fail, but there was a panic in regard to Government securities;

^a Ch. J. Canning's report of February 21, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23268, March 31, 1859.—*Ed.*

there was an unprecedented depreciation in all funds, with protests from the Chambers of Commerce at Bombay and Calcutta, and, in the latter town, public meetings composed of English and native money-mongers, denouncing the vacillation, the arbitrary nature and the helpless imbecility of the Government measures. Now, the loanable capital of India which up to January, 1859, had supplied the Government with funds, began to fail after that period, when the power of borrowing seems to have been exceeded. In point of fact the aggregate loans which from 1841 to 1857 amounted to £21,000,000, absorbed in the two years of 1857 and 1858 alone about £9,000,000, equal to almost one-half of the money borrowed during the previous sixteen years. Such a failure of resources, while accounting for the necessity of successively screwing up the rate of interest on Government loans from 4 to 6 per cent, is, of course, far from explaining the commercial panic in the Indian security market, and the utter inability of the Governor-General to meet the most urgent requirements. The riddle is solved by the fact that it has become a regular maneuver with Lord Canning to bring out new loans at higher rates of interest than those given on existing *open loans*, without any previous notice to the public, and with the utmost uncertainty prevailing as to the further financial operations contemplated. The depreciation of the funds, in consequence of these maneuvers, has been calculated at not less than £11,000,000. Pinched by the poverty of the Exchequer, frightened by the panic in the stock market, and roused by the protests on the part of the Chambers of Commerce and the Calcutta meetings, Lord Canning thought best to be a good boy and to try to come up to the desiderata of the monetary mind; but his notification of the 21st of February, 1859, shows again that the human understanding does not depend on human will. What was he required to do? Not to open simultaneously two loans on different conditions, and to tell the monetary public at once the sum required for the current year, instead of deceiving them by successive announcements, one contradictory of the other. And what does he do in his notification? In the first instance he says that there is to be raised by loan in the Indian market for the year 1859-60, £5,000,000, at $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and that

"when this amount shall have been realized, the loan of 1859-60 shall be closed, and no further loan will be opened in India during that year."

In the very same proclamation, sweeping away the entire value of the assurances just given, he proceeds:

"No loan carrying a higher rate of interest will be opened in India in the course of the year 1859-60, unless under instructions from the Home Government."

But that is not all. He opens, in fact, a *double loan* on different terms. While announcing that "the issue of Treasury bills on the terms notified on Jan. 26, 1859, will be closed on April 30," he proclaims "that a new issue of Treasury bills will be notified from the 1st of May," bearing interest of nearly $5\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, and redeemable at the expiration of one year from the date of issue. Both loans are kept open together, while, at the same time, the loan opened in January has not yet been concluded. The only financial matter which Lord Canning seems able to comprehend is that his annual salary amounts to £20,000 in name, and to about £40,000 in fact. Hence, despite the sneers of the Derby Cabinet, and his notorious incapacity, he sticks to his post from "a feeling of duty."

The effects of the Indian financial crisis on the English home market have already become apparent. In the first instance, the silver remittances on account of Government coming to swell the large remittances on mercantile account, and falling at an epoch when the ordinary silver supplies from Mexico are held back in consequence of the distracted condition of that country,²⁴⁵ have, of course, sent up the price of bar silver. On March 25, it had risen to the factitious price of $62\frac{3}{4}$ d. per ounce standard, causing such an influx of silver from every part of Europe that the price in London again fell to $62\frac{3}{8}$ d.; while the rate of discount at Hamburg rose from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 per cent. Consequent upon these heavy importations of silver, exchanges have turned against England, and a drain of gold bullion has set in, which, for the present, only relieves the London money market of its plethora, but in the long run may seriously affect it, coupled, as it will be, with large Continental loans. The depreciation, however, on the London money market, of the Indian Government stocks and guaranteed railway securities, prejudicial as it must prove to the Government and railway loans still to be brought forward in the course of this season, is certainly the most serious effect on the home market as yet, resulting from the Indian financial crisis. The shares of many Indian railways, although 5 per cent interest upon them is guaranteed by the Government, are now at 2 or 3 per cent discount.

Taking all in all, however, I regard the momentary Indian financial panic as a matter of secondary importance, if compared with the general crisis of the Indian Exchequer, which I may perhaps consider on another occasion.

II

London, April 12, 1859

The latest overland mail, so far from showing any abatement of the financial crisis in India, reveals a state of derangement hardly anticipated. The shifts to which the Indian Government is driven in order to meet its most urgent wants, may be best illustrated by a recent measure of the Governor of Bombay. Bombay is the market where the opium of Malwa, averaging 30,000 chests annually, finds its outlet by monthly instalments of 2,000 or 3,000 chests, for which bills are drawn upon Bombay. By charging 400 rupees upon every chest imported into Bombay, the Government raises a revenue of £1,200,000 annually on Malwa opium.^a Now, to replenish his exhausted Exchequer, and ward off immediate bankruptcy, the Bombay Governor has issued a notification, which raises the duty on each chest of Malwa opium from 400 to 500 rupees; but, at the same time, he declares that this increased duty will not be levied till after the 1st of July, so that the holders of opium in Malwa have the privilege of bringing in the drug under the old duties for four months longer. Between the middle of March, when the notification was issued, and the 1st of July, there are only two months and a half during which opium can be imported, the monsoon setting in on the 15th of June. The holders of opium in Malwa will, of course, avail themselves of the interval allowed them for sending in opium at the old duty; and, consequently, during the two months and a half pour all their stock in hand into the Presidency.²⁴⁶ Since the balance of opium, of the old and new crops, remaining at Malwa amounts to 26,000 chests, and the price of Malwa opium reaches 1,250 rupees per

^a *The Times*, No. 23274, April 7, 1859.—*Ed.*

chest, the Malwa merchants will have to draw upon the Bombay merchants for no less a sum than £3,000,000, of which more than £1,000,000 must come into the Bombay Treasury. The aim of this financial dodge is transparent. With a view to anticipate the annual revenue from the opium duty, and induce the dealers in the article to pay it at once, an enhancement of the duty is held out prospectively *in terrorem*.^a While it would be quite superfluous to expatiate upon the empirical character of this contrivance, which fills the Exchequer for the present by creating a corresponding void a few months hence, no more striking instance could be given of the exhaustion of ways and means, on the part of the great Mogul's successors.²⁴⁷

Let us now turn to the general state of Indian finances, as it has grown out of the late insurrection. According to the last official accounts,^b the net revenue derived by the British from their Indian farm amounts to £23,208,000, say £24,000,000. This annual revenue has never sufficed to defray the annual expenses. From 1836 to 1850 the net deficit amounted to £13,171,096, or, on a rough average, to £1,000,000 annually. Even in the year 1856, when the Exchequer was exceptionally filled by the wholesale annexations, robberies and extortions of Lord Dalhousie, the income and expense did not exactly square, but, on the contrary, a deficit of about a quarter of a million was added to the usual crop of deficits. In 1857 the deficiency was £9,000,000, in 1858 it amounted to £13,000,000, and in 1859 it is estimated by the Indian Government itself at £12,000,000. The first conclusion, then, which we arrive at is that even under ordinary circumstances, deficits were accumulating, and that under extraordinary circumstances they must assume such dimensions as to reach one-half and more of the annual income.

The question which next presents itself is, To what degree has this already existing gap between the expenses and the income of the Indian Government been widened by recent events? The new permanent debt of India accruing from the suppression of the mutiny is calculated by the most sanguine English financiers at between forty and fifty millions sterling, while Mr. Wilson estimates the *permanent deficit*, or the annual interest for this new debt to be defrayed out of the annual revenue, at not less than three millions. However, it would be a great mistake to think that

^a As a threat.—*Ed.*

^b J. Wilson's speech in the House of Commons on March 7, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23248, March 8, 1859.—*Ed.*

this permanent deficit of three millions is the only legacy left by the insurgents to their vanquishers. The costs of the insurrection are not only in the past tense, but are in a high degree prospective. Even in quiet times, before the outbreak of the mutiny, the military charges swallowed sixty per cent at least of the aggregate regular income, since they exceeded £12,000,000; but the state of affairs is now changed. At the beginning of the mutiny the European force in India amounted to 38,000 effective men,^a while the native army mustered 260,000 men. The military forces at present employed in India amount to 112,000 Europeans and 320,000 native troops, including the native police. It may be justly said that these extraordinary numbers will be reduced to a more moderate standard with the disappearance of the extraordinary circumstances which swelled them to their present size. Yet the military commission appointed by the British Government has arrived at the conclusion that there will be required in India a permanent European force of 80,000 men, with a native force of 200,000 men—the military charges being thus raised to almost double their original height. During the debates on the Indian finances, in the House of Lords, on April 7, two points were admitted by all speakers of authority: on the one hand that an annual expenditure upon the revenue of India little short of twenty millions for the army alone was incompatible with a net revenue of twenty-four millions only; and, on the other hand, that it was difficult to imagine a state of things which for an indefinite series of years would render it safe for the English to leave India without a European force double its amount before the outbreak of the mutiny. But suppose even that it would do to add permanently to the European forces not more than one-third of their original strength, and we get at a new annual permanent deficit of four millions sterling at least. The new permanent deficit, then, derived on one hand from the consolidated debt contracted during the mutiny, and on the other hand from the permanent increase of the British forces in India, cannot, on the most moderate calculation, fall below seven millions sterling.

To this must be added two other items—the one accruing from an increase of liabilities, the other from a diminution of income. By a recent statement of the Railway Department of the Indian

^a Here and below the data are taken from the speeches made by E. Ellenborough and E. Derby in the House of Lords on April 7, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23275, April 8, 1859.—*Ed.*

office at London,^a it results that the whole length of railways sanctioned for India is 4,817 miles, of which 559 miles only are yet opened. The whole amount of capital invested by the different railway companies amounts to £40,000,000 sterling, of which £19,000,000 are paid and £21,000,000 are still to be called in—96 per cent of the aggregate sum having been subscribed in England and 4 per cent only in India. Upon this amount of £40,000,000, the Government has guaranteed 5 per cent interest, so that the annual interest charged upon the revenues of India reaches £2,000,000, to be paid before the railways are in working order, and before they can yield any return. The Earl of Ellenborough estimates the loss accruing to the Indian finances from this source, for the next three years to come, at £6,000,000 sterling, and the ultimate permanent deficit upon these railways at half a million annually. Lastly, of the £24,000,000 of Indian net revenue, a sum of £3,619,000 is derived from the sale of opium to foreign countries—a source of revenue which, it is now generally admitted, must to a considerable extent be impaired by the late treaty with China.²⁴⁸ It becomes, then, evident, that apart from the extra expenditure still necessitated to complete the suppression of the mutiny, an annual permanent deficit of £8,000,000 at least, will have to be defrayed out of a net revenue of £24,000,000, which the Government may, perhaps, by the imposition of new taxes, contrive to raise to £26,000,000. The necessary result of this state of things will be to saddle the English taxpayer with the liability for the Indian debt and, as Sir G. C. Lewis declared in the House of Commons,

“to vote four or five millions annually as a subsidy for what was called a valuable dependency of the British crown.”^b

It will be confessed that these financial fruits of the “glorious” reconquest of India have not a charming appearance; and that John Bull pays exceedingly high protective duties for securing the monopoly of the Indian market to the Manchester free-traders.

Written on April 8 and 12, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5624, April 30, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1454, May 3, 1859

^a R. Crawford's speech in the House of Commons on April 4, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23272, April 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b G. Lewis' speech in the House of Commons on April 4, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23272, April 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels

[WAR INEVITABLE]²⁴⁹

London, Friday, April 15, 1859

Though diplomacy still continues to toil in the effort to bring about a Congress, and by its means a peaceful settlement of the Italian question, nobody any longer believes in the possibility of avoiding war. The English Cabinet and Prussia are certainly sincere in their wish for peace; but Russia and France have entered into the present negotiations exclusively with the view of gaining time. Deep snow still lies on the Mont Cenis, by which the French army will have to pass on the way to Italy. Some additional French and Arab regiments are still to be levied in France and Algeria, and the preparations for the transport of troops between Marseilles, Toulon and Genoa are not yet completed, while the Russians must have time to organize the Wallachian militia and the irregular Servian army. In the mean while, the war party is in the ascendant at Vienna, and Francis Joseph desires nothing more ardently than the first roar of the cannon. Why, then, does he countenance the propositions for a Congress, when he knows that diplomatic delay will exhaust his financial resources and add to the force of his enemies? The answer lies in the attitude of the Prince of Prussia, who, unmoved by the German enthusiasm, tries to find an honorable pretext for maintaining an honest neutrality, and for evading the ruinous cost of an armed neutrality, which, sooner or later, will lead to war. Should Austria, in her eagerness to crush the Piedmontese army, begin the war, the Cabinet of Berlin would be justified in such a policy, even in' the eyes of Germany; while an attack of the French on Austria in Lombardy would necessarily lead to an official appeal of Francis Joseph to the German Confederation to put the federal armies on the footing of preparation for war. Such being the real intentions of

Austria, it is ludicrous to see how the diplomatists of the different parties overreach one another by cunning devices, in order to force the adversary to strike the first blow. France finds fault with Austria's despotism; the man who peopled Lambessa and Cayenne with French Republicans is shocked that Francis Joseph should fill his prisons with Italian Republicans. Austria, on the other hand, which has confiscated Cracow, canceled the Constitution of Hungary,²⁵⁰ appeals seriously to the sacredness of treaties. Russia, which is now suddenly reminded that a paper currency is a great evil, and, therefore, is making an enormous loan, has, of course, no warlike desires, but proposes four points as basis of a Congress. These are the exact counterpart of the far-famed four points proposed to Russia by Austria during the Crimean war.²⁵¹ They include the abandonment of the Protectorate over the Italian Duchies, a Congress to regulate the administration of Italy, and settle the reforms necessary in that country, and a revision of the minor points of the great Treaties, such as the right of garrisoning Ferrara, Comacchio and Piacenza,²⁵² which will become superfluous by a declaration of Italian neutrality. England takes up these propositions in good faith, softens them in form, and brings them to the notice of Austria. Count Buol, of course, hastens to accept them, but in such ambiguous language as not to leave any doubt as to his desire to discard them altogether. But he adds a new point, a previous general disarmament. Lord Malmesbury thinks this proposition very reasonable, and invites Count Cavour to dismiss a portion of the Sardinian army and to relieve the country from a great burden. Count Cavour has no exception to so excellent a suggestion, but pointing to the immense Austrian armaments in Lombardy, he turns to Count Buol and says, "After you." Count Buol answers that he cannot begin to disband his costly battalions unless Napoleon will do the same. Napoleon coolly replies: "I have not armed, therefore I cannot disarm. Neither Rothschild nor Péreire have I asked for a loan; I have no war budget. I keep up my army by the regular resources of the country; how can I then disarm?"^a Lord Malmesbury dumbfounded by the impudence of this answer, but still anxious to try his diplomatic luck, next proposes that the Congress should begin with and first of all decide the question of disarming; but the Stock Exchange, with every sensible man in Europe, laughs at his gullibility, and is preparing for the worst. The German nation are

^a The content of the article from *La Patrie* of April 12 is in *L'Indépendance belge*, No. 104, April 14, 1859.—Ed.

fairly roused; but in Hanover, the agitation against France, encouraged by the Court, has suddenly taken a different turn. Awakened from their apathy, people think the time has come to settle their accounts at home as well as abroad, and if the present state of suspense should last for a couple of months longer, Germany will certainly stand in arms against France, but will insist upon liberty and unity at home as conditions of her acting. The Prince of Prussia knows his countrymen in this respect better than Francis Joseph, or the King of Bavaria,^a and, therefore, tries to prevent the spread of the excitement, which cannot fail to become dangerous to his semi-despotic tendencies.

Russia now has a good chance either to destroy the Turkish Empire by revolutions in Bosnia, Bulgaria and Albania, or to wreak vengeance on the Emperor of Austria. Of course she would not go to war against Francis Joseph, but she might encourage and abet a Moldo-Wallachian invasion of Transylvania and a Serbian one of Hungary. It is, of course, through the Wallachian and Slavonian elements that the Czar will try to disturb Hungary, or else an independent free Hungarian State might become a more efficient barrier to his aggressive policy than the effete centralizing despotism of Austria.

The King of Naples^b is on the point of death. Great agitation prevails in the Kingdom; some speak of a Constitution; some of a Muratist rising. The greatest probability is a Ministry formed by Filangieri, Duke of Satriano, representing enlightened absolutism, according to the original Prussian fashion.²⁵³ Such a system, however, cannot last in the face of an Italian crisis, and would soon have to make room, first for a Constitution, then for a Sicilian rebellion, while Murat would fish in the troubled waters.

Written about April 11, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5624, April 30, 1859

^a Maximilian II.—*Ed.*

^b Ferdinand II.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

THE PROPOSED PEACE CONGRESS

Paris, April 14, 1859

The British Government has at last thought fit to initiate the public into the official history of the European Congress, that *deus ex machina* introduced on the stage by the Russian and French managers when they became aware how much they were lagging behind Austria in their preparations for war. It may first be remarked that the note from Count Buol to M. de Balabine, the Russian Ambassador, dated Vienna, March 23, 1859, and the other note of the Austrian Minister, addressed to Lord A. Loftus, the British Ambassador at the Court of Vienna, under date of Vienna, March 31,^a had been confidentially communicated by the Austrian Government to the Vienna newspapers on April 8, while John Bull did not become acquainted with them before the 13th of April. But this is not all. The note of Count Buol to M. de Balabine, as communicated by the English Ministry to the London *Times*, contains only part of the Austrian note, and omits some highly important passages, which I shall take care to insert in this letter, so as to enable John Bull to learn, via New York, the diplomatic news which his Ministry thinks it unsafe to trust to his sagacious mind.

On first view it will be seen from Buol's note to M. de Balabine, that the proposal of the Congress proceeded from Russia, or, in other words, that it is a move concerted by the allied chess-players of St. Petersburg and Paris—a fact hardly calculated to fill us with a peculiar admiration for the sagacity or the sincerity of the tenants of Downing street, who, even in parliament, had not

^a *The Times*, No. 23280, April 14, 1859.—*Ed.*

refrained from claiming a patent for that invention. From the note itself it becomes evident that Austria (and this point was carefully concealed in the announcement of the French *Moniteur*^a of Austria's accession to the proposal of a general Congress) agreed to meet the other great Powers in Congress conditionally only.

"If," says Count Buol, "beside this question" (viz.: the putting down of the "political system of Sardinia"), "it should enter into the intentions of the Powers to bring forward others for discussion, it would be necessary that they should be exactly stated beforehand, and, inasmuch as they should touch upon the internal régime of other sovereign States, the undersigned could not dispense with insisting, above all things, that the mode of proceeding in this case should be *conformable to the rules formulated by the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, under date of the 15th of November, 1818.*"

Austria consequently accepted the Russian proposal of a general Congress upon the four conditions: First, that it should be the principal aim of the Congress to put down Sardinia and act in the Austrian interest; secondly, that the protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle²⁵⁴ should be recognized as the basis of the conference; thirdly, that, "previously to all conference, Sardinia must disarm"; and, finally, that the points to be brought under discussion "should be exactly stated beforehand." The first point needs no comment. To leave no doubt as to its significance, Count Buol adds expressly that he considers it "as the only one essentially important for the moral pacification of Italy."

The second point, the recognition of the protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, would, on the part of France, involve a direct recognition of the treaties of 1815 and of the Austrian special treaties with the Italian States. Now, what Bonaparte wants is exactly the abrogation of the treaties of 1815, upon which Austria's hold of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom rests, and of the separate treaties which secure to her a paramount influence over Naples, Tuscany, Parma, Modena and Rome. The third condition, the previous disarming of Sardinia, is the anticipation of an advantage which a successful campaign alone could win for Austria; and the last condition, the preliminary statement of the questions to be debated, would cut off Bonaparte from the main result which, beside the delay necessary for his war preparations, he flatters himself that he will gain from the Congress, viz.: to take Austria by surprise, and, having once entangled her in the meshes of diplomatic conferences, compromise her before public opinion in Europe by forcing her to give the signal for the breaking off of

^a *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 84, March 25, 1859.—Ed.

peace negotiations by an unceremonious denial of demands suddenly put upon her by France and Russia.

The conditions upon which Austria, in her note to the Russian Ambassador, consented to accede to a General Congress may, then, be summed up as follows: Austria will take part in a European Conference settling the Italian question, if, before the meeting of that Conference, the European Powers agree to stand for Austria against Sardinia, to force Sardinia to disarm, to acknowledge the treaty of Vienna, and the subsidiary treaties based upon it; and, lastly, if every pretext for breaking the peace is taken away from Bonaparte. In other words, Austria will enter upon a Congress, if the Congress, even before meeting, binds itself to concede everything to Austria which she now declares herself prepared to enforce at the sword's point. If one considers that Austria was fully aware that the Congress was only an ambush laid for her by foes decided upon war, nobody can censure her for treating the Russo-French proposition in this ironical manner.

The passages of the Austrian document which I have commented upon, are those which the British Ministry thought fit to publish. The following sentences, which include Buol's dispatch, are suppressed in the Malmesbury edition of the Austrian note:

"Austria will disarm as soon as Piedmont has disarmed. Austria is anxious to keep the peace, because it wants peace, and knows how to value it, but it wishes for a sincere and permanent peace, which it justly believes it is able to secure without damaging its own power and honor. Many sacrifices it has already made in order to maintain the tranquility of Italy. Yet, until the preliminaries alluded to be formulated and settled, Austria may moderate its war preparations, but cannot stay them. *Its troops will continue to march to Italy.*"

After the Russo-French dodge had thus been exploded, England, goaded by her august ally on the other side of the Channel, stepped in to urge Austria to accept the proposal of a Congress of the Great Powers, which should take into consideration the Italian complications, and expressed her desire to see the Imperial Government acquiesce in the preliminary propositions hatched in Downing street. There is, perhaps, in the annals of diplomatic history, no document more outrageously ironical than Count Buol's reply to the English Ambassador at Vienna. In the first instance, Buol repeats his demand that, previous to any Congress, Sardinia shall lay down her arms, and thus place herself at the mercy of Austria.

"Austria," he says, "could not present herself at the Congress until Sardinia shall have completed her disarmament, and shall have proceeded to the

disbandment of the *Corps Francs*.^a These conditions fulfilled and executed, the Imperial Government declares itself ready to give, in the most formal manner, the assurance that Austria will *not attack Sardinia pending the duration of the Congress*, as long as the latter shall respect the Imperial territory and that of its ally."

Thus, if Sardinia will disarm, Austria will only bind herself not to attack *disarmed Sardinia pending the duration of the Congress*. Buol's reply to England's proposals is written in the true Juvenal vein. As to the British proposition that "territorial arrangements and the treaties of 1815 shall not be touched," Buol exclaims, "Perfectly agreed!" only adding that, also, "the treaties concluded in execution of the treaties of 1815 shall not be touched." As to the English wish to find means to assure the maintenance of peace between Austria and Sardinia, Buol interprets it in the sense that "the Congress shall examine the means of bringing back Sardinia to the fulfillment of her international duties." As to the proposed "evacuation of the Roman States and consideration of the reforms in the Italian States," Buol will allow Europe to "discuss" and "debate" these points, but reserves "the definitive adoption of the advice" tendered "to the decisions of the States directly interested." As to the British "combination to be substituted for the special treaties between Austria and the Italian States," Buol maintains "the validity of the treaties," but will consent to a revision, if Sardinia and France will consent to have debated their respective possessions of "Genoa" and "Corsica." In point of fact, Austria gave to the English propositions the same answer which she had already given to the Russian dispatch. Upon this second disappointment Russia and France moved poor Lord Malmesbury to propose to Austria, as a preliminary step, *a general disarmament*.^b At the Tuileries, of course, it was presumed that Austria, having got the start over all her rivals in the arming business, would give a pointblank denial to such a proposal, but again Bonaparte had reckoned without his host. Austria knows that Bonaparte cannot disarm without disencumbering himself of the troublesome weight of the Imperial crown. Austria consequently assented to a proposal which was offered only to be rejected. Hence great perplexity at the Tuileries, which, after twenty-four hours' consideration, has enriched the world with the discovery that "a simultaneous disarming of the great Powers cannot mean anything beyond the disarmament of Austria." Read

^a Volunteer detachments.—*Ed.*

^b The British Government made this proposal to France, Prussia and Russia on April 18, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23287, April 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

only the following scurrilous lucubration of the *Patrie*, a paper directly inspired by Napoleon III:

"In any case the proposition of a disarmament need only affect two powers, Austria and Piedmont—Austria who has concentrated beyond all precedent her military forces in Italy; and Piedmont who, in presence of the Austrian army in Lombardy, is compelled to respond to the menaces of war by the preparations for her defense. The question of disarmament proposed by Austria is a question which must first be settled; when she shall have recalled her army from Italy, Piedmont cannot but recognize the example which shall have been given to her.

"As to France, she has no occasion to disarm (*elle n'a pas à désarmer*), for the simple reason that she has no extraordinary armament; that she has marched no troops to her frontiers; that she has not even desired to use her right to respond to the threats of Austria—threats directed against Piedmont and against the peace of Europe. On the part of France, it cannot be a question either of reducing a single effective soldier in her army, or of taking a single additional cannon into her arsenals. The disarmament can only extend, so far as she is concerned, to an engagement not to arm.

"We cannot believe that Austria makes any pretension to this extent; this would be to nullify the pledge which, doubtless in a more pleasant mood (*mieux inspirée*), she desired to give for the peace of Europe, by proposing a disarmament of which she well knows that she must take the initiative."^a

Written on April 14, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5624, April 30, 1859

^a The content of the article from *La Patrie* of April 13 is in *L'Indépendance belge*, No. 105, April 15, 1859.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.—GERMANY ARMING²⁵⁵

London, April 22, 1859

In German universities, after the students have been dislodged, at about 11 o'clock at night, by the academical authorities, from their various beer-houses, the several societies among the fraternity generally assemble on the market-place, if the weather is propitious. There the members of each society or "color" begin a game of "chaff" with those of any other color—the aim of which is to produce one of those frequent and not very dangerous duels which compose one of the chief features of student life. In these preliminary controversies on the market-place, the great art consists in so wording your hits that no actual or formal insult is contained in them, although as much as possible you vex your opponent, and at last make him lose his temper, so that he comes out with that conventional, formal insult which compels you to send him a challenge.

This preliminary game has now for some months been played by Austria and France. France, on the 1st of January last, commenced it, and Austria replied. From words to words, from gesture to gesture, the antagonists drew nearer to a challenge; but diplomatic etiquette requires such a game to be played out to its full extent. Hence proposals and counter-proposals, concessions, conditions, qualifications, tergiversations, without end.

The last form the diplomatic banter had assumed was this: On April 18, Lord Derby declared in the House of Lords^a that England was making an ultimate effort, on the failure of which she should withdraw her mediation. Only three days later, on April 21, the *Moniteur* stated^b that England had made to the four

^a *The Times*, No. 23284, April 19, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 111, April 21, 1859.—*Ed.*

other Great Powers the following propositions: 1. To effectuate, previous to the Congress, a general and simultaneous disarmament; 2. The disarmament to be regulated by a military or civil commission, independently of the Congress (this commission to be composed of six commissioners, one of them to be a Sardinian); 3. As soon as the commission shall have commenced operations, the Congress shall assemble and proceed to the discussion of political questions; 4. That the representatives of the Italian States should be invited by the Congress, immediately after its assembling, to take their seats with the representatives of the Great Powers, absolutely, as in the Congress of 1821.²⁵⁶ At the same time, the *Moniteur* announced that France, Russia and Prussia have given in their adhesion to the proposals of England; and a telegram from Turin^a comforted the different stock exchanges of Europe with the welcome news that Piedmont had been induced by Louis Napoleon to do the same. So far, things looked uncommonly peaceful, and all obstacles to the Congress seemed in a fair way of removal. In point of fact, the scheme was transparent. France was not yet "in condition" for the fight. Austria was. To leave no doubt as to his real intentions, Louis Napoleon, by his semi-official press, made known that this disarmament could apply to Austria and Piedmont only; for France, not having armed, *could not disarm*; and at the same time, in his official paper, the *Moniteur*, worded his articles so as to give no pledge whatever that France was to be included in the "principle of disarmament."^b His next step would evidently have been to make the semi-official assertion about France not having armed an official one; the question being thus successfully placed upon the indefinite ground of military detail, where it is easy to carry on such a controversy almost interminably by assertions, counter-assertions, challenges of proof, denials, official returns, and other suchlike tricks. In the mean time, Louis Napoleon would have been able to quietly complete his preparations, which, according to his new principle, he may say are not armaments, for his wants do not consist in men (those he may call in any day), but in materials and new formations. He has himself stated that he will not be ready for war until the first of June next.^c In fact, if his preparations were completed by the 15th of May, he could, with the help of his railways, have his men on

^a *The Times*, No. 23284, April 19, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 109, April 19, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c See Louis Boniface's article dated Paris, January 29, *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 30, January 30, 1859. See this volume, p. 171.—*Ed.*

furlough called in on that day, and by the first of June they would have joined their colors. There is, however, much reason to believe that from the enormous dilapidations, irregularities, jobberies and embezzlements which have taken place in the French military administration, according to the good example set by the Court, the necessary preparations of material cannot fully be completed even at the period originally fixed upon by him. However that may be, this much is sure, that every week's delay is so much gain to Louis Napoleon, and so much loss to Austria, which, in consequence of the diplomatic interlude, would not only give up the military advantages derived from the start she has got in her war preparations, but would be crushed by the enormous expense at which her present preparations must be maintained.

Perfectly understanding this state of things, Austria has not only refused the English proposal for a Congress upon the same conditions as that at Laibach, but has sounded the first note of war. In her name, General Gyulay has caused an *ultimatum*, insisting upon disarmament and the dismissal of the volunteers, to be presented to the Court of Turin, allowing Piedmont three days only for decision, after which respite war is to be declared.^a At the same time, two more divisions of the Austrian army, of 30,000 men, have been ordered to the Ticino. Diplomatically, then, Napoleon has driven Austria to the wall, because he has compelled her first to utter the sacramental word, the declaration of war. Yet, if Austria, through threatening notes from London and St. Petersburg, be not induced to rescind her steps, the diplomatic victory of Bonaparte may cost him his throne.

In the mean time the war-fever has seized other States. The smaller Powers of Germany, justly considering themselves menaced by Louis Napoleon's preparations, have given vent to expressions of national feeling, such as had not been heard in Germany since 1813 and '14. They are acting up to that feeling. Bavaria and the neighboring States are organizing new formations, calling in reserves and Landwehr. The 7th and 8th corps of the German Federal army (formed by these States) which would number, according to the official status, 66,000 men for the field, and 33,000 men in reserve, bid fair to figure in the war, with 100,000 men in the field and 40,000 in reserve. Hanover and the other North German States forming the 10th Federal corps, are

^a The reference is to "Copie d'une lettre de M. le Comte Buol-Schauenstein à M. le Comte de Cavour en date de Vienne le 19 avril 1859", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 116 (supplement), April 26, 1859.—*Ed.*

arming in a similar proportion, and at the same time are fortifying their coasts against naval attacks. Prussia, whose war material has been brought to a higher state of efficiency than at any former period by the preparations accompanying and succeeding the mobilization of 1850,²⁵⁷ has been for some time past getting quietly ready for a mobilization of her army, is arming her infantry more and more with the needle-gun, and has just given 12-pounders to the whole of her foot artillery, while her fortresses on the Rhine are being placed on a war footing. She has ordered three *corps d'armée* to be got ready for hostilities. At the same time, her action in the federal military commission at Frankfort is a clear proof that she is pretty well aware of the dangers with which Louis Napoleon's policy menaces her. And if her Government were still hesitating, public opinion is fully on the alert. There is no doubt that Louis Napoleon will find Germany more unanimously and more heartily opposed to France than it ever was at any former period; and that at a time when there is less enmity than ever between the Germans and the French.

Written on April 21-22, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5631, May 9, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1456, May 10, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 922, May 14, 1859

Frederick Engels

PROSPECTS OF THE WAR²⁵⁸

We have not thought it necessary to reply to various easy criticisms made during the last two months,²⁵⁹ whenever we have undertaken to discuss the resources and the strategic conditions for the opening of the great and bloody war in which Europe is now involved. We have now, however, in the ample details which to-day crowd our pages—presenting an impressive picture of the first scenes in this awful and imposing drama—a justification of our views so complete and so minute even, and at the same time so certain to interest the public, that we may properly call attention to the subject.

Fully two months ago, we indicated the offensive as the true method for Austria to defend herself.^a We stated that the Austrians, having their Italian army well concentrated near to the Piedmontese position of defense, and perfectly ready and equipped for action, would commit a great mistake if they did not take advantage of this momentary superiority over their still scattered enemies by at once entering the Sardinian territory, beating the Sardinian army first, and then marching against the French, who must pass the Alps in several columns, and thus run the risk of being beaten in detail. This conclusion of ours excited a liberal share of dissenting comment on the part of various more or less eminent and more or less strategical critics; but we have found our judgment confirmed by that of every military man who has written on the subject; and finally it proves to be that of the Austrian generals. So much for that point.

^a See this volume, pp. 197-201.—*Ed.*

The war having thus been begun, what are the relative forces of the parties, and their chances of success?

The Austrians have in Italy five army corps—the 2d, 3d, 5th, 7th and 8th—consisting of at least 26 regiments of infantry, of five battalions each (of which one is a grenadier battalion), and 26 light battalions—in all 156 battalions, or 192,000 men. With cavalry, artillery, engineers and garrison troops, their force amounts, at the very lowest computation, to 216,000 men. We do not know how far this number has been exceeded by drawing into Italy fresh frontier regiments and men of the reserve. That it has been exceeded, there can scarcely be a doubt—but let us take the lowest estimate of 216,000 men. Of these, 56,000 men will be perfectly sufficient to hold all the fortresses, forts and entrenched camps the Austrians care for holding in Lombardy; but let us take the largest possible figure, and say 66,000 men. This will leave 150,000 men for the invasion of Piedmont. The telegrams give the strength of the Austrian army of invasion at 120,000; and these statements are, of course, not to be strictly depended upon. But, to be on the safe side, we will assume that the Austrians have no more than 120,000 men disposable for the field. How will the French and Piedmontese forces be placed to encounter this compact army?

Between Alessandria and Casale, in a position which we described some weeks since,^a the Piedmontese army is concentrated. It numbers five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry—or 45,000 men of infantry of the line, including reserves; 6,000 riflemen, and about 9,000 cavalry and artillery—total 60,000 men, the utmost which Piedmont has been able to muster in the field. The remaining 15,000 men are required for garrisons. The Italian volunteers are not yet fit to encounter an enemy in the open field. As we have stated, the Piedmontese position cannot well be strategically turned to the south—it may be turned, however, to the north; and here it is supported by the line of the Sesia, which joins the Po about four miles east of Casale, and which the Sardinians, if we are to trust to the telegraphic dispatches, intend to hold.

It would be perfectly ridiculous for 60,000 men to accept a decisive battle in this position, if attacked by twice that force. In all probability, some show of resistance will be made on that river—enough to compel the Austrians to show their full strength—and then the Sardinians will fall back behind Casale

^a See this volume, pp. 197-98.—*Ed.*

and the Po, leaving the direct road to Turin open. This may have happened on the 29th or 30th of April, supposing that English diplomacy has not caused a new delay in the military operations. The day following, the Austrians would attempt the passage of the Po, and, if successful, would drive the Sardinians across the plain to Alessandria. There they might leave them for a while; if necessary the Austrian column, debouching south of the Po from Piacenza, could destroy the railroad between Genoa and Alessandria, and attack any French corps marching from the former to the latter place.

But what do we suppose the French to be doing all this while? Why, they are coming down, with all haste, toward the future seat of war, the valley of the upper Po. When the news of the Austrian ultimatum reached Paris, the forces destined for the army of the Alps scarcely exceeded four divisions of infantry about Lyons, and three more either in the south of France and Corsica, or in the act of concentration. One more division was on the road from Africa. These eight divisions were to form four corps; as a first reserve, the divisions of the troops of the line at Paris were disposable, and, as a second reserve, the Guards. This would give, in all, twelve divisions of the line and two of Guards, making seven *corps d'armée*. The twelve divisions of the line, before the arrival of their men on furlough, would count about 10,000 men each, 120,000 in all, or with cavalry and artillery 135,000, and the Guards 30,000, making a grand total of 165,000 men. With the men on furlough called in, the whole of this army would reach 200,000 men. So far, so good; it is a fine army, large enough to conquer a country twice as big as Italy. But where could they be on or about the first of May, the time they are wanted in the plains of Piedmont? Why, McMahon's corps was sent, about the 23d or 24th, to Genoa; not having been concentrated previously, it will not be able to leave Genoa before the 30th; Baraguay d'Hilliers's corps is in Provence, and was to advance, according to some, by Nice and the Col di Tenda; according to others, it was to go on board ship, and effect a landing in the Mediterranean. Canrobert's corps was to pass into Piedmont by Mont Cenis and Mont Genèvre, and all the other troops were to follow as they arrived by the same roads. Now it is certain that no French troops set foot on Sardinian territory before the 26th; it is certain that of the army of Paris three divisions were still at Paris on the 24th, one of which left only that day by railway for Lyons; and that the Guard was not expected to begin its march before the 27th. Thus, supposing that all the other troops enumerated above had been concentrated on the frontier

and ready for the march, we have eight divisions of infantry, or 80,000 men. Of these, 20,000 go to Genoa; 20,000 under Baraguay, if they go into Piedmont at all, go by the Col di Tenda. There remain 40,000 under Canrobert and Niel to go by Mont Cenis and Mont Genève. This will be the whole which Louis Napoleon can make available by the time his assistance will be most wanted—the time when the Austrians may be at Turin. And all this, let us observe in passing, is perfectly in agreement with the indications we gave on this subject weeks ago. But with all the railways in the world, Louis Napoleon cannot bring down his remaining four divisions from the army of Paris in time to take part in the first engagements, unless he allows the Austrians to do as they like with the Piedmontese for a full fortnight; and even then, having eight divisions on two mountain passes, and the enemy on their point of junction in at least equal numbers, he stands but a poor chance. But a man in his position cannot, from political reasons, allow Piedmont to be overridden by the enemy for a full fortnight, and therefore he will have to accept a battle as soon as the Austrians offer it; and that battle he must fight under disadvantageous circumstances. The quicker the French get across the Alps, the better for the Austrians.

Written on April 28, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5634, May 12, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1457, May 13, 1859

Karl Marx

THE FINANCIAL PANIC

London, April 29, 1859

Yesterday being settling day in Foreign Stocks and Shares, the panic on the Exchange, which had commenced on the 23d, reached a sort of climax. Not less than twenty-eight failures of members of the Stock Exchange were declared since Monday last, of which eighteen occurred on the 28th. The sums involved, reaching in one instance the amount of £100,000, surpass by far the usual average of such "executions." The simultaneous advance by the Bank Directors of the rate of discount to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent from $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, at which it was fixed on Dec. 9, 1858, an advance consequent upon the efflux of bullion necessitated by the purchase of silver for shipment to India, concurred in a slight degree to heighten the disturbance. Three per cent Consols,²⁶⁰ quoted, April 2, at $96\frac{1}{4}$, had sunk, April 28, to 89, and for some hours even to $88\frac{1}{4}$. Russian $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent stock, quoted, April 2, at 100, fell on the 28th to 87. During the same interval Sardinian stock went down from 81 to 65, while the Turkish 6 per cent loan realized a decline from $93\frac{1}{2}$ to 57, from which point it rose again in a later hour to 61. Austrian 5 per cent stock was quoted as low as 49. The principal circumstances that created this enormous depreciation of home and foreign stocks, accompanied by a similar fall in railway shares, especially the Italian railways, were the news of the invasion of Sardinia by the Austrians, the advance of a French army on Piedmont, and the offensive and defensive treaties concluded between France, Russia, and Denmark.²⁶¹ It is true that in the course of the day the telegraph conveyed a denial on the part of the *Constitutionnel* of the offensive and defensive treaty between France and Russia.^a Yet, credulous and sanguine as the

^a See Louis Boniface's article in *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 119, April 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

Stock Exchange mind certainly is, for once it dared to discredit the veracity of French semi-official declarations. It had not yet contrived to forget that hardly a week ago the *Moniteur* had taken upon itself to deny that France was arming or intended to arm.^a Moreover, while denying the treaty, the French oracle confessed that an "understanding" had been established between the Eastern and the Western Autocrat, so that the denial, in the best case, turned upon a quibble. With the failing British stock-jobbers, there went down at the same time the Russian loan of £12,000,000, which, but for the sudden resolution taken on the part of Austria,²⁶² would have been swallowed by Lombard street. Mr. Simpson, the money article writer of the London *Times*, makes these curious remarks on the bursting of that loan bubble^b:

"One of the points particularly worthy of remark in the present state of affairs is the escape the public have had from the projected loan to Russia. Although the designs of that Power have been transparent ever since the premature termination of the Crimean war, through the influence of our 'ally,' and the subsequent meeting of the Emperors at Stuttgart,²⁶³ it was certain that no warnings short of absolute demonstration would be of avail to prevent her from obtaining any desired amount, if a house of standing could be found willing to undertake the transaction. Accordingly, when the scheme for getting £12,000,000 was put out a month or two back, the greatest elation and confidence were expressed by all the parties interested. English capitalists might please themselves! Only a very moderate portion would be granted them! People at Berlin and elsewhere were anxious to get it at one or two per cent above the price at which it was to be offered in the London market. Under such circumstances, there was little hope of any word of caution being heard. True, neither Messrs. Baring nor Rothschild, who are usually eager enough to compete in such matters, had shown any willingness to touch it. There were also reports of a mysterious concentration of 100,000 Russian troops in Georgia. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna^c likewise was said to have remarked openly that the Emperor Napoleon was quite right in demanding a revision of the treaties of 1815; and, finally, the recent contrivances for annulling the Treaty of Paris, as regards the Danubian Principalities,²⁶⁴ the tour of the Grand Duke Constantine in the Mediterranean, and the adroit movement for counteracting the pacific mission of Lord Cowley,²⁶⁵ might have been supposed sufficient to induce hesitation. But nothing can influence a sanguine English investor, bent upon what he conceives to be a stock that will yield him 5 per cent, and there is no measure to his contempt for alarmists. So the hopes of the contractors remained undiminished, and it was actually only a day or two before the announcement of the Austrian ultimatum that the last deliberations were held, in order to have everything in readiness to bring out this proposal at a moment's notice. On the very next receipt of tranquilizing assurances in the French *Moniteur*, to back those already furnished, that France had not armed and did not intend to arm, the whole affair was to prove a great success. The 'criminal' movement of Austria, however, in not waiting till her opponents had obtained all

^a *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 109, April 19, 1859. See also this volume, p. 296.—*Ed.*

^b *The Times*, No. 23293, April 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c V. P. Balabin.—*Ed.*

they required, spoiled the proceeding, and the £12,000,000 will now have to be kept at home."

At Paris, of course, the panic of the money market, and the failures consequent upon it, leave the London disturbances far behind in the race; but Louis Napoleon, having just voted himself a new loan of 500,000,000 francs^a by his footmen of the Corps Législatif, has rigidly forbidden the public press to take any notice of these untoward accidents. Yet, we may arrive at a just appreciation of the present state of things by perusing the following tabular statement, which I have extracted from the official quotations:

	March 24.	April 7.	April 28.
	f. c.	f. c.	f. c.
Three Per Cents	69 20	67 95	62 00
Bank of France, shares	2,865 00	2,840 00	2,500 00
Crédit Mobilier	805 00	707 50	530 25 42 00
Orleans	1,368 00	1,257 50	1,150 00
Northern	940 00	915 00	835 00
Eastern	682 00	627 50	550 00
Mediterranean	850 00	830 00	752 00
Southern	523 00	503 75	412 50
Western	600 00	537 50	485 00
Geneva	540 00	520 00	445 00
Austrian	560 00	536 25	406 25
Victor Emmanuel	400 00	390 00	315 00
Lombardo-Venetian	527 50	512 50	420 00 ^b

The monetary mind of England is at this moment heated with excessive anger at the British Government, whom they accuse of having made themselves the laughing-stock of diplomatic Europe; and what is still more, of having led astray the commercial public by their own willful blindness and misapprehension. In fact, Lord Derby allowed himself, during the whole course of the mock negotiations, to be made the foot-ball of France and Russia. Not content with his previous uninterrupted blunders, he fell again into the same trap on the arrival of the news of the Austrian ultimatum, which, at the Mansion dinner, he branded as "criminal," having even then not yet become aware of the Russo-French

^a This loan was to enlarge military contingents. For the discussion of the question in the *Corps législatif* see *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 117, April 27, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b This table was made by Marx on the basis of tables contained in *Le Moniteur universel*, Nos. 84, 98 and 119, for March 25, April 8 and 29, 1859, but the *Moniteur* gave no figures for the Lombardo-Venetian railway.—*Ed.*

treaty.^a His last offer of mediation, which Austria could not but accept, was a mere electioneering trick, that could result in nothing but giving Bonaparte forty-eight hours more for the concentration of his troops and paralyzing the inevitable operations of Austria. Such is the diplomatic acumen of that proud aristocracy which pretends to oppose the popular Reform bill because it possibly might wrench the management of foreign affairs out of the clever hands of hereditary politicians. In conclusion, let me remark that the insurrections in Tuscany and the Duchies²⁶⁶ were just what Austria wanted to give her a pretext to occupy them.

Written on April 29, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5634, May 12, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1457, May 13, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

^a Lord Derby's speech at a dinner at the Mansion-House on April 25, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23290, April 26, 1859.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

FAIR PROFESSIONS

The circular of Louis Napoleon of the 27th of April, addressed, through his diplomatic agents, to the Governments of Europe,^a also his address of the 3d of May to his Corps Législatif,^b show the Emperor fully conscious of and exceedingly anxious to allay the suspicions so generally entertained as to the motives and ultimate objects of his intervention in the affairs of Italy. In the circular he endeavors to make out that in the matter of this intervention he has all along moved only in conjunction with England, Prussia and Russia, all of whom he represents as equally dissatisfied with himself at the condition of Italian affairs, equally convinced of the dangers arising from the discontent and underhand agitation prevailing there, and equally intent upon preventing, by a prudent precaution, an inevitable crisis. But when he refers, as proof, to Lord Cowley's mission to Vienna,²⁶⁷ the Russian proposal of a Congress, and the support given by Prussia to these movements, he seems to forget that, instead of having Italy for their primary object, what those measures looked to and what originated them was, the threatened breach between Austria and France, compared with which, Italian discontent and agitation sank into insignificance.

It was only the sudden development of a peculiar interest on the part of Napoleon in Italian affairs that gave the Italian question any pressing importance in the eyes of the other European

^a See A. Walewski's circular to the French diplomatic representatives abroad of April 27, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 121, May 1, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b This refers to Napoleon III's "Proclamation. L'empereur au peuple français", *Le Moniteur universel*, special edition, May 3, 1859.—*Ed.*

Powers. Though Austria has been the first to commence hostilities, the fact still remains that but for encouragement given by Napoleon to Sardinia, in which neither Prussia nor England concurred, and the steps taken by her in consequence, there is no reason whatever to suppose that hostilities would have commenced. So far from merely offering the cooperation of France to settle amicably in conjunction with the other Powers the matters in dispute between Austria and Sardinia, the fact cannot be got rid of that it was not till France had made herself substantially a party to that quarrel that the other Powers felt themselves called upon to take any deep interest in it, and then not as an Italian but as a European question. The very circumstance that France alone feels called upon to protect Sardinia against Austrian attack, contradicts the position which it is attempted to establish, that upon this question of Italian affairs France has only been acting in cooperation with the other Powers. Both in this dispatch, and in his address to the Legislative Corps, the French Emperor disclaims with great earnestness all personal ambition, all desires of conquest, any wish to establish a French influence in Italy. He would have it believed that he devotes himself exclusively to the establishment of Italian independence, and to the reestablishment of that balance of power disturbed by the preponderance of Austria. Those who remember the professions which the Emperor made and the oaths which he took as President of the French Republic, will hardly be inclined to place implicit confidence in his mere declarations; and even these very attempts of his to quiet the fears and dispel the suspicions of Europe contain suggestions well calculated to have a contrary effect.

That Louis Napoleon is at this moment sincerely desirous to prevent, on the part of England and Germany, any interference with his war against Austria, nobody can doubt; but that is very far from proving that he looks no further than to a mere settlement of Italian affairs. Suppose him to aim at European supremacy, he would, of course, prefer to fight the different Powers one at a time. He is astonished at the excitement which prevails in some of the States of Germany, although that excitement originates in the very same reasons by which he explains his own haste to rush to the aid of Sardinia.

If France is conterminous to Sardinia, bound to her by ancient remembrances, community of origin, and recent alliances, the relations of Germany with Austria are the same, and still closer; and, if Napoleon is unwilling to wait till he finds himself in the face of an accomplished fact, to wit, the triumph of Austria over

Sardinia, neither do the Germans incline to wait for the accomplished fact of a triumph of France over Austria. That Louis Napoleon looks to the humiliation of Austria, at least to the extent of her expulsion from Italy, he does not deny. It is true, he disclaims any intention to acquire Italian territory or influence, professing that the object of the war is to restore Italy to herself, not to impose upon her a change of masters. But suppose the Italian Governments, whose independence, as against Austria, it is thus proposed to vindicate, should find themselves troubled, as in all probability they would, by those whom Louis Napoleon describes as "the abettors of disorder, and the incorrigible members of old factions"? What then?

"France," says Louis Napoleon, "has shown her hatred of anarchy."

It was this very hatred of anarchy to which he professes to owe his present power. In that hatred of anarchy he found his warrant for dispersing the Republican Chamber, breaking his own oaths, overturning the republican Government by military force, crushing out all freedom of the press, and driving into exile or shipping off to Cayenne all opposers of his sole dictatorship. Might not the suppression of anarchy serve his turn quite as well in Italy? If "the suppression of the abettors of disorder and the incorrigible members of old factions" justified the destruction of French liberty, might it not furnish quite as fair a pretext for the overthrow of Italian independence?

Written about May 6, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5639, May 18, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1459, May 20, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Karl Marx

AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA AND GERMANY
IN THE WAR

Vienna, May 10, 1859

The impatience and disappointment of the Vienna public at the slow-coach pace at which the war, seemingly commenced in so bold a manner, is dragging on, has induced the Government to put on all the walls of the metropolis the following placard:

"The probability, that all the news published in the Austrian papers in regard to the movements of the Imperial army should become known within some hours to the enemy and enable him to turn them to his profit, imposes upon us the duty of observing the utmost caution in all such communications to the public. The latest news is to this effect, that the Imperial army has taken up a position between the Po and Sesia, which may serve as a basis for offensive movements. It is possessed of all passages over the Sesia, and although the still continuing rise of the Po prevents any decisive movement to the right bank of the river, the ground between Ponte Curone and Voghera remains occupied by important detachments of the army; at the same time the railway bridge near Valenza has been demolished by us."^a

The Government regards, of course, with some dismay, the movements in the smaller Italian States. The following statement of their military forces has been printed at the War Office:

Tuscany—Four infantry regiments of the line—each regiment consisting of two battalions, each battalion of six companies, 6,833 men; one battalion of riflemen, six companies, 780 men; one battalion of insular riflemen, 780 men; battalions of volunteer jägers, 2,115 men; one battalion of veterans, 320 men; one penal division, 150 men; two squadrons of dragoons, 360 horses; one regiment of artillery, 8 batteries, with six pieces each; one battalion

^a From a government communication on the observance of military secrets, published in the *Wiener Zeitung* on May 9, 1859. See the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 133, May 13, 1859.—*Ed.*

of coast artillery, 2,218 men; one regiment of gendarmes, 1,800 men. This gives, with the respective staffs, engineers, mariners, etc., 15,769 men.

Parma—Gardes du corps, hallebardiers, guides, 179 men; two battalions of the line, one battalion of jägers, 3,254 men; one company of artillery, 84 men; engineers, 14 men; gendarmes, four companies, 417 men; with the staffs, commanders, schools, companies of working-men, 4,294 men.

Modena—Four regiments of the line, each one battalion only, 4,880 men; one company of jägers, 120 men; three companies of dragoons, 300 men; one field battery, with six pieces, 150 men; one coast battery, with 12 pieces, 250 men; one working company, 130 men; one company of pioneers, 200 men; beside some veterans, hallebardiers, etc., altogether 7,594 men.

San Marino—The little Republic musters 800 strong.

Rome—Two regiments of Swiss infantry (third regiment now forming), 1,862 men; two Italian regiments, of the same force; two sedentary battalions (a curious sort this of warriors), 1,200 men; one regiment of dragoons, 670 men and horses; one regiment of artillery, with seven batteries and four pieces, 802 men; gendarmes, 4,323 men, with staffs, engineers, etc., 15,255 men.

Naples and Sicily—4 Swiss regiments, 2 Neapolitan grenadier regiments of the guard, 6 regiments of grenadiers, 13 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of carabiniers, with the dépôt companies, amounting altogether to 57,096 men; 12 battalions of jägers, 14,976, and with the dépôt companies, 16,740; 9 regiments of cavalry, 2 regiments of heavy dragoons, 3 regiments of dragoons, 1 regiment of carabiniers, 2 regiments of lancers, 1 regiment of mounted jägers—8,415 men and horses; two regiments of artillery, each consisting of 2 field and 1 siege battalion, or 16 field batteries, with 128 pieces, and 12 siege companies—altogether, train included, 52,000 men. If the hallebardiers, engineers, guides, gardes du corps, &c., are added, we get at an aggregate force of 130,307 men.

The Neapolitan fleet consists of two line-of-battle ships, with 80 and 84 guns; fifty sailing frigates, twelve steam frigates, each with 10 guns; two sailing corvettes, four steam corvettes, two sailing goélettes, eleven smaller steamers, ten mortar-boats and eighteen cannon-boats.

The events in Tuscany were, in fact, more or less anticipated by the Austrian Government, and may, to a certain degree, be said to have entered into its calculations; but what fills it with real apprehension is, the cool, vacillating, and anything but friendly

attitude assumed by the Prussian Government. The Prussian Government is arming because forced to do so by public clamor, but simultaneously it paralyzes, so to say, its armaments by its diplomatic movements. You know that the present Prussian Ministry, and especially von Schleinitz, the Foreign Minister, belong to what is called in Germany the Gotha party,²⁶⁸ a party which flatters itself with the delusion that the wreck of Austria might enable Prussia to form a new Germany under Hohenzollern auspices. This party listens with affected credulity to Bonapartist diplomacy assuring it that the war is to be "localised" in Italy, and that the formation of a French corps of observation at Nancy under Pélissier's command means nothing beyond a little flattery to that "illustrious warrior."^a I may remark *en passant*, that the same number of the *Moniteur* which contains this comfortable doctrine, publishes an imperial order for the erection of a statue of Humboldt at Paris,^b a maneuver showing at all events that Bonaparte thinks it no more difficult to buy the Gotha party by statues than to buy the French Zouaves by sausages.²⁶⁹ This much is sure, that the Austrian Plenipotentiary at the German Diet at Frankfort^c has proposed a motion calling upon the Confederation to declare whether its own security is not endangered by the participation of Bonaparte in the Italian struggle; but the Diet has till now abstained from answering the question in consequence of Prussian intrigues. Prussia may be right in protesting against being dictated to by a majority of the diminutive German *Landesväter*, but then it was her duty to take the initiative and herself propose the measures indispensable for the defense of Germany. So far she has followed quite the contrary course. On April 29, she addressed a circular to the different members of the Confederation, which, in a rather imperious way, preaches to them reserve and caution.^d In answer to this missive the Governments of Southern Germany have, in very impressive language, reminded the Berlin Cabinet of the Roman adage, "*Caveant consules ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat.*"²⁷⁰

They have said that in their conviction the moment of serious danger for the security of Germany had already set in, and that

^a *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 127, May 7, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b Napoleon III's order of May 9, 1859 was published in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 130, May 10, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c Johann Bernhard Rechberg.—*Ed.*

^d Prussia's circular letter to the states of the German Confederation of April 29, 1859, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 108, May 10, 1859.—*Ed.*

the do-nothing time was decidedly gone by. The Prussian Ministry finds within its own dominions allies of very different feather. Beside the Gotha party itself, there is first the Russian party, which preaches neutrality. Then there is the very influential party, represented by the *Cologne Gazette*,^a of bankers, stock-jobbers and Crédit-Mobilier men, who by their material interests are subjected to the *Crédit Mobilier* at Paris, and consequently to Bonapartism. There is, finally, the pseudo-democratic party, which affects to be so exasperated by Austrian brutality, as to discern liberalism on the part of the hero of December. I may state that some members of the last mentioned party have positively been bought by napoléons d'or, and that the great manager of this trade in consciences resides in Switzerland, being himself not only a German, but an ex-member of the German National Assembly of 1848, and an outrageous Radical.²⁷¹ You understand that under these circumstances any anti-neutrality manifestation in Prussia is eagerly watched at this place, and that a short manifesto of Herr Friedrich von Raumer, the Prussian historian of the crusades, which is headed the "*Standpoint of Prussia*," and openly combats the Gotha party theory, is made the most of.^b From the following extracts you may judge the tenor of the Raumer effusion:

"It has been asserted by a certain party that Prussia ought to preserve the fullest independence, and not allow herself to be carried away by events or by an impatient agitation, which intends forcing German policy into a false direction, and to premature measures. The Government, they say, ought to oppose these tendencies with iron determination; and, one of the great Powers of Germany being absorbed by the Italian war, the other German Powers ought to rally round Prussia as the natural center of Germanic politics.

"We feel unable to subject ourselves to those monitions, without scrutinizing their just value. At first, then, the talk of the fullest independence of Prussia is but an exaggeration. She has, on the contrary, justly looked around, interpellated, uttered wishes, warned, recommended; because, locked up between four powerful States, she cannot, in fact, pretend to full independence, but must have regard to her neighbors' acts, without, however, sacrificing her own true mission. Prussia has entered the rank of the great Powers, not by dint of her bulk, but by the movement of her mind, decision and energy. Lacking these conditions, she, as history has shown, will sink down to lower regions, to be neglected, if not domineered over by other Powers.

"For four months diplomacy tried its utmost against an adversary like Napoleon III; but effecting nothing at all it has proved a complete failure. Is it not natural, is it not praiseworthy, if, taught by bitter experience, and with a full appreciation of

^a *Kölnische Zeitung*.—Ed.

^b F. Raumer's article "Der Standpunkt Preussens" was published in the *Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen* on May 8, 1859, and was included with his other articles in the collection *Zur Politik des Tages*.—Ed.

what is demanded by honor, duty and the interest of self-conservation, the Germans should begin to grow impatient, and decline any longer to consider fantastic clouds as solid rocks?

"How is it possible to cling unchangeably to the old standpoint, after all the essential circumstances have changed, and the most serious events have overcome us? Since nothing has been effected from the standpoint of mediation, is it not allowable to doubt whether it was just in the beginning, and whether it was not the greatest error to take up the same position between France and Austria which Prussia might occupy between France and Turkey? This pretended impartiality, without any leaning to the German side, has not won the French, but in Germany at large it has diminished confidence and estranged the public mind from Prussia.

"I repeat that without Germany Prussia cannot be a great Power in the long run. The proposal and advice to abandon Austria to her fate and to look to Prussia only, mean the ruin of Germany. In true Medean manner, Germany, which at last feels itself an indivisible unity, is to be cut to pieces and thrown into the witches' caldron, fully convinced that the cooks of diplomacy will take care to recompose and renovate her! We do not know anything more stupid, more unpatriotic, more dangerous, than the doctrine, openly preached and secretly smuggled in, of an Austrian Germany and a Prussian Germany; it is this damnable doctrine of a line of demarcation crossing and dismembering our fatherland which prevailed in 1805, and which produced 1806.²⁷²

"The interests of all Germany are at the same time Prussian interests, and in despite of all shortcomings, errors and misfortunes, Austria for centuries past, has always been the protector of Germany against Slavs, Turks and Frenchmen. In a few weeks the Italian war must take a decided turn. Will Germany be prepared in a few weeks should Napoleon, stimulating France by the prospect of the natural frontiers of the left side of the Rhine, ask Prussia's consent to those frontiers, by virtue of the treaty of Basel?²⁷³

"What we have lacked till now is not *caution* but *foresight*. Events have overrun all expectants and made them forget the stern old proverb: 'Time lost everything lost.'"

Not to miss the post, I reserve for another opportunity some communications on the commercial panic and the popular movements of this gay and naïve city.

Written on May 10, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5647, May 27, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1462, May 31, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Frederick Engels**THE WAR**

Napoleon III sailed from Marseilles on the 11th inst. for Genoa, where he was to take command of the French forces, and where preparations had been made to receive him with extraordinary display. Whether his military exploits will equal the indisputable triumphs of his diplomacy is a problem with regard to which we are likely soon to have positive demonstration; hitherto the only evidence of strategic capacity, which he has furnished, is to be found in his plan for operations in the Crimea, whose main features were of an antiquated description, and belonged to the military school of Bülow, of whom the great Napoleon said that his science was the science of defeat and not of victory.^a

That the French Emperor enters Italy with the prestige of an immense moral success is not to be questioned. Having, by superior shrewdness and cunning, driven the Austrians to assume the heavy responsibility of declaring war, he has had the good fortune of seeing them throw away, in a fortnight of virtual inaction, the only advantage which they could hope to gain by that momentous step. Instead of crushing the Piedmontese army, by superiority of numbers and celerity of movement, before the French reenforcements could arrive, the Austrian has wasted his opportunity and now has before him an allied army fully equal to his own, which is every day becoming superior; and instead of offensive operations and the advance of a conqueror, he may very probably soon be compelled to abandon even Milan and fall back to the line of the Mincio, where he will assume a purely defensive attitude in the shelter of his great fortresses. Thus, Louis Napoleon begins his career as a commander with the benefit of

^a See this volume, pp. 232-33.—*Ed.*

vast and almost inexplicable faults committed by his antagonist. His lucky star is still in the ascendant.

The first fortnight of the war offers us, on the Austrian side, a curious though monotonous story, very much like that narrated in the famous couplet respecting the King of France.^a On the 29th of April, the Austrian advanced guard crossed the Ticino, without finding any great resistance, and on the following day the main body followed. From the first movements, which were made on Arona (on the Lago Maggiore), Novara and Vigevano, the direction of the attack appeared to be toward Vercelli and the Turin road. The occupation of Vercelli, which took place on the 1st, or the morning of May 2, and telegrams from Switzerland stating that the forces of the invading army were concentrated on the Sesia, tended to confirm this view. But this demonstration seems to have been merely a feint, destined to place the whole of the country between the Ticino and Sesia under contribution, and to destroy the telegraphic communication between Piedmont and Switzerland. The real point of attack was pointed out by a bulletin of General Gyulay,^b from which it appears that Cozzo and Cambio formed the chief points of concentration, and that on the evening of May 2 his headquarters were at Lomello. Now, the first-named point being near the junction of the Sesia and Po (a little to the eastward of it), the second on the Po, a little eastward of the junction of the Bormida with that river, and the third a little more to the rear, but equidistant from both, a glance at the map will show that the Austrians are advancing against the front of the Piedmontese position behind the Po, extending from Casale to Alessandria, with its center toward Valenza. Further news, received by way of Turin, report that on the 3d they threw bridges across the Po near Cambio, and sent reconnoissances toward Tortona, on the southern bank of that river; and that they also reconnoitered nearly the whole front of the Piedmontese position, but especially near Valenza, engaging the enemy on several points, in order to induce him to show his forces. There were still rumors of an Austrian corps having debouched from Piacenza, and marched along the southern bank of the Po toward Alessandria, but this report has not been confirmed; still, taken in connection with the construction of bridges across the Po at Cambio, it was not an improbable movement.

^a P. J. de Béranger, *Le Roi d'Ivetot*.—*Ed.*

^b Ferenc Gyulay's war bulletin of May 3, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23298, May 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

This was the aspect of the campaign up to the 5th of May; and so far, and indeed through the whole time since, the Austrian maneuvers have been marked by an extraordinary degree of slowness and caution, to say the least. From the Ticino to the Po, at Valenza, is certainly not more than 25 miles, or two easy marches, and hostilities commencing on April 29, the whole of the invading force might have been concentrated opposite Valenza by the 1st of May at noon; the advanced guard could have completed their reconnoissances on the same day, and during the night the resolution as to decisive operations for the following day might have been adopted. We are still, with the mails of the *Vanderbilt* in our possession, as much as ever unable to explain the delay which has occurred. But as rapidity of action was the course imperatively enjoined on the Austrians by the circumstances of the case, and as Gen. Gyulay has the reputation of a determined and daring officer, it is natural to suppose that unforeseen circumstances must have compelled them to this cautious mode of proceeding. Whether the idea of a march on Turin by Vercelli was at first actually entertained, and only abandoned on the receipt of news that the French had arrived in Genoa in such numbers as to render a turning movement dangerous; whether the state of the roads, cut up and barricaded everywhere by the Piedmontese, had something to do with it, or whether Gen. Gyulay, of whose qualities as a commander-in-chief the world is completely ignorant, found himself embarrassed by the unwieldiness of the masses he had to handle—all this is difficult to settle. A glance at the position of the other party may, however, throw some light on the state of the case.

Before an Austrian crossed the frontier, the French began to pour into Piedmont. On April 26 the first troops arrived in Genoa; on the same day the division of Gen. Bouat passed into Savoy, crossed Mont Cenis, and arrived on the 30th in Turin. On that day, 24,000 French were in Alessandria, and about 16,000 in Turin and Susa. Since then the influx has been uninterrupted, but with far greater rapidity into Genoa than into Turin, and from both points troops have been sent forward to Alessandria. The number of French thus sent to the front, cannot, of course, be determined, but from circumstances to which we shall allude directly, there can be no doubt that by May 5 it must have been considered sufficient to enable the allied armies to hold their own, and to prevent any turning movement of the Austrians by Vercelli. The original plan was, to hold the line of the Po from Alessandria to Casale with the main body of the Piedmontese and

whatever French troops could be brought up from Genoa, while the remainder of the Piedmontese (the brigades of guards of Savoy), along with the French arriving by the Alps, were to hold the line of the Dora Baltea from Ivrea to Chivasso, thus covering Turin. Any Austrian attack upon the line of the Dora might thus be taken in flank by the Piedmontese debouching from Casale, and compelling the invaders to divide their forces. But, for all that, the allied position was a mere make-shift, and intrinsically bad. From Alessandria to Ivrea it occupied a length of nearly fifty miles, with one salient and one reentering angle; and, though the opportunity for a flank attack strengthened it considerably, still the occupation of such a long line gave great facilities for false attacks, and could not offer serious resistance to a determined offensive. The line of the Dora once conquered, while a flank attack would have been momentarily paralyzed by a smaller Austrian corps, the victorious Austrians would have been at liberty to return on either bank of the Po, and to drive the army of Alessandria back under the guns of its fortress by superior numbers. Had the Austrians acted with energy during the first two or three days of the war, this might have been easily accomplished. There were not then forces concentrated between Alessandria and Casale to endanger their proceedings; but, on the 3d, 4th and 5th of May the case had changed, and the number of French who had arrived in the position and were still arriving from Genoa, must have been large enough to swell the force defending it to about 100,000 men in all, of whom 60,000 might have been used for an attack by way of Casale. That this strength was thought sufficient to cover Turin indirectly is proved by the fact that even as early as the 3d both French and Sardinian troops were being moved from the line of the Dora to Alessandria; and thus the tardiness of the Austrians permitted the allies to conclude in safety that dangerous maneuver, the concentration of their forces in the position of Alessandria. With this the whole end and purpose of the Austrian offensive was lost; and what we have called the moral victory of the allies was consummated.

So far the Austrian General appears to have acted successively upon at least three different plans of campaign. First, it would seem that in passing the Ticino, he designed to march straight on Vercelli and the Dora; then, on hearing of the large French arrivals at Genoa, and considering the flank march past Casale too dangerous, he altered his attack, and turned toward Lomello and the Po; and, finally, he alters his mind again, abandons the offensive altogether, and fortifying himself on the Sesia, waits for

the advance of the allies in order to give them battle. It is true, our reports of his movements are very imperfect, being derived almost exclusively from French and Sardinian telegrams; but such would seem to be the only inference to be drawn from the prolonged inactivity of the main body of the Austrians, and the various unimportant and seemingly irresolute movements of their outlying detachments between May 5 and 11.

Should the allied advance be delayed by any accident a few days longer, it is not impossible that we may see still another change in the Austrian strategy, in the form of a retreat to the Ticino, even without a battle—for Gyulay's army cannot remain for any length of time inactive in the pestilential rice swamps where it was at our latest advices; and it must either risk an attack against very doubtful odds or take up a new position in a less unhealthy district. The immediate advance of the allies, and a battle, are, however, what is to be expected; and it is likely that we shall have news of it by the next mail. But under these circumstances it is not surprising to hear from Vienna that Hess, the natural successor of Gyulay in the command, does not approve of his operations; and it is pretty certain that unless the Austrians win the approaching battle, they will have a new General-in-Chief before the first month of the war is over. This, however, is no unusual event in the history of their wars.

Written on May 12, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5643, May 23, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1460, May 24, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 924, May 28, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Karl Marx

HIGHLY IMPORTANT FROM VIENNA

Vienna, May 14, 1859

The Prussian General Willisen (brother of the other Prussian General of the same name who got some fame by his works on military science,^a and lost it again by his conduct of the Schleswig-Holstein war) has arrived here, apparently sent from Berlin, to receive the brainless King of Prussia and his Queen^b on their return to Prussia. His real business is said to be confined within two points—first, to warn Austria to desist from her intrigues at the Frankfort Diet, since Prussia is not willing to be dictated to by the Vienna Cabinet, under the mask of that grammatical being the German Confederation; secondly, to sweeten the pill thus administered by the positive assurance that Prussia is now definitively resolved upon “armed mediation.” The latter ambiguous term is interpreted to this effect: that Prussia, having put her house in order and armed herself to the teeth, will make some new peace proposals to Bonaparte, on the refusal of which she will cast her sword into the balance. Concurrently with this important communication the Austrian Government has received, via Bern, the news^c that, apart from its secret stipulations not yet known, the Russo-French treaty^d obliges France to confine the war within the limits corresponding to its professed purpose of liberating Italy, while Russia binds herself on the first actual

^a W. Willisen, *Theorie des grossen Krieges angewendet auf den russisch-polnischen Feldzug von 1831* and *Der italienische Feldzug des Jahres 1848*.—Ed.

^b Frederick William IV and Elizabeth.—Ed.

^c The *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 110, May 12, 1859.—Ed.

^d The treaty between Russia and France on neutrality and cooperation, Paris, February 19-March 3, 1859. It does not contain the terms of which Marx says below.—Ed.

intervention of the German Confederation in the struggle to march an army of at least 300,000 men over her frontiers.

There is much grumbling here at Gen. Gyulay's old-fashioned strategy, and rumors are set afloat of his dismissal, Gen. Hess being named as his successor. But no such step seems yet to be contemplated, since Col. Kuhn, the most distinguished officer of the Austrian staff, has been sent to support Gyulay's vacillating counsels. Gyulay himself is a Magyar. He was born at Pesth, Sept. 1, 1798. At 16 years of age he entered, as sub-Lieutenant, a regiment of infantry commanded by his father; he was then transferred to the Hussars, was appointed in Sept., 1827, Major of the Kaiser-Uhloden, soon after Colonel of the 19th Regiment of Infantry, and advanced in 1837 to the dignity of Major-General and Brigadier at St. Pölten. In 1845, he commanded the 33d Regiment of Infantry at Vienna; in 1846, having received the dignity of Field-Marshal Lieutenant,^a he was sent to Trieste in the capacity of General of Division and Supreme Military Commander. In 1848, he found occasion to do some good service at that place. Placing himself, on his own responsibility, at the head of the navy, he dismissed the suspected Italian officers and sailors, put the men-of-war at the different stations on the Dalmatian coast in security, and saved some men-of-war already on their way to Venice.²⁷⁴ He ordered the necessary measures of defense at Trieste, Pola, Pirano, and other important points on the coast, secured the frontiers menaced by insurrection, and prepared for the offensive, which was taken in fact by Feldzeugmeister,^b Count Nugent, on April 17, 1848, after the arrival of reenforcements from the inland provinces. A rowing flotilla, organized by Gyulay, supported the coast operations of the army. On May 23, the Piedmontese fleet appeared before Trieste, but was kept at bay by the preparations he had made; its attempt at surprising the distant battery at St. Barcola, was likewise baffled. The Piedmontese fleet alarmed Trieste for the last time on the 8th of June, but, finding Gyulay well prepared, withdrew from the horizon of the town on the 4th of July, and from the Adriatic Sea after the battle of Custoza. In reward for these services, Gyulay received different orders from the Emperor and the right of citizenship from the magistracy of Trieste. Being intrusted at the beginning of June, 1849, with the Austrian War Ministry, he is said to have displayed great energy and activity. At the occupation of Raab,²⁷⁵ he formed

^a The rank in the Austrian army corresponding to Lieutenant-General.—*Ed.*

^b An army officer second to field marshal.—*Ed.*

part of the Emperor's suite. From Vienna, whither he had returned to his office, he hastened, on the news of the defeat at Acs,²⁷⁶ immediately to Komorn, there to take the necessary measures. Subsequently, he was sent on a tour of inspection through the whole empire, and presented his report to Francis Joseph. After an exchange, in July, 1850, of the War Ministry for the command of the 5th Corps at Milan, he was named Feldzeugmeister, and received the order of the Golden Fleece.²⁷⁷ After Radetzky's retirement, he got the command of the second army, which he has now led against Piedmont. He is one of the Austrian Generals, mostly Slavs or Magyars by birth, that have disgraced themselves by women-flogging and other infamous brutalities.

Two battalions of Vienna volunteers have already left for the theater of war, and a third battalion is marching off to-day. These volunteers were, at first, the heroes of the day, dressed as they were in the uniforms of the *Legionairs* of 1848,²⁷⁸ and belonging to the *autochthone* gentry of the suburbs. Balls and concerts and theatrical representations for their benefit abounded, and even the Austrian Waltz Orpheus, Mr. Strauss, composed a new march in their honor before his rather unpatriotic departure for Petersburg. It cannot, however, be denied that latterly the popularity of these newfangled warriors has sunk to a frightful discount. These primitive roughs of the suburbs made somewhat too free with beer and cigars and the better half of mankind, and sometimes rather overstepped the limits of even Vienna "humor." What they are, they tell themselves in their pet song:

"Ich bin ein ächter Wiener,
Führ ein lustiges Leben,
Und da hat mich mein Vater
Zu den Deutschmeistern geben;
Deutschmeister ist ein
Gar lustiges Regiment,
Hält in der einen Hand den Säbel,
In der andern das Ziment."

("I am a true child of Vienna, lead a merry life, and so my father has given me to the *Deutschmeister*; *Deutschmeister* is a very merry regiment, which wields in the one hand the saber, and in the other the *Ziment*." *Ziment*, I should add, is a beer-pot encompassing a rather awful quantity of fluid.)

One of the exploits of these "free and easy" people took a somewhat serious turn, and was justly reprimanded by the press. The barracks of our friends are situated on the Salzgries, a place

which, like the streets leading to it, is principally inhabited by Israelites. The Jews from Galicia having business to transact at Vienna, used also to repair to those rather dirty regions. Now, returning one evening to their barracks from the *Sperl*,^a where they had been publicly feasted and congratulated upon their eventual prowess, our heroic wags, in a rather excited state of mind, gave some foretaste of their future operations by a sudden onslaught on the unhappy Israelites. They demolished the windows of some, trampled others down, cut off the beards of many, and even threw one unhappy victim into a tar-tun. Quietly passing people were apostrophized by the question, "Are you a Jew?" and on the answer being affirmative, mercilessly beaten, with noisy exclamations of "*Macht nichts, der Jud wird geprügelt*" ("never mind, the Jew must be cudgeled.") The hypersthenic feelings of those Vienna wags may be judged from one instance: A shoemaker's apprentice, of the age of fifteen, being refused admission to the volunteer corps by the recruiting sergeant, hung himself in despair.

The monetary and financial disturbance is visible in all regions, from the highest to the lowest. First, as you will have seen before from the European press, the Emperor himself has pawned the crown jewels. Then, in the second instance, whatever organ of the Vienna press be taken in hand, a prominent column headed "Patriotic Donations," is sure to strike the eye. These patriotic gifts, tendered either for war purposes in general or for the formation of volunteer corps in particular, vary extremely in amount, some falling as low as 2 florins 12 kreuzers, some rising to the respectable hight of 10,000 to 12,000 florins. The money donations are here and there interspersed with presents of a more medieval character, such as a pair of revolvers from a dealer in arms, paper for cartridges from a paper manufacturer, stuff for uniforms from a clothier, and so forth. Between the individual gifts there figure, more or less suspiciously, collections by provincial communes acting under the official pressure of their petty magistrates and Bürgermeisters (Mayors). One feature, however, distinguishes all the more valuable contributions, that of being tendered not in money of any kind, but in State obligations and coupons of public funds, so that the State is literally paid in "its own coin." The most unmistakable sign of the monetary derangement which intrudes itself upon you at every step is the total disappearance of small coin for the ready money transactions

^a A well-known café in Vienna.—Ed.

of daily life. The very moment the suspension of cash payments was officially announced^a together with the financial measures accompanying it, the small metallic currency, copper as well as silver, disappeared as if by the stroke of a magic wand. Recourse was taken to the same primitive method of parceling out larger paper into aliquot parts which so much bewildered the foreign visitor of Vienna in 1848—every individual holder of a one-florin bank note, cutting it into so many fractions as he stood in need of for effecting his retail purchases. The Government, at Vienna and in the provinces, has tried to stop this dilaniating process by a proclamation warning the public that fragments of notes will not be received in payment by the tax-gatherer and by the bank.^b With regard to the bank this warning seems illegal, since there still exists a law of the year 1848, obliging the bank to accept such fractions of notes, and there is at the bank even a whole system for calculating them. It has been officially asserted that there were in circulation 28,000,000 of florins in small cash, a sum which, it is added, twofold exceeded the real demand. The authorities, therefore,

“are resolved seriously to oppose the silly speculation, which at present renders the small currency scarce.”

This supposition of a superabundance of small cash, is, of course, far from meeting the visible deficiency of the thing needful.

The authorities should have been aware that the premium on silver has risen enormously, that even copper bears a premium of 10 per cent, and that the peasantry are everywhere hoarding whatever sounds like metal. The Governors of Bohemia and Lower Austria have reminded the public of a law punishing all *agiotage* in silver and copper coins, with a fine of fifty florins, and even heavier penalties, but all in vain. Such repressive measures miss their effect, the more surely when coupled with such official announcements as that contained in the official part of the *Wiener Zeitung*, according to which the silver pieces of six kreuzers will be put out of legal circulation in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom from the 1st of June.^c The Government will finally be compelled to

^a The *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 101, May 1, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b “Oesterreichischer Kaiserstaat. Wien, 2. Mai (Französische Unterthanen. Papiergegeld)”, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 104, May 5, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c Concerning this announcement on May 7, 1859 see the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

act upon the petition of the Chamber of Commerce of Lower Austria, and, however unrespectable it may be, to issue government paper for retail transactions at the respective denominations of 5, 10 and 25 kreuzers.

Ascending now from the low regions of retail transactions to those of the money market and commerce, properly so called, we have first to note the failure, already known to you, of the eminent firm of Arnstein & Eskeles, which was declared on the 5th of May. They were the principal bill-brokers of the metropolis on whom the discount of bills not immediately to be transacted at the bank, and the rediscount of the industrial and commercial bills of the provinces principally devolved. Apart from the metropolis, the monetary transactions of the manufacturers of Hungary, Bohemia and Silesia, were concentrated in their hands. The firm boasted of a standing of 80 years, and its chief, Baron von Eskeles, united in his hands the functions of Director of the National Bank, Consul-General for Denmark, Chairman of the Discount Company of Lower Austria, President of the Company for State Railways, Administrator of the Southern Railway, etc. He was, in one word, next to Rothschild, the highest financial authority of the Empire. Arnstein & Eskeles had played a prominent part in the time of the Vienna Congress, when the *salon* of Frau von Arnstein formed a center of reunion for the political and literary celebrities of the day. One of the immediate causes leading to this failure, which involves a sum of about \$30,000,000, was the refusal of the Paris Crédit Mobilier to honor the drafts of the Vienna firm. Consequent upon their downfall not a day has passed without a whole list of failures being registered at the Vienna Stock Exchange of firms, among which the most important are those of Solomon Commando, Eidam & Co., G. Blanc, Plecher & Co., Diem & English, I. F. Gaartner, F. C. Schmidt, M. Greger & Co., the Brothers Pokorny, Moritz Kollinsky, Charles Zohler, A. Kirschmann, etc. In the Austrian provinces bankruptcies immediately connected with this disaster have broken out at Brünn, Prague, Reichenberg, Lemberg, etc., the most important being that of the firm of Lutheroth & Co. at Trieste, whose chief is the Prussian Consul and Director of the Austrian Lloyd.²⁷⁹ Beyond the confines of the Austrian States some first-rate houses at Breslau, Magdeburg, Munich, Frankfort, and the Loan and Commercial Bank at Cassel, have succumbed. Generally speaking, the present panic reminds one of the commercial panic at Hamburg in the Autumn of 1857, and the Hamburg proceedings for the alleviation of the panic²⁸⁰ will also be imitated by this

Government. Some relaxation will take place in the laws concerning bills of exchange; the National Bank will form a Committee for the support of firms only momentarily driven to a suspension of payments by the general state of discredit, and two millions of paper money will be granted to the banks of Prague and Brünn.

Written on May 14, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5655, June 6, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1465, June 10, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 927, June 18, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Frederick Engels

THE WAR—NO PROGRESS

Our latest telegrams from the seat of war, received yesterday by the *Asia*, extend to the 13th inst., precisely three days later than the advices by the *Vanderbilt*. These telegrams consist of the brief and rather confused bulletins issued by the Sardinian Government, the Austrians publishing no account of their proceedings.^a Nothing of great importance has occurred in these three days. The campaign continues to maintain its preeminence in the annals of modern warfare for slowness. We almost seem to be transplanted back to those antediluvian times of pompous and do-nothing warfare, to which Napoleon put such a sudden and decisive end. Here we have two immense armies opposed to each other on a line extending over forty miles, each army capable of acting with from 100,000 to 140,000 men in the field; the one approaches, the other reconnoiters, feels its way now on this, now on that point of the enemy's position, and then draws back, while the other army does not stir from the ground it occupies; so that a distance varying from eight to twenty miles now separates the two.

There are some facts to give a rational explanation to this anomaly; but still anomaly it remains, and this in consequence of the error committed in the beginning of the campaign by the attacking party. As we have already shown,^b the whole end and purpose of the Austrian invasion of Piedmont was foiled by an indolence and indecision in the Austrian movements which could scarcely be ascribed to anything but to the vacillation of Gen.

^a The beginning of the article shows signs of interference by the *New-York Daily Tribune* editors.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 316-19.—*Ed.*

Gyulay. The reports since received tend fully to confirm this view. The Austrians offer no explanations for the strange conduct of their army—a plain proof that they let the responsibility fall undivided on the head of the General-in-Chief. Indeed, it was only after a week's campaigning that the Austrian bulletins began to speak of the bad weather and the inundated state of the country as the reason which compelled their General to withdraw his troops from the fever-stricken rice-swamps of the Po. And now our well-informed London correspondent writes us that the Emperor himself, imitating the example of Louis Napoleon, is going with Gen. Hess to supersede Gyulay and take the command.^a

As far as we can at present judge, the campaign appears to have proceeded as follows: In the first instance, the Austrian right wing was pushed forward toward Novara and Vercelli, with demonstrations on the Lago Maggiore. The center, and perhaps the left wing, marching by Vigevano and Pavia in parallel lines, were left rather behind. The column from Pavia only reached Lomello on the 2d of May with its main body. The throwing forward of the right wing now appears to have had for its object, first, to direct the attention of the Allies by a threatened attack on the Dora and Turin; and, secondly, to bring into requisition the resources of the Upper Lomellina for the use of the Austrian army. It was on the 3d of May only that the attack of the Austrian main body upon the line of Casale and Valenza developed itself; on the 4th, demonstrations were made against Frassineto (opposite the junction of the Sesia and Po) and Valenza, while the right wing was drawn nearer to the center; at the same time a bridge was thrown across the Po between Cambio and Salé, and a bridge-head constructed on the southern bank of the river. According to some accounts the 8th Austrian army-corps, said to have marched from Piacenza on the southern side of the Po, here effected its junction with the main body, and passed the river after a short excursion to Tortona and Voghera, and after destroying the railway bridge over the Scrivia. According to other accounts, however, and to some of our latest telegrams, there is still an Austrian force on the road between Piacenza and Stradella. Whether the reported excursion to Voghera was intended as a feint against Novi and the communications between Genoa and Alessandria, it is difficult to decide; at all events, it misled most of the able editors of Turin,

^a The report from London of May 14, 1859, *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5647, May 27, 1859. It may have been written by Ferenc Pulszky.—Ed.

Paris and London into prophesying a decisive battle on the old battle-ground of Novi, or somewhere about Marengo, which prophecy was at once negatively realized by the Austrians withdrawing to the northern side of the Po and breaking up their bridge. After the first few days of May, indeed, very heavy rains had set in. The Po rose ten to twelve feet near Pavia, and the secondary rivers in proportion. The inundations of the rice-fields in the valley of the Po—no obstacle ordinarily to a marching army, as the roads are formed by dykes above the level of the inundations—now became a serious matter; the whole country and many roads were flooded. Besides, the Austrians did not march; they remained in this swamp, obliged to bivouac either in the roads or in the wet fields. Accordingly, after they had remained a few days in the midst of this flood, it became imperative to them to withdraw to higher and drier ground; as it is, they must have suffered severe loss from sickness, especially from cholera and fever. The consequence was a movement of concentration toward the country about Mortara and Novara, a retreat not from the enemy (for they remained quiet enough in their lines), but from the elements. Since then the Austrians have constructed fortifications on the line of the Sesia, and pushed reconnoitering and foraging parties close up to the line of the Dora, which forms the extreme left of the allied position.

In all these series of operations, we cannot see a single stroke of good generalship. In fact, the first favorable moment for an attack upon the allied position once having been missed, the whole advance into the Lomellina became destitute of any definite and important purpose. The pushing forward of the Austrian right wing was a decided mistake. There was no time to be lost in artificial maneuvering; to march straight upon the enemy, to attack and beat him before he could fully concentrate his forces, was the only correct plan of operations. If it is true that Benedek's 8th corps marched by the southern bank of the Po, this was another error; it was separated from the main body by a large river, and if the rain had set in a day or two sooner, the throwing across of the bridge at Cambio would have been impossible, and the Austrians themselves would have been in that disconnected position in which they expected to find the enemy. The whole passage of the Po appears to have been forced upon them by the necessity of bringing Benedek over; why was he not from the beginning on the northern bank? By thus bridging the Po and the operations connected with it, they were compelled to stay a few days longer in the pestilential swamps than they otherwise need

have done. Finally the whole campaign appears to have been mismanaged. There is no decision in all these Austrian movements; demonstrations are made in all directions, but we nowhere see a move for a real attack; and thus they grope their way all along the enemy's line until at last the inundations place an impassable barrier of some miles in width between the contending hosts. Then, for want of something better to do, and in order to appear at least to be doing, they reconnoiter toward the Dora; but all these reconnoissances are made by small flying columns which cannot act with any vigor and have to fall back almost as soon as they reach any advanced point.

While thus the Austrians are in reality doing nothing, their opponents seem to be busy at the same game. They are now as much concentrated as they can be on the long line they occupy. Their positions are as follows: The extreme left line of the Dora and Po, as far as Casale, is occupied by the French corps of Gen. Niel, which includes two divisions; with the left at Casale, consisting of two Piedmontese divisions and 3,000 volunteers under Garibaldi. The center, at Valenza, is formed by the French corps of Gen. McMahon, and a Piedmontese division—in all, three divisions. The right, at Alessandria, consists of Canrobert's French corps and one Piedmontese division—in all, three divisions. The extreme right, at Novi and Arquata, is Baraguay d'Hilliers' French corps and one Piedmontese division—in all, three divisions. The reserve is formed by two divisions of the French guard in Genoa. Estimating the division at 10,000 men—which will be high enough, as the French have not had time to recall their men from furlough, and will count less, although the Sardinian divisions are stronger—this would give a grand total of 150,000 men, which is about the strength of the troops now in line on the side of the Allies. Of these, 110,000 to 120,000 men might act in the field. That they have been so extremely passive may be caused partly by the want of preparation on the part of the French, who have very little artillery and ammunition with them, and partly by orders from Louis Napoleon, who undoubtedly means to reap the first laurels of the campaign. This new General arrived at Genoa on the 12th, where he was received with popular acclamations. On the 13th he saw the King,^a who came from the camp for the interview; on the same day he issued a Napoleonic proclamation,^b

^a Victor Emmanuel II.—*Ed.*

^b Napoleon III, "Armée d'Italie. Ordre du jour, Gênes, le 12 mai 1859", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 134, May 14, 1859.—*Ed.*

which we copy on another page^a; and on the 14th, he was to leave for the army.

The rains now appear to have also subsided, and another mail or two may bring us news of a more decisive character. This state of suspense and inactivity cannot last much longer. Either the Austrians must re-cross the Po, or a battle must be fought in the Lomellina. It may be that the Austrians have been looking out for and preparing a strong defensive position, in which to receive the onset of the allied troops. If they have found one, this would be their best policy; they cannot well retrograde without showing fight, and at the same time they would be able, in such a position, to bring to bear all the strength they now have in the field, while the Allies would be weakened by the garrisons left in Casale, Alessandria and Valenza.

In the mean time, both parties are looking for reenforcements. Austria has sent a corps of 50,000 men under Gen. Wimpffen to Trieste and its neighborhood, to form a reserve for the army of Italy; while Louis Napoleon has organized two more army corps for Italy; and there are rumors that Prince Napoleon will take charge of a motley expedition, to land somewhere in the Peninsula to conquer a kingdom for himself.

Written on May 16, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5647, May 27, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1461, May 27, 1859

^a This clause is inserted by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—Ed.

Frederick Engels
FIGHTING AT LAST

The *City of Washington*, which sailed from Liverpool on the 25th ult., and passed Cape Race on Thursday evening last, brings intelligence of more than usual interest from the seat of war.^a The movement of retreat on the part of the Austrians, and the allied advance for the reoccupation of the Lomellina, has decidedly commenced, though it does not seem to be progressing with great rapidity, since the Austrian headquarters, which had been removed to Garlasco, a farm near the Ticino, on the road from Vigevano to Groppello, on the 19th, were still there on the 24th. On the south of the Po, however, a conflict has taken place at Montebello, a small town on the road from Stradella to Voghera, between a body of Stadion's corps and the advanced guard of Baraguay d'Hilliers, in which, according to their own account, the allies had decidedly the advantage. Our reports of this affair are as yet necessarily of the briefest. The French say^b that Forey's division, 6,000 to 7,000 strong (its full strength is 10,000), with a regiment of Piedmontese cavalry, engaged an Austrian force, 15,000 strong, or the half of Stadion's entire corps, and that after four hours hard fighting they were repulsed with a loss of 1,500 to 2,000 killed and wounded and 200 prisoners, some of whom have already arrived at Marseilles, while the allied loss was only from 600 to 700. However, the defeat of the Austrians was not so decisive as to allow the allies to pursue the retreating enemy. According to the Austrian version,^c Stadion had sent a body of

^a This sentence is inserted by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—*Ed.*

^b The report from Alessandria of May 21, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 142, May 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c The report from Vienna of May 22, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23313, May 23, 1859.—*Ed.*

troops across the Po to reconnoiter. They had advanced toward Voghera as far as Montebello, when they encountered a superior French force, and, after a hot fight, retired in good order behind the Po. This discrepancy in the reports is not unnatural considering the exaggerations which always occur in such matters in the absence of positive official figures. We must wait for more precise intelligence before we can judge as to the importance and real features of the fight. At any rate, however, it was merely a set-to of outposts, and not a great field-day in which the strength of the opposing armies and the capacity of the generals is really tested.

While the second act of the drama has thus fairly commenced, the materials for a critical examination of the operations during the first act have received a very valuable addition in the letters of the correspondents of the London *Times*^a and the Augsburg *Gazette*^b at the Austrian headquarters. But for these we should be obliged to judge of the Austrian maneuvers by the Piedmontese bulletins, which, as a matter of course, were not intended to report the whole truth in the premises; and by the Austrian bulletins, which have scarcely reported anything at all. To fill up the many deficiencies, we had at first nothing but the contradictory rumors and surmises afloat among the officers and newspaper correspondents now in Piedmont—rumors the credibility of which was very slender indeed. And, as the Austrians had taken the initiative of the campaign, and up to their withdrawal from Vercelli had maintained it, the Allies preserving a comparatively passive attitude, the interest centered in that army of which we had no information at all, or, at the best, but negative information. It is not, therefore, to be wondered that, in matters of detail, we have been led into conclusions which are not now borne out by fact. It is more wonderful, on the contrary, that we should, on the whole, have had the good luck to guess correctly the main features of the campaign. There is only one important point in which we have differed from what is now stated to have been the original plan of the Austrians; but, whether this plan was distinctly traced from the beginning, as it is now said to have been, or whether the present “original plan” is but an afterthought, is still a question.

^a “The Austrian Army in Piedmont”, *The Times*, No. 23313, May 23, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b “Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien. Mortara, 16. Mai”, Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 144, May 24, 1859.—*Ed.*

We thought when the first news of the invasion of Piedmont by the Austrians reached us, that their intention was still, as it evidently had been all along, to fall by a rapid march on the Piedmontese army and French vanguard before the body of the French had time to arrive. We are now informed that this idea had previously been given up. The Austrians appear to have been under the impression that the French began to enter the Piedmontese territory on the 24th; and, although no French regiment put a foot on Piedmontese ground before the 26th, this false report may indeed have induced them to abandon all attempts at a *coup de main* against whatever troops might be in front of them. Consequently, the invasion lost that character of rapidity with which the pursuit of the larger object would have invested it. It was merely a commencement of hostilities, ordered by the Emperor, and with no further object than to occupy part of the hostile territory, to make its resources available for the invaders, and to deprive the defending army of the use of these resources. If this was the object, it was pretty evident that the invasion must halt at the Sesia and Po, at Vercelli and Valenza. This being the case, no hurry was required. Methodically, slowly and surely, the Austrian army marched into the Piedmontese territory. There was another point which had great influence on this mode of action. The Austrians moved by the two main roads which lead from east to west through the Lomellina; the one from Pavia to Valenza, the other from Abbiategrasso to Vigevano and Casale. The northern road, from Boffalora to Vercelli, was not used by them at all. Both these roads are intersected by numerous rivers running from north-west to south-east, two of which, the Tredoppio and Agogna, are of some importance. The bridges being destroyed, the roads broken up in many places, while the lowlands to the right and left of the roads were either inundated or soaked with water, the advance was much retarded, and the whole of the army, 150,000 to 180,000 men, had to march on these two roads. Accordingly, we are not now astonished to learn that the last corps of the Austrian army crossed the Ticino not earlier than the 1st of May; for a corps of 30,000 to 35,000 men, marching on one single road, with its baggage and train, will take up a length of at least 12 to 15 miles, or a day's march; and as three corps marched on the road from Pavia to Casale, it follows that the third of these corps passed the Ticino, at Pavia, two days after the first.

The advanced guard passed on the 29th at Pavia; this was a brigade of the 5th corps under Gen. Festetics. It was followed by

the whole of the 3d corps (Schwarzenberg) advancing to Groppello; on the same day another corps, the 7th (Gen. Zobel), passed further north at Bereguardo and went to Gambolò. On the 30th the 8th corps (Benedek) followed the 3d at Pavia, and the 5th (Stadion) followed the 7th at Bereguardo. On the 1st of May, the 2d corps (Liechtenstein) passed at Pavia. In this formation, the 7th corps forming the extreme right, the 5th, 3d and 2d forming the center, and the 8th the extreme left, the army passed first the Terdoppio, then the Agogna, and finally appeared about the evening of the 2d before the Po and Sesia. From this we see that the Piedmontese reports about large bodies of troops passing at Boffalora and Arona, were completely in error (a fact which Garibaldi's unopposed advance to Gravellona, on Lake Maggiore, fully confirms), and that they were equally wrong in supposing Gen. Benedek with the 8th corps to have issued from Piacenza and marched, in an isolated column, along the southern bank of the Po.^a The Austrians marched, on the contrary, on as narrow a front (of twelve miles) as an army of 150,000 men ever march. They kept together as closely and methodically as possible, having but a few flying columns on their flanks about Novara, Arona and the southern side of the Po. Now this very methodical march seems to us to prove that every idea of an attack upon the Piedmontese had not been given up. The enemy being notoriously incapable of offering serious resistance before his line of defense was reached, it would have been, but for this idea, subjecting the troops to unnecessary fatigue and hardships to confine them to such a narrow space. The road to Novara might have been used without detriment and to immense advantage, Vercelli being, under all circumstances, one of the necessary objects of a mere occupation of the Lomellina and Novarese. That this advantage was neglected, seems to us a certain proof that a hope was still lingering in the Austrian headquarters of finding a chance to attack, with superior strength and under favorable circumstances, the hostile forces about Casale or Alessandria. A *coup de main* against Novi (the nucleus of the railway connection between Genoa, Alessandria and Stradella) appears certainly to have been under consideration. To effect this, the bridge at Cornale was thrown across the Po during the night of the 3d, and Gen. Benedek passed over with his 8th corps. He behaved with great

^a See "Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 2. Turin, 30 avril au matin", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 124, May 4, 1859; *The Times*, No. 23295, May 2, 1859; *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 107, May 8, 1859.—*Ed.*

activity; in less than twelve hours he occupied Voghera, Castelnuovo della Scrivia and Tortona, destroyed the railway bridges; and would very likely have ventured on toward Novi, had not the rains and the sudden rise of the Po, which partly destroyed his bridge, compelled him to retreat in order to keep his communication with the main army. The bridge was restored, and the whole of the Austrian force was again concentrated on the northern bank of the Po. The weather rendered a stay in the inundated lowlands of the Po impossible; consequently, the army took up a position further north, between Garlasco, Mortara and Vercelli, profiting by the proximity of the main forces to the Sesia, to reconnoiter and forage in the district west of that river. This they accomplished without finding any resistance worth speaking of; and on the 9th abandoned the western bank of the Sesia except Vercelli, removing their headquarters to Mortara, where they remained as we have said, till the 19th. While at Belgiojoso they threw a bridge across the Po, near the mouth of the Ticino, and a corps—it is not known how strong or how composed—occupied the position of Stradella, and foraged the districts of Southern Piedmont, adjoining the duchy of Parma. We suspect that this was the corps with which Forey had the battle at Montebello. But on this point we must wait for more positive information. The Sardinians are apparently on the point of experiencing the full delights of the French alliance. Their army is to be cut up; instead of forming a separate corps, and earning its own glory, each of its five divisions is to be made an appendix to one of the five French army corps, in which, of course, it will be completely merged, so that all the generalship and all the glory will belong to the French exclusively. Genoa, forts and all, has already passed completely into the possession of the French; and now the Sardinian army will cease to exist, except as a sort of appendix to the French. The Napoleonic liberation of Italy is indeed beginning to dawn. Though there is nothing surprising or improbable in the charges of brutal atrocity and plundering in the Lomellina, which the Sardinians bring against the Austrians, it is but just to say that the correspondence of the London *Times*^a and the Augsburg *Gazette*,^b from the Austrian headquarters, casts a different light on the matter. According to these authorities, the hatred of the

^a "The Austrian Army in Piedmont", *The Times*, No. 23309, May 18, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b "Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien. Lomello, 3. Mai," Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

peasantry in the Lomellina, as well as in Lombardy, against the landlords far exceeds their aversion against the foreign oppressor. Now, the landlords of the Lomellina (formerly an Austrian province) are mostly *sudditi misti*, mixed subjects, belonging to Austria as well as to Piedmont. All the great nobles of Milan have large possessions in the Lomellina. They are Piedmontese, and anti-Austrian at heart; and, by contrast, the peasantry of the province rather lean toward Austria. This is proved by the cordial reception the Austrians have found in the Lomellina, and it would appear that their requisitions and exactions have been as much as possible confined to the property of the nobles, and to the towns, the seats of Italian patriotism, while the peasantry have been as much as possible spared. This policy is essentially Austrian, and has been so ever since 1846²⁸¹; and it explains at once the outcry made in the Piedmontese press about requisitions which do not exceed, after all, what is customary in modern warfare, and do not reach what French troops have been in the habit of exacting.

Written about May 24, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5655, June 6, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1464, June 7, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 926, June 11, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Frederick Engels

THE BATTLE OF MONTEBELLO

The mails of the *Africa* add little to our previous knowledge with regard to this famous battle, of which such great account has been made by the Bonapartist press on both sides of the Atlantic.^a

Of Gyulay's report^b we have as yet only a brief telegraphic extract; and the mass of the French and Sardinian accounts are but the gossip of Turin and Paris, with so small pretensions to accuracy that they do not even give correctly the numbers of the regiments engaged. The deficiency is indeed supplied to some extent by Gen. Forey's report^c which we received by the *City of Washington* on Monday night; but Forey does not undertake to state either the strength or the losses of the Austrians. From Baraguay d'Hilliers, unfortunately, we have nothing; for as there were troops of his corps engaged, in addition to Forey's division, his report would certainly clear up some doubtful points. But, while waiting for more ample and authentic intelligence, we proceed to make some observations founded on a careful comparison of all the documents before us, which may not be without their value. The Austrians, having been informed that a movement of the French toward the line of the Po, between Pavia and Piacenza, was in contemplation, had a bridge thrown across that river at Vaccarizza, not far from Pavia. The corps of Gen. Stadion was sent over to reconnoiter the position and the

^a This sentence is inserted by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—*Ed.*

^b "Official Bulletin Published To-day. Vienna, May 26", *The Times*, No. 23317, May 27, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c "Rapport officiel de M. le général Forey, transmis par S. Exc. le maréchal Baragaey d'Hilliers à l'Empereur", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 114, May 24, 1859.—*Ed.*

intentions of the enemy. Stadion occupied the position of the Stradella, a defile close to the river, where a spur of the Apennines, over which there are no carriage-roads, approaches the Po, and sent three brigades (15 battalions, with some eighteen guns and perhaps some cavalry) toward Voghera. The Austrians, no doubt leaving strong parties on their line of march to secure their retreat, met the enemy's outposts in front of Casteggio, and drove them through the town and through the village of Montebello. They advanced to the next village, Genestrello; but there they were met by a brigade of Gen. Forey's division (Brigade Beuret, 17th battalion of Chasseurs, 74th and 84th regiments of the line), and the combat became stationary. At this period, the Austrians evidently had but a few troops engaged—perhaps a brigade. The French were speedily reenforced by four battalions of Forey's other brigade (Blanchard, 98th, and one battalion of the 91st of the line). This gave them the superiority in numbers. Beuret's brigade was formed for the attack; took Genestrello, and afterward Montebello, after an obstinate fight; but at Casteggio, behind the small river on which it is situated, the Austrians made a stand. They very likely received fresh supports at this point, for they drove the French back in disorder upon Montebello, and were on the point of entering that village again when they were met by a portion of Gen. Vinoy's division, consisting of the 6th battalion of Chasseurs and the 52d regiment of the line. This again turned the scale in favor of the French, and the Austrians retreated in good order to Casteggio, where they left a rear-guard, until their columns had fairly got in marching order. Having thus accomplished their object, and ascertained where the corps of Baraguay d'Hilliers (forming the extreme right wing of the French) was posted, they retreated unmolested across the Po, certain that, so far, there was no intention on the part of the allies to advance toward Piacenza.

The Austrians cannot have had more than about two brigades on the battle-field, for three battalions at least must have been left on the road, and two more were required to fight two battalions of the French 91st at Oriolo, from which reason only one battalion of this regiment fought at Montebello. Of these two brigades or ten battalions, a portion only can have been engaged; the Austrian General, who should engage his last reserves in a reconnoissance, would certainly be very severely blamed.

On the French side there were three regiments (74th, 84th and 98th), and one battalion of the line (of the 91st), beside one battalion of Chasseurs; in all eleven battalions, supported at the

end of the battle by two battalions of the 52d, and one of the 6th Chasseurs. Thus, all in all, we have fourteen^a battalions of French against some ten Austrian battalions; and although the latter are certainly stronger, still the numerical superiority was on the side of the French when the turn of the fight came. Independent of this, it is to be remembered that the Austrians did not fight for victory so much as to compel their opponents to show what strength they had on a given point; and this object they fully accomplished. It is, therefore, absurd to regard this insignificant engagement as a victory of importance. With the gigantic armies now opposed to each other on the Italian plains, an affair like that of Montebello is of no more account than a mere collision of outposts in wars of smaller magnitude; and if this be a victory where are the fruits of it? The French say they took 140 wounded and 60 unwounded prisoners; no more than they had a right to expect after a couple of hours' struggle for a village. They also took one ammunition wagon and lost one. But pursuit there was none; there was no attempt to reap the fruits of the victory, although the French had plenty of Piedmontese cavalry. The Austrians evidently gave their opponents the last repulse, and then marched away in perfect order and unmolested.

Written about May 24, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5659, June 10, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1465, June 10, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 927, June 18, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

^a The *New-York Daily Tribune* has "fifteen".—Ed.

Karl Marx

A PRUSSIAN VIEW OF THE WAR

Berlin, May 24, 1859

The war got up by the French autocrat is sure not only to be not "localized" in the sense of the political slang, according to which the term is understood to mean that the operations of war are not to be carried beyond the limits of the Italian Peninsula; the war, on the contrary, will not be confined even within the bounds of a simple war to be fought between arbitrary governments and to be decided by the action of drilled armies. In its progress it will turn into a general revolutionary conflagration of continental Europe, out of which not many of the present rulers are likely to save their crowns and their dynasties. Germany may become the center of the revulsion, as it must become the center of military operations the very moment Russia has made ready to throw her sword into the balance. Not much reasoning is required in order to arrive at the conclusion that a serious defeat on the battle-field will lead to revolutionary convulsions in France or in Austria, but Berlin is perhaps the only place which affords the data indispensable for calculating the rude trials Germany is to pass through in no distant future. Day by day you may discern, almost with the naked eye, the growth of the conditions which, when developed to a certain degree of maturity, will produce a tremendous crisis hardly yet suspected by the vulgar of all ranks. I may sum up the symptoms of the coming storm in a few words: The jealous rivalry of the German Princes, which condemns them to inactivity during the first phase of the war; the social misery and disaffection, spreading like wild-fire from the Vistula to the Rhine, which will add civil commotions to foreign aggression during the second phase of the war; and lastly, the outbreak of the Slavonian populations incorporated with Germany, which will

join an internal struggle of races to a foreign war and a revolutionary dislocation.

Now, let us first consider the social basis the German Princes will stand upon, when at last the force of circumstances shall have compelled them to decide upon some common course of action. You are aware that the period from 1849 to 1859 marks an epoch unprecedented in the economical development of Germany. During that time it has, so to say, been converted from an agricultural into an industrial country. Take one single city, Berlin, for instance: In 1848, it mustered hardly 50,000 manufacturing laborers, male and female, while at this moment their aggregate number has expanded to 180,000. Take one single branch of industry: Before 1848, the export of wool to England, France and other countries formed one of the principal German resources, while at the present moment the home-grown German wool hardly suffices for the consumption of the home manufactories. Simultaneously with the development of manufactories, railways, steam navigation, and exploration of mines, there has suddenly sprung up a credit system not only proportionate to the general progress of industry and commerce, but fostered beyond its legitimate bounds by the hot-house contrivances of the *Crédit Mobilier* imported from France. The peasantry and the small middle class, including, until lately, the immense majority of the nation, had, before the revolution of 1848, quietly taken to the old Asiatic method of hoarding hard money, but have now replaced it by paper securities of all sorts, all colors, and all denominations. The Hamburg crisis of 1857 had slightly shaken, but not seriously damaged this fabric of new-fangled prosperity, which now reels at the very first roar of the cannon on the banks of the Po and Ticino. You have doubtless already been informed of the reaction of the Austrian commercial crisis upon the rest of Germany, and of the bankruptcies following each other in rapid succession at Leipsic, Berlin, Munich, Augsburg, Magdeburg, Cassel, Frankfort and other commercial centers of Germany. These disasters, however, denote only transitory catastrophes in the higher commercial spheres. To give an idea of the real state of things, I think it best to call your attention to a proclamation of the Prussian Government just published, in which, referring to the dangerous disbandment of whole industrial armies in Silesia, Berlin, Saxony, and Rhenish Prussia, it states that it can *not* listen to the petitions of the Chambers of Commerce at Berlin, Breslau, Stettin, Danzig and Magdeburg, recommending the ambiguous experiment of issuing more inconvertible paper money, and

declines still more positively to employ the laborers on public works solely for the purpose of affording them occupation and wages.^a The latter demand certainly sounds strange at a moment when the Government, from want of means, was forced to suddenly stop the public works already in progress. The single fact that, at the very beginning of the war, the Prussian Government should be forced to issue such a proclamation speaks volumes. Add to this sudden interruption of industrial life, a general imposition of new taxes throughout the whole of Germany, a general rise in the price of first necessities, and a general disorganization of all business concerns by the calling in of the reserves and the Landwehr, and you may realize a faint idea of the proportions which social misery will reach in some months. The times, however, are passed when the bulk of the German people used to consider worldly misfortunes as inevitable inflictions sent from heaven. There is a low, but audible popular voice murmuring already the words: "Responsibility! If the revolution of 1848 had not been crushed by fraud and violence, France and Germany would not again be arrayed in arms against each other. If the brutal subduers of the German revolution had not lowered their crowned heads before a Bonaparte and an Alexander, there could have been no war, even now." Such are the low grumblings of the popular voice, which, by and by, will speak in accents of thunder.

I come now to the spectacle which the German Princes exhibit before the eyes of a rather impatient public. The Austrian Cabinet, since the beginning of January, had put in motion all resorts of diplomatic intrigue to induce the German States to concentrate a great federal army, into which Austrian forces were to enter to a large extent, on some point of Southern Germany, which concentration should expose France to an attack on its eastern frontiers. In this way the German Confederation was to be inveigled into an offensive war, while, at the same time, Austria reserved for herself the direction of that war. A resolution in that sense, proposed to the German Diet at Frankfort, on the 13th of May, by Hanover,^b was met by Herr von Usedom, the Prussian

^a "Circular-Erlass vom 21. Mai 1859—betreffend die Bewilligung von Staats-Prämien für die Ausführung neuer Chausseebaprojekte in solchen Fällen, wo derartige Bauten zur Vorbeugung oder Beseitigung von Notständen für erforderlich erachtet werden", *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 121, May 24, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b For the resolution see the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 141, May 21, 1859.—*Ed.*

Plenipotentiary, with a formal protest "of his Government."^a Hence a general outburst of patriotic indignation on the part of the Princes of Southern Germany. The counterpart was now enacted by Prussia.

The Prussian Government, on the prorogation of its Parliament, had secured itself a passing popularity by declaring that it was resolved on a line of "armed mediation."^b Hardly were the Chambers dismissed when the "armed mediation" shrunk together to the more modest dimensions of a refusal on the part of Prussia to declare itself neutral, as called upon to do by France and Russia. The negative prowess, although sufficient to arouse the wrath of the Court of St. Petersburg, was far from coming up to the expectations of the Prussian people. The armaments of the Western and Eastern fortresses, coupled as they were with the calling in of the reserves and the Landwehr, were intended to allay the popular clamor thus raised. On May 19, however, Herr von Usedom, in the name of his Government, asked the German Diet to put the Federal Army of Observation under the direct command of Prussia, and leave to her the whole initiative of the military measures to be taken. Now it was the turn of the minor German Princes, secretly backed by Austria, to verify their patriotic pretensions. Bavaria declared that the time was not yet come to subject the army of the Wittelsbachers to the commands of the Hohenzollerns. Hanover, with a rancorous "*Tu quoque,*"^c reminded Prussia of its protest against a Federal army of observation, to be concentrated on a point of Southern Germany. Saxony, on its part, saw no reason why its august ruler should not be intrusted himself with the supreme command, if it were only with a view to set aside the conflicting pretensions of the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. Württemberg almost preferred French invasion to Prussian supremacy; and in this way all the worst reminiscences of the Holy German Empire²⁸² boasted an ignominious revival. The nullification of Germany for the moment is the sum total of these bickerings between its diminutive rulers. The cry for the restoration of the German National Parliament is only the first weak protest, not on the part of the revolutionary

^a This protest was made on May 19, 1859. See the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, No. 118, May 22, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b From the Prince of Prussia's speech at the closing session of the two Chambers of the Prussian Diet on May 14, 1859. See the *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung*, No. 113, May 15, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c "You too."—*Ed.*


masses, but of the anxious, mediating middle classes, against those dynastic obstructives.

I shall take another occasion to speak of the Slavonian troubles preparing in Germany.

Written on May 24, 1859


Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5659 and the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1465, June 10, 1859



Das Volk.

Offic: 3, Kurfürst-Street, Döbeln.



Preis: 4

Editor: Conrad 21. Mai 1859.

Preis: 2 Pfenn.

Frederick Engels

THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY²⁸³

The campaign in Italy, which by now has lasted almost a month, has taken a peculiar and unexpected course. Two large armies, each of not much less than 200,000 men, concentrated opposite each other in the first days of May. While the outposts are within cannon range of one another, the two main bodies watch each other, put out feelers now here, now there, engage in light fighting at isolated points, make changes in their fronts, extend one wing or the other; but there are no large-scale encounters. This way of waging war seems out of keeping with the modern system of rapid decisive blows; it seems to be a step backwards from the lightning-quick moves and short campaigns of Napoleon.

Since Napoleon two new elements have changed warfare significantly. The first is the improved defence of states by entrenched camps and groups of fortresses at suitable points of the terrain. The fortresses of Napoleon's times were either too insignificant, too isolated from one another, or in terrain that was too indifferent strategically to raise serious obstacles to his operations. A victory in the open field or an outflanking march forced the enemy army away from its fortresses.

What fortifications can do was proved by Danzig in 1813, the quadrilateral of fortresses in Lombardy in 1848, Komorn in 1849, Sevastopol in 1855.²⁸⁴ At the present time the position of the Franco-Piedmontese behind the Po and the Tanaro, between Casale, Alessandria and Valenza, forms such a system of grouped fortresses which shields an army even against considerably larger forces. The French succeeded in throwing so many troops behind this position before the Austrians arrived that an attack lost all prospects of decisive success, so that time was gained to bring up

the rest of the French troops and assemble all their supplies and equipment. This brought the Austrian offensive to a halt at Casale and Valenza, and since neither a frontal attack nor a serious outflanking of the position was possible, there was nothing else the Austrians could do but make demonstrations on the flanks, west of the Sesia and south of the Po, combined with the requisition of the useful resources for the army available in those districts.

The second factor that has changed warfare significantly since the time of Napoleon is steam. It was only by means of railways and steamships that the French were able to throw such masses of troops into Piedmont in the five days between the delivery of the Austrians' ultimatum and their actual invasion that any Austrian attack on the Piedmontese position was doomed to failure, and so to reinforce these masses during the following week that by May 20 at least 130,000 French were in the line between Asti and Novi.

The inevitable corruption and administrative disorder under the rule of an adventurer like Louis Bonaparte, however, result in the material required for the French campaign arriving only slowly and inadequately. In favourable contrast to this are the order and rapidity with which the Austrian army corps were transferred to Italy in full combat readiness. This cannot but affect the future course of the war.

The Austrians cannot advance because they have come up against the position between the Piedmontese fortresses; the French cannot because their armament is not yet complete. This is the reason for the operations coming to a standstill, and for the unmerited interest in the small action of Montebello. The whole affair comes down to the following: The Austrians received word that the French were shifting their right wing towards Piacenza; this movement aroused the suspicion that the intention was to cross the Po between Pavia and Piacenza and thus outflank the Austrian position in the Lomellina in the direction of Milan. The Austrian Fifth Army Corps (Stadion) therefore sent three brigades over a bridge thrown across the Po at Vaccarizza (below Pavia), in order to occupy the position before the Stradella and carry out a reconnaissance in the direction of Voghera. Near Casteggio these three brigades came up against the allied outposts and near Montebello against the first brigade of the French division of Forey, which they drove back out of Montebello. Soon after this, the second French brigade arrived, and now the Austrians were driven from the village after a stubborn fight; they beat off an attack on Casteggio and drove the French back on Montebello in disorder and would undoubtedly have taken it (the majority of

their troops had not yet entered battle) if a brigade of the French division of Vinoy had not arrived in the meantime. Seeing these reinforcements, the Austrians halted their advance. They had achieved their purpose; they knew now where the nearest bodies of troops of the French right wing stood, and they withdrew unhindered from Casteggio towards the Po and then over it to the main army, certain now that the French had not yet undertaken any serious movement against Piacenza. The Austrians are quite right to stay concentrated on the left bank of the Po as long as they have no imperative reason to throw their *entire* army over to the right bank; it would be a mistake to split the army *à cheval*^a the river, and the Vaccarizza bridge, with its bridgehead, enables them to make the crossing at any time and to attack any French advance on the Stradella by the flank.

Garibaldi, at the head of 5,000 volunteers, has turned the Austrian right flank and is now on Lombard soil. According to the latest reports, the Austrians are already on his heels, and he is in great danger of being cut off, something that certainly would please Bonaparte the liberator greatly.

Prince Napoleon Plon-Plon has been ordered to organise an army corps in Leghorn (Tuscany), which is to fall on the flank of the Austrians. The French soldiers are furious and the Austrians laugh.

On Saturday and Sunday the Sardinians tried to establish themselves on the left bank of the Sesia but were prevented from doing so by the Austrians.

Written about May 27, 1859

Printed according to the news-paper

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 4,
May 28, 1859

Published in English for the first time

^a Astraddle.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels

STRATEGY OF THE WAR²⁸⁵

We have very little to add to our last observations on the action at Montebello.^a From the official Austrian report, which has at last turned up, and which yesterday adorned our columns, it becomes evident, that of the three brigades with which Gen. Stadion advanced on Montebello, portions were left behind to guard the flanks of the line of march.^b The remainder arrived before Casteggio, which was taken by the Prince of Hessen Brigade; this brigade kept the town occupied, while the two other (incomplete) brigades advanced and took Montebello and Genestrello. They bore the brunt of the battle against the whole of Forey's division and the two cavalry regiments of Gen. de Sonnaz (Real Piedmont and Monferrato regiments)—and when they were ultimately driven in toward Casteggio, the Prince of Hessen Brigade appears to have so well supported them that no attack was ventured, and the Austrians were allowed to retreat in perfect good order and at their own convenience. It appears, however, very likely, from the Austrian reports which have come to hand, that at least the whole of Marshal Baraguay d' Hilliers's corps was assembled on the field toward the close of the engagement. This corps has three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry—amounting in all to twelve regiments of infantry, three battalions of Chasseurs, four regiments or twenty squadrons of cavalry, and a proportionate artillery force. This agrees with what the Austrians report^c of the

^a See this volume, pp. 338-40.—*Ed.*

^b Mention of the official Austrian report belongs to the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*. See "The Battle of Montebello. Count Gyulay's Official Report", *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5662, June 14, 1859.—*Ed.*

^c "Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien. Garlasco, 22. Mai", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 147, May 27, 1859.—*Ed.*

statements of French prisoners, that there were twelve French infantry regiments present, and with two reports from Turin—according to the first of which, Vinoy's, and, according to the second, Bazaine's division supported Forey's.^a Now, these three divisions form together the whole of Baraguay's infantry. There is also some talk of French cavalry and Piedmontese infantry having been present; but that appears less authentic. The result, then, is this: The Austrians, who could not have any object but reconnoitering (otherwise it would have been madness to attack with three weak brigades), attained this object to the fullest extent, by compelling Baraguay to show the whole of his strength. During the engagement they fought quite as well as their opponents; when driven out of Montebello they had to retire before superior numbers, and the pursuit ended before Casteggio, where the Austrians even turned round and drove the pursuers so energetically back that they were not again molested, although by that time the French had nearly four times as many men on the field as the Austrians. Thus, if the French claim the victory, because they finally held Montebello and the Austrians retreated after the engagement, the Austrians may claim it on the ground that they drove the French from Casteggio and had the last success of the day, and especially that they completely fulfilled the object they had in view; for the engagement was commenced with the purpose of coming ultimately upon superior forces, and of course retreating before them.^b

Since Montebello, the center and right wing of the Austrian army have seen some fighting. According to the dispatches which we received by the *Fulton*, and published yesterday,^c the Sardinians crossed the Sesia near Vercelli on the 30th ult. and attacked and carried some Austrian intrenchments at Palestro, Casalino and Vinzaglio. Victor Emmanuel himself commanded^d; and the work was accomplished by the bayonet. The loss of the Austrians is described by the Sardinians as very heavy. By the *Europa* at Halifax we now learn that the Austrians have twice endeavored to retake Palestro, and once were on the point of succeeding, when a body of Zouaves came to the rescue and repulsed them. Here the

^a The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 148, May 28 and No. 149, May 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* the foregoing passage is omitted.—*Ed.*

^c Here and in what follows information about the dispatches received is given by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—*Ed.*

^d The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* adds here: "and fought most gallantly".—*Ed.*

Sardinians say they^a took a thousand prisoners; but as to this affair it is impossible to form a judgment, owing to the absence of all precise details. Such obstinate fighting at the outposts on the Sesia is not what we expected from the Austrians, who are said to be in full retreat across the Ticino.^b On their extreme right, however, they have^c not shown so much pluck and tenacity. On the 25th of May, Garibaldi, who, with his Chasseurs of the Alps and some other troops, in all perhaps 5,000 men, had passed round the extreme right of the Austrians, crossed the Ticino and marched upon Varese, between Lake Maggiore and the Lake of Como, and took possession of that town. On the 26th he defeated an Austrian detachment which attacked him, followed up his victory with great vigor, and again, on the 27th, defeated the same detachment (reinforced by the garrison of Como), and entered that town the same night. The flying corps of Gen. Urban marched against him, and actually drove him into the mountains; but^d our latest dispatches, received last night by the *Europa*, report that he had come back and surprised the Austrians and retaken Varese. His success produced an insurrection in the towns on the Lake of Como and in the Valtellina or Upper Valley of the Adda, a mountain district, which in 1848 showed more insurrectionary energy than the towns of the Lombard plain. The steamers on the Lake of Como are in the hands of the insurgents, and 800 men from the Valtellina had joined Garibaldi. It is said that notwithstanding his temporary reverse, the insurrection in that part of Lombardy was spreading.

In this movement of Garibaldi the Allies have gained a great advantage, and the Austrians have made a great mistake. There was no harm to the latter in allowing him to take Varese; but Como ought to have been held by a strong column, which he would not have dared to meddle with. Another detachment sent toward Sesto Calende would have cut off Garibaldi's retreat, and thus, hemmed in in the small district between the lakes, a vigorous

^a In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* there is the following insertion here: "not only suffered heavy losses themselves but".—*Ed.*

^b The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* has here: "Such obstinate fighting at the outposts on the Sesia is probably intended to hold the allied advance in check while the Austrians recross the Ticino and reenter Lombardy."—*Ed.*

^c The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* has here: "not been defeated, they have been outgeneraled".—*Ed.*

^d The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* further has: "he came back, surprised the Austrians, retook Varese and regained his former position at Como".—*Ed.*

^e The words "received last night by the *Europa*" are inserted by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—*Ed.*

attack must have compelled him either to lay down his arms or to pass into the neutral Swiss territory, where he would have been disarmed. But the Austrians, underrating this man, whom they call a brigand chief, and whom, if they had taken the trouble to study the siege of Rome and his march thence to San Marino,²⁸⁶ they might have known to be a man of uncommon military talent, of great intrepidity, and full of resources, treated his incursion as lightly as the irruptions of Allemandi's Lombard volunteers in 1848.²⁸⁷ They quite overlooked the fact that Garibaldi is a strict disciplinarian, and that he has had most of his men under his hands for four months—quite enough to break them to the maneuvering and movements of petty warfare. Garibaldi may have been sent into Lombardy by Louis Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel in order to destroy him and his volunteers—elements rather too revolutionary for this dynastic war—a hypothesis strikingly confirmed by the fact that his movement was made without the indispensable support; but it is not to be forgotten that in 1849 he took the same route and managed to escape. At all events, he gained possession of the bridge at Lecco, and of the steamers on the lake, and this insured to him the liberty of moving to the eastward of the Lake of Como. Here there is a large mountainous tract, extending north to the Splügen and Stelvio passes, east to the Lake of Garda, south to Bergamo and Brescia—a country especially adapted to partisan warfare, and where it will be very difficult to catch him, as Urban has just discovered. If 6,000 to 8,000 men would have been sufficient to ruin him in the Varese country, it may now require more than 16,000, so that his one brigade will henceforth fully occupy three of the Austrians. Still, with the forces accumulating in the Tyrol (a full army corps has been passed from Bohemia through Saxony and Bavaria by rail to the Tyrol), and with the troops holding Lombardy, we do not see how he can hold his own, notwithstanding his last success at Varese, unless the Allies gain a very speedy and very decisive victory over the Austrians. This will be a difficult matter. Another Austrian army corps, the 9th, has joined the active army, making it consist of six corps, or at least 200,000 men in all; and other corps are on the march. Still, from the fact that Louis Napoleon cannot afford to be long quiet, a battle may soon be expected; and the report that he has gone with his headquarters and guards to^a Voghera, on the extreme right of the Allied

^a The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* further has: "Novara, on the left of the Allied position, would indicate a battle in that neighborhood".—Ed.

position, would indicate a battle in the neighborhood of Stradella. If this be the case, we shall very likely see the Austrians defend the defile of Stradella in front, and try to operate on the French flank and rear by the bridge at Vaccarizza.^a

Written on May 30, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5663, June 15, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1467, June 17, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 927, June 18, 1859

^a The last sentence is omitted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*.—Ed.

Karl Marx

MAZZINI'S MANIFESTO²⁸⁸

Under present circumstances, any declaration on the part of Mazzini is an event deserving of greater attention than the diplomatic appeals from the contending Cabinets, or even the colored bulletins from the theater of war. However various men's opinions may be as to the character of the Roman triumvir,²⁸⁹ nobody will deny that for a period of almost thirty years Italian revolution has been connected with his name, and that for the same space of time he has been acknowledged by Europe as the ablest exponent of the national aspirations of his countrymen. He has now performed an admirable act of moral courage and patriotic devotion, in raising, at the peril of damaging his popularity, his solitary voice against a Babel of self-delusion, blind enthusiasm, and interested falsehood. His revelations on the real plans concerted between Bonaparte, Alexander, and Cavour, the agent of the two autocrats, ought to be weighed the more carefully, since, of all private individuals in Europe, Mazzini is known to be possessed of the amplest means of penetrating into the dark secrets of the ruling Powers. His advice to the national volunteers to draw a clear line of distinction between their own cause and that of the crowned impostors, and to never dishonor their proclamations by encumbering them with the infamous name of Louis Napoleon, has been literally acted upon by Garibaldi. The omission of the name of France from the latter's proclamation,^a as the Paris correspondent of the *London Times* reports, is considered by Louis Napoleon as a deadly insult; and such was the fear inspired

^a "Garibaldi's Proclamation to the Lombards", *The Times*, No. 23319, May 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

by the knowledge of Garibaldi's secret connection with the Roman triumvir, that his corps was reduced from the 10,000 *chasseurs d'Alpes* originally promised him, to 4,000; that a corps of artillery allowed him was withdrawn, the one battery already dispatched at his request was stopped, and a pair of experienced policemen, instructed to report on every word and movement of his, were, under the garb of volunteers, smuggled into his following.

We subjoin a literal translation of Mazzini's manifesto, published at London in the last number of *Pensiero ed Azione* (Thought and Action), under the title of *La Guerra* (The War):

"The war has begun. We have, therefore, before us no probability to be discussed, but a fact accomplished. The war has broken out between Austria and Piedmont. The soldiers of Louis Bonaparte are in Italy. The Russo-French alliance, announced by us a year ago, reveals itself to Europe. The Sardinian Parliament has conferred dictatorial powers on Victor Emmanuel. A military insurrection has overthrown the Ducal Government of Tuscany, and accepted the dictatorship of the King (who since then has surrendered it to a Bonaparte). The general fermentation in Italy is likely to produce similar facts in other places. The destinies of our fatherland are to-day irrevocably intrusted to the decision of battles.

"Under such circumstances most of our countrymen, inebriated by the desire of action, fascinated by the idea of possessing the mighty help of regular armies, carried away by the pleasure of making war against Austrian dominion, justly abhorred, disown the opinions of the past and their principles, immolate not only their dearest convictions, but even the intention of returning to them, renounce all foresight, all liberty of judgment, have but words of applause for whoever assumes to direct the war, approve without inquiry whatever may come from France or Piedmont, and initiate the battle of liberty by rendering themselves slaves. Others, seeing every idea of political morality extinguished in the political agitators, and the mob behind them; a people, the apostle of liberty for half a century, allying itself at once with despotism; men, who till yesterday believed in Proudhon's anarchy, surrender themselves to a King, and the countrymen of Goffredo Mameli burst into the cry, '*Viva l'Imperatore*', who murdered him with thousands of others,²⁹⁰ despair of the future, and declare our people not fit for liberty.

"We, for our part, do not share either the blind and servile hopes of the one party, or the desperate gloom of the others. The war begins under the saddest auspices, but the Italians can, if they will, turn it to a better end; and we believe in the noble instincts of our people. And those instincts powerfully pierce through the errors to which the agitators goad them. It would perhaps have been better if, instead of rallying round the absolute standards of Powers which will betray their hopes, the volunteers had silently organized the insurrection in their own countries and proclaimed it in the name of the Italian people, by taking its initiative; but the spirit which moved them is holy and sublime; the proof they give of devotion to the common country is not to be denied, and on this nucleus of the future national army, spontaneously formed, center the greatest hopes of Italy. The acceptance of a royal dictatorship is an error which may indeed result in disappointment, and violates the dignity of a people rising for its own emancipation; that dictatorship in a country and with a Parliament devoted to monarchy, with the precedents of Rome and Venice, where the harmony of the popular assemblies with the leaders of the defense was the source of power, with the record of the long and

tremendous war sustained by England against the first Empire, without the least violation of civil liberties, is evidently nothing but a concession to the exigencies of the allied despots and the first symptom of a design which intends to substitute the question of territory for the question of liberty; but the people which enthusiasticaly accepts the dictatorship, thinks it accomplishes an act of supreme sacrifice for the benefit of the common fatherland; and, deluded by the notion of the success of the war depending upon such a concentration of power, wants to show by its applause its firm determination to combat and to vanquish at any price whatever. The unconditional surrender of the revolted provinces to the absolute direction of the royal dictator, is almost sure to result in fatal consequences. The logic of the insurrection required every insured province to put itself under a local revolutionary administration, and each to contribute by a representative to the formation of a national revolutionary Government; but even this immense error is a homage to the want of national unity, invincibly confuting the stupid chit-chat of the European press as to our dissensions. It constitutes the Italian common law. Patriotism is at this moment so powerful in Italy as to overcome all mistakes. Good citizens, instead of despairing, must try to give it the right direction. And for that purpose they must insist, without fear of malign interpretations, upon the true state of the situation. The moment is too solemn to care either for immediate favor or for calumny.

"The truth of the situation is this:

"As in 1848, and still more so, the Italian movement tends to liberty and national unity. The war is undertaken by the Sardinian monarchy and by Louis Bonaparte with entirely different views. As in 1848, and still more so, the antagonism existing between the tendencies of the nation and those of the accepted chiefs, which then ruined the war, menaces Italy with tremendous disappointments.

"What Italy aspires to is National Unity. Louis Napoleon cannot wish this. Beside Nice and Savoy, already conceded to him by Piedmont as the price for his aid in the formation of a northern kingdom, he wants an opportunity to set up the throne of a Murat in the south, and the throne of his cousin^a in the center. Rome and part of the Roman State are to remain under the temporal government of the Pope.

"It does not matter whether sincerely or not, the Ministry^b which to-day rules supreme in Piedmont has given its consent to this plan.

"Italy is thus to be divided into four States: two to be directly governed by the foreigner; *indirectly*, France would have the whole of Italy. The Pope has been a French vassal ever since 1849; the King of Sardinia,^c from gratitude and from inferiority of forces, would become the vassal of the Empire.

"The design would be entirely executed should Austria resist to the last. But if Austria, defeated at the outset, should offer terms like those which, at a certain moment in 1848, she offered to the British Government, viz.: the abandonment of Lombardy, on the condition of retaining Venice, peace, naturally supported by the whole diplomacy of Europe, would be accepted; the single conditions of the aggrandizement of the Sardinian monarchy, and of the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, would be insisted upon; Italy would be abandoned to the revenge of its patrons, and the full execution of the pet plan be deferred to some more favorable moment.

^a Joseph Charles Paul Bonaparte.—*Ed.*

^b Of Camillo Benso Cavour.—*Ed.*

^c Victor Emmanuel II.—*Ed.*

"This plan is known to the governments of Europe. Hence their general armaments; hence the warlike fermentation throughout the German Confederation; hence the elements already prepared of a coalition between England, Germany and Prussia—a coalition inevitable despite the declaration to the contrary of the governments. If Italy, independent of Bonaparte's alliance, should not vindicate her national life, the defense of Austria and the treaties of 1815 will fatally form the pivot of the coalition.

"The coalition is feared by Louis Napoleon. Hence his league with Russia, an uncertain and perfidious ally, but still ready to step in on the condition of liberticide concessions, such as the absolute abandonment of Poland, and the general protectorate by the Czar of European Turkey in exchange for the Mediterranean transformed into a French lake. If the war be prolonged so as to assume, consequent upon German intervention, European proportions, the insurrection of the Turkish Provinces, prepared a long time since, and that of Hungary, would enable the alliance to assume palpable forms.

"In case things come to that point, it is intended to merge in the territorial rearrangement every idea of popular right and liberty. Russian princes would govern the States established on the ruins of the Turkish Empire and Austria; princes of the Bonaparte dynasty the new States of Italy, and perhaps others into the bargain, according to eventualities. Constantine of Russia is already proposed to the Hungarian malcontents, as Louis Napoleon Bonaparte to the monarchic agitators of the Legations^a and of Tuscany. As Charles V and Clement VII, although mortal enemies, coalesced in order to divide among themselves the free cities of Italy,²⁹¹ the two Czars, hating each other cordially, coalesce in order to stifle all aspirations for liberty and *imperialize Europe*. Hence the decree which, for an indefinite period, suppresses the liberty of Piedmont, betrayed by Cavour. With a mute press, every comment upon the operations being prevented, the people kept in darkness as to everything, the field is cleared for the tactics of the patrons. And the popular mind, fascinated by the phantom of an independence which, finally, would turn out but a change of dependence, becomes disused to liberty, the true source of all independence.

"Such are the designs of the allied despots. They may be denied by some exactly because they are working out their execution, in the same way as Louis Bonaparte disowned the idea of the *coup d'état*; by others from credulity as to every word that falls from the great, or from a blind desire darkening their intellect; they are not the less real for all that; known to myself, known to the different Governments and betrayed partly in the words, still more in the acts, of Louis Napoleon and Count Cavour. I say of Count Cavour, because I incline to think Victor Emmanuel a stranger to the bargains of Plombières and Stuttgart.²⁹²

"If Count Cavour had been a real friend of Italy he would have relied on the immense prestige derived from the possession of an important material force and from the general tendencies prevailing in Italy, in order to prepare Italian movements, to be *immediately* seconded by Piedmont. To a struggle initiated by Italian forces alone, Europe would have given applause and favor. And Europe, which to-day menaces Napoleon when he descends into Italy at her call and with the semblances of a liberator, would never have suffered him to come without provocation, in his own name, to the rescue of Austria. It would have been a holy and sublime enterprise, and Cavour could have carried it through. But it would have been necessary to fraternize, in the name of liberty and right, with the Italian revolution. Such a course did not suit the Minister of the Sardinian monarchy.

^a The provinces of which the Papal States were composed.—*Ed.*

Aversion to the people and to liberty spurred him to seek the alliance of tyranny—and of a tyranny which, by dint of old traditions of conquest, all nations abominate. This conception has changed the very nature of the Italian cause. If it comes out victorious, with the ally accepted as its patron, the national unity is lost—Italy is made the field of a new division under the French protectorate. If it succumbs with the man of December, Italy will have to pay damages and to undergo reactions without end; and Europe, instead of complaining of us, will say, 'Serves you right.' (*Voi non avete, se non quello che meritate.*) All calculations, all human tactics, are swayed by moral laws, which no people can dare violate with impunity. Every guilt drags inevitably behind itself its expiation. France—and thus we told her at the time—expiates the expedition to Rome.²⁹³ May God exempt Italy from the severe expiation deserved by the Sardinian monarchy for having coupled a cause sanctified by half a century of sacrifice, of martyrdom, and virtuous aspirations, with the banner of egotism and tyranny!

"Nevertheless, the war is a *fact*—a powerful fact—which creates new duties, and essentially modifies our own proceedings. Between the conception of Cavour and the menace of a coalition, between Louis Napoleon and Austria, equally fatal, there stands Italy—the more serious the dangers of the situation are, the more the efforts of all must concentrate themselves to save the common fatherland from the perils it incurs. If the war was carried on between Governments, we might remain spectators, watching the moment when the combatants having weakened each other, the national element could come forward. But that element has already exploded. Deluded or not, the country trembles in a feverish state of activity, and believes it is able to accomplish its purpose by making use of the war of the Emperor and the King. The Tuscan movement,²⁹⁴ a spontaneous movement of Italian soldiers and citizens, the universal agitation, and the rush of volunteer corps, break through the circle of the official intrigues, and they are beatings of the national heart. It is necessary to follow them on the field; it is necessary to enlarge, to italianise (*italianizzare*) the war. The Republicans will know how to accomplish this duty.

"Italy, if she will, may save herself from the perils we have set forth. She may win from the actual crisis her national unity.

"It is necessary that Austria should succumb. We may deplore the Imperial intervention, but we cannot deny that Austria is the eternal enemy of every national Italian development. Every Italian must cooperate in the downfall of Austria. This is demanded by the honor, by the safety of all. Europe must learn that between us and Austria there is an eternal war. It is necessary that the people of Italy maintain intangible its dignity, and convince Europe that, if we can undergo the aid of tyranny, because it was claimed by an Italian Government, we have not asked for it, and have not renounced for it our belief in liberty and the alliance of peoples. The cry of '*Viva la Francia!*' may issue without guilt from Italian lips; not so the cry of '*Viva l'Imperatore!*'... It is necessary that Italy arouse, from one end to the other, ... in the North to conquer, not to receive liberty; in the South, to organize the reserve of the national army. The insurrection may, with due reserve, accept the military command of the King wherever the Austrian has pitched his camp, or is at hand; the insurrection in the South must operate and keep itself more independent.... Naples and Sicily may secure the Italian cause, and constitute its power, represented by a National Camp.... The cry of insurrection, wherever it is heard, must be, 'Unity, Liberty, National Independence!' The name of Rome ought always to accompany that of Italy. It is the duty of Rome, not to send one man to the Sardinian army, but to prove to Imperial France that it is a bad bargain for any power to combat in the name of Italian Independence, while

declaring itself the support of Papal absolutism.... On Rome, Naples, and the conduct of the volunteer militia, depend to-day the destinies of Italy. Rome represents the unity of the fatherland: Naples and the volunteers can constitute its army. The duties are immense; if Rome, Naples and the volunteers do not know how to fulfill them, they do not merit liberty, and will not get it. The war,²⁹⁵ abandoned to the Governments, will end with another treaty of Campoformio.

"The discipline preached to-day as the secret of the victory by the same men who betrayed the insurrections of 1848, is nothing but servility and popular passiveness. The discipline understood by us, may require a strong unity for everything concerning the progress of the regular war; it may require silence on all questions of form; but never that Italy should rise or sink according to the will of a dictator without a programme, and a foreign despot, never that it should keep back its resolution to be free and united!"

Marx's introductory remarks to Mazzini's manifesto were written late in May 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5665, June 17, 1859; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1467, June 17, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 928, June 25, 1859

Frederick Engels

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

As yet the glory of the war has been carried off by Garibaldi, who certainly does not seem afraid of that dash, which Napoleon III warns his soldiers not to indulge in. All of a sudden this volunteer leader has made himself the hero of Italy, though on this side of the Atlantic the Bonapartist press attempt to monopolize the credit of his exploits for their own great champion. But the laurels of the partisan general seem to have roused a spirit of emulation in the breast of Victor Emmanuel; and hence the battle of Palestro, of which we have unfortunately as yet received only telegraphic reports, and those from the Sardinian camp alone.

It seems, according to these,^a that the Piedmontese 4th division, under Cialdini, which had some days previously passed the Sesia near Vercelli, and had spent the subsequent time in petty skirmishes with the Austrian outposts, attacked the enemy's entrenched position at Palestro, Vinzaglio, and Confienza on the 30th of May. They defeated the brigade which occupied it (very likely Gen. Gablenz's), but on the next morning (31st) it is reported that a body of 25,000 Austrians tried to retake the position. They attempted to turn the Piedmontese right flank, by which they offered their own flank to Gen. Canrobert's corps (Trochu's division), which had thrown a bridge across the Sesia and was just coming up. The Emperor at once ordered the 3d Zouaves to the support of the Piedmontese. They attacked, "although unsupported," an Austrian battery, took the six guns,

^a "Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 61, Turin, 31 mai soir" and "N° 62, Turin, 1-er juin matin", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 155, June 4, 1859.—*Ed.*

and drove the covering party into a canal, where 400 of them are said to have been drowned. The King of Sardinia was in the thickest of the fight, and so bent upon slaughtering the enemy that "the Zouaves tried to restrain his ardor, but in vain."^a The Zouaves were led, it is said, by Gen. Cialdini in person. Finally, the Austrians were driven back, leaving in the hands of the Allies 1,000 prisoners and eight guns.

"The loss of the Austrians," say the Piedmontese, "was very great; that of our own troops is not yet known."^b

At the same time, a separate struggle was going on at Confienza, in which the enemy was defeated by the division of Gen. Fanti. About 6 o'clock in the evening, however, the Austrians again attempted an attack on Palestro, but with no better success. On the 1st of June, Gen. Niel, with the French fourth corps, entered Novara, as it appears, without finding any resistance.

A more confused and contradictory account of a battle it has not been our lot to read since the peace of 1849 returned the *spada d'Italia* into the scabbard²⁹⁶; and yet in our *résumé* of it we have omitted some of the most inexplicable features. The Austrians attack with 25,000 men; are these all sent against Palestro, or do they comprise the troops beaten by Fanti at Confienza? As the strength of these is not stated separately, we shall certainly be on the right side, considering the extraordinary veracity of the Piedmontese bulletins, if we conclude that the whole of the Austrians engaged on the 31st were about 25,000. What the forces were which defeated them we shall see by and by. When the Piedmontese are in danger, the Emperor orders the 3d Zouaves to advance. Cialdini leads them, and the King presses forward among them where the fight was most furious, the Zouaves trying in vain to restrain him.

An admirable picture! How beautifully the parts are distributed! Louis Napoleon, "the Emperor," orders the Zouaves to advance. Cialdini, the General, and a Piedmontese, too, leads them on—a Piedmontese leading French Zouaves! "The King" rushes among them, and fights under the orders of his own General where the fight is thickest. But we are also told that the King commanded the fourth Piedmontese division, that is, Cialdini's, in person. What may have become of the fourth division while Cialdini led

^a "The Battles of Palestro", *The Times*, No. 23322, June 2, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b "Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 60, Turin, 31 mai au matin", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 154, June 3, 1859.—*Ed.*

on the Zouaves, and the King rushed into the thickest of the fight, we shall, perhaps, never learn. But this does not surprise us in Victor Emmanuel. At the fatal battle of Novara, he committed equal freaks of childishness, neglected his division, and contributed not a little to the loss of the battle, and the triumph of Radetzky.

From this confused account of an engagement, the real nature of which will not be revealed until we get the official reports of the French and Austrians, we may, however, glean a few useful facts. The extreme left wing of the Allies had been held, hitherto, by the French corps of Gen. Niel; he stood on the Dora Baltea west of Vercelli. Next in order came the two Piedmontese divisions of Cialdini and Durando (4th and 3d) at Casale. At Alessandria and Valenza were the Piedmontese divisions of Castelborgo (1st) and Fanti (2d), the French corps of McMahon, Canrobert and the Guards, forming the center. East of Alessandria, at Tortona, Novi, Voghera, were the Piedmontese 5th division of Cucchiari and the French corps of Baraguay d' Hilliers.

Now, we find engaged at Palestro and Confienza (these places are scarcely three miles from each other), not only Cialdini but Fanti; and though nothing is said of Niel, yet we find Canrobert there. We also find there the 3d regiment of Zouaves, which does not belong to Canrobert's, nor indeed to any of the other three French corps. Finally, we hear that Louis Napoleon has moved his headquarters to Vercelli, and that Gen. Niel occupied Novara the day after the battle. This shows a decided alteration in the disposition of the allied army. The left wing, formerly composed of Niel's corps, 26 battalions, and Cialdini's division, 14 battalions, in all 40 battalions, has now been reinforced by Canrobert's corps of 39 battalions and Fanti's division of 14, making together 53 battalions, and raising the total of that part of the allied army to 93 battalions in all. Of these, the two Piedmontese divisions, 28 battalions, and Trochu's division of Canrobert's corps, 13 battalions, in all 25,000 Piedmontese and at least 11,000 Frenchmen were, confessedly, more or less engaged in the action of Palestro. The repulse of the 25,000 Austrians is thus accounted for.

But this reenforcing of the left wing has evidently been undertaken with an ulterior object; Niel's advance upon Novara proves it; and so does the removal of Louis Napoleon's headquarters to Vercelli. The additional probability that the Guard has followed him there, leaves little doubt as to the intentions of the Allies. The Guard increases the force on the Sesia to 127 battalions in all; and by means of the railway, as at Montebello,

troops may soon be brought up from the extreme right, and be in time to participate in a general action. There will, then, remain two eventualities. Either Louis Napoleon will follow up the movement which has now begun, by entirely turning the Austrian right, and placing the main body of his army in the direct road from Vercelli to Milan, on the line of Vercelli and Novara, at the same time occupying the Austrians by demonstrations on the line of the Po. Or, while demonstrating strongly on the Austrian right, he will concentrate his main forces about Valenza, where Baraguay, McMahon and the Guards count 99 battalions, and Cucchiari, Durando and Castelborgo 42 battalions, to be reenforced by a quick removal of Canrobert's corps and some Piedmontese to the same quarter, by which 170 battalions might be united on one point, and fall upon the Austrian center with the intention of breaking it.

The ostentation with which Canrobert's corps (of which after all but Trochu's division may be there) and Fanti's Piedmontese are paraded on the Sesia, while Louis Napoleon removes his headquarters with similar ostentation to Vercelli, would seem to speak for the second alternative; but it is impossible to do more than guess.

In the mean time, the Austrians are apparently still on the Agogna, though their retreat across the Ticino is reported in the London *Daily News*. Their troops are getting more and more concentrated on a small space around Garlasco. They put a feeler out, now and then, such as the one at Montebello and the other at Palestro, but take care not to scatter themselves. They are at least six army-corps strong from 160 to 200 battalions (varying according to what may have been detached for garrisons). The forces seem pretty equally balanced. A few days, and the clouds must discharge whatever thunderbolts they hold suspended.

Written on June 2, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5665 (as a leading article)
and in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*,
No. 1467, June 17, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

Frederick Engels

MILITARY EVENTS

The fragmentary and contradictory nature of the telegrams received from the theatre of war permits only a few comments on the withdrawal of the Austrians over the Ticino and their defeat at Magenta. Intimidated, it would appear, by General Niel's occupation of Novara, the Austrians withdrew over the Ticino on June 3 and 4. On June 4, at four in the morning, the French and Piedmontese, who had crossed the Ticino at Turbigo and Boffalora on the right wing of the Austrians, fell with superior forces on the enemy directly opposite them and drove him from his position after exceptionally bloody and obstinate resistance. The details of the action released by the telegram-writer of the allied army, Louis Bonaparte,^a testify to the power of imagination of this "secret general", who can still not overcome his aversion to *armes de précision*^b and so travels with the train and baggage at a timid distance from the battlefield and behind the army, but still in "complete bodily health".^c

There are good reasons for the importunity with which this health bulletin is thrown in the face of the world. At the time of the deliberations of the French Chamber of Peers on Louis Bonaparte's Boulogne expedition²⁹⁷ it was confirmed on the sworn testimony of witnesses that at the moment of danger the hero opened his burdened heart in a way that was anything but a symptom of "complete bodily health".

^a Napoleon III's telegram to the Empress Eugénie, June 5, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 157, June 6, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b Precision weapons (rifled guns).—*Ed.*

^c The report from Alessandria, May 29, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 150, May 30, 1859.—*Ed.*

The Austrians had concentrated on the Agogna in the position of a tiger poised to spring. Gyulay was responsible for their defeat because he gave up this position. After they had occupied the Lomellina and taken up a position about thirty miles before Milan, it was obvious that it was impossible to cover all the possible approaches to that capital. Three routes were open to the Allies: one through the Austrian centre by way of Valenza, Garlasco and Bereguardo; one on the Austrian left by way of Voghera, Stradella and the Po between Pavia and Piacenza; and finally the road on the Austrian right via Vercelli, Novara and Boffalora. If the Austrians wanted to defend Milan directly, they could block only one of these routes with their army. Stationing a corps on each of them would have split their forces and made their defeat certain. But it is a rule of modern warfare that a route can be defended just as well, if not better, by a flanking position than by a position in the front. An army of 150,000 to 200,000 men concentrated in a small area and ready to act in any direction can be ignored by the enemy with impunity only if his forces are enormously superior in number. When Napoleon marched towards the Elbe in 1813, the Allies, although much weaker in number, had reasons for provoking him to battle. They therefore took up a position near Lützen, a few miles south of the road leading from Erfurt to Leipzig. Part of Napoleon's army had already marched past when the Allies revealed their proximity to the French. As a result, the entire French army was brought to a halt, its advanced columns were called back, and a battle took place which hardly left the French in possession of the field, although their superiority in numbers was about 60,000.²⁹⁸ On the next day both armies marched towards the Elbe in parallel columns, without the Allies having been hindered in their retreat. If the forces had been less out of proportion, the position of the Allies on the flank of Napoleon's march would have halted it at least as successfully as a frontal position straddling the road to Leipzig.

Gyulay's position was similar. He stood between Mortara and Pavia with a force of about 150,000 men, blocking the direct road from Valenza to Milan. He could have been outflanked on either wing, but his position gave him means of counteracting any such turning of his flank. The bulk of the allied army was concentrated near Vercelli on May 30, May 31 and June 1. It consisted of 4 Piedmontese divisions (56 battalions), Niel's corps (26 battalions), Canrobert's corps (39 battalions), the Guard (26 battalions) and MacMahon's corps (26 battalions), in all 173 battalions of infantry, besides the cavalry and artillery. Gyulay, for his part, had 6 army

corps, weakened by detachments against Garibaldi, towards Voghera, for occupying various strongholds, etc., but still mustering 150 battalions. His army was so placed that its right flank could only be turned by a flanking march within its operational range. Now, it is known that an army always needs time to go from marching order to battle order, even in a frontal attack, although in this case the marching order is organised for battle as far as possible. The derangement is much more dangerous when columns in marching order are attacked on the flanks. It is therefore a standing rule to avoid a flanking march within the enemy's range of action. The allied army violated the rule. It marched on Novara and the Ticino, apparently without consideration of the Austrians on its flank. This was the moment of action for Gyulay. He was to have concentrated his troops on Vigevano and Mortara during the night of June 3, after leaving a corps on the Lower Agogna to keep Valenza in check, and fallen on the flank of the advancing Allies on June 4 with every available man. There could have been little doubt as to the result of such an attack by about 120 battalions on the Allies' extended and in many places broken marching column. If part of the allied forces had already crossed the Ticino, so much the better for Gyulay; his attack would have brought them back but would hardly have allowed them time to play a decisive part. Even in the worst case, that of an unsuccessful attack, the withdrawal of the Austrians to Pavia and Piacenza would have been as safe as, e.g., after the battle of Magenta. Gyulay's whole troop disposition shows that this was, in fact, the Austrians' original plan. His council of war had decided after mature deliberation that the direct road to Milan should be left open to the French and Milan covered only by a march against the enemy's flank. When the decisive moment came, however, and Gyulay saw the French masses on his right rolling on towards Milan, the thoroughbred Magyar lost his head, wavered and finally retired behind the Ticino. By so doing he prepared his own defeat. While the French marched in a straight line on Magenta (between Novara and Milan) he made a wide detour, first marching down along the Ticino and crossing it at Bereguardo and Pavia and then marching up along the river again towards Boffalora and Magenta, in order to block the direct road to Milan. The result was that his troops arrived in weak detachments and could not be massed into bodies that could break the core of the allied army.

On the assumption that the allied army holds the battlefield, and hence the direct road to Milan, the Austrians will have to

withdraw behind the Po, behind the Adda or within their big fortresses to reform. Although the battle of Magenta would then decide the fate of Milan, it would by no means decide the campaign. The Austrians have three whole army corps which they are concentrating on the Adige at this moment, and which are bound to ensure them the balance of forces unless the gross errors of the "secret general" are compensated, as they have been again in this case, by Gyulay's indecision.

Written about June 9, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 6,
June 11, 1859

Published in English for the first time

Frederick Engels

THE AUSTRIAN DEFEAT

The arrival of the *Persia* last night puts us in possession of a variety of highly interesting documents concerning the battle of Magenta, for which we refer our readers to the proper place. Their substance may be summed up very briefly^a: The battle of Magenta was a decisive defeat of the Austrians and a pregnant victory for the French; the Allies have entered Milan amid popular rejoicings; the Austrians are in full retreat, and the corps of Benedek has been signally defeated by Baraguay d'Hilliers (of whose disgrace no more is heard) at Marignano and 1,200 prisoners taken; and the Allies are flushed with confidence and the Austrians are dispirited and desponding.

Our London contemporaries generally treat the battle as a surprise on the part of the Austrians; and such was our own judgment until the present testimony came into our hands. It now appears to us that Gyulay was not so much surprised, as caught in a fatal blunder; and our reasons for this opinion we proceed to set forth. When the Austrians took their position some thirty miles in advance of Milan, it was not to be expected that they could cover every possible avenue to that capital. There were three roads open to the Allies: they could march right through the Austrian center by Valenza, Garlasco, and Bereguardo; on the Austrian left by Voghera, Stradella, and across the Po between Pavia and Piacenza; and finally on the Austrian right by Vercelli, Novara, and Boffalora. Now, if the Austrians wanted to defend Milan, they could defend only one of these three routes by placing their army across it; to defend every one of them by placing a corps on each,

^a This passage is added by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—Ed.

would have been to scatter their strength and incur certain defeat. But it is recognized as a rule in modern warfare, that a road is quite as well, if not better, defended by a lateral position than by a mere front defense. An army of 150,000 to 200,000 men, concentrated on a small space of ground, ready to act in every direction, cannot be passed by with impunity by a hostile army, unless immensely superior in force. When, for instance, Napoleon, in 1813, marched toward the Elbe, and the Allies, though vastly inferior^a in numbers, had reasons of their own to seek a battle, they took position at Lützen, a few miles south of the road leading from Erfurt to Leipsic. Napoleon's army had in part passed by already, when the Allies gave notice to the French of their proximity. The consequence was that the march of the whole French army was stopped, the advanced column recalled, and a battle fought, which left the French, although superior by 60,000 men, barely in possession of the battle-field. The next day both the hostile armies marched on parallel lines toward the Elbe, and the retreat of the Allies was not even molested. Had the forces been more equally balanced, the lateral position of the Allies would have stopped Napoleon's march as effectively, at least, as an occupation in front of the direct road to Leipsic. General Gyulay was in exactly such a position. With a force which it certainly depended upon him alone to increase to more than 150,000 men, he stood between Mortara and Pavia, stopping the direct road from Valenza to Milan. He might be turned by either wing, but that was the very nature of his position, and if that position was worth anything, he ought to have been able to find an effective remedy for that contingency in the very facilities the position gave him for counteracting such movements. But leaving the Austrian left entirely out of consideration, we will confine ourselves to the wing that has actually been turned. On the 30th and 31st of May, and 1st of June, Louis Napoleon concentrated the mass of his troops at Vercelli. He had there, on the 31st, 4 Piedmontese divisions (56 battalions), Niel's corps (26 battalions), Canrobert's corps (39 battalions), and the Guards (26 battalions). In addition he also drew there McMahon's corps (26 battalions), in all the enormous force of 173 battalions of infantry, beside cavalry and artillery. Gyulay had six Austrian army corps; they were weakened by detachments left as garrisons, sent against Garibaldi, to Voghera, &c., but would still average 5 brigades each, giving 30 brigades or 150 battalions.

^a The newspaper has a mistake here: "superior".—Ed.

Now, such an army, if it has confidence in itself, no general dare leave on his flanks or rear. This army, besides, was so placed that it could not be turned on its right except by a flank march within reach of it, and such a flank march is a very dangerous maneuver. An army in marching order always requires a great deal of time to come into proper fighting order. It is never fully prepared for a battle. But if this be even the case when it is attacked in front, where the marching order is made as much as possible subordinate to the chances of resistance, it is far more the case when the marching columns are attacked in flank.

It is, therefore, a standing rule of strategy to avoid a flank march within reach of the enemy. Louis Napoleon, relying upon his masses, deliberately violated that rule. He marched toward Novara and the Ticino without heeding, apparently, the Austrians on his flank. Here was the moment for Gyulay to act. His business was to concentrate his troops, by the night of the 3d June, about Vigevano and Mortara, leaving a corps on the Lower Agogna to observe Valenza, and on the 4th fall with every available man on the flank of the advanced Allies. The result of such an attack, made with some 120 battalions, on the long, disconnected columns of the Allies, could scarcely have been doubtful. If part of the Allies had crossed the Ticino, so much the better. This attack would have recalled them, but they would have scarcely been in time to restore the fight. And supposing even the attack to have been unsuccessful, the retreat of the Austrians to Pavia and Piacenza would have been quite as safe afterward, as it has now proved since the affair of Magenta. There is reason to suppose that this was Gyulay's original plan. But when he found, on the 2d June, that the French were accumulating their masses on the direct road to Milan, on his right, his resolution seems to have forsaken him. The French could be at Milan quite as soon as himself, if he chose to let them—there was scarcely a man there to block the direct road; the entry of even a small body of French into Milan might set all Lombardy in a blaze, and although most probably all these considerations had been weighed over and over again in his councils of war, and a march upon the flank of the French insisted upon as quite sufficient to cover Milan; yet when the case came actually to pass, and the French were as near Milan as the Austrians, Gyulay faltered, and at last retreated behind the Ticino. That sealed his doom. While the French marched on a straight line toward Magenta, he made a large circuit, descending along the Ticino and passing it at Bereguardo and Pavia, and then reascending along the river to Boffalora and Magenta—and thus

attempting, too late, to block up the direct road to Milan. The consequence was that his troops arrived in small detachments, and could not be brought up in such masses as was required to oppose successfully the bulk of the allied forces. That they fought well there is no doubt; and as to the question of tactics and strategy in the fight, we propose to recur to that on another occasion. But it is useless for their bulletins^a to attempt to palliate the fact that they were beaten, and that the battle has decided the fate of Milan, and must have its influence in deciding the fate of the campaign. Meanwhile, the Austrians have three more army-corps concentrating on the Adige, which will give them a considerable superiority in numbers. The command has also been taken from Gyulay, and given to Gen. Hess who has the reputation of the first strategist in Europe; but he is said to be such an invalid as to be incapacitated from protracted attention to business.

Our readers will notice that the reports of Austrian outrages in the Lomellina are contradicted on French as well as English authority.^b We call attention to this fact also, not only to do justice to all parties, but because our own disbelief in the reports has been construed into an expression of sympathy with the cause of Francis Joseph—a potentate whose overthrow we have no desire to see postponed for a day. If he and Napoleon could but go down together, and by each other's hands, the perfection of historical justice would be attained.

Written about June 9, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5669, June 22, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1469, June 24, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 928, June 25, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*

^a "The Austrian Account", *The Times*, No. 23325, June 6, and No. 23326, June 7, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b "Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 18, Turin, 8 mai au matin", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—*Ed.*