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# CATEGORY: IncidentResponse

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Incident Response (IR) scripts must be treated as **high-sensitivity**, **high-impact**, and **high-auditability** tools. These SOPs ensure every IR action performed through RDAM Script Wizard is controlled, logged, and aligned with enterprise security and forensic standards.

## SOP 1 – Network Connections with Process Mapping

**Script Name:** Network Connections with Process Mapping **Category:** IncidentResponse **Version:** 1.0  
**Approved By:** Security Operations / Incident Response Leadership

### 1. Purpose

This script enumerates active network connections on a system and maps each connection to the owning process. It supports threat hunting, malware analysis, and incident triage by identifying suspicious outbound or listening connections.

### 2. Scope

- **Systems:** Windows servers and workstations
- **Use Cases:** IR triage, malware investigation, lateral movement detection
- **Authorized Personnel:**
  - Security analysts
  - Incident responders
  - Forensic investigators
  - Tier-3 system administrators

### 3. Definitions

- **Network Connection:** Active TCP/UDP communication endpoint.

- **Process Mapping:** Identifying which executable owns a connection.
- **Listening Port:** Port awaiting inbound connections.

## 4. Preconditions

- Local admin rights required to enumerate all processes.
- System must be reachable.
- Script must run under a trusted security context.

## 5. Required Inputs

- Optional:
  - Filter by port
  - Filter by process name
  - Filter by remote IP

## 6. Procedure Steps

### 1. Input Collection

- Wizard prompts for optional filters.
- Validate filter formats.

### 2. Connection Enumeration

- Retrieve all TCP/UDP connections.
- Include:
  - Local address/port
  - Remote address/port
  - State (Established, Listening, etc.)

### 3. Process Mapping

- Map each connection to owning PID.
- Retrieve process name, path, and command line.

### 4. Suspicious Pattern Detection

- Highlight:
  - Unknown processes
  - Connections to foreign IPs
  - Unusual listening ports

## 5. Output Formatting

- Present structured table with connection → process mapping.

## 6. Logging

- Log filters, operator, timestamp.

## 7. Expected Output

- Full list of network connections with associated processes.

## 8. Post-Execution Validation

- IR team may correlate with firewall logs, SIEM, or threat intel.

## 9. Error Handling

- Access denied
- Process terminated during enumeration
- Network stack unavailable

## 10. Security Considerations

- Output may reveal sensitive system activity.
- Must be restricted to IR personnel.

## 11. Audit Logging Requirements

- Operator ID
- Filters used
- Result count
- Timestamp

## 12. Organizational Benefit Statement

This script provides a rapid, auditable method for identifying suspicious network activity, accelerating incident triage and reducing dwell time.

# SOP 2 – Search for Known IOCs

**Script Name:** Search for Known IOCs **Category:** IncidentResponse

# 1. Purpose

This script searches a system for known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), including file hashes, malicious domains, IP addresses, and registry artifacts. It supports threat hunting and incident containment.

## 2. Scope

- **IOC Types:**
  - File hashes
  - Filenames/paths
  - Registry keys
  - Domains
  - IP addresses
- Used by IR and security teams.

## 3. Definitions

- **IOC:** Observable artifact indicating malicious activity.
- **Hash:** Unique identifier for a file's contents.

## 4. Preconditions

- Operator must have read access to file system and registry.
- IOC list must be validated and approved by IR leadership.

## 5. Required Inputs

- IOC list (hashes, domains, IPs, registry paths)

## 6. Procedure Steps

### 1. Input Collection

- Wizard prompts for IOC list.

### 2. IOC Categorization

- Separate IOCs by type.

### 3. Search Operations

- Hash search: compute file hashes and compare.
- Domain/IP search: inspect DNS cache, logs, and connections.

- Registry search: enumerate keys and values.

#### **4. Match Identification**

- Flag any IOC matches.
- Include file paths, timestamps, and process associations.

#### **5. Output Formatting**

- Present matches with severity indicators.

#### **6. Logging**

- Log IOC count, matches, operator.

### **7. Expected Output**

- List of matched IOCs with context.

### **8. Post-Execution Validation**

- IR team may escalate to containment or eradication.

### **9. Error Handling**

- Invalid IOC format
- Access denied
- Large directory scan timeout

### **10. Security Considerations**

- IOC lists may contain sensitive threat intel.
- Results must be handled securely.

### **11. Audit Logging Requirements**

- Operator ID
- IOC count
- Match count
- Timestamp

### **12. Organizational Benefit Statement**

This script accelerates threat detection by providing a fast, auditable method for identifying known malicious artifacts.

# SOP 3 – Dump Process Memory

**Script Name:** Dump Process Memory **Category:** IncidentResponse

## 1. Purpose

This script captures the memory of a running process for forensic analysis. It supports malware investigation, credential theft detection, and advanced IR workflows.

## 2. Scope

- **Targets:** Suspicious or compromised processes
- **Use Cases:**
  - Malware analysis
  - Credential theft investigation
  - Memory forensics

## 3. Definitions

- **Memory Dump:** Snapshot of a process's memory space.
- **PID:** Process identifier.

## 4. Preconditions

- Local admin rights required.
- Dumping must be authorized by IR leadership.
- Sufficient disk space must be available.

## 5. Required Inputs

- PID or process name
- Dump file output path

## 6. Procedure Steps

### 1. Input Collection

- Wizard prompts for PID and output path.

### 2. Process Resolution

- Confirm process exists and is accessible.

### 3. Dump Initialization

- Prepare dump writer with appropriate flags.

#### **4. Memory Dump Operation**

- Capture full memory or minidump depending on configuration.

#### **5. Post-Dump Verification**

- Confirm dump file exists and is readable.

#### **6. Logging**

- Log PID, dump path, operator.

### **7. Expected Output**

- Confirmation of successful memory dump.

### **8. Post-Execution Validation**

- Forensics team may load dump into analysis tools.

### **9. Error Handling**

- Access denied
- Process terminated
- Insufficient disk space

### **10. Security Considerations**

- Memory dumps may contain credentials or sensitive data.
- Must be stored and transmitted securely.

### **11. Audit Logging Requirements**

- Operator ID
- PID
- Dump path
- Timestamp

### **12. Organizational Benefit Statement**

This script provides a controlled, auditable method for capturing process memory, supporting advanced forensic investigations.

# SOP 4 – Enumerate Persistence Mechanisms

**Script Name:** Enumerate Persistence Mechanisms **Category:** IncidentResponse

## 1. Purpose

This script identifies common persistence mechanisms used by malware or threat actors to maintain access on a system.

## 2. Scope

- **Persistence Types:**
  - Registry Run keys
  - Scheduled tasks
  - Services
  - Startup folders
  - WMI subscriptions

## 3. Definitions

- **Persistence:** Techniques used to survive reboots or logoffs.

## 4. Preconditions

- Local admin rights required.
- System must be reachable.

## 5. Required Inputs

- None (full scan)

## 6. Procedure Steps

### 1. Registry Enumeration

- Inspect Run/RunOnce keys.

### 2. Scheduled Task Enumeration

- List tasks with suspicious triggers.

### 3. Service Enumeration

- Identify auto-start services with unusual paths.

### 4. Startup Folder Inspection



- Check user and system startup folders.

## **5. WMI Subscription Enumeration**

- Identify permanent event consumers.

## **6. Output Formatting**

- Present findings with severity indicators.

## **7. Logging**

- Log count of suspicious entries.

## **7. Expected Output**

- List of potential persistence mechanisms.

## **8. Post-Execution Validation**

- IR team may escalate to containment.

## **9. Error Handling**

- Access denied
- Corrupted registry keys

## **10. Security Considerations**

- Results may reveal sensitive system configuration.
- Must be restricted to IR personnel.

## **11. Audit Logging Requirements**

- Operator ID
- Count of findings
- Timestamp

## **12. Organizational Benefit Statement**

This script accelerates detection of malicious persistence, reducing attacker dwell time and improving system integrity.

# **SOP 5 – Quick Triage Summary**

**Script Name:** Quick Triage Summary **Category:** IncidentResponse

# 1. Purpose

This script performs a rapid triage of a system, collecting key indicators of compromise and system health to support fast decision-making during an incident.

## 2. Scope

- Windows servers and workstations
- Used during early IR phases

## 3. Definitions

- Triage: Rapid assessment of system state.

## 4. Preconditions

- Local admin rights recommended.
- System must be reachable.

## 5. Required Inputs

- None (full triage)

## 6. Procedure Steps

### 1. System Info Collection

- OS version, uptime, logged-in users.

### 2. Process Snapshot

- List running processes with command lines.

### 3. Network Snapshot

- Active connections and listening ports.

### 4. Service Snapshot

- Auto-start services.

### 5. Event Log Summary

- Recent critical and error events.

### 6. Suspicious Artifact Detection

- Flag anomalies.

### 7. Output Formatting

- Present structured triage report.

## **8. Logging**

- Log operator and timestamp.

## **7. Expected Output**

- A comprehensive triage summary.

## **8. Post-Execution Validation**

- IR team may escalate to deeper analysis.

## **9. Error Handling**

- Access denied
- Missing components
- Partial data retrieval

## **10. Security Considerations**

- Triage data may contain sensitive information.
- Must be handled securely.

## **11. Audit Logging Requirements**

- Operator ID
- Summary metadata
- Timestamp

## **12. Organizational Benefit Statement**

This script provides a rapid, auditable snapshot of system health and potential compromise indicators, accelerating IR decision-making.