Code Red Was Not a Technology Test. It Was a Leadership Test.

A high-intensity simulation revealed that the greatest risks in a crisis are not technological, but organizational. Failures emerged from decision-making architecture, responsibility concentration, and a breakdown in collective sensemaking.

- **Decision Paralysis:** Critical actions were stalled by a concentration of authority, turning individual delay into a systemic risk.
- **Fragmented Perception:** The organization failed to connect disparate signals into a coherent picture of a coordinated attack.
- **The Underestimated Human Vector:** The initial breach point, a C-level compromise, was not treated with the requisite urgency, revealing a deep-seated process vulnerability.
- **Reactive Communication:** Delaying external communication in the name of security created a secondary crisis of reputation and trust.



The Anatomy of Code Red 6: A Business Crisis, Not a Cyber Drill

Code Red 6 was designed as an **integrated business case, simulating a crisis at the intersection of technology, regulation, reputation, and internal conflict. The objective was to test the organization's resilience under conditions of uncertainty, information fragmentation, and extreme time pressure.**



The Fictional Organization:

Name: Big Money Vilnius

Profile: A realistic international FinTech group providing electronic money and payment services.

Operating Environment: Governed by a full suite of EU regulations (MiCA, AML, GDPR).

Structure: Contained fully functional departments including a SOC, AML, Compliance, Legal, IT, and Product teams.

The Proving Ground: Two Hours in the Fog of War

Key Constraints

- **Extreme Time Pressure:** A strict two-hour window to identify, assess, and act on a cascading series of events. This pressure revealed the difference between deliberate analysis and decisive action.
- **Information Asymmetry:** Information was delivered in fragments ("injections") to different teams, mirroring real-world chaos.
- **Deliberate Misdirection:** Some information was intentionally misleading to test the organization's ability to filter signal from noise.

As theorist Karl Weick notes, in a crisis, organizations do not simply *solve* problems; they must first create *meaning* (sensemaking). Code Red 6 was fundamentally a test of this sensemaking capability under extreme duress.

The First Domino: A Malicious CV and a C-Level Compromise

The Attack Vector

- The incident began with a malicious document disguised as a CV.
- It was opened by a C-level executive, immediately granting the attacker high-privilege access.

The Strategic Failure

- The organization's risk assessment was siloed by function, not by business impact.
- A high-level account compromise—which according to NIST SP 800-61 must be treated as a highest-priority incident—was not immediately identified as a critical event.
- This demonstrates a systemic over-reliance on technology and an underestimation of the human factor.



Engineering Cognitive Overload: The Distraction Architecture

The initial compromise was followed by a barrage of parallel, seemingly unrelated signals designed to fragment attention and prevent the formation of a clear, unified picture of the incident.

The Effect:

This architecture forced leadership to choose where to focus limited attention, leading to uncoordinated responses as different teams chased different problems.

The Breakdown of Sensemaking

The primary failure was not technical, but cognitive. The team struggled to construct a shared, accurate understanding of the situation from fragmented and contradictory data. This is a classic failure of organizational sensemaking as described by Karl Weick.



Fragmented View

Coherent Reality

Table: What We Saw vs. What It Meant

What the Team Saw	What Was Actually Happening
A series of independent operational issues.	A single, coordinated, multi-vector attack.
Technical glitches and network problems.	Symptoms of a deep system compromise.
An external PR nuisance.	A deliberate reputational assault linked to the breach.

The Intuition Paradox: Recognizing Patterns Amidst the Noise

The Glimmer of Insight
In the early stages, some experienced participants intuitively suspected the disparate events were interconnected.

The Science of Intuition
This aligns with research by Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein. Expert intuition is not a guess; it is a form of rapid, experience-based pattern recognition.

The Organizational Response
These intuitive hypotheses were largely sidelined in favor of a search for more data and concrete proof. The organization's processes favored analytical certainty over expert judgment, causing critical delays. This created a paradox where the fastest path to the correct conclusion was dismissed as being insufficiently rigorous.



The Decision Bottleneck: Organizational Paralysis Under Pressure

Organizational Paralysis Under Pressure

The Critical Failure Point

As the incident escalated, decision-making authority became increasingly concentrated in a few key individuals, particularly at the technical leadership level.

Examples of Delayed Decisions

- Activating the *failover* infrastructure.
- Isolating compromised network segments.
- Executing a temporary halt of all customer payment processing.

The Impact

These critical strategic decisions were deferred, awaiting a single person's approval.
Even a short delay in this context became a systemic, cascading risk, allowing the threat to deepen its hold on the organization's systems.

This personification of decision-making created a single point of failure.

The Psychology of Delay: Confusing Caution with Professionalism

The Underlying Cause

The observed decision paralysis was not a sign of incompetence, but a manifestation of a common organizational habit: mistaking cautious deliberation for professional rigor.

"Organizations often confuse caution with professionalism, though in crises, delay is one of the most dangerous strategies."
— Adapted from Henry Mintzberg.

The Strategic Lesson

In a fast-moving crisis, inaction is itself a decision—**often the worst one**. The simulation proved that the negative impact of delayed-but-perfect decisions was far greater than that of immediate-but-imperfect ones.



The Second Front: A Self-Inflicted Reputational Crisis

The False Dilemma: Throughout the simulation, the leadership team treated security and communication as conflicting priorities. The prevailing belief was: “We can’t talk about it until it’s fixed.”

The Consequence: This led to a critical delay in all external and internal communications. While the team was debating technical responses, the external narrative was being controlled by attackers, rumors, and customer panic.

The Outcome: The organization appeared secretive, incompetent, and out of control. The reputational damage stemmed not from the breach itself, but from the information vacuum the company created.

Internal Reality



External Perception

The Communication Playbook They Ignored

The Guiding Principle

The Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) emphasizes that the greatest damage to reputation and trust comes from withholding information, inconsistent messaging, and perceived deception.

What Should Have Happened

- **Timeliness:** Acknowledge the issue promptly, even before all details are known.
- **Transparency:** Communicate what is known, what is unknown, and what is being done to fix it.
- **Consistency:** Ensure a single, unified message is delivered to all stakeholders (customers, regulators, employees).

The Lesson

Reputation management is not a separate workstream to be activated after a crisis is contained. It must be integrated into the incident response process from the very first minute.

Correct Path



Red Code 6 Path



The Regulatory Litmus Test: Preparedness Is Not Theoretical

The Moment of Truth

When the simulation introduced inquiries from regulatory bodies, the organization's structural unpreparedness became glaringly obvious.

Observed Failures

- **Fragmented Documentation:** Key policies, procedures, and incident logs were difficult to locate and assemble.
- **Inconsistent Responses:** Different leaders provided conflicting information to regulatory role-players.
- **Missing Reports:** Critical compliance artifacts could not be produced on demand.

The Standard

According to frameworks like ISO 27035 (Incident Management) and ISO 22301 (Business Continuity), documentation is not a formality; it is an essential control mechanism during a crisis. Compliance must be a continuous state of readiness, not an ad-hoc assembly of documents after an event.

The True Diagnosis: This Was a Test of Organizational Maturity

Looking Beyond the Symptoms

The malware, C2 servers, and service disruptions were only the triggers. They served as catalysts that exposed pre-existing weaknesses in the organization's core operating model.

The Real System Under Test

- The **Decision-Making Architecture:** How the organization makes high-stakes choices under pressure.
- The **Distribution of Responsibility:** Whether authority is centralized or effectively delegated.
- The **Capacity for Coordinated Action:** The ability of disparate teams to synthesize information and act as one.

An organization’s resilience is not defined by its security tools, but by the maturity of these foundational organizational systems.

A Blueprint of Failure: Key Organizational Vulnerabilities Revealed

1. Decision-Making & Authority

- Paralysis from centralized authority.
- Personification of critical decisions.
- Mistaking deliberation for professionalism, leading to fatal delays.



2. Sensemaking & Perception

- Inability to connect disparate events into a single narrative.
- Cognitive overload engineered by distraction architecture.
- Dismissal of expert intuition in favor of slow analysis.

3. Process & Preparedness

- Systemic underestimation of the human vector.
- Reactive, delayed, and siloed crisis communication.
- ‘On-paper’ compliance that crumbled under pressure.

4. Culture & Risk

- Risk viewed by functional silo, not business impact.
- Lack of a shared psychological framework for crisis response.
- Absence of pre-delegated authority for emergency actions.

Your Organization's Operating System is the Ultimate Security Control

The Final Reframe:

Code Red 6 demonstrates that a crisis does not test your firewall; it tests your organizational "Operating System"—the underlying architecture of how your people think, decide, and act together under pressure. Technology is merely an application running on top of it.

Strategic Questions for Your Leadership Team:

- Where are our hidden decision bottlenecks, and who is empowered to act when they are unavailable?
- How do we practice collective sensemaking *before* a crisis hits?
- Is our crisis communication plan a document on a shelf, or a rehearsed, integrated capability?
- Is our resilience defined by our tools, or by the design of our organization?



Is Your Architecture Resilient by Design?