

CS 4530

Software Engineering

Lesson 10: Software Engineering & Security

Jonathan Bell, Adeel Bhutta, Ferdinand Vesely, Mitch Wand
Khoury College of Computer Sciences
© 2022, released under [CC BY-SA](#)

Learning Objectives for this Lesson

By the end of this lesson, you should be able to...

- Describe that security is a spectrum, and be able to define a realistic threat model for a given system
- Evaluate the tradeoffs between security and costs in software engineering
- Recognize the causes of and common mitigations for common vulnerabilities in web applications
- Utilize static analysis tools to identify common weaknesses in code

Outline:

1. What is a threat model?
2. What are the primary categories of threats for software systems?
3. Techniques for mitigating threats
4. Costs and tradeoffs of mitigations

Security as non-functional requirements

CIA: An overview of security properties

- Confidentiality: is information disclosed to unauthorized individuals?
- Integrity: is code or data tampered with?
- Availability: is the system accessible and usable?

Security isn't (always) free

In software, as in the real world...

- You just moved to a new house, someone just moved out of it. What do you do to protect your belongings/property?
- Do you change the locks?
- Do you buy security cameras?
- Do you hire a security guard?
- Do you even bother locking the door?



Security is about managing risk

Vocabulary

- Security architecture is a set of mechanisms and policies that we build into our system to mitigate risks from threats
- Threat: potential event that could compromise a security requirement
- Attack: realization of a threat
- Vulnerability: a characteristic or flaw in system design or implementation, or in the security procedures, that, if exploited, could result in a security compromise

Security is about managing risk

Cost of attack vs cost of defense?

- Increasing security might:
 - Increase development & maintenance cost
 - Increase infrastructure requirements
 - Degrade performance
- But, if we are attacked, increasing security might also:
 - Decrease financial and intangible losses
 - So: How likely do we think we are to be attacked in way X?


A Threat Model forces us to answer 3 key questions:

- What is important to defend?
- Who do we trust?
- What processes do we institute to protect our code and data?

Thread Model: What is important to defend?

What value can an attacker extract from a vulnerability?

- What is being defended?
 - What resources are important to defend?
 - Does our code contain any sensitive data?
 - What is the cost if that data is breached or tampered with?
 - Even if your code is not “sensitive”: does it expose other routes of attack?



Threat Model: Who do we trust?

- What entities or parts of system can be considered secure and trusted?
- Have to trust **something!**
- Never trust remote users (especially remote users!)

Threat Model: Processes

- What processes do we institute to protect our code and data?
 - How often do we review our code for security?
 - How often do we review our partners' security practices?

Creating a Reasonable Threat Model

Best practices applicable in most situations

- Trust:
 - Developers writing our code
 - Server running our code
 - Popular dependencies that we use and update
- Don't trust:
 - Code running in browser
 - Inputs from users
- Practice good security practices:
 - Encryption (all data in transit, sensitive data at rest)
 - Code signing, multi-factor authentication
- Bring in security experts early for riskier situations

Part 2: Categories of Threats

1. Code that runs in an untrusted environment
2. Untrusted data flowing into our trusted codebase
3. Threats coming from the software supply chain (dependency on untrusted code)

Threat: code that runs in an untrusted environment



Threat: Code that runs in an untrusted environment


Authentication code in a web application

```
function checkPassword(inputPassword: string) {  
  if(inputPassword === 'letmein') {  
    return true;  
  }  
  return false;  
}
```

Should this go in our frontend code?


Threat: Code that runs in an untrusted environment

Authentication code in a web application




```
function checkPassword(inputPassword: string) {
  if (inputPassword === 'letmein') {
    return true;
  }
  return false;
}
```

Threat: Code that runs in an untrusted environment



Threat: Data controlled by a user flowing into our trusted codebase



Threat: Data controlled by a user flowing into our trusted codebase

Cross-site scripting (XSS)




The screenshot shows two browser windows side-by-side.

Left Window: A REST API response in JSON format:
{"student": {"studentID": 4, "studentName": "casey"}, "grades": [{"course": "DemoClass", "grade": 100}]}


Right Window: A malicious JavaScript response:
Congratulations!
You are the 1000th visitor to the transcript site! You have been selected to receive a free iPad. To claim your prize [click here!](#)

Threat: Data controlled by a user flowing into our trusted codebase

Cross-site scripting (XSS)




```
app.get('/transcripts/:id', (req, res) => {
  // req.params to get components of the path
  const {id} = req.params;
  const theTranscript = db.getTranscript(parseInt(id));
  if (theTranscript === undefined) {
    res.status(404).send(`No student with id = ${id}`);
  }
  res.status(200).send(theTranscript);
});
```




Threat: Data controlled by a user flowing into our trusted codebase

Cross-site scripting (XSS)




```
app.get('/transcripts/:id', (req, res) => {
  // req.params to get components of the path
  const {id} = req.params;
  const theTranscript = db.getTranscript(parseInt(id));
  if (theTranscript === undefined) {
    res.status(404).send(`No student with id = ${id}`);
  }
  res.status(200).send(theTranscript);
});
```






Threat: Data controlled by a user flowing into our trusted codebase

Cross-site scripting (XSS)



https://rest-example.covey.town/transcripts/%3Ch1%3ECongratulations!%3C/h1%3E You are the 1000th

/t...
/t...



```
app.get('/transcripts/:id', (req, res) => {
  // req.params to get components of the path
  const {id} = req.params;
  const theTranscript = db.getTranscript(parseInt(id));
  if (theTranscript === undefined) {
    res.status(404).send(`No student with id = ${id}`);
  }
  res.status(200).send(theTranscript);
});
```

<h1>Congratulations!</h1>
You are the 1000th visitor to the transcript site! You have been selected to receive a free iPad. To claim your prize click here!
<script language="javascript">
document.getRootNode().body.innerHTML='<h1>Congratulations!</h1>You are the 1000th visitor to the transcript site! You have been selected to receive a free iPad. To claim your prize click here!;
alert('You are a winner!');
</script>

Threat: Data controlled by a user flowing into our trusted codebase

Java code injection in Apache Struts (@Equifax)

The screenshot shows the Equifax website with a red header. The header features the Equifax logo, language selection (English), and a link to return to equifax.com. Below the header, there is a large white banner with the text "2017 Cybersecurity Incident & Important Consumer Information". In the bottom right corner of this banner, there is a small "NEWS" label. To the right of the banner, there is a news article titled "Equifax Says Cybersecurity Breach Has Cost \$1.4 Billion". At the bottom right of the page, there are social media sharing icons for Facebook, Twitter, and Email.

EQUIFAX

English

Return to equifax.com

2017 Cybersecurity Incident & Important Consumer Information

NEWS

Equifax Says Cybersecurity Breach Has Cost \$1.4 Billion

f t e

CVE-2017-5638 Detail

Current Description

The Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts 2 2.3.x before 2.3.32 and 2.5.x before 2.5.10.1 has incorrect exception handling and error-message generation during file-upload attempts, which allows remote attackers to **execute arbitrary commands via a crafted Content-Type, Content-Disposition, or Content-Length HTTP header**, as exploited in the wild in March 2017 with a Content-Type header containing a #cmd= string.


Threat: Data controlled by a user flowing into our trusted codebase

Java code injection in Log4J

Extremely Critical Log4J Vulnerability

Leaves Much of the Internet at Risk

December 10, 2021 · Ravie Lakshmanan



CVE-2021-44228 Detail

Current Description

Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related **endpoints**. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when

The Apache Software Foundation actively exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, Apache Log4j Java-based log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. execute malicious code at <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228> systems.

<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/extremely-critical-log4j-vulnerability.html>

Mar 8, 2022


APT41 COMPROMISED SIX U.S. STATE GOVERNMENT NETWORKS

... networks between May and February in a “deliberate campaign” that reflects new attack vectors and retooling by the prolific Chinese state-sponsored group.

<https://duo.com/decipher/apt41-compromised-six-state-government-networks>

Threat Category 3: Software Supply Chain

Do we trust our own code? Third-party code provides an attack vector



Postmortem for Malicious Packages Published on July 12th, 2018

Summary

On July 12th, 2018, an attacker compromised the npm account of an ESLint maintainer and published malicious versions of the `eslint-scope` and `eslint-config-eslint` packages to the npm registry. On installation, the malicious packages downloaded and executed code from pastebin.com which sent the contents of the user's `.npmrc` file to the attacker. An `.npmrc` file typically contains access tokens for publishing to npm.

The malicious package versions are `eslint-scope@3.7.2` and `eslint-config-eslint@5.0.2`, both of which have been unpublished from npm. The pastebin.com paste linked in these packages has also been taken down.

[npm has revoked](#) all access tokens issued before 2018-07-12 12:30 UTC. As a result, all access tokens compromised by this attack should no longer be usable.

The maintainer whose account was compromised had reused their npm password on several other sites and did not have two-factor authentication enabled on their npm account.

We, the ESLint team, are sorry for allowing this to happen. We

<https://eslint.org/blog/2018/07/postmortem-for-malicious-package-publishes>



Photo Illustration by Grayson Blackmon / The Verge

PODCASTS

HARD LESSONS OF THE SOLARWINDS HACK

Cybersecurity reporter Joseph Menn on the massive breach the US didn't see coming

By Nilay Patel | @reckless | Jan 26, 2021, 9:13am EST



SHARE


In December, details came out on one of the most massive breaches of US cybersecurity in recent history. A group of hackers, likely from the Russian government, had gotten into a network management company called SolarWinds and infiltrated its systems to breach even

<https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/26/22248631/solarwinds-hack-cybersecurity-us-menn-decoder-podcast>

Part 3: Mitigating security threats in software engineering


- For these threats:
 - Threat category: Code that runs in an untrusted environment
 - Threat category: Inputs that are controlled by an untrusted user
 - Threat category: Software supply chain
- Recurring theme: No silver bullet

Threat Mitigation: Trusted Code



client page
(the “user”)

**Do I trust that this response
really came from the server?**




server

**Do I trust that this request *really*
came from the user?**

Threat Mitigation

Might be “man in the middle”
that intercepts requests and
impersonates user or server.



client page
(the “user”)


Do I trust that this response
really came from the server?

malicious actor
“black hat”

Do I trust that this request *really*
came from the user?

Threat Mitigation: Trusted Code

Preventing the man-in-the-middle with SSL




client page
(the “user”)

HTTP Request

HTTP Response





amazon.com certificate
(AZ's public key + CA's sig)



server

Threat Mitigation: Trusted Code

Preventing the man-in-the-middle with SSL




Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **192.168.18.4** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). [Learn more](#)

NET::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID



[amazon.com](#) certificate
(AZ's public key + CA's sig)



server

SSL: A perfect solution?

Certificate authorities


- A certificate authority (or CA) binds some public key to a real-world entity that we might be familiar with
- The CA is the clearinghouse that verifies that [amazon.com](#) is truly [amazon.com](#)
- CA creates a certificate that binds [amazon.com](#)'s public key to the CA's public key (signing it using the CA's private key)

Asymmetric encryption: aka public key/private key

- Each actor creates two keys:
 - A public key, which it publishes. This tells the world: if you want to send a private message to me, encrypt it with this key. Then only I can decode it.
 - A private key, which it keeps secret. The private key is what the actor uses to decode the messages that are processed by the public key.


Asymmetric encryption, aka public key/private key

- When a node B wants to send a message to node A, it obtains A's public key and uses it to encrypt the message
- Only A can decrypt the message using its private key
- Computationally expensive; usually only used for authentication




Public/Private Key Encryption

- Encrypt with public key: only private key holder can decrypt



asymmetric encryption can be used for authentication, too

- Encrypt with private key: anyone with public key can decrypt and be confident about who sent it.



Certificate Authorities issue SSL Certificates




amazon.com certificate
(AZ's public key + CA's sig)



Certificate Authorities are Implicitly Trusted

- Note: We had to already know the CA's public key
- There are a small set of “root” CA's (think: root DNS servers)
- Every computer/browser is shipped with these root CA public keys



Should Certificate Authorities be Implicitly Trusted?

Signatures only endorse trust if you trust the signer!

- What happens if a CA is compromised, and issues invalid certificates?
- Not good times.

Security

Fuming Google tears Symantec a new one over rogue SSL certs

We've got just the thing for you, Symantec ...

By Iain Thomson in San Francisco 29 Oct 2015 at 21:32

36

SHARE ▾

Security

Comodo-gate hacker brags about forged certificate exploit

Tiger-blooded Persian cracker boasts of mighty exploits



Google has read the riot act to Symantec, scolding the security biz for its

Threat Mitigation: Untrusted Inputs

Restrict inputs to only “valid” or “safe” characters

- Special characters like <, >, ‘, “ and ` are often involved in exploits involving untrusted inputs
- Simple fix: Prohibit such inputs using input validation

[Create password](#)

Please create your password. Click [here](#) to read our password security policy.

Your password needs to have:

- ✓ At least 8 characters with no space
- ✓ At least 1 upper case letter
- ✓ At least 1 number
- ✓ At least 1 of the following special characters from ! # \$ ^ * (other special characters are not supported)

Password

.....


⚠ Your password must contain a minimum of 8 characters included with at least 1 upper case letter, 1 number, and 1 special character from !, #, \$, ^, and * (other special characters are not supported).

Threat Mitigation: Untrusted Inputs

- Sanitize inputs – prevent them from being executable
- Avoid use of languages or features that can allow for remote code execution, such as:
 - eval() in JS – executes a string as JS code
 - Query languages (e.g. SQL, LDAP, language-specific languages like OGNL in java)
 - Languages that allow code to construct arbitrary pointers or write beyond a valid array index

Threat Mitigation: Software Supply Chain

Consider threats at each phase



Threat Mitigation: Software Supply Chain


Process-based solutions for process-based problems

- External dependencies
 - Audit all dependencies and their updates before applying them
- In-house code
 - Require developers to sign code before committing, require 2FA for signing keys, rotate signing keys regularly
- Build process
 - Audit build software, use trusted compilers and build chains
- Distribution process
 - Sign all packages, protect signing keys
- Operating environment
 - Isolate applications in containers or VMs

Weak Links in Software Supply Chain

2021 NCSU/Microsoft Study

- 8,498 NPM packages are maintained by at least one maintainer whose email address is inactive and could be purchased
- 33,249 NPM packages include installation scripts that can be exploited to run arbitrary code on developers' machines at installation-time
- 5,645 NPM packages are not actively maintained



"What are Weak Links in the npm Supply Chain?" By: Nusrat Zahan, Thomas Zimmermann, Patrice Godefroid, Brendan Murphy, Chandra Maddila, Laurie Williams

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.10165>

Part 4: Which threats to protect against, at what cost?

Consider various costs:

- Performance:
 - Encryption is not free
 - Preventing buffer overruns is not free
 - “Safe” languages like TS are usually (but not always) slower than optimized C.
- Expertise:
 - It is easy to try to implement these measures, it is hard to get them right
- Financial:
 - Implementing these measures takes time and resources

OWASP Top Security Risks

All 10: <https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>


- Broken authentication + access control
- Cryptographic failures
- Code injection (various forms - SQL/command line/XSS/XML/deserialization)
- Weakly protected sensitive data
- Using components with known vulnerabilities

Mitigations for Broken Authentication + Access Control

OWASP #1

- Implement multi-factor authentication
- Implement weak-password checks
- Apply per-record access control
- Harden account creation, password reset pathways

Don't do this at home!
Use a trusted
component instead



<https://auth0.com>

Cryptographic Failures

OWASP #2

- Enforce encryption on all communication
- Validate SSL certificates; rotate certificates regularly
- Protect user-data at rest (passwords, credit card numbers, etc)
- Protect application “secrets” (e.g. signing keys)

	Amazon	Facebook	Twitter	Bitly	Flickr	Foursquare	Google	LinkedIn	Titanium
Total candidates	1,241	1,477	28,235	3,132	159	326	414	1,434	1,914
Unique candidates	308	460	6,228	616	89	177	225	181	1,783
Unique % valid	93.5%	71.7%	95.2%	88.8%	100%	97.7%	96.0%	97.2%	99.8%

Table 5: Credentials statistics from June 22, 2013 and validated on November 11, 2013. A credential may consist of an ID token and secret authentication token.

The screenshot shows a search interface for decompiled Java code. The search term 'AKIA*' is entered in the search bar. The results table has columns for 'Android Package', 'Path', and 'Line'. The 'Line' column displays code snippets containing AWS access keys. For example, one snippet shows:

```
public static final String AMAZON_KEY_ID = "AKIA...";  
BasicAWSCredentials localBasicAWSCredentials = new BasicAWSCredentials("AKIA...","zc3/1lb...");  
("AWSAccessKeyId=AKIA...").append("AssociateTag=mariuorda-206").toString()).append("ItemPage=1&").append("Keywords=").append(str2).append("&").toString();  
("AWSAccessKeyId=AKIA...").append("AssociateTag=mariuorda-206").toString()).append("ItemPage=1&").toString()).append("Keywords=").append(str2).append("&").toString();  
final String accessKeyId = "AKIA...";  
private SimpleDB simpleDBClient = new SimpleDB("AKIA...","25FJvKg51bLnmBrSqGw00DwgoJ0baN...");  
8akIa8bJ/2m1pdLWyqTbNPfKeNN533CAvtug4dRLPD05ZtckU/JF8RAVoi/HxGSE9jpJj3skccxk75t0gUJr/sJX18nV+TxPMH8lAgQ/Bk1BIFB+A4KyZtpkKPz9+cVL8jIDAAKjRkjjaKAAAAAAAUAk4u6RWY2ZQ6hoeHh5XP5zU0NKRXXnmFiwUQA4cPH9ahQ4fU3d1...  
String str1 = work03(paramString, "", "AKIA...","ecs.amazonaws.jp", "AtxeExfj7HibQhDlb4mc...");  
protected AmazonSimpleDBClient sdbClient = new AmazonSimpleDBClient(new BasicAWSCredentials("AKIA..."));  
private String awsAccessKeyId = "AKIA...";  
private String awsAccessKeyId = "AKIA...";
```

Below the table, there are navigation links for 'Previous' and 'Next' pages, and a 'Search' button.

Figure 9: PLAYDRONE’s web interface to search decompiled sources showing Amazon Web Service tokens found in 130 ms.
“A Measurement Study of Google Play,” Viennot et al, SIGMETRICS ‘14

Static Analysis can help detect secrets at rest in a repo

GitGuardian (Launched in 2017)

The image shows the GitGuardian homepage. On the left, there's a large call-to-action section with the heading "Automated secrets detection & remediation". Below it, a subtext reads: "Monitor public or private source code, and other data sources as well. Detect API keys, database credentials, certificates, ...". A blue button labeled "Schedule a demo" is present. On the right, a screenshot of the product's interface is displayed. The interface has a dark sidebar with icons for PERIMETER, ACTIVITY (which is selected), SECRETS, and SETTINGS. The main area is titled "Activity" and shows three charts: "Push events" (77), "Public events" (12), and "Commits" (153). Below each chart is a line graph showing activity over time from December 10 to December 16. To the right of the charts is a "Table of activity" listing various events and commits with their actors. At the bottom of the interface, there's a decorative pattern of colored dots.

Products ▾ Pricing Resources ▾

Get a demo SIGN UP FOR FREE Internal Monitoring

Automated secrets detection & remediation

Monitor public or private source code, and other data sources as well. Detect API keys, database credentials, certificates, ...

Schedule a demo

Activity

PUSH EVENTS 77 PUBLIC EVENTS 12 COMMITS 153

Push events

Public events

Commits

Table of activity

FILTER Filter by search...

TYPE ACTOR

- Commit David Héault
- Public elacaille18
- Event genesixx
- Commit Deployment Bot (fro
- Event elacaille18
- Commit Eric
- Event elacaille18
- Commit Eric
- Event dherault
- Commit David Héault

Cryptographic Failures

Secret detection tools are not enough

These are process-related issues and so require process-related solutions.

- Industrial study of secret detection tool in a large software services company with over 1,000 developers, operating for over 10 years
- What do developers do when they get warnings of secrets in repository?
 - 49% remove the secrets; 51% bypass the warning
- Why do developers bypass warnings?
 - 44% report false positives, 6% are already exposed secrets, remaining are “development-related” reasons, e.g. “not a production credential” or “no significant security value”

“Why secret detection tools are not enough: It’s not just about false positives - An industrial case study”


Md Rayhanur Rahman, Nasif Imtiaz, Margaret-Anne Storey & Laurie Williams

<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10664-021-10109-y>

Cryptographic Failures

Secret management tools (“Vaults”) centralize points of failure, and automates:

- Authorizing access to secrets
- Providing time-limited secrets
- Audit secret access



Example platform: HashiCorp Vault (open source, or cloud-hosted)
<https://learn.hashicorp.com/tutorials/vault/getting-started-intro?in=vault/getting-started>

Code Injection

OWASP #3

- **Sanitize user-controlled inputs (remove HTML)**
- Use tools like LGTM to detect vulnerable data flows
- Use middleware that side-steps the problem (e.g. return data as JSON, client puts that data into React component)

1 path available
Reflected cross-site scripting

2 steps in server.ts


Step 1 source

```
Source root/src/server/server.ts
↑ 1-61
62 app.get('/transcripts/:id', (req, res) => {
63   // req.params to get components of the path
64   const {id} = req.params;
65   console.log(`Handling GET /transcripts/:id id = ${id}`);
66   const theTranscript = db.getTranscript(parseInt(id));
↓ 67-169
```

Step 2 sink

```
Source root/src/server/server.ts
↑ 1-65
66 const theTranscript = db.getTranscript(parseInt(id));
67 if (theTranscript === undefined) {
68   res.status(404).send(`No student with id = ${id}`);
69 } else {
70   res.status(200).send(theTranscript);
↓ 71-169
```

Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to user-provided value.



Detecting Weaknesses in Apps with Static Analysis

LGTM + CodeQL

The screenshot shows the LGTM web interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for Help, Query console, Project lists, My alerts, and a user profile for Jonathan Bell. Below the navigation is a purple header bar with tabs for Alerts (16), Logs, Files (selected), History, Compare, Integrations, and Queries. A green banner at the top of the main content area says "Sammie is joining GitHub". The main content area has a sidebar on the left with "Alert filters" (Severity, Query, Tag, Show excluded files, Show heatmap) and an "Export alerts" button. The main panel shows a circular heatmap visualization for the source root. Below it is a table with columns for Name, Alerts, and Lines of code.

Name	Alerts	Lines of code
public	0	0
src	16	756
package.json	0	0

- Clear text storage of sensitive information**
Sensitive information stored without encryption or hashing can expose it to an attacker.
- Clear-text logging of sensitive information**
Logging sensitive information without encryption or hashing can expose it to an attacker.
- Client-side cross-site scripting**
Writing user input directly to the DOM allows for a cross-site scripting vulnerability.
- Client-side URL redirect**
Client-side URL redirection based on unvalidated user input may cause redirection to malicious web sites.
- Code injection**
Interpreting unsanitized user input as code allows a malicious user arbitrary code execution.
- Download of sensitive file through insecure connection**
Downloading executables and other sensitive files over an insecure connection opens up for potential man-in-the-middle attacks.

<https://lgtm.com>

Weakly Protected Sensitive Data

OWASP #4

- Classify your data by sensitivity
- Encrypt sensitive data - in transit and at rest
- Make a plan for data controls, stick to it
- Software engineering fix: can we avoid storing sensitive data?
 - Payment processors: Stripe, Square, etc

Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

OWASP #5



Bump junit from 4.12 to 4.13.1 #155

Merged jon-bell merged 1 commit into master from dependabot/maven/junit-junit-4.13.1 22 days ago

This automated pull request fixes a security vulnerability
Only users with access to Dependabot alerts can see this message. [Learn more about Dependabot security updates, opt out, or give us feedback.](#)

Conversation 0 Commits 1 Checks 2 Files changed 1

dependabot bot commented on behalf of github on Oct 13

Bumps junit from 4.12 to 4.13.1.


► Release notes

► Commits

compatibility 93%

Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting @dependabot rebase .

Dependabot will also send you an email



GitHub security alert digest

mwand's repository security updates from
the week of **Mar 22 - Mar 29**



neu-se organization

⚠ neu-se / covey-town-roomservice-buggy

Known security vulnerabilities detected

Dependency	Version	Upgrade to
<code>xmlhttprequest-ssl</code>	< 1.6.2	~> 1.6.2

Defined in

`package-lock.json`

Vulnerabilities

CVE-2021-31597 Critical severity

CVE-2020-28502 High severity

Dependency	Version	Upgrade to
<code>hosted-git-info</code>	< 2.8.9	~> 2.8.9

Defined in

`package-lock.json`


Vulnerabilities

CVE-2021-23362 Moderate severity

Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

Static analyses are imperfect

- Study: Vulnerable dependencies reported on a large, open source project, OpenMRS. Compare results across tools.



“A comparative study of vulnerability reporting by software composition analysis tools ”

Nasif Imtiaz, Seaver Thorn and Laurie Williams

<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3475716.3475769>

Learning Objectives for this Lesson

By the end of this lesson, you should be able to...

- Describe that security is a spectrum, and be able to define a realistic threat model for a given system
- Evaluate the tradeoffs between security and performance in software engineering
- Recognize the causes of and common mitigations for common vulnerabilities in web applications
- Utilize static analysis tools to identify common weaknesses in code