



JENS NEUHALFEN

SLEEP BETTER WITH CONTENT ENCRYPTION

SOLUTIONS FOR SECURING KEY(S)



Master key in different storage

E.g. records in DB, master key on filesystem.

Baseline. Easy. Protects (only) agains DB theft (e.g. SQL injection)

Easy. Some protection

against FS access (e.g.

Encrypt master key

to encrypt master key. Better:
Store master key in OS keyring.
Unique per record key derived

Use baked in 'obfuscation key'

remote file inclusion)

Mostly easy. Protects
against some cipher text

attacks. Use AEAD!

Derive perrecord key

Crypto Host

All crypto operations on a dedicated host. (Master)key never leaves Crypto Host.

Bonus: Protect integrity. Bind to record.

from master key.


Depends on architecture.
Helps w. key distribution.
Makes key theft difficult.

HSM

Use Hardware Security Module as Crypto Host.

Expensive & difficult. "Crypto Host on steroids".








PATTERNS

KEY DERIVATION 1: PASSWORD TO KEY

SOLUTIONS FOR SECURING KEY(S)



Master key in different storage	E.g. records in DB, master key on filesystem.	Baseline. Easy. Protects (only) agains DB theft (e.g. SQL injection)
Encrypt master key	Use baked in 'obfuscation key' to encrypt master key. Better: Store master key in OS keyring.	Easy. Some protection against FS access (e.g. remote file inclusion)
Derive per- record key	Unique per record key derived from master key. Bonus: Protect integrity. Bind to record.	Mostly easy. Protects against some cipher text attacks. <i>Use <u>AEAD</u>!</i>
Crypto Host	All crypto operations on a dedicated host. (Master)key never leaves Crypto Host.	Depends on architecture. Helps w. key distribution. Makes key theft difficult.
HSM	Use Hardware Security Module as Crypto Host.	Expensive & difficult. "Crypto Host on steroids".